

Federalism in the European Parliament

From Ventotene to the Spinelli Group

SUMMARY

Following the conclusion of the Conference on the Future of Europe in May 2022, it remains to be seen whether the European Union will embark on substantial Treaty reform in the future. Federalists are pushing for such reform, however, and they have organised themselves for this purpose in the European Parliament ever since Altiero Spinelli created the 'Crocodile Club' in 1980. His key role in defining and advocating a constitution for a federal Europe – from his co-authored 1941 Ventotene Manifesto, through to his engagement in the Union of European Federalists and his crucial role in the drafting of the 1984 Draft Treaty on European Union – explains the choice of name of the present-day Spinelli Group.

This briefing traces the organisation and networking of European federalists and their impact on European integration from outside and inside the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Parliament (as it called itself from 1962 onwards) of today's European Union. It demonstrates how federalists and their constitutional ideas embedded in draft constitutions, which were never ratified, nevertheless strongly impacted Treaty reform and the EU's constitutionalisation in the long run.

Figure 1 – President of the European Parliament Simone Veil meets with Altiero Spinelli, February 1981



Source: European Parliament Multimedia Centre.

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Introduction

Federalists have organised themselves in the European Parliament ever since Altiero Spinelli, a directly elected Member of the European Parliament (MEP) on the list of the Italian Communist Party from 1979 to 1986, first created the Crocodile Club in 1980. Spinelli named it after the Strasbourg restaurant, which still exists, where its first meetings took place. Working with Ernesto Rossi and Eugenio Colorni, Spinelli had authored and completed the federalist [Ventotene Manifesto](#) in June 1941 (Box 1), on the island of Ventotene off the west coast of Italy, where they were imprisoned by the fascist regime. The manifesto subsequently circulated within the Italian Resistance. After the Second World War, stripped of some of its original strongly anti-capitalist thrust and advocacy of socialist revolution, it morphed into the programme of the cross-party Union Européenne des Fédéralistes (UEF), or Union of European Federalists, and the broader European Movement working for the creation of some kind of United States of Europe.

Federalist thought and mobilisation have influenced European integration and the deepening of the present-day European Union (EU) since the very start, from the European Movement's 1948 Congress of Europe in The Hague to the Conference on the Future of Europe that concluded in May 2022. Federalists initially sought to influence the creation of an economically and institutionally more integrated 'core Europe' of the six founding member states of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951-1952 and of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957-1958 – Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

Box 1 – Excerpt from the Ventotene Manifesto

The multiple problems which poison international life on the continent have proved to be insoluble: tracing boundaries through areas inhabited by mixed populations, defence of alien minorities, seaports for landlocked countries, the Balkan Question, the Irish problem, and so on. All matters which would find easy solutions in the European Federation.

Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi, For a Free and United Europe: A Draft Manifesto, 1941

Spinelli then led the mobilisation of the directly elected European Parliament for the [Draft Treaty on European Union](#) (DTEU), passed in 1984. It was never ratified, but constituted a key federalist reference point for the EU's constitutionalisation. Spinelli's death in 1986 induced the lightly institutionalised organisation of federalist MEPs from different political groups in an intergroup – called the Spinelli Group since 2010 – to protect his legacy and advance the EU's deepening through subsequent treaty reforms.

From the Ventotene Manifesto to the ECSC

The early historiography of post-war European integration arguably overemphasised the direct impact of federalist thought on the formation of a more highly integrated 'core Europe'.¹ These works explored the cooperation and organisation of European federalists in the Resistance and after 1945, which certainly created an intellectual and political climate conducive to 'supranational' forms of integration. Moreover, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman referred to the need to create a European federation in his declaration of 9 May 1950.

However, actors other than federalists, like political parties and their transnational cooperation and transatlantic networks, also mattered. The intergovernmental negotiations leading to the creation of the ECSC were also influenced by other motives like the West German desire to achieve full diplomatic equality and sovereignty and the interest of the Benelux governments in the inclusion of a Council of Ministers to prevent the domination of the new organisation by a Franco-German condominium.

Federalists nevertheless performed several key roles in early European integration. One was to create an institutional forum for the national and transnational organisation and exchange of ideas among people from politics, business, and culture. In July 1947, the UEF formed the European Movement (as it was called from 1948 onwards), together with the Ligue Européenne de Coopération Economique, primarily focused on fostering economic integration, the European Parliamentary Union, set up and run by Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, and the Anglo-French United Europe Movement.

