Democratic Change in
Central and Eastern Europe 1989-90
The European Parliament and the end of the Cold War

Study
This study has been written at the request of the Historical Archives Unit of the Directorate General for Parliamentary Research Services (DG EPRS).

Author: Dr Aline Sierp, University of Maastricht

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERVICES

HISTORICAL ARCHIVES UNIT

arch-info@europarl.europa.eu

Cover: The Baltic Way was a peaceful political demonstration that occurred on 23 August 1989. Approximately two million people joined their hands to form a human chain spanning 675.5 kilometres across the three Baltic states. © Kusurija (Own work) [CC BY-SA 3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons


Disclaimer and Copyright

The content of this document is the sole responsibility of the author and any opinions expressed therein do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament.

Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and the publisher is given prior notice and sent a copy.

PE 538.881
DOI: 10.2861/833736
CAT: QA-05-14-170-EN-N
© European Union, 2015
Printed in Luxembourg
Executive summary

The analysis of the European Parliament’s archival documents (reports, resolutions and debates) undoubtedly demonstrates that the EP has been in the front-row when it comes to debating the events leading to democratic change in Central and Eastern European countries. Clearly voicing its concerns about developments in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia even before its first direct elections in 1979, the EP from the very beginning has taken a clear stance in condemning human rights violations while supporting movements towards democratisation in Central and Eastern Europe.

The amount of discussions in the Parliament increased with the beginning of glasnost and perestroika in the 1980s and intensified in the run-up to the fall of the Berlin Wall. MEPs discussed not only the deteriorating political situation in Poland and Czechoslovakia but also the protection of human rights in Romania and Eastern Germany. As the events of 1989 unfolded debates became more and more controversial. The question of German unification and of national self-determination in both the GDR and the Baltic States clearly divided MEPs. While there seemed to be a general agreement concerning the active role the EU should play in providing economic aid to Central and Eastern Europe, marked security concerns dominated discussions on Germany’s and the Baltic countries’ future.

The beginning of the 1990s was characterised by a general shift in focus. With the signing of the Europe Agreements and with enlargement becoming a real possibility, the importance of political, cultural and scientific cooperation suddenly started to take centre stage. Initial debates on accession were nevertheless characterised by stark differences of opinion concerning the timeframe and the depth of future collaboration with Central and Eastern Europe. Similarly heated discussions can be observed at the start of the Yugoslav Wars with MEPs being divided over the question of a possible military intervention on Yugoslav territory and the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.

The Balkan Wars and their aftermath clearly provided the backdrop to accession negotiations with Central and Eastern European countries, brushing aside most disagreements between MEPs on the one hand and the Commission and the EP on the other. While the EP closely monitored progress towards democratisation, it gave unwavering support to almost all candidate countries. It thus paved the way for the accession of ten Central and Eastern European countries in 2004 followed by three more in 2007 and 2013 respectively.
Table of Contents

List of abbreviations and acronyms ................................................................. 7

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 9

I – Background .................................................................................................. 9

II – Objectives .................................................................................................... 9

III – Sources and methodology ........................................................................ 10

CHAPTER I MILESTONES IN THE PERIOD PRIOR TO 1989 ....................... 11

I – 1956 to 1979 – Before the first direct EP elections ............................... 11

1. The Hungarian Revolution ......................................................................... 11
2. The Prague Spring ...................................................................................... 11

II – 1979 to 1984 – The first parliamentary term ......................................... 12

1. Human rights violations in Czechoslovakia ............................................ 12
2. Poland ........................................................................................................ 12

III – 1984 to 1987 – The start of glasnost .................................................... 14

1. Economic, political and cultural cooperation ........................................ 14
2. Poland and Romania ................................................................................ 14

CHAPTER II THE FALL OF COMMUNISM .................................................. 17

I – 1988 – The run-up to the fall of the Berlin Wall ...................................... 17

1. Human rights and religious freedom ...................................................... 17
2. Human rights in Poland .......................................................................... 17
3. Political rights in Czechoslovakia ........................................................... 18
4. Ethnic minorities in Romania ................................................................. 19

II – 1989 – The end of Communism ............................................................. 20

1. Human rights in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, East Germany and
   Yugoslavia ............................................................................................... 20
2. The situation in Poland ........................................................................... 26
3. East German refugees and the situation in the GDR .............................................. 30
4. The fall of the Berlin Wall ......................................................................................... 32
5. Romania ...................................................................................................................... 36

III – 1990 – The beginning of a new era ....................................................................... 37
1. (Economic) Relations with Central and Eastern Europe ............................................. 37
2. From economic to political relations ............................................................................. 38
3. Poland, the GDR and German unification ....................................................................... 40
4. Lithuania and Romania ................................................................................................. 41
5. Cooperation with the USSR .......................................................................................... 44
6. The Europe Agreements ................................................................................................. 45

IV – 1991 – The end of the Cold War ............................................................................. 45
1. The Baltic States ............................................................................................................. 45
2. Deepening relations with Romania, Bulgaria, Poland and Czechoslovakia ............... 49
3. The break-up of Yugoslavia ........................................................................................... 53
4. The end of the Cold War ............................................................................................... 57

CHAPTER III  POST-COMMUNISM AND EASTERN ENLARGEMENT .............. 59

I – 1992 to 1994 – The first years of Post-Communism ............................................. 59
1. The Yugoslav Wars ......................................................................................................... 59
2. Early debates on accession ............................................................................................ 60

II – 1994 to 2004 – The road to accession ..................................................................... 62
1. The Yugoslav Wars and their aftermath ........................................................................ 62
2. Towards Enlargement .................................................................................................... 64

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 69

Annexes ......................................................................................................................... 71
List of abbreviations and acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Rainbow Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Common Agricultural Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEEC</td>
<td>Central and Eastern European countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Left Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoE</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COM</td>
<td>Communist and Allies Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comecon</td>
<td>Council for Mutual Economic Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR</td>
<td>Group of the European Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ED</td>
<td>European Democratic Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIB</td>
<td>European Investment Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPP</td>
<td>European People’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G7</td>
<td>Group of 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUE</td>
<td>European United Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDR</td>
<td>Liberal and Democratic Reformist Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>Member of European Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PES</td>
<td>Party of European Socialists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDE</td>
<td>European Democratic Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>The Green Group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

I – Background

The year 1989 was marked by the fall of Communism in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. These events took place at the end of a process that began in 1985 with Perestroika. The acceleration of reforms specific to each of these states led to the general collapse of regimes starting at the end of 1989. The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 was one of the most significant events of the period: the definitive end of the Cold War and the Iron Curtain. The Warsaw Pact and Comecon, institutional structures of the Eastern bloc, ceased to exist in the summer of 1991, and the USSR itself disappeared as a state in December of the same year.

The events of late 1989 started a transition process towards democracy in the countries of the former Eastern bloc and resulted, 15 years later, in the accession of several Eastern European countries to the European Union. The European Parliament closely followed and frequently discussed the process of democratic change in Central and Eastern Europe and issued a number of important resolutions on the situation in these countries during the period before and after 1989.

In 2014, on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the fall of Communism and the 10th anniversary of the Eastern enlargement, this in-depth analysis presents an overview of the events leading to democratic change in Central and Eastern European countries, with particular attention to the events around 1989, and their consequences and effects on European history.

II – Objectives

This study forms a part of the European Parliament History Series produced by the Parliament’s Historical Archives. The series analyses the contribution of the Parliament to the history of modern Europe and the process of European integration. The text studies the process of democratic change in Central and Eastern Europe from the perspective of the European Parliament as detailed in its archive documents. In particular, the text provides a synthesis based on the thorough research and analysis of documents issued by the European Parliament on this topic. It traces the discussions and opinions of Parliament over the years regarding a) the events leading to democratic change in Central and Eastern Europe with special attention to the events around 1989 and b)
Post-communism and Eastern enlargement. The scope of the work is to provide readers with a better understanding of the history of the Parliament as it relates to this particular topic and to enhance visibility of Parliament’s historical documents.

III – Sources and methodology

The study builds on a wide range of parliamentary documents. It is based on a selection of 820 parliamentary reports, resolutions and debates (see list of selected documents in Appendix I) sourced from the Historical Archives of the European Parliament in Luxembourg and the Historical Archives of the European Union in Florence. The documents have been selected with a view of representing not only different document types but also different periods and points of view. The core analysis covers the four years framing the fall of the Berlin Wall, namely 1988 up to and including 1991. For the period between 1967 and 1988 and between 1992 and 2004 a succinct chronology and synthetic analysis has been provided. Particular attention has been paid in particular to debates on events in countries who became EU Members in the years following the fall of the Iron Curtain, namely Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, East Germany, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
CHAPTER I
MILESTONES IN THE PERIOD PRIOR TO 1989

I – 1956 to 1979 – Before the first direct EP elections

1. The Hungarian Revolution

In the period before 1979, the European Parliament (EP) exclusively discusses the situation in two Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs): Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Debates revolve initially around the Hungarian Revolution in 1956. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) fully support the aims of the Hungarian citizens. However, compared to the Prague Spring in 1968, the EP is fairly cautious in expressing its opinion and concentrates more on the question of how to provide effective aid to Hungarian refugees.1

2. The Prague Spring

The violent repression of the Czechoslovak uprising on the contrary triggers much more concrete reactions.2 This might have to do with the fact that the European Parliament is particularly shocked by the blatant disregard of the existing treaties. It sees the brutal intervention by the Soviet army as a hard blow to the beginning appeasement process, destroying any hope for the international acceptance of a general politics of disarmament and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signed on July 1, 1968. At the same time the Prague Spring events are interpreted as a clear indication (after the Hungarian Revolution) that behind the Iron Curtain there is increasingly the longing for freedom. Most MEPs believe that the EP should react to this and firmly express their conviction that the only way towards appeasement goes via the acceptance of human rights, the refraining of the use of violence and disarmament. Indeed, debates in the following years almost exclusively concentrate on the question of whether human rights and détente are complementary or conflicting and whether the Nine should exert pressure for the respect of human rights in Central and Eastern European countries.

2 European Parliament debates of 1 October 1968 on political implications of the events in Czechoslovakia, pp. 39-51; European Parliament debates of 1 October 1968 on political implications of the events which occurred in Czechoslovakia (cont.), pp. 53-64.
II – 1979 to 1984 – The first parliamentary term

1. Human rights violations in Czechoslovakia

The first parliamentary term is initially dominated by discussions on the political situation in Poland and incidents of human rights violations in Czechoslovakia. In several debates, resolutions and reports the European Parliament firmly condemns the violations of human rights in Czechoslovakia that took place in its newly elected chamber.\(^3\) It particularly criticizes the increasing amount of politically motivated arrests of opposition leaders and resolutely calls on the Czechoslovak government to respect the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The parliamentary debates on the human rights situation in Czechoslovakia bring up the question if human rights can be subject to political interpretation and whether the EP should be a ‘factory’ for the production of resolutions on events over which it has no power. Despite disagreement over this issue, MEPs express more and more frequently the idea that the European Parliament is not only the Assembly of the Nine or Ten or Twelve but the legitimate democratic voice of all Europeans and should thus be a privileged forum of the defence of human rights in Europe.

2. Poland

The aspiration to be a ‘Parliament of Europe’ as a whole reappears frequently in the following debates on Poland. MEPs from both right- and left-wing groups stress the importance of non-interference in internal Polish (or Czech) affairs and advocate giving European financial support to the Polish democratic effort instead. The common past experience of WWII is frequently invoked in this

context to emphasize the existing solidarity between West European countries and Poland on the one hand and to underline the EPs moral duty to defend human rights on the other.4

The EP generally speaking welcomes almost unanimously the events in Gdansk and Katowice in August 1980 where trade unions have reached agreements with Polish authorities and is willing to provide urgent food supplies to counterbalance the ensuing difficult economic situation.5 When General Wojciech Jaruzelski (under Soviet pressure) introduces martial law in December 1981, the EP reacts immediately with a resolution, condemning the ‘state of war’ in Poland and demanding the release of those arrested.6 A few months later it issues a report in which it takes a firm position towards the Polish case by denouncing the introduction of martial law, the continuous political arrests, the violation of the freedom of press and association and the USSR’s role in the conflict.7 At the same time it reasserts its support for Solidarność and Lech Walesa and demands the Polish government to immediately release political prisoners, repeal martial law and resume the democratic process. It advocates freezing any form of economic aid until the situation is resolved but confirms its willingness to further grant humanitarian aid and asylum to Polish refugees. The report is supported particularly by the conservative and liberal groups. The Communists (COM) and Socialists (PES) are divided, they support the text but are critical of some of its points.8 This changes as soon as Solidarność is outlawed. All groups support the resolutions on the outlawing of ‘Solidarity’ in Poland and on repression in Poland and insist that the EEC should rethink its relation towards the country if Jaruzelski’s ‘dictatorial regime’ continues to disrespect human rights.9

---

7 Report on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee on the situation in Poland, Historical Archives PE1 AP RP/POLI.1979 A1-0436/82.
III – 1984 to 1987 – The start of glasnost

1. Economic, political and cultural cooperation

The first years of the second parliamentary term are marked on the one hand by discussions on resolutions that are very specifically addressing certain incidents (i.e. the ‘exclusion from study imposed by the Czechoslovak Government on the son of the Foreign Minister at the time of the ‘Prague spring’) or overarching fundamental questions concerning the ‘appeal for the establishment of democracy in Eastern Europe’. For the first time, in most adopted reports and resolutions the relations between the European Economic Community (EEC) and Eastern and Central Europe are considered as a whole. Clear ideas are voiced on the form that future cooperation not only in the economic but also in the political and cultural field could take. The EP calls on the Comecon countries to recognise the EEC and pledges for more cooperation in all fields both on a bilateral and a European basis. The deepening of bilateral economic relations is also clearly seen as a way to encourage further political cooperation in the human and civil rights sector. The proposal for the establishment of a European Foundation for East European Studies has to be seen in this context as well.

2. Poland and Romania

Human rights are again discussed in detail in relation to several Eastern European countries. Particularly the worrisome situation in Romania is highlighted. Right and Left unanimously condemn the Ceausescu regime and call for Community aid to alleviate the difficult situation of the Romanian population. In relation to Poland there is less agreement within the

---

Parliament. Debates on the situation in Poland show a clear Right-Left divergence on whether confrontation or peaceful coexistence with the regime would be the preferable solution. Also the question of to what extent the EP should interfere in Polish internal affairs is debated fervently. However, all agree that after the Chernobyl catastrophe Community aid to Poland is vital. The resolution passed in December 1986 clearly marks a shift in the attitude of the EP towards Poland. It recognises the Polish government’s recent progress towards the respect of political and civil liberties and calls for the normalisation of relations between Poland and the EEC. The resolution lays the foundations for developments that would express themselves fully only in the following year during the run-up to the fall of the Berlin wall.


CHAPTER II
THE FALL OF COMMUNISM

I – 1988 – The run-up to the fall of the Berlin Wall

1. Human rights and religious freedom
Debates in 1988 gravitate almost exclusively around the deteriorating human rights situation in Central and Eastern Europe. Several resolutions deal particularly with the repression of religious freedom in Czechoslovakia, Estonia and East Germany.16 The EP notices with concern that despite glasnost and perestroika freedom of religion is still being restricted and underlines that if this practice continues, glasnost cannot be taken seriously. Religious freedom in this context is clearly seen as an essential part of human rights and self-determination whose protection is covered by the Helsinki Final Act.

2. Human rights in Poland
Nine resolutions and three long debates cover the situation in Poland and in Czechoslovakia.17 Despite the recognition of the progress towards the respect of political and civil liberties, MEPs from all political currents express their disappointment at the slow evolution of democratic change in both countries. According to them the fact that there is still no real freedom of expression, betrays the hopes awakened by the Gdansk Agreements of August 31, 1980 and dampens hopes for speedy political change. They are particularly concerned about the attitude of the Polish government and are asking Wojciech Jaruzelski to abandon oppressive measures in order to not lose credibility in the West. MEPs stress in particular that the European Parliament is

in favour of self-determination and the respect for human rights without bloodshed and without violence. They thus call on the Council and the Commission to assist the Solidarity trade union organization and to openly condemn the actions by the Polish Government. While they believe it to be counterproductive if the EEC tries to force the Polish authorities on to the defensive, they underline that all trends towards democratization must be encouraged. What emerges clearly from discussions is the attempt to find the right balance between action and reaction. While on the one hand the EP calls for a clear stance condemning the use of force by the Polish government thereby setting itself clearly apart from the policy of rapprochement pursued by the US, it also does not want to adopt the role of the ‘master towards the pupil’\textsuperscript{18}. While it fears that resignation and unconditional submission might play into the hands of the Soviet Union, thus having a destabilizing effect on the whole of Europe, it also thinks that if the European Parliament stands for human rights and freedom of the individual, it has to react and cannot allow rapprochement at all costs. Underlying all the debates is clearly a more general concern about the right course of action if the Community wants be seen as champion of human rights, democracy and national self-determination also in the future. This appears to be particularly important in the Polish context. Most MEPS express their impression that in Poland a decisive contest is in progress that extends far beyond the Polish borders. They see the events in Poland as a first step towards a more general struggle between those Central and Eastern European countries that want to go forward with reform, democracy and renewal and those who want to turn back to centralization.

3. Political rights in Czechoslovakia

This might explain why the subsequent discussions on 19 May 1988 on the question of whether the Community should recognize the attempts by the Soviet Union to found political groups and establish a democratic opposition party in Czechoslovakia become very heated\textsuperscript{19}. While the Liberals think that it is the EP’s duty to support this development, the Socialist group wonders if the time is ripe yet for such a step. They draw attention to the fact that citizens who for decades have not had any political influence cannot be brought within months to a system of democracy. They fear in particular that such a development might destroy the feeble beginnings of perestroika and glasnost.

\textsuperscript{18} Speech by Carlo Galluzzi, European Parliament debates of 19 May 1988, No 2-365/248.

The Socialists’ attitude gets interpreted by the liberal and conservative groups as being ‘too tolerant’ towards the Soviet Union and Gorbachev. This accusation sparks renewed discussions about the right balance between concessions and enforcement of international agreements. Many MEPs warn that the Community should weigh carefully their desire for visible achievements in perestroika and glasnost on the one hand, and their commitment to human rights on the other. It is remarkable that in this context the Parliament repeatedly tries to pitch itself against the United States. It accuses the US of following a very narrow trajectory interested only in rapprochement and avoiding any potential conflict with sensitive issues. It is probably no coincidence that those criticisms are voiced shortly before the meeting between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev takes place at the end of May 1988 during which the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty is signed.

4. **Ethnic minorities in Romania**

The idea that the EEC might pay more attention to human rights issues than the US and that it pays as much attention to fundamental rights as it does to the right of trade comes back in the July debate and the following resolutions on ethnic minorities in Romania and the USSR. The Parliament makes very clear that it is interested in better relations with Central and Eastern European countries and the USSR but that any development into this direction has to be within the framework of the Helsinki Agreements, meaning inclusive of respect for the rights of minorities, for autonomy and for human rights. It is not prepared to accept that one of the signatory countries violates the document that is generally seen as marking the transition from the Cold War to a relationship of cooperation and mutual trust between countries. MEPs notice in their speeches that the developments in Romania stand in stark contrast to those in the rest of the Soviet Union and believe that for that reason the EEC should not deal with Romania the same way as with the other CEECs under the joint EEC/Comecon declaration. The EP therefore calls on the Commission and the Council to consider the total suspension of negotiations with Romania and the possibility of adopting harsher measures and real economic sanctions. Despite the fact that the European Parliament renews this call during the

---

October debate on human rights in Romania, stressing that Romania might become a test case on how the EEC uses its powers and responsibilities, the Commission is not prepared to recommend any interruption of trade links with Romania at this stage since it does not believe that it would help to improve the human rights situation.\(^{21}\) The Commission will change its attitude only six months later, in March 1989.

II – 1989 – The end of Communism

1. Human rights in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, East Germany and Yugoslavia

One of the red threads running through debates in the pre-1989 period is the constant evocation of the Community’s special responsibility towards the Central and Eastern European countries due to their geographical location and their common historical roots. If the conservative parties stress in particular the shared Christian heritage of Poland and Czechoslovakia, the Greens and Socialists underline the communality of Latin and European cultures and traditions in Romania and Hungary. The importance of history is emphasized in the first debate of the new year dealing with the situation in the Baltic States and Armenia.\(^{22}\) 1989 marks the 50th anniversary of the Molotov Ribbentrop Pact and MEPs express the hope that the Soviet Union will use this occasion to show that it takes glasnost and perestroika indeed seriously. All groups notice that politicians in the Soviet Union have completely changed rhetoric. They are surprised about the positive response of the Soviet Union to demands of independence by the Baltic States and think that the EEC should carefully encourage the process of foresight and courage initiated by Moscow. The ultimate hope is that Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia become independent states on a par with the states in Western Europe. All groups indeed agree on the motions for a resolution on the independence of the Baltic States, only the Conservative group (ED) expresses hesitations on putting forward unrealistic demands which might destabilize the area.

Debates in the following months until the end of the second parliamentary term, deal almost exclusively again with human rights in Czechoslovakia,


Poland, Romania, East Germany and Yugoslavia. Debates are surprisingly void of any political or ideological conflict. Only the Far-Right (DR) makes several times polemical remarks, reminding the EP that the situation in Eastern Europe is due to Western countries ‘selling it off to Stalin at the end of WWII’ and ‘leaving it to its communist fate by a guilty West’. The main concern in all debates is the limited application of the principles set down in the Helsinki Final Act and the Vienna Agreement. To sign international agreements and not to abide by them is considered an act of hypocrisy of which almost all governments of the five countries can be accused of.

Poland

In the overall comparison, Poland fares best. The EP welcomes that the Polish government has officially recognized the agricultural branch of Solidarity. It sees it as a sign that a whole new system of freedoms is being given expression and set in place. As a result, it calls for improved economic and trade relations and the revision of the foreign debt problem, believing that this will help the Polish people to make their own independent decisions about their future. A number of MEPs nevertheless express a certain degree of hesitation remarking that despite these positive tendencies, there are also a number of negative ones that have to be carefully monitored. The Commission agrees that a new phase in the talks and relations with Poland on trade and cooperation shall be initiated in the hope that this will contribute to what appeared to be the start of an overall positive development towards democracy.

Czechoslovakia

The evaluation of Czechoslovakia looks quite different. As with Poland, where MEPs had expressed their initial disappointment about the fact that the hopes connected to the Gdansk Agreements of August 31, 1980 had been destroyed, so do they regret to see that despite perestroika and glasnost, the ideas advanced during the Prague Spring were not heard again. A particularly
pronounced form of responsibility is evidently felt towards Czechoslovakia in light of the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Prague’s occupation by Hitler. The fact that nobody intervened at the time is seen as having been partly the result of the weakness of the Western democracies, a weakness the EEC does not want to be accused of again. This might be part of the explanation of why all political groups in the Parliament fervently condemn the brutal way in which the Czechoslovak police put down the peaceful demonstrations held in Prague on January 15, 16 and 17, 1989 to commemorate the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Jan Palach’s suicide, and why they support the joint motion of a resolution on the brutal suppression of human rights demonstrations in Prague. Only the Far-Right group deplores the fact that their group had not been consulted beforehand but nevertheless signs the resolution.

