

US foreign policy after the 2020 Presidential election

Issues for the European Union

SUMMARY

The election of the 46th President of the United States took place on 3 November 2020 amidst the unprecedented scenario of the coronavirus pandemic. Following several days of vote-counting, the democratic candidate, Joe Biden, secured the electoral votes needed to become the next President of the United States. His inauguration will take place on 20 January 2021.

Domestic concerns, most notably the management of the coronavirus crisis and the economy, as well as racial issues, were the most important subjects in determining voter preference. As usual, foreign policy did not rank highly amidst voters' concerns. However, for the European Union, the impact of the election of Joe Biden on US foreign policy will leave a substantial mark on the future course of transatlantic relations and of global cooperation.

While foreign policy under the forthcoming Biden Administration is expected to depart from some of the key tenets of President Trump's 'America First' foreign policy, experts also point to a high possibility of continuity in areas such as trade and relations with China. However, on climate change, multilateral cooperation and support for NATO, expectations are high regarding a potential return to deep levels of transatlantic consensus and cooperation. Biden's foreign policy is likely to focus on multilateral cooperation, for example by re-joining the Paris Agreement on climate change and resuming US support for the World Health Organization. The former Vice-President has stated he will likely re-join the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, or Iran Nuclear Deal) in time, and pursue an extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Russia.



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Background

The 2020 US elections took place on 3 November. As election officials had [warned](#), due to the large number of postal ballots and state processing timelines, the result was not known for several days. Following days of counting, on 7 November, former Vice-President, Joseph (Joe) Robinette Biden Jr., the Democratic candidate, crossed the threshold of 270 electoral votes needed to become the 46th President of the United States. The incumbent, Donald Trump, also the candidate for the Republican party, is one of [few](#) sitting US presidents in modern history to have run and not been re-elected.

US elections tend to be dominated by domestic politics, with citizens ranking [other priorities](#) higher than foreign policy. Domestic concerns, chief among them the management of the coronavirus pandemic and the economy, as well as racial issues, [overshadowed](#) the candidates' foreign policy agendas this year too. Yet, for the European Union and the rest of the world, the next US President's international perspective is a key concern. Following a period of change and uncertainty in transatlantic relations, the Biden administration will likely mark a departure from several of the trends observed in recent years. Public opinion polls [indicate](#) that the majority of citizens in the EU-27 support Joe Biden as the next US President and that the US has suffered reputational decline in Europe under President Trump's conduct of transatlantic relations (Figure 1). There is widespread [expectation](#) that, under a Biden presidency, EU-US relations will recover from what have admittedly been a disruptive four years. On 2 December, the European Commission and High Representative adopted a [communication](#) on 'A new EU-US agenda for global change', to be submitted to the European Council meeting on 10-11 December. Among others, it lists the fight against coronavirus, economic recovery, climate change, technology, trade, multilateralism and shared values, and the promotion

Following the 3 November [Congressional elections](#), Democrats are projected to retain a small majority in the House of Representatives. The distribution of seats in the new Senate will be finalised only after 5 January, when [run-off elections](#) for both of Georgia's Senate seats will take place. [Forecasts](#) suggest that Republicans will maintain their majority of the past six years, but the possibility of a '[split Senate](#)' cannot be ruled out. If the run-off elections were to lead to a 50-50 split, then the Vice-President's casting vote would give Democrats the majority. The important [role of Congress](#) in US foreign policy makes its composition a significant factor for the future direction of that policy.


of democracy, peace and security as key areas.

Nevertheless, experts caution that US foreign policy will have to find a new balance between domestic challenges and the desire to restore US global leadership in a world where the balance of power has shifted. In this context, EU-US relations will also face a readjustment: while alignment may be rebuilt on a number of issues, others are likely to continue on a course similar to recent years.

Foreign policy

At the beginning of the past decade, the US pivot to the Asia-Pacific under President Obama already caused some [alarm](#) on the European side regarding the centrality of transatlanticism in US foreign policy. This was further

Figure 1 – European perceptions of US policies (2017-2019)



DPRK: Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or North Korea.
Source: [EUISS](#), 2020, based on data from Pew 2019, 2020; Dalia 2020.

aggravated under Trump's '[America First](#)' foreign policy. The US President's scepticism towards NATO and his criticisms of multilateral security agreements and institutions created a sense of a widening gap across the Atlantic. The decisions to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ([JCPOA](#)), the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces ([INF](#)) Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty, as well as from the [Paris Agreement](#) on climate change, the UN Human Rights Council, and most recently the World Health Organization (WHO), are cases in point. The Trump administration's step away from a US role as global liberal leader has led to diverging approaches between the EU and the US on several issues. These include policies towards regimes with poor human rights records, such as in Russia, North Korea, and the Philippines; commitment to multilateral agreements, such as those mentioned above, and approaches to global trade, global health policy, climate change, immigration, and arms control.

