International trade policy

SUMMARY
The coronavirus pandemic caused a significant collapse in international trade in the first half of 2020. Trade accounts for a higher proportion of the EU economy than that of the United States of America (US) or China, which can make the EU’s economic model more vulnerable to import and export disruptions. In recent years, the multilateral liberal trading order has already been facing unprecedented turbulence. The rise of protectionism and zero-sum thinking, trade wars and the blockage within the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body have been severely undermining the basis on which trade had been conducted in recent decades. At the same time, the European Commission remains committed to the promotion of free and fair trade. Thus the five main priorities for EU trade policy after coronavirus will be economic recovery, re-establishing a positive transatlantic relationship, levelling the playing field with China, negotiating a fair new trade relationship with the United Kingdom, and improving enforcement and implementation of the EU’s trade agreements with 76 countries around the world. Each of these priorities will need to be balanced against the requirements of the WTO, a comprehensive regulatory approach to digital trade and mainstreaming of sustainability objectives into trade policy. Creative solutions, such as instruments to tackle foreign subsidies and the WTO pharmaceutical agreement can also help Europe to navigate the new geo-economic and post-coronavirus era of global trade successfully.

Introduction
The coronavirus pandemic created both supply and demand shocks to international trade, as production fell due to lockdowns and consumption shrank with decreased spending. Growth in the rate of cross-border trade and investment had already been slowing prior to the pandemic, leading commentators to proclaim the beginning of an era of ‘slowbalisation’ rather than globalisation. In parallel, pressures on the multilateral and liberal trading order were mounting, with the WTO under threat. Key EU trade partners, China and the US, preferred a more nationalist and mercantilist approach to trade over liberalisation. However, the EU has remained committed to preserving the open multilateral rules-based trading system, taking on a leading position among the coalition of countries favouring open and fair trade.

The flagship role of the EU has come about gradually, due to structural and political developments over the last few decades. Traditionally, EU trade policy has been a flagship area in which the EU exercises exclusive competence. Since the 1980s, Member States have mandated the European Commission to pursue trade liberalisation and increase market access for EU companies in foreign countries. Following rapid economic growth and expansion of its industrial capacities, China joined the WTO in December 2001. Expectations of deep liberalisation in China did not materialise, however, and the EU and the USA found themselves in a multilateral trading system whose members have widely different versions of capitalism.
In December 2016, Donald Trump became President of the US. The Trump administration considers that it inherited 'a significantly flawed trading system' and is attempting to rectify this by reconfiguring US trade policy towards a more confrontational and mercantilist approach, imposing tariffs, including on the EU, blocking the WTO Appellate Body, and threatening to block the WTO budget. The Trump administration has imposed heavy tariffs on China, prompting retaliation. In December 2019, the USA and China announced the first phase of a trade deal that will partially remove US tariffs on Chinese goods in return for Chinese commitments to purchase US commodities and products. The high volumes of trade affected by the Sino-American trade war have sent shock waves throughout the world economy, owing to the way global supply chains intertwine. In addition to increased costs of trade due to tariffs, issues at stake include conflicts over standards, intellectual property rights and forced technology transfers.

Within the EU, widespread public protests and grievances broke out over the proposed EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) in 2016. As a result, the Commission increased the transparency of trade negotiations and ramped up the level of engagement with civil society. The measures appear to have been successful, as 2019 Eurobarometer results exhibit a clear improvement of 16 percentage points in Europeans’ attitudes towards EU trade policy.

In 2018, the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report heightened global alarm over climate change, stating that there are only 12 years for global warming to be kept at maximum 1.5 degrees Celsius. The growing perception that business cannot continue as usual extends to the area of trade policy, spurring debates over the climate and trade nexus and the possibility of having a climate waiver in the WTO. Growing public concern about the harmful effects of trade on environment and climate have obliged the EU to make good its promises of climate leadership and adapt its trade policy accordingly.

At the same time, the digital transformation has decreased transaction costs, fuelling services trade and increasing consumer choice on one hand, and on the other hand, created entirely new regulatory challenges and complex cross-border trade and investment (as well as taxation and competition) policy problems, from data flows to e-commerce.