27 A Czech student who protested against the end of the Prague Spring by committing suicide through self-immolation in 1969.
The situation in Czechoslovakia is discussed again two months later, on March 16, 1989. The EP is concerned with the amount of arbitrary arrests and harsh sentences that had increased in the first half of 1989. MEPs are convinced that the EEC cannot accept this kind of repression at a time when it is expanding its ties with the Czechoslovak authorities and that it should react firmly and effectively by making clear that trade agreements cannot be concluded unless the Czech government honours its obligations to respect human rights. Some MEPs go as far as suggesting that watching the use of Stalinist methods without speaking out, would be a form of complicity since ‘if we remain silent, we have already given up the struggle for freedom and human rights’.29

Romania

This idea is also behind the discussions on Romania that take place on the same day (March 16, 1989) and feed into a resolution dedicated exclusively to the violation of human rights by the Ceausescu regime.30 If in 1988 the EP had compared itself to the US, in 1989 it starts to look increasingly to the actions of other international institutions. One of the main arguments put forward for a harsh stance towards Romania is the fact that the UNHCR had condemned Romania and that it was felt that the EP should follow since ‘at a time when for once the UN is reacting, we cannot be weaker than the rest of the world’.31 Many MEPs express embarrassment about the fact that the West had remained silent for years and had until recently welcomed Ceausescu’s representatives in the EP because Romania was seen as an anomaly in the Comecon. It is therefore not surprising that there is wide support for the motion for a resolution submitted by six groups. Only the Liberals believe that the text is too weak and deplore that it does not mention the immediate freezing of negotiations for a more extensive trade agreement. They accuse the EP of not having the courage to take a decisive stand against Romania. The resolution indeed only ‘calls on the Commission, the governments of the Member States and the Council to review their relations with Romania’.32 Interestingly, the Commission in the end decided to take a much harsher stance than the one the Parliament recommended: it stopped the negotiations on the trade agreement immediately. This firm position is welcomed by the Parliament in the

subsequent debate on Czechoslovakia (analysed above). While stressing that the situation in Czechoslovakia is not the same as the one in Romania, MEPs note that events have started to look very similar and recommend to the Commission and the Council to review their policies also with regards to Czechoslovakia.\textsuperscript{33}

Human rights issues in Romania are on the agenda again at the end of May, however, the debate revolves almost exclusively around the violation of freedom of expression in the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{34} Romania only appears in the request voiced by several MEPs to refuse Romania the observer status it is seeking in the Council of Europe (CoE). Besides that, the EP concentrates on the law passed by the Supreme Soviet on April 9, 1989 aimed at penalizing dissent. MEPs find it extremely worrying that the Soviet Union allows racism and anti-Semitism but made it illegal for anyone in the Soviet Union to criticize the state. They propose to put to the Soviet authorities as basic condition for closer relations with the EEC that each nation within the Soviet Union must have the possibility of developing its own democratic formula for government, administration and policy. The EP clearly refers to the situation of the Baltic


States and their request for independence here, a topic that will come back several times also in the following months.

**GDR**

One of the countries that fares less well in the evaluation of the EP because ‘it has still not allowed glasnost or perestroika to come near it’, is the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The EP asks its government - now that it has established relations with the EEC following the joint EEC/Comecon declaration - to fulfil the minimum criteria set by the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki. In particular it asks the GDR government to follow the example of a number of other communist states who have become far more liberal in terms of travel and exit permits than the GDR.

**Yugoslavia**

The other country that suddenly appears on the radar of the EEC in the first half of 1989 is Yugoslavia. The revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy by Slobodan Milošević followed by the miners’ strike cause alarm since both events are seen as creating the danger of disequilibrium in a region that is considered a nerve centre when it comes to the stability of the European continent. Most MEPs do not think that Yugoslavia is on the threshold of civil war, nor that peace in Europe is threatened but they openly express their concerns about the most recent events. Despite underlining that Europe bears great responsibility towards Yugoslavia because it will be directly or indirectly affected by the possible break-out of an ethnic conflict in the Balkans, many MEPs stress it to be important to not get involved directly in Yugoslavia’s internal political conflicts. They think that the EP should rather be concerned with respect for human rights and the restoration of a climate of détente and calm as an essential prerequisite for any kind of sincere dialogue. Direct comparison is made with experiences in other European countries (Spain, Ireland), where the forceful suppression of justified demands for ethnic and cultural independence had not led to integration. Most groups believe that the EP is in a position to make such demands since it maintains special political, economic and financial relations with Yugoslavia.

37 European Parliament debates of 13 April 1989 on human rights in East Germany and Yugoslavia, No 2-
2. The situation in Poland

The first sitting of the third parliamentary term is dominated by a very long discussion on the situation in Poland after which eight resolutions are passed.\(^{38}\) It takes place after the semi-free elections on June 4, 1989 in which Solidarity won with an overwhelming majority electing Tadeusz Mazowiecki as leader of the first non-communist government in the Eastern bloc in August of the same year. It is one of the first debates during which oral questions are put jointly to the Commission and the Council. The EP expresses its hope that in future the Council will be represented more often when proposals put forward by the EP concern it as well. This is a criticism that will come back frequently in the next debates, in which the EP starts to increasingly assert its role in the decision-making process of the EEC. It is no coincidence that the EP tries to reassure itself of its role as supervisor of the Commission particularly in the debate on the situation in Poland. During the 15th G7 Summit in Paris in July 1989 the Commission was given the role of coordinator of aid. The Community thus took centre stage, which is seen by the EP as a test of the EEC’s moral, institutional and organisational preparedness to take on the leadership in world affairs and to play an independent and decisive role instead of following along passively. It firmly believes that the fate of Eastern Europe does not depend exclusively on the interests of the two superpowers. It thus hopes that the Commission will not surrender the initiative completely to the US or to Japan and that it will put its own proposals forward at the next meeting of the 24 industrialized countries. This is why the declared aim of the debate is to have a joint resolution at the end that is ‘practical and substantive and not rhetorical and hyperbolic’ so that the Commission might feel supported unanimously by the whole Parliament.\(^{39}\)

\(^{377/280.}\)
\(^{39}\) Speech by José Mendes Bota, European Parliament debates of 14 September 1989, No 2-380/184.
The formation of a new government in Poland after relatively free elections is generally seen as a historic event, a miracle that 10 years before had been deemed impossible. According to the EP it proves 'the strength of a non-violent policy, the strength of democracy and the strength of a people’s will'.

At the same time it does not fail to underline that the Parliament was the first to support the Poles in their struggle for democratisation. Poland is again presented as a beacon of hope, as a pilot project whose success is significant also for the neighbouring countries. It is generally believed that the fate of Central and Eastern Europe and the establishment of more permanent economic and political cooperation depend on the successful outcome of the Polish experiment. It is feared that if economic reforms fail, then there is probably no chance for successful political reforms either. According to many MEPs the discontent and violence that might accompany this would sound the death-knell for perestroika and glasnost in the whole Eastern bloc. The repercussions of this might have the effect of weakening President Gorbachev himself to such an extent that he would be prevented from pressing on with

---

the fundamental reforms in the Soviet Union. This is the reason why most MEPs see the investment in Poland as an investment in democracy and in greater security, in short, as an investment for Europe. They think it is a small price to pay if in return the Cold War dynamics are lessened and savings in armaments investments are made.

There is furthermore the strong feeling in all groups that ‘history will rightly judge this House as the voice of democratic Western Europe’ by the way it responds.41 It explains the sense of urgency connected to the general feeling that this is a window of opportunity and that the hope being placed in the new Polish government can rapidly dissipate unless there are clear signs of change. Many MEPs ask the Commission and the Council to do more for Poland; they believe the EEC should not continue with the policy of ‘wait and see’. Instead it should increase its level of assistance to the Central and Eastern European countries and make sure it is available sooner. The EP appeals to the Council and the Commission to increase its budget and deplores that under the Interinstitutional Agreement between the Council, the Commission and the Parliament the EP has no real scope to help Poland on the scale that may be required. Most orators stress the need for new trade and cooperation agreements, economic reform within the country, the resolution of Poland’s debt problem, the need of a privileged access to Western markets and the encouragement of investments.

With its particular emphasis on the training of people who will take on leadership positions, expert advice and support, environmental issues and the reduction of expenditure on armaments, the EP tries to propagate a clearly different strategy to the one put forward by the Reagan Administration. In particular, the reduction of the foreign debt plays a prominent role in the discussion. It is a recurring topic (see also the debates on February 2, 1989 and on November 11, 1989) and is closely connected to one of the concerns of the EP: that Poland could become as dependent on the West as many Third World countries. Even if all groups share this concern, proposals on how to avoid this risk vary considerably: many MEPs talk about a European Marshall Plan, others about a genuine European plan using a ‘Marshall Method’. While right-wing groups think that aid should be free of all demands and conditions, most others propose tying help to definite expectations, namely evidence of some basic readjustments of the economic system and full implementation of the Helsinki

41 European Parliament debates of 15 September 1989 on the situation in Poland (Vote), No 2-380/232.
Agreements. They want to demonstrate that the EEC is more than just an economic grouping and that it is evolving as a vehicle for the promotion of international solidarity and respect for human rights. For that reason they perceive the excessive reservations by most Member States with regard to the amount of aid to be granted and the limited room of manoeuvre of the Commission with regards to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as worrying.\footnote{ European Parliament debates of 14 September 1989 on the situation in Poland, No 2-380/184.}

Despite this seemingly generous attitude shown by most groups, there are also a number of critical voices that want to review the choices made regarding the allocation of resources that EEC Member States have at their disposal. The Far-Right in particular stresses that any moral obligations must be met in a reasonable manner which is economically feasible also for the Community. It underlines that ‘no penny is to be used to stabilize Communism’ and that it has to be ensured that the money sent actually benefits the people and not only a few officials.\footnote{Speech by Franz Schönhuber, European Parliament debates of 14 September 1989, No 2-380/184.} Also the Socialists call for more transparency on what is on offer, especially in light of the fact that the conversion of a planned economy to a free economy might entail many problems. They think it is illusory to suppose that the dismantling of a political system can take place without some resistance and point to risks posed by the existence of reactionary forces, growing anti-Semitism, the absence of coherent democratic political parties, the retention of important government portfolios by the former governing party, the apathy of citizens, the deplorable economic situation and the lack of healthcare. Not only the Socialists but also other members of groups from both the Right and the Left emphasize that the EEC has to pay particular attention to those factors that risk undermining the viability of the recent democratic developments. They call on the Commission and the Council to be patient with the new government, to be sensitive and encouraging while avoiding being paternalistic and self-seeking. The latter is mentioned several times by the Green parties, who believe that the attitude of many Western European governments is dictated by ulterior motives or self-interest. They accuse in particular West Germany of using the EEC to further its own expansionist policies by trying to incorporate Poland economically after its military invasion and subjugation had failed during WWII. They propose to release Poland from...
its debt as a gesture of at least material compensation, whereby the size of the loan should reflect the scale of the Nazi war crimes against Poland.44

References to history abound in this particular debate on September 14, 1989. Most speakers in their interventions mention the invasion of Poland by Hitler-Germany and the Hitler-Stalin Pact. They refer to the particular responsibility of Germany and criticize that the West German government had not presented a real policy for political peace on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the start of the war. A certain degree of uncertainty over the question if the current Polish borders are going to be accepted by all German politicians characterises many speeches. At the same time there is also clear praise of the German contribution to political change in the form of Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik. The border issue comes back into the debate on September 15, 1989 in the Commission statement on Poland.45 German MEPs from the Socialist group stress that Western Germany has no territorial claims against Poland and explain that they regard this as a German contribution to stabilizing peace and democracy.

3. East German refugees and the situation in the GDR

This ‘contribution’ is particularly salient if one considers the particular situation Germany faces in September 1989 with Hungary unilaterally and without warning suspending the agreements concluded with East Germany and the other countries of the Warsaw Pact in 1969 and with hundreds of refugees fleeing the German Democratic Republic as a consequence. During the debate on September 14, 1989 on refugees from the GDR and in the following resolution, the EP recognizes that Hungary is taking unselfishly a grave risk in light of the events of 1956 and expresses its thanks to Hungary and Austria for acting courageously and in the spirit of humanitarian aid.46 It underlines that Hungary with this act of courage ‘has left the Eastern bloc and has returned to the common European motherland’.47

As much as MEPs consider the developments in the GDR exciting, so too do they see them as a potential source of danger, thinking that it cannot be in the

45 European Parliament debates of 15 September 1989 on the situation in Poland (Vote), No 2-380/232.
mutual interest of East and West for there to be another shift in population in Central Europe. They vividly call on the Council to persuade the GDR government to join the reform movements in Poland and Hungary. The debate becomes heated when the Far-Right suggests that the fate of the German refugees is ignored and proposes to condemn the GDR by classifying it as an illegal state. This is criticized by the other groups, who accuse the Far-Right group of misusing the problems of the GDR as an excuse for purely ideological reasons.

The debate shows that the question of German reunification is high on the European agenda shortly before the actual fall of the Berlin Wall. It is seen as a European problem which needs a European solution, not just a German one. The idea that Europe cannot afford to ignore the German peoples’ desire for unity comes back forcefully a month later in the second debate on East German refugees.48 This time the prospect of a united German state is expressed in terms of fear. As a result, German MEPs from different groups feel compelled to stress that any development in this direction must remain integrated in the wider European system of peace, security and cooperation and that there is no risk that Germany will leave the EEC at any point of time. There is the general feeling that Europe is irreversibly moving towards a new post-war system but also the recognition, in light of recent developments, that a common Ostpolitik is not enough to make perestroika irreversible and successful. What instead is needed, according to many MEPs, is European unity as a stabilizing factor for a joint Eastern but also a joint German policy. In this debate but also in most of the following ones, there is over and over again a call for speeding up the process of unification and for strengthening the institutions in the European Community. The creation of a political union that does not just give priority to managing the ECU and the promotion of Europe as an open Community with varied structures and varied forms of cooperation is considered one of the main priorities for the next years to come. The EP in this context is seen as making the necessary contribution to greater mutual trust and continued détente between East and West.

The developments in the GDR are nevertheless also seen with concern. Many MEPs are worried that a situation is developing that might have a damaging effect on the climate of cooperation and stability in Europe. According to them, the EEC should on no account attempt to exploit the situation and should

consider very carefully what to do. Most groups agree that the EP should support the popular movement for more freedom and democracy in the GDR to help it on its way to an independent development instead of further encouraging the flight of citizens.

4. The fall of the Berlin Wall
Surprisingly there are no major debates on Central and Eastern Europe in the period between mid-October and mid-November 1989. The next key debate is the one on November 22, 1989 and the vote a day later on a resolution on the recent developments in Central and Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{49} In the meantime the Hungarian constitution had been amended to allow for a multi-party political system and free elections. And on November 9, 1989 the Berlin Wall had fallen.

The importance of this very long debate is marked by the fact that for the first time two members of the Council, François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl, report to the EP on the special session of the Council held in Paris the previous Saturday. It is welcomed by the EP as sign of the democratic transformation of the European institutions outside the framework of any Treaty revision. It is interpreted as recognition of the Assembly’s growing role in the decision-making process. It is therefore not surprising that considerable debate space is taken up by discussions concerning the future of the Community and the actual powers of the Parliament. Most speakers propose that the EEC should rapidly become a genuine political Community by moving ahead in relations on a functional basis with agreements in areas of clear common interest (i.e. the environment), creating a social Europe that will act as a magnet of attraction to other countries. Some propose a federal Europe (the Liberal and Democratic Reformist group LDR), others believe that the EEC must progress towards an integrated Europe based on a constitution (the European People’s Party EPP). Everybody is convinced that the current organizational forms of the Community are no longer adequate to cope with the new challenges. It is very much felt that this is a historic moment that was thought to be impossible only six weeks before and that perhaps even marks the political birth of the Parliament. There is nevertheless some disagreement on the question of who deserves credit for the most recent developments. Some MEPs from the

conservative and liberal groups stress that the developments did not come out of thin air; the EP had hoped for these developments but had also helped to shape them. These MPs are convinced that the EP has shown itself to be a European vanguard when it comes to developments in Europe and believe that it must also be in the front line compared to the Commission and the Council in seeking without prejudice the right way of giving a clear and precise evaluation of them. The Socialists and Greens (V) on the contrary respond that the EP should steer clear of any self-righteousness, sense of superiority and Eurocentrism and emphasize that the recent developments were not triggered by the West but by Gorbachev, Brandt, and an independent force of citizens from Central and Eastern European countries.50

Despite those differences in opinion, all groups agree that the EEC should take on an active role and show that it does not only provide emergency aid but is also prepared for measures of wide-ranging economic, ecological and scientific cooperation between East and West. Many MEPs believe that the task ahead is ‘nothing more than laying the foundations of the new international order, that of the 21st century’51 and that it would be very serious if Europe in the face of the ‘greatest historical, political and cultural happening put petty trade considerations first and failed to grasp the concrete opportunity for a new era with new roads opening up’.52 Otherwise there might be the risk that very alert competitors (namely Japan and Korea) exploit the situation. The opinions on what exactly ‘grasping the opportunity’ should look like, vary. There are particularly ardent discussions on a question that had appeared also in previous debates, namely whether the EEC should make its aid and cooperation policy dependent on certain conditions. The left-wing parties especially fear that if aid is being made conditional on accepting the Western system down to the last detail, it will turn into a sort of patronage that destroys those social attributes of Central and Eastern Europe that could actually contribute to the building of a social Europe in the West. Aid should therefore be different from so-called development aid to the Third World countries, otherwise it might create a complex web of dependency. At the same time, it should be made clear that support for Eastern Europe is not going to be to the detriment of aid to developing countries. The idea of a European Marshall Plan is voiced again in this debate. Knowing that this time there will be no American

aid programme, MEPs think that the Council will have to accept the dimension and vocabulary of a European Marshall Plan at some point of time. Even though the Socialists warn that references to the original Marshall Plan and tendencies to imitate political interventions and practices reminiscent of that past should perhaps be avoided, most MEPs want aid to be organized at Community level. Behind this is the attempt of the EP to again assert its position in contrast to the US and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{53}

The planned meeting of Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush in Malta later in the year certainly triggers a number of comments that refer both to the role the EEC should play providing aid and to the future of the security landscape. Most MEPs think that the EEC should not accept that the problems and the future of Europe are decided by agreements entered into between the Soviet Union and the United States. They believe that European security interests especially cannot be determined by interests other than Europe’s own and call on the US to limit their military presence in Europe. The Rainbow group (ARC) draws attention to the fact that during the debate not a word was said about disarmament and threaten to vote against the resolution if no reference is made to the abolition and removal of nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{54} Some MEPs from the Green and the Socialist groups furthermore wonder if the commitments under the Atlantic Treaty should be called into question or whether other countries should be encouraged to leave the Warsaw Pact. However, most groups believe that both the Warsaw and the NATO Pact should remain in place because according to them they give Europe a guarantee of stability that is seen as absolutely vital in the current situation.

Given those marked security concerns, it is not surprising that during the debate the question of German reunification is also very much framed in these terms. It is by far the most discussed subject and occupies a considerable amount of space during the debate. However, compared to later debates in 1990, what is striking is the evident attempt to keep controversial discussions at bay. It is continuously emphasized that the question about the future of the two Germanys is open and that no one has it on the agenda for political debate at the moment. Many MEPs believe that not immediately but only ‘one day we shall have to address the question of the political relations between the two

\textsuperscript{53} European Parliament debates of 22 November 1989 on events in Central and Eastern Europe, No 3-383/151.

\textsuperscript{54} In the end, the Rainbow group votes for the resolution. Only the Far-Left (CG) abstains because it wanted to see more commitment to disarmament.
Germanys and of the return of Berlin to the status of a free and united city’. Until then MEPs believe that the right to self-determination of the German people is unquestionable but that it should not be the first thing to talk about because it might block reforms in the East and raise doubts about the process of European unity. Most speakers stress particularly the last aspect: that the unification of the German people is to be resolved within the sphere of European unity. They believe that only the rapid building of a political Europe will be able to provide the framework for the peaceful political reunification of the two Germanys and thus echo what had been said in previous debates by German MEPs. Fears that Germany might go its own separate way or that it might reclaim the 1937 borders are voiced particularly by the Rainbow group and the Greens. Both groups want a reformed GDR and not a simple extension of the Federal Republic dressed up as reunification. They are particularly concerned about Germany’s concentrated economic and military power that had already provoked two world wars. They actually criticize the fact that there have not been clear enough statements on this and that the topic is not at all on the agenda. The EPP is of a similar opinion, albeit for different reasons: the German MEPs in particular think that not addressing the issue might be interpreted as hostility which could lead to an explosion of nationalism in the GDR that might destabilize the whole European system.

The discussion shows clearly that the EP underestimated the speed of development in Central and Eastern Europe. Nobody had foreseen the fall of the Berlin Wall and evidently nobody in November 1989 was expecting the two Germanys to unite in the near future. The same is true for the prospect of accession of the Central and Eastern European countries. Having been evoked more than once as the desirable next step in previous debates, discussions about enlargement at the end of 1989 suddenly become very cautious. MEPs still think that accession might be the right answer but do not want to put forward ideas now that could divide the Community. They believe that association agreements or expansion of the free trade area might be the better solution.

---

Critical voices furthermore highlight the fact that it might be premature to lower the guard and that prudence is still necessary with regard to leaders who still have to provide evidence of their good faith, far-sightedness in the face of a situation in which the decline of imperialism might leave the field free for the re-emergence of nationalism, and fundamentalism and caution with regard to a military situation where the balance remains precarious. Most MEPs are nevertheless convinced that Europe should look to the future, and that the ghosts of the past should not paralyse the decision-making of the EP today.58

5. Romania

As in 1988, 1989 also ends with a debate and resolution on Romania.59 The debate takes place on December 14, 1989, only two days before the Romanian

communist regime is being overthrown and its leader Ceausescu executed. MEPs unanimously note with concern that Romania’s repressive totalitarian regime is becoming more and more isolated, prejudicing the democratisation process under way in the other East European nations. They call on the Commission to press Romania hard on both the diplomatic and trade levels by withdrawing ambassadors and by denouncing all trade agreements, while expressing disbelief and indignity at the fact that the international community has tolerated Ceausescu’s oppressive policies for so long.60

III – 1990 – The beginning of a new era

1. (Economic) Relations with Central and Eastern Europe

As the events in Central and Eastern Europe unfold, debates turn more and more to the question of (economic) relations between the EEC and the former communist bloc. 1990 starts with an open clash between the Commission and the Parliament. During the debate on the Commission statement on Eastern Europe in January 17, 1990, the Commission is reproached for the way it has behaved in relation to the trade agreement with the Soviet Union.61 The EP feels that it gets unduly rushed into decisions (i.e. about the medium-term financial assistance programme for Hungary) and is not informed enough about ongoing discussions. It makes it very clear that it does not want to be treated as a rubber stamp and reserves the right to keep a close eye on the performance of the Commission.

