

EU space act

CONTEXT

On 25 June 2025, the Commission published a proposal for a regulation on the safety, resilience and sustainability of space activities in the European Union (EU) ('the EU space act'). A majority of Member States have already adopted or are considering adopting legislation on space activities. The regulation's relevance was highlighted by Mario Draghi's report on the future of European competitiveness, which explained the role of space systems and services in supporting the EU's sovereignty and economy.

Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – TFEU (internal market) is the legal basis of the proposed regulation. It aims to create a single market for space activities, grounded on common safety, sustainability and resilience rules, which should apply in principle to any space operator providing space services in the EU. The proposal is expected to lay down rules on: the authorisation, registration and supervision of space activities and services carried out by space service providers; orbit traffic management; and the establishment of an EU space label. On resilience, the proposed regulation is expected to complement Directive (EU)2022/2555 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the EU, and Directive (EU) 2022/2557 on the resilience of critical entities. In the Parliament, the file has been referred to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), which has appointed Elena Donazzan (ECR, Italy) as rapporteur. In the Council, the working party on space has started examining the proposal.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL

[2025/0335\(COD\)](#) – Proposal for a regulation on the safety, resilience and sustainability of space activities in the Union – COM(2025) 335, 25 June 2025

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule: [2025/0335\(COD\) EU space law](#)

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
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Issue

The space sector is subject to fierce global competition between states as well as between companies. Technological developments have spurred a substantial drop in launch costs, which has enabled private actors to harness a majority of the orbits currently in use, while generating higher revenues from them. Mario Draghi's [report](#) on the future of EU competitiveness expects the value of the global space economy to grow by 9 % annually on average until 2035, when it may reach €1 628 billion.

Figure 1 – Breakdown of operational satellites by type of operator and orbit as of 31 December 2022



Source: [The space economy in figures](#), OECD, 2023.

This competition is also leading to the **congestion** of space. In addition to operational satellites, disused satellites and parts from them or their launch systems are also orbiting the Earth: the European Space Agency (ESA) estimates that, in 2023, 7 500 operational satellites were sharing their respective orbit with 6 200 tonnes of [space debris](#). Collisions could hamper the provision of space services (especially through potential cascading collisions among satellites, known as the '[Kessler syndrome](#)').

In addition, geopolitical tensions are fuelling **contestation** of the space domain, as some space-faring nations do not systematically facilitate space exploration or the use of space resources as a global commons. For example, in 2021 Russia conducted an illegal [anti-satellite strike](#), highlighting the risks to the continuity of space services caused by weaponisation of the space domain.

The EU's position in the global space economy is significant. However, it faces various challenges: foreign dependencies, regulatory fragmentation, and resilience and sustainability risks.

The impact assessment [report](#) published alongside the proposed regulation states that the EU currently accounts for some 20 % of the value of the space economy (€80 billion out of €484 billion), behind North America and Asia, measured as the sum of public space budgets, private revenues, and investments.

While this estimate is useful to provide an order of magnitude, in the absence of an approved statistical [methodology](#) to follow the space economy in Member States' national accounts, it might include [flaws](#) such as double counting of public spending. Another approach to measuring the competitiveness of the EU's space economy is to assess the industry's workforce and market share. According to the 2024 [facts and figures](#) published by European space industry association ASD-Eurospace, the EU businesses active in the upstream space sector employ more than 62 000 full-

time equivalent staff. The ESA's 2025 [report](#) on the space economy assesses the volume of the upstream segment to have been around €63 billion in 2024, of which the EU's market share was 6 % (€3.78 billion).

For the downstream segment, the 2024 [market report](#) on Earth observation and the global satellite navigation system (GNSS) from the European Union Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA) mentions an estimated 14 000 people employed in the Earth observation sub-sector, but without providing a consolidated estimate of the other sub-sectors. The report also stresses that demand for GNSS devices is expected to grow more intensely in the Asia-Pacific region, which might represent an export opportunity for EU stakeholders. However, Europe accounts for only 20 % of global sales in Earth observation (compared with 50 % for North America).