According to the Democratic party [platform](#), Biden can be expected to restore diplomacy and liberal values to US foreign policy. A Biden administration will seek to rebuild tarnished relationships with allies to achieve greater unity towards adversaries. But the degree of continuity or change will also depend on the level of Congressional support for the reorientation of US foreign policy, which fluctuates significantly on an issue-by-issue basis.

China

[Experts](#) tend to agree on the likelihood of continuity in the US's China policy, based on the broad bipartisan agreement that the US should take a tougher line. Democracy and human rights concerns have moved up the agenda in the US–China relationship, with US policy having taken an 'ideological turn in the months preceding the election; President Trump shifted gradually from simply focusing on trade (see section on trade below) to portraying the Chinese regime as 'the greatest threat to liberty and democracy globally'.

Beyond major concerns about China's economic rise, in recent months the Trump administration's critique increasingly focused on the Chinese government's response to the coronavirus, the suppression of pro-democratic demonstrations in Hong Kong, and human rights abuses towards the Uighur minority, issues that, during the campaign, had been concerns exclusively for Biden. In Congress, there is high bipartisan support for confronting China on human rights issues, illustrated by the enactment of the [Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020](#). The Trump administration implemented [sanctions](#) on multiple Chinese officials, including Chen Quango, member of the Central Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China. Beyond the bilateral relationship, Biden has also committed to working with allies to put pressure on China to stop human rights violations. This suggests that a Biden administration's approach would differ, as it would likely be centred around multilateral ways to put pressure on China. In addition, [analysts](#) suggest that Biden is more sensitive to the degree of economic integration between the US and China and is therefore less likely to completely abandon cooperation. Some speculate that tariffs on certain products will be dropped, in particular those that are difficult for American companies to acquire elsewhere.

A Biden administration would try to reduce the economic dominance China has in Asia by increasing the US's economic engagement with Asian countries. Biden has [expressed](#) interest in re-joining what is now the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), a regional free trade agreement between Australia, Brunei, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam, a deal which he supported as Vice -resident. By creating possible alliances with countries such as Japan, Australia, and India, Biden could utilise these international alliances to start a collective negotiation with China. However strained relationships with China might become, Biden is unlikely to engage with North Korea as long as the status quo remains regarding democracy and human rights; rather, he would likely return to the Obama administration's [approach](#) of 'strategic patience', based on trying to isolate North Korea, including through sanctions.

In October 2020, the EU and the US [launched](#) a bilateral high-level dialogue on China. EU-US cooperation and dialogue on confronting the Chinese challenge is likely to continue. The 2020 [Democratic Party Platform](#) states: 'We believe Europe is our natural partner in managing areas of competition with China and will work to establish common priorities, strategies, and tools'.

Iran and the Middle East

In May 2018, President Trump [announced](#) that the US would be leaving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), otherwise known as the Iran nuclear deal, and would (re)-impose sanctions. US sanctions block American firms from doing business in Iran, and prohibit foreign firms (including European ones) that do business with Iran from accessing the entire US banking and financial system. US sanctions have had a very serious impact on the Iranian economy, promoting widespread discontent and protests. Yet this strategy of 'maximum pressure' against Tehran that followed the US's withdrawal from the JCPOA has failed to bring Iran back to the negotiating table.

The Democratic Party programme states its intention to re-enter the Iran nuclear deal. Biden has said that, as President, he would make this conditional on Tehran returning to compliance with the deal. He has also said that he would use diplomacy and cooperation with allies to strengthen and extend the deal, while pushing back on other destabilising activities by Iran. This would [mean](#) that renegotiations concerning the JCPOA could be extended. At the same time, the outcome of the 2021 elections in Iran could jeopardise the agreement if renewed sanctions play in favour of reformist candidates seeking to challenge the current regime. Even if a nuclear deal is reached, US-Iran relations would remain brittle under the Biden presidency, and the nuclear deal would remain fragile. Nevertheless, Biden's focus on diplomacy in foreign policy would lower the risk of a flare-up in US-Iran relations. On 8 November, the Iranian president, Hassan Rouhani, [called](#) on President-elect Joe Biden to 'compensate for past mistakes' and return the US to Tehran's 2015 nuclear deal.