Alongside Spinelli, the Congress of Europe brought together political leaders like the Belgian socialist and future first President of the Common Assembly of the ECSC, Paul-Henri Spaak, as well as Pierre-Henri Teitgen, a lawyer-politician from the Christian democratic Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP), and François Mitterrand from the Rally of Republican Lefts, both ministers in the government of Robert Schuman. The future German Christian democratic Chancellor Konrad Adenauer also took part alongside some 750 other participants. Through this event and others organised by the European Movement, participants were able to build personal connections and create trust, which was in short supply after 1945.

Federalist initiatives also created trajectories for legal-political concepts on how to integrate Europe. In this regard, despite its pronounced socialist origins, the Ventotene Manifesto served as a broader reference point, not least due to the dramatic conditions of its production and its visionary nature so early in the Second World War.

Following the 1948 Congress of Europe, politicians with a legal background were especially active in discussing the need for meaningful economic integration and stronger institutional ties. Teitgen, for example, played a key role in drafting the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms at the Council of Europe, created in 1949. Charged by the European Movement, François de Menthon, another lawyer-politician from the MRP, drafted the first constitutional blueprint for a United States of Europe later in 1948. Federalist cooperation in the UEF and the broader European Movement, and through bilateral and multilateral party contacts, thus created a reservoir of constitutional ideas for an integrated Europe that politicians could draw upon in intergovernmental negotiations on the ECSC Treaty and subsequently, the 1953 [European Political Community \(EPC\) draft treaty](#).

Lastly, European federalists also directly lobbied governments to foster the integration of Europe. Many politicians were members of the European Movement and others were close to its political ideals and ideas. For example, Sandro Guerrieri has shown how Italian federalists around Spinelli worked very closely with the government led by the Christian democratic Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi and his close collaborator, Paolo Emilio Taviani.² Taviani was the chief Italian negotiator for the Schuman Plan and subsequently also responsible for the EPC in the foreign ministry.

Spinelli suggested inserting the EPC into Article 38 of the European Defence Community (EDC) treaty.

Federalists produced many ideas for the EPC as developed by the ECSC Ad hoc Assembly during

Figure 2 – Congress of Europe in The Hague on 7 May 1948: Inaugural speech by Dutch senator Pieter Adriaan Kerstens



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1952-1953, which had three additional co-opted members from the three larger states and the specific task of drawing up the EPC. In drafting the document, several MEPs with close connections to the European Movement played key roles. They included the constitutional lawyers Teitgen and the German Heinrich von Brentano from the Christian Democratic Union, who headed the Constitutional Committee, the Belgian socialists Paul-Henri Spaak and Fernand Dehousse, and the Italian Christian democrat Lodovico Benvenuti.

Despite the strong federalist influence, the final EPC draft treaty marked a constitutional compromise and combined functionalist, federalist, and confederal intergovernmental ideas. It envisaged a directly elected parliament as well as a second chamber, the Senate, consisting of national parliamentarians. The president of the executive was to be elected by the Senate, and the executive would consequently depend on the support of both chambers. The Member State governments would be associated with the decision-making process, too. Finally, the EPC also included the need to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, which was missing from the [ECSC Treaty](#).

The refusal by the French Assemblée Nationale to continue the ratification process for the EDC in a procedural vote on 30 August 1954 marked the demise of the EPC. Nonetheless, it served as a reference point for discussions in the European Parliament, as it called itself from 1962 onwards, about deepening European integration in the direction of 'ever closer union', as stipulated in the 1957 [EEC Treaty](#).

From the Dehousse Report to the DTEU

With strongly pro-integration national parliamentarians selecting themselves to work in Strasbourg and Brussels, the still unelected Parliament was heavily biased towards federalist ideas for the deepening of European integration. It worked closely with the European Commission under its [first President, Walter Hallstein](#), himself a convinced federalist, to expand the competences of the EEC and the powers of Parliament.

In the 1960s, the French Gaullist MEPs, who had initially joined the Liberal and Allies Group, had moderately intergovernmental institutional preferences. Moreover, the Italian and French communists were excluded under national law from representation in the European Parliament until 1969 and 1972 respectively, further limiting dissent on institutional matters. In other words, organising federalists separately in Parliament did not seem necessary at the time.

