Safety of journalists and media freedom: trends in non-EU countries from a human rights perspective

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ABSTRACT

Since 2012 media freedom has been in general decline. While statistics for the 2002-2021 time-period show that the number of killings of journalists has declined somewhat in recent years (since 2013), there has been a marked erosion of legally enabling environments and an increase in other damaging forms of targeted attacks on the media. These include non-lethal physical violence; legal, digital, psycho-social, gender and identity-based intimidation; and state-led capture of the media landscape, often accompanied by politically-motivated denigration and exclusion of critical media voices. Our findings show: (i) political journalism remains most at risk; (ii) major social shocks or crisis (exemplified by the COVID-19 pandemic) have been widely used as pretexts for intrusive government measures to constrain media freedom; and (iii) media pluralism and independence are declining. Impunity remains unacceptably high with most cases of killings remaining unresolved. Imprisonments are on the rise while online spaces are becoming increasingly hostile and replete with gender-based hate speech. Countering the wide range of overt and covert threats will require an unequivocal reversal of global trends towards authoritarian controls and suppression of independent media. To undertake this, the European Parliament and concerned institutions need access to reliable data which reflects the realities of the multiple threats that impede the work of journalists globally.
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Table of contents

1  Introduction: A human rights perspective on protecting the safety of journalists 1

2  Trends analysis 2
   2.1  Human rights abuses constraining media freedom and affecting the safety of journalists 2
        2.1.1  Overall trends in media freedom 2
        2.1.2  Media freedom and the pandemic 2
        2.1.3  Media freedom and the legal environment 2
        2.1.4  Media freedom and the online environment 3
        2.1.5  Media freedom and media pluralism 5
        2.1.6  Media freedom, media independence and media capture 5
        2.1.7  Media freedom, legitimacy and trust 5
   2.2  Recent trends in human rights abuses affecting the safety of journalists and constraining media freedom 6
        2.2.1  Killings 7
        2.2.2  Killings and impunity 9
        2.2.3  Imprisonments 10
        2.2.4  Killings and imprisonments 12
        2.2.5  Other types of abuses 13
   2.3  A typology for analysing types of civil and political contexts of human rights abuses affecting the safety of journalists 16

3  Conclusion and recommendations 19

4  Bibliography 22

5  Appendix 26
   5.1  List of figures 26
        5.1.1  Killings 26
        5.1.2  Killings and Impunity 36
        5.1.3  Imprisonments 44
        5.1.4  Killings and imprisonments 57
# List of abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APAC</td>
<td>Asia and the Pacific</td>
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<td>ATI</td>
<td>Access to Information</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>Central Asia</td>
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<td>CPJ</td>
<td>Committee to Protect Journalists</td>
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<td>EE</td>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICCPR</td>
<td>International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAC</td>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
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<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<td>NA</td>
<td>North America</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<td>SEE</td>
<td>South Eastern Europe</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>VNR</td>
<td>Voluntary National Review</td>
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Introduction: A human rights perspective on protecting the safety of journalists

Whilst recognising the existence of some debate over who can be called a journalist, we define them as ‘individuals who observe and describe events, document and analyse events, statements, policies, and any propositions that can affect society, with the purpose of systematising such information and gathering of facts and analyses to inform sectors of society or society as a whole’ (UNHRC, 2012: 3). The basis of journalists’ protection under international human rights law has two dimensions. Firstly, states have obligations to safeguard fundamental rights attached to any individual journalist, such as: the right to freedom of expression and opinion (see General Comment 34, UNHRC, 2011); as well as the right to life and the dignity of a person (see rights outlined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UNGA, 1976)). Secondly, journalism must be recognised as being protected because of its societal value in keeping the public(s) informed, thereby enabling members of the public to address collective concerns through interpersonal exchange (UNHRC, 2010: 16). International human rights law also establishes that the protection of journalists includes provisions to prevent all forms of discrimination as applying to every person ‘without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’ (UNGA 1976, Article 2). This provision against discrimination has a particular bearing on forms of identity-based and intersectional violations, targeting journalists because of ethnicity, national origin and sexual orientation.

Safety of journalists is widely recognised as a precondition for effective media freedom, as there can be ‘no media freedom without safety, nor can there be independence or pluralism, when journalists work in fear’ (UNESCO, 2014:24). Here safety implies: ‘the absence of killings and physical assaults of journalists; impunity in crimes against media professionals; incarceration and arbitrary arrest; exile to escape repression; harassment (both legal and economic); self-censorship in media platforms and the internet, and the destruction or confiscation of equipment and premises’ (UNESCO, 2014: 83). Attacks on the safety of journalists, which occur both online and offline, comprise a range of human rights violations which can be classified under five dimensions: (1) physical safety (killing and other types of physical attacks); (2) digital safety (online harassment, internet shutdowns, surveillance, etc.); (3) psycho-social safety (targeted attacks designed to undermine individual well-being, dignity, mental health, consequences such as self-censorship, etc.); (4) legal safety (being subject to impunity and the weaponisation of law to silence and/or criminalise journalistic activity, e.g. through Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation - SLAPPs, the use of criminal defamation, accusations of ‘fake news’, etc.); (5) gender and identity based threats to safety (discriminatory targeting and intersectional forms of violence, etc.).

In short, media freedom provides the enabling context for the work of journalists, and legal or political restrictions on media freedom can impact their safety. Trends affecting both media freedom and the safety of journalists in non-EU countries are summarised in the next chapter.
2 Trends analysis

2.1 Human rights abuses constraining media freedom and affecting the safety of journalists

2.1.1 Overall trends in media freedom

While the world experienced ‘an historic (…) expansion in media freedom’ (UNESCO, 2022:45) during 1992-2012, media freedom and freedom of expression have been deteriorating in many countries since 2012. Whereas these recent trends are diverse, with some countries experiencing backsliding while others are progressing, data from the V-Dem Institute shows that ‘between 2015 and 2020, 27 countries saw freedom of expression decline substantially, compared with 25 countries from 2010 to 2015, and just 10 from 2005 to 2010’ (UNESCO, 2022). In most countries the situation was found to be ‘stagnant’, indicating limited progress to strengthen media freedom. While the overall decline in media freedom is described as receding slightly over the past five years as compared to the preceding five-year period, it is suggested that there are now more subtle forms of erosion, which are also impacting the legal environment. Following the surge of online mis- and disinformation, the introduction of repressive media laws and regulations may signal future downturns (UNESCO, 2022).

2.1.2 Media freedom and the pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic is understood to have aggravated the deterioration of media freedom, independence and pluralism by negatively influencing ‘media viability, internet transparency, and audience media and information literacy and related perceptions of the credibility of independent news’ (UNESCO, 2022:47). Research by the V-Dem Institute shows that ‘a majority of governments – 68 % (or 98 countries [out of 144]) – have used the pandemic to place major limits on media freedoms during at least one quarter between March 2020 to June 2021’ (Kolvani et al, 2021:2). Journalists have faced ‘direct censorship, arrest, and threats – for carrying out a profession that is recognized as an essential public service during a health crisis’ (UNESCO, 2022:47). From February 2020 to May 2021 the International Press Institute (IPI) recorded 473 COVID-related media freedom violations including: 102 access to information restrictions; 215 arrests or charges; 95 censorship cases; and 238 cases of verbal attacks¹. The adoption of laws purporting to reduce mis- and disinformation have been used to curtail independent journalism with IPI recording that ‘fake news’ laws adversely affecting media freedom have been adopted in a total of 18 countries. The Broadband Commission stresses that in mounting effective responses to disinformation, it must be recognised that journalists themselves are ‘prime targets for purveyors of disinformation’ that seek to discredit credible sources of information ‘through hacking, disruption, and other tactics of intimidation and surveillance […] to advance disinformation and wider objectives’ (Broadband Commission, 2020:21).

2.1.3 Media freedom and the legal environment

According to UNESCO recent declines in media freedom can largely be attributed to ‘subtle or indirect forms of restrictions and legal threats’ (2022:48). Criminal defamation laws, as well as laws intended to protect heads of state, public officials and state symbols are often understood to constitute a threat to independent journalism and its ability to scrutinise powerholders (OSCE, 2017). It needs to be recognised that criminal defamation and libel laws are a two-edged sword. On the one hand these laws are meant to protect both the public against abuse by journalists and journalists against hate speech and online targeting. On the other hand, these laws can also be used against journalists to restrict their reporting. Talk of redressing the former whilst keeping in place the latter presents a current legal quandary that is far from

¹ IPI Tracker on COVID-related press freedom violations: http://ipi.media/covid19-media-freedom-monitoring/
resolved but it is safe to say that the repressive and vindictive use of criminal defamation and libel laws with regard to news journalism is a serious impediment to its freedom and independence. In this light – and regrettably –, UNESCO notes that the decriminalisation of defamation ‘has slowed in the last five years in all regions but Africa, where momentum remains strong’ (UNESCO, 2022:48). With 39 criminal defamation laws in place by 2021 Africa has the highest number, followed by Asia-Pacific (APAC) with 38, Central and Eastern Europe (15), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) (29), Western Europe (WE) and North America (NA) (20). At least 160 countries still have criminal defamation laws (a decrease from 166 in 2015). A related and emerging problem is the use of SLAPPs and ‘libel tourism’ through which political and financial actors ‘initiate lawsuits in countries where defamation or libel laws are easier to abuse for the purpose of silencing critical voices’ (UNESCO, 2022; see also Foreign Policy Centre, 2020). The adoption of laws proclaimed as countering ‘mis- and disinformation, cybercrime, or hate speech’ is another trend which is likely to have a chilling effect on media freedom and according to UNESCO (2022) ‘at least 57 laws and regulations across 44 countries have been adopted or amended since 2016 that contain overly vague language or disproportionate punishments that threaten online freedom of expression and media freedom’.

