

# Artificial intelligence, democracy and elections

## SUMMARY

Artificial intelligence (AI) has become a powerful tool thanks to technological advances, access to large amounts of data, machine learning and increased computing power. The release of ChatGPT at the end of 2022 was a new breakthrough in AI. It demonstrated the vast range of possibilities involved in adapting general-purpose AI to a wide array of tasks and in getting generative AI to generate synthetic content based on prompts entered by the user. In a just a few years' time, a very large share of online content may be generated synthetically.

AI is an opportunity to improve the democratic process in our societies. For example, it can help citizens to gain a better understanding of politics and engage more easily in democratic debate. Likewise, politicians can get closer to citizens and eventually represent them more effectively. Such an alignment between citizens and politicians could change the face of electoral campaigns and considerably improve the policymaking process, making it more accurate and efficient.

Although concerns over the use of AI in politics have been present since the late 2010s, those related to democracies and the election process in particular have grown with the recent evolution of AI. This emerging technology poses multiple risks to democracies, as it is also a powerful tool for disinformation and misinformation, both of which can trigger tensions resulting in electoral-related conflict and even violence. AI can, for example, generate false information, or spread a bias or opinions that do not represent the public sentiment. Altogether, despite its benefits AI has the potential to affect the democratic process in a negative way.

Despite the above risks, AI can prove useful to democracies if proper safeguards are applied. For example, specific tools can be employed to detect the use of AI-generated content and techniques such as watermarking can be used to clearly indicate that content has been generated by AI. The EU is currently adapting its legal framework to address the dangers that come with AI and to promote the use of trustworthy, transparent and accountable AI systems.



### IN THIS BRIEFING

- Introduction
- AI as a catalyst of democracy
- Disinformation and misinformation fuelled by AI
- Negative impact of AI on democratic engagement
- Tools to counteract harmful impacts of AI
- EU legal framework



## Introduction

While [concerns](#) about the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in politics and its impact on the democratic process are [not new](#), they have been provoked further by the rise of [general-purpose AI](#) and [generative AI](#), which represents a technological breakthrough. [Ninety per cent](#) of online content may be generated synthetically by 2026. Although there is no scientific consensus on how to define AI, the European Commission's [Joint Research Centre](#) has come up with an operational definition whereby AI systems are seen as software systems designed by humans that decide the best action to take to achieve a certain goal, by acquiring data and processing the information derived from this data. These AI systems are commonly used to provide personalised recommendations to people based on their previous searches or other online behaviour. In November 2022, AI research company OpenAI made available to the public its chatbot [ChatGPT](#), a generative AI system designed to generate text after a human user enters a prompt. Generative AI systems are usually trained on [large language models](#) that use [deep learning](#) algorithms to learn and adapt without following explicit instructions and to draw inferences from patterns in data.<sup>1</sup> Generative AI systems can then replicate and predict similar patterns to generate content. Since the release of ChatGPT, multiple rival generative AI solutions capable of generating text, images and sound have entered the market. Generative AI is expected to [become](#) even more powerful in the coming months, and [video generators](#) based on text prompts will look even more authentic in the near future. ChatGPT also belongs to the category of [general purpose AI](#), which encompasses AI systems trained on large language models to be adapted to a wide range of tasks across different domains.

The functioning of those new AI systems is relatively [opaque](#) and information about how the data is collected or trained is often unavailable. On top of privacy and intellectual property concerns, AI has a potential for bias, manipulation and spreading of disinformation, which risks weakening societies. However, if proper safeguards and rules on transparency are implemented, AI can be an extremely useful tool to improve the democratic process, particularly during election times.

## AI as a catalyst of democracy

### AI tools to improve political engagement

As a [UNESCO](#) study underlined, AI has the potential to improve democratic values, institutions and processes, including elections in various ways.

AI can serve to [educate](#) citizens in the principles of democratic life, whether by gaining knowledge about a policy issue or getting familiar with a politician's stance. For instance, political [recommender systems](#) could form the basis of a [chatbot](#) responding to citizens' questions on candidates' electoral programmes.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, specially designed AI [tools](#) could update citizens on how policies in which they have an interest are evolving<sup>3</sup> and empower them to better [express](#) their opinions when addressing governments and politicians. [Civic debate](#) could improve thanks to the capability of AI to manage massive political conversations in chat rooms. AI could automatically summarise participants' opinions, [moderate](#) the debate by identifying tensions and nudging them away from attacks and insults, and even act as a [consensus builder](#).

