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The New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Africa

ABSTRACT

The New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Africa (NAFSN) launched in May 2012 under the auspices of the G8 aims to create the conditions that will allow the African countries concerned to improve agricultural productivity and develop their agrifood sector by attracting more private investment in agriculture. The participating countries (Burkina Faso, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal and Tanzania) adopted 'country cooperation frameworks' (CCFs) listing their policy commitments, and companies provided 'Letters of Intent' identifying intended investments. While the general objective of the NAFSN is sound, certain deficiencies remain: the CCFs are silent on the need to shift to sustainable modes of agricultural production and to support farmers' seed systems, on the dangers associated with the emergence of a market for land rights, or on the regulation of contract farming; and they are weak on nutrition as well as on the recognition of women's rights and gender empowerment.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Africa (NAFSN) was launched in May 2012 under the auspices of the G8. Its aim is to attract private investment in agriculture, to complement public investment, by creating the conditions that will allow the countries concerned to improve agricultural productivity and develop their agrifood sector. This is to be achieved by a package of reforms that present strong similarities to the 'green revolutions' of the past, by their focus on irrigation, on encouraging the use of improved varieties of seeds and of external farming inputs, and on mechanisation of production. Ten African countries have joined the initiative: Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania did so in 2012, and Benin, Malawi, Nigeria and Senegal joined in 2013. These countries adopted 'country cooperation frameworks' (CCFs) that list their policy commitments, as well as the commitments of development partners supporting this effort; the CCFs also refer to the 'Letters of Intent' in which companies identify the areas in which they intend to invest, and the volumes of such investments.

The professed objective of the NAFSN is to encourage a reinvestment in agriculture in order to allow low-income food-deficit countries to improve agricultural productivity and thus reduce their dependency on food imports and on food aid. This objective is sound. The CCFs concluded under the NAFSN framework are seriously deficient in a number of areas, however. They are silent on the need to shift to sustainable modes of agricultural production. They refer only selectively to existing international standards that define responsible investment in agriculture. They encourage a swift process of titling land, without considering the dangers associated with the establishment of a market for land rights, particularly for land-poor farmers. They omit to refer to the need to regulate contract farming, although outgrowers' schemes are an important part of the overall vision under the CCFs. They promote a reform of seed regulations, with a view to strengthening the protection of plant breeders' rights, but without acknowledging the need to support farmers' seed systems. They are weak on nutrition, hardly acknowledging the links between agricultural production, food and health, and the need to support healthy and diversified diets. Finally, while they pay lip service to the need to address the needs of women in particular, they fail to do so in practice, effectively creating the risk that women's rights will be negatively affected as a result. These deficiencies should be addressed as a condition for the continued support of the EU and its Member States to the process.

1 The background: Reinvesting in African agriculture

The New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition launched in May 2012 at the Camp David Summit of the G-8 is one in a series of responses to the global food price crisis of 2008-2010. Section 1 of this introductory chapter therefore recalls how this crisis developed and how it was interpreted, in order to understand the response and assess its adequacy. Section 2 describes how the international community reacted to the global food price crisis, detailing the reactions of the EU and of the G8 in particular. Section 3 presents, against this background, how the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (NAFSN) emerged in 2012, in order to facilitate and support the contribution of private investment to agricultural growth in Africa. Finally, section 4 provides a brief summary of the current state of play, examining how the initial commitments were met.

1.1 The global food price crisis of 2008: Immediate and structural causes

The so-called 'global food crisis' began when the prices of agricultural commodities on international markets began to surge in late 2007, reaching its peak in June 2008: at that point the prices of major commodities (rice, maize, wheat and soybean) were more than double their pre-crisis levels. The most immediate triggering factors were certain weather-related events in 2005 and 2006, which led to worse-than-expected harvests in certain major cereal-exporting countries. The resulting price impacts were magnified by export restrictions put in place, in a matter of weeks, by a significant number of countries (20 to 29, depending on how they are counted), suddenly panicking that the prices of staples could continue to increase and concerned that they needed to protect their population from future price spikes -- just as other countries decided to resort to panic buying, further worsening the situation.[1]

These events only led the markets to panic, however, because the crisis laid bare deeper imbalances in the global food system. First, agricultural production has grown over the years to become highly dependent on fossil energies, in the major cereal-producing regions. Any increase in the price of oil therefore leads to a corresponding rise in the cost of producing food, making it difficult for producers to respond to sudden price increases of agricultural commodities by boosting production. Second, combined with higher oil prices, the move towards renewable fuels for transport has, since the mid-2000s, led to a higher demand for agrofuel feedstock—particularly maize, soybean, rapeseed and palm oil. This has created a surge in the demand for grain and more competition for cropland between food, feed for livestock, and fuel.[2] It also further strengthened the links between the food and the energy markets, as biofuels production has pro-cyclical effects: the higher the prices of oil, the more it becomes profitable to increase the processing of plants into energy, at the very same time that agricultural production is more expensive due to increased input prices. Third, the nervousness of the agricultural markets was magnified by financial speculation: increased investments by financial actors in 'derivatives' from agricultural commodities, in the form of futures contracts, options or swaps, significantly worsened volatility on the spot markets.[3]

In 2007-2008, these various factors combined to create a climate in which the market actors, States included, came to fear that the markets could not be trusted to ensure a steady supply of foodstuffs at

[1] For a more detailed assessment, see O. De Schutter, 'The Green Rush: The Race for Farmland and the Rights of Land Users', *Harvard International Law Journal*, vol. 52(2) (2011), pp. 503-559.

[2] See e.g., D. Mitchell, 'A Note on Rising Food Prices', *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* No. 4682, July 2008, p. 16. Mitchell estimates that, because mandates and subsidies encouraging biofuels production and consumption in the United States and in the European Union have increased competition for land and water between energy and food (thereby encouraging speculation and export bans as stocks declined), up to seventy-five percent of the food price rise of 2007–2008 can in fact be traced back to these policies.

[3] See generally O. De Schutter, Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 'Food Commodities Speculation and Food Price Crises: Regulation to Reduce the Risks of Price Volatility', Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food Briefing Note No. 2, September 2010.

affordable prices, because of the low level of stocks at global level and the inability of agricultural producers to respond swiftly to the rise in demand for agricultural commodities. However, we find yet more structural causes if we move up the causality chain and go further back in time. Indeed, what the crisis also brought to light, were the imbalances brought about by the 'structural adjustment' programmes of the 1980s and 1990s devised by the World Bank and, as a component thereof, the trade liberalisation policies that many developing countries were forced to pursue. The aim of structural adjustment was to improve the macro-economic conditions of heavily indebted developing countries, in order for them to continue to have access to international financial markets. But the impacts of such policies on the agricultural sector were often devastating. As part of these reforms, the new orthodoxy had it that farmers henceforth should respond to the price signals from the market. Public interventions, like the establishment of commodity boards buying the crops at certain predefined prices, were seen as market distortions.

The removal of subsidies to agricultural producers and the dismantling of extension services were shocks with which many smaller farmers were unable to cope.[4] In addition, although trade liberalisation was part of the package of reforms conducted in the name of structural adjustment, the lowering of import tariffs exposed the less competitive food producers of developing countries to competition from abroad. The 'competition' that resulted was particularly unfair: the governments of the least developed countries (LDCs) were often unable to support their producers exposed to the dumping of agricultural products from Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, who sold various products, at often highly subsidised prices, on the domestic markets of LDCs. Small-scale farmers were especially hard hit. In contrast to middle-size or larger farmers, they could not switch to producing cash crops for export markets and thereby adapt to the new international division of labour that was being encouraged by trade liberalisation. The smaller production units were also less competitive, since they were not in a position to achieve significant economies of scale. Finally, they were unable to overcome a range of barriers impeding access to the high-value markets of OECD countries, related both to the tariffs imposed by these countries and to non-tariff barriers, including both public and private standards.

Finally, further fragilising the agricultural sector in LDCs in the 1980s and 1990s, official development assistance (ODA) moved away from agriculture, which donors did not see as offering a strong potential for development: In 2008, the World Bank reported that the share of ODA resources devoted to agriculture declined from 18 % in 1979 to 3.5 % in 2004, and that it declined in absolute terms from USD 8 billion (in 2004 USD) in 1984 to USD 3.4 billion in 2004.[5] According to other (converging) estimates, 'ODA support to agriculture reached a peak of about USD 23 billion (2009 constant USD) in the mid-1980s, and then declined to approximately USD 5 billion in the mid-2000s, before climbing back up to almost USD 10 billion in 2009. Similarly, the share of agriculture in total ODA declined from 18 % to 4 % between the mid-1980s and mid-2000s, but grew to 6 % in 2009'[6] (fig. 1).

[4] *See* H. Stein, 'World Bank Agricultural Policies, Poverty and Income Inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa', *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society*, vol. 4 (2011), pp. 79-90. Other assessments have been more positive: see e.g., L. H. Summers & L. H. Pritchett, 'The Structural-Adjustment Debate', *American Economic Review*, vol. 83 (1993), pp. 383-9.

[5] World Bank, *World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development*, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2007, p. 41.

[6] S. Fan and C. Breisinger, 'Development Assistance and Investment in Agriculture: Promises and Facts', *Zeitschrift des ITAS zur Technikfolgenabschätzung*, Nr. 2, 20. Jahrgang (July 2011), S. 20-28.

Fig. 1. The decline in official development assistance going to agriculture (1970-2009)



Source: Fan and Breisinger, based on 2011 OECD statistics (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2011: Development Assistance Committee online database – Official bilateral commitments by sector).

While public support to agriculture declined significantly between the mid-1980s and throughout the 1990s, it was hoped that private investors would fill in the gaps. They did not. As a result of the huge subsidies provided to OECD producers by their governments,[7] overproduction was massive, and the prices of raw agricultural commodities on the international markets fell structurally since they had last peaked in 1973 and 1979. The private sector was not interested in entering a sector that was perceived as being in decline.[8]

The net result of the policies of the 1980s was, therefore, a further increase in inequality and poverty in the rural areas. Many small farmers were relegated to subsistence agriculture, with neither the incentives nor the possibility to produce beyond what was needed to feed their families. Some took up work on large plantations. Many others migrated to cities, on a seasonal or more permanent basis, in search of better opportunities. And the dependence of LDCs on food imports to feed themselves increased significantly, rendering them very vulnerable to price variations on international markets.[9]

1.2 The reactions of the EU and the G-8 to the global food price crisis: The L'Aquila Food Security Initiative

It was this catalogue of failures that policymakers were suddenly faced with when they awoke to the global food price crisis in the spring of 2008. The EU responded swiftly, with the establishment in December 2008 of the EUR 1 billion Food Facility, to raise the productivity and incomes of small farmers in the fifty worst affected countries, by strengthening farmers' organisations, developing rural

[7] Government support to farmers in OECD countries was USD258 billion in 2007, just before the crisis of 2008, representing 23 percent of total farm receipts in these countries. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), *Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries: At a Glance* (OECD, 2008), p. 9.

[8] H. Ghanem, 'World Food Security and Investment in Agriculture', *International Economics Bulletin* (17 September 2009).

[9] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), *The Least Developed Countries Report 2010. Towards a New International Development Architecture for LDCs*, UNCTAD, Geneva, 2010, pp. iv and 8.

infrastructures and services, and linking farmers to markets.[10] The Regulation came into force on 1 January 2009. A first set of projects was approved on 23 March 2009, covering 23 developing countries (including 14 in Sub-Saharan Africa) for a total amount of EUR 313.9 million; a second set was approved on 24 April 2009, covering EUR 393.8 million; further projects were approved in batches on 9 December 2009 (EUR129.7 million) and on 22 April 2010 (EUR 145.3 million). By 31 December 2011, all contracts had been completed.[11] It has been estimated that, altogether, the 232 projects funded under the EU Food Facility improved the lives of over 59 million people in 49 countries; 93 million others benefited indirectly, for instance through or by learning from farmers directly supported by the EU programme.[12]

In July 2009, a year within the crisis, the G-8 Leaders, together with a number of partners, joined to discuss food security at a session convened in L'Aquila under the Italian presidency of the G-8. The meeting took place in a context in which the food prices, though they had declined since the peak reached in June 2008, remained high and volatile, in particular as a result of insufficient investments in agricultural development in poor, net-food-importing countries. Against that background, the G-8 Leaders and their partners pledged to 'partner with vulnerable countries and regions to help them develop and implement their own food security strategies, and together substantially increase sustained commitments of financial and technical assistance to invest in those strategies'.[13] In adopting the L'Aquila Food Security Initiative (AFSI), they committed to 'substantially increasing aid to agriculture and food security including through multiyear resource commitments', announcing commitments amounting to a total of USD 20 billion for the period 2009-2012 in support of a 'coordinated, comprehensive strategy focused on sustainable agriculture development, while keeping a strong commitment to ensure adequate emergency food aid assistance'.[14] The European Commission alone announced it would contribute to this collective effort with an amount of USD 3.8 billion. Though Africa is not, in principle, the only region concerned by these efforts, in practice it is there that the impacts of underinvestment in agriculture have been the most severe, both as a result of the budgetary constraints faced by local governments and as a result of more structural factors, including poor governance, poor infrastructure, and limited opportunities allowing the rural population to exit from agriculture in alternative sectors of the economy.