During the 1970s, while most citizens took little interest in Community politics and policymaking, the permissive consensus on the general desirability of further integration was still growing. At the same time, several key changes took place that eventually motivated Spinelli, who was active in the federalist movement and applied research about European integration and international relations in the 1960s, to organise support for Community reform in a federal direction in the first directly elected Parliament.

To begin with, the European Movement was temporarily fractured, with most federalists under the leadership of Spinelli advocating more competences for the Community and powers for Parliament as a precondition for the democratisation of the Community. Others argued that the Community and Parliament should first address new policy concerns, especially the socio-economic challenges in the aftermath of the 1973 oil crisis and environmental degradation, to gain legitimacy in the eyes of citizens for the further deepening of the Community. This controversy led to a temporary split in the federalist movement between 1956 and 1973, which also informed the debate about the most appropriate timing of more powers and the direct election of Parliament.³

At the same time, French President Charles de Gaulle first articulated an alternative, aggressively intergovernmental vision of the EEC in the 1960s. De Gaulle returning to power in France in 1958 already helps explain why Parliament's 1960 Dehousse Report about future European Parliament elections included several compromises to overcome the French leader's opposition to institutional deepening, such as a mixed parliament with directly elected and delegated members from national parliaments. However, De Gaulle's policy became more intransigent, which led to the 1965 'Empty Chair' crisis and the 1966 Luxembourg Compromise over an informal national veto.⁴

Figure 3 – Fernand Dehousse in October 1960



© Communautés européennes 1960-1969 – European Parliament.

Such opposition to the federalist majority in Parliament grew with the first enlargement in 1973. The British Labour and Conservative parties comprised large sections that preferred the Community to remain a more traditional international organisation with limited independent powers. In Denmark, the 'No' campaign in the 1972 referendum highlighted institutional issues and produced a cleavage that subsequently curtailed the freedom of governments to support reforms. The membership of French communists further added to more strongly articulated, if ideologically diverse, opposition to federalist reform in the European Parliament.

Lastly, the 1970s was also a period marked by the dominance of executives in the face of the socio-economic crisis, with rising unemployment, high inflation rates, and growing state and budget deficits. Acting as one of two Italian commissioners during 1970-1976, Spinelli experienced this dominance within a Commission weakened in the aftermath of the 1966 Luxembourg Compromise as well as in the Community system more widely.

The prevalent crisis mode privileged technocratic, internationalist practices for governing Europe, which had also shaped the thinking of Jean Monnet, the first President of the ECSC High Authority during 1952-1955, about European integration.⁵ This approach prioritised the quality of the 'output' of policymaking. In contrast, Spinelli and other federalists were primarily concerned with the input side. They wanted to create appropriate, legitimate democratic structures and processes with a strong European Parliament modelled essentially on the existing Member State parliamentary systems.

Once Parliament was directly elected but without any additional powers, Spinelli set about transforming it into a constituent assembly that would draft a constitution for Europe. On 25 June 1980, Spinelli wrote to all MEPs with a translated copy of a speech he had previously given in Parliament in response to Emilio Colombo, the Italian foreign minister. In the letter, he proposed the setting up of an 'ad hoc' committee in the tradition of the 1952-1953 EPC work to prepare 'the necessary institutional reforms' in a draft treaty to be ratified directly by the national parliaments.

Only eight MEPs took part in the first meeting of the Crocodile Club on 9 July 1980. By October 1980, however, 78 MEPs had joined, and on 10 February 1981 Spinelli handed over a motion for a 'Crocodile resolution' to Parliament President Simone Veil signed by 179 MEPs, only 11 short of Spinelli's original target.

Spinelli had succeeded in creating a de facto intergroup. He was keen to get the broadest possible cross-party support for the Crocodile Club and the creation of an independent Committee on Institutional (now Constitutional) Affairs that was finally created from the existing sub-committee of the Political Affairs Committee at the start of 1982. Finally, on 14 February 1984, 237 MEPs voted for the final version of the DTEU, with 31 against and 43 abstentions.