The competitiveness of the EU space industry faces dependencies both in its sales and across its supply chain. In terms of sales, the dependency on foreign markets comes from the EU's substantially lower public investment in space compared to the US or China; OECD [data](#) show that, in 2022, the US government's space budget amounted to 0.20 % and 0.25 % of GDP, whereas the Member States (France and Luxembourg) with the highest government space budgets each spent less than 0.1 % of their GDP and the average European (the EU, plus the United Kingdom, Norway and Switzerland) public space budget was around 0.12 % of GDP. According to the ESA's [report](#) on the space economy, in 2024 defence missions represented 54 % of global space budgets. However, the increasing demand for space systems for defence does not represent an opportunity for EU space industries as such procurements are closed in foreign jurisdictions, and due to the absence of commensurate demand in the EU. The dependencies across the supply chain were thoroughly identified in the impact assessment report mentioned above. They include raw materials (nickel, palladium, vanadium and boron) as well as critical components such as chips, but also entail technologies such as launchers.

The regulatory landscape of space activities across the EU is another key challenge, which might hinder the development of an efficient space economy. The regulation of space activities is based on the United Nations [Outer Space Treaties](#) (OST), to which the Union is not a party. By the time the proposed regulation was published, a majority of Member States had already adopted or were considering adopting national legislation on space activities derived from the OST. The data included in the UN [repository](#) of space laws, along with recently adopted national legislation (such as the 2023 [Cyprus space law](#)), show that at least 13 laws related to space activities were in force in EU countries by the end of 2024. Since then, the Italian Parliament has been examining a [legislative proposal](#) on the space economy and Spain has been designing a [similar legislative proposal](#). In Estonia, a [space law](#) is expected to enter into force on 1 January 2026. However, the impact assessment report stresses that such national laws are non-interoperable by default, hindering the development of cross-border activities, as well as the scale-up of new businesses that provide space systems and services.

This fragmentation also has consequences in terms of resilience and sustainability. This stems from the fact that such national laws do not guarantee systematic compliance with the latest cybersecurity solutions, and do not provide for a thorough life-cycle assessment of the sustainability of space products; such an assessment has yet to be designed and agreed.

Main points of the proposal

Legal basis

[Article 114](#) TFEU on the approximation of laws to ensure the functioning of the internal market has been chosen as the legal basis for the proposal. A specific annex (Annex VII) to the impact assessment [report](#) explains this choice, noting that [Article 189](#) TFEU on space policy explicitly excludes harmonising Member States' laws on space. Therefore, to ensure the proper functioning of

the market for space systems and services against the backdrop of existing national laws on space, there is a need to harmonise the key aspects of safety, resilience and sustainability underpinning the provision of such economic activities.

Scope and definitions

Article 1 on subject matter would provide for the regulation to lay down rules on: a) the authorisation, registration and supervision of space activities and services carried out by space service providers established in the Union, and outside the Union when such services or space-based data are provided in the Union; b) orbit traffic management rules; c) a governance and enforcement framework; d) the establishment of a Union space label.

Article 2 on scope would specify that the proposal does not apply to space assets launched before 1 January 2030, nor to space objects exclusively used for defence or national security purposes and to space assets temporarily used for defence purposes for the duration of the operation. In addition, Article 4 on national security states that the proposal would be without prejudice to the responsibilities of Member States in safeguarding national security, and other essential State functions.

Article 3 on free movement is expected to guarantee the smooth flowing of space services and space-based data across the single market by service providers registered in the 'Union register of space objects' (URSO). However, Member States would retain the capacity to require stricter safety, sustainability or resilience requirements for authorising a launch or operating a mission, provided such requirements are objectively necessary.