The figure announced in L'Aquila, later raised to USD 22 billion, is difficult to monitor, in part because only a portion of that amount is 'new money', the remainder taking the form of already committed funds that were to be redirected (or, less charitably put, repackaged) to serve food security and nutrition. Despite these limitations, the assessment presented by the G-8 three years later, at the end of the financing period covered, presented a mixed picture. The Camp David Accountability Report, released in May 2012, notes that: 'Nearly half of the G-8 members have made rapid progress in disbursing their financial commitments and have fully disbursed their pledges. However, despite the substantial increases

[10] Regulation (EC) No 1337/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 establishing a facility for rapid response to soaring food prices in developing countries, OJ L 354, 31.12.2008, p. 62–69.

[11] Data from Europaid, *The Food Facility. The EU Rapid Response to the food crisis*, 2010, see: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/publication-food-facility-a-rapid-response-from-eu-2010_en.pdf.

[12] Final Food Facility Report (Dec. 2012).

[13] L'Aquila Joint Statement on Global Food Security, para. 3.

[14] L'Aquila Joint Statement on Global Food Security, para. 12. In addition to the Heads of State or Governments of the G-8 countries, the session was joined by Algeria, Angola, Australia, Brazil, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Libya (Presidency of the African Union), Mexico, The Netherlands, Nigeria, People's Republic of China, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Spain, South Africa, Turkey, Commission of the African Union, FAO, IEA, IFAD, ILO, IMF, OECD, The Secretary General's UN High Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis, WFP, The World Bank and the WTO. In addition, though they did not attend the session, the L'Aquila Food Security Initiative was joined by the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), Bioversity/Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), the Global Donor Platform for Rural Development and the Global Forum on Agricultural Research (GFAR).

in public-sector funding from the G-8, other AFSI donors, multilateral development institutions and developing countries themselves, national agriculture investment plans are still underfunded by about half. While in some cases public financing could more directly support the investment needs identified in national agriculture investment plans, in almost every case the private-sector elements of these national plans are disproportionately underfunded. This suggests the urgent need to actively attract private investment to the priorities identified in national agriculture investment plans.'[15]

1.3 From the L'Aquila Food Security Initiative to the G-8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition

At the heart of the G-8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, lies therefore the recognition that African governments alone -- public investment in poor countries combined with official development assistance -- shall not suffice to compensate for underinvestment in agriculture since the early 1980s. The New Alliance was announced at the G-8 Summit convened in Camp David on 18-19 May 2012. The Summit brought together the leaders of the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Russia, under the Presidency of the United States. The Camp David declaration included a statement praising African governments for committing to 'increase public investments in agriculture and to adopt the governance and policy reforms necessary to accelerate sustainable agricultural productivity growth, attain greater gains in nutrition, and unlock sustainable and inclusive country-led growth' through the African Union's Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), and continued:

> Building on this progress, and working with our African and other international partners, today we commit to launch a *New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition* to accelerate the flow of private capital to African agriculture, take to scale new technologies and other innovations that can increase sustainable agricultural productivity, and reduce the risk borne by vulnerable economies and communities. This *New Alliance* will lift 50 million people out of poverty over the next decade, and be guided by a collective commitment to invest in credible, comprehensive and country-owned plans, develop new tools to mobilise private capital, spur and scale innovation, and manage risk; and engage and leverage the capacity of private sector partners – from women and smallholder farmers, entrepreneurs to domestic and international companies.

The NAFSN can be described as an attempt to mobilise the private sector into investing in food security and nutrition, in order to compensate for the inability of public budgets to make up for the financing gap. To this end, the participating countries negotiate country cooperation frameworks (CCFs), setting out a number of commitments to facilitate private investment in the areas concerned. Such cooperation frameworks typically: (i) bring together the various strategies adopted by the country in support of agricultural development, food security and nutrition, forming the national implementation framework of the African Union's CAADP; (ii) list commitments made by the concerned government; (iii) list pledges from donor countries in order to ensure predictable support to these programmes, as well as pledges from companies, both domestic and foreign, to contribute to the national strategies put in place by their investments.

[15] Camp David Accountability Report, May 2012, p. 4.

1.4 Implementation of commitments: The state of play

Three years after the initial announcement of the NAFSN, it would still be premature to provide a comprehensive assessment of the impacts on the ground of the policies that were announced at the time, and in the CCFs adopted by the ten countries who joined the programme in 2012-2013. Although many policy commitments were already present in the national plans adopted under the CAADP framework, such promises take time to materialise, and the private sector has complained that certain reforms (particularly a clarification of tenure rights on land and water) were a condition for their arrival in the countries concerned. The state of play is currently as follows:

Host country commitments. In their CCFs, host countries pledged to facilitate and encourage private investment in support of food security objectives. With that objective in mind, the cooperation frameworks list intended substantive reforms in three major areas: a *business-friendly environment* should be created by infrastructure improvements (in irrigation of land and rural feedroads, as well as port infrastructures), tax reforms and better access to finance, as well as a removal of fiscal, regulatory and administrative barriers to marketing of products and trade, greater transparency and stability in trade policy (to facilitate export of agricultural commodities), and regulatory reform in the area of seeds to strengthen intellectual property rights of plant breeders and to establish a seed catalogue where such catalogue has not been established; the *access to inputs for farmers* should be facilitated (by the production, distribution and use of improved seed, fertiliser, pesticides and farming implements, ensuring in particular that women farmers benefit), and rights to land and water should be clarified; finally, *specific nutrition-based policies* should be adopted (such as biofortification, fortification, nutrition policies and malnutrition treatment). In addition, the CCFs refer to the need for a follow-up to the commitments made, by the establishment of an appropriate *institutional framework*: they refer in this regard to the annual review process provided for under the CAADP strategy.

The tables included in the annexes to this report provide a summary overview of the commitments made under the cooperation frameworks adopted by the ten participating countries. Table A lists the key policy initiatives mentioned in the cooperation framework as well as the institutional framework established to implement the policies concerned. Table B lists the key reforms that the governments concerned pledge to take in three substantive areas: the shaping of a business-friendly environment; access to land and to inputs; and nutrition-specific policies. Altogether, the ten countries concerned committed to 213 policy changes. 116 of these were to be completed by June 2014. Of this total, according to the NAFSN, 25 % of these policy changes were completed, and progress was made on another 70 %. The following table illustrates that the areas in which policy reforms have been most difficult to implement are the clarification of land and resource rights, nutrition-specific reforms, and access to financial instruments and insurance against risk:

Table 1. State of progress in implementing the 116 policy changes that were due by June 2014



Source: G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, 2013-2014 Progress Report, August 2014

Development partners' commitments. In total, for the ten participating countries, development partners committed to support the national action plans for food security for a total amount of USD 6.2 billion. By June 2014, the donors had disbursed USD 2.1 billion, or about 72 % of the commitments that they had pledged by that date.[16]

Private sector commitments. For the ten countries concerned, 180 companies pledged in their 'Letters of Intent (LoIs)' to invest a total of USD 8 billion in agriculture; though private investors were slow at delivering at first (only USD 60 million were invested in 2012 on the basis of the LoIs), about USD 1.1 billion investments had been made by the end of 2013. A rough estimate is that these investments reached an estimated 1.90 million smallholders (21 % of which are women), including by the provision of services (546 947 farmers), by sourcing from these producers (208 935 farmers), by outgrowers' schemes (111 194 farmers) and by training (593 481)[17]; and that they have led to the direct creation of 36 676 jobs (40 % of which are women). Generally, the commitments expressed in the LoIs have been followed through: by mid-2014, the New Alliance estimated that 78 % of the investments committed were completed ahead of schedule (13 %) or on plan (38 %), or encountered only minor problems or delays (24 %).[18]

The data show that, whereas some Africa-based companies play an important role in the NAFSN (as calculated by the anticipated size of the investments pledged in the 'Letters of Intent' included in the New Alliance Country Cooperation Frameworks), two companies are significantly leading: the Swiss seed company Syngenta and the Norwegian fertiliser company Yara International (who pledged USD 500 million and USD 1.5 billion respectively) (Fig. 2).

[16] G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, *2013-2014 Progress Report*, August 2014.

[17] For 805,984 smallholders who allegedly have been reached by this first wave of investment, it remains unspecified how they were involved. Moreover, some smallholders have been reached by more than one channel; for instance, outgrowers commissioned to supply buyers of raw materials may have benefited from training. These estimates are based on an analysis of 98 of the 227 LOIs in the ten countries involved in the New Alliance. Data from the G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, *2013-2014 Progress Report*, August 2014, Table 1.

[18] G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, *2013-2014 Progress Report*, August 2014.

Fig. 2. Total investment pledged by companies having contributed Letters of Intent as of November 2012 (by country of origin)



Source: D. Hong and ONE, New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition: Part 1. (available from http://www.one.org/us/policy/policy-brief-on-the-new-alliance/)

This pattern explains why many observers consider the NAFSN to be a Trojan horse for Western multinational firms, eager to expand their markets by taking part in the relaunching of African agriculture -- but imposing, in the process, their own views of the trajectory to be followed, and of the associated agronomic and economic choices. How real is this risk? As an attempt to coopt the private sector in the broader effort to reinvest in agriculture in Africa, the NAFSN gave rise to an important debate around the role of private investment in support of this effort. Is private investment a necessary complement to the efforts of governments? What are the dangers associated with governments partnering with private companies -- agrochemical companies and seed companies, commodity traders and agrifood processors -- who have in mind, not the interests of the local communities, but the increase of their profits and the expansion of their markets?

In order to answer this question, part II of this report replaces the NAFSN within the broader attempt of which it is a part -- to launch a new 'Green Revolution' on the African continent. In chapter 3, the report then examines the most contentious issues involved: governance and ownership; access to land and land rights ; regulatory reforms in the seeds area ; nutrition ; and the gender dimension.

To the fullest extent possible, the assessment is based on updated information concerning the implementation of the CCFs. However, the data concerning implementation remain fragmentary, as we still are in many areas at a very early stage of implementation.

2 The second generation 'Green Revolution'

The NAFSN has been controversial from the start. Like other initiatives that have sought in recent years to encourage a reinvestment in agriculture in African countries after almost thirty years of neglect, the CCFs adopted under the New Alliance chapeau define food insecurity as, primarily, attributable to a productivity gap, which in turn is seen as resulting from a lack of irrigation, of mechanisation, and of inputs -- pesticides, chemical fertilisers and 'improved' varieties of seeds in particular. This diagnosis largely relies on a comparison with Asia: at the time when the NAFSN was being launched, the percentage of irrigated land is comparatively much lower in Africa than in Asia (3 % versus 47 %)[19]; the use of fertilisers is minimal (11 kg per hectare versus 169 kg in South Asia)[20]; and the number of tractors, small: in 2003, there were 1.3 tractors per hectare of arable land in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the figure in Asia and the Pacific was 14.9.[21]

The NAFSN thus contributes to an agenda described as a new 'Green Revolution' in Africa, as a means of catching up with the higher productivity levels of other regions by a package of reforms introducing more 'modern' technologies into agriculture. However, there are three major differences between the 'green revolution' implemented in Asia in the 1960s and 1970s and what is currently at stake in Sub-Saharan Africa. First, the South Asian countries that implemented the initial 'green revolution' were creating, during the same period, a demand for labour in the industry and services sectors, in some cases (as in India and China, but also South Korea) by protecting their 'infant' industries behind strong barriers to allow them to gradually compete on global markets. In other terms, at least part of the surplus labour that would migrate from the farming sector as a result of the transformation of agriculture could be employed in other parts of the economy, so that the introduction of labour-saving technologies, in general, was rightly seen as desirable.

Secondly, while it did allow for significant increases in yields per hectare of cultivated land, the environmental impacts were largely ignored. Yet, the 'Green Revolution' led to an extension of monocultures, and thus to a significant loss of agrobiodiversity and to accelerated soil erosion. The overuse of chemical fertilisers polluted freshwater, increasing its phosphorus content and leading to a flow of phosphorus to the oceans responsible for eutrophication. Greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture also increased significantly as a result of the reliance of nitrogen-based fertilisers. Although these various liabilities are well understood today, in the 1960s, when the 'Green Revolution' in agriculture was taking place, there was little concern for the preservation of natural resources or for the risks of increased competition over resources. These are threats that are now much better understood: the Sustainable Development Goals include the goal to promote sustainable agriculture, and set the target to 'ensure sustainable food production systems and implement resilient agricultural practices that increase productivity and production, that help maintain ecosystems, that strengthen capacity for adaptation to climate change, extreme weather, drought, flooding and other disasters and that progressively improve land and soil quality', by the year 2030.[22] It is troubling, against this background, that the CCFs are almost entirely silent about the transition to sustainable forms of agricultural production.[23]

Thirdly, the 'Green Revolution' that characterised agricultural development in Latin America and in Asia respectively in the 1950s and 1960s was primarily focused on the increase of production of food crops to feed the local population: the emphasis was on staples such as wheat, maize and rice, and the chief concern was to ensure that productivity growth would match population growth, that was particularly strong at the time. In contrast, the current transformation of agriculture in Africa follows thirty years

[19] FAO, *The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2012*, FAO, Rome 2012.

[20] S. Mwangi, Kimenyi, B. Routman, and A. Westbury, *CAADP at 10: Progress Toward Agricultural Prosperity*, Africa Growth Institute at Brookings, Policy Paper, 2013, p. 2 (based on World Bank statistics (November 2012)).

[21] J. Ashburner and J. Kienzle, *Investment in agricultural mechanization in Africa: Conclusions and recommendations of a Round Table Meeting of Experts*. Agricultural and Food Engineering Technical Report. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Rome, 2011.

[22] UNGA Res. A/70/L.1, Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, target 2.4.