Access to Information (ATI) laws are designed to ensure that information held by governments and their institutions is in principle publicly available and withheld only if there are legitimate reasons, which tend to be issues of privacy and security (Article 19, 2016). UNESCO (2022: 50) data reflects a continuing increase in the adoption of ATI laws over the past five years with ‘at least 22 UN Member States adopt[ing] constitutional, statutory, and/or policy guarantees for public access to information, bringing the global total to 132 UN Member States as of August 2021’. UNESCO (2022) notes a tripling of ‘the number of countries with such access to information laws […] in less than 20 years’. Problematically, though, ATI laws often lack implementation strategies and can be too broadly defined, meaning that in practice they can provide governments with an excuse to deny requests from citizens and journalists for information that could be used to hold officials to account.

2.1.4 Media freedom and the online environment

Different human rights abuses impact the degree to which freedom of expression and media freedom can be realised in the online sphere. UNESCO notes that while the protection of these rights online is recognised internationally (UNHRC, 2016; 2021), ‘these principles remain severely threatened in practice’ (UNESCO, 2022: 50). One growing human rights challenge is government internet shutdowns. These are often justified by governments ‘as a “precautionary measure” or as a matter of “national security”, “public safety”, or “hate speech”, when the underlying motivations appear strongly correlated with moments of political instability, protests, communal violence, or elections’ (UNESCO, 2022:51). The non-governmental organisation (NGO) Access Now (2021), has recorded information on six methods for restricting freedom of expression and press freedom online: (1) broadband throttling, ‘the intentional slowing of an internet service or type of internet traffic by an internet service provider’; (2) broadband internet shutdowns, ‘cuts to internet access via broadband, such as in a home, office, or business’; (3) mobile internet shutdowns; (4) ‘internet blackouts’ or blanket internet shutdowns; (5) mobile phone call and text message network shutdowns; and (6) service-specific (platform) shutdowns.

See discussions related to the UK online safety bill: UK Government, Online Safety Bill: factsheet, Dept for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, 19 April 2022; A. Kersley, Online Safety Bill fails to protect journalists’ freedom of speech, MPs and editors warn, Press Gazette, 24 January 2022; and CPJ, How social media regulation could affect the press, 5 January 2022. Also see A. Rosenberg, Women have poorer legal protection than men from online hate, News, Nordic Co-operation, 21 June 2017; and Nordic Information on Gender (NIKK), Online hate speech, 2017.

Please note that UNESCO’s definitions of regions are used here, and EU countries are not excluded.
Research by Access Now shows that during 2016 and 2020 the highest number of internet shutdowns were recorded in 2019 (213 instances) while 155 were recorded in 2020. Data available for 2021 shows that 55 internet shutdowns were recorded during January-May. Some of the most disruptive trends highlighted as emerging during 2021 include the extension of government shutdowns imposed in 2020 in countries such as Ethiopia and Myanmar as well as India (where the authorities in the Jammu and Kashmir regions repeatedly imposed internet shutdowns following what is referred to as possibly the ‘longest internet shutdown on record in a democracy’, extending from 4 August 2019 to 4 March 2020). A number of shutdowns recorded during January-May 2021 occurred around elections, in countries such as Uganda, Niger, the Republic of the Congo and the Russian Federation. Shutdowns also occurred during protests in countries such as Iran, Cuba, Chad, Kazakhstan, Jordan and Myanmar, as well as in connection with active conflicts such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.4

Another human rights challenge in the online context is increased investment in governments’ capacity ‘to “filter” and “throttle” the internet, blocking certain kinds of content or slowing down access to discourage users from seeking information online’ (UNESCO 2022:52). Some governments’ investment in ‘online surveillance capabilities to monitor opposition figures, activists, and journalists’ (UNESCO, 2022), also ‘puts new financial burdens on news outlets, encourages self-censorship, and has significant implications for the safety of journalists’ (UNESCO, 2022; see Woodhams, 2021). UNESCO (2022:52) notes that ‘[t]hese tactical assaults on press freedom are also far more difficult to detect and deter, posing a vexing challenge to the global efforts to safeguard freedom of expression and a free press’. Another challenge comes in the form of requests for online content removal by governments. UNESCO analysis shows a rise in the number of content removal requests to major platforms (Meta, Google and Twitter) from court orders, law enforcement and executive branches of government globally with a doubling ‘in the last five years to a total of approximately 117,000 requests in 2020’ (2022:52). Such requests for content removal are understood to be problematic when done without clear reasons and transparency to undermine people’s right to information, however content removal by states can also be done for legitimate reasons and to protect people for instance through removing extreme or dangerous content, violence, or child porn.

There is growing recognition of the private sector’s obligation to respect rights to expression and publication online (UNSG, 2020). While companies may determine their own terms of service and define ‘the types of expression […] allow[ed] on their services, they are […] expected to implement […] policies consistently and provide redress where appropriate’. Accordingly, they are obliged to put in place ‘prohibitions on violating other users’ rights to express themselves without being subjected to intimidation, bullying, hacking, or hate speech’ (UNESCO 2022: 53). Growing criticism has emerged in regard to the lack of action taken by internet platforms to deal with speech not protected under freedom of expression standards, including hate speech and death threats targeting journalists (UNESCO, 2022). Research has also highlighted the particularly problematic gendered abuse prevalent in the online sphere and targets women journalists (Posetti et al., 2021). Ultimately, there is concern that internet companies ‘are not doing enough to help respect and protect the exercise of legitimate expression, such as that by journalists, but instead allow and even enable harms to mount (not least against women journalists […]’ (UNESCO 2022: 54). Against this background calls for increased transparency of internet companies have been made (see Puddephatt, 2021) and initiatives launched to address issues related to platform regulation including through the Digital Services Act of the European Union5 and the Online Safety Bill in the United Kingdom (UK).6

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5 European Commission, The Digital Services Act: ensuring a safe and accountable online environment, n.d.
2.1.5 Media freedom and media pluralism

Media pluralism ‘relates to choice and diversity and to issues such as concentration, centralization, and monopolization of media-related institutions’ (UNESCO 2022: 58). Media pluralism is key to freedom of expression and publication as it supports the development of informed societies where diverse voices can be heard (Council of Europe, 2011). According to data by the V-Dem Institute, which assesses if major print and broadcast media represent a wide range of political perspectives, the trend is that media pluralism is in decline or experiencing a stagnation in many parts of the world (UNESCO, 2022: 58). Whereas systematic global level data is largely missing, it is clear that media pluralism and diversity directly suffer in contexts ‘where journalists are not free to practice their profession without undue restrictions or threats’ (UNESCO, 2022:59) or where indirect or direct forms of censorship limit media access and choice both online and offline.

2.1.6 Media freedom, media independence and media capture

Media independence must exist to facilitate the production of high-quality public interest journalism (UNESCO, 2022). Accordingly, adherence to professional standards along with reliance on self-regulation and independent regulatory institutions is what confers upon journalism a distinct form of trustworthiness within the wider information and media environment. Current financial pressures on the media industry are understood to weaken editorial independence and professional standards. As producing quality reporting becomes increasingly costly financially and safety-wise, journalism is seen as becoming ‘more vulnerable to pressures to serve political agendas or commercial prerogatives over public interest’ (UNESCO, 2022: 69). In this context, media capture (Schiffrin, 2017), or the exploitation of these trends ‘by political and economic actors to erode journalistic autonomy’ and to serve vested interests is identified as a key challenge to media freedom. According to Dragomir (2020: 4) media capture occurs across ‘four levers of power: the regulatory mechanisms governing the media; state-administered media operations; public funds that finance journalism; and the ownership of privately held news outlets.’ Analysis by the Council of Europe (2021:46) also indicates that state-led capture of the media landscape may serve as ‘an appealing model to authoritarian-minded states as it avoids the types of developments – for example, the jailing of journalists, physical attacks on the press or overt censorship – that typically attract international scrutiny and condemnation’. At the same time, processes of state-led media capture are also likely to be accompanied by politics of repression and the active silencing of independent journalism, something Balamir Coşkun (2020) refers to as ‘capture by intimidating and criminalizing journalists’.