The Parliament nevertheless welcomes the fact that the Commission wants to extend the existing network of trade and cooperation agreements and add possible forms of association and asks explicitly how exactly the EP can be involved in discussions on the new agreements, enabling it to fulfil its role as an authoritative body. Even though it generally speaking supports the initiatives of the Commission, it points to a number of possible problems: it stresses that the new agreements should under no circumstances act at the expense of economic and social cohesion in the rest of Europe, particularly in the south.

60 The Commission confirms that negotiations on the trade and economic cooperation agreement remain suspended but does not think that it would be appropriate to denounce the agreements already in force or to break off all contacts with the Romanian authorities.

The Commission is asked in particular to make it clear to everyone that ‘Gorbachev’s common home cannot have Grade A or Grade B tenants’.62

Funds should furthermore be closely monitored. They should be used exclusively to foster a market-led economy and the initiation of a process of cultural integration, dialogue and exchange of information. According to the EP, Central and Eastern Europe needs permanent structural changes and less philanthropy, more modern economic and political management and less temporary relief. It openly warns of the IMF’s heavy hand and wonders what the point of being the world’s leading trading and economic power is if it is incapable of making its voice heard by international institutions.

It also emphasizes that the political problem is just as great as the economic one. There is no doubt that newly elected political parties in Central and Eastern Europe need resources to project and proclaim their programmes. The question of whether this support should be given before or after elections, however divides the Parliament and leads to heavy discussions on January 18, 1990 during the debate on a resolution that had been withdrawn by the European People’s Party and the European Democratic group (ED) for lack of support.63 Members from both the EPP and the ED express their disbelief and disappointment at this. They reproach the Socialists of willingly wanting to give an advantage to the current ruling parties by making sure that assistance only comes into play once the parliaments concerned have been elected. The Far-Right accuses the Socialist group of simply concealing their spiritual affinity with Communism by making sure that ‘turn-coats’ remain in government. The Socialists respond that they do not need lectures from either side about hypocrisy or democracy.

2. From economic to political relations

The idea that there is more at stake than simply the transformation of an economic system, returns in the following debates on relations between the EEC and the CEECs.64 If the initial discussions revolved around the question of economic aid and the danger of creating a market economy that is dominated entirely by Western capitalist interests, in the following debates the focus shifts.

---

64 European Parliament debates of 10 July 1990 on the relations between the EEC and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, No 3-392/29.
An element that had already been present before, takes centre stage, namely the need to also foster scientific and technological cooperation in order to close the economic and social gap between East and West. The aim is to help the CEECs to break through their isolation resulting from the old political system and thus prevent any further brain drain. This would allow them to mobilise their human capital, take on a role as responsible partners instead of being treated as simple beneficiaries of hand-outs. Cooperation should not only take place in the economic and technological area but more thought should be placed also into the establishment of more ambitious forms of contractual relations in the political and security field. One of the main tasks the EP sees for the future is to seek a common security system that would allow swift progress towards ending the old opposing Cold War systems of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) on the one hand and the Warsaw Pact on the other. Even if everybody agrees on this in principle, no group puts forward concrete proposals on how the establishment of a new genuinely European peace-keeping system might look like. Only the Rainbow group proposes to develop the CSCE into a permanent organisation that in the long run could replace NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The idea that the Twelve are too restricted a body to formulate future political relationships within Europe and that the EEC should leave some tasks to other international organisations, is not new. It had been proposed before that Intra-State bodies such as the UN Commission for Europe, the CSCE, the European Security and Cooperation Conference and the Council of Europe could provide a better framework for wide-ranging cooperation.65 Whenever these concerns are voiced, the next item of discussion is usually enlargement. Even if all groups had become much more cautious talking about the prospect of former communist countries joining the EEC since 1989, the topic was not off the table. Particularly the Rainbow group continued to question if priority should be given to further EEC integration. In their view, the EEC should rather put a stop to the construction of a union in favour of wide and all-embracing free trade and cooperation agreements under the EFTA umbrella. But the Liberals also fear that full membership to the union will not be possible because of the backwardness of the Eastern economies, the state of public opinion in the West and the interests of the Soviet Union and Russia. Instead of joining the EEC at

some point of time, they propose that Central and Eastern European countries should create their own community.

Despite these proposals that can be seen as relativizing the EEC’s engagement to a certain extent, there is at the same time a strong feeling that the Community should create a suitable structure for communication between the EP and the elected representatives of the Central and Eastern European countries. This might ensure that the Western hopes of the CEECs are not disappointed, and that the USA and Japan do not ‘graze off all the grass in our backyard’.66

3. Poland, the GDR and German unification

The problem of matching very high expectations with the reality of what can be delivered in practice is mentioned in almost every debate on Poland.67 It is striking that in all debates on delivering support to Central and Eastern Europe, Poland continues to occupy a central place. It can certainly be explained by the previously mentioned position of Poland as a test-case and the fear that the austerity programme which the new government put into place to a large extent at the demand of the Western European countries might turn the very people who brought it to power against it. It can also be traced back to the special responsibility felt towards Poland because of the West’s historic failure to prevent the invasion by Nazi-Germany in 1939. There is the strong feeling that the EEC is not only responsible for ensuring the economic and political wellbeing of Poland but also for protecting the security of its borders.

How closely the border-question is connected to the question of German unification becomes evident in debates both on relations between the EEC and Poland and the EEC and the GDR.68 In all debates in particular the German MEPs from all groups underline that no one wants to re-establish a Greater Germany within the 1937 borders. They openly criticize the German chancellor Helmut Kohl for not taking a clear stand on this for fear of losing votes and express regret for the fact that Kohl’s government has approached the East German issue from the point of view of domestic political advantage with unnecessary

67 European Parliament debates of 14 February 1990 on Relations between the EEC and Poland, No 3-386/144; European Parliament debates of 14 February 1990 on Relations between the EEC and Poland (continuation), No 3-386/151; European Parliament debates of 15 February 1990 on Relations between the EEC and Poland (continuation), No 3-386/247.
68 European Parliament debates of 16 March 1990 on EEC-GDR, No 3-388/278; European Parliament debates of 13 July 1990 on Trade with the GDR, No 3-392/305.
posturing over German frontiers. Instead they propagate German unity as an opportunity to establish new security structures in Europe and stress over and over again that the strengthened links between the GDR and the FRG must be integrated into the European context. This conviction is also expressed in the resolution passed on April 4, 1990 on the impact on the European Community of the German unification process. 69

That the prospect of German unity suddenly acquired greater salience compared to the preceding months can be seen by the fact that the EP set up an ad-hoc committee to deal with unification and passed a resolution dealing specifically with the parliamentary procedures applicable to consideration of the German unification process.70 MEPs clearly felt passed over by the Commission when it initiated the agreement between the EEC and the GDR and express their disappointment at the fact that they were not given the opportunity to deliver an opinion on the negotiating mandate granted to the Commission.

4. Lithuania and Romania

Despite the heightened attention towards the GDR, many MEPs are equally convinced that the German question must not obscure the EEC’s responsibility towards the other countries of Eastern Europe. One of them is Lithuania, which had declared independence on March 11, 1990. Initial reactions are – besides the Far-Right, who blames the EEC for not having recognized Lithuania’s independence de facto and de jure already long time ago - quite cautious. MEPs express the wish to not inflame the highly sensitive situation in Lithuania and view with approval that a dialogue between Soviet authorities and the leaders of the freely elected Parliament of Lithuania is developing. They nevertheless voice their reservations for a situation that reminds them too much of 1956 and the Hungarian national uprising when ‘the Soviets waited for four days and then struck because they knew that the West would not take any further action’. They see Lithuania as a test of the sincerity of Gorbachev’s

69 Resolution of the European Parliament of 4 April 1990 by the temporary committee to study the impact on the European Community of the German unification process, OJ C 113/98, 7 May 1990.
pledges and thus want to send an unequivocal signal to the Soviet government that the economic agreement between the Soviet Union and the EEC will be bound to be put into question if Soviet military repression continues. As in all previous and following debates on the Baltic States, MEPs precede their interventions with two remarks: a) that the Baltic States are different from the rest of the Central and Eastern European countries because none of the EEC Member States had legally recognized the Soviet occupation of the Baltic States in 1940 and their subsequent incorporation into the USSR after WWII, and b) that they were among the first to back Coudenhouve-Kaergi’s call for pan-European union, which gives them a sort of ‘European birthright’.

There is very little disagreement on the need to express clear disapproval of the Soviet aggression and to support Lithuania. What triggers a heated debate is the wider question of the right to self-determination. The motions for a resolution tabled by the different groups indeed show that there is disagreement of what exactly the right to self-determination means. While members of the Rainbow group accuse the left-wing groups of using the opportunity to attack the right to self-determination as the presumed and fatal source of a wave of nationalism in Europe, the EPP thinks that patriotism and nationalism should not be confused and the Socialists emphasize that national
self-determination must not necessarily lead to renewed nationalism. Particularly the Far-Left (CG) stresses that it would be detrimental to peace in Europe if the EP gave signals to Lithuania or any of the other Baltic States that unilateral declarations of independence, regardless of their consequences, would automatically gain the unquestioning support of the Parliament. Discussions about the price to be paid for national self-determination will come back in late 1990 and the beginning of 1991 in connection with the Baltic states and Yugoslavia.

The other country dominating several debates and resolutions in 1990 is again Romania. It remains the ‘problem child’ of the EP. MEPs are more concerned about the signs of political instability in Romania than in any other Central and Eastern European country. They fear that the country is developing a fictitious democracy in which power continues to be controlled by former members of the Communist Party and in which the concept of free elections and social democracy have been twisted. For this reason the EP proposes in May 1990 to link the Community’s aid programme to the conduct of free and fair elections. While humanitarian aid should continue, it should be distributed exclusively by NGOs in order to avoid diversions by government officials.

Only one month later and in light of the violent clashes that happened during and after the elections, the EP demands that negotiations with Romania will be broken off instantly, that the trade agreement with Romania should be suspended, that the proposal to include Romania in the PHARE programme should be postponed and that the Commission should consider very carefully its position concerning the aid and trade deal it is negotiating with the country. It expresses its disappointment with the lukewarm response of most European governments and underlines that it is time for vigorous measures if it wants to prevent such actions from catching on and threatening the democratisation process in the whole of Europe.

---

72 European Parliament debates of 05 April 1990 on Lithuania, No 3-389/245.  
5. Cooperation with the USSR

Change in the Soviet Union happened so rapidly that reports frequently make reference to a situation that has transformed in the meantime. This is particularly pronounced in the case of relations with the USSR. This might be one of the reasons why the tone used between Parliament and Commission again becomes slightly impatient. While the EP welcomes the rapid action of the Commission in response to the processes of democratisation in the USSR and the CEECs, it criticises that the speed of the Commission’s proposals and EPs decisions has not been matched by similar rapidity in putting them into operation. According to many MEPs, major advances can only be seen in the liberalisation of trade. When it comes to the distribution of aid, community procedures are too complex, with the result that aid often does not reach its targets. MEPs furthermore reproach the Commission for not putting forward any specific proposals on how the USSR and the other Eastern European countries can be helped in the restructuring of their economies and on how an economic gap between the Soviet Union and the rest of Europe can be prevented from emerging. They underline that the EP had proposed a number of actions in previous resolutions and wonder why the Commission had not paid attention to this. In particular they point out that the kind of nationalism which is emerging in the Soviet Union often has its roots in social problems. Most groups therefore emphasise again the need to go beyond simple economic considerations and instead establish cooperation in the employment and vocational guidance sector. The Commission answers those reproaches with hesitancy. If in July it had fully endorsed the Penders Report74 on political developments in Central and Eastern Europe and the Larive Report75 on scientific and technological cooperation, during the October debate it emphasises that not one ECU had been set aside for the Soviet Union and that it therefore cannot and should not arouse any expectations.

The difference between the approach to Central and Eastern European countries on the one hand and the USSR on the other, is very evident and will become even more pronounced as soon as the so-called Europe Agreements between the EEC and Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia are signed.

74 Historical Archives PE3 AP RP/POLI.1989 A3-0172/90.
75 Historical Archives PE3 AP RP/ENER.1989 A3-0174/90.
6. The Europe Agreements

The EP wants the negotiations on the Europe Agreements to start as quickly as possible and welcomes in particular that, following immediately from the trade and cooperation agreements, the Commission is already poised to enter into negotiations on association. The Commission indeed notices that they are witnessing something new, namely that even before already concluded agreements are being put into effect, every effort is being made to arrive at new agreements. It feels that this is the time to grasp a political opportunity and that the accelerating pace of events should be matched by an equally accelerating speed of action. The EP also sees this as a unique chance in history to restructure Europe and as a historic task that is comparable only to the one accomplished at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s when the Southern European countries joined. This is, however, also the reason why MEPs are disappointed that no mention is made in these agreements on possible membership. Two main arguments are put forward for the need to think about accession: on the one hand the belief that the future of Western economies lays in the East and on the other that the further Europe extends its borders eastwards, the more secure Western Europe will be. This argument will come back frequently in 1991, a year characterised by several crises that threaten Europe’s integrity.

IV – 1991 – The end of the Cold War

1. The Baltic States

1991 is dominated almost entirely by two events: the crisis in the Baltic States and the beginning of the Yugoslav Wars. Both put the carefully sought equilibrium after 1989 at serious risk. The first debate in the New Year takes place shortly after the Soviet army had violently crushed demonstrations in Lithuania and Latvia. All groups in the EP condemn the aggression in the strongest terms, believing that the statement originally issued by Council had

---

76 The EP originally had very ambitious goals for some countries: They foresaw association agreements in 1991, followed by negotiations on accession in 1993 and accession before the year 2000.
been too soft. They voice their disillusionment with Gorbachev, who has ‘thrown off his mask’ destroying persistent illusions in the West.\textsuperscript{79} Since the debate takes place right after the debate on the Gulf War, MEPs compare the two situations and stress that the EP cannot condemn crimes in distant Iraq and condone crimes in Europe similar to those committed by Saddam Hussein. Parallels are also drawn to the situation in Budapest in 1956 and to Prague in 1968, warning that Soviet action in the Baltic States might not be an exception. There is the evident fear that an attitude of wait-and-see might trigger the repetition of the situation experienced in 1956. MEPs thus draw attention to the fact that there are Soviet troops stationed in Poland and Germany, that the situation in the Soviet Union is far from stable and that ethnic violence and civil war might just be below the surface. They underline that the EP has no interest in the collapse of the Soviet Union but rather wants a peaceful and rapid disbandment of the Soviet states.

\textsuperscript{79} Speech by Otto von Habsburg, European Parliament debates of 21 January 1991, No 3-398/31. It is interesting to note that most MEPs suddenly use the same words that the Far-Right had always used with reference to Gorbachev (i.e. in European Parliament debates of 05 April 1990 on Lithuania, No 3-389/245).
Even if all groups agree that nothing should be done that could undermine the forces for democratization, there is disagreement on the next steps to be taken. While the left-wing groups think that the suspension or reduction of aid to the Soviet Union might jeopardize perestroika and drive citizens into the hands of the reactionary forces, the right-wing groups are in favour of freezing all funds. The Rainbow group proposes to keep humanitarian aid but to suspend all other Community aid. The vote taking place three days later clearly reflects this division. Even if all groups found a compromise for the joint resolution on the situation in the Baltic States, critical voices in the Socialist group regret that a clear condemnation of attitudes towards unilateral independence has not been included in the motion and still think the financial measures taken to be extremely unjust.

The question of how to deal with requests for independence will occupy the Parliament also in the next debates on both the Baltics and Yugoslavia. Moving from vivid debates on the definition of self-determination in 1990, discussions in 1991 rotate increasingly around the question on how to deal with those requests. Seeing efforts towards independence in the various republics as a potential destabilising factor, MEPs increasingly wonder if a structure on the pan-European level can be created that could provide a peaceful means of satisfying demands for independence and autonomy. They therefore criticise the refusal of the Soviet Union to allow the situation in the Baltic countries to be placed on the agenda for the CSCE process and support the fact that discussions are taking place also in the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and the Council of Europe. The EP feels that it has a special duty to keep discussions on the Baltic States alive within those forums especially since attention has been distracted by the situation in the Gulf region. Again parallels are drawn to the situation in 1956 when the Anglo-French invasion of Suez overshadowed the Hungarian revolution and its brutal repression.

After the first strong reactions in the aftermath of the violent ‘January events’, the Parliament becomes more cautious. If in the first debate only the European

---

80 European Parliament debates of 24 January 1991 on the situation in the Baltic States (Explanations of Vote), No 3-398/246.
81 Replacing resolutions Docs. B3-64/91, B3-69/91, B3-107/91, B3-121/91, B3-122/91 and B3-124/91 with a new text.
82 This indeed backfires when several newspapers report shortly after the resolution has been passed that the ‘European Parliament holds up food aid to Soviet Union’ and that ‘European Parliament blocks emergency aid to Soviet Union, Romania and Bulgaria’.
United Left (GUE) called for a more careful approach, already in February, most groups press for moderation in light of the delicacy of the international political situation and the potential repercussions of the Gulf War for the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{83} They are afraid of the immediate threat of a coup d’état in favour of a non-ideological but military dictatorship and urge the Bureau to send a delegation to the Baltic States that can assess the situation. The latter is proposed because the Parliament feels that it continues to not receive enough information and is kept deliberately in the dark by the Council and the Commission. Expressions of disappointment about the fact that the Council tends to be absent during the EP debates, are recurrent in almost all contributions. Most of them link the process of democratisation in Central and Eastern Europe directly to the question of democratisation at home, expressing the fear that the Parliament’s right of participation remains a mere formality on paper.

It might thus not be a coincidence that in the following months the Council attends more and more plenary meetings of the EP. In the debate on February 21, 1991 for example the President in Office reports to the EP on the outcome of the troika meetings and the Soviet Union’s reply to questions on human rights.\textsuperscript{84} He shares the EP’s concern about the Soviet Union’s refusal to recognize the referendum in Lithuania as a basis for independence under international law, calls on those involved to sit down at the negotiating table and agrees that the EEC with its experience when it comes to independence movements and autonomous regions could help the Soviet Union in its attempt to draw up a new statute for its union.

The tone adopted in the Parliament becomes again harsher during the debate on June 13, 1991 with clear calls for sanctions against the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{85} In light of the recent acts of violence in the Baltics the debate is termed ‘topical and urgent’ and is preceded by a discussion if it should be classified under the heading of ‘human rights’ or ‘political questions’. MEPs do not think that it is a coincidence that renewed attacks have taken place after the Community agreed to release financial support to the Soviet Union and after President Gorbachev received his invitation to the G7 talks. They therefore ask the Commission again to grant technical aid only if the questions of self-determination, constitutionality and human rights figure in every negotiation the Soviet Union conducts with the other republics.

\textsuperscript{84} European Parliament debates of 21 February 1991 on the Baltic States, No 3-401/260.
\textsuperscript{85} European Parliament debates of 13 June 1991 on the Baltic States, No 3-406/268.
2. Deepening relations with Romania, Bulgaria, Poland and Czechoslovakia

This prerogative underlies also the following two discussions on the supplies of agricultural products to the USSR, Romania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. MEPs make very clear that these countries should not be dealt with en bloc. While the developments in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia are evaluated as mostly positive, the EP notes that since the Council outlined its cooperation policy in December, the situation in the USSR has not changed for the better. It believes that it is high time for the EEC to adopt a coherent policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union that takes into account the current political situation but does not attach any political conditions to food aid. It heavily criticizes the Commission

---

for being inconsistent when progressing from the policy formulation stage to the practical implementation of the measures. It furthermore denounces the Council’s long delay in following last summer’s announcement of a series of urgent measures of support for the Soviet Union. In particular the rapporteur Lamassoure warns that the guarantee for loans has to be followed by a budget appropriation and denounces that a ‘bad habit has crept in of discussing funds that are not available, making grand political statements that are not consistent with the available financial resources’.87 A call for proper budgetary precautions and the need to get a contingency reserve into the budget to cover the increasing number of liabilities reappears in the report by Tomlinson presented in February 1991.88 It draws particular attention to the risk run by guaranteeing European Investment Bank (EIB) loans against an entry in the budget for which there is no financial provision. Again the Council and the Commission are criticized for entering into commitments with no thought for their financial implications, giving the impression that the current policy is somewhat improvised and inconsistent.

While MEPs agree that Community guarantees should be extended to Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, concerns are voiced with regards to Romania. Eight months had passed since the blocking of the cooperation agreement that had been initialled in May 1990 (discussed above). Its suspension is clearly still seen as the right decision, however, not all MEPs believe that it is already time to free Romania from its isolation. While some fear that, if the trade agreement is not signed, the EP will be accused of allowing the continuation of conditions favourable to parties interested in destabilizing the situation, others believe that the EEC would no longer have any leverage as far as human rights are concerned, if it did. In particular the EPP and the LDR express serious reservations and propose to ‘delay not to deny’.89 A settlement is reached with the proposal to use the trade and economic cooperation agreement to monitor progress with the possibility to suspend it if developments are not satisfactory. The prospect of an association agreement could then be used as a ‘carrot’ to further encourage the democratic process.

88 Report on behalf of the Committee on Budgets on the proposal from the Commission to the Council for a decision extending to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Bulgaria and Romania the Community guarantee to the European Investment Bank against losses under loans for projects in Hungary and Poland, Historical Archives PE3 AP RP/BUDG.1991 A3-0035/91 0010.
The association agreements are indeed signed a few months later. Their signature is seen as an important historical step forward in the development of the new political map and institutional structure of Europe and is considered a visible sign of the changes of political direction that had occurred in Central and Eastern Europe. During the preceding debate, a number of arguments that had already been voiced in 1990 are being repeated, namely that what is at stake is the future of the continent, its security, and its economic, political and social stability. Given the rate of change in Central and Eastern Europe, the EP feels that the European Community must give an adequate political response if it wants to stabilize the reform process.

The association agreements are seen as the right middle way offering a political foundation and political protection to the CEECs without exposing them immediately to the open market. A too-rapid enlargement of the Community is considered as potentially having a disruptive effect for everybody. Even if most groups agree that not all countries should be put into the same basket, the

---

Socialists and Communists believe that the mistrust and reticence towards Gorbachev and ultimately the exclusion of the Soviet Union from the Europe Agreements are short-sighted. They furthermore criticize the Radzio-Plath Report, drawn up on behalf of the Committee on External Economic Relations and dealing with the general outline for association agreements with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. They say it concentrates too much on merely economic, not to say economistic aspects, and neglects the need for encouraging democratic exchanges, political dialogue and cultural debate. This criticism is shared also by some of the Conservatives: the EPP likewise stresses the importance of specific programmes for the education and training of management and executives and welcomes the idea of youth exchanges.

Controversially discussed is the question on how to deal with sensitive areas (agriculture, iron and steel and textiles). While some MEPs call for clear trade restrictions in order to not enter into direct competition, others think that the EEC should particularly support those sectors where CEECs are most competitive. This point comes back also in the following debates on investments in Poland and the installation of a reinsurance pool for export credits to Central and Eastern Europe. Even if fears are voiced that migration from the Eastern European to the Community countries will increase, it is stressed more than once that it is important to show that the EEC is not just making promises but that it will keep those promises and is capable of solidarity by opening the market to products which are competitive for the CEECs. In particular, the Liberals suggest that while solidarity obviously has a cost, the transition to the market economy system of the EEC could have a modernizing effect which will benefit not only the Central and Eastern European countries but also the Community itself.