The drafting and lobbying process that brought about the result was tedious. Spinelli was, in some ways, an extraordinary entrepreneur in the European Parliament. Having been elected on their list without being a party member, he did not even enjoy the support of all members of the Italian Eurocommunists. He had to work especially hard to enlist the support of MEPs from the European People's Party (EPP) Group under the leadership of Egon Klepsch from 1977 to 1982 and again from 1984 to 1992. The EPP Group eventually agreed to the process, with a separate fully-fledged committee being set up under Spinelli's leadership to draft the DTEU, thus relinquishing to some extent their traditionally strong influence over constitutional matters through the Political Affairs Committee.⁶

Although, like the 1952-1953 EPC, the DTEU was never ratified, it nevertheless created a reservoir of constitutional ideas that has served as a reference point for federalists in Parliament and directly and indirectly influenced subsequent treaty reforms.⁷ To begin with, the DTEU, although it was still strongly informed by principles of representative democracy and did not include citizen participation, stipulated the need to overcome the traditional intergovernmental method for treaty reform – an idea that influenced the 2002-2003 Constitutional Convention.

The 1984 DTEU also included the notion of European citizenship, revived in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. In Article 4, it introduced the idea of fundamental rights that were eventually enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights promulgated in the 2000 Nice Treaty and integrated into the 2007 [Lisbon Treaty](#). In Article 12, the DTEU laid down, for the first time, the [principle of subsidiarity](#) that was later enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty.

Like the Dehousse Report, however, the DTEU also included compromises to maximise support in the European Parliament and national parliaments. In the light of persisting deep ideological and national fault-lines in this policy field, one such compromise was to treat the question of economic

Figure 4 – President of the European Parliament Simone Veil meets with Altiero Spinelli



© European Communities, 1981.

and monetary union superficially, without clear commitments to its future introduction or governance. Another was the formalisation of the national veto from the Luxembourg Compromise during a transitional period of 10 years, after which all decisions would be taken by majority vote. Spinelli hoped that this would appease those with moderately intergovernmental preferences and allow them to experience the advantages of majority voting in practice.

From the Crocodile Club to the Spinelli Group

Following Spinelli's death in 1986, the Crocodile Club evolved into the Federalist Intergroup, which, when it was founded, had 78 MEPs as members. It was organised by its secretary-general, Pier Virgilio Dastoli, who had been Spinelli's parliamentary assistant and later worked as an official in the European Parliament. The Intergroup's bureau consisted of a dozen MEPs who rotated monthly as chair.

Following the 1999 elections, some 100 MEPs joined what was then called the European Constitution Intergroup. They included Alain Lamassoure, who had, *inter alia*, been Minister for European Affairs in the French government of Edouard Balladur during 1993-1995. Among others, Jo Leinen, Andrew Duff, Monica Frassoni, Michail Papayannakis, Carlos Cornero and Cecilia Malmström also participated.

Renamed the Federalist Intergroup for a European Constitution, the group had 138 MEPs in 2004, shortly before the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in referendums in France and the Netherlands in 2005. In 2010, following the 2009 elections and the ratification of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, the group was renamed again, as the Spinelli Group.

Affiliated MEPs have included Guy Verhofstadt, the Belgian Prime Minister at the time of the 2002-2003 Constitutional Convention and leader of the ALDE Group from 2009 to 2019, Andrew Duff and Sylvie Goulard from the same political group, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the Franco-German co-leader of the Greens-European Free Alliance from 2004 to 2014 and Belgian MEP Isabelle Durand from the same group, the German Social Democrat Jo Leinen, and the Austrian First Vice-President Othmar Karas from the Austrian People's Party, among others. The Spinelli Group's current president is Italia Viva member Sandro Gozi, who was elected to the European Parliament on Emmanuel Macron's party list in 2019.

Figure 5 – Spinelli Group meeting with Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Guy Verhofstadt, Jerzy Buzek, Andrew Duff, Gianni Pittella



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The Spinelli Group continues to maintain close relations with the European Movement, with a large overlap in terms of membership and leadership roles (Box 2). Recent or current group members have been presidents of the UEF, including the Spanish Socialist Domènec Ruiz Devesa since 2023. Moreover, Leinen was also president of the European Movement International from 2011 to 2017. He was succeeded by the Bulgarian MEP Eva Maydell from the EPP Group in 2017, also a member of the Spinelli Group, before Verhofstadt took over in December 2023, with Ruiz Devesa one of the vice-presidents.