Authorisation and registration

Title II on authorisation and registration of space activities entails specific schemes for EU space operators, EU space operators operating Union-owned assets, and space service providers from third countries and international organisations. Any space operator should be registered in the URSO established under Article 24. Whereas Article 6(1) would provide for Union operators to obtain authorisation from a Member State to carry out space activities following a technical assessment conducted under Article 8, space service providers established in a third country should be registered in the URSO based on a Commission decision mentioned in Article 17(1), provided they comply with the requirements defined in Articles 15 and 16, and subject to the designation in writing of a legal representative in the Union (Article 23). However, Article 19 would enable a Member State or the Commission to ask for the registration of such service providers when the two public interest conditions set out in Article 19(2) are met: a) the launch services of the provider do not have a readily available substitute in the Union; b) the launch service is expected to promote technological capacities of strategic importance for the Union or Member States. Article 10 on light regimes allows specific actors such as research and education institutions and small enterprises to enjoy adapted conditions for authorisation.

The URSO would be managed by the EUSPA, which would be responsible for delivering the electronic certificate following registration of space service providers, with the exception of providers of collision avoidance services (Article 25). Article 22 would enable the EUSPA to make a proposal to the Commission to suspend or withdraw registration of a space service provider established in a third country, following a dialogue with such a provider.

Under Articles 26 and 27, the provision of space-based data in the Union by primary providers – providers initiating the first processing of space-based data, as defined in Article 5(22) – should require their proper registration in the URSO, as well as the registration of their space objects.

Safety, security, resilience and sustainability

Title IV on technical requirements lays down the rules on safety, sustainability and resilience.

The provisions on safety and sustainability are expected to regulate space launchers (Articles 58–61) and spacecraft (Articles 61–74). While both would be subject to analogous obligations regarding trackability, mitigation of space debris, and re-entry safeguards, spacecraft would be subject to additional obligations, such as collision avoidance through subscription to collision avoidance space services (Article 64) and orbital traffic rules (Article 68). Spacecraft should also ensure their manoeuvrability (Article 66), and any individual spacecraft in a constellation should have a propulsion system (Article 73(1)). Article 72 would provide for the mitigation of light and radio pollution, but Article 62 would provide a partial exemption to the rules applying to spacecraft used in research and education missions.

The provisions on resilience of space infrastructure would embed the proposed EU space act in the EU legislation on cybersecurity ([Directive \(EU\)2022/2555](#) on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, 'NIS2') and on the resilience of critical entities ([Directive \(EU\) 2022/2557](#) on the resilience of critical entities, 'CER'). Article 75(1) would establish the proposed EU space act as the specific EU legislation on cybersecurity for any Union space operator qualifying as an 'essential or important entity' under Article 3 of NIS2. The CER Directive would apply in complementarity to any space operator identified as a critical entity subject to this Directive.

Resilience also entails the physical resilience of space assets (Article 82). The scope of the due diligence required from space operators would be extended and would include the prevention and protection of assets (Article 84), as well as the detection and monitoring of incidents (Article 83). In addition, space operators would be obliged to design a business continuity policy (Article 87), train their staff (Article 89), and establish supply chain risk management (Article 92).

The chapter on environmental sustainability of space activities complements other relevant provisions on mitigating light and radio pollution and space debris. Article 96(1) provides a definition of sustainability, including sustainability in space and sustainability on Earth. Article 96 and Article 98 would oblige operators to submit an environmental footprint declaration when requesting authorisation to conduct a space activity, as defined in Article 6. The promotion of sustainability in space would also be supported through the creation of a Union space label framework in Articles 111 and 112. This label should be attributed by the Commission, based on an assessment by the EUSPA, to any space operator that would voluntarily abide by high standards of space activities.

The proposal defines rules on in-space operations and services, which would be specified through delegated acts, and a framework for orbital traffic rules. Article 103 provides a methodological framework for collision avoidance manoeuvres.

Article 104 would mandate the Commission to ask one or several EU standardisation organisations to draft standards on the essential requirements of the visual magnitude of spacecraft (or shielding), as defined in Article 72(2), on common specifications, and on the e-certificate that would be released following registration in the URSO, as defined in Article 25(5).

Governance supervision and enforcement

Article 28 would require each Member State to designate a public authority with responsibility for authorising and supervising space operators, and for the market surveillance activities needed to ensure compliant use of space-based data. Article 29 sets out the proposed supervisory tasks of these public authorities, while Article 30 details their proposed supervisory powers and Article 31 would enable Member States to lay down administrative sanctions to penalise infringements to the proposed regulation. Such sanctions should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.