What nevertheless still causes heated debates is the question of accession. While the Conservatives think that the EEC should not make any binding promise of accession in order to not disappoint anyone, the Greens are of the opinion that even if accession is an important and desirable principle, it cannot be taken for granted in an almost automatic way, and the Socialists believe it would be a great mistake to see association agreements as an alternative to

---

91 Report on behalf of the Committee on External Economic Relations on a general outline for association agreements with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Historical Archives PE3 AP RP/RELA.1991 A3-0055/91 0010.
92 European Parliament debates of 10 September 1991 on reinsurance pool for export credits to Central and Eastern Europe, No 3-408/46; European Parliament debates of 10 September 1991 on investments in Poland, No 3-408/46.
accession. Closely connected to this is a question that had first been mentioned in 1989 during the first debates on enlargement, and then repeatedly reappears: the question of deepening versus widening. In all following debates on enlargement, this contraposition gets cited. Despite evident disagreements on this question, the fact that reference to membership has been included in the agreements is welcomed by everybody.93

3. The break-up of Yugoslavia

Besides the Baltic States, the other geographic area that keeps the Parliament busy in 1991 is the Balkans. At nearly every sitting the EP concerns itself with the situation in Yugoslavia and the surrounding countries. The initial focus is almost exclusively on Albania. The EP still believes that the full democratization and rapid development of this particular country could contribute to overall stability in the Balkan area. It thus wants to associate Albania as soon as possible with the process of pan-European and Mediterranean cooperation, supports its participation in the CSCE and plans to include it in the TEMPUS and PHARE programmes. The only group that voices reservations is the Far-Right. It criticizes the Commission for not having an overall geopolitical vision and denounces the inconsistency of condemning Saddam Hussein but not Milosevic.94

The awareness that the Community needs a Balkan policy in order to avoid destabilization in a region bordering the Community appears in contributions of other groups as soon as the first wave of Albanian refugees reaches the EEC. There is the general feeling that the Yugoslav issue has become a European issue that demonstrates how important it is to establish appropriate policies both in terms of development aid for countries surrounding the EEC and in terms of support and initial refuge. It is very evident that MEPs are surprised about the direction events have taken. They admit to having realised the seriousness of the problem too late by relegating Yugoslavia to the category of merely a Balkan problem and express their shock at recognizing that the fall of dictatorships in Central and Eastern Europe had not been a sufficient condition to ensure Europe’s peace and stability. Lying between Greece and the rest of the EEC and being vital to geopolitical balances of the region, MEPs draw

93 European Parliament debates of 10 September 1991 on investments in Poland, No 3-408/46.
94 European Parliament debates of 21 February 1991 on relations between the EEC and Albania, No 3-401/297; European Parliament debates of 22 February 1991 on relations between the EEC and Albania (Vote), No 3-401/337.
attention to the fact that the Balkans had been the powder keg of a Great War in the past, a role that they could potentially play again. Even if there are different opinions about the historical roots of the Yugoslav situation, all groups agree that the EEC must do something to remediate political and moral errors committed in the past.95

If initially MEPs are of the opinion that the EEC should encourage all republics to work closely with the Community with a view to becoming full members of the EEC either as a federation, or as a confederation, the possibility of a break-up starts to dominate debates from March 1991 onwards.96 Discussions become very controversial with a clear right-left rift emerging. Disagreement crystallises around four main topics: a) if a break-up is desirable or not; b) if free elections should be held or if it is too early; c) if the EEC should interfere or if the Yugoslav nations should find their own way and d) if the third financial protocol and the negotiations aimed at putting Yugoslavia on an equal footing with Poland and Hungary allowing them to receive aid from the EIB should be suspended or not. While the right-wing groups generally speaking support the installation of individual republics, are in favour of elections and are rather cautious about giving advice or suspending the financial protocol, the left-wing groups propagate the contrary. The divisive character of the discussions becomes particularly evident concerning the possible consequences of a break-up and the question of whether self-determination can or should go as far as self-dismantling. Considering the previous debates on the Baltic States, this is hardly surprising. The EP indeed finds itself in a difficult dilemma: while it has no interest in the Balkans violently disintegrating on the one hand, it feels it has to stand up to the principles of international responsibility, self-determination and democracy on the other.

Given the heat of the debate, the Socialists warn about the danger of turning Yugoslavia into a battleground for unfruitful ideological debates on the European level. This opinion is shared by the Council and the Commission. During the debate on the situation in Yugoslavia in July, both institutions give a statement stressing that it is important for the EEC to follow one line and to take a united stand in this conflict.97 This plea has to be understood within the context of the failure of the Brioni Agreement and the initial attempts by the

Council to restore the Yugoslav Federation. However, if anything, the discussions in the EP become even more heated. The Liberals criticize not only the Left but also the Council and the Commission for initially adopting the wrong position by insisting on the need to maintain the unity of the Yugoslav federation. The European Democratic Alliance (RDE) points out that the EEC cannot acknowledge the right to self-determination in the former GDR and in the Baltics and then deny it to the Balkans. And the European Peoples’ Party repeats that it is high time to recognize Croatia and Slovenia as independent states. The Far-Right goes as far as suggesting that the Community with its hesitant policy bears some responsibility for the outbreak of the civil war. The Socialists and the European United Left respond by reminding everybody who is calling for the disintegration of the Balkans of the mistakes that were made after WWI when the focus was solely on the right to self-determination and underline that splitting up Yugoslavia cannot be done peacefully. They furthermore observe that the establishment of small states runs counter to the current political trend in Europe and wonder if the EEC has done everything and will do everything in the future to ensure that the various republics that formed part of the federation will cooperate again if it actually comes to secession. They suggest that the Community could play a constructive part in the reorganisation of Yugoslavia by offering cooperation or even association agreements to all concerned.

The positive role the EEC could play is arguably the only element all groups agree upon. They see the current situation as an opportunity for the Community to reveal two features of its political identity: the absolute refusal to permit the use of force on the continent of Europe and the use of the democratic process alone to resolve disputes arising there. Almost all MEPs express the hope that the EEC is able to pass on something of its experience to Yugoslavia. The crisis is very much seen as a double bench test: a test on the one hand of the European Community’s ability to act in situations of acute crisis on the continent and on the other a test of how far it is possible to transform the existing Central and Eastern European structures without causing their savage disintegration. The Yugoslav crisis is considered symbolic of a broader crisis in which the opposing ideological positions that divided the world are being replaced by other divisions in the name of the subjectivity of peoples and of their races and their history. Despite their different opinion on the issue, most MEPs are very much aware of the fact that the hesitancy to recognize the independence of Slovenia and Croatia has to do with some Member States’ fear of autonomous movements in their own territory. They are thus calling for
consistency in European policy with regard to the recognition of autonomy and the right of self-determination. 98

A common foreign policy coordination is seen as being a vital part of such a European policy. As was already the case during the Baltic States crisis, calls for more cooperation in this sensitive area are becoming more frequent as the situation deteriorates. The EP feels that Europe of post-autumn 1989 has been endowed with new responsibilities and that now there is the opportunity to show that the Community is indeed capable of foreign policy cooperation or of at least putting into effect a coordinated initiative (something that often has been denied by cynical observers). As the conflict progresses, calls for concrete action in military terms are also voiced with increasing urgency. Almost all parties stress that the absence of an integrated Community policy and of a clear mandate has not facilitated action and in fact threatens the new European order. They feel that if Europe fails to play its role as the guardian of law then there is the risk that other countries will seek a protector elsewhere (i.e. the US or Russia). During the two debates in September 1991, the Liberals thus make concrete proposals for sending peace-keeping troops, whereas the European United Left thinks that if the cease-fire was to be disregarded and the war continued, the EEC should take steps immediately at the CSCE and UN level to arrange for a peacekeeping force. 99 References are made to the Spanish Civil War and the catastrophic result of the policy of non-intervention at the time, however, it is also underlined repeatedly that while the EEC could play the role of mediator, it is up to the CSCE and the UN to intervene.

The previously stark differences in opinion between the different groups in the Parliament slowly fade away in light of the prospect of a full scale war. Almost all groups start to support the recognition of the right of the different Yugoslav republics to self-determination, albeit with the specific rider that the problems this entails must be solved at the negotiating table, not by force of arms. If the previous vote on a motion for a resolution in July was still marked by disagreements, 100 in October all groups have tabled resolutions and manage to agree on a common text after hard negotiating. 101 They realise that the

100 European Parliament debates of 10 July 1991 on the situation in Yugoslavia (Vote), No 3-407/165.
previous resolution revealed itself as being merely a chapter of good intentions without the power to put a stop to a conflict which was already under way. All groups are in favour of recognition now in order to allow for the application of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

The debate is marked on the one hand by self-criticism expressing a feeling of impotence in the face of a situation in which the EEC allegedly has reacted too late and too hesitantly, and on the other by renewed accusations directed towards the Council and the Commission whose actions according to the EP destroyed the previously excellent reputation of the EEC. The fact that the Council still believes that it is exceptionally unwise to be over-hasty in recognizing the independence of Slovenia and Croatia does little to dampen those accusations. The situation only changes in November when the EP fully supports the abrogation of the cooperation treaty. Two months later the European Community recognizes both Slovenia and Croatia.

4. The end of the Cold War

The Yugoslav conflict evidently overshadows contemporary events in the USSR. A fairly short debate takes place in September 1991 just after the Soviet coup attempt in August.102 There is general consensus on how to structure future relations with the USSR and how to deal with political and institutional questions. Critical remarks come only from the Far-Right and the Far-Left. While the Far-Right believes that the return to a Marxist dictatorship is not to be completely excluded, the Far-Left warns that the exchange of one repressive intolerant regime for another should not be facilitated. Despite those notes of caution, there is the general feeling that a new chapter is beginning. However, nobody seems at the time to foresee the final dissolution of the Soviet Union and the official end of the Cold War that will take place only a few months later.

CHAPTER III
POST-COMMUNISM AND EASTERN ENLARGEMENT

I – 1992 to 1994 – The first years of Post-Communism

1. The Yugoslav Wars

The last two years of the third parliamentary term are marked by two main topics: the Yugoslav Wars and accession of some countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The EP welcomes the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia and fully supports the UN peace-keeping mission. At the same time it expresses its concern about the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It clearly condemns the lack of genuine political cooperation among European states, accusing some countries of exploiting the situation for their own ends but also self-critically reflects on the role of the EC in having failed to prevent the bloody break-up of Yugoslavia. There is a general feeling that the EC has not lived up to expectations and that it was not able to preserve its foundation for the future. At the same time the EP expresses its irritation at the fact that Lord Owen and Lord Carrington negotiated on behalf of the Community without having a clear mandate from the Parliament. All resolutions on Yugoslavia end with the instruction to forward it not only to the Commission, the Council and the Member States but also to the UN, NATO and the CSCE. The EP thus clearly tries to make its voice heard also outside of the Community.

Discussions are heated and agreement on the compromise resolutions is difficult to reach. The debates on which republics should be recognized, if the UN should get involved and whether military force should be employed or not mirror very much those political discussions that take place on the national level as well. The incapacity to adopt a common position is again frequently traced back to the lack of necessary institutional structures on the Community level. As had happened with the crisis in the Baltic States, the Yugoslav Wars are

seen as a lesson demonstrating the need to build a political union that is capable of integrated action.105

2. Early debates on accession

The situation looks considerably different when it comes to the situation in Central and Eastern Europe. The historical dimension of the EC’s support for democracy in the CEECs is stressed over and over again in all debates, reports and resolutions. Frequent reference is made to the Balkan wars and the fear that if the EC fails to promote democratic developments at its doorstep, Europe will face a situation similar to the one in Yugoslavia. This might be the reason why there is surprisingly little disagreement about association among MEPs and between the EP and the Commission. Debates tend to be short confirming the decisions on association agreements taken by the Council and the Commission.106 The EP nevertheless stresses after the Edinburg European Council Summit in December 1992 and the Copenhagen European Council Meeting in June 1993, that accession must take place in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and in light of the internal situation in the Community. Several MEPs note that the difficulty of enlarging the Community stems from the heterogeneity that characterizes the Central and Eastern European countries from the standpoints of political stability, social protection, economic vigour and respect for human rights. They thus prefer to engage in close political and economic cooperation learning processes attached to a clear revision monitoring programme instead of promising fixed dates for accession. The EP furthermore reiterates its decision that a revision of the institutional framework of the Community should take place before new countries accede to the EU as an abrupt enlargement would work against the smooth functioning of the institutions and would delay achievements of the aims set by the Maastricht Treaty.107

The only areas of concern regard the slow progress of the ratification of the Europe Agreements in the Member States and about the potential one-

106 Report on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security on the conclusion of an association agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Poland, Historical Archives PE3 AP RP/POLI.1992 A3-0258/92 0010.
sidedness of the reciprocal opening up of markets. The EP supports the imposition of trade restrictions on a small range of sensitive products and the establishment of special rules governing the agricultural sector, but it also draws attention to the fact that the provisions taken have benefitted mainly the Western European countries so far. It recognizes the difficult economic situation that Member States are facing but still calls for an accelerated access of CEECs to Western markets, stressing that the political situation can only improve if economic aspirations are satisfied. The EP thus suddenly starts to speak with one voice, where previously a lot of hesitation had reigned with regards to the pros and cons of enlargement. Particular awareness is raised concerning environmental issues. The EP notes that very little money has been spent so far on environmental protection measures and criticises the Environment Ministers for adopting a programme without providing any funding for its implementation.108

Disagreement appears after the Council decided to block the interim agreement with Bulgaria in October 1993. In light of the ongoing Yugoslav Wars it is seen as the wrong signal by the EP. An economically stable Bulgaria is clearly considered an important bulwark against instability in the Balkans. The signing of the agreement is also considered an important symbolic act confirming that the EU does not disregard south-eastern Europe. 109

This stands in stark contrast to the situation concerning Romania. Although the majority in the EP is in favour of the association and interim trade agreement for the same reasons as in the Bulgarian case, concerns are expressed about Romania’s failure to establish a democratic regime and to assure the respect for minority rights. As had happened in February 1991 during the debate on supplies of agricultural products to the USSR, Romania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia,110 there is some disagreement in the Parliament about the question of to what extent the signing of the agreements should be linked to democratic progress. While some members believe that signing the agreement might send the wrong signal to the Romanian government, others think – as

---

does the Commission – that, on the contrary, it gives the EU the opportunity to influence human rights in a positive way.  

This discussion comes back in the debate on extending a Community guarantee to the European Investment Bank in case of losses on loans in the Baltic States. MEPs express worries about the lack of election rights of the Russian speaking minority and propose that loan guarantees by the EU should be made conditional on the respect for democracy and human rights. There is some difference in opinion by members of the EPP about the status of the Russian speaking minority, namely, since it arrived during the Soviet occupation is it a minority in the strict sense of the term or not? However, the rest of Parliament agrees that the conclusion of association agreements should depend on the respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms of the Russian minority on the one hand and the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic territory on the other.

II – 1994 to 2004 – The road to accession

1. The Yugoslav Wars and their aftermath

The fourth parliamentary term is still initially dominated by the Yugoslav Wars and their aftermath. The situation in Bosnia Herzegovina occupies MEPs substantially but with much less divisive discussion compared to the third legislative period. The resolutions passed on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina are supported by large majorities. Only the Far-Left and the Far-Right criticise that the EP is promoting a military instead of a peaceful solution by simply rubber-stamping decisions taken unilaterally by the United States and NATO.

Debates and documents issued after the end of the war stress the willingness of the EU to provide economic and financial aid, the need for reconciliation, and the role that Western Europe could play in this by drawing from its own

112 European Parliament debates of 8 February 1993 on guarantee to the EIB for losses on loans to Baltic States, No 3-427/13.
114 European Parliament debates of 17 November 1994 on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Vote), No 4-453/166; European Parliament debates of 17 November 1994 on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Vote), No 4-453/168.
experiences after WWII. There is no disagreement on these points. Diverging opinions exist only concerning the freedom of the press and the situation of the Italian minority in Croatia and Slovenia. This is also the reason why the Europe Agreement with Slovenia is initially blocked in the Council and opposed by many Italian MEPs. Most groups nevertheless are in favour of relegating the Italian/Slovene dispute over property and of signing the agreements with the country that is seen as the most ‘advanced’ in Central Europe.\textsuperscript{115} The fact that Croatia on the other hand is initially denied access to the PHARE programme, sees negotiations for a cooperation agreement suspended and is not admitted to the Council of Europe, is largely supported by all groups.\textsuperscript{116}

Discussions on the future of Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina recede into the background as soon as the Kosovo War breaks out in March 1998. Again there is the feeling that too little has been done too late and that if the EU did not react now it would bear part of the guilt for the outbreak of violence. Some MEPs voice their hesitation about interfering into Yugoslav internal affairs and express their fear that the re-establishment of autonomy for Kosovo - which no-one questions in principle - risks awakening a desire for independence which would dangerously disrupt international relations. Most of them thus initially stress that the solution to the conflict should not be a military but a political one and that peaceful dialogue should be promoted. Discussions show the same right-left rift that had characterized debates on the recognition of independence of Slovenia and Croatia, with the left-wing groups in favour of making a UN Security Council vote a binding prerequisite for military intervention.\textsuperscript{117} At first, the EP indeed proposes to only threaten the Yugoslav government with sanctions but then moves to fully support NATO preparations for a possible military intervention.\textsuperscript{118}

Once the war ends officially in June 1999, the amount of Parliament debates and resolutions dealing with Kosovo and Yugoslavia decrease. In the following years concerns are voiced regarding the respect for fundamental rights, the freedom of press, the instability of the Kosovar border and the political


\textsuperscript{116} European Parliament debates of 5 June 1996 on non-admission of Croatia to the Council of Europe, No 4-483/22; European Parliament debates of 19 June 1996 on aid to former Yugoslavia, No 4-484/139.

\textsuperscript{117} European Parliament debates of 12 March 1998 on the situation in Kosovo, No 4-516/282.

situation in FYROM. The focus is on the reestablishment of economic and political dialogue, and in 2007 a Multilateral Agreement is signed with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYROM, Serbia and Montenegro, followed by the conclusion of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2. Towards Enlargement

As soon as the Europe Agreements were signed and ratified in 1993, almost all debates and resolutions on Central and Eastern Europe make reference to them both in positive and negative terms.

They are invoked to remind candidate countries of their obligations under the agreements (i.e. Romania to review its human rights record with regards to political prisoners, homosexuals, minorities and children) but also to underline the obligations the EU has towards them (i.e. to support the Bulgarian population during the severe economic crisis, in a spirit of European solidarity). The latter is also the reason why in 1995 the EP calls on the Council and the Commission to review the inclusion of Romania and Bulgaria in

the list of countries whose nationals require visas, believing that as a matter of principle those states which have signed an association agreement with the European Union with a view to accession should be treated equally with regard to visa questions.\textsuperscript{120}

The provisions of the Europe Agreement and the Agenda 2000 proposal also provide a renewed opportunity to re-discuss sensitive political issues that had emerged in earlier debates, namely the asymmetrical opening of the markets, the harmonization of competition policy, the redistribution of aid in the Union and the environmental and social impact of the transformation to a social market economy. Between 1994 and 1998 the EP adopts several interim reports to influence the definition of the strategy of accession and holds a number of debates on the topic.\textsuperscript{121} All groups (except the Far-Right and the Far-Left who do not agree on the conditions for admission and call for referendums on enlargement in the EU) unanimously support enlargement to the East but underline that it should be accompanied by the thorough deepening of the institutional and financial structures of the EU. Despite the fact that divergent interpretations exist on the sectors to be deepened, the revision of the EU structures is seen not only as a necessary precondition for the strengthening of the decision-making mechanisms but also for offering the new countries a Union that is worth joining. This also includes benefits Member States enjoy. In this context provisions of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the Structural Funds prove to cause discussions within the EP. Even if it is underlined continuously that enlargement is a political and not an economic or technical exercise, the financial implications of accession take up a lot of space during the debates. While the Greens and the Socialists stress again that the negative social consequences of enlargement in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will only be avoided if developments are geared towards improving the standard of living and quality of life of the citizens, other groups fear that the cost of enlargement will be particularly huge for countries that are currently beneficiaries of the Structural Funds or are lying at the EU’s periphery.


\textsuperscript{121} European Parliament debates of 30 November 1994 on accession by the countries of central and eastern Europe, No 4-454/6; European Parliament debates of 2 March 1995 on relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, No 4-458/64; European Parliament debates of 15 January 1996 on the Europe Agreements with the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic, No 4-473/6; European Parliament debates of 10 December 1996 on financing Enlargement, No 4-492/61; European Parliament debates of 3 December 1997 on Enlargement – Agenda 2000, No 4-510/2; European Parliament debates of 11 March 1998 on assistance to the applicant countries in central and eastern Europe – Accession partnerships, No 4-516/130.
Yet all MEPs agree that this is an historic moment in the history of the EU in which selfishness should not prevail.

It is nevertheless stressed that both sides will only benefit from enlargement if the *acquis communautaire* is respected and progress of its implementation is carefully monitored. How much attention is attached to this aspect becomes evident as soon as the Slovak Government dispossesses democratically elected members of the Slovak National Council of their seats and passes a new language law depriving its Hungarian-speaking minority of its rights. In its resolution on the Slovak Republic, the EP makes very clear that if the country did not show sufficient respect for democracy, human and minority rights and the rule of law, the European Union would reconsider or even suspend its programmes of assistance and cooperation under the Europe Agreement. In 1996 it supports the Council’s decision to delay the conclusion of the Additional Protocol to the Europe Agreement and in November 1997 it agrees with the Commission that Slovakia does not fulfil the political criteria for membership. The prospect of accession is clearly seen as a tool for EU countries to monitor not only economic but also political developments. The EP nevertheless continues to be of the opinion that the people of the Slovak Republic should not be isolated and therefore asks the Council and the Commission to re-assess the European Union’s position towards Slovakia and include it in the first round of accession negotiations after the elections one year later that sees the victory of the pro-European ‘Slovak Democratic Coalition’. It feels that the decision taken by the European Parliament to hold the door open for Slovakia, despite recommendations to the contrary by the Commission, was correct after all.

Similar arguments are also voiced when it comes to the Baltic States. The signature of the Europe Agreements is welcomed by all political groups. They comment positively on the fact that the problems with the Russian-speaking minority is being addressed in the human rights suspension clause of the agreements that could be invoked should the situation deteriorate and comment on the remarkable progress that all three countries have made in

---


economic and political terms. Problems still exist in some areas, particularly in the banking sector and the unresolved question of Baltic NATO membership but overall most speakers are positive that the agreements will pave the way for future membership (maybe as early as in the year 2000). The geo-political stakes involved in allowing the Baltics to play an important role as mediators between Russia and the rest of Europe are stressed more than once in this context. According to most MEPs the inherent security aspect and the benefit for Western European economies outweigh all concerns voiced by critics who are afraid of the enormous cost of enlargement. Some MEPs draw attention to the fact that the association agreement will not be welcomed with open arms by all and that there might be resistance to join a ‘new version of the Soviet Union with its capital in Brussels’. They thus think it is important that membership is preceded by democratic referenda on the one hand and internal reform of the EU on the other.