Many MEPs from the Spinelli Group – like Verhofstadt, Ruiz Devesa, and Gwendoline Delbos-Corfield from the French Greens –

are also members of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs. Several have been instrumental in shaping the positions of the European Parliament on reform issues, most prominently Verhofstadt, who was also the European Parliament's coordinator for the Conference on the Future of Europe.

Although organised for the same basic purpose of advancing European integration in a federal direction, the Spinelli Group is facing greater adversity than the Crocodile Club. In 1986, its successor organisation mobilised 78 MEPs out of a total of 518, or 15 % of all MEPs. In 2024, the Spinelli Group comprises 76 out of a total of 705, or 10.7 % of all MEPs. In other words, despite a temporary increase at the time of the 2002-2003 Constitutional Convention and afterwards, the organisational strength of the federalist intergroup in the European Parliament declined by 29 % from 1986 to 2024.

At the same time, the organisational strength of the European Movement and its ability to mobilise its members has also declined.⁸ In the early post-war period, its many young members participated in spectacular actions like breaking down border barriers. On 28-29 June 1985, in conjunction with the European Community summit in Milan in Italy, where the federalist movement had always been the best organised and most influential, the UEF got 100 000 followers out to demonstrate for major constitutional reform. Despite support for the EU growing once more in most Member States, the UEF and the European Movement are currently not able to achieve a similar degree of mass mobilisation for major changes following the last reform under the Lisbon Treaty.

Two other factors have complicated the federalist cause, which were already present in the 1970s. First, a series of crises from the 2007-2008 financial and economic crisis through to the Russian war of aggression on Ukraine have once again induced more executive-dominated governance practices that make it harder for the European Parliament to prevail in interinstitutional power struggles and to gain citizens' support for a further strengthening of its role.

Box 2 – List of presidents of the UEF and EMI

Union of European Federalists	
Domènec Ruiz Devesa	2023 - current
Sandro Gozi	2018 - 2023
Elmar Brok	2013 - 2018
Andrew Duff	2008 - 2013
Mercedes Bresso	2005 - 2008
Jo Leinen	1997 - 2005
European Movement International	
Guy Verhofstadt	2023 - current
Eva Maydell	2017 - 2023
Jo Leinen	2011 - 2017
Pat Cox	2005 - 2011
José María Gil-Robles	1999 - 2005
Mário Soares	1997 - 1999

Second, populist political parties with strongly intergovernmental institutional preferences have attracted more popular support and gained greater parliamentary representation than in the 1980s. Moreover, through the various enlargements, of the two historically as well as currently largest groups in the European Parliament, the EPP Group in particular is much less united around the federalist constitutional agenda than it was at the time of Spinelli. In the early 1980s, the Christian democrats still saw themselves more strongly in the tradition of what they then called the 'founding fathers' of European integration – Schuman, Adenauer, and De Gasperi – from their own political family.⁹ In other words, the structural conditions for major treaty reform, which would require ratification in all national parliaments, seem to be significantly less propitious now than in the late 1980s.

Figure 6 – President of the European Parliament Pierre Pflimlin at a pro-European demonstration during the European Council meeting in Milan, June 1985



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Conclusion

Following the creation of the ECSC, federalists dominated the Common Assembly and the European Parliament, as it called itself from 1962 onwards. During the 1960s and 1970s, however, opposition to Community reform in a federal direction grew, and so federalists started to organise themselves in the directly elected Parliament after 1979. Altiero Spinelli, who had co-written the federalist Ventotene Manifesto in 1941, during his imprisonment in fascist Italy, created the Crocodile Club in 1980 to promote his idea of the directly elected Parliament acting as a constituent assembly to draft a constitution for a united Europe. Ever since Spinelli's death in 1986, federalist MEPs from across the party spectrum have continued to organise themselves in intergroups with changing names and in the Spinelli Group since 2010.

Mapping, in a more detailed manner than in this briefing, the membership of these intergroups, their internal roles and external connections would allow deeper insights into the operation of federalist self-organisation and action in the European Parliament. It has become sufficiently clear, however, how closely connected many members of the current Spinelli Group are with the federalist pressure group UEF and the broader European Movement, and how they have continuously sought to influence Parliament's positioning on constitutional issues.