With regard to the wider Middle East, as well as Afghanistan, Biden [intends](#) to have less military engagement, ending the 'forever wars', ensuring that the focus remains on fighting Al-Qaeda and ISIL/Da'esh, goals that President Trump has also pursued. He has also stated that he will end US support for the Saudi-led wars in Yemen and place greater importance on human rights. However, experts argue that the importance of maintaining alliances with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt to counteract terrorism and potential threats from Iran, as well as to counter Chinese and Russian influence, limits the choices available for Biden's foreign policy. Biden is also likely to show continued support to Israel, although the US-Israeli alliance may be [strained](#) by a policy shift on Iran and on the Middle East Peace Process.

Biden has [welcomed](#) the Trump administration's brokering of a normalisation of relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain. The process culminated in Trump hosting the signing of the '[Abraham Accords](#)' at the White House in September 2020. Biden called the agreement a 'historic step to bridge divides in the Middle East'. However, his team has expressed [concerns](#) about the sale of F-35 fighter jets to the UAE, which has been enabled by the Accords. The pursuit of the 'deal of the century' – in the form of the Middle East peace plan announced by Trump at the beginning of 2020 – has further [sidelined](#) the Palestinians, following the transfer of the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 2018, and done little to advance a two-state solution. Biden has said he would restore suspended US funding to the West Bank and Gaza, including assistance delivered through the US Agency for International Development and UN agencies. He has in the past [opposed](#) Israeli settlement construction in the occupied West Bank, and voiced support for a two-state solution. The Palestinian Authority has [welcomed](#) Biden's victory. On 8 November, its president, Mahmoud Abbas, joined Arab leaders in congratulating the future President.

Security and defence

Following the election of Donald Trump in 2016, tensions over NATO, and particularly on the issue of defence spending, increased between the US and EU NATO members. The US has regularly insisted that NATO allies spend more on defence and live up to the pledge to spend two per cent of gross

domestic product (GDP) on defence by 2024. Out of 30 NATO allies, 10 have now [achieved](#) the Wales target of spending two per cent of GDP on defence, up from three in 2014. However, [experts](#) had not ruled out the possibility of President Trump attempting to withdraw the US from NATO in a second term, as he has threatened to do before. By contrast, Joe Biden is a long-time [supporter](#) of NATO, who refers to the Alliance as a key element of his plan to 'restore and reimagine partnerships'. He has voiced his intention to keep NATO's military capabilities sharp, while also expanding allied capacity to take on new, non-traditional threats like weaponised corruption, cyber-theft, and new challenges in space and on the high seas. He has also [made a point](#) of emphasising the democratic nature of the alliance and has said he will call for a review of NATO members' democratic commitments. In the 2 December communication, the Commission and High Representative proposed a structured EU-US Security and Defence Dialogue to promote a shared strategic vision on security, including a joint arms control agenda. They emphasised that EU [strategic autonomy](#) is consistent with better burden-sharing.

The Trump administration initially increased US defence engagement in Europe through military exercises, a forward presence and the 'prepositioning' of military equipment in central and eastern Europe, funded under the European Deterrence Initiative ([EDI](#)). However, in 2020 the administration proposed cuts to the EDI's funding in order to divert funds to the building of the border wall with Mexico, provoking strong [reactions](#) and opposition from Congress. Biden has [pledged](#) to continue supporting the EDI, without diverting funds away from the initiative.

In 2019, the US (as the EU) expressed [support](#) for the Prespa Agreement, the implementation of which allowed North Macedonia to [join](#) NATO in 2020. Biden is a longstanding [supporter](#) of NATO enlargement, having, in the past, expressed support for both [Georgia](#) and [Ukraine](#) joining the alliance.

Russia

According to [experts](#), the Trump administration's policy towards Russia has oscillated 'between a strong deterrent in its defence postures and conciliatory messages from the White House', with the key point of consistency being the rejection of arms controls agreement with Russia. Under President Trump, the US has maintained – and added to – Obama-era sanctions against Russia and Russian businesses and figures close to the Kremlin. In 2019, the US withdrew from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and in June 2020 it gave notice of its intention to withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty, citing Russian non-compliance in both cases. In addition, the US sent military equipment to Ukraine to help it in its war against Russian-backed separatists.