On the politicians' side, AI can be helpful in [summarising](#) citizens' comments made during public consultations or received by email. Feedback could be [classified](#) according to various criteria, helping politicians gain a better understanding of citizens' views, especially if [combined](#) with human expertise.<sup>4</sup> Afterwards, politicians could use AI to draft personalised replies to the citizens. A [study](#) showed that such use of AI does not undermine citizens' trust as long as careful disclosure of the use of AI is made and human oversight is guaranteed.<sup>5</sup>

## New forms of election campaigns

The way political campaigns are run may also see major changes with the rise of AI. Politicians will soon have the capacity to use AI to respond instantly to campaign developments. The increased use of sentiment analysis on social media will also allow them to [better understand](#) the topics citizens are sensitive to and interested in. AI could then be used to generate [personalised emails](#) or text messages from chatbots to specific audiences. The other side of the coin is that such an understanding allows to very precisely target one's audience, meaning that politicians could eventually target specific groups of voters, among them swing voters.<sup>6</sup>

## A transformative effect on the policymaking process

AI could also play an important role in the policymaking process and generate more [value](#) in each of its five stages: identification, formulation, adoption, implementation and evaluation. AI's ability to [summarise](#) complex problems and to process vast amounts of data can help policymakers to identify societal issues. AI can also deepen policymakers' knowledge of and provide democratic assemblies with [expertise](#) on broad topics, thus sparing them the difficulties associated with restricted availability or access. On the other hand, AI could eventually be used for new forms of lobbying, by [summarising](#) a proposal for new legislation, assessing whether it is of relevance to a company and even drafting a letter to its author arguing for changes to the proposal.<sup>7</sup> AI could also help [select](#) key legislators and target them through direct communication and public relations campaigns. Researchers have shown that AI could be used to enact [micro-legislation](#), which involves making small modifications to proposed legislation that would have the biggest impact on a narrow area of interest.<sup>8</sup> While AI could [democratise](#) lobbying activities for individuals and non-profits by reducing their cost, there is a risk that AI capabilities may influence public policy towards outcomes that do not reflect societal aspirations in a fair way.

## Disinformation and misinformation fuelled by AI

AI equips malicious entities with a wide variety of techniques to influence public opinion. First, AI can help to [observe](#) the information environment and understand the emerging social fissures. The network analysis capabilities of AI can also be used to better target an audience and establish the profile of voters, in what is known as political micro-targeting. AI can dramatically increase the speed at which content is made, while also offering access to a wealth of resources. Consequently, this could give rise to entire [fake-news websites posing](#) as news outlets. New AI tools also make it possible to [generate](#) images from text or to clone a person's voice. [Deepfake](#) videos are getting [easier](#) to produce and are becoming more and more convincing, to the point that [text-to-video](#) is described as the upcoming [breakthrough](#) in generative AI.

Deepfakes have a huge [potential](#) for misinformation (false or inaccurate information), or even disinformation (information having as its intention to mislead), notably through the making of memes and humorous video content, both of which often go viral online. Politicians are the main [potential target](#) of deepfakes, especially when they do not have the resources to protect their online presence.<sup>9</sup> Overall, deepfakes severely risk undermining trust in the information environment. They also may make it easier for some politicians to [dodge responsibility](#) for their real words, on the pretext of having fallen victim to AI-generated content.

The breakthrough in generative AI raises [concerns](#) regarding influence campaigns, as it will now require less human and financial resources to conduct large-scale disinformation campaigns. The [OECD](#) stressed that the combination of AI language models and disinformation can lead to deception on a large scale and damage public trust in democratic institutions.<sup>10</sup> AI systems themselves can produce misinformation. A [study](#) found that Google's Bard AI tool generates persuasive misinformation content on 78 out of 100 tested narratives. The new version of ChatGPT, ChatGPT-4, is even more [susceptible](#) to generating misinformation and more convincing in its ability to do so than its predecessor, ChatGPT- 3.5.