2.1.7 Media freedom, legitimacy and trust

A relationship of trust between the public and journalism is ultimately what bestows legitimacy upon journalism as a reliable information source. However, recent years have witnessed a decline in trust in news media globally (Fletcher, 2020). While the COVID-19 pandemic may to some extent have halted this process in some places, ‘trust is likely to remain fragile, with significant implications for the survival of independent media and the health of democratic politics in the years to come’ (UNESCO, 2022: 72). Research suggests that such weakened trust in journalism is likely to make individuals more vulnerable to mis- and disinformation. It has also been shown that people are less likely to pay for news in countries where trust is low (UNESCO, 2022:73), indicating that a loss of trust in journalism is likely to correlate with weakened public support. In the context of constraints on media freedom it is noted that ‘some political leaders have exploited the current environment of mis- and disinformation and scepticism [of journalism] to attack the legitimacy of critical, independent media’. Furthermore, whereas a majority of the public in most countries have expressed support for freedom of expression and media freedom, ‘the proliferation of misinformation

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7 For trends in risk to media pluralism in Europe (27 EU member states and 5 candidate countries), see the Media Pluralism Monitor.
and hate speech online and active campaigns […] to discredit journalism [could turn] public opinion […] opening the way for leaders who would roll back freedoms even further’ (UNESCO 2022:73). As described by Chocarro et al. (2020: 8), the fact that the ‘very capacity of the public to bestow trust in journalism is under attack […] is a direct threat to the safe undertaking of journalism as it minimizes the likelihood of the public […] defending journalism against attack’.

2.2 Recent trends in human rights abuses affecting the safety of journalists and constraining media freedom

The extent of data on human rights abuses against journalists around the world tends to be limited to recording instances of killings, the most serious form of violation. Global coverage on annual killing counts is for instance collated by organisations such as: Reporters Without Borders (RSF); the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ); the International Press Institute; the International Federation of Journalists; and the Press Emblem Campaign. This data collection is crucial as it maps the most serious types of violation targeting journalists. Notably, different monitoring methodologies lead organisations to record different figures on the number of killings. Torsner (2017; 2019) presents an overview of these methodological differences. The UNESCO Observatory of Killed Journalists is one of these initiatives which has the added benefit (as does the CPJ dataset) of disaggregating data on killings in additional categories, allowing for a more in-depth analysis. The UNESCO data also records the status of judicial enquiry for killings, which acts as a form of country assessment on impunity for killings and indicates the political will in countries to ensure judicial redress. However, because UNESCO data on killings provides for fewer categories of disaggregation as compared with the CPJ data, the original analysis of statistical data for non-EU countries conducted in this Briefing is based on data collated by CPJ which covers three of the most serious types of violations facing journalists: killings; killings and impunity; and imprisonment.

There also exist several regional monitoring initiatives that gather statistics on a wider range of violations against journalists beyond killings. Similarly, a range of organisations carry out crucial work to monitor a range of human rights violations at country level. Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) Indicator 16.10.1, sets out to monitor the ‘[n]umber of verified cases of killing, kidnapping, enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention and torture of journalists, associated media personnel, trade unionists and human rights advocates in the previous 12 months’. The UNESCO Observatory is one of the key data sources that feeds into UNESCO’s reporting on the SDG 16.10.1 violation category of killings. The Voluntary National Review (VNR) mechanism under the SDG Agenda is aimed at facilitating the tracking of progress in implementing the SDGs and sharing of best practices. Accordingly, states are encouraged to report on the safety of journalists and SDG indicator 16.10.1 in their VNRs, to be presented at the High Level Political Forum. NGOs like Free Press Unlimited point to the fact that, in practice, many states are reluctant to report on the safety of journalists and SDG 16.10.1. Out of the 44 countries asked to provide a VNR report
in 2021, only 4 referenced data on the safety of journalists\(^{19}\). In this context, a range of civil society shadow monitoring initiatives are ongoing so as to provide alternative data to that officially provided (or not provided) by countries within the VNR process. These shadow monitoring initiatives are crucial as accountability mechanisms, especially when there is a lack of political will by states to provide relevant data on the indicator. Through our research\(^{20}\) we have been able to show that existing shadow monitoring under SDG 16.10.1 is patchy and lacks infrastructural solutions for gathering data over time systematically. Current initiatives often collect data only for a single year which prevents comparisons across different monitoring efforts\(^{21}\). Problematically, research also shows that shadow reports from civil society and their inputs are often ignored by state authorities. Monitoring organisations have expressed concern over the fact that there is a lack of constructive engagement from governments to ensure that their data is taken seriously\(^{22}\).

Research and data collection on journalists’ safety to date is oriented towards small-scale country case studies, meaning the data is unsuitable for trends analysis. Wider contextual data that could provide for a better understanding of circumstances producing certain types and patterns of violations is not systematised or harmonised across datasets, which as a result are incompatible with each other. In short, these data challenges hamper the establishment of comprehensive trends and comparative analysis between countries. Against the background of these data limitations, what follows in this section is therefore a summary of findings on recent trends related to the safety of journalists based on key reports and datasets\(^{23}\) combined with original analysis of statistical data for non-EU countries collated by CPJ which covers: killings; killings and impunity; and imprisonment. The statistical analysis covers six regions: Africa; Asia and the Pacific (APAC); Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC); the Middle East and North Africa (MENA); South Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe and Central Asia (SEE, EE & CA); along with Western Europe and North America (WE & NA)\(^{24}\). The trends analysis focuses on the years 2012-2021 and uses the previous 2002-2011 period on journalist killings selectively to provide more longitudinal analysis. A complete list of graphs and tables is presented in the Appendix Section 5.1.

### 2.2.1 Killings\(^{25}\)

Data from CPJ (2002-2021) and UNESCO (2011-2015) reflects a downward trend in recent years. UNESCO records a 20 % decrease in 2016-2020 when compared with 2011-2015, but cautions against reading too much into this downward trend ‘as numbers continue to rise and fall from year to year’ (2022: 84). According to CPJ, the main perpetrators are: political groups (39.2 %); military officials (23.5 %); criminal groups (14.9 %); and government officials (12.7 %).

Regional variations in numbers are significant. The CPJ data for 2012-2021 shows that: MENA has the highest number with 226 killings (44.4 % of the total); followed by APAC, 116 killings (22.8 %); LAC, 75 killings (14.7 %); Africa, 65 killings (12.8 %); SEE, EE and CA, 20 killings (3.9 %); along with WE and NA, 7 killings (1.4 %).

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\(^{21}\) See e.g. Voces del Sur (LAC); *Foundation for Press Freedom in Colombia*; and *Independent Journalist Association* in Indonesia.

\(^{22}\) Free Press Unlimited, *Civil society data on safety of journalists neglected by UN member states*, 15 July 2021.

\(^{23}\) For this analysis it has not been possible to focus specifically non-EU countries due to the nature of the data.

\(^{24}\) For a list of countries belonging to each region please see: [https://tinyurl.com/2p8829v8](https://tinyurl.com/2p8829v8)

\(^{25}\) See the Appendix Figure 1-20 for a complete list of graphs for this section.
According to UNESCO ‘the proportion [of killings] that occurred outside of countries experiencing conflict has been steadily rising, from 50 percent in 2016 to 61 percent in 2020 […]. Overall, journalist killings have decreased worldwide, but in the past five years, the number of journalists killed in countries experiencing armed conflict has declined more significantly’. Notably, CPJ data shows that, in the most recent years, killings have been increasing not only in APAC and LAC, but also in Africa since 2020. Figure I below shows the number of annual killings per region (2002-2021).

Figure I. Number of annual killings per region (2002-2021)

According to CPJ, journalist killings occurred in 51 non-EU countries during 2012-2021. A majority of those (391 cases representing 61.1 % out of 509 killings) occurred in 11 countries, including Syria (137 killings), Iraq (39), Somalia (35), Mexico (33), Afghanistan (31), India (27), Pakistan (22), Brazil (21), Yemen (19), Philippines (16) and Bangladesh (11).

Journalists most at risk according to CPJ data are local journalists operating in their own countries. A total of 462 local journalists were killed (90.8 %), versus 47 (9.2 %) foreign journalists. Research (Horsley and Selva, 2021) indicates that the low number of foreign journalists killed may relate to an increased reliance by international outlets on local journalists who are typically and problematically not provided the same type of work contracts or protection as employed foreign journalists, leaving them particularly vulnerable26.

The most common deaths are those classified by CPJ as murder, meaning the targeted killing of a journalist by way of reprisal for their work. Overall, though, the total number of murders decreased from 347 in 2002-2011 to 264 in 2012-2021. Killings in the crossfire category, indicating a killing on a battlefield or in a military context, have gone up from 97 to 158 in the same time period. Killings classified as a dangerous assignment (including deaths while covering a demonstration, riot, clashes or assignments that unexpectedly turn violent), have also risen from 64 to 70.

Most journalists killed were involved in political journalism (28.8 %), followed by war reporting (23.8 %), human rights (15.8 %), crime (10.7 %) and corruption (9.6 %), indicating that sensitive and investigative beats are the most dangerous forms of journalism27.