[23] One exception is Senegal, where the CCF refers to a commitment of the Government to 'respecting and ensuring respect for the environment, especially environmental assessment in accordance with existing legislation, specifically the Environmental Code and implementation decrees'. Among the policy measures that should be adopted to that effect, the document refers to the implementation of the program to combat deforestation and soil degradation through sustainable and integrated management of forest stands and soil.

during which the focus has been on the development of export-led agriculture, in which the priority has been to increase the production of cash crops for global markets, and with a view, especially, to enter the high-value markets of OECD countries: since the launch of structural adjustment programmes in the early 1980s and, as a component of such programmes, the gradual removal of barriers (both tariff and non-tariff) to the trade of agricultural products, many developing countries have been designing their investment policies to support the production of crops (such as cocoa, coffee, cotton, tobacco, or cashew nuts, for instance) that could allow them to have access to hard currencies and thus to reimburse their foreign debt. This has been guiding their choice of infrastructures (which ports to build, which roads to maintain, which storage facilities to establish), their choice as to which farmers to support (those producing for global supply chains rather than those growing food for local communities), and their choice as to which types of production to encourage, with the associated agronomic consequences: the large-scale, more highly capitalised and mechanised forms of production were prioritised, whereas small-scale (or 'family') farming was comparatively neglected. Such export-led agriculture thus generally favoured the larger producers, those capable of achieving certain economies of scale and of complying with the standards imposed in global supply chains as well as to comply with the expectations of the large commodity buyers (who favour suppliers who can provide large volumes of agricultural commodities within predictable timeframes). It also led the low-income countries' dependence on food imports to grow significantly.

Fourthly, finally, a major difference between the 'Green Revolution' of the 1960s and 1970s and the new revolution that is being launched on the African continent today, concerns the role of the State. In the earlier Green Revolution, the State took centre stage -- training farmers, financing agricultural research to produce new seed varieties that were distributed freely or were heavily subsidised, and combining purely technological advances with economic policies (particularly price support policies and price stabilisation mechanisms through the use of marketing boards) that were intended to support farmers' ability to undergo the shift to a more highly capitalised type of agriculture. Partly as a result of the growing suspicion of the State's involvement in the economy (particularly the 'price-distorting' impacts thereof), and partly because of the lack of resources of the State, the approach we witness today differs significantly from the earlier one: it is now private investment that is guiding the process of agricultural transformation, and it is agrifood companies, not States, that are the central actors in food systems.

It is at this fourth level that the NAFSN is perhaps the most significant: the main objective of the initiative, indeed, is to ensure adequate linkages between public programmes and private investment, in a process of *mutual alignment* -- so that private investors contribute to the national plans on investment in agriculture, and so that public investments and regulatory reform create a business-friendly environment, encouraging private companies to enter the agrifood sector. To a large extent, whether the New Alliance on Food Security and Nutrition shall make a positive contribution to the alleviation of hunger and malnutrition in the participating countries shall depend on how such alignment is achieved. Shall the commitments made by the parties involved -- the government concerned, the international community, and the private sector -- be aligned with the local needs as they have been identified in fully participatory processes, with a focus on the most marginalised food producers, and taking into account the specific needs of women? Or will the New Alliance's insistence on facilitating the role of the private sector (as private investment is increasingly seen as a substitute for the inability of governments to make the required budgetary commitments towards the relaunching of agriculture) instead divert scarce public resources away from rural poverty reduction and rural development, to benefit 'growth corridors' aimed primarily at export-oriented agriculture, in which middle-size and large-size agricultural producers are given priority? Will private investment be aligned with local priorities, or will local priorities be tailored to suit the needs of private investors? These questions may sound general. But how they are answered shall have precise implications on the ground, as may be illustrated by the case of Malawi (Box 1).

Box 1. Aligning private investment with nationally-owned development plans, or aligning plans with the needs of the private investors? -- The case of Malawi

The case of Malawi illustrates the dilemmas New Alliance countries face when committing to strengthen their agricultural sector in order to attract private investment. The 2010 Agriculture Sector Wide Approach (ASWAp), Malawi's master plan for reinvesting in agriculture under the CAADP framework, acknowledges that agricultural extension services should be significantly scaled up.[24] Indeed, their staff has been drastically reduced since the late 1990s (from about 3 000 to about 1 000 extension staff), with negative consequences for vulnerable farmers. In joining the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in 2013, the Government committed to strengthen extension services to support export growth clusters. While this is promising, it is unclear whether, as result of such strengthening, the extension services will also reach the most vulnerable farmers: if the growth of extension services targets as a matter of priority the producers that contribute to the National Export Strategy or are involved in the development of large-scale commercial agriculture, this will represent a huge diversion of scarce public resources, with limited impacts on the reduction of rural poverty, and with potentially regressive impacts within the rural population.

Another commitment of Malawi under the Country Cooperation Framework is to release 200 000 hectares of land to investors, 'after conducting a survey to identify idle land and crop suitability under both customary [tenure] and leasehold'.[25] 2.4 million hectares of land have been identified as 'underutilised', and the intention of the government in 2013 was to favor the exploitation of this land, inter alia by expanding the area under irrigation through the Green Belt Initiative, from 90 000 hectares to 400 000 hectares.[26] It is likely, however, that the 200 000 hectares of land that are intended to be 'freed' for investors shall be given priority in this regard, and that this land will be the best quality land, with the most desirable geographical location alongside Lake Malawi. The progress achieved in 2013-2014 on the Chikwawa Green Belt Irrigation Scheme in the Salima district (alongside Lake Malawi), with irrigation and mechanisation on 563 ha of land achieved thanks to support from the Indian government (with USD 10 million going to irrigation and another USD 40 million going to mechanisation) and the building of a sugar processing plant, illustrates how this priority is being pursued.[27] The opportunity costs are therefore potentially considerable, once we consider the huge benefits that could result from agrarian reform in the service of small-scale farmers for the reduction of rural poverty.

3 A review of the contentious issues

3.1 Governance and ownership

3.1.1 National ownership and consistency with the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) framework

Many of the commitments made under the country cooperation frameworks reiterate commitments made under the CAADP strategy and its regional implementation frameworks such as the Agricultural Policy of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAP) for the Economic Community of West African States (CEDEAO) or, as regards nutrition-specific policies, under the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) initiative. The New Alliance, thus, generally has supported ongoing initiatives, that preceded it: the CAADP process was inaugurated in 2003, and the SUN Movement in 2010. The added value of the New

[24] Malawi, Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, *The Agriculture Sector Wide Approach (ASWAp): Malawi's Prioritised and Harmonised Agricultural Development Agenda,* 2010, p. 46.
[25] Country Cooperation Framework to Support the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Malawi (2013), p. 6.
[26] Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) II (2011-2016), p. 72.
[27] G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition - Malawi - 2014 Progress Report, no date, p. 13.

Alliance, as its promoters see it, was to encourage companies in the agrifood sector (both domestic and foreign) to express an interest in investment in the various segments of the food chain, and to identify the commitments that governments should make in order to facilitate this involvement of the private sector.

The CAADP was launched at the African Union's Assembly Second Ordinary Session convened in Maputo on 10-12 July 2003, as part of the African Union's New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) initiative. Initially launched for ten years, it was renewed in 2014, following a review initiated in 2012, in the form of the *Sustaining CAADP Momentum Results Framework - Next Decade of CAADP 2015-2025*. CAADP encourages a peer review of processes that are negotiated at country and regional level to stimulate investment in agriculture. It is organised around four pillars, focused respectively on extending the area under sustainable land management (pillar 1); improving rural infrastructure and trade-related capacities for market access (pillar 2); increasing food supply and reducing hunger (pillar 3); and supporting agricultural research, as well as the dissemination and adoption of technology (pillar 4). CAADP is seen as the framework through which the AU countries can meet the pledges made in Maputo: to dedicate 10 % of the public budget to the agricultural sector and to achieve an annual growth rate of 6 % in agriculture, in order to improve food and nutrition security and to reduce rural poverty. Though these specific pledges were more honoured in the breach than in the observance, the CAADP process did place agriculture higher on the political agenda, and its impacts on policy-making are probably more significant than its impacts on budgetary choices: at the very least, the CAADP process has led a range of countries, including the ten countries now involved in the New Alliance, to establish a clear agricultural policy framework, and to make progress based on a comparison of the different country plans.[28]

Under the CAADP framework, each country is encouraged to convene a roundtable between actors, for a stock-taking exercise in which a joint assessment is prepared, to be followed by the adoption of a 'CAADP compact' expressing the agreement of all relevant players to contribute to the process. National investment plans are then adopted on the basis of these compacts: these plans identify the roles of different actors, the budgetary commitments required, and the sources of funding.[29] Though not all member States of the African Union have adopted such compacts or the accompanying investment plans, all 10 countries which have joined the New Alliance have done so. Malawi, for instance, adopted such a compact on 19 April 2010, at a meeting involving the government of Malawi, the development partners (represented by the chair of the Donor Committee on Agriculture and Food Security), the African Union/NEPAD and COMESA representatives, the private sector (through the Malawi Chamber of Commerce and Industry) and civil society organisations, including the main farmers' union of the country. The compact identifies what each of the partners should contribute to the implementation of Malawi's agricultural development and food security strategy, the Agriculture Sector Wide Approach (ASWAp). The objective is to provide a clear sense of priorities, and thus to facilitate the mobilisation of resources as well as the alignment of donors' contributions with the ASWAp national strategy; and to encourage mutual accountability.

[28] S. Mwangi, B. Kimenyi, B. Routman and A. Westbury, *CAADP at 10: Progress Toward Agricultural Prosperity*, Africa Growth Institute at Brookings, Policy Paper, 2013, at p. 6.

[29] Such funding can be from private investment or from the mobilization of domestic resources by the local government, or from external donors. These external donors are OECD development agencies such as USAID, the British DFID, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DGIS), and the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA). In addition to bilateral funding, however, the CAADP has a Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), a mechanism operated by the World Bank, and to which the European Union in particular has contributed (other contributors are USAID, and the governments of The Netherlands, France, Ireland and the United Kingdom).

The New Alliance CCFs build on the country compacts developed under the CAADP/NEPAD process. The New Alliance intends to contribute to the fulfilment of this agenda in two ways: first, by defining the conditions that will encourage the arrival of private investors, particularly foreign investors (through the establishment of a 'business-friendly environment', including in particular a revision of seed laws, the development of infrastructures, facilities for the movement of agricultural goods, and improved security of tenure rights); second, by encouraging a review of the commitments made under the CAADP framework, since the Country Cooperation Frameworks concluded under the New Alliance provide that the review shall extend to monitoring the implementation of such frameworks.

3.1.2 The reference to international standards

The CCFs refer to certain international standards regulating investment in agriculture. They do so selectively, however, and the references are not fully up to date. All the CCFs refer to the 2012 Voluntary Guidelines on responsible governance of tenure of land, fisheries and forests (VGGT), adopted by the Committee on World Food Security to encourage governments to react to the increasing commercial pressures on land. This is to be welcomed, particularly if the review process of the implementation of the CCFs can include a systematic assessment of whether the VGGT are fully complied with.

The CCFs also mention the Principles on Responsible Agricultural Investment (PRAI). These principles were initially presented in 2010 by the World Bank, together with the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).[30] They were met with scepticism or even overt hostility, however, by many developing countries' governments and civil society organisations. The governments most directly concerned, whether as buyers of land or as sellers, resented the top-down manner in which the Principles were elaborated, and they feared that the Principles will be used to impose more transparency and accountability in deals that they would prefer to exclude from public scrutiny. As to civil society, they denounced the PRAI as a check-list to legitimise deals and favour a type of agricultural development, based on the expansion of large and heavily mechanised plantations that will further marginalise small-scale, family farms.[31] Some groups also expressed doubts about the willingness of the World Bank to impose discipline on investors because of the Bank Group's long-standing support for reducing or eliminating any impediments to foreign investment.[32]

As a result, the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) decided at its 36th annual session held in Rome in October 2010 to redefine the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment, in a far more inclusive and participatory manner, as would be allowed by holding discussions on this issue under the auspices of the newly reformed CFS. This led to the adoption, in October 2014, of the *Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems*.[33] While it is not possible here to enter further into the content of the Principles, it is important to note that they could be relied on as a guide for any further improvement to the normative framework of the NAFSN.

It is also striking that the 2004 Voluntary Guidelines to support the progressive realisation of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security are nowhere mentioned in the CCFs. Yet, these

[30] These 'Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respect Rights, Livelihood and Resources' were released initially on January 25, 2010, and they were presented at the annual meeting of World Bank held in Washington, D.C., on 25–27 April 2010, and at a side-event to the High-level segment of the 65th General Assembly of the United Nations, on September 24, 2010..

[31] See The Global Campaign for Agrarian Reform: Land Research Action Network, FIAN International, Focus on the Global South, La Via Campesina, Social Network for Justice and Human Rights, 'Why we oppose the principles for responsible agricultural investment,' October 2010.

[32] See Sh. Daniel and A. Mittal, *(Mis)investment in agriculture: The role of the International Finance Corporation in global land grabs*, Oakland: The Oakland Institute, 2010.

[33] *Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems*, para. 21 (available from: http://www.fao.org/3/a-au866e.pdf).

guidelines have an even stronger legal standing than the other instruments mentioned: an outcome of the World Food Summit-*five years later* of 2002, they were the result of a two-year long process of intergovernmental negotiation within the CFS, before being adopted by the Council of the FAO on 23 November 2004. They list a number of important recommendations, including adopting a framework law on the right to food that would ensure that agricultural and food policies are developed in a participatory fashion and are consistent with policies in other areas such as rural development, health, education and social protection.