Although AI providers are working on making their models more reliable, such as by running [red-team exercises](#), AI can easily be used to draft and spread harmful narratives online, directly [tailored](#) to country-specific contexts. Disseminating disinformation could become even more impactful with the use of interactive [chatbots](#), which can customise interactions based on voter characteristics, but also adapt manipulation tactics in real time and apply them to a multitude of citizens. Such AI models could be conceived as [anthropomorphised tools](#) and generate content that simulates human emotions to manipulate the user. Generally, AI presents an important manipulative potential, as users may not be able to [distinguish](#) between human and AI-generated content. Researchers [demonstrated](#) AI's power of persuasion by showing that across different topics, AI-generated messages were at least as persuasive as human-generated messages, and that users are even more likely to [trust](#) tweets generated by AI than content written by humans.

## Negative impact of AI on democratic engagement

Politicians usually perceive mails and correspondence from their constituents as an [expression of public opinion](#) on which they can act. The rise of AI makes it possible to conduct [astroturf](#) campaigns, where a small group, posing as a genuine grassroots movement, presents a skewed view of public opinion. For instance, AI could be used to generate false correspondence with the aim of influencing legislators. An [experiment](#) showed that legislators found AI-generated text they received on six policy areas almost as credible as human-written messages. AI could also be used to create the [illusion](#) of political agreement, by posting millions of automatically generated content entries on a topic online. It could further be used to compose [comments](#) on regulatory processes, or to write letters to the editors of local newspapers, which are then published.

## Tools to counteract harmful impacts of AI

The [globalpolicy.ai coalition](#), gathering organisations from around the globe, has been [discussing](#) the possibility of launching a Global Challenge on Digital Trust to incentivise stakeholders around the world to develop solutions to mitigate the risks of disinformation. Currently, several methods can help deter AI-generated content from featuring in disinformation campaigns online.

### Automated detection tools

First, guardrails can be implemented by AI systems providers against certain types of speech, but they can [easily](#) be circumvented, for instance by [feeding](#) ChatGPT-3 with fictitious scenarios in prompts, by asking it to take on the [role](#) of a character, or by making slight [modifications](#) to the spelling of keywords. Moreover, [automated detection](#) tools, such as [GPTZero](#), [OpenAI's classifier](#) and [DetectGPT](#), can flag AI-generated content but are not [entirely reliable](#), as they are [quickly](#) rendered obsolete due to AI's increasing ability to generate more fluent language.<sup>11</sup> OpenAI's [own tool](#) correctly identified only 26 % of AI-written texts in the evaluations the company launched, although it has proven to be more accurate with longer texts. Detection tools can also easily be circumvented by [replacing](#) a few words with synonyms, or by [paraphrasing](#) AI-generated text. To improve the efficiency of detection tools, [some experts](#) advocate for open-source AI models, which would make it easier for the forensics community to build effective detection tools for tackling deepfakes, among others.

### Watermarking and innovative tools to identify AI-generated content

Another technique called [watermarking](#) involves the addition of a visual label to indicate that a content is AI-generated, or to mark the metadata. For instance, the image generator [DALL-E](#) incorporates a colourful stripe in its images. [Google](#) also announced that it would attach a written disclosure underneath AI-generated results on Google Images. Such a watermark is however sometimes hard to [spot](#) and can easily be [removed](#). When it comes to AI-generated text, the

provider can [watermark](#) the output by embedding patterns into the model's word choice that do not substantially change the output meaning. Consequently, they remain invisible to humans but are algorithmically [detectable](#). The limitations of this method are that it may reduce the quality of AI-generated text due to its vocabulary constraint and that the watermarks can be removed by [paraphrasing](#) the AI-generated text.

It is worth noting that the industry has been [working](#) on creating an interoperable open standard called [C2PA](#) to label AI-generated content and disclose its provenance or ownership history. Adobe for example is now using this standard as part of its [content credentials](#) tool, enabling creators to add extra information about themselves and their creative process directly to their content at export or download.