Articles 32–37 define the framework for making use of the qualified technical bodies referred to in Article 8(1)(a) regarding authorisation systems.

Article 48 would give the Commission a specific remit to supervise a) EU space operators of Union-owned assets; b) third-country space operators; c) international organisations. The Commission

would be entrusted with the power to investigate (Article 50), as well as the right to conduct on-site inspections in the Union (Article 51) and outside the Union (Article 52). Article 53 would enable the EUSPA to open an investigation in the event of serious indications of infringement of the technical requirements set out in Title IV. Article 56 would allow the EUSPA to ask the Commission to fine an entity mentioned in Article 48, or pursuant to Article 54 in a case of an infringement. The maximum amount of the fine should be twice the amount of the profits gained, or twice the amount of the losses avoided through the breach, or 2 % of the total worldwide turnover if the amount of the profits/losses cannot be determined.

Article 105 on equivalence would allow the Commission to adopt, through an implementing act, an equivalence decision that would deem the legal framework of a third country to be equivalent to the provisions of the proposed regulation, subject to the conditions set out in Article 105(2).

Article 106 on international agreements would allow the Union to conclude cooperation agreements with third countries, in particular to: facilitate the mutual recognition of the rules covered by the proposed regulation, and the technical assessments carried out by the qualified technical bodies; set conditions for the use of space services or space-based data provided by a governmental entity that operates or owns military assets of space infrastructure.

Final provisions

Article 113 on exercise of the delegation would confer a set of 15 grounds for adopting delegated acts by the Commission. Such acts relate to matters of governance, such as determining the amount of fees to be incurred by space operators in carrying out tasks under the proposed regulation (mentioned in Article 41(3)), to technical points pertaining to sustainability and safety (mitigation of space debris, mentioned in Article 70(4)), or to resilience related to the use of specific cryptographic products or services (mentioned in Article 86(4)).

Article 116 on evaluation and review would mandate the Commission to submit the first evaluation report on the proposed regulation by 1 December 2025 to the Parliament and the Council. It should then present an evaluation report every five years, and these reports should be public.

Article 119 on entry into force and application specifies that the proposed regulation should enter into force on the twentieth day following its publication, but apply only from 1 January 2030. Article 118 establishes a transitional period for a specific set of space assets to be launched after 1 January 2030: if the critical design review phase ends up to 12 months after the entry into force of the proposal, the regulation would apply only from 1 January 2032.

Parliament's prior position

Parliament has been supportive of an EU legislative initiative to foster a space single market, in line with the objective of EU strategic autonomy.

During the ninth legislature, Parliament adopted several resolutions to substantiate its support. For instance, in its [resolution](#) of 6 October 2022 on an EU approach for space traffic management, Parliament expressed its support for 'a comprehensive framework for European binding legislation on space', to serve as the basis for an EU-wide level playing field to guarantee safe and secure space activities. The resolution also notes that space assets should be sustainable by design, in a context where space debris puts pressure on the safety of space operations.

Parliament also stressed the need to address the resilience of the space industry across its whole value chain. In its [resolution](#) of 9 May 2023 on critical technologies for security and defence, Parliament called on the Commission to include its findings on EU strategic dependencies in space in its forthcoming classified report to the Member States on critical technologies and risks. The

resolution invites the Commission to cooperate with the European Defence Agency to address existing and future gaps in technology and enhance the efficiency of investments.

In November 2023, Parliament welcomed the inclusion of a space law initiative in the Commission's 2024 [work programme](#), in its [resolution](#) on the 'Strategic Compass and EU space-based defence capabilities'. In Parliament's view, the law would improve the resilience of EU space services, strengthen EU strategic autonomy, tackle market fragmentation and enhance EU space companies' competitiveness. Notably, Parliament asked for 'significant emphasis' on information security and protective measures and to ensure access to space in crises. It was suggested that private space companies could be considered 'as private entities with a public service mission' to ensure continuity of service. Furthermore, Parliament asked the Commission to include registration, liability and environmental standards in the forthcoming legislation.