Less concern is voiced with regard to the other acceding countries. In the debate on November 4, 1998 the Commission reports to the EP on the progress of the candidate countries on the three dimensions of the accession criteria: political and economic reform and respect for the acquis communautaire. The overall picture is of steady progress even if the different countries move at different speeds. Between 2000 and 2003 the EP then invites the presidents of eight of the respective countries to give speeches during formal sittings of the Parliament and to justify their choices. Their words are all met with great enthusiasm. On May 1, 2004 ten Central and Eastern European countries (Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia) join the European Union. Romania and Bulgaria follow in 2007, Croatia in 2013.

---

CONCLUSION

The analysis of the historical documents of the European Parliament clearly demonstrates that the EP has played an important role in framing debates on democratic change in Central and Eastern Europe. Being very active even before the first direct elections in 1979, the Parliament extensively discussed events leading up to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Cold War, post-Communism and enlargement. In its numerous reports, resolutions and debates it pays particular attention to the question of human rights and the importance of economic, political and cultural cooperation for democratic progress in Central and Eastern Europe.

Opinions on the nature and the form of this cooperation are nevertheless far from being uniform. Debates also prove to be particularly heated when it comes to the question of interference on the one hand and the right to national self-determination on the other. Divergences of opinion appear in particular with regards to German unification, the recognition of the Baltic States’ independence and the acknowledgement of Slovenia and Croatia as sovereign states.

In all its debates the EP tries to find a delicate balance between action and reaction, showing a particular concern with promoting a vision of itself as beacon of democracy and human rights. In doing so it often pitches the EU against the US. In putting a special focus on issues that go beyond mere economic considerations, the EP also often tries to set itself apart from the Commission and the Council. Debates are thus not only used to present a certain vision of Europe’s democratic future but also to question the institutional set-up of the European Union.

Despite it not being a full co-legislator at the time, the EP nevertheless manages to often set the terms of debate within the EU. More than once it proposes measures that are then taken up by the Commission. In this sense it has not only closely followed and largely discussed democratic change in Central and Eastern Europe, it has also contributed more or less actively to its progress.
Annexes

Part of the "East Side Gallery, a 1.3 km long part of original Berlin Wall and the largest world graffiti gallery, Berlin, Germany. Image ID: 218210710 © Atosan - source: Shutterstock.
2. Human rights

(a) Joint resolution replacing Docs. B2-1483, 1497, 1523, 1537 and 1547/88

RESOLUTION
on human rights in Czechoslovakia

_The European Parliament_,

A. recalling that the present government of Czechoslovakia is not only a party to the Helsinki Final Act, but this year signed the Vienna agreement in the framework of the CSCE which re-affirmed respect for human rights,

B. whereas, contrary to those international agreements and the urgent appeal formulated by the European Parliament, the Czechoslovakian writer Vaclav Havel, was sentenced to nine months' imprisonment with hard labour on 21 January 1989, Ota Veverka and Jara Petrova were given prison sentences of 12 months and nine months respectively, and five other Czechoslovakian citizens were given sentences, simply for having taken part in a peaceful demonstration to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the death of Jan Palach,

C. whereas several European governments, the USA and hundreds of intellectuals, writers and private individuals have petitioned the Czechoslovakian Governments to release Havel,

D. recalling its resolution of 19 January 1989 (¹) and 16 February 1989 (²) on Czechoslovakia to the effect that the fruitful development of East-West relations depended in part on both sides fulfilling their obligations,

1. Condemns the arrest of Vaclav Havel and his friends and calls for them and the other political prisoners to be released immediately;

2. Notes that this incident constitutes a serious violation of the final document of the Vienna Conference, which was signed, _inter alia, by the Czechoslovakian Government_;

3. Calls on the Foreign Ministers meeting in European Political Cooperation to make an official protest to the Czechoslovakian Governments and to do everything possible to secure the release of peaceful opponents as soon as possible;

4. Instructs its delegation responsible for relations with the parliament of Czechoslovakia to raise the question of political oppression with the delegation of the Czechoslovakian Parliament;

5. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, European Political Cooperation, the governments of the Member States and the Czechoslovakian Government.

(¹) See minutes of that sitting (Part II, Item 3 (c)).
(²) See minutes of that sitting (Part II, Item 3 (b)).
(h) EEC-Romania relations

— Doc. A2-103/89

RESOLUTION

on relations between the European Community and Romania

The European Parliament,

— having regard to the resolution of 17 December 1987 (*) on Romania,

— having regard to its resolution of 13 October 1988 (?) on new measures liquidating villages in Romania,

— having regard to its resolution of 7 July 1988 (?) on the situation of Protestant Christians in Romania,

— having regard to resolution of 15 December 1988 (?) on the fate of Mrs Doña Cornea,

— having regard to its resolution of 16 March 1989 (?) on the Community’s relations with Romania and the statements delivered to Parliament on that occasion by Mr Andriessen, Vice-President of the Commission,

— having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mrs Lizing on relations between the EEC and Romania (Doc. B2-283/86),

— having delegated the power of decision to its Committee on External Economic Relations, pursuant to Rule 37 of the Rules of Procedure,

— having regard to the report of the Committee on External Economic Relations (Doc. A2-103/89),

A. moved and horrified by the plight of the Romanian people and shocked, in particular, by the persecution of minority groups such as the Hungarians, Germans, Serbians, Jews and gypsies,

B. whereas Romania has been faced by a serious economic crisis for nearly 10 years now and it has the lowest real income of all the Comecon countries,

C. whereas the crisis has recently led to substantial social unrest and there have been widespread public protests against the country’s political leadership, and whereas these protests are prevented from taking on an explicitly political and organized form solely because of repressive measures by the police,

D. whereas the structural causes of the economic crisis are to be found in the highly centralized administration of the economy and, more specifically, the decision to allocate an enormous proportion of the national income to a rapid process of basic industrialization which is profoundly upsetting the economic and social balance of the country, since its structure is weak and based mainly on agriculture,

E. whereas imports have been drastically cut in the hope of cancelling out the foreign debt by 1990 and, although the debt was halved between 1981 and 1987, the cuts have adversely affected internal consumption, even of the most basic commodities, and the acquisition of technologies which could assist the country’s efforts towards industrial development,

(?) Minutes of that date, Part II, Item 1.
F. whereas the process of agricultural restructuring is to destroy thousands of villages which would mean the inhabitants being moved away from their homes,

G. whereas this situation has repercussions on the ethnic balance of areas inhabited by sizeable Hungarian and German minorities, and who are thus forced to assimilate or, as is already happening to a certain extent, to take refuge abroad,

H. condemning the destruction of villages and the historic centres of towns and cities as a means of depriving the Romanian people of their cultural identity,

I. whereas contractual relations between the EEC and Romania over the last 10 years have been more extensive than with any other country in Eastern Europe and in 1980 culminated in a trade agreement and the setting-up of a joint committee, all of which has encouraged and increased exports from Romania to the EEC, but not vice versa, and has resulted in a very one-sided balance of trade over the last few years,

J. whereas although Romania has become closer to the USSR in recent years, in particular in order to compensate for the decline in its relations with the EEC and OECD countries in the commercial sphere and to guarantee a supply of energy resources, it does not seem to be interested in the kind of political and economic reforms now under way in various Eastern bloc countries,

K. whereas all this constitutes a most oppressive political situation, with a regime which apparently disregards the most elementary human rights, represses any form of political dissent and rejects the idea of any form of renewal or receptiveness to democratic beliefs which might make room for pluralism,

1. Expresses its unequivocal disapproval of the Romanian authorities' political attitude, repeats its condemnation of their violation of human rights and democratic principles and calls on them to bring in radical changes which may lead to a solution to the economic crisis and reduce the reasons for public protest;

2. Urges respect for human and civil rights in accordance with the recommendations laid down at the Vienna Conference, in particular a change of attitude towards the rights of minorities (Hungarians, Germans and others) who must be entitled to continue to stay in the areas where they now live as communities with a variety of histories, cultures, traditions and languages, but historically integrated in the country as a whole;

3. Agrees with the Commission that in this situation the conditions are not right for resuming and continuing negotiations for the renewal and extension of the present trade agreement;

4. Calls for a Community ban on all imports of food from Romania, in view of the grave food shortages in that country;

5. Calls on Romania to follow other Eastern European countries in being more open to relations with other countries and undertaking political and economic reforms;

6. Expects that once the situation has changed and conditions corresponding to the principles of human rights have been restored in Romania and relations between that country and the Community have been normalized, diplomatic relations between Romania and the Community will be established and negotiations on improving and extending commercial and economic relations will be initiated, particularly since Romania has for nine years been the only Comecon country to be linked with the Community by a formal commercial agreement;

7. Agrees with the Commission of the European Communities that the Romanian request for further liberalization of its exports to the Community can only be considered when the political climate (the policy of "systematization") has changed and there are guarantees that the present substantial obstacles to a more balanced flow of trade with Romania are to be finally removed;
8. Considers it would nevertheless be useful not to suspend all links with the Romanian authorities, not least because the Community can thus continue to try to influence them; calls on the Council of Ministers meeting in political cooperation to do their utmost in this direction; calls on the Romanians to adopt an attitude designed to prevent the economic and commercial relations covered in the 1980 agreement from coming to a standstill at the very time when the whole Comecon area is becoming more receptive to the idea of a committed relationship with the EEC.

9. Feels that, provided the circumstances allow the resumption of the negotiations in question, it would be both mutually beneficial and feasible to find new sectors for cooperation between the EEC and Romania, in particular in the following fields:
   — transport by road and inland waterways,
   — joint ventures (since Romanian law offers interesting opportunities and guarantees for Community operators in this sector),
   — scientific cooperation,
   — standards,
   — tourism and cultural exchanges;

10. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments of the Member States and the Government of Romania.
RESOLUTION

on the situation in the Baltic States

The European Parliament,

A. recognizing the continuing process towards greater constitutional sovereignty pursued by the Supreme Soviets of the Republics and supported by the Popular Fronts of Latvia and Estonia and Sajudis in Lithuania,

B. noting the amendments made to the Estonian Constitution concerning eligibility to vote and requirements to use the Estonian language, which resulted during August in serious strike action by the non-Estonian speaking elements of the population,

C. aware that the Lithuanian Parliament is to discuss a new nationality law on 20 September,

D. observing that the Latvian Central Committee of the Communist Party has recommended that the Latvian Constitution be modified to permit political pluralism,

1. Welcomes the recognition by the authorities of the Soviet Union of the existence of the secret protocol attached to the Molotov/Ribbentrop Pact of 23 August 1939, which allocated "spheres of influence" to the Soviet Union and Germany;

2. Salutes the nationwide commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the Molotov Ribbentrop Pact by the population of the Baltic States when a million people demonstrated their opposition to the secret agreement;
3. Salutes the process of democratization which is under way in the USSR, and believes that all the national and religious questions can best be resolved within this new framework of agreement and progress;

4. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Foreign Ministers meeting in European political cooperation, the President of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Presidents of the Supreme Soviets of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
4. Refugee problem in Hungary

— Joint resolution replacing Docs. B 3-132 and 162/89

RESOLUTION

on the refugee problem in Hungary

The European Parliament,

A. having followed with concern and compassion the massive exodus of East German citizens to Hungary in search of a free and democratic life in the Federal Republic of Germany,

B. whereas the overwhelming majority of the refugees are leaving their country solely on account of the intolerable totalitarian pressure,

C. recognizing that the Hungarian Government faced a very difficult situation since it had to consider conflicting obligations due to its treaties with the GDR, as a signatory of the CSCE Final Act of Helsinki and as member of the United Nations,

D. whereas the human tide from Romania far exceeds the material resources of the Hungarian people,

1. Expresses its admiration to the Hungarian people for their generous readiness to help and humane attitude and welcomes the decision of the Hungarian Government to allow thousands of East German citizens who want to do so to cross the frontier to Austria to proceed into the Federal Republic of Germany;

2. Believes that this decision marks a great advance in respect for human rights and encourages the Hungarian Government to continue the democratic and economic restructuring of their country;

3. Calls on the GDR leadership to abide by the Helsinki Final Act — which they themselves signed — and in particular to guarantee the right of free movement;

4. Calls once again on the Government of Romania finally to comply with the norms of civilized peoples;

5. Calls on the Council and Commission to show European solidarity by providing material aid, provided that the Hungarian Government is prepared to accept it, forthwith and leaving aside red tape, to refugees in Hungary and, as far as the financial aspect is concerned, to help Hungary as far as they can in the reception and care of, and in finding accommodation for, the refugees:
6. Asks the Foreign Ministers meeting in European political cooperation to call once again on the leadership in the GDR and the Government in Bucharest not just to pay lip service to human rights but to give them practical expression, namely by guaranteeing their peoples free elections, and proposes that the Commission raise and take account of these goals in its negotiations with the two countries concerned;

7. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the Foreign Ministers of the Community meeting in European political cooperation, the parliaments of the Member States, and the Hungarian, East German and Romanian Governments.
RESOLUTION
the political situation in Poland

The European Parliament,

A. having regard to the political upheavals which occurred in Poland following the first "free elections" held in the country since the Second World War,
B. having regard to the economic crisis which has beset the country for many years,
C. whereas it is in the common interest of both East and West to enable Poland to put an end to this crisis,
D. whereas the Europe of the Twelve must support the measures pursued by the new Polish Government,

1. Expresses its confidence in the new Polish Government and assures it of its support in pursuing its difficult task;
2. Calls on the Governments of the Twelve and the Commission to ensure that such support takes the practical form of effective economic aid, implemented as soon as possible;
3. Instructs the Commission to examine all possible measures to supply economic aid to the Polish Government under bilateral and other agreements as well as any specific and sectoral aid that would appear necessary and to report back to Parliament, in particular to the delegation responsible for relations with Poland;
4. Calls for a mission of European experts to be sent to meet the Polish Government to gain a full appreciation of the economic situation and of the most urgent needs to which the Community can respond;
5. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council and the governments of the Member States.
PART II

Texts adopted by the European Parliament

1. East German refugees

— Joint resolution replacing Docs. B3-249, 254, 281, 287, 290, 291 and 299/89

RESOLUTION

on the situation in the German Democratic Republic

The European Parliament,

A. noting with concern the flood of thousands of East German citizens to the Federal Republic of Germany via Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia,

B. whereas discontent at the lack of democratic reforms is the main reason why most of these refugees have left the country, as has been underlined by the many demonstrations which have taken place in East German towns,

C. concerned at the crackdown on the demonstrators who called on 7 October 1989 for democratic reforms — in East Berlin, Leipzig and Dresden in particular — which ended with hundreds being detained for questioning, dozens being injured and a number of arrests,

D. whereas a vast flood of refugees poses humanitarian and practical problems for transit countries,

E. recalling the Hungarian Government’s decision to allow thousands of East German citizens to cross the Austro-Hungarian border in order to reach the Federal Republic of Germany and the decision by the Polish and Czechoslovakian Governments to facilitate their departure,

F. whereas it is certain that the people of the GDR are following, and endorse, the Community’s efforts to achieve a united Europe and self-determination for the German people in peace and freedom,

1. Calls on the Government of the GDR to open the way to democratic reforms;

2. Calls on the Government of the GDR not to resort to repression and to meet all the obligations under the Helsinki Final Act, to which it is bound by treaty;

3. Calls on the GDR to put an immediate end to all police action against individuals who wish simply to live in freedom in their country, to release those arbitrarily arrested or sentenced and to abandon judicial and police proceedings;

4. Highlights the desire for freedom, democracy and personal involvement voiced by the demonstrators;

5. Takes the view that the necessary democratic reforms may help to resolve the serious problems which are the root cause of the mass exodus and moreover stresses the need for dialogue between all political and social elements in society;

6. Considers it the legitimate right of the people of the GDR to determine their own economic system, the form of government and the future of their country;

7. Requests the Foreign Ministers meeting in European Political Cooperation to call on the Government of the GDR to observe human rights and calls on the governments of the Community Member States to discuss the human rights situation in the GDR, as well as support for the reform movements in Eastern and Central Europe, at their summit in Strasbourg on 8/9 December 1989;
8. Expects the Council and Commission to take account of this resolution in future negotiations or contacts with the GDR;

9. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the parliaments of the Member States and the Government of the GDR.
should like to begin by announcing on behalf of the enlarged Bureau its decision to award the Sakharov prize this year to Mr Alexander Dubcek.

(Loud and sustained applause)

I see that the House like the enlarged Bureau unanimously supports this gesture insofar as Mr Dubcek symbolizes for all Europeans our fondest hopes for peaceful reform in Eastern Europe. As I said in my speech to the House following my election last July, we believe that parliamentary democracy forms the cornerstone of our 'common European House' and therefore we note with satisfaction everything which is happening with a view to creating democratic systems throughout Europe.

I hope that it will be possible for me to present this award to Mr Dubcek personally during the December part-session. I felt that it was appropriate to make this announcement which, I am sure, will be welcomed throughout Europe...

(Applause)

...before giving the floor to the President-in-Office of the Council.

Similarly, I have to make a brief statement in relation to a terrorist outrage: I am referring to the assassination of the president of Lebanon, Mr René Muawas, which has inspired us with a feeling of the most profound horror. President Muawad was a source of hope to the Lebanese people and the international community. More than ever before we must condemn this barbaric act which has put an end to the fragile hopes which had emerged following his election. The international community and in particular the European Community must recognize its commitment to demonstrate its solidarity with this country which is undergoing the martyrdom of an internecine civil war.

In the past in Ireland and in Spain, and today in Lebanon, terrorism violates the basic principles of democracy. The European Parliament, representing the peoples of Europe, will not cease to combat resolutely this evil growth which is seeking to undermine the civilized world.

On behalf of the House I should like to extend a warm welcome to the President-in-Office of the Council and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, a member of the Council.

(Applause)

We are experiencing today two historical events. Last Saturday a meeting of the Council in Paris showed the will of the Council to respond to the challenges of the present day and, above all, to what is happening in Central and Eastern Europe. The House has the special privilege today of welcoming for the first time two members of the Council who symbolize the European union which we are trying to build.
MITERRAND, President-in-Office of the Council. —
(FR) Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, as you know, and as you have just been reminded, a special session of the European Council was held in Paris last Saturday. The agenda was simple: to look at the events taking place in Eastern Europe and draw the first conclusions.

After talking to the President of this House, I thought it would be helpful to the smooth running of our institutions if, in my capacity as President of the European Council, I were to speak to you briefly, without holding up your work too much, about what happened at that meeting.

It was less than a month ago, on 25 October, that I spoke to you here in this chamber as I am doing today. I mentioned the situation of our neighbours in Eastern Europe where, as you know, history is being made every day. I referred to the vast movement towards democracy and freedom. I referred to the determination of the people which was dictating the course of events, bringing down walls and opening frontiers and I said: once again the people are on the move, and when they move the effect is decisive.

Well, in Berlin on 9 November the onward march of history offered the world a sight which had still seemed unlikely even the day before — the sight of a hole in the wall, that wall which for nearly 30 years had been the very embodiment of the division of our continent. It was on that day that democracy and freedom — inerparable from one another — carried off what I see as one of their finest and most telling victories. The people moved. The people spoke, and their voice carried beyond frontiers and shattered the silence of an order which they did not want, which was imposed on them and which they clearly wished to reject in order to recover their own identity.

I am therefore delighted to be able to express here, before Chancellor Kohl, before the representatives of the peoples of the twelve Member States of the Community, how deeply moved we were at these stirring events, a depth of emotion which is pointless to dwell upon, since it is personal to each of us, a part of our inner experience of history, as well as being a formidable example of a mass movement in which we can, I believe, be proud to have played a part.

The movement began in Poland and then spread to Hungary. I am talking of course about recent events, because for a very long time, indeed from the very first, free men have hoped, free men have fought. Many risked the loss of their freedom, risked death. Many met that fate. How then can we pinpoint the moment of the first sign, the first awakening? If we are talking about recent events, then it has to be what happened in Poland, in Hungary, a movement sought and encouraged by the Soviet Union, and we can never overemphasize the role played in this situation by Mr Gorbachev.

(Applause)

Here is a man who is certainly a product of his own culture and history, the history of his country, but a man who has understood that it is time to move on to new ways of doing things, that his country, like others, must now bow to the dominant forces in human society which are — let me repeat the words, it is such a pleasure to do so — democracy and freedom. In short, the movement is gathering pace, it is expanding, it is spreading throughout Europe, and we want this to happen — and I hope you don’t mind if I speak for you here, even though you have not empowered me to do so, but I feel we are in unison — we even want the movement to continue. Our hunger is not assuaged, we see what has been happening in towns throughout Poland, what is happening in towns throughout East Germany, what has happened in Hungary. We hear the call of the crowds in Prague; and if we do not hear the voice of the Romanian people it is because it is still stifled.

(Applause)

But we are aware of it. The silence is deafening. Sooner or later that people will join the concert of nations already formed by our twelve countries which have been much divided by the history of this century and which have come together again because they wished it and perhaps also because necessity taught them that they must so wish.

Why then hold this meeting in Paris on 18 November? Would it not have been better to hold it sooner? I do not wish to reopen this argument, which had its merits, but it is a difficult matter to decide. I was thinking about it from the very first day. It seemed to me that perhaps it was necessary to stand back a little from events, the breathing space was not very long, some eight days. It allowed us to distance ourselves a little from the feelings and emotions of the first hours, before we began to see our way more clearly, before the peoples themselves began to discern what separated their ambitions, their deepest desires and sometimes their dreams from the reality of today, from the realities of our political debates, our parliamentary assemblies, our government decisions.

I did not bring forward the Strasbourg European Council meeting, for what seemed to me an obvious reason: it is due to take place on 8 and 9 December. Everything in its time; you know very well, ladies and gentlemen, from having experienced it in other places besides our Community, that meetings need to be prepared and matters need to be ripe for discussion. The Strasbourg meeting was arranged to coincide with a decisive moment for the future of our Community, for reaffirming its structures, for defining its principles. I wished it to retain all its importance.

On Saturday we spoke chiefly, I would say almost exclusively, about the events in the East and what we
should do about them, we the countries generally regarded as the Western countries. I shall come back to this in a minute. What should we do? Answers are beginning to emerge. We need to amplify these answers. Both you and I have a great deal of work before us. We are all faced with the situation, we must decide how we are to forge the Europe of tomorrow. But we had a twofold objective: to make a joint analysis of the situation in Eastern Europe and weigh up the possible consequences for the balance of Europe and at the same time to express the wish of the Community and its Member States to assist the countries of the East in the process of reform.

We wish to assist all the countries of the East but more specifically and more precisely those which have committed themselves to a course of action, those which have made promises, not verbally to us, but to themselves. The arrangements already announced show that they are on course towards democratic systems. The circumstances clearly justified the meeting. The matter was one which required detailed consideration without further delay, the issues at stake required the Community to look at what was going on and define its position on events which were of direct concern to it.

Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, you wished to organize a debate on political developments in Central and Eastern Europe and their implications for the future of Europe and consequently for the future of the Community. I congratulate you on that initiative. Your debate will, I am sure, enhance the message which the Twelve are holding out to the countries of Europe. Given my present role and the fact that I am currently responsible for this task, I felt that I could not accomplish it without some stage reporting to you on the matter, that is what Parliament is for, it seems to me, even if it is also in a state of permanent flux, and evolution; it is at least necessary to mark certain stages in a significant way, and I hope that is what will be done today.

(Applause)

Do not think that this is merely a duty. It is also a pleasure for me, even if it is something of a repetition, to have this opportunity of laying our conclusions before you.

But as I was speaking to you about the European Council meeting on Saturday, and it was that which occasioned and which is the reason for our meeting, I shall just dwell on that a little, if you will permit.

The first of our conclusions, and I think I can say that it affects the very future of our Community, let us use terms which have already been employed, is that it is the existence of an ever-stronger Community which has provided a point of reference and a stimulus to events in the East. We do not take the credit for those events, that belongs primarily to the peoples of those countries and then to their leaders who understood the need for this development, who permitted it, who facilitated it. Some credit is also due, I am convinced of it, to that Community which today represents the only real point of attraction around which to build a structured future for this, our continent.

And then there are the values, those fine values which are so often talked about, you know the ones I mean. The values which these peoples are laying claim to are very close to our own, we ourselves have expressed the same aspirations. They are our own aspirations, aspirations which we hold in common; but, civilization being what it is, the course of centuries has seen the birth of Europe, has seen it come together, split apart and come together again. These values exist independently of fixed points, frontiers, splits and walls: we have the proof — walls are coming down, we are meeting up again, and we understand one another.

I am convinced, as I have already said that existence of a strong and structured Community is a factor for the stability and success of the whole of Europe. We should therefore affirm our identity as a Community, confirm our determination, strengthen our institutions and set the seal on our union. That in my view is the first lesson to be learned, because I can see no other alternative to the opening up of the East and the completion of the Community construct. The two things go hand in hand. I have said it before, and I say it again, they are complementary. We must not look inwards but must draw on the Community's success, its strengths, its reserves of energy, the driving force which will enable Europe as a whole to come together. I used that expression at the press conference which followed our meeting on Saturday evening, when I said that the great political lesson to be learned from all this is that we are two inseparable factors in the European equation. As events unfold in the East, the Europe of the Community, — at the same pace, and indeed why not even a little more quickly in order to anticipate the result — must decide to strengthen itself more than it has yet done, must press on rapidly towards the full realization of its structures. And those structures will depend absolutely on the Community's political will to see unity — political unity — finally hold sway over all the measures initiated since the founders conceived the idea of Europe.

(Applause)

And I think I can say that that was the spirit in which the twelve Heads of State and Government met. That was what they wished to express, what they wished to see happen. They wanted to encourage and support steps towards democracy wherever such steps were being taken, but also to take those factors as an indication that our Community should itself learn something from the lesson of events.

You can make the connection after what I have just said between the meeting on 18 November and the meeting which awaits us on 8 and 9 December.

But a lot has happened in the meantime and will happen yet. I would nevertheless like to tell you straight away how the few specific measures were examined, according to the very different circumstances of the East European countries in the process of change. To turn
first to Poland and Hungary. The Twelve have stressed the urgent need for these two countries to conclude agreements with the International Monetary Fund, and it was decided that the Community bodies would take energetic steps to urge that body to come to a decision before the end of the year. Of course Poland and Hungary will also have to make an effort to arrive at a sound agreement which is in keeping with the rules which must govern our international institutions. But the matter is so urgent that the Community should back up these two countries in pleading a difficult case which nevertheless deserves to succeed.

The recent visit to Warsaw and Budapest by the President of the Commission, Mr Jacques Delors, and the President of the Council, Mr Roland Dumas, provided an opportunity for assessing those two countries' needs. Poland needs a stabilization fund estimated at one thousand million dollars, while Hungary is requesting a bridging loan for the same amount. I can tell you that these two things can already be regarded as agreed in principle.

The Twelve have also discussed cooperation with other countries. They have considered and entirely agreed to the signing of a trade agreement with the German Democratic Republic. We perhaps have a tendency to forget it in the hurly-burly of events, but we must not forget that the country was perhaps the first to show a power of resistance and a courage such that, even thought the economy was not thereby improved, we really are morally obliged to help its people, along with the others, especially since the country is going through a severe economic crisis, as you know.

Furthermore, to support the movement for reform, we examined what measures might be introduced. These were of several kinds, and I shall come back to them in a moment. There was discussion on one question which indeed requires some discussion. Should conditions be imposed on the countries which need our help? Yes and no. In the case of countries which have shown a clear intention of acquiring democratic institutions based on certain simple themes: respect for human rights and free, and hence secret, elections, those are the countries for which we felt we should make an extra effort and pass straight on to helping them obtain a number of the advantages they should enjoy, as well as entry to certain institutions, as if the Community (while not contemplating enlargement without due process) considered that there already existed a Community, a group of nations and of peoples, which could take such a step. A certain link has therefore been established for this kind of measure between Poland, Hungary and the countries of the Community. This does not of course mean that we are abandoning countries which have not reached the same stage to their fate.

We would not want aid from our countries in any way to provide fresh fuel for perpetuating the totalitarian regimes which persist in certain places. That would be absurd, but at the same time we can see how unfortunate it would be if we were to refuse our aid, simply because, if we did, those countries which have not had the opportunity to free themselves earlier from oppressive regimes would be deprived of our assistance and friendship. We must therefore tailor our intervention, and that is what we are trying to do. And although we have decided on a course of action, have arranged for a series of agreements, something now clearly in prospect for Poland and Hungary, we are also blazing a trail and providing pointers for the others, so that the way ahead is clear.

If we are to support the reform movement we cannot simply remain passive observers, merely counting the blows struck. We must enter into the movement, help to carry it further. The measures to be taken have already been outlined and are to be discussed again in the days and weeks to come. I shall mention a few, for example the project which I referred to on 25 October, that of a bank for the development and modernization of Eastern Europe.

I was speaking personally at the time; decision taken in Paris was a mandate to the 'Troika'. I believe that such a bank, comparable to the regional banks for South East Asia and Africa, should involve widespread participation by all those who wish to contribute to its capital, starting with the 24 countries which attended the Arche Summit on 14 July of this year. That is what would constitute — until such time as there is explicit agreement among the members of the Community — the unusual feature of this bank.

Of course the EIB was mentioned. It springs to mind immediately. It is not that we have a mania for creating new bodies at every opportunity, or at least I don't, I don't like bureaucracies any more than you do, it is simply that this is not a role for the EIB. The task of the EIB is basically linked to the structural funds, it is oriented towards another part of Europe; the EIB consists only of the twelve Community countries.

I believe — and there are several of us who think this way — that the new bank should have a special flavour, that of the East European countries, and that instead of involving only the members of the Community it should involve all the well-wishers of the world and all types of capital, from whatever source, in order to launch a powerful movement on a scale commensurate with the size of the task ahead. This therefore is the characteristic that I wish to highlight and which I shall continue to highlight. The 'Troika' has begun its discussions; it will report on 8 and 9 December. I hope that this project — an idea which has sprung from several quarters, including a number of benches in this House and in our national Parliaments, an idea which many have thought of — I hope that this bank for Eastern Europe will really tackle the development question, and help to form new forces, to pull them back from the brink of the abyss before which they stand. And from this point of view matters are extremely urgent, I think that since the setting up of this bank might take some time, and I fear that it will, it is necessary to find an immediate solution. That is to say that from next week we must begin to
mobilize the bodies capable of carrying out this task until an institution is set up.

In a similar vein, thinking about the sort of things we have all heard, I remember a conversation I had with Mr. Gorbachev. I do not usually confide the contents of private conversations at meetings of this kind, but it is something that has been said so often that I feel I can repeat it. I remember the day he said to me: 'what we need most is to train our managers'. How many other countries have we heard say that? We need to train bosses — it seems that the men and women called on to run these countries are no longer able to do so because they have not been trained for it, they were trained for something else. They have not been able to adapt to the new forms of management. That, after all, is our job; let us do it, without attaching conditions.

Let us draw up a plan for the training of managers in all these countries, just as we have decided to open up to the East European countries the programmes which the Community already has for education and training. One day we may see — and I am giving my imagination free rein — a Hungarian student doing an Oxford doctorate under the Erasmus programme, a student from Leipzig following a training course in a Dutch or Italian, or indeed French firm under the Comett programme. We could see a teacher of French from Warsaw perfecting his knowledge of the language under the Lingua programme. I don't think I need to go on, you get the idea. These programmes are not exclusive. We have already taken our activities way beyond the Community framework in a number of areas, especially that of technology, and we shall continue to do so.

Other suggestions have also been made, such as allowing certain East European countries to have access to the Council of Europe and GATT, initially as observers. Each of these suggestions will of course be examined in the appropriate forum and by the appropriate procedures, to use the language of our administrators. We shall see what the appropriate procedures are when the European Council meets on 8 and 9 December and takes up the matter. I hope that there will not be any going back over the issues, at least if there is that it will be in order to do more and to do it better.

Has the Community lived up to the expectations of those who have placed their faith in it? Has it really responded to the anguished appeal of Mr. Mazowiecki that there should no longer be a Europe of the poor and a Europe of the rich? Has it lived up to your own expectations, the expectations of you who have put forward projects on many occasions? Has the Community met the aspirations of those men and women of Europe who want it to make its voice heard in all world affairs and to confirm its place as a protagonist in a new European balance and as one of the fundamental protagonists in human life on this planet.

We can never go far enough or quickly enough. Swiftness of action does not mean lack of thought. But it must be said — and here I am preaching to the converted, since you remind us of it often enough, and I hope that the message will spread beyond these walls — none of this will come about if we are unable in the next few days, among ourselves, within the Community, to agree on the fundamental projects which will endow our Europe with the instruments of an economic and monetary policy, the instruments of a social policy, of an environmental policy. It will not come about if we do not complete the internal market according to the pace and timetable we have already decided on.

(Appause)

This is what we are going to turn our hands to now. This is what we shall be looking at and these are the questions which I shall be asking in Strasbourg in a few days' time. Everyone will have to respond. And, while I am on the point, I am sure that within the minds of each of us, as responsible people, light will dawn, not a blinding light but one which will illuminate the whole horizon: from what we are able to do among ourselves and for ourselves will flow the things which will seem valuable, worthwhile and lasting for others. In short, we hold in our hands much more than our own fate. We can now show the way, without pretension, without any wish to dominate, without the feeling of fulfilling some authoritarian role, but out of a profound desire for democracy, as demonstrated time and again by each of our countries. We want the way in which the Community decides on its action to serve as an example for the countries of the East who are on the move, searching for something, suffering, hoping, an example to those millions who dream, like us, that one day Europe will be Europe.

This then, ladies and gentlemen, is what I expect of the European Council in Strasbourg. You are aware of what is at stake, I have no need to tell you how important it is, I am speaking to an assembly in which the vast majority is already convinced that this is the path we should follow, that this is where our duty lies; we must embark on the venture together.

(Loud applause)

PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr President-in-Office of the Council.

I now call on the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr Helmut Kohl.

(Appause)

KOHl, member of the European Council. — (DE) Mr President of the European Parliament, Mr President of the French Republic, ladies and gentlemen, each of us senses that what is now happening in Europe — and especially Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe — is of historical importance. I thank you, Mr President, and the House very sincerely for this opportunity to explain the position of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany at this time.

President Mitterrand has just described and explained the conclusions reached at the special summit meeting
of the Heads of State and Government of the European Community held in Paris last Saturday. I should like to thank President Mitterrand once again for giving us the opportunity to have a detailed exchange of views on current events, which are of interest to us all, and to pave the way for the decisions that now need to be taken, and to do so before — and I want to stress this — before the summit meeting between the Presidents of the USA and the Soviet Union and before the regular European Council meeting to be held here in Strasbourg in a few days’ time, on 8 and 9 December.

We are all witnesses to radical changes in Europe. In the West of Europe the Member States of the Community are actively preparing for the challenge of the 21st century.

The large European internal market, which we together intend to complete on 31 December 1992, will make Western Europe the world’s largest economic area with over 320 million inhabitants.

In addition, we are already making preparations for the further development of the European Community beyond this date, with Political Union as our goal. For the Federal Government this large market is an important, but intermediate stage. What we want is the political unification of Europe.

(Applause)

The steps that must now be taken — giving substance to the social dimension of the internal market so that the many millions of workers and their representatives in the trade unions feel enthusiastic about this Europe not only in their minds but also in their hearts, and taking the decisions needed if there is to be an Economic and Monetary Union — are important milestones on this road. In short, development in the European Community must continue.

At the same time, the political, economic and social systems of more and more countries in the East of our continent are undergoing fundamental change at breathtaking speed. One of the main factors that has triggered this development has been the policy of perestroika initiated by General Secretary Gorbachev. He deserves our respect for this.

(Applause)

I share his view that the success of the reforms in the Soviet Union are of fundamental importance for overall development in Europe. The same is true — and we should not forget this in this debate — of the need for further progress with disarmament and arms control. It is crucial that the negotiations in Vienna succeed.

In Hungary and Poland — and now in the GDR — it has been the people themselves who have cleared the way for radical reforms. The same will be true — we all hope — of Bulgaria and, in the near future, Romania. As everyone knows, the process is already under way in Czechoslovakia. The pictures from Prague arouse in us heart-felt sympathy and hope for the people of Czechoslovakia.

(Applause)

For the first time since the end of the Second World War there is thus legitimate hope that the East-West conflict will be overcome, that there will be lasting stability and freedom for all throughout Europe. I realize, of course, that this is only the beginning of the process, and none of us must underestimate or overlook the risk of failure and the dangers that may entail.

At this time of hope I should also like to warn against ignoring the facts and giving way to visions and illusions, but — and this gives us hope — there is now a genuine prospect of change throughout Europe, a genuine prospect of a peaceful European order, of a Europe of freedom, human rights and self-determination.

It has been the renewed dynamism of the process of European unification in recent years that has given the processes of reform in the countries of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe such strong encouragement. We would therefore be making a bad mistake and completely misjudging the situation if we were to deprive this process of European unification of its momentum at this time of all times.

(Applause)

From many of the talks I have had and from much of the information I receive I know that the aura and appeal of the European Community have the people throughout Europe under its spell. We therefore have a common interest and a joint responsibility in Europe for ensuring that these processes of reform make progress and succeed.

The European Community and all its Member States must play their part in this with wisdom and discernment, with imagination and flexibility and also with willingness to participate in a vigorous, far-sighted programme of cooperation. Let us help together for the simple reason that what is at stake is Europe, our Europe. And Europe — I will say again at this time — happens to be more than the Europe of the Twelve of the European Community. It is not only London, Rome, The Hague, Dublin and Paris that belong to Europe, but Warsaw, Budapest, Prague and Sofia and, of course, Berlin, Leipzig and Dresden as well.

(Applause)

The events in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe in particular make it more than clear to us all how the Single European Act points the way: it tells us to establish a common foreign policy and then to implement it. If we act in solidarity with these countries, we shall be on the right road.

On the other hand, there would be little comprehension in these countries if we failed to make significant progress towards economic and political integration in our European Community. Let all those who have doubts about the position of the Federal Republic of
Germany take note: the Federal German Government stands by the Single Act and its goals in every respect. It is a staunch supporter of the completion of the European Union. We see no alternative to the continuation and strengthening of the process of European unification.

Our position is clear, and no one has the right to question it. Given the history of this century — and only ten years separate us from the beginning of the 21st — we Germans are aware of our special mission and, speaking personally, of our European vocation.

The historic events of the last few weeks and months in Poland, Hungary and recently the GDR and especially Berlin have changed the face of Europe and, with it, the face of Germany.

This was also particularly noticeable during my visit to the People’s Republic of Poland from 9 to 14 November. Our relationship with Poland and the developments in the GDR are very closely linked. If Poland and Hungary — along with the Soviet Union — had not gone ahead with radical political, economic and social reforms, current developments in the GDR would have been impossible.

(Appause)

It is equally true to say that, if the reforms in Poland and Hungary do not succeed, the opportunities for change elsewhere, not least in the GDR, will be at risk. These reforms must not fail. Their success is in the interests of the whole of Europe.

Those who now refuse to have any part of this are betraying Europe and the cause of freedom for all Europeans.

(Appause from the centre)

For this very reason my main message to all Poles was: ‘You are not alone as you go down this difficult road, which will require hard work and sacrifices. You can rely on your friends in the West.’ I should also like to pass this message on to the European Parliament.

(Appause)

Now is the time for European solidarity. We all owe our European neighbours in these countries, where decades of mismanagement have robbed the people of the fruits of their labour, the solidarity they need. I have personally advocated extensive economic and financial aid and an offer of wide-ranging cooperation with Poland. We have also given this careful thought in the Federal Government. We have taken our decision conscious of our national and European responsibility.

With a view to sharing the burden within the western community, we are thus making a substantial contribution to the tasks Europe faces in the future.

During my visit to Warsaw to Warsaw Prime Minister Mazowiecki and I referred to the trade and cooperation agreement recently signed by the Community and Poland as forming an important basis for future cooperation. All the various opportunities this provides must be seized and — again as proof of our solidarity — access for Polish goods to the European market further improved. But we must not content ourselves with this initial success. It is now essential that the European Community approach these countries with an open mind, all the countries that have actually made a start on radical political, economic and social restructuring.

We intend and have a duty to support these reforms with a wide-ranging programme of cooperation and, in this, to join with the appropriate international bodies, like the International Monetary Fund and the Paris Club. We want to give the trade and cooperation agreement more substance and, on this basis, to achieve even closer cooperation in the medium and long term.

As I see it, this is especially true of Hungary. In the often tragic history of our continent there can be no doubt that no two countries have lived in peace and harmony as long as Germany and Hungary. From their long joint history has sprung firm friendship, which has proved its worth in recent times.

I would remind you of the Hungarian Government’s exemplary policy towards minorities, which enables Hungarian Germans to retain their language, culture and traditions in their hereditary home instead of seeking salvation in emigration.

I would also remind the European Parliament of the courageous step taken by Hungary in removing the Iron Curtain, in opening its frontiers, and this not only for its own citizens but for the Germans too.

(Appause)

We all remember the pictures we have seen this summer. They have moved people in Germany and in Europe, and we will not forget them. In the process of political and social reform Hungary and Poland are pressing ahead towards a system of government and a social order based on the principle of liberty like no other country in the Warsaw Pact.

Radical economic reforms have been launched, with a market economy and private initiative as their goals. We can only welcome this. But these reforms require painful adjustment processes in Hungary, and these processes take time. In these difficult times western aid is essential.

For Hungary too this means closer cooperation with the European Community, an early conclusion of the negotiations with the International Monetary Fund and other western bodies and not least bilateral aid from the western partner countries. We have done what we can in this respect: since the autumn of 1987 the Federal Republic of Germany has made over DM 2bn available to Hungary. I would very much welcome it if the other countries of Europe provided Hungary with substantial aid.

Last Sunday Hungary’s Prime Minister, Nemeth, made it very clear to me in a personal conversation that in the next few months in particular it will be essential for this country and, I suspect, for other CMEA countries to
avoid bottlenecks in energy supplies and to remain solvent. What he especially underlined was that western aid must be seen to be very closely linked to the undisturbed continuation of the political reforms in his country.

The spring of 1990 will see the first really free parliamentary elections to be held in Hungary since 1945.

In the build-up to these elections the aim must be to maintain and strengthen the commitment of all citizens to the Hungarian reforms. Last week Hungary applied for full membership of the Council of Europe. We should all give this application our full support.

(Appause)

Let me repeat what I have just said about Poland: the success of this process of reform is in our interests, in the interests of the whole of Europe. I therefore take this opportunity to reiterate the appeal I made at the Elysée Palace last Saturday: let us join together in helping Poland and Hungary, let us join together in helping the countries of Central, Eastern and South-eastern Europe which have initiated genuine political and economic reforms. Let us join together in helping them as they progress towards democracy — at national level, at European level and in the international organizations.

But we are all under an obligation to ensure that the fine words uttered by so many are followed by many good deeds. One thing must be made clear at this juncture: the world economic summit last summer made the Commission responsible for coordinating aid to Poland and Hungary. Let us help the Commission and its President, Jacques Delors, to perform this important task. National egoism is particularly out of place in the present situation.

Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, I therefore appeal to you: go on giving all these political developments the necessary support, along with all the Members of the national parliaments.

People not only in Germany but throughout Europe and the world have been held spellbound by the dramatic events in the GDR. Since the night of 9/10 November the situation in Germany — in the heart of Europe — has changed fundamentally. The yearning of Germans in East Berlin and in the GDR for freedom has resulted in the Wall and the barbed wire being breached peacefully. After almost three decades of division the people of Germany have been celebrating the fact that they can meet again, that they belong together and that they are one nation.

We have been able to witness on our television screens and in person moving scenes of human happiness and joy, fraternity and active compassion. These pictures have made it clear that the Germans who are now at last coming together in a spirit of freedom will never be a threat and are in fact a gain for the unity of Europe.

(Appause)

The events in the GDR are also a factor in this unity. The division of Germany has always been a visible and particularly painful manifestation of the division of Europe. Conversely, Germany will be completely united only if progress is made towards the unification of our old continent. Policy on Germany and policy on Europe are completely inseparable. They are two sides of the same coin.

(Appause)

Like no other city, Berlin, this European metropolis in Germany, has become the symbol of Germany's division and so of Europe's division. The whole world saw the Wall as an inhuman frontier, separating the Europe of freedom and the Europe of dictatorship — and, therefore, people who belong together.

Today we look towards Berlin with hope. We feel joy and satisfaction in the knowledge that the peaceful strength of freedom can overcome frontiers and unite families and friends, compatriots. This is also a sign for the future, because we are banking on this strength in our vision of a peaceful European order. Wherever frontiers can be crossed without hindrance, ideas and opinions can be freely exchanged and people can meet, distrust and enmity are bound to be overcome in the end.

The best guarantee of lasting and secure peace in Europe is and remains the freedom of the people.

This is a conviction that constantly inspired the founding fathers of European unification — Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, Alcide de Gasperi and Konrad Adenauer. They knew what is all too often forgotten today: the construction of United Europe is above all else an act of peace. And it is something we must do together.

(Appause)

The citizens of the free part of our continent — and especially the younger generation — take it for granted today that they can cross frontiers in freedom and make friends. We want this to be taken for granted throughout Europe. Here again, Berlin becomes a symbol — a symbol of hope for a future that unites all Europeans and all Germans in peace and freedom.

In its Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950 the Council of Europe laid the foundations for a joint future of this kind — or, if you like, drew up the absolutely essential house rules for a 'common European house', to introduce this image. The preamble of the Convention refers to the common heritage of intellectual assets, political traditions, respect for freedom and the supremacy of the law'.

That above all is what the Germans in the GDR now want. Happy as we are about the newly gained freedom of movement in the GDR, we must not forget that this is only the beginning. The goal is still a long way off. The people of the GDR now want freedom in every sphere of their lives. They want freedom of speech and inform-
Kohl.