Other solutions that are being brought forward to counter AI-generated disinformation include the development of an [instant fact-checker](#) for social media users, the introduction of [human detection](#) of AI-generated content, or the identification of networks of fake accounts on social media platforms. Although distinguishing text generated by AI as opposed to humans is a difficult task, it remains [necessary](#) especially for fact-checking breaking news. The EU is currently funding a number of projects to build trustworthy AI solutions, one such project being [vera.ai](#), which includes a fact-checker-in-the-loop approach (where the AI model is re-trained continuously with the help of the users' feedback) and AI models that constantly check updated and verified sources.

## EU legal framework

AI can both benefit and endanger democracy, as was already highlighted above. EU law already contains some rules to address the risks linked to the use of AI tools. For instance, the [General Data Protection Regulation](#) (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR) and the [EU Data Protection Regulation](#) (EU) 2018/1725 give users the right to object to profiling but also restrict profiling based on the use of sensitive personal data. In addition, the EU is currently adapting its legal framework to better address the risks of AI, including for democracy.

## Code of Practice on Disinformation

The European Commission launched a series of non-legislative initiatives to tackle disinformation, starting with a [communication](#) presented in 2018. There followed the adoption of a Code of Practice on Disinformation, where industry – including major online platforms – voluntarily agreed on self-regulatory standards to fight disinformation. In 2021, the Commission issued [guidance](#) to strengthen the Code of Practice on Disinformation, and in 2022, a new [Code of Practice on Disinformation](#) was adopted. The industry agreed to put in place stronger transparency measures on political advertising, by providing more efficient labelling, committing to reveal the sponsor and the advertising spend and display period, and to put in place searchable advertising libraries for political advertising. The code also aims to empower users by making available tools to recognise, understand and flag disinformation and to access authoritative sources, and by running media literacy initiatives.

## Digital Services Act

The [Digital Services Act](#) (DSA) entered into force in November 2022. Under the DSA, very large online platforms have to take a risk-based approach through independent audits of their risk management systems to prevent abuse – such as disinformation – of their systems. They then have to take action to mitigate the risks, including by moderating the content displayed on their platforms.

The Code of Practice on Disinformation is recognised under the DSA. Consequently, for very large platforms, complying with the code could be considered an appropriate risk-mitigating measure.

The DSA further addresses concerns regarding the micro-targeting of citizens. It bans both targeted advertising to minors based on profiling, and targeted advertising based on profiling using special



categories of personal data such as political opinions. It also imposes transparency requirements for advertising on online platforms.

AI can be a powerful tool to improve [content moderation](#) and detect fake news on social media. However, reducing the visibility of content also entails [risks](#) of blocking legitimate forms of expression, limiting the circulation of legitimate content, restricting democratic debate and limiting pluralism during electoral periods. The [risk of bias](#) that can come with AI models can reinforce these concerns. To address the problem of platforms' [opacity](#) and understand their impact on societies, the [DSA](#) enables vetted public interest researchers to access the data of very large online platforms and thus enhance their accountability to the public.

## Political advertising

The European Parliament and the Council of the EU are currently holding trilogue negotiations on the proposal for a [regulation on political advertising](#). The proposal seeks to harmonise the rules on the transparency of political advertising by making record-keeping and labelling of political advertisements obligatory. Labels would have to be accompanied by a transparency notice mentioning the sponsor's identity and contact details, the period of publication and the amounts spent. The proposal would also ban targeting and amplification techniques that involve the processing of sensitive personal data such as political opinions.

## AI Act

Moreover, the proposed [AI act](#) envisages a risk-based approach and imposes specific regulatory requirements on high-risk AI systems. In its [position](#) on the proposed AI act, the Parliament added to the list of high-risk AI systems those used to influence voters in political campaigns. It also introduced a layered approach to regulating general-purpose AI. Providers of foundation models (defined in the Parliament's position as AI system models that are trained on broad data at scale, are designed for generality of output, and can be adapted to a wide range of distinctive tasks), would have to ensure robust protection of fundamental rights, democracy, the rule of law, health, safety and the environment. Furthermore, generative foundation AI models, aimed at generating text images, audio or video, would have to disclose the fact that the content was generated by AI and not by humans. Moreover, they would have to be trained and designed to prevent generation of illegal content. Institutional negotiations are currently ongoing to finalise the proposed AI act.

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## ENDNOTES

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