Biden's commitment to the defence of democratic values is [likely](#) to lead to an overall harsher stance on Russia's interference in Belarus and eastern Ukraine, and possibly increase military support to Ukraine if tensions escalate. Biden has previously said that the international community should expand sanctions on Russia and against the Lukashenka regime in [Belarus](#), as well as support for the pro-democracy uprisings in the latter. In addition, his commitment to NATO could lead to a stronger alliance against Russia, increasing international pressure. Biden has also promised to reduce Russia's influence in the Middle East, criticising Trump for neglecting to address a [collision](#) between US and Russian military vehicles in Syria in August 2020.

A pressing task for the new President will be the extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), negotiated under the Obama administration, which is set to expire in February 2021. Biden has [said](#) he will pursue an extension without conditions, referring to it as 'an anchor of strategic stability between the United States and Russia', and to use that as a foundation for new arms control arrangements. For Trump an extension would have been [conditional](#) on a number of parameters, including the inclusion of China in the nuclear arms control process. US opposition to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which will increase Europe's reliance on Russian gas, is expected to continue.

Multilateralism, diplomacy and human rights

As noted above, under the Trump administration, the US moved to withdraw from a number of its multilateral commitments and to reduce or eliminate US financial support. Among others, President

Trump's budget [proposals](#) have repeatedly sought to reduce foreign aid and funding for several UN peacekeeping missions. A central aim of Biden's vision is to restore diplomacy and multilateral cooperation, including by reversing several of these actions and by reinstating support for multilateral cooperation, particularly in the areas of human rights, democracy, development and climate. The nomination of [Antony Blinken](#) as the next US Secretary of State attests to this; Blinken has repeatedly expressed his commitment to multilateralism and to US cooperation with allies.

The Mexico City policy, or 'global gag' rule

The [Mexico City policy](#), or the global gag rule, is a policy that prohibits organisations receiving funding from the US to provide abortion services, provide advice regarding abortion or advocate on abortion law. Originally implemented by Ronald Reagan in 1984, it was reinstated and expanded by Trump in January 2017. The updated policy meant that non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working in multiple areas lost [the entirety of their funding](#). It is highly probable that [Biden will revoke the Mexico City policy](#) when he enters office, as all democratic presidents have done since its initial implementation.¹

World Health Organization

In February 2020, the Trump administration proposed a 53 % cut to US payments to the World Health Organization. In July, the US President declared that the [US would withdraw](#) from the WHO, claiming that the organisation had withheld information regarding Covid-19 transmission as well as the initial spread of the virus in China. Although these claims [were false](#), the administration continued the process of withdrawal, which is set to take place on [6 July 2021](#). For the US to withdraw from the WHO, it needs to give a year's notice and sustain the financial obligations of the current year, as decided by a 1948 Congressional [joint resolution](#). However, it has been [argued](#) that the President alone does not have unilateral [power](#) to remove the US from the organisation, and may be impeded by Congress. A US withdrawal would hamper the work of the WHO, as global health initiatives, such as vaccine distribution against diseases like malaria and tuberculosis, are already [heavily affected](#) by the coronavirus pandemic. As President, Biden is likely to end Trump's attempts to leave the WHO. According to the [Democratic party platform](#) Trump 'actively sabotaged global efforts to slow the pandemic' when he withdrew funding and support to the WHO. Instead, the party supports the role of the US as a leader in the coordinated global health and economic response to the coronavirus pandemic. Biden has [tweeted](#) that he would reverse Trump's decision on his first day as president.