Finally, the CCFs do not refer to any duty of the private investors' concerns to respect human rights. Thus, while investors are promised a stable and hospitable investment climate, no expectation is expressed concerning their own conduct, whether with the local communities or with their business partners in the host country.[34] This is especially surprising, since the UN Human Rights Council adopted a set of Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights that are now seen as an authoritative statement of the human rights duties or responsibilities of States and corporations,[35] and have been widely endorsed, by business organisations and in intergovernmental settings -- including, notably, by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) when it revised its Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises in 2011.[36]

3.2 Access to land and security of tenure

Notwithstanding the reference to the VGGT mentioned above, the CCFs approach the question of land policy by an almost exclusive focus on the certification of land (or titling). This is understandable: whereas the rolling out of titling schemes is not inexpensive, it is certainly less costly than agrarian reform that would involve the provision of strong support to small-scale farmers to ensure that they can use their land productively; moreover, external donors appear willing to support such titling progress.

The promoters of titling programmes and land registration schemes see them as presenting a number of advantages. First, the security of tenure favoured through titling should encourage individual landowners to make the necessary investments in the land, not only because they will be protected from the risk of losing it, but also because titling of their property allows the owners to mortgage their land, and thus to obtain access to credit, allowing them to make such investments. It also functions as a signalling device that provides information about the trustworthiness of the borrower: local banks may see titling of their property as proof that the household will be able to repay the loan, independently from the use of the property as a collateral.[37] Second, the clarification of property rights should encourage the emergence of efficient land markets, conducive of economic growth: lowering transaction costs, it is supposed, shall result in the land going to the most productive user, thus maximising the productivity of land as an economic asset.[38] Third, the clarification of property rights and the development of markets for land rights should attract foreign investors: the easier it is to register property rights, the faster and the cheaper the procedures are for transferring property rights, the more

[34] One exception is the Senegal CCF, which refers to the commitment of the private sector to 'establishing internal consultation frameworks that will contribute to a greater ownership of NAFSN objectives, especially linking producers' groups, improving food and nutrition security, promoting responsible investment and mobilizing funding (banks and decentralized financial systems)' (para. II.3).

[35] Human Rights Council Res. 17/4 (16 June 2011).

[36] The new version of the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises include a chapter IV on human rights, that is based on the 'Protect, Respect and Remedy' framework.

[37] P. Castañeda Dower and E. Potamites, *Signaling Credit-Worthiness: Land Titles, Banking Practices and Formal Credit in Indonesia*. Centre for Economic and Financial Research at New Economic School, CEFIR/NES Working Paper Series No. 186, 2012.

[38] G. Feder and R. Noronha, 'Land rights systems and agricultural development in Sub-Saharan Africa', *World Bank Research Observer*, vol. 2 (2) (1987), pp. 143-169; World Bank, *World Development Report 2008 : Agriculture for Development*, World Bank: Washington, D.C., 2007, p. 138.

investors will be willing to enter the country concerned and thus, it is hoped, to contribute to its development.[39] Fourth, the formalisation of property rights over land allows the public authorities to increase their tax revenues, and where necessary to deliver certain public services that depend on fees being paid by the users.

It is nevertheless troubling that most CCFs adopted under the New Alliance chapeau uncritically refer to titling (or 'certification') as the key instrument of their land policy -- or even as its sole component. There are three reasons to be sceptical about such an approach.

1. The arguments put forward in defence of land registration and titling are inherently contradictory. On the one hand, the clarification of property rights is to provide security of tenure: to allow slum dwellers to be recognised as owners of their home in the informal settlement where they are staying, or to allow small farmers to be protected from eviction from the land which they cultivate. On the other hand however, the clarification of property rights is justified by the need to establish a market for land rights, allowing a more fluid transfer of property rights -- a lowering of transaction costs, increasing the liquidity of these markets. Yet, the commodification of property rights can be a source of exclusion, and *increase* insecurity of tenure. Such exclusion may happen by four mechanisms. First, the process of titling itself may be captured by the elites, or tainted by corruption; or the formalisation of property may be too costly or complex for the poorest segment of the population to benefit. Second, once property has been formalised and land demarcated, taxes may be imposed, and more easily collected, by the public authorities. While this may present an opportunity to better finance public services, it may also have exclusionary effects: it may occur that the poorest shall not be able to pay those taxes and shall be forced to sell off the land as a result. Third, whether to pay those taxes or whether to make the necessary investments in their houses or on their cultivated lands, the poor (who by definition have no capital of their own) shall be tempted to mortgage their land in order to have access to credit. But even if this works -- even if, that is, lenders are willing to provide loans --, the risk is that the debts will accumulate, and that the land will finally be seized by the lender : the commodification of land, in such a case, shall have made the loss of land possible, rather than having protected the land user from its risk. Fourth, the rural poor may be tempted to sell off land in order to overcome temporary economic hardship such as bad harvest or a fall in the farm gate prices received for their crops, a phenomenon referred to as 'distress sales'.[40] In other terms, it appears that the counterpart of the improved security of tenure that formalisation of property allowed, is the insecurity resulting from the possibility of losing property -- whether because the household finds itself unable to reimburse the lender after having mortgaged the land, because the levels of taxes makes them unaffordable and forces the family to leave, or (where rural farming households are concerned) because the household finds it impossible to expand its property following the speculation fuelled by the titling process, and thus cannot achieve the economies of scale required to be competitive on markets.

   One way of framing this discussion is to distinguish between a static analysis (attentive to the immediate or short-term impacts of the formalisation of property rights) and a dynamic perspective (attentive to the longer-term impacts). The commodification of land rights, which is often seen as an inherent quality of registration processes, may benefit land users in the short run, as the assets they

[39] The automaticity of this relationship has of course been questioned, see O. De Schutter, J. Swinnen and J. Wouters, 'Introduction: Foreign Direct Investment and Human Development'. In O. De Schutter et al. (eds), *Foreign Direct Investment and Human Development. The Law and Economics of International Investment Agreements*, Routledge: London and New York, 2012, pp. 1-24.

[40] World Bank, *Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction: A World Bank Policy Research Report*, World Bank: Washington, D.C., 2003, pp. 96-98.

'own' (and shall henceforth be recognised as owning) can be transformed into capital, increasing their value. But whether or not they benefit in the long run will depend on the range of conditions that will either allow them to seize the opportunities this creates for them, or instead increase their marginalisation further. For instance, the registration of land will allow small-scale farmers to have access to credit only if they have access to a network of credit institutions, that can provide loans suited to their needs[41], and if measures are taken to support farmers who are generally too risk-averse to take loans, particularly if the consequence is that they may lose their land through foreclosure.[42]

2. Even more troubling is the fact that were titling schemes have been implemented, they often led to increased inequalities, making the poorest even worse off, as the national elites, who have a superior purchasing power, may emerge victorious from the auctioning of land that titling schemes in fact lead to.[43] This effect may be further strengthened where investors from abroad seek to acquire large areas of land in order to develop agriculture for export, and are encouraged in their quest by the creation of a market for land rights. As such markets develop, speculation over land increases, and so does land concentration: foreign investors are mostly interested in developing large-scale plantations, that are relatively non-labour-intensive and contribute relatively little to rural development; and conflicts over land increase as land becomes a valuable asset.

   This is particularly problematic in contexts where the distribution of land is already unequal. Registration gives a premium to those who already occupy land, making entry into land markets more difficult for the landless. Land registration may benefit the relatively better-off, who have some land and may hope to improve its productivity by making the necessary investments; it is not a means to ensure access to land for those who have none, who should instead be supported by grants.[44] In that sense, titling may be said to constitute a transfer of wealth from the landless to those who occupy land, and from the next generation to the present one: as titling increases the market value of land, land will become less affordable for the poorest part of the population or for the new entrants on the land markets, for whom *access* to land -- not just the *consolidation* of unrecognised property rights -- is vital.

3. A third ambiguity stems from the terms of 'clarification' or 'formalisation' that are used to refer to the improvements to property rights regimes that titling should allow. Prior to the formalisation of property rights through titling, tenure generally is regulated by custom. Customary forms of tenure are often highly legitimate and can ensure a high level of security of tenure and deliver the same services than formalised property rights, including by favouring in certain cases efficiency-enhancing exchanges.[45] The superimposition of titling on these pre-existing, customary forms of tenure, may result in more conflicts, rather than in more clarity, and in less security, rather than in improved security.[46] In addition, customary forms of may provide security for those depending on the commons -- such as pastoralists, artisanal fishers, or small herders -- for whom classic property rights are generally not an appropriate solution.

[41] W. Bruce and S. Migot-Adholla (eds), *Searching for land tenure security in Africa*, World Bank: Washington D.C., 1994.
[42] J.-Ph. Platteau, 'Does Africa need land reform?', in C. Toulmin and J. Quan (eds). *Evolving land rights, policy and tenure in Africa*, London: DFID/IIED/NRI, 2000, pp. 51–7459; P. Shipton and M. Goheen, 'Understanding African land-holding: power, wealth, and meaning'. *Africa*. Vol. 62(3) (1992), pp. 307–25.
[43] A. Berry, 'When Do Agricultural Exports Help the Rural Poor? A Political Economy Approach'. *Oxford Development Studies*, vol. 29(2) (2001), pp. 125–44.
[44] World Bank, *Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction*, p. 96.
[45] World Bank, *Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction*, pp. 53 and 31-32 respectively; G. Feder and R. Noronha, 'Land rights systems and agricultural development in Sub-Saharan Africa'. *World Bank Research Observer*, vol. 2(2) (1987), pp. 143-169.
[46] C. Toulmin and J. Quan (eds), *Evolving Land Rights, Policy and Tenure in Africa*, London: Department of Foreign and International Development (DFID)/ International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED)/ Natural Resources Institute (NRI), 2000.

In sum, rather than on improving access to land for landless or land-poor rural dwellers, the emphasis in the CCFs is on the clarification of property rights, through the implementation of titling (also referred to as 'certification') schemes. For the reasons discussed above, the outcomes can be highly ambiguous. On the one hand, it is clear that improving security of tenure and clarifying property rights is an important prerequisite for farmers' ability to move away from subsistence agriculture to market-oriented agriculture, for which they need to make investments that require access to credit and, therefore, the possibility to use land as a collateral. On the other hand, the emergence of a market for land rights may facilitate the transfer of land into the hands of local elites, or of foreign investors, who can capture the process of titling for their own benefit. It is significant in this regard that, in the CCFs, the clarification of property rights over land is described as beneficial for both small-scale farmers and for investors, and is part of a package of reforms that can attract investors into the agricultural sector. This is insufficient. Titling schemes should be rolled out gradually, to ensure that they shall go hand in hand with a strengthening of the ability of smallholders to increase their ability to live decently from farming, if we want to limit the exclusionary impacts discussed above. Strict conditions should be imposed on any transfer of land to investors (whether local or foreign), to ensure that commodification of land shall not increase poverty in the local communities concerned.

Box 2: Tanzania's Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor (SAGCOT): the demarcation of land as a condition for large-scale investments in farmland

Tanzania provides a clear example of the dangers involved.[47] Tanzania is described in the country cooperation framework as 'a showcase for public-private partnership in agricultural growth, exemplified by the development of its Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor (SAGCOT)'. The SAGCOT project was initiated by the Kilimo Kwanza ('Agriculture First') Growth Corridors, an international public-private partnership launched at the World Economic Forum on Africa in May 2010 in Dar es Salaam, and involving a range of partners around the Government of Tanzania including Unilever, Yara International, the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, the Confederation of Tanzanian Industries, the Tanzania Sugarcane Growers Association, USAID, the Irish Embassy in Tanzania, all of which are members of the Kilimo Kwanza Growth Corridors Executive Committee. (Other partners include, inter alia, Syngenta, DuPont, Cargill, SAB Miller, Diageo, Norfund, the Norwegian Embassy in Tanzania, and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)). Yara International, a major Norwegian fertilizer firm, and AgDevCo, a 'not-for-profit agricultural development company operating in Sub-Saharan Africa' (as it describes itself) with close links to the UK's Department for International Development (DFID), appear to have been leading actors in the process.[48] SAGCOT covers around 287 000 km^2 of land, a large area of land representing approximately one third of mainland Tanzania in which around 9 – 11 million people (depending on the source[49]) live (see Fig. 3).

[47] In addition to the sources cited, the discussion of SAGCOT is based on conversations with NGOs and representatives of farmers' organisations active in Tanzania, including in particular with ActionAid. The author of this report expresses his gratitude for the information provided.

[48] Yara International promoted the 'growth corridor' concept since 2008; AgDevCo is a co-lead in the SAGCOT Technical Team.