I should like to repeat something I said before the German Bundestag a few days ago: 'If such change is now set in motion as a binding and — of necessity — irreversible process, the Federal Government will be prepared to create a completely new type of aid and cooperation — especially one that is of immediate benefit to the people.'

I discussed this with the Chairman of the GDR's Council of State on the telephone. On my behalf Federal Minister Seitz has had initial discussions on these subjects in East Berlin in the last few days, and I intend to go to the GDR myself soon to have talks with the people in charge there.

It is not only the Germans who have a responsibility to support change in the GDR. It is a task, and I must emphasize this, with a pan-European dimension, because what is now happening will have a very profound effect on overall developments in Europe — to keep to the architectural metaphor: the statics of Europe.

Please accept that we are aware of our special responsibility — in this as in other connections — as a partner of our European friends and our European neighbours. This is a challenge for all Europeans and for the Community too, of course. I see it as an important step that the Commission is shortly to receive a mandate to negotiate a trade agreement between the Community and the GDR and that Commissioner Andriessen will be starting the discussions in early December.

Last Saturday the Community's Heads of State and Government particularly welcomed the developments in Germany. Above all, they expressed admiration for the calm and peaceful way in which the people of the GDR are demanding freedom. They supported the efforts of the people of the GDR to gain freedom. I am very grateful for this attitude and for these statements. We know that we cannot solve our problems alone. Germany's problems can only be solved under a European roof. This is true of us in the Federal Republic of Germany, and it is, of course, true of the Germans in the GDR. What is at stake is their freedom and the freedom of the Poles and the Hungarians and the future of the people in the Soviet Union, the future of the Czechs and Slovaks, the Bulgarians and the Romanians.

What is at stake is the freedom of one Europe. What is at stake is a future in joint freedom for all Germans and for all Europeans. Let us join together in this spirit and work for a just and lasting peaceful order for the whole of Europe. The Federal Republic of Germany is prepared to make its contribution to this major task.

(Loud and sustained applause)

PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Chancellor Kohl.

COT (S). — (FR) Mr President, confronted with the momentous events unfolding before our eyes to the East. What did the President-in-Office of the European Council do? He invited his colleagues to a special meeting in Paris in order to adopt emergency measures,
and now he comes to report to the European Parliament, to the elected representatives of the peoples of the Community. All that is perfectly normal, and yet, what remarkable progress this marks for our democracy in Europe!

President Mitterrand, by setting such a precedent and associating Chancellor Kohl with it, you honour Parliament, but the most important effect of your action is a form of democratic transformation of the European institutions outside the framework of any revision of the Treaties.

(Applause)

Whereas the problem of how the institutions are to be made more democratic is to be considered by the next intergovernmental conference, constitutional practice, if I may put it that way, has just taken a major step forward, thanks to you, and this in order to debate the situation in Eastern Europe.

Is there anyone among us who has not yearned for the winds of change, the winds of freedom which are at last sweeping over Eastern Europe? Is there anyone here who has not longed to see our divided Europe reunited, the Wall of Shame demolished, the cold war consigned to the pages of history? Let us not pretend to be surprised by these developments, for which we had hoped, but which we had also helped to shape. We could not of course have imagined the electrifying turn of events, the pace of these historic changes. But we must shoulder our responsibility as politicians and each of us must now work together and play our part in mastering the forces we Europeans helped to unleash.

We Europeans — let me cite two who have played a special role in bringing the present situation about. Mikhail Gorbachev, by his bold and courageous decision to embark on the policy of perestroika, shook the system to the core. It is his name that the young people invoke as they demonstrate in Prague and Leipzig and Sofia. Just as they did in Tienanmen Square. For all that, the active support he is giving to the changes in the East is not confined to setting an example. It was also he, President Gorbachev, who ordered the Soviet tanks to remain in their camps, a spectacular repudiation of Brezhnev's sinister doctrine of limited sovereignty in order to give democracy its chance.

(Applause)

The other European to whom I wish to pay tribute today is Willy Brandt. The young mayor of Berlin, who saw the Wall erected during his term of office, and who later became Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, laid the foundations of the new edifice through his Ostpolitik. The treaties signed in the 1970s opened the door to trade, offered the first guarantees of security, paved the way for the Helsinki process. The consequences we are witnessing today.

But it is above all the men and the women of Warsaw and Budapest, of Berlin and Prague, who are making history. As the President-in-Office of the European Council said here a month ago, and repeated just now, it is the people who are making their voice heard, it is the determination of the people that is dictating the events that are bringing down walls and frontiers.

Yes, it is the people who are asserting their will to take their destiny in their own hands. It is the people that are setting the seal on the abject failure of totalitarian communism. And what a historic failure of a previously triumphant ideology! What a historic revenge for Léon Blum over Marcel Cachin at the Congress of Tours. How right socialists were when they said "There can be no socialism without freedom: socialism can be achieved only through democracy!"

(Applause)

The peoples of Europe are taking their destiny in their own hands. What is their destiny? No one knows. That is the law of democracy, the law of democratic pluralism. But I wish on behalf of the Socialist Group to salute the rebirth of social democracy in Eastern Europe and say how delighted we are to welcome here in Strasbourg today the young leaders of the new Social-Democratic Party of the German Democratic Republic, headed by their secretary-general, Mr Böhme.

(Applause)

Their movement was born in a small church on 26 August 1989, two centuries to the day after the adoption of that great Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. What a happy omen!

Democracy means self-determination, democracy is the affirmation of the right of people freely to determine their future. In the case of the German Democratic Republic, we socialists say that East Germans must have that free and sovereign right, including the right to become part of a united Germany within a unified Europe.

(Applause)

The decision belongs to them and to no one else. But, some will say, that means destabilizing the European political system! Yes, it does. The problem is not one of stability, it is one of peaceful change. For let there be no doubt that what we are witnessing is a veritable revolution, and it is of the essence of revolution to destabilize, to overturn the old order and replace it with a new one. We must accept that. The challenge will be to accomplish this daunting transformation peacefully, whereas advances on such a scale have previously been achieved only at the cost of blood and tears.

What can we politicians do? In the first place help. Time is short, as we all know. The immediate economic aid agreed at the Paris meeting is vital. Democracy must not result in such a decline in living standards as to engender the worst forms of nostalgia.

Economic and financial aid, we shall be talking about that in the course of the debate. Political support, too, support for the forces of democratic revival, for Mikhail Gorbachev's courageous undertaking. Beyond that, we must strengthen our own structures. As Jacques Delors said a few weeks ago, 'To be generous, you have to be
strong. Only through greater unity can we build political will. A large market displays no will, no generosity. We must rapidly become a genuine Community, strengthen our cohesion, establish Economic and Monetary Union, create a social Europe, make our institutions more democratic.

The Socialist Group believes that it would be fatal to wait, to procrastinate, on the pretext that we must first study the lessons of history.

(Applause)

For to build the Europe that is now emerging will require determination, tenacity and patience. The task ahead is nothing more nor less than to lay the foundations of the new international order, that of the 21st century.

At someone who had previously helped to establish the system produced by the cold war remarked a few days ago, it will take not just a matter of weeks but many years, entailing major adjustments and difficult negotiations. And it will be up to us Europeans to accomplish that task. The two superpowers who are about to meet in Malta can, indeed must, make an indispensable contribution in the field of disarmament, in the establishment of what Olof Palme referred to as common security. But they will not redraw the map of Europe, as they did at Yalta. They no longer have the power to do so. Vietnam and Afghanistan have obliged them to show greater circumspection. Even the economic aid that can be expected of them will be limited. Let us be realistic, there will be no American Marshall Plan for Eastern Europe.

(Applause)

What then is to be done? We must use all the structures at our disposal to strengthen our ties. We must show imagination. The Council of Europe, about to be joined by Hungary, and by others before long, should play a pioneering role. We must find ways of associating the countries of Eastern Europe more closely with the Community. We must look for areas that bring us all together, Europeans that we are. One such area is undoubtedly the environment. It was the clouds spreading from Chernobyl that awoke in many people an awareness of the environment. It became a symbol. We must understand that signal and translate it into political action. As we set up the European Environmental Agency, let us be bold and establish it as a pan-European agency, with its seat — and why not? — in Berlin.

(Applause)

For the rest, we should avoid too many preconceived ideas about the structures of the future. We have to come to terms with the complexities of our time. Enlargement of our Community might be the right answer. I do not know. And I do not want to put forward at this stage ideas that might divide us at a moment when we need to unite.

Happiness is a new concept in Europe. Could it be that this ideal, launched by our ancestors two centuries ago, will at last become a reality? As France and Europe celebrate the bicentenary of the Revolution and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, what a striking manifestation of these ideals, which gladden the hearts of men of liberty!

(Applause)

KLEPSCH (PPE). — (DE) Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, seldom has an event been more worthy of the adjective ‘historic’ than the radical change that has been gathering momentum in Eastern and Central Europe in the past few days and weeks. Recent events in Leipzig, Dresden and Berlin and now in Czechoslovakia can rightly be described as a non-violent revolution. We the elected representatives of 320 million Europeans want to make it clear today how pleased, enthusiastic and shaken we feel about this non-violent revolution in Eastern and Central Europe.

The unrestrained desire for freedom felt by people who have lived under a totalitarian dictatorship for years has won through in the historic situation we are now witnessing.

I quite appreciate that General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, now the Soviet Union’s head of State, triggered off this process when the turned the tide of events in his own country, but we should not forget two other aspects in this context, one being the peace-making power of European unification, which since the Second World War has shown that systems based on the principle of liberty can emerge and cooperate to the benefit of everyone living in the areas in which they apply.

This model — and reference has rightly been made to the founding fathers — has proved so successful and attractive that we have also managed to bring about the downfall of the authoritarian structures in Greece, Spain and Portugal. Today these countries are members of the European Community, which has continued to make an impact, building on the splendid ideas that we have endorsed. Today it is also clear that, with growing opportunities to make comparisons and given the growing problems they face, the people of Central Europe have realized that the way in which we respect human rights, insist on respect for them, foster them and show everyone what they are is the model to which they themselves aspire.

We know that we can say today that the State based on freedom and the rule of law and pluralist democracy are the two elements that the people in Eastern and Central Europe are now eager to achieve for themselves. We are happy about this, and we have a duty to help them on the difficult road they have to take to this end. But I am not forgetting those who have fought and struggled for freedom in Central and Eastern Europe for over 40 years and have had to live in prisons and forced labour camps. Our thoughts go out to them today. They were one of the reasons why this House established the
Sakharov Prize. What we want to say above all else is that we want to see freedom in Central and Eastern Europe now becoming freedom for all, we want to see the prisons emptied once and for all, and we want to see walls and barbed-wire barriers disappearing.

(Applause)

This, ladies and gentlemen, is not a vision. It is a reality that the people want to achieve. Anyone who remembers the Berliners dancing on the Wall, anyone who thinks of the endless line of Trabis, those little cars, anyone who tried to re-establish contact with long lost friends and relations will know what tremendous strength there is behind this desire for freedom.

It is therefore crucial that we Europeans in the European Community clearly appreciate two things: firstly, that we continue to regard the model of an order based on the rule of law and the principles of freedom and democracy, the further development of the European Community as one of the principal tasks of our political work. We therefore expect the summit meeting to produce results.

But, secondly, we also expect this Community to do what is needed at this historic hour and to set about helping the people in this process of development with the commitment of which there is so much talk. I listened to the announcement with considerable interest, and I would like to say that we are grateful for what has already been done. Federal Chancellor Kohl should certainly be thanked for the fact that the Federal Government has acted in exemplary fashion towards all its neighbours.

But now it is our, the European Community's turn, and we should think about the contribution we are going to make. I remind myself that we face the difficulty of finding the US$ 600 million still needed for the US$ 1 billion stabilization fund for Poland. And that we face the question: who is going to provide the money for the bridging loans of, again, US$ 1 billion for Poland and Hungary? And how is the planned European development fund to obtain the capital it needs? Mr Cot has said we do not want to be entirely dependent on American aid. That is undoubtedly a fine sentiment, but we want to make it quite clear that we too can do something. I therefore say to President Mitterrand, Council President Dumas, Federal Chancellor Kohl and President Delors that we can certainly do more than just talk. We have a surplus of over ECU 800 million in the monetary reserve this year. Is this money simply to be returned to the national treasuries under Article 207, even though they were not expecting it, or do we not have here a large sum that we can do something with?

(Applause)

Expenditure from the Guarantee Section of the EAGGF has been well over ECU 1 billion less than expected. The Council now wants to approve the repayment of 1 billion of this, despite the Commission's opposition. I believe we would be putting this money to far better use if we actually financed the measures we are always talking about.

(Applause)

It may not be possible to quote a precise figure. Thanks to the boom in the internal market, we have quite a sum in additional VAT revenues, which are also to be refunded to the Council next year. But why are we saving them and collecting them for the European Community if they are to go back to the national treasuries? The question that surely has to be asked here is this: how is this Community to solve today's major global problems? When we shortly set about drawing up the financial forecasts, the budgets for 1990 to 1992, this will, frankly, be the time for this House and the Council to consider whether we should not together think about drawing up a budget for the future, to plan what we can do together for the continent of Europe, because the Community's policy cannot consist solely of measures that complement national policies. The Community's policy must be so formulated that we are able to solve problems in the world on a global and also a continental scale. When we talk today about how hard the Hungarians, the Poles, the Germans in the GDR, perhaps the Czechs tomorrow, perhaps the people of Bulgaria and Romania in the near future are trying and how much help they need, we are talking about an appeal to us all, to the political forces: we must try to give the forces of freedom emerging in these countries—as Mr Cot has rightly said—our joint support and to help them with their development. And we must ensure that this Community grows together more quickly and more strongly so that it can do what needs to be done if we are to cope with our future together this decade.

Ladies and gentlemen, we Christian Democrats are aware that we have this obligation, and you may rest assured that we will put our money where our mouth is when it comes to helping the people of Eastern and Central Europe in their quest for freedom, so that they may lead lives fit for human beings in the future. That is what we want to see.

(Applause)

GISCARD D'ESTAING (LDR).—(FR) Mr President, today perhaps marks the political birth of the European Parliament, for events mould institutions. At a time when the tide of liberty is bursting all the dykes in Eastern Europe, it is here that the two representatives of the European Council, the President-in-Office and the Head of Government of the country closest to these events, have chosen to explain their views and their proposals to the elected representatives of all the peoples of the Community. We listen to you on behalf of Europe.

The meeting of the European Council was necessary and we congratulate you for having called it, for each of the Community institutions must at all times, but especially when grave events unfold, play its proper part. After listening to your statements on the proceedings, I shall give you this response on behalf of
my group: Yes to faster progress towards union of the
Community; yes to massive Community aid to assist
reform in the countries of Eastern Europe; yes to the
right of all the peoples concerned, including of course
the East Germans, to determine their future freely and
democratically within the framework of the commit-
ments entered into.

But I would add two essential qualifications. Given that
the military alliances do not at the moment threaten
peace, it would be a senseless risk to call into question
our commitments under the Atlantic Treaty or to
encourage others to leave the Warsaw Pact. Let our
twelve countries join together in recognizing the present
frontiers of Europe.

Yes to faster progress towards union of the Community.
This is what we hope for, what we demand. It will be the
task of the forthcoming European Council in Stras-
bourg to take the two necessary decisions, a decision to
set in train the negotiations on the treaty on Economic
and Monetary Union, and a decision on what President
Mitterrand referred to here as the democratic aggi-
ornamento of the Community. Parliament wishes to be
closely associated with these two steps and my group
believes that the objective must be a modern form of
federalism based on subsidiarity.

(Appause)

For a federal Europe will be better able to respond and
adapt to the needs of Eastern Europe.

We want aid to the countries of Eastern Europe to be on
a massive scale, organized at Community level, and
accompanied by technical assistance as a matter of
priority. The President-in-Office of the European
Council has accepted the proposal for a modernization
bank unanimously adopted here on 15 September.
Excellent!

But a word of caution. We have no need of a new
international institution, for we already have the World
Bank and the European Investment Bank. What must be
done is to create banks adapted to the situation of each
of the countries of Eastern Europe, with half the capital
subscribed by the Community institutions and half by
the beneficiary countries. They must be close to the
industries they will have to serve and acquainted with
their needs, in other words they must be established on
the spot. The European Investment Bank is ideally
qualified to coordinate their activities.

You have so far declined, President Mitterrand, to
accept the dimension and the vocabulary of a European
Marshall Plan. The day will come when you are obliged
to do so by the pressure of public opinion and by the
gigantic scale of the needs.

(Appause)

Let us not be faint-hearted in offering our help. Despite
the efforts of the Commission and its President, to
whom I pay tribute, we have a long way to go, even with
our 1990 budget; as Mr Klepsch pointed out, we are still
far short of the sums required.

We have listened very attentively, Chancellor Kohl, to
the new undertakings you have given. We ask you to
implement them without delay. You have appealed to us
for our backing. You have it, for I believe that in this
domain the European Parliament has shown itself to be
in the vanguard rather than lagging behind. And let us
not lose sight of other crucial issues in Europe. We must
also think of the South — in Europe as in the rest of the
world — the developing countries.

(Appause)

The next crisis in Eastern Europe could be an economic
crisis capable of bringing in its wake despair and social
revolution. We must not risk doing too little or acting
too late.

Finally, we join you in asserting the right of all the
peoples of Eastern Europe to choose freely and
democratically their political and social organization
and their form of government. Some will seek closer ties
with our Community. Article 238 of the Treaty of
Rome offers the possibility of negotiating with them
association agreements adapted to individual circum-
stances.

It will be only natural if, after a period of reform, the
East Germans strive for closer political links with their
compatriots in the West, and hence with us. That is their
legitimate right, a right we fully endorse. Let us not close
our eyes, but let us not deny ourselves the right to
reflect.

We have been observing with unbounded joy, these last
few days, the reunion of the German people. One day
we shall have to address the question of the political
relations between the two Germanies and of the return
of Berlin to the status of a free and united city.

In his memoirs Jean Monnet describes the frame of
mind of the German delegates on his Committee for the
United States of Europe in 1962, representing every
political spectrum, some of whom later became Federal
Chancellors.

European integration, that is to say the union of the free
peoples of our continent, was for them the only hope,
and whilst they dreamt, like every German, of the
reunification of their country, they did not see that as an
alternative to the Community. On the contrary, No, it is
not an alternative to the Community. Our response
must be this: The more united and federal the European
Community becomes, the better able it will be, when the
day comes, to meet the wishes of those who seek to join
it or enter into an association with it. It is the European
Community as a whole that must make ready, by
moving forward rapidly, to provide a framework for the
political reunification of the German people. Faster
progress towards the union of Europe is thus the only
way by which we can outstrip the march of history.

(Appause)

PROUT (ED). — Mr President, I would like to
congratulate the President of France on his prompt
initiative in calling last Saturday's European Council
and to say how delighted we are to see Chancellor Kohl here today.

Some 40 years ago the Iron Curtain came crashing down, savagely dividing our continent. Now the subjugated peoples of East Central Europe are repudiating spontaneously and courageously their totalitarian governments. They are entitled to expect a great deal from us and we must not falter in the generosity of our response.

We must do everything in our power to sustain the momentum towards genuine democracy in East Central Europe. But let us be under no illusions about the scale of the task these nations face. Free elections are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a free society. The whole relationship between the State and the individual will have to be recast. Judges must become independent, political parties nurtured, the press freed from shackles of censorship and individuals guaranteed the right to free association; and there will be much more to do besides.

Throughout this phase of social reconstruction the newly elected governments will be under immense pressure from their citizens to satisfy the expectations arising from their new-found freedoms. Above all, living standards will have to improve steadily if the fledgling democracies are to win enduring popular support. In principle, our help should not be given without some conditions on progress towards democracy and human rights. But Hungary and Poland have already made great steps down the road to freedom and it is right that increased aid should be forthcoming without attaching any further conditions. My group is greatly encouraged to hear that the European Council is to make these additional commitments to help these crisis-torn economies.

But if economic reform, based on open market economies, is to be established and to endure our response will have to go beyond financial aid and trade agreements, as the European Council so rightly concluded last Saturday. The nations of East Central Europe will require managerial know-how, scientific and technological knowledge and a host of other schemes to bring their enterprises up to the competitive standards required of world markets. We must respond to these needs with flexibility and imagination in the framework of association agreements and other bilateral arrangements.

But bilateral relations are not our only option. Some problems are better tackled on a multilateral basis. Last month I suggested that the Community open negotiations to conclude an environmental agreement with as many countries in Central and Eastern Europe as are willing to participate. My source of inspiration for this idea was Jean Monnet. We should move ahead in our relations on a functional basis beginning as the European Community did with agreements in areas of clear common interest. The European Community began with the Coal and Steel Treaty. We might equally contemplate a similar kind of agreement for the environment between the Community and the countries of the East.

Mr President, we have heard much recently about the pace of integration within the European Community. I am all for speed as long as it is in the right direction! And I am optimistic that it will be. The Single European Act, as Chancellor Kohl has emphasized today, has pointed us in the right direction, establishing a process of integration through deregulation, removing the powers of national bureaucracies to intervene arbitrarily in the market place and replacing them by a rule of law whose writ runs throughout the European economy, capable of enforcement by the individual citizen in his own courts. The Single European Act is succeeding because it enshrines the doctrine of subsidiarity. Let us make sure that future arrangements to ease the path to our shared goal of economic and monetary union do the same.

Above all, we must ensure that these momentous changes take place within a stable framework of international relations. It has been the steadfastness of the West, and the vision of Mr Gorbachev, which have changed the political climate between East and West. We believe that both NATO and the Warsaw Pact must remain in place as forces of stability and that the United States, to whom Europe owes so much, should continue to participate in the security arrangements of our continent. It is within this framework that we will best be able to build on the achievements of the INF Treaty and the Conference on Security and Cooperation.

(Applause)

FERNEX (V). — (FR) Mr President, the Greens, like all Europeans, were deeply moved as they followed the events which have brought down over the space of a few days whole sections of the walls erected by the cold war. We pay tribute above all to the remarkable victory of non-violence, which has unequivocally proved its superiority over the mighty police and military apparatus deployed in the service of sclerotic political systems. What was badly needed in Eastern Europe was the emergence of an ecological movement. Last weekend we all saw hundreds of thousands of people demonstrating in Bulgaria on behalf of the eco-glasnost movement. The Chernobyl disaster released a ground swell which carried many ecologists first into the People's Congress and subsequently into the Supreme Soviet, prominent among them Yuri Cherbak, the Kiev paediatrician. This ground swell has led to the shutdown of many nuclear power stations, particularly in Armenia, and then to the abandonment of a number of new construction projects.

Again, the writer Ismatov spoke in the Supreme Soviet of the assassination of the Aral Sea, which be described as a crime against humanity.

The President-in-Office of the European Council is truly unlucky, because every time he comes to address the European Parliament he does so the day after a nuclear test. And so it is on this occasion, for yesterday
FERNEUX

France carried out a nuclear test on Mururoa Atoll. At a
time when the Iron Curtain is collapsing, we are
perfectioning in Polynesia instruments of mass extermina-
tion, final solutions for the whole of humanity.
Auschwitzes on a planetary scale. I liked what François
Mitterrand said about a great silence which was in
reality a loud noise. We should listen to the great silence
now to be heard in the South Pacific around Mururoa
and Fangatofa Atolls!