The pandemic has quickly exacerbated these trends, as countries’ bilateral trade dropped, export restrictions were quickly adopted, and digital leaps were made across the globe. For the EU, trade constitutes an important part of the economy and the survival of the multilateral trading system has been proclaimed as a paramount objective. As the shock of the pandemic exposed the vulnerability of global supply chains, strategic autonomy, resilience and sustainability have become more important. Free trade and trade liberalisation remain an EU objective. However, creating new tools to tackle unprecedented challenges is key in post-coronavirus trading systems. To better understand the EU’s options going forward, trade priorities can be split into five areas: post-coronavirus economic recovery, trade with the US, levelling the playing field with China, negotiating the EU-UK relationship following Brexit, and improving the enforcement and implementation of existing trade agreements for the benefit of EU companies. Each area includes a number of immediate responses that have already been taken, as well as long-term strategic options for the EU and its Member States to follow.
International trade policy

Trade as an engine of post-coronavirus economic recovery

Following the coronavirus pandemic, global trade is set to fall between 10 and 16% according to the European Commission, by 13 to 32% according to the WTO, and by 25% according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, on the basis of a different methodological approach. Compared to key trade partners the USA and China, the EU is far more reliant on international trade as a proportion of its GDP (see Figure 1). This exposes the vulnerability of the EU export-led growth model and makes the post-coronavirus economic recovery a key EU trade policy priority.

Figure 1 – Trade in goods and services (% of GDP)

The EU has a higher share of exports and imports of goods and services as a share of gross domestic product than major trade partners.

Data source: World Development Indicators - World Bank.

Underlying the significant drop in cross-border trade are supply-side and demand-side shocks that have spilled over into the global value chains. On the supply side, lockdowns resulted in production at reduced capacity, as operation of non-essential plants and movement of workers was limited. Transport disruption in turn affected delivery of intermediate parts, which account for most trade in merchandise. For example, reduced flight schedules meant that certain air freight routes were halted completely, increasing freight costs. On the demand side, international manufacturing export orders fell below even the lowest point of the global financial crisis. As orders dried up, cash flow crises for industrial producers ensued. Consumer spending has also dropped due to a number of factors, such as uncertainty, increased saving, and rising unemployment. How can policy-makers react to mitigate the effects of the pandemic on international trade in the months and years to come?

Way forward: The immediate challenge is to ensure a swift post-coronavirus recovery of trade flows that is also sustainable and in line with EU values and standards. However, the profound disruption of international trade will have important geopolitical and economic implications for the EU, centrally affecting its trade policy. In June 2020, the European Commission launched a Trade Policy Review which will set the political direction for EU trade and investment policy in the medium to long term. The model of 'open strategic autonomy' sums up the new direction of the EU. On one hand, EU reliance on trade means that open and free trade, achieved in particular through trade agreements and the WTO, will remain a priority. On the other hand, the principles of strategic
autonomy, a level playing field, and even self-sufficiency, are likely to guide future trade policy debates. Supply-chain resilience and sustainability will need to be ensured. Foreign take-overs in strategically important sectors will need to be tackled.

In the short term, countries chose to implement national trade measures in the face of great uncertainty linked to the global coronavirus pandemic. First, support and grants for struggling industries, as well as provision of trade finance by national export credit agencies can help revive trade following the Covid-19 shock. By April 2020, some 80 countries had notified the WTO of export restrictions for essential goods, medical equipment, but also food (e.g. grains) and even toilet paper. The EU adopted an export authorisation requirement between April and May 2020, for essential goods such as personal protective equipment and established a dedicated clearing-house to coordinate the authorisations. The EU can now build on the lessons learnt on the strong coordination between the Commission and Member States in the context of this Covid-19 clearing-house to build a strong model for future crisis management. On the other hand, countries also adopted cuts to import tariffs on critical equipment to facilitate trade. This took place in the context of G20 economies' trade flows already being hit by historically high levels of trade restrictions in 2019. Governments also supported affected businesses with grants and loans. The European Commission’s temporary State aid framework improved flexibility of rules for Member States’ stimulation of economic activity. Export credit agencies became an important source of trade financing in a tightening lending environment. Finally, the Commission issued further guidance to Member States concerning foreign direct investment (FDI) from third countries and the protection of European strategic assets, following news about an attempted US takeover of the German vaccine-developer CureVac.