[49] The Investment Blueprint says 9 million (SAGCOT, *Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania: Investment Blueprint*, January 2011, p. 21, www.sagcot.com). The *Strategic Regional Environmental and Social Assessment* refers to 11 million people (Government of Tanzania, *SAGCOT: Strategic Regional Environmental and Social Assessment, Interim Report*, July 2012, p. 5)

Fig. 3. The Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) project



Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit, Dec. 5th, 2011

The SAGCOT project aims to boost agricultural productivity in Tanzania and the wider region. The Investment Blueprint for the project anticipates that USD 2.1 billion of private investment will be catalysed over a twenty year period, alongside public sector grants and loans of USD 1.3 billion, in order to triple the area's agricultural output: 'Approximately 350,000 hectares will be brought into profitable production, much of it farmed by smallholder farmers, and with a significant area under irrigation'.[50] The objective is to combine public investment, particularly for the strengthening of the rural roads network -- it is to roads, in particular, that the EU contribution is dedicated[51] --, with private investment, in order to facilitate the conversion of smallholders to commercial agriculture, in particular by the generalisation of outgrowers' schemes in the vicinity of large-scale farms, allowing these farmers to access inputs, extension services, value-adding facilities and markets. Such outgrowers' schemes shall be facilitated by the development of six 'clusters' across SAGCOT, defined as 'geographic concentrations of interconnected companies, specialised suppliers, service providers, and associated institutions'. The concentration within a same geographical area of suppliers of farm inputs, machinery, and agriculture support services (extension agents, financial services), commercial farmers (large and small) and processors, as well as the development in such areas of infrastructure such as irrigation and rural roads,

[50] SAGCOT, *Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania: Investment Blueprint*, January 2011, Preface, www.sagcot.com

[51] The EU has committed to support SAGCOT for a total of USD 36.5 million (representing 40 percent of the total commitment of the EU towards Tanzania's objectives as announced under the NAFSN, which represents USD 87 million). The contribution of the EU towards SAGCOT is intended to support the building of roads, energy, agriculture, and environmental management. See *Tanzania : Progress in Public Private Partnership in Agriculture Transformation*, June 2014, p. 13.

should allow long-term relationships to develop between these actors, and for 'each member to benefit as if it had greater scale'.[52]

For such relationships to develop in a way that is inclusive, the State should create an enabling environment. The Investment Blueprint pledges in this regard that 'SAGCOT will also support smallholder producer associations, helping them enter into equitable commercial relationships with agri-processing and marketing businesses. In many cases, irrigation will be made available through professionally-managed farm blocks'.[53] In order to attract investors, financing facilities will be made available, however they 'will come with strong conditions attached. Funding will only be made available to investors who demonstrate a commitment to building equitable and sustainable partnerships with smallholder producers. Compliance will be monitored and investment withdrawn if social or environmental obligations are not met'.[54] The promoters of the project are quite explicit about the risks involved. They insist on the need for the investments to be inclusive: 'the debate about 'land grabbing' highlights the dangers of industrial-scale farms that exclude local communities and smallholder farmers. For SAGCOT and similar initiatives the challenge is to attract private investment in a way that maximises social gains and allows smallholder farmers to become profitable producers and entrepreneurs with access to regional and international markets'.[55] They also acknowledge the potential environmental impacts: SAGCOT's Environmental and Social Management Framework of August 2013 notes that the project is 'likely to have significant environmental and social impacts associated with the numerous development challenges in the region and the Corridor's important biodiversity and ecosystem services'. It cites issues such as: 'vested interests may skew [land] acquisition process', 'increased pressure on remaining land', and 'agricultural intensification may increase water pollution from agrochemical runoff'.[56]

The most immediate threat, however, concerns access to land for the local population. A June 2014 New Alliance Progress Report, titled *Tanzania : Progress in Public Private Partnership in Agriculture Transformation*, mentions that, under the 'Big Results Now' Initiative launched by the Government of Tanzania to accelerate progress towards poverty reduction (agriculture being one of the six 'National Key Results Areas', and the focus being on maize, sugar and rice given their strategic importance to food security), the land acquisition process has been fast-tracked, 'with a total of 80,000 ha entrusted to the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) to date for fielding expressions of interest from investors for land grants'.[57] Such land would be allocated to investors at a very low price -- 1 USD/year/hectare, according to what government representatives have advertised.[58] The same report notes that this allocation of land to investors will also benefit local surrounding smallholders as potential out-growers, who 'have been trained and sensitised and are ready to engage and work with investors'.[59] In addition, as noted in Table B (see Annex), in its CCF, the Tanzanian government commits to 'demarcating' 'all village land in SAGCOT region', completing 'land use plans', and issuing Certificates of Occupancy, in 20 % of the villages in the SAGCOT region by June 2014 and in a further 20 % by June 2016.[60] 'Village land use plans' are in principle the result of a participatory process leading to identify the different uses of the land in a particular location

[52] SAGCOT, *Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania,* p. 18.
[53] SAGCOT, *Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania*, p. 7.
[54] SAGCOT, *Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania*, p. 9.
[55] SAGCOT, *Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania*, p. 12.
[56] SAGCOT, *Environmental and Social Management Framework*, August 2013, pp.83-5, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/08/26/000356161_20130826125705/Rendered/INDEX/E30750v10REVISED0AFR0ESMF0P125728.txt
[57] *Tanzania : Progress in Public Private Partnership in Agriculture Transformation*, June 2014, p. 5.
[58] Christopher Chiza, Minister for Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives, 'SAGCOT Investment Partnership Program: Opportunities for investors in the rice and sugar sectors', 27 November 2012, available on: www.sagcot.com
[59] *Tanzania : Progress in Public Private Partnership in Agriculture Transformation*, June 2014, p. 5.
[60] *Country Cooperation Framework to Support The 'New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition' in Tanzania*, 2012, p. 4.

-- whether for settlements, for pastures or for cultivation, for forests or for wildlife --: what remains is 'unused' and is considered to be land that can be transferred to 'general land' that the Tanzanian Investment Authority can lease out to an investor, against compensation to the local community and provided strict environmental and social safeguards are complied with. By November 2012, according to a presentation of the Minister for Land, Housing and Human Settlements Development, the government had completed 391 Village Land Use Plans in SAGCOT districts, a process which led to identify 900 000 hectares of 'potential land for investment'.[61] This is a considerable surface of land since, on average, only 15 % of 'village land' was identified as 'unused' by the local community and thus as land that can be leased out. The intention was for the process to continue, to cover 700 more villages (including all the villages in the SAGCOT area).

The demarcation of land for the SAGCOT project to develop provides a good illustration of the links between land demarcation and large-scale acquisitions or leases of land to outside investors. In effect, the development of Village Land Use Plans is a precondition for large commercial estates to be established, since only once tenure rights are fully clarified shall the investor be assured that its title is secure. Whether the local community can benefit will depend on a range of factors, including in particular (i) whether the identification of 'unused' land, that can be ceded to outside investors, has been done in ways that are transparent and participatory; (ii) whether the arrival of the investor to develop a commercial farm benefits local communities, taking into both account the employment opportunities that may result from such arrival and the improved access to local processing facilities and to markets for the local smallholders under outgrowers' schemes, but also the potential impacts on water use or on soil pollution resulting from the establishment of the industrial farm. Most crucially, the opportunity costs are not to be underestimated: a decisive question is whether investing in support to smallholders (by strengthening extension services, by building rural infrastructure improving their access to markets, and by supporting the establishment of cooperatives to allow them to achieve economies of scale particularly for the processing and marketing of their produce) would not have produced stronger poverty-reducing impacts, without the risks associated with large-scale commercial farms, particularly insofar as such farms compete for land and water with local producers.

3.3 Contract farming

Contrary to a common misperception, much of the investment that is committed under the LoIs submitted by private companies under the NAFSN are not primarily aimed at ensuring that agricultural producers shall buy the products of these companies, although of course the significant presence of Syngenta and Yara International are exceptions. In fact, it is chiefly as suppliers of agricultural products that small-scale farmers are targeted by private investment: many of the private companies which have made commitments under the NAFSN are interested in buying from these farmers in order to link them to the markets and to expand their supply chain. This is illustrated by the following figure, which ranks the various levels of commitments of the private sector across the different segments of the value chain (fig. 4):

[61] Presentation by Minister for Land, Housing & Human Settlements Development, 'SAGCOT Investment Partnership program: Initiatives to ensure full community involvement and environmental safeguards while putting underutilised land to productive use', 27 November 2012, www.sagcot.com

Fig. 4. Quantity of investments along the value chain (investment figures, in thousands of USD)



Source: D. Hong and ONE, The New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition: Part 2 (April 2013), available at: http://one-org.s3.amazonaws.com/us/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Fig-2-Value-Chain-Role-chart.png

The question of how contract farming is (or is not) regulated is therefore of great importance under the NAFSN.[62] Only some CCFs concluded under the New Alliance framework refer to the need to provide support to farmers in this regard. The Ethiopia CCF refers to the need to implement guidelines of corporate responsibility for land tenure and responsible agriculture investment, and many CCFs refer to the importance of encouraging inclusive supply chains and outgrowers' schemes in particular (this is the case in Tanzania, in particular). Only the CCF adopted by Ghana, however, commits explicitly to 'provide a 'model lease agreement' for outgrower schemes / contract farming'.

This is clearly an area in which the CCFs could be improved. Under certain conditions, contract farming can help in the development of localised food chains, for instance by linking farmers' cooperatives to the local food-processing industry or to local fresh produce retailers serving urban consumers. At the same time however, farmers can easily become disempowered by the process. Five key criteria may be relevant to assess the adequacy of a particular contract[63]:

a) Economic viability for all parties. If the contract appears unviable to the buyer, the contract may be terminated or the buyer may renege on obligations when under financial stress, with detrimental consequences for the livelihoods of farmers. Conversely however, if the arrangement is not viable for the farmer, for instance because of an unsustainable debt, the buyer will face supply problems in the short term, and will incur high reputational costs with other farmers which may make it more difficult for him

[62] See for instance the brief by Oxfam-France, Action contre la faim, and CCFD-Terre solidaire, *La faim. Un business comme un autre*, September 2014 (describing how rice farmers in Côte d'Ivoire were trapped under an unsustainable and imbalanced contract farming arrangement).

[63] For a more detailed assessment, see Contract farming and inclusive business models in the food chains, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De Schutter, to the 66th session of the General Assembly, UN doc. A/66/262 (4 August 2011).

to enter into arrangements with other producers in the longer term. Such a risk should not be underestimated: the costs of participation in long-term contract farming arrangements may be disproportionate for small-scale farmers, since fixed costs, including costs for the payment of extension services or costs associated with reporting on compliance with conditionality, are highest for those who cultivate small plots. Moreover, while the ability of the buyer to purchase inputs at wholesale prices might allow it to pass on savings to farmers through lower prices, it may also occur that, where the farmer can only have access to inputs through the buyer, the buyer will charge farmers higher than market prices for these inputs, leading the farmer to fall into a cycle of debt. The risk is particularly important where the investment on the land is related specifically to one type of production for which the contracting firm is the only buyer, a constraint which may be exploited by the firm as a way to exercise monopsonistic power and thus gradually impose lower prices on farmers.

Since economic conditions may change in the course of the implementation of the arrangement, information management and the use of flexible but transparent provisions are essential. Agreements should therefore be structured so that both farmers and firms benefit, and both sides desire to respect the contract and do not have strong incentives to renege. In establishing a framework for contract farming, particular attention should be given to pricing arrangements. Ideally, the producer should be guaranteed a fixed minimum price based on the need to meet production costs and to ensure a living wage for all the workers concerned, but the prices paid by the buyer should be higher if market prices increase. This eliminates the temptation of side-selling by the producer, which avoids the need for the buyer to closely monitor the producer's operations; it therefore guarantees a stable supply for the buyer, while at the same time reducing the transaction costs linked with the contracting of a large number of small-scale suppliers. In order to reduce the risks associated with the asymmetry of information between the parties, pricing mechanisms should be subject to an independent arbitration mechanism, and farmers should be provided with the market prices of internationally traded commodities.

b) Fairness in negotiations. Farmers typically have less information and negotiating skills than their business partners, and a lower degree of legal literacy.[64] The way prices are determined, the deductions for the provision of inputs, the conditions under which the contract can be terminated, or the way the quality grading of the produce is assessed are all areas in which contractual clauses may be heavily biased in the favour of the buyer.

c) Respect for women's rights. Contracts tend to be in the name of the male head of household or the male holder of the title to the land cultivated. As a result, unless proactive action is taken, women will benefit less than men from contract farming.[65] The ability for women to benefit from contract farming is mediated by their rights over land, and by the power relationships both within households or, when the contract is negotiated through representatives of the community or the farmers' organisation, within these groups. Women also tend to lose control over decision-making when crops are produced for cash rather than for feeding the local community: while women decide about the use of food produced for self-consumption, they do not decide how the monetary income of the household is spent. Therefore, unless the framework for contract farming is gender sensitive, it may weaken the situation of women vis-à-vis men.[66] Strengthening the position of women is not only a matter of guaranteeing the right to

[64] M. Brüntrup & R. Peltzer, 'Outgrowers – a key to the development of rural areas in Sub-Saharan Africa and to poverty reduction,' Report of the DEG / DIE Workshop on August 18, 2006 (Jan. 2007), p. 43.
[65] *State of Food Insecurity 2011* (SOFI 2011), FAO, Rome, 2011, p. 13 (referring in particular to M. Maertens & J. Swinnen, 'Are modern supply chains bearers of gender inequality?', ILO-FAO workshop 'Gender Dimension of Rural Employment', 30 March–3 April 2009, Rome).
[66] See Man-Kwun Chan, *Improving Opportunities for Women in Smallholder-based Supply Chains*, for the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 2010 ; K. Schneider and M.K. Gugerty, 'Gender and contract farming in Sub-Saharan Africa: Literature Review', Evans School of Public Affairs, University of Washington, 2010.

equality of treatment. It also can lead to productivity improvements, since women receiving a greater proportion of the crop income will have a greater incentive to increase production.

d) Clarity in the use of quality standards. Standards must be clear and specific so that firms cannot manipulate the application of vague standards. On the other hand, they should not be too complex, which could also allow firms to manipulate standards. Firms should demonstrate the standards visually to farmers, and explain in advance how crops are graded.

e) Support to sustainable agriculture. Contract farming, just like cash crops in general, is generally associated with monocropping schemes and with forms of production that rely heavily on chemical fertilisers and pesticides, often with adverse repercussions for human health and for the soils. To counter this, contract farming could include incentives for moving towards more diverse farming systems, using a combination of plants, trees and animals according to the principles of agroecology. And, while contract farming often involves the provision of inputs, including mineral fertilisers, by the buyer, it may also include provisions that oblige the producer to comply with certain environmental conditions, for instance a more cautious use of pesticides.

f) Dispute settlement. Contracts should facilitate communication between parties through appropriate management structures and should identify ways of resolving disputes. In the vast majority of cases where one of the parties fails to comply with the requirements of the contract, there is no resort to courts because the sums involved are too small and because, in many developing countries, courts are in practice inaccessible to the rural poor. Therefore, other forums should be established in which farmers can raise concerns and conflict mediation by non-governmental organisations or third parties.