Most journalists killed worked through the Internet (35.5 %) (possibly reflecting that most journalists today produce online content while simultaneously working for other medium types), followed by television

26 CPJ also gathers statistics on work-related deaths of media workers (including translators, drivers, fixers, security guards and administrative workers). A total of 41 media workers were killed in non-EU countries in 2012-2021.

27 Various reports show how certain topics can put journalists at greater danger see e.g. Transparency International, 2020; RSF 2018a; and RSF, 2021a.
(29.7 %), print (20.4 %) and radio (13.7 %). The most dangerous jobs included ‘forefront’ roles such as broadcast reporter (23.7 %), camera operator (19.3 %) and photographer (13.9 %), while roles more associated with desk work were less risky: editors (6.9 % of killings); producers (3.6 %); columnists/commentators (3.3 %); publishers/owners (2.9 %).

2.2.2 Killings and impunity

CPJ statistics on impunity, or the lack of judicial remedy, for journalist killings shows that over 97 % of 1019 killings recorded in 2002-2021 are cases of complete or partial impunity. 46.9 % of these are cases with complete impunity; for 39.7 % there is no information on the status of judicial resolution, whilst 10.4 % are classified as partial impunity. Full justice has been achieved for a total of 2.9 % (30 cases). Figure II. below shows the number of cases of impunity across all categories between 2002-2021.

Figure II. Number of cases with impunity across all categories, including full justice for killings (2002-2021)

Regionally, APAC has most cases of complete impunity for 2012-2021 (77 from 116 killings), followed by LAC (50 from 75), MENA (47 from 226), SEE, EE & CA (10 from 20) and WE & NA (0 from 7).

Most instances of no information stem from MENA (175 cases), followed by APAC (31 cases), Africa (18 cases), LAC and SEE, EE & CA (8 cases respectively) and WE & NA (3 cases).

Looking at cases of complete impunity and no information for killings, MENA stands out as the region with the worst track record (99.1 % of cases with complete impunity or no information) followed by APAC (92.3 %), SEE, EE & CA (90 %), Africa (89.2 %), LAC (77.3 %), WE & NA (42.9 %).

LAC had the highest number of cases of partial impunity (16 cases), indicating that at least some degree of judicial remedy has been achieved. APAC had 7 such cases, with MENA and Africa recording 4 cases respectively. Two cases of partial impunity were recorded for SEE, EE & CA whilst WE & NA had none. Four cases of complete justice were recorded in WE & NA and three in Africa. The APAC and LAC regions had one case of complete justice each.

UNESCO (2022: 89) shows that ‘at the country level, journalist killings and impunity rates are typically proportional, and high rates of fatalities are associated with high rates of impunity’. It is also shown ‘that there is no clear correlation between impunity of journalist killings and impunity for other crimes in the country’. Furthermore, journalist killings tend not to correlate ‘with overall homicide levels in any given

28 See the Appendix Figure 21-33 for a complete list of graphs and tables for this section.
country [...] rather, the killing of journalists – and impunity for that crime – is a unique issue across the globe, reinforcing the clear intentionality in targeting media professionals’ (UNESCO, 2022).

CPJ’s data reveals that from 224 cases of complete impunity during 2012-2021, 185 (82.6 %) were recorded in 12 countries. These countries have all had five or more cases of complete impunity each during the time period and include: Mexico (26 cases); Somalia (25); Syria (22); India (21); Afghanistan (17); Iraq (17); Philippines (14); Brazil (14); Pakistan (12); Bangladesh (7); South Sudan (5); and the Russian Federation (5). Notably, these countries include conflict affected contexts experiencing forms of interstate, intrastate, non-state and organised violence. Syria is a notable example of a country where journalist killings and related impunity have taken place in contexts of war (with very high spikes in certain years) while Mexico is a country where killings are a long-term trend often connected to the pervasive presence of organised and drug-related crime (see for example CRS, 2022 and Deutsche Welle, 2022).

For the no information category, 211 cases were recorded in 11 countries (each with five or more such cases), most of which experiencing ongoing conflict. These cover 86.8 % of all cases of no information recorded in 2012-2021 and include: Syria (113); Iraq (21); Yemen (17); Afghanistan (14); Pakistan (9); Egypt (8); Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory (8); Somalia (6); India (5); Libya (5); and Ukraine (5).

Considering the two categories of complete impunity or no information, the 17 countries with five or more such cases have an impunity rate of around 70-100 %.

For partial impunity, 33 cases were recorded in 17 countries, including Brazil (5), Mexico (5), Colombia (4), Somalia (3), Bangladesh (2), Philippines (2), Syria (2), Guinea (1), India (1), Maldives (1), Pakistan (1), Guatemala (1), Paraguay (1), Iraq (1), Yemen (1), Türkiye (1) and Ukraine (1). Nine cases of full justice were recorded in 2012-2021 in six countries: the USA (4); Brazil (1); Somalia (1); Bangladesh (1); the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1); and South Africa (1).

2.2.3  Imprisonments

Imprisonments and the use of law to silence journalists continues to be a matter of urgent concern (UNESCO, 2022: 92-94). CPJ statistics reflect an overall increase in imprisonments with 293 cases being recorded for 2021. Among the types of charges used to justify these imprisonments, accusations of anti-state activities dominate (61.5 %), followed by ‘no charge’ (14.8 %), retaliatory action (11.7 %), false news (7 %) and defamation (3 %). Figure III here shows changes in the numbers of different types of charges between 2012-2021.

Conflict types are identified based on classifications by Uppsala Conflict Data Program: https://ucdp.uu.se/
See the Appendix Figure 34 -59 for a complete list of graphs and tables for this section.
Regional trends during 2012-2021 (Figure IV below) show that MENA consistently records high numbers, with a peak of 94 imprisonments in 2020. APAC reflects overall high numbers with a significant rise in 2020-2021 (from 76 to 113 cases). Figures for Africa remain at a consistent level with numbers ranging from 32-50 cases. Having peaked with 103 imprisonments in 2016 for SEE, EE & CA, figures have since declined to 57 cases in 2021. LAC and WE & NA are the regions with the lowest numbers of imprisonments. Six cases were recorded in LAC in 2021 and one case for WE & NA (in 2013).

Figures based on the annual average of imprisoned journalists in 2012-2021 shows that 84.35% were male while 15.7% were female. The media most commonly used by imprisoned journalists were: the internet (53.9%); print (30.7%); television (8.4%); and radio (5.8%). The most common coverage-types were politics (23.1%), crime (19%), culture (16.8%), corruption (16.2%), human rights (14.2%) and war (3.9%). The most common job-types are photographer (34.7%), internet reporter (20.5%), editor (11.8%), print reporter (9.6%), publisher/owner (7.4%) and columnist (6.9%).
2.2.4 Killings and imprisonments

Juxtaposing statistics on killings and imprisonments provides a starting point for trying to understand how trends in these two categories of violations may interrelate. Statistics for 2012-2021 demonstrate how killings have decreased over time while imprisonments have increased. See Figure V below which illustrates the number of imprisonments versus killings between 2012-2021.

Figure V. Number of imprisonments vs killings (2012-2021)

Speculating on the reasons for these diverging trends, one hypothesis suggests that increasing government repression to silence journalists through means of imprisonment indicates that lethal violence is being used less as a means of silencing journalists. A further hypothesis proposes that the number of killings has decreased because journalists are reporting less from conflict contexts. To facilitate examination of these hypotheses, a more granular analysis would be required. While such an analysis is beyond the scope of this Briefing, we are able to point to the potential value of such granular analysis by examining whether it is the same countries that tend to have cases of imprisonment and killings or if these violations occur in different countries. Looking at the top five countries where killings and imprisonments occurred, it becomes evident that the majority of killings and imprisonments do not occur in the same countries (see Figure VI below). Those countries that imprison most journalists have either no cases or only very few cases of killings, whilst countries with most journalist killings have virtually no cases of imprisonment. These findings indicate the need for a granular and country level analysis over time (e.g. in relation to regime types and democratic backsliding). While the complexity of such an analysis is beyond the scope of this Briefing, we do provide a discussion in Section 2.3 on how different types of contexts can be differentiated in relation to how they may compromise the safety of journalists.

31 See the Appendix Figure 60-67 for a complete list of graphs and tables for this section.
2.2.5 Other types of abuses

**Kidnapping and enforced disappearances:** In 2021, at least 65 journalists and media workers were held hostage according to RSF (2021b) (an increase of 3% since 2020). Most hostage takings occurred in three MENA countries: Syria (44); Iraq (11); and Yemen (9). One journalist was abducted in Mali. The Islamic State is the group responsible for most journalist abductions (28 cases), followed by the Houthis in Yemen (8 cases) and the Syrian Jihadi group (7 cases). RSF also reports that two journalists went missing during 2021 (both in Mexico). None of the five journalists who disappeared in 2020 have been found. In total, 46 journalists disappeared between 2003 and 2021 according to RSF. Correspondingly, CPJ recorded 69 journalist disappearances between 2002-2021 (Mexico has the highest number with 15 cases, followed by Syria (10), Iraq (9) and Russia (7))32. Insurgent groups continue to use online broadcasting of journalists being subjected to torture, false and public executions for propaganda purposes (UNESCO, 2018). Many of these journalists are local, often underpaid and working in highly precarious conditions often as ‘the only remaining witnesses of […] deadly conflicts in war zones […] virtually inaccessible for the international media’ (RSF, 2018b:18).