At the same time, the new trade agreements have reportedly brought about economic benefits and could help with the post-coronavirus economic recovery. EU FTAs can eliminate trade barriers, improve intellectual property protection, and enable bilateral dispute settlement and trade defence action, thus enhancing trade flows. The adoption of the trade pillar of the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement would form a major region-to-region trade deal. However, in the aftermath of Amazon forest fires, this deal has become politically sensitive, which is likely to jeopardise its adoption in the European Parliament. The EU could also encourage the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement, paving the way for a future EU-Africa region-to-region free trade area, as opposed to fragmented bilateral agreements. With regard to Asia, negotiations with Indonesia are ongoing, but a relaunch of the bi-regional agreement between the EU and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is not likely at this time. India will continue to be an important trading partner, but a comprehensive free trade agreement in the country’s current political environment is unlikely. The conclusion of the ongoing trade negotiations with Australia and New Zealand will be important and realistic deliverables. The EU has put forward an international initiative for trade in healthcare products (pharmaceuticals and medical goods) that could lead to updated WTO disciplines and decreased tariffs to boost trade. Progressing on the WTO e-commerce negotiations will be equally important to establish a set of rules recognised by an important number of countries with regard to digital trade, including recognition of e-signatures and achieving a permanent ban on customs duties on electronic transmissions. At the EU level, an initiative to develop common principles on the use of blockchain technologies for supply chains could remove a considerable number of barriers to trade by enhancing trust and interoperability.

Mitigating EU-US trade tensions

EU-US talks to mitigate a number of transatlantic trade tensions were progressing at a slow pace already before the onset of the coronavirus pandemic. The EU and its Member States have been faced with unilateral tariffs on steel and aluminium under Section 232 of the US Trade Expansion Act, which allows the imposition of measures in cases of national security concerns. The EU retaliated with rebalancing measures targeting €2.8 billion in imports, but also launched trade talks with the US to explore a negotiated solution to the tensions, namely in the form of agreements on
International trade policy

industrial goods and conformity assessment. The threat of tariffs on cars and car parts and the likely change to the rules of origin under the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA, or the renegotiated North American Free Trade Agreement) loomed over EU car-makers, such as Daimler, Volkswagen and BMW, impacting trade and investment decisions. This in part encouraged the EU and US to conclude an agreement on imports of hormone-free beef from the US, earmarking a portion of the EU tariff-rate quota to the US.

Following a favourable WTO ruling on the long-standing case regarding the subsidies given to EU aircraft manufacturer Airbus (EC-Large Civil Aircraft), the USA imposed tariffs worth US$7.5 billion on the EU. The EU has a similar case pending against US manufacturer Boeing that is likely to allow it to retaliate against the US on goods worth US$20 billion. Meanwhile, in December 2019, the US Trade Representative announced that the US will take action ‘against digital tax regimes that discriminate or otherwise impose undue burdens on US companies’, more specifically with a tariff on US$2.8 billion of French products in the context of President Emmanuel Macron’s proposed digital services tax. The EU has also been squeezed by the US-China trade war, as higher tariffs between the two major trade partners increased. In June 2020, the Council welcomed confirmation by China that the ‘US-China phase 1’ deal will be carried out in a WTO-compatible manner, without discrimination against EU companies. At the same time, the US blockade of nominations to the WTO Appellate Body has effectively undermined the two-step dispute settlement procedure which was considered the ‘crown jewel’ of the multilateral trading system.

The 2019 ESPAS report describes US protectionist trade policy as outdated, concluding that tariffs are unlikely to ‘encourage domestic manufacturing, and hence, preserve jobs’. However, the strong-arm tactics of the USA – even if economically undesirable – follow a (geo-)political rationale designed to encourage political wins and advance specific sectoral interests. According to some estimates, the trade war has not (at least not yet) translated into higher prices for consumers, but has been paid for by importers and retailers (see Chapter 5 of EPRS’s Ten issues to watch in 2019).

Thus, while the economic logic of protectionism and the tariff spree that has characterised the Trump administration may be flawed, specific interest groups do benefit from the measures in different cases. Dismissal of the new logic of US trade policy as wholly outdated would be a risk to the EU. Mercantilist logic is not merely a peculiarity of the Trump administration, and scepticism about the WTO Appellate Body, for instance, continues from the Obama administration. In addition, a number of candidates for the 2020 presidential election, both Democrats and Republicans, were also sceptical of the liberal trade agenda and the WTO, albeit for different reasons.