If these five conditions are met, then contract farming could work for the farmer and for the buyer. While these are private contractual arrangements that vary from case to case, governments may have a role to ensure that farmers are not being hoodwinked. The State could: provide an enabling legal framework; establish appropriate dispute settlement mechanisms; convene multi-stakeholder meetings to design codes of conduct to guide the negotiations between suppliers and buyers; and strengthen farmers' organisations in order to improve the bargaining position of farmers. It cannot be easily expected from the private sector to assume these various roles.

3.4 Regulatory reform in the seed sector

The countries participating in the NAFSN have committed to adopt seed laws that shall facilitate the diffusion of 'improved' seeds (the so-called high-yielding varieties) to farmers. The reforms that are announced are generally conceived as having to grant plant variety protection (PVP) on the model of the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, developed under the auspices of the Union Internationale pour la protection des obtentions végétales (UPOV).[67] The UPOV convention, initially adopted in 1961 but most recently revised in 1991, protects the rights of plant breeders provided they develop plant varieties which are new, distinct, uniform and stable (art. 5(1)). The strengthening of plant breeders' rights is seen as means to encourage seed companies, who may fear that their investment in the development of new plant varieties will not be secured, to sell their seeds in the country and to develop varieties suited the country's specific conditions.

[67] The references to the requirements of the UPOV convention are not always explicit. They do appear explicitly, for instance, in the Tanzania CCF.

Supporting farmers by the provision of improved varieties of seeds which promise better yields can create its own problems, however.[68] First, although commercial seed varieties may improve yields in the short term, their higher performance often has been a response to inputs (fertilisers) and to water availability, making it difficult for farmers unable to access to such inputs and working under less favourable conditions to reap their benefits. Those who acquire inputs with their own means, often encouraged to do so during an initial period of subsidised inputs, may find themselves trapped in the vicious circle of debt as a result of a bad harvest and consequent impossibility to reimburse input loans. This may occur particularly when they have switched to mono-cropping leading to revenues which may be higher in certain seasons but less stable across the years, and diminish resilience in the face of climate change.[69] The risks of dependency are significantly increased by the strengthening of the role of intellectual property rights in the food system, particularly through 'TRIPS-plus' provisions in trade agreements protecting such rights beyond the minimum requirements of the WTO TRIPS agreement.

Second, commercial seed varieties may be less suited to the specific agro-ecological environments in which farmers work, and for which landraces (traditional farmers' varieties) may be more appropriate. The development of a commercial seed sector in which seed providers are protected by strong IPR may put in jeopardy the farmers' seed systems, on which most farmers in developing countries still rely and which, for these farmers, is a source of economic independence and resilience in the face of threats such as pests, diseases or climate change. How governments achieve a balance between the support they provide to both these systems is therefore a vitally important question for the future.

Third, the expansion of surfaces cultivated with commercial seeds accelerates crop diversity erosion, as an increasing number of farmers grow the same crops, using the same, 'improved' varieties on their fields. It is estimated that about 75 % of plant genetic diversity has been lost as farmers worldwide have abandoned their local varieties for genetically uniform varieties that produce higher yields under certain conditions,[70] and genetic diversity within crops is decreasing. Such wide-scale genetic erosion increases our vulnerability to sudden changes in climate, and to the appearance of new pests and diseases.[71]

For all these reasons, the commitments to regulatory reforms in the seed sector in the Country Cooperation Frameworks adopted under the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition should be considered with great caution. The approach to regulatory reform we identify in the CCFs is generally one-sided. It underestimates the importance to many small-scale farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa of farmers' seed systems, in which local varieties ('landraces'), developed by the farmers themselves, are traded or exchanged. Such farmers' seed systems may be particularly important to resource-poor farmers in resource-poor agro-ecological environments, because of the importance, for production in such environments, of locally adapted varieties. Rather than preventing access to traditional varieties and associated knowledge by creating a new system of enclosures, what is required is proactive support for the development of farmers' seed systems on which the poorest farmers still largely rely.[72] In order to

[68] See for instance *Seeds of hunger: intellectual property rights on seeds and the human rights response*, 3dthree, May 2009. For a detailed assessment, see Seed policies and the right to food, Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De Schutter, to the 64th session of the General Assembly (UN doc. A/64/170) (27 July 2009).

[69] There exists a correlation between the switch to specialized and uniform varieties on one hand and increased variability in productivity on the other hand: see D. Duvick, 'Variability in U.S. Maize Yields', in J. Anderson and P. Hazell (eds), *Variability in Grain Yields*, Washington D.C., World Bank, 1989.

[70] D. Nierenberg and B. Halweil, *Cultivating Food Security*, New York, Norton & Co., 2005.

[71] See G. Heal et al., 'Genetic diversity and interdependent crop choices in agriculture', *Resource and Energy Economics*, vol. 26(2), June 2004, pp.175-184. Genetic diversity is also important to food security for other reasons, less relevant in the context of this report. See, for an overview, UNEP, *The Environmental Food Crisis. The Environment's Role in Averting Future Food Crises*, February 2009, pp. 65-76.

[72] See IFPRI and FAO, *Local Markets, Local Varieties. Rising Food Prices and Small Farmers' Access to Seed*, IFPRI Issue Brief 59, February 2009 (based on case-studies from Mali, Kenya and India).

encourage farmers who conserve and sustainably use plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, extension services could be provided to them specifically, and other incentives could be put in place, such as to facilitate the marketing of their produce or to provide them easier access to credit.

Of all the Country Cooperation Frameworks developed by the countries participating in the NAFSN, only the Senegal CCF refers to a 'policy for rebuilding seed stocks'. The other CCFs are focused on regulatory reform to favour investment by private seed companies through a strengthening of plant breeders' rights, without any reference to farmers' seed systems. Yet, in the absence of proactive policies aimed at preserving and encouraging the development of farmers' seed systems and associated traditional knowledge and practices, such systems risk disappearing, as a result of three kinds of pressures. First, seed regulations (national seed certification schemes) may only catalogue commercial varieties which are PVP protected (since only these present the stability and uniformity required for cataloguing), and either explicitly exclude the trade of non PVP-protected seeds or lead to *de facto* exclusion of traditional varieties, since these are normally not genetically homogeneous enough to meet the requirements for approval and certification.[73] Second, government-sponsored programmes seeking to improve access to seeds may promote certain types of seeds only, such as hybrids, although they often may require to be combined with the use of expensive inputs, which may be unsustainable for cash-strapped farmers, and may not be best suited to local agronomic conditions. Third, the buyers of crops, particularly for the export sector, may require from their suppliers that they use certain seeds which guarantee uniformity and stability, at the expense of diversity and variability, leading to progressive genetic erosion. As clearly illustrated by a review of the CCFs, all of these incentives are present in the reforms encouraged under the NAFSN. While it is understandable that governments seek to ensure that farmers have better access to 'improved' seed varieties, which under certain conditions can perform better and which are generally a condition for farmers seeking to enter into global supply chains, this should not be at the expense of the ability for farmers' seed systems to flourish.

3.5 The nutrition dimension

In comparison to other areas such as strengthening security of tenure, facilitating trade or improving access to inputs and financial services to farmers, the dimension of nutrition is comparatively neglected in the CCFs adopted under the NAFSN; and it is in this area also that implementation to date appears weakest. Table B in the annex illustrates this to a certain extent, but another indicator of this neglect is the fact that, according to a 2013 study, 'only 7 % of investments [under the NAFSN] include a direct nutritional component, while an additional 14 % of investments are positioned along fruit and vegetable value chains'.[74]

This is perhaps surprising, since all ten countries involved to date in the NAFSN have joined the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) initiative, which explicitly aims to raise the profile of nutrition in the agricultural policies and, more broadly, in the food security strategies of the participating countries. SUN was launched in 2010, when the initial SUN Framework and Road Map were adopted. Its aim was to encourage national-level actors to join forces to improve nutrition, with a focus on the '1 000-days window opportunity' between conception and the second birthday of the child, during which adequate nutrition -- for the pregnant and lactating mother and for the infant -- is vital for the future development of the child.[75] In order to achieve this, SUN encourages partnerships involving governments, the private

[73] See Shabnam Anvar, *Semences et droit. L'emprise d'un modèle économique dominant sur une réglementation sectorielle*, doctoral thesis, Université de Paris I-Panthéon-Sorbonne, 2008.
[74] D. Hong and ONE, The New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition: Part 2, cited above.
[75] C. Victora, L. Adair, C. Fall, P.C. Hallal, R. Martorelli, L. Richter, H.S. Sachdev, and the Maternal and Child Undernutrition Study Group, 'Maternal and Child Undernutrition: Consequences for Adult Health and Human Capital', *The Lancet*, vol. 371 (2008), pp. 340-357.

sector, and civil society organisations. Such alliances are seen as the best means to 'improve people's access to affordable nutritious food and other determinants of nutritional status such as clean water, sanitation, healthcare, social protection and initiatives to empower women', which are the main objectives of SUN. The countries joining the initiative pledge to significantly reduce the number of stunted children and to improve good nutritional practices, such as exclusive breastfeeding.[76]

The concerns that led to the establishment of the SUN Movement are extremely important, and the diagnosis essentially sound: improvements to agricultural productivity alone shall not lead to better nutritional outcomes, if such productivity gains remain focused on a limited range of commodities and on increased calorie availability, without greater attention being paid to the nutritional impacts -- the quality of diets --, and if access to healthcare and to water and sanitation remains poor. This is a broadly shared conviction, and the SUN initiative expanded swiftly: at the time of writing, it involved 55 countries as well as the Indian state of Maharashtra. However, the role of the private sector in the SUN Movement was seen with suspicion by some actors, particularly some civil society organisations fearing that the aim to improve nutrition would serve as a convenient argument for agrifood companies to reach new markets. As a result of these critiques, Principles of Engagement were adopted, emphasising inclusiveness, transparency, mutual accountability, and the rights-based approach, and a Reference Note and Toolkit on the Prevention and Management of Conflict of Interest in the SUN Movement were produced in 2013.

In general however, as noted above, the CCFs adopted under the NAFSN are weak as regards their reference to improved nutrition (the CCF of Ethiopia is even entirely silent in this regard). Moreover, with the exception of Senegal and (less explicitly) Côte d'Ivoire, these frameworks do not commit the governments to the full implementation of the 1981 International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes and the resolutions adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) on Infant and Young Child Nutrition, including by regulatory reforms and strong enforcement mechanisms, despite the important contribution such implementation could make to improved nutrition. These lacunae should be remedied: food insecurity is not simply a matter of a lack of calorie availability, but increasingly a matter of micronutrient deficiency and imbalanced diets, linked to agricultural policies that have prioritised the maximisation of outputs over the diversification of diets and the supply of nutritious foods.

3.6 The gender dimension

A study on the NAFSN, released in April 2013, noted that of all the projects developed by private investors under this framework, only one explicitly targeted women producers: a postharvest storage facility in Burkina Faso that can store up to 200 tons of rice is meant to benefit the Union Conannet des Etuveuses de Riz de Bagré (UCERB), a women's producer organisation comprised of almost 500 members. While some other investments may be expected to primarily benefit women, for example processing plants for crops primarily grown by women or plantations that shall employ women, the overall assessment is that women are hardly specifically addressed under the NAFSN-led projects.[77] This is perhaps surprising, since the CCFs adopted by the countries joining the Alliance acknowledge in principle the need to be particularly sensitive to the needs of women.

Gender, indeed, is a very important dimension of the challenge currently facing the reinvestment in agriculture. In Africa as elsewhere, rural women have long been discriminated in their access to a range of productive resources, including land, credit, inputs and extension services: 79 % of the studies on

[76] Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) Movement Strategy 2012-2015, September 2012.
[77] D. Hong and ONE, New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition: Part 2, available on: http://www.one.org/us/policy/new-alliance-for-food-security-and-nutrition-part-2/.

fertiliser, seed varieties, tools, and pesticide use concluded that men have higher mean access to these inputs.[78] This discrimination in turn largely explains the difference in yields between male and female smallholders, though the greater ability for men to command labour, both from (unremunerated) family members and from other members of the community, also plays a role. This is especially important today, as a result of the gendered nature of the agrarian transition: because men exit first from agriculture, the ratio between women and men in this sector increases; and there is a high proportion of women whose main employment is in agriculture.

In the past, there has been a tendency to provide support to agricultural producers on a gender-blind basis, with the result that all were treated as if they were men. This has proven misguided: not paying sufficient attention to the specific needs of women may result, in practice, in leaving them out.[79] The professed intention of the NAFSN to pay specific attention to the removal of the obstacles women face as independent food producers must therefore be welcomed. Priority should be given to removing all discrimination in access to land, whether such discrimination results from formal laws (in the area of inheritance, for instance) or from traditional norms and customs; to improving access of women to extension services; to ensuring women have access to microcredit schemes, and that they effectively have control over the use of the loans, which they should be allowed to use to improve their productivity as independent producers; and finally, that priorities in agricultural research and development effectively involve women, to ensure that the specific constraints faced by women, and their preferences, are taken into account.