**Exile and relocations:** As a consequence of attacks and threats, many local journalists are forced to relocate each year, exile being the only course of action ‘to avoid politically motivated harassment, kidnapping, incarceration, violence or even assassination’ (High Level Panel of Legal Experts on Media Freedom, 2020:6)33. While no systematic figures over time are available, data from CPJ (2015) suggest that 452 journalists were forced into exile between 2010 and 2015. During that time, Syria and Ethiopia were the two countries forcing most journalists into exile, while many others also fled from Iran, Eritrea and Somalia34. Significantly, these figures account only for those cases where CPJ has been able to provide assistance to individual journalists through their Journalist Assistance programme35. The High Level Panel of Legal Experts on Media Freedom (2020:10), points out that while it is ‘States and intergovernmental organisations that hold the keys to safe refuge for journalists at risk’ ‘it is [currently] almost exclusively […]

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32 https://cpj.org/data/missing/?status=Missing&start_year=2002&end_year=2021&group_by=location
33 For more information on obstacles to pathways to safety for journalists forced into exile see High Level Panel of Legal Experts on Media Freedom, 2020 and its ensuing recommendations to states.
34 On this issue see: CPJ, Syria tops survey of journalists fleeing into exile, 17 June 2015; CPJ, The high cost paid by journalists in exile, 17 June 2021; CPJ, At-risk journalists who must flee home countries often find few quick and safe options, 17 June 2021.
35 https://cpj.org/emergency-response/what-we-do/
[NGOs] that bear the tremendous burden of providing essential financial, administrative and logistical assistance to journalists in their quest for safety’. This work is carried out both by individual NGOs and through international networks such as the Journalists in Distress network. In 2020, the Human Rights Council Resolution 45/18 (Article 19, 2020) also highlighted extraterritorial targeting of journalists following a number of recent cases, including Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Escalating harassment of BBC News Persian journalists and their families have also seen the BBC, in the UK, file an urgent complaint to the UN against Iran.

**Threats and intimidation:** Despite recognition of the urgent need to address threats against journalists (UNODC, 2021), there is no systematic data to enable global cross-country comparisons. However, there is evidence that journalists killed often received threats prior to being assassinated (RSF, 2021c). Research also shows that online violence may be a precursor to offline violence (Posetti et al. 2020).

**Public intimidation and abuse:** A particularly problematic emerging trend is increasing verbal and physical attacks against journalists while they cover protests, with such attacks being committed by security forces and the public. Between January-August 2021 such attacks were recorded in at least 60 countries (UNESCO, 2022: 95). At least 13 journalists have been killed while covering protests since 2015 (UNESCO, 2020).

**Gender and abuse in the workplace:** Women journalists are understood to ‘face risks of physical assault, sexual harassment, sexual assault, [and] rape […] not only from those attempting to silence their coverage, but also from sources, colleagues, and others’ (UNESCO, 2018: 153). Women are particularly vulnerable to sexual harassment in newsrooms with the ‘majority of threats, intimidation and abuse directed toward [survey] respondents [having] occurred in the workplace’ (Barton and Storm, 2014:5).

**Safety of journalists during COVID:** New challenges for the safety of journalists have emerged with the COVID-19 pandemic, while existing challenges have also been exacerbated. When reporting on the frontline of the pandemic, journalists have faced exposure to the virus ‘and many (especially freelancers) lack protective equipment, sanitary safety training, and/or access to healthcare’ (UNESCO 2022: 100). Between March 2020 and January 2022, the NGO Press Emblem Campaign recorded nearly 2 000 COVID-related deaths of journalists.

**Abuses in the online sphere:** Awareness related to digital safety threats for journalists has increased globally in recent years. Yet, digital attacks on journalists from state and non-state actors are a constantly evolving challenge to the safe practice of journalism (see UNESCO 2015, 2018 and Posetti, 2017). While systematic data is lacking, evidence is suggesting that digital threats against journalists are increasing. According to a report by Access Now, which examines the first 10 000 requests for emergency support received by the organisation, there is an ‘ever-increasing need of digital security assistance’ for journalists, human rights defenders, and civil society organisations globally ‘as they face more severe and more persistent threats’ (2021: 26). The organisation notes that digital attacks are shrinking civil space and that urgent requests for support were most likely to come from individuals operating in unstable political and conflict settings. Threats in the online sphere are wide-ranging, including forms of ‘harassment, mass and targeted surveillance, data storage vulnerabilities, and digital attacks (including hacking)’ and they are used to access confidential information and silence journalists (UNESCO 2022: 96). Research shows that ‘illegal or arbitrary digital surveillance, location tracking, […] software and hardware exploits […] phishing, fake domain attacks, Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks, and Denial of Service (DoS)’ are used ‘by large and well-resourced adversaries’ to purposefully target journalists often for the purpose of ‘seeking to further socio-political goals’ (Betz et al., 2015: 8). Other types of digital attacks include the hacking of social media accounts and having private information publicly revealed through the practice of ‘doxing’, which serves

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36 [https://www.journalistsindistress.org/](https://www.journalistsindistress.org/)
37 Doughty Street Chambers, Escalating security concerns see BBC file urgent complaint to UN against Iran’s ongoing harassment of BBC News Persian journalists and their families, 10 February 2022.
the purpose of ‘obtaining and publishing private and identifiable information about individuals, usually with malicious intent’ (Betz et al., 2015:152). Journalists also report having experienced ‘digitally-mediated threats of death, bombing, violence against themselves and family members, rape, abuse and insult’ (Betz et al., 2015).

Consequently, journalists require ‘protection from threats such as website defacement, compromised user accounts, confiscation or theft of their digital resources, and online intimidation, disinformation, and smear campaigns’ (Betz et al., 2015:8). Online attacks can: compromise personal information, data and confidentiality of sources of a journalist; prevent the dissemination of information; enable forms of direct censorship; cause financial loss for media outlets operating online; be used to discredit journalists; result in self-censorship through intimidation of journalists and their sources; and lead to the detention, arrest, prosecution and imprisonment of journalists (Betz et al., 2015).

In this context it is important to note that many journalists often do not have ‘adequate access to or knowledge of tools that can help protect them’ (UNESCO, 2022: 96). Furthermore ‘the onus is put on […] individual[s] to ensure their own digital safety, as other actors, including internet companies and media organizations, very often do not offer adequate support’ (UNESCO, 2022, see also Høiby and Garrido, 2020). The interconnectedness between the online and offline worlds is also pointed out as digital threats are reportedly turning into physical and sometimes fatal attacks on media professionals. Attention has also been drawn to the fact that journalists who experience physical forms of attack are ‘particularly vulnerable to digital threats’ (UNESCO, 2018:152).

As discussed in Section 2.1.5, arbitrary surveillance is understood to be a growing threat with such violations of rights to privacy becoming an effective way to coerce journalists (Posetti, 2017). Such arbitrary surveillance reportedly takes place in both democratic and non-democratic societies (UNESCO, 2018) and may result in journalists becoming reluctant to report on sensitive topics (Pen America, 2013). In 2021 revelations surrounding the Pegasus spyware which disclosed ‘the widespread surveillance of the mobile devices of hundreds of journalists, human rights defenders and political leaders’ (Forbes, 2021) led UN bodies to call ‘for a moratorium on the sale of surveillance technology, warning against the danger of allowing the sector to operate as “a human rights-free zone” (UN, 2021) imperiling rights to expression, privacy and liberty as well as media freedom.

Mapping instances of online mass harassment and orchestrated attacks in 32 countries, RSF (2018c) found that ‘online harassment […] constitutes one of the gravest threats to press freedom’, as ‘information wars are not just waged between countries at the international level’ but also through the deployment of ‘troll armies to hunt down and harass all those who investigate and report the facts honestly’. Hate campaigns were found to be coordinated by ‘authoritarian or oppressive regimes’ in such countries as China, India, Türkiye, Vietnam, Iran and Algeria but ‘aggressive cyberharassment campaigns are also waged by communities of individuals or political groups in supposedly democratic countries such as Mexico, and even in countries that are ranked at the top of the World Press Freedom Index’ (RSF, 2018c, d).