A conference of democracies

As part of Biden's promise to reinforce the democratic foundations of the US, an international '[summit of democracies](#)' will be organised to 'renew the spirit and shared purpose of the nations of the free world'. It is not yet clear which countries would be invited to participate in the summit, but the lack of electoral integrity and human rights abuses could be [criteria](#) for exclusion according to some. The conference is meant to restore the influence of multilateral institutions in global affairs, confirming Biden's conviction to reinstate the more traditional diplomacy-led foreign policy prevalent during the Obama administration. The summit could also be seen as a visible effort to [reinforce](#) international coordination against common threats to democracy, which most likely include the increasingly strong influence of China and Russia. Furthermore, its aim will be to fortify democratic institutions and confront the struggles of nations that are backsliding on democracy. The summit is set to take place in 2021, with three [main areas](#) being identified: (i) fighting corruption, (ii) defending against authoritarianism, and (iii) advancing human rights nationally and internationally. Private-sector actors, such as tech and social media giants, which benefit from democratic conditions, will also be invited to recognise their democratic responsibilities in preserving open societies and free speech, including through ensuring that the use of algorithms and digital platforms does not promote undemocratic behaviour and values. In the 2 December communication, the Commission and High Representative affirmed the EU's readiness to play a full part in the Summit for Democracy.

Climate change

Following an [announcement](#) by President Trump in 2017 and formal notice of withdrawal in 2019, on 4 November 2020, the US exited the Paris Agreement. Trump also proposed to withdraw two-thirds of the funding to the UN Green Climate Fund pledged by the US in 2017.²

Fighting climate change is central to the Biden programme. Beyond actions at home to achieve a clean-energy economy with net-zero emissions by 2050, Biden has [expressed](#) the intention to re-join the Paris Agreement 'on day one', to renew support for the Green Climate Fund and to lead a major diplomatic push to raise the ambition of countries' climate targets. Re-joining the agreement would need 30 days as [provided](#) for in the agreement itself. Biden has also [proposed](#) to host a global climate summit during his first 100 days in office. According to the [Biden plan](#), the US will mobilise other countries to accelerate transitions towards sustainable energy through tools such as export financing and debt relief. It will seek support and consensus at G20 level, in the form of a G20 commitment to end all export finance subsidies of high-emission projects and a worldwide ban on fossil fuel subsidies. The new administration will also aim to establish a new global climate change report to hold countries accountable for meeting, or failing to meet, their Paris commitments and for actions that promote or undermine global climate solutions.

Trade aspects

Transatlantic trade relations

Since the ramping up of transatlantic trade tensions, steps forward have included the EU-US agreement on [imports of hormone-free beef](#) into the EU, a temporary agreement to postpone the French digital services tax, and in August 2020, [EU-US tariff cuts on certain goods](#), which is the first agreement on mutual tariff reductions in over two decades between the EU and US. The EU will lower tariffs on live and frozen lobster products, while the US will reduce duties on, for example, EU-made glassware, prepared meals, cigarette lighters and other goods. The deal was perceived as a tactic to gain votes in the lobster-producing [state of Maine](#) and [offset the damage](#) of

Trump's trade war with China. For transatlantic trade relations, the deal marked a sign of good will prior to the US elections, and the European Parliament adopted a [resolution](#) giving the green light to the regulation cutting tariffs on certain goods in November 2020. However, in October 2020, the WTO decided that the EU has the right to impose retaliatory tariffs on US goods worth [US\\$4billion](#) in the context of the long-standing case against US subsidisation of its aircraft manufacturer Boeing. The US already has tariffs in place on US\$7.5 billion worth of EU goods over a parallel WTO case involving the subsidisation of [Airbus](#). On 9 November 2020, the [EU exercised its right](#) to impose tariffs on US goods. In response, the US Trade Representative (USTR) has stated that he is engaging in negotiations with the EU to resolve the long-standing conflict.

Overall, the Biden administration is likely to take a slightly more constructive approach vis-a-vis the EU, compared to that of the Trump administration. A central hope from the EU perspective would be a shift away from the [transactional](#) 'mini-deals' of the Trump administration and settlements on the tariff front. By contrast, the blockage of nominations to the [WTO Appellate Body](#), which is a multilateral issue important to the EU, partially dates back to the Obama administration and may continue under the Biden administration. There are also [hopes](#) that agreement will be reached with regard to the digital tax dispute between France and US once Biden takes office.

The transatlantic trade relationship under President Trump has been characterised by a number of tensions. The US imposed unilateral [tariffs on steel and aluminium](#), prompting the EU to [retaliate](#). The Trump administration has threatened the EU with [car tariffs](#) based on alleged national security concerns, and it renegotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in a way that increases American [content requirements for automobiles](#). In July 2020, the US announced tariffs on US\$1.3 billion worth of French goods over disagreement on the [digital services tax](#). US trade policy under Trump has involved heavy use of tariffs and strong-armed tactics. A central objective has been the focus on rectifying the US trade deficit in line with principles of [economic nationalism](#).