But do the New Alliance CCFs deliver in this regard? The frameworks acknowledge the importance of the gender dimension, in a context in which agriculture is increasingly feminised, and in which, therefore, not taking into account the specific needs of women would significantly reduce the effectiveness of the initiative. However, three important limitations should be noted. First, the professed aim to take into account women's needs remains expressed at a high level of generality. None of the country frameworks provide details, for instance, as regards the right of women to inherit land, the increased proportion of women in extension services, or the involvement of women in shaping the priorities in the design of agricultural research programmes. In the CCFs, the commitment to a gender-sensitive approach thus remains primarily at a rhetorical level, and this is hardly compensated by the comparatively more detailed national plans for the reinvestment in agriculture that the New Alliance CCFs propose to contribute to.[80] While such national action plans typically do refer to gender,[81] what is generally missing is gender budgeting, a monitoring of progress that includes indicators disaggregated by gender, and (perhaps most importantly) the inclusion of the specific needs of women in the design and implementation of agricultural research and development policies.

[78] Peterman A, J. Behrman and A. Quisumbing, *A Review of Empirical Evidence on Gender Differences in Nonland Agricultural Inputs, Technology, and Services in Developing Countries*, IFPRI, Washington DC, 2010, p. 6. Thus, one study in Burkina Faso found productivity on female-managed plots in Burkina Faso to be 30 percent lower than on male-managed plots within the same household because labour and fertiliser were more intensively applied on men's plots: C. Udry, 'Gender, agricultural production, and the theory of the household', *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 104 (5) (1996), pp. 1010–1046.

[79] World Bank, 'Agriculture for Development: The Gender Dimensions', *Agriculture for Development Policy Brief*, World Bank, Washington, DC, 2007.

[80] See Action Aid, *Fair Shares: Is CAADP Working?* (May 2013) (noting that national strategies developed under the CAADP framework pay only lip service to the gender perspective).

[81] Some of the national plans adopted under the CAADP framework do provide a more detailed set of commitments towards rural women. For instance, Burkina Faso's Document de stratégie de développement rural, adopted in January 2004, defines the gender dimension as one of the seven 'strategic axes', and it refers in this regard to the need to improve literacy of women and their training in order to enable them to use modern technologies and to manage micro-enterprises; to reduce the burden on women; to support access to markets for products such as karité, néré, or fruits and vegetables which women tend to prefer to cultivate; to promote female entrepreneurship; to improve access to land of women and their presence in representative professional organisations; to strengthen the financing institutions they rely; and to support women in acquiring assets such as small means of transportation products.

Second, to the extent that they are mentioned specifically, women are seen as economic agents whose potential remains unfulfilled, but who should be supported by improving their access to productive resources, in particular inputs for farming, and their access to markets. Thus, women are seen as potential entrepreneurs, who should be given the means to become as productive as men. This is certainly a valuable goal in its own right, however it does presuppose that the women who are in charge of developing the land intend to succeed economically as farmers. But this is a choice they should make, and that should not be made for them: it cannot be excluded that this priority shall crowd out investments that would allow women to move away from agriculture (something that would be facilitated by improved access to education, or the acquisition of other skills), or that women would prefer to farm in order to feed their families and communities, rather than to sell their produce on markets against cash payments.

Third, the language of rights and empowerment is absent from the commitments that are expressed. Women are seen as beneficiaries of programmes that are intended to help them, but that are designed without them and that remain charity-based rather than based on their identification as rights-holders, who can claim certain types of support.

These dimensions are closely inter-related. Only by moving from highly abstract and general to more concrete and precise commitments can women be seen as rights-holders, who may be able to claim certain types of support from the government, with strong empowering impacts. And only by involving women in decision-making, in particular for the design and implementation of programmes aimed at rural and agricultural development, shall they be able to make choices, in particular, as regards the kind of farming they wish to practice and whether their production shall be market-oriented or focused in meeting the needs of the family or the community.

4 Conclusions and recommendations

Our understanding of what needs to be done to eradicate hunger and malnutrition has changed significantly over the past ten years. Earlier approaches that emphasised the expansion of volumes of agricultural commodities to be produced for the benefit of the food processing industry, and addressing hunger and malnutrition in developing countries by a combination of subsidised exports and food aid. This is now behind us. The focus today has shifted in four directions:

First, there was an insistence on strengthening the ability for poor countries to feed themselves. In the July 2009 L'Aquila Joint Statement on Food Security, the G-8 governments pledged to support 'country-owned strategies, in particular to increase food production, improve access to food and empower smallholder farmers to gain access to enhanced inputs, technologies, credit and markets' (par. 12). This commitment was echoed in November 2009 at the World Summit on Food Security.[82] There is today a general agreement that international markets will be more volatile in the future, and that countries should not take the risk of being excessively dependent on imports to feed themselves: resilience, instead, requires that they invest in domestic food production; and this is also a means to increase productivity in regions where productivity has remained low hitherto, as a result of a lack of interest of both private investors and governments in strengthening such production.

Secondly, there is recognition of the need to design agricultural policies that would support the incomes of small-scale farmers, in order to ensure that these policies would contribute to rural development and to the reduction of rural poverty. The L'Aquila Statement acknowledged that 'special focus must be devoted to smallholder and women farmers and their access to land, financial services, including microfinance and markets' (par. 10). Again confirming this, the Final Declaration adopted at the 2009 World Summit on Food Security refers to the need to support 'medium and long-term sustainable agricultural, food security, nutrition and rural development programmes to eliminate the root causes of hunger and poverty, including through the progressive realisation of the right to adequate food' (Principle 3), in particular by 'building capacity, focusing on integrated actions addressing policy, institutions and people, with a special emphasis on smallholders and women farmers' (par. 19).

Thirdly, there is a broad recognition that we need to shift to more sustainable farming practices. Monocultures lead to extractive types of farming that increase the dependency on chemical fertilisers and to massive land degradation, as well as to climate change. There is now a growing consensus that agroecological alternatives should be prioritised: agronomic techniques that aim to reduce the use of external fossil-based inputs, to recycle waste, and to combine different elements of nature in the process of production in order to maximise synergies between them.

Fourthly, we now acknowledge the need to place nutrition at the core of our efforts to rebuild food systems. In the past, increasing the availability of cheap calories was seen as the priority of agricultural policies and as the chief means through which food security could be improved. We now understand that calorie intake alone, which is the sole indicator for undernutrition in the official data on hunger, says little about nutritional status. Lack of care or inadequate feeding practices for infants, as well as poor health care or water and sanitation, also play a major role. And food intake itself cannot be assessed solely on the basis of its energy content: even where food intake provides a sufficient amount of calories,

[82] The World Summit on Food Security convened in Rome on 16-18 November 2009, and adopted the 'Five Rome Principles on Sustainable Global Food Security' (see the Final Declaration of the World Summit on Food Security, available on: http://www.fao.org/wsfs/wsfs-list-documents/en/ (last consulted on Jan. 23rd, 2014)). Under Principle 1, governments pledged to 'Invest in country-owned plans, aimed at channelling resources to well-designed and results-based programs and partnerships'.

inadequate diets can result in micronutrient deficiencies such as a lack of iodine, of vitamin A, or of iron, to mention only the deficiencies that are the most common in large parts of the developing world.

This is also the orientation that the EU has chosen to support. The 'EU Policy Framework to Assist Developing Countries in Addressing Food Security Challenges' (FSPF) adopted in 2010 encourages the EU and Member states, in particular, to focus on sustainable small-scale food production to increase availability of food in developing countries, recognising its multiple effects of enhancing incomes and resilience for rural producers, making food available for consumers, and maintaining or enhancing environmental quality; help create employment in rural areas through agroprocessing, mainly in small and medium sized enterprises; support research and innovation which have clear benefits for smallholder farmers; support the application of the right to food in developing countries through strategies that tackle the root causes of hunger and empowerment of marginalised groups in the design, implementation and monitoring of national programmes.[83]

Against this background, how can the NAFSN be assessed? The professed objective, which is to encourage a reinvestment in agriculture in order to allow low-income food-deficit countries to improve agricultural productivity and thus reduce their dependency on food imports and on food aid, is sound. But the CCFs concluded under the NAFSN framework are seriously deficient in a number of areas. They are almost entirely silent on the need to favour a shift to low-input, sustainable agriculture and they are weak on the integration of nutrition in agricultural policies: in these respects at least, they appear to be based on an outdated model of agricultural development, one that predates the new thinking that emerged when the international community tried to draw the lessons from the global food price crisis of 2008. Given the support the European Union and its member States are providing to the NAFSN, as well as the important role of EU-based companies in the process (though the most important European players from the private sector appear to be a Swiss and a Norwegian company), the EU could use its influence to bring about significant improvements to the process. Specifically, taking into account the various areas covered by this study, the EU and its Member States could make their continued support conditional upon the following improvements:

1. That the participating countries clearly commit to the implementation of the 2004 Voluntary Guidelines to support the progressive realisation of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security and of the 2014 Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems, as well as to imposing on investors that they comply with the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights; and that the annual evaluations of the implementation of the Country Cooperation Frameworks include a review of whether the commitments under this instruments were fulfilled. The EU could support host countries' efforts in ensuring that EU-based companies respect the rights of the local communities where they operate, by ensuring that any practical obstacles victims of human rights violations may face (particularly in cases of evictions from land) in having access to remedies in the EU, as allowed in principle under the 'Brussels I' Regulation,[84] are effectively removed.

2. That the impacts of land titling / certification schemes be carefully monitored, to ensure that they do not increase concentration of land ownership, and that they not lead to dispossession of local communities from the resources on which they depend. This requires that titling / certification be seen as one part of a larger effort in favour of agrarian reform, providing smallholders with the resources and support required to live on their land, and to increase the revenues they can gain

[83] COM (2010) 127, 31 March 2010.
[84] Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 351 of 20.12.2012, p. 1.

from farming. Specific measures may have to be taken against the risk of corruption tainting the allocation of land, whether at the stage of certification of land or at the stage of leasing or selling land to outside investors.

3. That the participating countries design model contract farming schemes on the basis of a participatory process; support farmers' cooperatives in order to strengthen the bargaining position of farmers vis-à-vis buyers; put in place legal empowerment programmes to ensure that farmers can negotiate arrangements that distribute the risks and benefits equitably across parties; and establish appropriate dispute settlement mechanisms.

4. That, in the reform of the regulatory reform on seeds and in their seeds policies more generally, the participating countries take into account the need to support farmers' seed systems and to reward farmers for maintaining and enhancing agrobiodiversity by continuously developing local seed varieties. This means adapting the regulations on seed catalogues to ensure that farmers' varieties are not excluded, but also encouraging local seed banks and seed fairs; and, in public programmes designed to support farmers, leaving the choice to the farmer whether to use the 'improved', commercial varieties, or whether to rely on local varieties.

5. That the participating countries encourage investment in a variety of crops, with a view to increasing the diversity of diets and the availability of fruits, vegetables, and nuts, in addition to staples such as maize, rice or wheat; and that they commit to the full implementation of the International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes and the resolutions adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) on Infant and Young Child Nutrition, including by regulatory reforms and strong enforcement mechanisms.

6. That the participating countries significantly strengthen the tools ensuring that women shall benefit from the transformation of agriculture, by removing any discriminatory provisions that create obstacles to their access to productive resources and by combating discriminatory customs, but also by designing programmes in support of women that take into account the specific time and mobility constraints they face, as well as the preference they may express for cultivating food crops to meet their own families' needs, and for doing so through low-external input farming methods or through methods that require less time and labour.

None of these improvements will be sustainable, nor will they have lasting impacts, unless they are grounded in a rights-based approach to agricultural development. This means defining clearly the commitments of all parties involved, and informing the beneficiaries about the rights that they may claim; and establishing accountability mechanisms that can allow these beneficiaries to complain if the commitments are not fulfilled. This applies to governments, but also to private investors: at present, the commitments of the private sector generally do not include maintaining an open space for dialogue with civil society organisations or farmers' groups, let alone to establish grievance mechanisms allowing such actors to seek redress if their rights are violated. This anomaly too should be remedied if the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition is to contribute effectively to the eradication of hunger and malnutrition.