Gender dimensions of online threats: It is well documented that ‘women journalists face specific challenges related to gender-based violence that may go beyond longstanding understandings of journalist safety’ (UNESCO: 2022: 97). The migration of gendered harassment to the online world also ‘reflects, and may amplify, the realities and hierarchies that exist offline’ (Betz et al., 2015: 43). There is increasing agreement that intersectional perspectives on gendered harassment of journalists is needed to capture how violence against women journalists is ‘compounded by stereotypes and prejudice related to ethnicity, religion, and sexual orientation/ gender identity’ (UNESCO, 2022; see also Gardiner et al., 2016; Article 19, 2022). Online abuse of women journalists is ‘particularly relevant for women who report on topics that have been traditionally covered by men, such as sports, gaming, crime and politics’ (UNESCO, 2018: 157). A global study (Posetti, et al. 2020, 2021) has shown that 73 % of 901 journalists surveyed said they had experienced
some form of online violence. 20% had also suffered offline attacks or abuse connected with the online violence. The survey study also found that attacks on women journalists are often linked to coordinated disinformation campaigns. The most reported online threat experience was receiving hateful, often misogynistic, language designed to denigrate (49%). 48% of respondents had been harassed (often sexually) through private messages. Other digital security and privacy attacks included surveillance (18%), hacking (14%), doxing (8%); and spoofing (7%) (Posetti et al., 2021).

2.3 A typology for analysing types of civil and political contexts of human rights abuses affecting the safety of journalists

This Briefing so far has provided an overview of recent trends in human rights abuses constraining media freedom and affecting the safety of journalists. However, a systematic understanding of the diverse civil and political circumstances creating various types of human rights abuses against journalists is ultimately essential for uncovering and remedying their underlying drivers and causes.

Based on an identified knowledge gap in this regard our ongoing empirical and comparative research suggests that what we refer to as a ‘contextual approach to documenting human rights violations against journalists’ (Harrison and Torsner, 2020) is best developed through a typology of the communicative conditions of precarity within which journalists are forced to operate. These conditions are not the equivalent of political regimes. Rather, they represent the extent to which state and market forces influence or dominate free and independent news journalism. In essence they show the balance of power that exists between state, market and four different types of news environments, and as such they depict the conditions under which news journalism operates. These conditions can be linked to different types of fragilities to the civil institution of journalism, creating the circumstances under which independent journalism is threatened, restricted or completely subjugated. To this end we propose the following typology of news environments that could serve as a contextual and analytical tool to help provide us with a greater understanding of the civil nature of journalistic precarity. We suggest four types of news environments and their respective communicative circumstances:

1. **Agonistic pluralism** is where different media compete in accordance with respectful contestation, shared understandings of the role and freedom of journalism in accordance with accepted professional guidelines, legal rules and where there is relative freedom from state intervention.

2. **Antagonism** brings about a gradual break-down in respectful contestation. This is due to inter-media rivalries and state bias that facilitate the emergence of networked news partisan silos and feature the emergence of a vocabulary of truth and untruths, loyalty and disloyalty, as well as irreconcilable differences. Essentially, the news environment here is riven with state and market power disputing the value of independent news services or those that reflect an independent point of view distinct from the needs of state and market power.

3. **Repression** sees a complete break-down of respectful contestation which has been replaced by: a climate of state chilling towards certain out-of-favour media outlets; economic distortions and market bias, particularly with regard to ownership and senior positions in the media; as well as state encouraged and sponsored editorial approaches (typically populist, hence anti-cosmopolitan and anti-elitist with irredentism and nativism as well as other forms of partisanship being encouraged), and most significantly the emergence of impunity (inducing self-censorship through fear).

4. **Authoritarianism** results in the weaponisation of the law and/or constitution against independent media alongside the forceful domination and persecution of critical journalism as exemplified by the widespread imprisonment of journalists perceived to be in defiance of state power. It does this because power over the media has been invested in an individual, body or group which has absolute authority over it.
This typology represents a spectrum of communicative conditions that vary in intensity across different civil, political and legal contexts and which, as we move from agonistic towards authoritarian circumstances, reflect the intensification of journalistic precarity and a progression towards circumstance in which the direct targeting of journalists is no longer considered taboo. It is also important to point out that a particular societal context can display varied constellations of features of the four types of communicative circumstances at the same time, and they can over time drift either towards agonism or authoritarianism. Against the background of the findings from Sections 2.1 and 2.2 it is possible to apply these classifications to identify a broad drift towards the creation of increasingly precarious circumstances for journalists across a wide range of societal settings, from liberal democracies to illiberal and oppressive states.

**Agonistic pluralism:** The communicative conditions of agonistic pluralism are most often found in countries considered to be liberal democracies and arguably represent the circumstances in which journalism stands its best chance of being free and independent. The most serious forms of attacks against journalists (killing and imprisonment) are rare but occasionally do occur in such countries which commonly have strong legal protections for media freedom which can include constitutional protections and provisions for the establishment of public service news journalism (of some kind). The statistics also show that these types of contexts have the best track record (see analysis of WE & NA region) when it comes to the judicial redress for killings further indicating that rule of law is well established and upheld. Nevertheless, it is still the case that agonistic contexts display features of antagonism as created for instance through the dramatic surge in – and lack of legal redress for – routine and often gendered vitriolic online harassment of individual journalists, which has been shown to pave the way for further attacks as online violence spills over to offline attacks.

**Antagonism:** While outright state attacks on the media are rare in established democracies, the public smearing of professional journalism by partisan political actors (CPJ, 2020), or attempts to dismantle public service media are manifestations of antagonistic circumstances that generate a loss of trust in journalism among citizens, thereby weakening their willingness to value and defend journalism against attack. The public delegitimisation of journalism combined with hyper-partisan public contestation (e.g. via the peddling of conspiracy theories) may also serve to create an enabling environment for targeted attacks against journalists. Between 2019 and 2021, a doubling in physical attacks against journalists was recorded for the Council of Europe region often linked to COVID-19 related news coverage on anti-vaccination and anti-lockdown protests (Torsner, 2022). Antagonistic circumstances are established through media regimes that engender a rise in partisanship and populism which sees state or market power trying to achieve its own ends through media channels that support their own views, and correspondingly attacking other media channels that do not support these views (see Benkler et al., 2018). Essential to this is the rise of journalism that focuses on issues of national identity. Here, news becomes disassociated from debate and the scrutiny of power. It is worth noting also that country contexts considered democracies (at least in the electoral sense) moving towards illiberalism (displaying disregard for civil liberties, as a protection of a plurality of views and media) and which undermine the rule of law (as a means to constrain the executive arm of government) (see Lührmann et al., 2020) are likely to display escalating antagonism towards independent journalism. Here processes of media capture represent the escalation of conditions of antagonism toward the systemic and state-led oppression of independent journalism via the distortion of the legal environment through procedural legal reform that favours a certain type of media ideology.

**Repression:** The drift towards repression concludes with the strategic dismantling of journalistic independence and the capture of the media landscape to serve polarising, partisan and nativist political agendas. Here illiberal conditions define the way in which the news environment is treated and how it is regarded. These illiberal conditions stop short of completely extinguishing a free and independent new sector, though what remains is greatly immiserated (for example in Türkiye). Repressive states can be
understood as targeting journalists with measures that render independent journalism unlawful (and consequently pressing charges, arresting and imprisoning them) while simultaneously using means of direct intimidation and violence, sometimes lethal, to silence them. Notably, high numbers of journalist imprisonments are a key feature of repressive contexts alongside the widespread use of impunity – the aim of which is to create conditions of intimidation and to encourage fear based self-censorship. Overall, under the conditions of repression the independence of the legal system is undermined and impunity for ‘crimes’ against news journalism is common.

Authoritarianism: In this case, absolute political authority has been invested in an individual, body or group which consequently has absolute authority over the civil sphere and hence the media and journalism. The ideologies of the individual, body or group with invested power will vary as will the nature of the investment process (whether it be via a coup, a revolution, through mock election or via populist movements, etc.). Typically, what happens is that state-led hostility through the weaponisation of law reflects a movement from repression toward authoritarianism, where spaces for independent journalism are completely closed down through forms of systematic persecution and subjugation. Previous repressive measures become legally and or constitutionally justified. This type of context is represented by some of the worst performing countries on the RSF index, such as China and Eritrea (RSF, 2021d). Notably, censorship and propaganda permeate the communicative environment in these countries and state repression is clearly manifest in the high number of imprisoned journalists (a human rights violation always linked to state and/or legal repression). As shown in the statistical analysis, journalist killings are rare in these types of authoritarian contexts (see Figure VI above). While further analysis of the underlying reasons for this is needed, one potential explanatory factor could be that authoritarianism is so oppressive that killing as a means of state repression is not necessary. Though this needs to be qualified by the fact that authoritarian countries having experienced widespread conflict, most notably Syria, Afghanistan and Somalia, are country settings with the highest number of killings. On the other hand, countries like Egypt, which has experienced periods of civil conflict, has few killings (and many imprisonments). However, it is significant that Syria, as a highly authoritarian regime, combines the highest number of killings with an above average annual rate of imprisoned journalists. Of course, it must be borne in mind that any analysis is restricted by reliance on available and of necessity incomplete data (Harrison, et al. 2020), given that attaining information on human rights abuses in authoritarian societies is a very challenging undertaking. We can therefore assume that existing records are incomplete and that there likely is an underreporting on instances of human rights abuses against journalists.