Way forward: The EU needs stronger tools to counter the likely continuation of EU-US trade turbulence. Upgrade of the Enforcement Regulation would allow for the introduction of economic counter-measures (e.g. customs duties, quantitative restrictions or public procurement restrictions) when third countries adopt illegal measures and at the same time block the WTO dispute settlement process. At the same time, the EU and a number of other WTO members have set up a multi-party interim appeal arrangement (MPIA) to ensure continuity of the two-step dispute settlement system in the (temporary) absence of the Appellate Body. Moreover, a Chief Trade Enforcement Officer (CTEO) has been tasked with monitoring and improving compliance and enforcement of trade agreements, and contributing to monitoring the implementation of climate, environmental and labour provisions in trade agreements, to ensure the delivery of sustainability and climate goals. The CTEO will work under the direct guidance of the Trade Commissioner and report regularly to the European Parliament and the Council.

With regard to the possible US tariffs against the French digital services tax, the EU's best bet is to ensure an outcome in the international negotiations taking place in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The central idea behind the OECD proposal would be that digital companies pay tax wherever they have consumer-facing activities and profit generation. In parallel, the US tariffs that are largely targeted against a single Member State are a chance for the EU to demonstrate the bloc’s solidarity. As has been the case with steel and aluminium tariffs, in the
absence of a negotiated outcome with the US, the EU should not hesitate to react with retaliatory measures.

## Levelling the playing field with China

The **EU-China summit of 2020** offered a chance to recalibrate the important relationship with China, which is seen as both a key cooperation partner and an economic competitor. The commitment to conclude an [EU-China comprehensive agreement on investment](#) by 2020 is unlikely to be met, while the EU-China Agreement on Geographical Indications should enter into force in the near future. Considerable divergences remain between the EU and China when it comes to the WTO (e.g. on subsidies, state-owned enterprises, forced technology transfer, and special differential treatment for developing countries). On a bilateral level, the EU priority is to address the ‘reciprocity gap’, for instance in the areas of market access barriers, ownership caps, investment restrictiveness and public procurement. In addition, the EU has set up a [framework for foreign direct investment (FDI)](#) and published additional guidance in March 2020 on FDI and protection of Europe’s strategic assets, as the coronavirus pandemic highlighted the urgent need to preserve healthcare capacities and related industries. In June 2020, the Commission published a [white paper](#) on levelling the playing field as regards foreign subsidies in the single market, outlining several 'modules' to address the distortive effects of foreign subsidies and fill legislative gaps. In addition, the Commission seeks to address subsidised acquisitions by including additional scrutiny of merger reviews. The Commission's proposed [international procurement instrument](#) also seeks to establish fairer terms of trade for EU companies by encouraging trade partners to adopt reciprocal market access for public procurement. Fifth generation (5G) mobile telecommunications networks, planned across the EU in the coming years, have sparked a highly politicised debate about whether the use of Chinese 5G equipment in critical EU infrastructure poses a threat to security.

### Way forward:

The coronavirus crisis has highlighted the extent of European companies’ reliance on China for production and parts. Offshoring production and global sourcing of intermediates has become the norm in international business since the 1990s. For companies, offshoring and global sourcing in supply chains provide opportunities to minimise costs, for instance through labour arbitrage. In reaction to the coronavirus pandemic, EU Trade Commissioner Phil Hogan has underlined the need to ensure supply chain resilience and sustainability, but it is industrial, rather than trade policy, that could decisively steer profit-maximising company decisions. Due diligence regulations, adopted for specific sectors, could help ensure the sustainability of supply chains, while pandemic resilience could be achieved through diversification or regional sourcing.