Since the beginning of the tenth legislature, Parliament has continued to express its support for an EU space law, and has also highlighted the challenges facing the EU space industry, notably in terms of resilience and sustainability.

In autumn 2024, during Commissioner-designate Andrius Kubilius's [hearing](#), the initiative to propose an EU space law was broadly supported across the political groups.

In May 2025, Parliament adopted a [resolution](#) on a revamped long-term EU budget, which stresses that a secure space sector is critical to EU sovereignty and requires sustained investment, highlighting the link between the proposed EU space act and the continuity of EU space assets and services.

In July 2025, Parliament adopted a [resolution](#) on tackling China's critical raw materials export restrictions, where it stresses that the EU space industry could be specifically disrupted by such restrictions, and calls on the Commission and Member States to accelerate the implementation of the critical raw materials act.

Prior positions of other EU institutions

Council

Space policy is under the remit of the Competitiveness Council. In [conclusions](#) adopted in 2022 on an EU approach to space traffic management (STM), Member States invited the Commission to facilitate coordination between them to address STM legislation, in order to foster convergence of national positions on an EU STM approach. The conclusions also ask the Commission to consider the risks and benefits of developing EU STM legislation to the competitiveness of EU industry. In [conclusions](#) adopted in 2023, the Council reminded the Commission of the need to comply with Member States' competences and prerogatives, including safeguarding their national security. In 2024, the ministers in charge of space held a [discussion](#) on the objectives of an EU legislative initiative (safety, resilience and sustainability of space activities in the EU), and on the possible risks from the development of foreign-based standards and rules on STM.

Preparation of the proposal

The first mention of a possible legislative initiative to establish an EU level playing field in space activities was in a 2022 joint [communication](#) by the Commission and the High Representative setting out the EU's position on [space traffic management](#). It outlined the option of preparing an EU legislative initiative, to be published by the end of 2024, that would include three complementary objectives:

- **safety:** to tackle increasing space congestion by defining rules on spacecraft and space operation safety, and by improving space situational awareness capabilities;

- **security-resilience:** to strengthen the security of space assets and operations, including [cybersecurity requirements](#) in orbit;
- **sustainability:** to reflect the EU's commitment to ensuring sustainability, including solutions to reduce the luminosity of spacecraft to preserve astronomical observation from Earth, for instance.

The preparatory work on the EU space law included a [public consultation](#) and a targeted consultation conducted during autumn 2023, for which the summary report was published only in June 2025 as an annex to the impact assessment [report](#). The targeted consultation gathered more than 300 written responses from a wide range of institutional and industrial actors as well as individuals, who were mostly supportive of the initiative. The main messages conveyed by the participants included their preference for adopting an EU law, as well as the requirement to design it to optimise EU competitiveness in the space domain; thus, the law should also apply to space operators registered in third countries but active in the EU single market. The respondents also insisted on the need to make the proposal consistent with the relevant EU legislation on cybersecurity and critical entities.

Publication of the proposal was originally planned for the first quarter of 2024, but in April 2024 the Commission informed the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) that the publication would be postponed.

The [report](#) on the future of European competitiveness by Mario Draghi included advice to 'establish a functioning single market for space, through a common EU legislative framework'. In September 2024, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen included the preparation of an EU space law in her [mission letter](#) to Commissioner-designate Andrius Kubilius, in charge of defence and space. During his [hearing](#) in November 2024, Kubilius confirmed that the Commission was considering publishing a proposal for a regulation on an EU single market for space in 2025, and that the initiative would focus on safety, security and sustainability.

In January 2025, with the publication of the [competitiveness compass](#), the Commission embedded the preparation of the proposal for a EU space act among its economic priorities to regain EU competitiveness.

The impact assessment [report](#) outlines four policy options: option 1, option 2, option 2+ and option 2++. All four options entail a legislative proposal.