Research also indicates that incentives for states to harass and suppress journalists increase ‘when governments face threats to maintaining power or undertake extraordinary efforts to consolidate power’ (VonDeoepp and Young, 2013: 36) in relation to events such as elections, coup plots, major public protests and the emergence of civil conflict.

In relation to the categories of repression and/or authoritarianism it is often the case that the state in such contexts lacks capacity, authority and legitimacy to function effectively. This is for instance reflected in a state’s inability to hold the monopoly of violence vis-à-vis other actors or in instances when the legitimacy of a regime is rejected or challenged internally or externally. Such circumstances may prevent the state from safeguarding journalists against political groups or organised crime networks. Examples of such contexts are wide-ranging, including contexts of widespread conflict (as in Iraq, Syria or Somalia where high number of killings of journalists have been recorded) to contexts such as Mexico where organised crime accounted for most (39 out of 52) journalist killings during 2002-2021, according to the CPJ.

It is worth highlighting that even in cases when the state is not the direct perpetrator of killings and other type of attacks on journalists these instances still represent a failure by the state to meet its obligation to protect human rights. The high impunity rate for killings is also a clear indication of some form of state complicity, in the sense that legal redress is either absent or diminished to the point of virtual
ineffectiveness and likely enabling further killings to occur. In relation to the targeting of journalists by non-state actors, such as through organised crime, this can be state sanctioned, with the state and its representatives being complicit in, benefiting from (e.g. via corruption), or tolerating an environment within which organised crime can perpetrate attacks on journalists. Whereas imprisonments of journalists are emblematic of direct state repression through the weaponization of law, lethal violence against journalists is also unlikely to occur without some form of state complicity either explicit or tacit, as most murders are undertaken with impunity.

3 Conclusion and recommendations

This Briefing has shown that whilst journalist killings, as the most serious form a human rights abuse, show a slight decline in recent years, journalistic safety, and consequently also media freedom, are under intensified attack. The sustained very high levels of impunity for killings are emblematic of this trend and continue to undermine the effective rule of law in societies. Journalistic safety is undermined through the spread of insidious forms of non-lethal violence such as legal, digital, gender and identity-based intimidation. Globally there is greater weaponization of law through legal restrictions on independent journalism, including criminal defamation laws, SLAPPs and the adoption of fake news laws. The online space is becoming increasingly hostile towards journalists with lack of adequate protections against gendered vitriol, hate speech and organised mass harassment of journalists. Governments are also weaponizing the online space to silence journalists and restrict the public’s access to reliable information via internet shutdowns, surveillance, blocking or filtering online content and through requests for content removal to major platforms. State-led capture of the media landscape, often accompanied by the concentration and monopolisation of media institutions to serve vested political interests is on the rise and is often accompanied by a politics of repression and the active silencing of independent journalism.

Recommendations for consideration by the European Parliament and the other EU institutions:

• Lead by example by supporting the creation of a safe and enabling environment for journalists within the European Union by ensuring the effective countering of and legal accountability for the wide range of threats facing media freedom and the safety of journalists. In doing so, the European Parliament and relevant EU institutions can encourage, share and – where practical – assist in the global spreading of good practice based on internationally recognised guidelines. These include, for instance, the Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)4 on the protection of journalism and safety of journalists and other media actors\(^ {38}\) (which focuses on three pillars: protection against, prevention and prosecution of crimes against journalists) as well as the Council of Europe principles of protection of journalism in situations of conflict and aggression\(^ {39}\). The European Parliament can also support and encourage the take up of good practices in non-EU countries to ensure the safety practice of journalism by drawing on the EU’s own guidelines and principles\(^ {40}\).

• Work to repeal or amend legislation which is inconsistent with international human rights standards and law as well as encourage and support the introduction of laws and policies that support a safe and enabling environment for free and independent journalism (including the protection of journalistic

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38 Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)4(1) of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the protection of journalism and safety of journalists and other media actors, 13 April 2016.
39 Council of Europe, Journalism in situations of conflict and aggression: Principles from the relevant Council of Europe and other international standards, 7 March 2022.
sources, protecting the right to information, and countering the weaponization of defamation, hate speech and fake news legislation against journalism).

• Encourage and support initiatives (including financially) seeking to address the need for more reliable quality data on the full range of human rights violations against journalists as a means to more effectively counter attacks by:
  
  o supporting the effective replication of initiatives like the Council of Europe Safety of Journalists monitoring Platform41, which maps attacks on media freedom and journalists as a means to hold member states accountable and establish dialogue with states where attacks against journalists occur, in other regions of the world where such initiatives are under way42 or in regions where such initiatives do not exist.

  o fund research by academia and civil society to better understand patterns of escalation in attacks on journalists and media freedom and towards establishing a solid data evidence base that can support the prediction and prevention of such attacks.

• Promote improved country engagement with the Voluntary National Review mechanism under the SDG Agenda against the background of limited reporting by states on issues concerning safety of journalists to date, alongside the promotion of country and civil society reporting on issues on the safety of journalists for the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review. This can be achieved, for instance, by:

  o Providing resources for the further development and refinement of easy to use data protocols for monitoring the safety of journalists in line with human rights standards43 and the SDG Agenda and Indicator 16.10.1 (including across all violation categories: killings, torture, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, kidnapping and other harmful acts).

  o Building capacity among civil society actors to undertake local data collection by promoting and supporting new and existing civil society SDG 16.10.1 shadow monitoring initiatives particularly in countries where there is a lack of political will to report on the Indicator.

• Promote and support the development and adoption of national action plans on the safety of journalists in non-EU countries, in particular to support the implementation of the SDG Agenda and SDG 16.10.

• Invest in and support initiatives to train and educate law enforcement and judicial operators on international human rights norms and standards related to the safety of journalists44.

• Promote the use of Media Information Literacy as a tool to support citizens’ and societies’ broader understanding of journalism’s societal value, aiming to build greater public trust in journalism, thereby making it more likely that the public will defend journalism against attack.

• Promote the adopt a gender-sensitive and intersectional approach to countering attacks against journalists including, for instance, recommendations made by Article 1945 relating to the need to consider the challenges and violence women face in their private and public spheres.

41 See Council of Europe, Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists.
42 https://safetyofjournalistsinafrica.africa/
44 See e.g. UNESCO, Training security forces and the judiciary on freedom of expression, n.d.
45 Article 19, Equally Safe – Towards a feminist approach to the safety of journalists, n.d.
Safety of journalists and media freedom: trends in non-EU countries from a human rights perspective

- Take measures to implement emergency visas for journalists at risk as per the High Level Panel of Legal Experts on Media Freedom Advisory report\(^{46}\) and engage in outreach to support journalists at risk via delegations abroad regarding in-country assistance and trial monitoring (for non-EU states).

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5 Appendix

5.1 List of figures

5.1.1 Killings

Global analysis

Figure 1. Number of killings per year 2012-2021 (CPJ) ¹⁷

The CPJ also records cases where the motive of the killing of the journalist is not confirmed as work-related. A total of 228 such cases were recorded in 2012-2021.
Figure 2. Number of killings per year 2002-2021 (CPJ)

Number of killings per year (2002-2021)

Figure 3. Source of fire for killed journalists, percentage and type (2012-2021)

Percentage of type of source of fire for killed journalists (2012-2021)

- Unknown: 1.0%
- Criminal Group: 14.9%
- Political Group: 39.2%
- Government Officials: 12.7%
- Local Residents: 5.2%
- Paramilitary Group: 3.0%
- Mob Violence: 0.6%
- Military Officials: 23.5%
Regional analysis

Figure 4. Number of killings per region 2012-2021

Number of killings per region (2012-2021)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of killings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APAC</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAC</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEE, EE &amp; CA</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WE &amp; NA</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5. Percentage of killings per region (2012-2021)

Percentage of killings per region (2012-2021)

- MENA: 44.4%
- APAC: 22.8%
- LAC: 14.7%
- SEE, EE & CA: 3.9%
- Africa: 12.8%
Safety of journalists and media freedom: trends in non-EU countries from a human rights perspective

Figure 6. Comparing the numbers of killings per region

Comparing the numbers of killings per region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2002-2012</th>
<th>2012-2021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APAC</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>173</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAC</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEE, EE &amp; CA</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WE &amp; NA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7. Number of annual killings per region (2002-2021)

Number of annual killings per region (2002-2021)

Year | Number of Killings
2005 | 42
2010 | 70
2015 | 74
2020 | 27

Legend:
- Total
- WE & NA
- SEE, EE & CA
- MENA
- LAC
- APAC
- Africa
Figure 8. Number of killings per region and year 2012-2021

Number of killings per region and year 2012-2021

Countries where most killings occur

Figure 9. Countries with ≥ 10 killings (2012-2021)

Countries with ≥ 10 killings (2012-2021)
Figure 10. Countries with ≤ 10 killings (2012-2021)