In the short term, the EU’s growing recognition of the need to secure strategic autonomy and preserve critical industries has led to efforts to more forcefully reel in foreign subsidies and tackle level-playing-field concerns. It remains to be seen whether this hardened EU stance will dampen progress on the bilateral investment agreement. In the long term, and if the investment agreement materialises, the question of an EU-China trade agreement is likely to arise. However, if China’s current nationalistic trade policy approach continues, regulatory and policy convergence with the EU that would facilitate eventual trade negotiations is unlikely. From the EU perspective, in the absence of a global consensus on key challenges, it would be prudent to advance on WTO reform on a plurilateral basis where members can join at a later stage, or advance on standard-setting in the OECD, e.g. on digital taxation. The EU’s updated and cooperation-based approach to African countries must be devised with consideration of China’s deep-rooted presence in the continent. At the same time, climate change and rapid digitalisation will increasingly require policy reactions from a global constellation of actors, and the EU will have to play a critical role in setting the bar high in terms of deliverables. The EU has recognised China as a partner under the Paris Agreement, but called for a more decisive and ambitious policy with regard to emissions reductions as soon as possible.
Negotiating the EU-UK trade agreement

In June 2016, the UK voted to leave the EU, triggering the withdrawal process in March 2017, and compelling policy-makers to address several trade policy issues for the first time: splitting and allocating EU tariff rate quotas (TRQs) in the WTO following Brexit; UK roll-overs of EU free trade agreements after its departure from the EU; and the future shape and form of the EU-UK trade relationship. Concerns continue as to whether the December 2020 deadline can be met. One of the most tenuous issues in the negotiations is that of the level playing-field. The EU concern is that the UK may choose to adopt less stringent environmental and labour laws or shift towards a laxer approach to State aid. As the UK seeks, in parallel, to negotiate a trade agreement with the USA, difficulties are likely to arise from the differences between the EU and US regulatory systems and the precautionary principle, as well as different approaches to services liberalisation.

**Way forward:** Both the EU and the UK have published their draft negotiating positions, and talks regained momentum in June 2020. One possible solution to tackling the level-playing-field issues would be to link departures from agreed principles to tariff increases. This could potentially mean that the EU-UK trade agreement would be the first to link environmental provisions to a threat of ‘economic sanctions’, i.e. temporary remedies such as reinstating tariffs. Time-constrained negotiation could bring about a limited FTA on priority areas, rather than the ambitious single comprehensive agreement sought under the Political Declaration and European Commission recommendation.

Improving the enforcement and implementation of EU trade agreements

While the coronavirus pandemic is the main cause behind the recent collapse of international trade, cross-border trade flows were already declining, in part due to escalating trade protectionism around the world. The European Commission trade and investment barriers report of June 2020 identifies a rise in the number of barriers, and increasing difficulty in tackling them, as the protectionist paradigm has settled in. Protectionist measures can mean import or export bans and border taxes, as well as non-tariff barriers to trade that are domestic, as well as border measures limiting European companies’ ability to do business, or unilateral tariff increases. In addition, contemporary protectionism is expressed in a growing scepticism towards multilateral solutions, such as the WTO. While the EU cannot oblige trade partners to liberalise, it can deepen enforcement and implementation of existing trade agreements. The EU has a wide array of instruments that can encourage trade openness in partner countries, most importantly diplomatic action, dispute settlement and EU free trade agreements. A focus on enforcement and implementation will allow the EU to better tackle escalating trade protectionism. In June 2020, the European Commission reported increasing trade barriers, in particular on trade with China, but also the USA, as well as countries in the southern Mediterranean and Middle East.