In 2018, before the last European Parliament elections, the Spinelli Group adopted a 'Manifesto for the Future of Europe', which intentionally recycled the term used by Spinelli and his collaborators in 1941. Responding to tendencies towards disintegration like Brexit that 'would be a road to disaster', the Spinelli Group put forward a variety of proposals for developing the EU in a federal direction. They included, for the European Parliament, the idea of [transnational lists](#) alongside national ones to strengthen the European character of elections, as well as consolidating the [Spitzenkandidaten](#) approach that was first introduced in 2014. The manifesto also recommended concentrating EU executive powers in the hands of the European Commission. For the European Council, it demanded greater responsiveness of its President to the Parliament, including the obligation to answer oral and written questions. The Spinelli Group's manifesto also recommended a return to the Convention method from 2002-2003 for revising the existing Treaty framework.

With these and other proposals, the intergroup made a major contribution to preparing the [Conference on the Future of Europe](#). Following its conclusion in May 2022, the Spinelli Group drafted a '[Manifesto for a Federal Europe: Sovereign, Social and Ecological](#)', which it symbolically adopted on the island of Ventotene on 29 August 2022. It inserted its ideas into the deliberations in Parliament about its demands for EU reform. Many of them found their way into the '[Proposals of the European Parliament for the amendments of the Treaties](#)' adopted by the plenary on 22 November 2023.

In a similar vein, as this briefing has demonstrated, organisations and networks of federalists outside and inside the European Parliament have created strong trajectories for constitutionalising the present-day European Union over time. The Ventotene Manifesto marked a starting point for this process, which the Common Assembly and the European Parliament pushed forward with the 1952-1953 EPC and the 1984 DTEU. These two draft constitutions became reservoirs of constitutional ideas, and subsequent treaty reforms have incorporated many of these ideas into the EU.¹⁰ The Spinelli Group certainly hopes that some of its proposals, while not necessarily transforming the EU in the short term, can nevertheless create a similar long-term impact.

In the past, constitutionalising the EU has not only required institutional trajectories, but also consistently communicated narratives. In this regard, the Spinelli Group has successfully embedded repeat references to its own 'founding father' in European Parliament resolutions and proposals. Thus, the 'Proposals of the European Parliament for the amendment of the Treaties' explicitly refers to the Ventotene Manifesto as well as the 1950 Schuman Declaration as starting points of European integration in the present-day EU.

Adverse circumstances currently seem to mitigate against substantial treaty reform, such as the increasingly aggressive articulation of intergovernmental concepts for Europe by populist and extremist political parties that oppose the Spinelli Group's vision for the EU. It remains to be seen, therefore, whether European constitution-building has come to an end, or whether reform in a federal direction, as Spinelli desired, is still possible, and, if so, when and under what conditions.

ENDNOTES

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- ² S. Guerrieri, Un parlamento oltre le nazioni: l'Assemblea Comune della CECA e le sfide dell'integrazione europea (1952-1958), il mulino, 2016.
- ³ G. Pittoors, [The European Parliament and the European citizen as voter](#), EPRS, European Parliament, 2023.
- ⁴ For the 'Empty Chair' crisis see P. Bajon, Europapolitik „am Abgrund“: Die Krise des „leeren Stuhls“ 1965-66, Franz Steiner Verlag, 2012.
- ⁵ For a long-term perspective on the role of technocratic internationalism in governing cross-border issues, see W. Kaiser and J. Schot, Writing the Rules for Europe: Experts, Cartels, and International Organizations, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
- ⁶ For greater detail, see W. Kaiser, [Shaping European Union: The European Parliament and Institutional Reform](#), 1979-1989, EPRS, European Parliament, 2018.
- ⁷ See A. Glencross and A. Trechsel (eds), EU Federalism and Constitutionalism: The Legacy of Altiero Spinelli, Lexington Books, 2010.
- ⁸ On the history of organised European federalism, see Sergio Pistone, The Union of European Federalists, Giuffrè Editore, 2008.
- ⁹ See W. Kaiser, Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union, Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- ¹⁰ For more detail, see W. Kaiser, S. Guerrieri and A. Ripoll Servent, [The European Parliament and EU democracy: Lessons from 70 years of reform](#), EPRS, European Parliament, 2023.

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