Option 1 would rely on co-regulation, whereby the proposal would essentially set a governance framework and define minimum targets on safety, sustainability and resilience. Then, the proposal would mandate space industry bodies (such as trade associations and standardisation bodies) to develop the technical application of these requirements and steer the process. The bodies would develop and adopt a series of non-binding measures (for example, on best practices, guidelines and charters).

Option 2, Option 2+ and Option 2++ rely, on the contrary, on including binding provisions on safety, sustainability and resilience in the proposal. However, while option 2 would provide only for binding measures (which would be checked by national licensing authorities), Option 2+ would also provide for the development of non-binding measures (labels) to encourage the industry to exceed basic compliance and demonstrate a commitment to higher standards and best practices. The Commission noted that this would be particularly relevant for technological solutions still under development (such as solutions to mitigate light pollution). Option 2++ would correspond either to Option 2 or Option 2+, complemented with a set of bilateral international agreements to facilitate regulatory convergence with like-minded partners, based on Article 218 TFEU. The Commission assessed Option 2+ to be the most appropriate.

Points of view

The European space industry has started conveying its views and expectations on the expected proposal, well in advance of its publication. For instance, ASD-Eurospace (Eurospace) adopted a comprehensive position [paper](#) in late 2023. Eurospace welcomes an EU space act that would contribute to guaranteeing the existence of an EU internal space market, investment through a clearer legal framework and a level playing field with non-EU competitors. It calls on the Commission to involve the industry in implementing the new legislation, and to provide sufficient time to organise a smooth transition. Eurospace sees the geographical scope of the proposal as a key provision: while supporting the inclusion of all entities delivering space-based services in the EU, regardless of their jurisdiction, Eurospace also draws attention to the advantage of a flexible approach to the delivery of space-based services by EU operators in third countries. Eurospace sees an opportunity for the proposal to lay down the first legal definition of space resilience at international level. It also calls for all new satellites to include on-board cybersecurity. On safety, it stresses the need to reinforce EU space situational awareness capabilities, noting the EU's current dependency on the US. On sustainability, it also calls for commensurate EU investment in research and development to allow for the deployment of technological solutions, for instance in the field of active debris removal.

Other stakeholders stress the need to avoid unnecessary regulatory burdens, and to ensure cybersecurity by default in space systems; they include SME4space, an umbrella organisation of European SMEs active in the space sector, which issued a [paper](#) in 2024 on the future of EU space policy. The Young European Enterprises Syndicate for Space published a [paper](#) on the EU space law in 2023, as part of the public consultation, in which it concurs with the positions expressed above, most notably on the positive role of an EU law on space in incentivising long-term investment, while ensuring safe and sustainable space activities.

Confindustria, the main association representing manufacturing and services companies in Italy, expressed its [preference](#) for harmonising the liability schemes in March 2025. In Germany, following the presentation of an [outline](#) for a federal space law in late 2024, the German aerospace industries association stated its [preference](#) for aligning this with EU legislation.

Space stakeholders from third countries are also following preparation of the proposal closely. For instance, the US think-tank Center for Space Policy and Strategy published an [article](#) in 2024, in which it stressed the need for US industry and authorities to mitigate the risks incurred by US space companies. While the costs of complying with EU legislation might hinder the competitiveness of US space systems and services, the price of non-compliance might be even higher should the EU succeed in setting space standards with global reach.

Following publication of the proposal, representatives of the regions of Emilia Romagna, the Azores and Catalonia published an [open letter](#) in which they expressed their support for harnessing the proposal to boost the demand side of the space economy, notably by facilitating the integration of satellite-based data into the decisions and processes of public and private sector entities.

In its [opinion](#) on the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework, Business Europe supports the achievement of a single market for industrial defence goods, including its space dimension.

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT SUPPORTING ANALYSIS

Frizberg, D., [Safe, resilient and sustainable space activities](#), EPRS, European Parliament, September 2025.

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Pataki, G. Z., [EU capabilities in space: Scenarios for space security by 2050](#), EPRS, European Parliament, March 2025.

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OTHER SOURCES

[Types of orbits](#), European Space Agency, 2020.

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