**Way forward:** Currently, the EU has an important implementation gap with regard to some trade agreements. The annual implementation report on free trade agreements by the European Commission shows that there is room for improvement with regard to preference utilisation rates on EU exports to trade partners under FTAs. For instance, the utilisation rate for CETA stood at 37% in 2018, the first full year of CETA implementation so far, which is considered a good performance. The Chief Enforcement Officer should improve the implementation of trade agreements through the increase of preference utilisation rates, especially among small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), while also enforcing WTO rules and commitments included in the EU’s free trade agreements. The EU Trade Barriers Regulation allows Member States and companies to bring complaints for European Commission investigation. In addition, strengthening the Market Access Partnership between EU Member States, the European Commission, European External Action Service and industry would help tackle specific trade barriers. In this context, the market access
database is an important resource for companies wishing to make use of trade preferences for which they would be eligible. More should also be done on monitoring the implementation of climate, environmental and labour provisions in trade agreements, to ensure the delivery of sustainability and climate goals. Meanwhile, the network of dispute settlement provisions embedded into EU FTAs ensures that disagreements can also be solved bilaterally, through due process. In addition, the updated Enforcement Regulation will allow the EU to enforce WTO commitments in the absence of the two-step WTO dispute settlement process.
## Potential initiatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Likely lead EU actor</th>
<th>What should be done?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commission Regulation on Exports subject to an export authorisation</td>
<td>Commission, Member States</td>
<td>Coordinate the export authorisation requirements for personal protective equipment at a central level, including through the EU Covid-19 clearing-house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Member States measures in reaction to Covid-19 related to exports of essential products; services and investment; trade finance</td>
<td>Member States</td>
<td>The sudden trade disruption caused by the Covid-19 pandemic necessitates strong action by Member States to coordinate exports of essential products, while boosting trade in the long-term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI screening regulation and guidance to Member States concerning FDI</td>
<td>Commission, Member States</td>
<td>The Commission guidance concerning FDI seeks to protect Europe’s strategic assets from risky takeovers, Member States are responsible for implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission white paper on foreign subsidies</td>
<td>Commission, Council, Member States, Parliament</td>
<td>Develop new approaches to address distortions caused by foreign subsidies, namely in general market operations, acquisitions, public procurement, access to EU funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU trade policy review 2020</td>
<td>Commission, Council, Member States, Parliament</td>
<td>Build a consensus on the medium-term direction of EU trade policy based on input from EU institutions and stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU trade agreement with Australia and New Zealand</td>
<td>Commission, Council, Parliament</td>
<td>Conclude negotiations with Australia and New Zealand, which are advancing on separate tracks at a good pace. Sustainability issues need to be closely monitored by the Parliament with particular regard to the EU-Australia FTA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade pillar of EU-Mercosur Association Agreement</td>
<td>Commission, Council, Parliament</td>
<td>Debate over the trade pillar of the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement, in the context of concerns over deforestation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blockchain technologies for supply chains</td>
<td>Commission, Parliament, Member States</td>
<td>Develop common principles towards use of blockchain technologies for supply chains to remove trade barriers and increase interoperability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement Regulation</td>
<td>Commission, Parliament, Council, Member States</td>
<td>Upgrade the EU Enforcement Regulation, which allows EU to take countermeasures in case the WTO two-step dispute settlement function is undermined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-party interim appeal arrangement (MPIA)</td>
<td>Commission, Member States</td>
<td>Set up and expand the MPIA, which temporarily rectifies the absence of appeals instance in WTO dispute settlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Trade Enforcement Officer (CTEO)</td>
<td>Commission</td>
<td>Set up a Chief Trade Enforcement Officer to improve the implementation and enforcement of trade commitments and FTAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International initiative on trade in healthcare products</td>
<td>Commission, Parliament, Council,</td>
<td>Spearhead an international initiative to facilitate trade in healthcare products (pharmaceuticals and medical goods) with a group of WTO partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Initiative</td>
<td>Participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>WTO e-commerce agreement</td>
<td>Commission, Parliament, Council, Member States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>EU Trade Barriers Regulation</td>
<td>Commission, Member States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Negotiate solutions to resolve trade tensions with the USA</td>
<td>Commission, Council, Member States, Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>EU-China comprehensive investment agreement</td>
<td>Commission, Council, Member States, Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>International Procurement Instrument (IPI)</td>
<td>Commission, Council, Member States, Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Market Access Partnership</td>
<td>Commission, Member States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>EU-UK trade agreement</td>
<td>Commission, Council, Member States, Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Due diligence regulation for supply chains</td>
<td>Commission, Council, Member States, Parliament</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
REFERENCES

European Commission, Report on the implementation of Free Trade Agreements, October 2019.
European Commission, White paper on levelling the playing field as regards foreign subsidies, June 2020.

DISCLAIMER AND COPYRIGHT

This document is prepared for, and addressed to, the Members and staff of the European Parliament as background material to assist them in their parliamentary work. The content of the document is the sole responsibility of its author(s) and any opinions expressed herein should not be taken to represent an official position of the Parliament.

Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and the European Parliament is given prior notice and sent a copy.

eprs@ep.europa.eu (contact)
www.eprs.ep.parl.eu (intranet)
www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank (internet)
http://epthinktank.eu (blog)