5 Annex

The new alliance for food security and nutrition: The commitments

Table A. Summary overview of the commitments made in Country Cooperation Frameworks: institutional set-up and relationship to country-level policy initiatives in support of investment in agriculture

Country (and year of joining the New Alliance)	Lead development partner	Key policy initiatives mentioned in the cooperation framework	Institutional framework
Benin since 2013	Germany	Strategic Plan to Revive the Agricultural Sector (Plan stratégique de relance du secteur agricole -- PSRSA) 2011-2015 (adopted on 12 October 2011) and National Agricultural Investment Plan (PNIA) Strategic Plan for Food and Nutrition Development (PSDAN) and National Programme for Food and Nutrition (PANAR)	1) PSDAN and PANAR coordinated by the National Council for Food and Nutrition (CAN), chaired by the President of the Republic. 2) Establishing 'mechanisms for dialogue: (1) with the private sector through the effective implementation of the priority measures recommended by the Round Table on Public-Private Dialogue; (2) with farmers and other stakeholders; and (3) across government ministries'.
Burkina Faso since 2012	France, working closely with the rural development and food security sector donor working group led by the World Bank	Strategy for Accelerated Growth and Sustainable Development 2011-2015; Rural Sector National Programme (PNSR) 2011-2015 (which is the CAADP National Investment Plan for Agriculture and Food Security)	Annual review process of the commitments under the New Alliance Cooperation Framework to be conducted within the existing broader CAADP-donor Joint Sector Review of PNSR implementation
Côte d'Ivoire since 2012	Delegation of the EU, as co-chair of the Côte d'Ivoire agriculture sector working group	2010-2015 National Agricultural Investment Programme (PNIA) (which is the CAADP National Investment Plan for Agriculture and Food Security)	Annual review process to be conducted within the existing broader CAADP-Joint Sector Review of PNIA implementation
Ethiopia since 2012	Lead interlocutor for Ethiopia is the chair of the agriculture sector donor working group (RED-FS)	Agriculture Sector Policy Investment Framework (PIF) (which is the CAADP National Investment Plan for Agriculture and Food Security)	Annual review process to be conducted within the existing broader CAADP-donor Joint Sector Review of the PIF implementation
Ghana since 2012	Lead interlocutor for Ghana is the co-chair of the Ghana agriculture sector working group (the United States of America at the time of adoption)	Medium Term Agriculture Sector Investment Plan or METASIP (which is the CAADP National Investment Plan for Agriculture and Food Security)	Annual review process to be conducted within the existing broader CAADP-donor Joint Sector Review of METASIP implementation

Malawi since 2013	European Union	Agriculture Sector Wide Approach or ASWAp) (which is the CAADP National Investment Plan for Agriculture and Food Security) and Trade Industry and Private Sector Development Sector Wide Approach (TIP SWAp)	Annual review process conducted within the existing broader CAADP-donor Joint Sector Review of the ASWAp implementation
Mozambique since 2012	Japan and the United States, working with the agriculture sector development partner working group (Agriculture and Rural Economic Development - AgRED)	Plano Nacional de Investimento do Sector Agrário (PNISA) (which is the CAADP National Investment Plan for Agriculture and Food Security) and Strategic Plan for the Development of the Agricultural Sector (Plano Estratégico para o Desenvolvimento do Sector Agrário – PEDSA)	Annual review process to be conducted within the existing broader CAADP/PEDSA-donor Joint Sector Review of the PNISA implementation
Nigeria since 2013	The lead interlocutor of Nigeria is the co-chair of the Nigeria agriculture sector working group (the United Kingdom at the time)	Agricultural Transformation Agenda (ATA) (which is the CAADP National Investment Plan for Agriculture and Food Security)	The G8 members, the Government of Nigeria, and the private sector intend to review their collective performance through an annual review process to be conducted jointly on the basis of jointly determined benchmarks in contributing to the fulfilment of Nigeria's ATA
Senegal since 2013	Canada	National Agricultural Investment Programme (NAIP) (2009-2020) (which is the CAADP National Investment Plan for Agriculture and Food Security)	Annual evaluation process conducted within the broader context of the CAADP Joint Sector Review of NAIP implementation
Tanzania since 2012	The lead interlocutor of Tanzania is the co-chair of the Tanzania agriculture sector working group (the United States of America at the time)	Tanzania Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan (TAFSIP) (which is the CAADP National Investment Plan for Agriculture and Food Security)	Annual review process to be conducted within the existing broader CAADP-donor Joint Sector Review of TAFSIP implementation

Table B. Commitments made by governments in the Country Cooperation Agreements signed upon joining the New Alliance

Country	Creating a business-friendly environment and improve access to markets to attract investors	Access to land and provision of farming inputs in support of local agricultural producers	Improving nutritional outcomes
Benin	1) Implement the findings of the committee tasked with actioning the recommendations of the Round Table on Public-Private Dialogue. 2) Revise the Investment Code to create a more favourable environment for promoting the agricultural sector. 3) Revise tax, legislative and regulatory provisions to favour investment in the agricultural sector. 4) Develop irrigation schemes (rice: 5,000 ha; maize :50,000 ha; pineapples: 500 ha; vegetable crops:1,500 ha). 5) Create fishponds and enclosures (1,600 fishponds and 2,190 fish enclosures). 6) Implement environmental action plan for the agricultural sector. 7) Improve the electricity tariff regime and cut waiting times for connection to the electrical grid. 8) Implement joint public-private programme for 'Processing' and 'Access to market' components of the PNIA. 9) Apply the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) directives in respect of exemption from VAT for certain foods and agricultural products. 10) Set up the Benin Agency for Food Safety (ABSSA) and the Central Laboratory for Food Safety (LCSSA). 11) Strengthen the information systems on markets, flows and prices of agricultural products. 12) Develop transport and communications infrastructure.	1) Develop rural land ownership plans to cover the entire country. 2) Set up information system on rural land ownership.	1) Guarantee the nutritional wellbeing of the population by ensuring the availability, accessibility and consumption of foods (early warning system, education and supervision and promotion of foods with a high nutritional value). 2) Build on achievements and strengthen the universal salt iodisation strategy. 3) Build the capacities of the National Council for Food and Nutrition (CAN) and strengthen Benin's participation in the SUN movement.
Burkina Faso	1) Improving access to marketing and processing channels for agricultural commodities, progress measured by the increase in the number of agro-industrial	1) Improving access to inputs for farmers to achieve an increase in 'improved seed use' and	Mainstream nutrition in all food security and agriculture-related programmes and to

	SME/SMIs established 2) Developing/rehabilitating irrigated areas and creating the conditions for sustainable water resource management based on the integrated Water Resource Management strategy of the PNSR 3) Creating a secure investment climate for private investors, by improving efficiency and transparency in commercial and customs procedures for agricultural commodities, and by improving access to financial services, including microcredit, especially for women	in the use of (nitrogen-based) fertilisers 2) Facilitating access to land and its secure productive use, by increasing number of certificates of land holdings and long-term leases 3) Reduce risk for farmers by developing primary storage capacities for food commodities to contribute to mitigating agricultural price volatility, by agricultural insurance schemes, and by establishing a system of social safety nets adapted to different categories of beneficiaries	continue the actions undertaken so far to fight malnutrition
Côte d'Ivoire	Shaping an environment conducive to private sector investment, by: 1) improving basic infrastructure (agricultural roads, irrigation systems); 2) assisting and supporting potential investors; 3) facilitating free movement of agricultural commodities; and 4) adopting the Seed Act, to facilitate registration of new varieties in the seed catalogue	Implement the Rural Land Act by demarcating village lands and issuing land tenure certificates, and improving access to land for women and youth from rural areas through specific programmes	1) Mainstream nutrition in all food security and agriculture-related programmes 2) Strengthening regulatory framework for nutrition (fortification, biofortification and food hygiene), including by legislating on the marketing of breast milk substitutes and the sale of foodstuffs in the vicinity of schools and establishing a food safety agency
Ethiopia	1) Incentivising international seed companies to operate in Ethiopian seed markets (with the exception of certain open/self-pollenated or indigenous crops, specifically teff, coffee, niger seed, and inset), inter alia by allowing market pricing of seeds and by allowing cooperatives and individual farmers to source seed from any supplier. 2) Encouraging potential agriculture investors by establishing a one-window service for all formalities, including to help them identify opportunities, and by policy measures such as ensuring secure	1) Extend land certification to all rural land holders, initially focusing on Agricultural Growth Programme (AGP) districts (woredas). 2) Improve land laws and land use policy frameworks. 3) Further develop and implement guidelines of corporate responsibility for land tenure and responsible agriculture	

	ownership and crop trading rights for commercial farms and committing not to impose export quotas on commercial farm output and processed goods.	investment. 4) Improve access to credit to support smallholder farmers and agribusiness (e.g. warehouse receipts, out-grower contracts, machinery leasing, etc.).	
Ghana	1) Improve seed regulations (to estabish a seed registry system and framework for the development of new varieties and seed testing, etc.) 2) Create a database of suitable land for investors and define clear procedures to channel investor interest (including that related to value-added agricultural processing) to appropriate agencies. 3) Provide a 'model lease agreement' for outgrower schemes / contract farming.	Develop a new agricultural input policy for fertiliser and certified seed use.	
Malawi	1) Eliminate export bans on other crops but not maize 2) Fast track the doing business reforms and review taxation regimes in order to maximise incentives to investment in the growth clusters under the National Export Strategy and to support agricultural mechanisation 3) Create the Malawi Investment and Trade Centre as a one stop shop for the promotion and attraction of investment to the key clusters of the NES, trade facilitation and ensuring smooth information flow to investors 4) Review the National Seed Certification System (Seed Act, 1996), consistent with the SADC and COMESA Seed Harmonization Programme 5) Fast track the development of the Fertilizer Regulatory Framework and the Contract Farming Strategy 6) Link donor funded irrigation projects to the National Export Strategy, ensuring that the irrigation infrastructure designs accommodate crops that have been identified in the National Export Strategy; and prioritise rural feeder roads to primary production areas of prioritised crops in growth clusters	1) Release 200,000 hectares for large scale commercial agriculture by 2015, this will be done after conducting a survey to identify idle land and crop suitability under both customary and leasehold 2) Increase sustainability, transparency, accountability and value for money in its approach to the Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP). 3) Prioritise dairy production as well as the following crops: maize, groundnuts, soya beans, sunflower, cotton, pigeon peas and sugar cane 4) Improve the quality of agricultural commodities by capacitating the Malawi Bureau of Standards and other research institutions to be able to certify products to meet international standards	1) Reduce malnutrition by promoting production and utilisation of diversified foods with high nutritive values, under the Scaling Up Nutrition-Nutrition Education and Communication Strategy 2) Implement ASWAp as regards a) the diversification agenda which focuses agriculture production away from maize towards increased production of nutritious crops such as pulses, soya beans, groundnuts, legumes. b) investing in increased agro-processing and value addition thus increasing the choice of nutritious foods in the markets. 3) implementing the National Export Strategy so that farmer incomes may increase to allow them to afford more nutritious foods, while at the same time widening

			the tax base to better enable the Government to afford welfare programmes targeting nutrition. 4) Enact the Nutrition Bill and complete the review of the Public Health Act to enforce salt iodisation and extend maternity leave.
Mozambique	1) Revise the National Seed Policy, including by ceasing distribution of free and unimproved seeds except for pre-identified staple crops in emergency situations ; implement approved regulations governing seed proprietary laws which promote private sector investment in seed production; and adopt seed certification regulations compliant with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) seed protocol requirements 2) Adopt regulations to authorise communities to engage in partnerships through leases or sub-leases (*cessao de exploração)*	1) Accelerate issuance of certificates on land use rights (DUATs) to allow smallholders (women and men) to secure tenure and to promote agribusiness investment 2) Facilitate trade and marketing of agricultural products, especially for smallholder farmers. 3) Increase the availability and access to credit in the agricultural sector, especially for smallholder farmers.	1) Implement the Multi-Sectoral Nutrition Action Plan for the Reduction of Chronic Undernutrition 2011-2015 (PAMRDC) which is aligned with Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) Movement 2) Ensure that PAMRDC and CAADP/PEDSA implementation plans are aligned with one another
Nigeria	1) Increase private sector participation in the production & distribution of seed and fertiliser by adopting and implementing a seed law that reflects the role of the private sector in technology (certified and foundation seed), by seed and fertiliser certification, and by improving transparency and private sector participation in fertiliser distribution system 2) Mechanism to fast track registration of agricultural enterprises 3) Implement Staple Crop Processing Zones (SCPZs) 4) Establish an agricultural commodity exchange managed by the private sector	1) Improve access to financial services for agricultural producers through Nigeria Incentive-Based Risk Sharing System for Agricultural Lending (NIRSAL), Fund for Agricultural Financing in Nigeria (FAFIN) and other agencies lending to agriculture; develop agricultural insurance market 2) Adopt a Systematic Land Titling and Registration (SLTR) process that respects FAO Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests.	1) Extend existing legislation on fortification and bio-fortification to other important food staples not covered by existing policies and regulations 2) Develop a National Nutrition Plan 3) Provide funding to expand school feeding programme with 25 % of food purchased from local farmers

Senegal	1) Implement tax incentives for agricultural investment 2) Agriculture modernisation measures (structures, equipment, infrastructure, and so on).	1) Increase the share of financial loans set aside for the agricultural sector from 3 % to 8 % by 2015 2) Reduce the budgetary level of input subsidies from 0.5 % to 0.3 % of gross domestic product over three years and ensure better targeting of recipients (cooperatives, individuals, economic interest groups, smallholders, in particular women, etc.) 3) Define and implement land reform measures for responsible agriculture.	
Tanzania	1) Increased stability and transparency in trade policy, with reduced tariff and non-tariff barriers, and by searching for alternatives to export bans in times of emergency 2) Fiscal measures encouraging incentives for the private sector: pre-profit tax at farm-gate ('cess') on crops reduced or lifted; VAT on spare parts for farm machinery and equipment reduced or lifted 3) Revised Seed Act that aligns plant breeder's rights with the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) system; facilitating release of new varieties of imported seeds from outside the region; qualified private sector companies authorised to produce foundation seed under proper supervision and testing.	1) Secure certificate of land rights (granted or customary) for small holders and investors and clarification of the roles of land implementing agencies (TIC, RUBADA, Ministry of Lands and Local Government) in order to responsibly and transparently allocate land for investors in the SAGCOT region 2) Time required to register imported agrochemicals outside the region to be reviewed and benchmarked with international best practices.	Update and align the National Food and Nutrition Policy with the National Nutrition Strategy; implement a policy on infant and young child feeding; implement the Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes and the Codex Alimentarius

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