US trade with third countries

The Trump administration has waged a de facto [trade war](#) against China and undermined the multilateral trading system. The US and China have applied tariffs on hundreds of billions worth of imports, although a conciliatory [phase one](#) deal came into effect in February 2020. Tensions in the field of [technology](#) have grown more prominent towards the end of the term. The US has restricted the sale of chips to Chinese telecommunications giant [Huawei](#) and tried to block the use of Huawei equipment in 5G networks, as well as tried to induce the forced sale of the US arm of the Chinese video application [TikTok](#), both on alleged national security grounds. These tensions are likely to continue under the next administration.

With regard to the US trade relationship with the United Kingdom, the Trump administration employed [hard-line bargaining tactics](#) for a future trade agreement, with agricultural trade the key US offensive interest. Nevertheless, [experts](#) now suggest that the UK is less likely to secure a comprehensive US-UK trade deal with a Biden administration. For instance, Biden has publically expressed [concerns](#) over upholding the Good Friday Agreement and peace in Northern Ireland.

Due to the coronavirus pandemic and the ensuing economic crisis, trade policy is unlikely to be a top priority for the next US president. Democrats and Republicans are likely to find common ground on industrial policy and a focus on keeping jobs in America. Like Trump, Biden is focused on national security and has voiced a degree of commitment to economic nationalism, as exemplified by his '[Made in America](#)' plan and a focus on [trade deficits](#). Biden has also supported the renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which has become the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement ([USMCA](#)). Whilst Biden has been the more outspoken supporter of climate action, his positions may overlap with Trump's concerning a [carbon border adjustment mechanism](#).

The US and the multilateral trading system

Under President Trump, the US Trade Representative (USTR) Robert Lighthizer has played a central role in the direction of US trade policy with third countries. On issues relating to the functioning and reform of the WTO, Biden has been largely silent. The USTR is likely to continue to play an important role in defining US trade policy. Possible candidates include Californian member of the US House of Representatives, [Jimmy Gomez](#), and, from among Biden's [external advisers](#), former World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body Member, Professor Jennifer Hillman, whose liberal and multilateral approach could represent a stark change to Lighthizer as USTR. The Biden administration is likely to link the possible reinvigoration of the WTO two-step dispute settlement function to a broader [reform of the WTO](#), including on subsidies and State aid rules. The WTO would also be an appropriate forum for negotiating a possible [global ban](#) on fossil fuel subsidies.

In sum, both US trade with third countries, in particular China, and US scepticism about the multilateral trading system are likely to feature a degree of [continuity](#). The defining moment for the future of US trade policy will come in 2021 with the expiry and renegotiation of [Trade Promotion Authority](#), the legislation that sets fast-track procedures for the adoption of trade agreements in Congress.

In a [resolution](#) on EU-US relations in 2018, the European Parliament recalled the longstanding EU-US partnership and alliance, and insisted that it 'should be based on jointly sharing and promoting together common values including freedom, rule of law, peace, democracy, equality, rules-based multilateralism (and) sustainable development'. It expressed concern at the approach taken by the US towards addressing global issues and regional conflicts since the election of President Trump, and called on the US administration to uphold shared core values. Parliament also welcomed the work of the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue (TLD) in [fostering](#) EU-US relations through parliamentary dialogue and coordination on issues of common interest. It also welcomed the relaunch of the bipartisan EU caucus in Congress. On the EU side, the TLD is chaired by the Chair of the [Delegation for Relations with the United States](#), Radosław Sikorski (EPP, Poland). EP President David Sassoli [congratulated](#) Joe Biden on his victory on 7 November 2020, emphasising the need for a relaunch of transatlantic relations. In November 2020 the EP [urged](#) the Commission to construct a positive EU-US trade agenda beyond tariff reductions.

FURTHER READING

[US Presidential Election \[What Think Tanks Are Thinking\]](#), EPRS, November 2020.

[EU-US dispute over civil aircraft subsidies](#), EPRS, November 2020.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ The policy was rescinded by Bill Clinton and again by Barack Obama, having been re-implemented by George W. Bush.
- ² The Green Climate Fund is a fund dedicated to helping low-income countries reduce greenhouse gas emissions and better prepare them to respond to climate change. The fund mainly focuses on the least developed countries (LDCs), as defined by the UN (2018), many of which are situated in sub-Saharan Africa.

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