Countries with ≤ 10 killings (2012-2021)

Figure 11. Countries with ≥ 30 killings (2012-2021)

Countries with ≥ 30 killings (2012-2021)
Types of journalists/journalism most at risk

Figure 12. Number of journalists killed by gender

Journalists killed by gender

![Bar chart showing the number of journalists killed by gender from 2002-2011 and 2012-2021.](chart)

Figure 13. Number of killings, foreign vs local journalists

![Bar chart showing the number of killings for foreign and local journalists.](chart)
Figure 14. Types of death 2002-2011 and 2012-2021

Figure 15. Type of coverage by killed journalists (2012-2021)
Figure 16. Type of coverage by killed journalists as percentages (2012-2021)

Figure 17. Killed journalists’ medium (2012-2021)
Figure 18. Killed journalists’ medium as percentages (2012-2021)

Killed journalists’ medium as percentages (2012-2021)

- Internet: 35.5%
- Television: 29.7%
- Print: 20.4%
- Radio: 13.7%
- Documentary Film: 0.7%

Figure 19. Types of job for journalists killed (2012-2021)

Types of job for journalists killed (2012-2021)

- Broadcast Reporter: 178
- Camera Operator: 145
- Photographer: 104
- Internet Reporter: 103
- Print reporter: 87
- Editor: 52
- Producer: 27
- Columnist/Comment: 25
- Publisher/Owner: 22
- Technician: 6
- Documentary: 1
5.1.2 Killings and Impunity

Global analysis

Figure 20. Type of job for killed journalists as percentages (2012-2021)

Figure 21. Percentage of impunity categories and full justice for journalist killings (2002-2021)
Figure 22. Number of cases of impunity and full justice for killings

Figure 23. Number of cases with complete impunity and no information for killings (2012-2021)
Figure 24. Number of cases with complete impunity and no information for killings 2002-2021.

Number of cases with complete impunity and no information for killings 2002-2021

Figure 25. Number of cases with impunity across all categories, including full justice for killings (2002-2021)
Regional analysis

Figure 26. Complete impunity per region (2012-2021)

Complete impunity per region (2012-2021)

Figure 27. Number of cases with no information per region (2012-2021)
Figure 28. Impunity category per region (2012-2021)

Impunity category per region (2012-2021)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Complete impunity</th>
<th>Full justice</th>
<th>Partial impunity</th>
<th>No information</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>65</td>
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<td>77</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>116</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>226</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WE &amp; NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>224</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
<td><strong>243</strong></td>
<td><strong>509</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Country level analysis

Figure 29. Countries with ≥ 5 cases of complete impunity (2012-2021)

Figure 30. Countries with ≥ 5 cases of no information (2012-2021)
Figure 31. Cases of complete impunity and no information in relation to total of killings (countries with ≥ 5 cases (2012-2021)).

Table 2. Cases of complete impunity and no information relating to total killings (countries with ≥ 5 cases (2012-2021))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total killings</th>
<th>No information</th>
<th>Complete impunity</th>
<th>Impunity rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>98.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>97.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>88.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>84.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>96.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>95.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>Yemen</td>
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<td>Philippines</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>87.5</td>
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<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>Egypt</td>
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<td>Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory</td>
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<td>Country</td>
<td>Cases</td>
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<td>Full Justice</td>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>-------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
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<td>Libya</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>87.5</td>
</tr>
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<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>435</strong></td>
<td><strong>216</strong></td>
<td><strong>192</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 32. Countries with number of partial impunity cases > 0 (2012-2021)**

**Figure 33. Countries with cases of full justice (2012-2021)**
5.1.3 Imprisonments

Global analysis

CPJ statistics reflect an overall increase in the number of imprisonments (See Figure 34) with 293 cases of imprisonments being recorded for 2021.

Figure 34. Imprisonments per year (2012-2021)

Figure 35. Type of charge for imprisonment (2012-2021)

48 CPJ's census of imprisoned journalists is a snapshot of those incarcerated on December 1 each year. It does not include journalists imprisoned and released during the year. See: https://cpj.org/data-methodology/#:~:text=CPJ%20defines%20journalists%20as%20people,involving%20staff%20journalists%20and%20freelancers.
Figure 36. Type of charge for imprisonment as percentages (2012-2021)

- Anti-State: 61.5%
- Ethnic/Religious Insult: 1.6%
- Defamation: 3.0%
- False News: 7.0%
- Retaliatory: 11.7%
- No charge: 14.8%

Figure 37. Type of charge for imprisonment (2012-2021)
Regional analysis

Figure 38. Imprisonments per region and year (2012-2021)

Figure 39. Imprisonments per year in MENA (2012-2021)
Safety of journalists and media freedom: trends in non-EU countries from a human rights perspective

Figure 40. Imprisonments per year APAC (2012-2021)

![Imprisonments per year APAC (2012-2021)]

Figure 41. Imprisonments per year Africa (2012-2021)

![Number of imprisonments per year Africa (2012-2021)]
Figure 42. Imprisonments per year LAC (2021-2021)

Imprisonments per year SEE, EE & CA (2012-2021)

Figure 43. Imprisonments per year LAC (2021-2021)
Figure 44. Imprisonments per year WE & NA (2012-2021)

Country level analysis

Figure 45. Top 5 countries with the highest annual number of imprisonments globally (2012-2021)
Figure 46. Comparing number of imprisonments between top 5 countries (Türkiye, China, Egypt, Eritrea, and Iran) and total number of imprisonments (2012-2021)

Comparing number of imprisonments between top 5 countries (Turkey, China, Egypt, Eritrea, and Iran) and total number of imprisonments (2012-2021)

Figure 47. Countries with the highest number of recorded imprisonment cases: MENA

Countries with the highest number of recorded imprisonment cases: MENA
Figure 48. Countries with the highest number of recorded imprisonment cases: APAC

Countries with the highest number of recorded imprisonment cases: APAC

- China
- Vietnam
- Myanmar
- India
- Bangladesh

Figure 49. Countries with the highest number of recorded imprisonment cases: SEE, EE & CA

Countries with the highest number of recorded imprisonment cases: SEE, EE & CA

- Turkey
- Azerbaijan
- Russian Federation
- Uzbekistan
- Belarus
Figure 50. Countries with the highest number of recorded imprisonment cases: Africa

Countries with the highest number of recorded imprisonment cases: Africa

Figure 51. Countries with the highest number of recorded imprisonment cases: LAC

Countries with the highest number of recorded imprisonment cases: LAC
Figure 52. Countries with the highest number of recorded imprisonment cases: WE & NA

Countries with the highest number of recorded cases of imprisonment: WE & NA

Country: USA

Year


Number of imprisonments

Types of journalists/journalism most at risk

Figure 53. Percentage of male and female imprisoned journalists

Percentage of male and female imprisoned journalists (based on yearly average) (2012-2021)
Figure 54. Type of medium reported through by imprisoned journalist

![Bar chart showing type of medium reported through by imprisoned journalists (2012-2021)]

- Internet: 1744
- Print: 1012
- Television: 277
- Radio: 191
- Documentary Film: 55
- No information: 19

Figure 55. Percentage of type of medium reported through by imprisoned journalists (2012-2021)

![Pie chart showing percentage of type of medium reported through by imprisoned journalists (2012-2021)]

- Internet: 52.9%
- Print: 30.7%
- Television: 8.4%
- Radio: 5.8%
- Documentary Film: 1.7%
Figure 56. Type of coverage by imprisoned journalists (2012-2021)

Figure 57. Type of coverage by imprisoned journalists (2012-2021)
Figure 58. Type of job imprisoned journalists (2012-2021)

Figure 59. Imprisoned journalists’ jobs, as percentages (2012-2021)
5.1.4 Killings and imprisonments

Figure 60. Number of imprisonments vs killings (2012-2021)

Number of imprisonments vs killings (2012-2021)

![Graph showing the number of imprisonments vs killings (2012-2021)]

Figure 61. Number of imprisonments vs killings: Africa (2012-2021)

Killings vs imprisonments: Africa (2012-2021)

![Graph showing the number of killings vs imprisonments in Africa (2012-2021)]
Figure 62. Number of imprisonments vs killings: APAC (2012-2021)

Figure 63. Number of imprisonments vs killings: MENA (2012-2021)
Safety of journalists and media freedom: trends in non-EU countries from a human rights perspective

Figure 64. Number of imprisonments vs killings: LAC (2012-2021)

Killings vs imprisonment: LAC (2012-2021)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Killings</th>
<th>Imprisonment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
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<td>2020</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 65. Number of imprisonments vs killings: SEE, EE & CA (2012-2021)

Killings vs imprisonments: SEE, EE & CA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Killings</th>
<th>Imprisonment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>67</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 66. Number of imprisonments vs killings: WE & NA (2012-2021)

Killings vs imprisonment: WE & NA (2012-2021)

Figure 67. Top 5 countries with most killings and imprisonments

Top 5 countries with most killings and imprisonments (2012-2021)