The developments in Eastern Europe underline the
anarchism of the situation inherited from Yalta. It is
time for the former Allies to sign the peace treaty
provided for at Yalta, with both the German Dem-
ocratic Republic and the Federal Republic of
Germany, on the understanding that no frontier will be
called into question. This would imply the immediate
repatriation of the armies of occupation, the Soviet
troops leaving the German Democratic Republic and
the French, British, American and Canadian troops
leaving the Federal Republic. This would considerably
speed up the Vienna negotiations on conventional arms
and the Geneva negotiations on the banning of nuclear
tests and chemical and biological weapons, as well as
the bilateral and multilateral negotiations in progress.

In the present circumstances the Western military
budgets appear utterly anachronistic, nothing less than
a misappropriation of resources that ought to be spent
on meeting real needs. These budgets could this very
day be cut by half without further ado, thus allowing
the debt accumulated by the countries of Eastern Europe
with the West to be written off.

And speaking of the economic situation, the Greens do
not want to see the countries of Eastern Europe
colonized by bankers and rapacious businessmen.
Remember that our wasteful economy, which has
received such eloquent praise in this House, monopo-
lizes 80 % of the world's resources for the benefit of
20 % of the population whilst two-thirds of the human
race remain undernourished and 40 000 children
continue to die of hunger every day.

Together with our friends, in East and West alike, we
shall fight for a Europe of solidarity, justice, fraternity
and democracy, a green Europe.

(Applause)

COLAJANNI (GUE). — (IT) Mr President, Mr Chan-
celler, ladies and gentlemen, I have no need to recall the
vast scale and new nature of events, with which we are
all familiar. Now, Czechoslovakia too — without
which, in the opinion of Mr Gorbachev, no European
Common Home policy could be developed — well,
Czechoslovakia too is on the move.

There is no need for me to express again my
appreciation of the enthusiasm and promptitude with
which President Mitterrand has endeavoured to give
Europe a role commensurate with the present circum-
stances: I already did this on 25 October in a broad,
detailed debate. I do not think that this new visit to the
European Parliament is a purely formal one: a real
debate is expected from us. And the presence of
Chancellor Kohl as well was not intended merely to be
by way of celebration: it is recognised that this is a place
— and Mr Giscard d'Estaing also reminded us of this—
not the only one, of course, not the least important one,
that makes Europe a reference point at this time. And
we have to discuss the new, real problems clearly and
with loyalty.

I am aware — I have to say this — of the sincere
determination on everyone's part to support the process
that is taking place in Eastern Europe, a process that
everyone considers to be just and decisive. We must
certainly go thoroughly into the most difficult ques-
tions; amongst these, there are two problems that must
be tackled clearly — the conditions, as they have been
called, for aid to the Eastern countries and the subject of
the two Germans. In recent weeks concern and
uncertainty has arisen. I appreciate what Chancellor
Kohl has said: it seems to me to be a step forward. But
the two subjects have still to be looked at in detail. We
know that there is not complete agreements on one
essential point, that is to say, whether Europe should
make its aid and cooperation policy dependant, and
what it should be made dependent on. Some believe
that intervention should be massive, in regard not only to the
timing and manner of institutional reforms and
elections but also to the nature of the economic system.
In my view, it is not for us to decide on behalf of the
Poles, the Hungarians, the East Germans and the
Czechoslovaks, all of them people whose countries have
very different economic and political structures and
situations, whether in their countries as well a capitalist
system or some other kind of system should be in force.
We have to take a truly democratic line when we ask
these countries to install a democratic regime. They
must be able to decide using free, democratic pro-
cedures, and this must be our sole concern — for them
to be able to determine, themselves, the ways and the
timing of their democracy and the changes in their
economic and social system. We shall see them
following paths that are quite different, because the
base from which they set out is different. If that were not
so the result would be a protected democracy, crossed
by the incursions of the economic and financial groups
— a new type, that is, of protectorate. I do not believe
that this is what we want. I understand moreover that
this can be consistent with a certain idea that some have
of Europe: a Europe that is united in its market, without
political institutions that have the power to control and
direct.

I would like to emphasize that, since great social
structures are not altered by decree, and since these
changes are complex, and since it is necessary to change
social relationships where production is concerned, if
this was the way action was taken it would be preparing
the ground for real, genuine disasters, for destabi-
лизation itself, and the building of a united Europe
would be pushed further away.

President Mitterrand rightly said that the only condition
to be made was the development of democracy and
respects for human rights, and he added that there could be different forms of democracy — liberal or socialist. We might add that the mixed economy also, towards which the Eastern countries are moving, can contain a quite varied mixture — if I can call it such — of the State-owned and the private sectors, of the individual and the social; we do not know, it is difficult to determine. It would be very serious if Europe, in face of the greatest historical, political and cultural happening of this end-of-century, put petty trade considerations first and failed to grasp the concrete opportunity for a new era, with new roads opening up.

I must add — to talk of still more concrete and also more dramatic things — that next winter is going to be very hard for certain Eastern countries, in particular Poland, which is fighting extremely serious food and energy supply problems; for all of these countries the next few years will be difficult, because the measures for restructuring the economy will have serious social repercussions. For example, they will cause unemployment, estimated at two million unemployed in Poland — such situations, in other words, as might cause social and political back-lash, with the risk of prejudicing the process of renewal and democratization that is taking place. And this is what we have to worry about! And it is for this reason that the sole concern that must guide us in the action to be taken is a concern that the democratization process shall continue. This is the only guarantee that we must ask for and, I believe, it is the only one for which we can ask.

And I should like to add that we emphasize the need for Community aid and action to be run in agreement with the interested countries, and for it to be borne in mind that at this stage only the foundations for the birth of a private sector can be laid, because there are not sufficient private savings in these countries for the factories that are closed to be reopened in private hands.

Community action must take this into account. And that is also why the idea of a bank for the development and modernization of Eastern Europe, that was put forward again here by President Mitterrand, seems to us to be both opportune and valid.

In any case, we have to look to a wider process, a process in which the progressive forces of Eastern Europe and the West — and we can now indeed say 'and Eastern Europe' — must link up and move together in the direction of the progressive disarmament and dismantling of blocs, in the direction of joint security, cooperation and growing economic and cultural integration. And, jointly, they can seek the roads that will lead to a fairer, more closely integrated society than at present, with no other condition than the search for a strong democracy, capable of tackling today's problems. Today we can look towards the objective of a common European home, and this is possible because reforms and democracy in the East are more credible today.

It seems to us that President Mitterrand, the President of the Commission, Mr Delors, the French Government and certain groups in the European Parliament — including our own, the federalist parties and the Socialist Group — have made a clear choice: namely that we must speed up political unity and the integration of the Europe of the Twelve, because with this Europe of the Twelve — as has been said — will gradually be associated, as the pattern of events spreads concentrically onwards, the countries of the East, in a process that is guided and directed democratically.

As part of all this there is another great problem, which is the problem of the German question. Let me say this very specifically, for it is an extremely delicate point — the right to self determination of the German people, like that of any other people, is unquestionable. We must all of us be aware that, in the case of the Germans, they have a history that affects the present. It does not help anyone to disregard this; equally, it is unacceptable to use this as a means of preventing the healing and forgetting of deep wounds.

But the first thing we have to talk about, however, is not reunification. This question, which is decisive for Europe's future, must be tackled along the lines indicated by some people, for example Mr Brandt. Unity does not necessarily mean reunification; the frontiers with Poland are inviolable; the unity of the German people is to be resolved within the sphere of European unity.

I see that these ideas are gaining ground, and that they are being confirmed again here, and this is important. We have to clear the decks of all misunderstandings in this field, because we know that other things, also, have been said, and that there has been pressure in other directions. This is the road! — because what we can and must do today concerns a new type of relationship between the two Germans and between East Germany and Europe. Holding aloft now the image of reunification will block reforms in the East and even raise doubts about the process of European unity.

It would be a historical error if we were now to slow down the building of a political Europe in order to shift our interest into the reunification of the two Germans. Chancellor Kohl gave an undertaking here: we will check this against the facts, first at the December Summit and then at the Intergovernmental Conference and in attitudes actually adopted.

And, finally, there are a whole set of questions that concern the administrative bodies and contacts between the capitalist economy and the planned, State economy. These are all things that require political guidance. In order to guide processes, to solve these problems, to go forward in a fair, effective manner a Europe is needed that can decide with one voice. We must accelerate the processes of political unity.

(Applause)

DE LA MALÈNE (RDE). — (FR) Mr President, in the face of the events in Eastern Europe our initial reaction, our basic reaction, the reaction of us all, is obviously one of joy. Here we have the nations of that part of
DE LA MÄLENE

Europe, subjugated for 50 years by a communist dictatorship, in a movement gathering pace with every week, repudiating the false ideals imposed upon them and forcefully asserting their political and economic freedoms.

Already the results of this great movement are politically tangible in Poland, Hungary and elsewhere. Already the Berlin Wall has started to crumble. Let us not hold back your joy, at the same time acknowledging the calm but firm resolve demonstrated by the people concerned.

Of course it is important to look beyond the media headlines and make an accurate assessment of today's political and economic reality in that part of Europe. Of course we have to remember that, despite the growing irreversibility of this process, it is above all in the hands of Moscow that the future lies. Of course we must not forget for one moment that the Warsaw Pact's military strength is still intact, its weaponry still being built up, and that the contrast between these military certainties and the political uncertainties is an element of instability and consequently a matter of grave concern. It would therefore be premature to lower our guard, whether it be at the economic, political or military level.

Having said that, we have a right and a duty; to consider, as the President-in-Office of the European Council did throughout his address, the adequacy of Western Europe's — indeed the entire West's — response to the question posed by the other nations of our continent through their repeated demonstrations. It must be our prime concern to find the right response to that question. And what has been our response so far? President Mitterrand listed the financial and economic measures: in the short term, humanitarian aid for Poland and other countries; in the medium term, the guarantee of a billion dollars for Poland and Hungary; in the medium term also, other investments, a special European Bank, a training centre. But bear in mind that part of all this is, quite rightly, conditional upon political or economic progress.

We do not underestimate these efforts but feel it necessary to point to the overriding importance of immediate emergency assistance being given virtually unconditionally. It is imperative that the first steps made by these people towards freedom should not be accompanied by an even lower standard of living and even greater misery. Apart from direct financial measures, a growing number of high-level visits and consultations are taking place. Problems are examined, agreements drafted. Summits have been held — the topic of our debate today — others are imminent. For the moment, however, and without wishing to carp, the response has not been such as to make a striking impact on the people affected. This two-pronged political and economic effort on behalf of Eastern Europe is accompanied by repeated affirmations of the need to speed up the unification of the Twelve along traditional lines.

All this is highly commendable. But can we really be sure that these efforts measure up to the circumstances? Can we really be sure that they take sufficient account of all the consequences of these upheavals, some of which are already becoming apparent? Can we, above all, really be sure that on the other side of what used to be the Iron Curtain they will be perceived as an encouraging response to the anguished appeal directed at us? Can we really be sure that this justified strengthening of the Community should not be accompanied, in the event of decisive progress towards democracy, by a generous and open attitude towards the countries of Eastern Europe? That is the crux of the matter. Our response will be at two levels, the external and the internal. At the external level our response is clear, even though it is still not certain. The internal response, however, has still not been formulated, and it is this formulation which could no doubt constitute the message we must address to Eastern Europe.

Chancellor Kohl, President Mitterrand, the world order established by war and ideological conflict is changing. The division of our continent in two, which has survived for over forty years, is beginning to crumble. We are of course all aware that these developments are due to the strength of our ideals, to our democratic structures, to our economic success, in short to what our Community has achieved. But should we today be satisfied with merely setting an example? Should we not go further? Should we not, apart from speaking to governments, address to the peoples the message that they expect to hear from us? If the conditions that we — and indeed everyone else — impose are met, if the reforms are implemented, if the inviolability of frontiers is readily and wholeheartedly accepted, if nations are allowed to decide their own future, then Europe, all of Europe, can aspire to a new order. And it is this new order that ought to be the burden of our message.

We lived through the events of Berlin, Prague and Budapest. The West could do nothing. Today the appeal is heard again, more loudly, on all sides. But now we are so much better placed to respond. We must do so with the conviction, disinterest and boldness demanded of us by the situation, inspired by the joy of which I spoke in my opening remarks.

(Applause)

SCHÖNHUBER (DR). — (DE) Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, Mr Chancellor, I have listened to this debate very carefully, and I must say that I have seldom heard so many empty words. Everyone has talked about the wind of change and ended up talking about business. I know full well — hence the scepticism I want to express here — that not a few Members of this House share the view of the French writer Mauriac, who once said: I love Germany so much that I am glad there are two of them. We Republicans take the view that there can and must be only one Germany. While fully acknowledging the guilt of the criminal National Socialist regime, we say loud and clear: the Federal Republic and the GDR are nothing but dreadful
accidents in German history. We must set about making the necessary repairs after these accidents. In practical terms, this means our goal is a united Germany, and the capital of this united Germany will again be Berlin, not Bonn.

We in this House should not set the shameful example I now see in the Federal Republic, where the tragic and yet joyful situation is being abused for petty electioneering, for eyeing certain opinion polls — who is ahead, who is behind? I am not interested in whether Mr Kohl or Mr Vogel is ahead. All I am interested in is whether the German people are ahead, because it is the German people who speak, not their strange representatives in the political parties.

(Mixed reactions, applause from the Technical Group of the European Right)

Let me say what I have to say. I represent two million electors here, and I will not be shouted down. I will speak until I am finished. I am used to being interrupted in Germany, but I have always said what I have to say, and I shall do the same here. You can be sure of that.

We Republicans say: we do not want any national solo efforts at any price. We know who depends on whom. We also know about sensitivities, which undoubtedly have their roots in history, but we do not intend to leave it to the speed of the Community train to determine when our reunification comes — and we do not even know for sure that the Community train is heading for the reunification that is our goal.

Of one thing you can be certain. Despite all the tactical moves that are noticeable here, despite all the politicians’ statements that can be heard here, the call from the people will be louder — and not only louder than the voices of those people you see today on the French or German television, those intellectuals who were obediently dancing to the Communists’ tune only two years ago. Reunification will be forced through — read the Zürcher Zeitung — by the workers and farmers, who are sick and tired of the opportunists in the GDR, even if they are the favourites of the Socialists. One thing must be clear, and none of this Gorbimania will help at all: Communism is dead. Communism can be neither democratized nor reformed.

We therefore believe that, however much aid we may willingly give, the Communist regime must not be allowed to become stable. I warn against praising Mr Gorbachev. Mr Gorbachev has a past too...  

(Mixed reactions)

... and it is not as noble as people here. Mr Gorbachev was once a KGB man too. Just remember that.

(Mixed reactions, shouts)

Schönhuber is not leaving. He is staying here. We take the view that plain speaking is needed in this Parliament. We must have honesty, not constant grovelling before public opinion or published opinion. That is not the opinion of the people, of that you can be sure.

We are cooperative. We believe we must help everyone, but we call on you too to shed all your distrust of the German people. We are reformed patriots. We know what we have been through, and the most decent patriots are perhaps the ones who do not deny their own history. We republicans believe the same anthem will one day be sung in East and West: unity and justice and freedom for the German fatherland.

EPHREMIDIS (CG). — (GR) Mr President, you spoke of this sitting as being historic, and it seems also to have been celebratory. That is confirmed by the presence of President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl. There has been talk of the historic and revolutionary changes taking place in the socialist states. We wish to point out that these changes are a natural historic development. The driving forces behind them are the social forces in those countries, the popular masses with the participation and cooperation of the organized political powers, even of the governments themselves. Indeed, in some cases the governments are in the forefront, as with perestroika and glasnost in the Soviet Union. In the light off these facts we are right to celebrate. To celebrate the toppling of the Berlin wall, that symbol of the cold war and of Europe’s division. However, Mr President, if this celebration is to be justified, we should note the need for many kinds of wall to be toppled also from the other side, the West. Walls which foster mistrust, restrictions upon our economic, political and cultural relations with that area which makes up over half of Europe. Those walls must be knocked down too if we are to say that celebrations are in order. Walls must also be knocked down inside the Community itself. Those which bar 17 million unemployed within the European Community from the joy of creative work. We must topple the walls that separate off the 40 million Europeans who live below the hunger level, so that they too, when those walls fall, can live a decent life. We must knock down the wall which separates the Community’s developed regions and countries from the less developed ones. And more still, the Community has responsibilities and must help to topple a wall that divides the Palestinian people, and here I want to point especially to the lyricism with which Chancellor Kohl spoke of the German people’s right to self-determination. There is a wall separating the Palestinian people from its right to self-determination, from having its own homeland, its own State. The Community also shares responsibility for another wall, that which separates the people of Cyprus. It is the divisive wall imposed by the occupying army on the island of Cyprus.

Mr President, if we draw attention to all this, it is not to be different or contentious in this House. Our aim is to find common ground, and that is the intention of what we are saying. In truth, we must help those countries, but let us be careful not to justify the ancient Greek quotation ‘Beware of Greeks even when bearing gifts’. If the help has ulterior motives, with attempts at indirect of direct intervention to divert the changes along other courses, then you will impede those changes, you will bear responsibility and you will give the remnants of the
cold war, and there are residues of Nazism even in here, the right to exploit the opportunity and to reverse the changes from which we all expect that an infrastructure will be built for an all-European home for all Europe's peoples, in a Europe marked by peace and creative cooperation.

PIERMONT (ARC). — (DE) Mr Mitterrand, Mr Kohl, the special summit laboured and brought forth a mouse. Not a word that, now the future of the Eastern Bloc, the Warsaw Pact is in doubt, NATO belongs on the rubbish heap of history. On the contrary: The developments in Eastern Europe are seen as a reason for stepping up efforts to turn the European Community, Western Europe's bloc, into an economic, political and military superpower. Not a word about comprehensive disarmament, especially the dismantling of all nuclear weapons, including the French. Not a word about the time having at last come for all foreign troops stationed in the Federal Republic, the GDR and Berlin to be withdrawn.

Mr Mitterrand, youpresumed to say to the Bundestag in 1983: 'Les fusées sont à l'est; les pacifistes sont à l'ouest.' Even at that time these words lacked geographical far-sightedness. Now at least even you must admit that you were also politically short-sighted. Those who have drifted into obscurity are quite different from those whom you have always accused of being short-sighted.

In the end, the Twelve chose the coward's way out and declared the subject which politicians, particularly in the Federal Republic — in other words, you, Mr Kohl, and the members of your party — have been shouting about for months and which has revived the nationally coloured atmosphere of the cold war in the Federal Republic to be non-existent, not to be on the agenda, instead of nailing their colours to the mast. I am talking about what is known as reunification. But plain language is needed, because, firstly, 74% of the population of the GDR — as initial opinion polls show — want a reformed GDR, not an extension of the Federal Republic to the Polish border dressed up as 'reunification'.

Secondly, a reunified Germany is inconsistent with the history of Germany, which, apart from one 74-year period, has never had a central government. We do not feel the need to form a single State with the German-speaking part of Switzerland simply because German is spoken there. Exactly the same applies to the GDR as long as its people can decide how they want to live and have normal friendly relations with us.

Thirdly, the united Germany that emerged from a war with France has already provoked two world wars over supremacy in Europe and invaded Europe with the genocide of the Nazi regime. The so-called German Reich within the 1937 boundaries has therefore lost any right to exist or to exist again.

Fourthly, under international law it ceased to exist with the unconditional capitulation of 8 May 1945, which was the same as liberation from National Socialism. What is known as the German question has not been open since then. Instead, two new sovereign German States have emerged in the last 40 years, not an 'accident' but a logical consequence of German history.

Another part of the former Reich is now the west of Poland, with the Oder-Neisse line as its western boundary. And that is how it must stay.

Fifty, merging the world's largest exporter, the Federal Republic, and Eastern Europe's strongest economic power, the GDR, would produce a concentrated economic and military power in the middle of Europe with a population of 80 million, a threat to Europe as a potential hegemonic power, explosive in the eyes of the more and more downtrodden countries of the Third World.

Instead of clear statements on this, what we see is a carrot-and-stick timetable. Free and secret elections are the conditio sine qua non of any economic aid to those willing to adjust to the ways of the 'free West', a European Bank that pays out rewards in coin of the realm. In due course, the absorption of the GDR and Eastern Europe into the economic superpower that is the European Community can then be discussed.

Trained by Community programmes and lured by the western consumer paradise, the people will then, of course, opt for the right — or what the West considers right — kind of self-determination' — self-determination that is denied the last European colonies. With a new order such as this in the European house the situation will be the same as it is with nuclear power. To that I say: 'No, thank you.'

(Appause from the Rainbow Group)

RAUTI (NI). — (IT) Mr President, Mr Chancellor, I think that, in substance, it all turns on this question: what to do and how to help in practice, and in the best way possible, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe?

We in the Movimento Sociale Italiano find it surprising that so far no mention has been made in any of the speeches of the problem of the indebtedness with which these countries appear once again on the European scene.

Now this state is not the fault of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The fault is the fault of the collectivist system. But if this is true — and it is true — whilst these peoples turn to Europe, whilst they are attempting to get away from collectivism and communism, we have a primary duty to them — the commitment to which Chancellor Kohl referred earlier, namely, the commitment to help them with all our strength.

This is the point from which we must depart, because it is not right to make those people pay the cost of the economic failure of Marxism, the indebtedness — past and present — of the communist regimes. Carrying this line of reasoning further, we intend to put forward a proposal to all the Groups in this Assembly, a proposal
that we put also to Chancellor Kohl and President Delors. The Community must write off, cancel, the indebtedness of the Eastern European countries, starting with Hungary, Poland and East Germany.

What does this mean — writing off indebtedness? There are many roads available, and undoubtedly the experts and the specialists will be able to find them. The Community, in our view, should first of all take on responsibility for the payment of interest, especially that which falls due in 1990, '91 and '92; then, it should make itself responsible for the entire debt, staggering the payments over a ten-year period. It was calculated in Paris that every citizen of the EEC would have to assume responsibility for an amount ranging between 25 000 and 30 000 lire. In order to implement this proposal, which is of such enormous social and moral importance.

In our view we are getting off on the wrong foot, because in the entire framework that was drawn up at the Paris meeting, and in all that we have heard here, it seems that the European Investment Bank must completely ignore this tragedy of the indebtedness. This means we are asking the Eastern countries to take a kind of a leap into what for them is a new economic system, taking with them the dead weight — which could be fatal — of indebtedness. As a Member of this Parliament who follows, in the competent committee, the problems of the Third World, we are now talking about the same mechanism that did not succeed in functioning for the Third World countries which, in fact, weighed down with indebtedness, are permanently, continuously isolated from one year to the next ...

DELOORS, President of the Commission. — (FR) Mr President, in this exceptional debate which we, the members of the Commission, have the privilege of attending, the floor belongs first and foremost to you, the Members of the European Parliament, the directly elected representatives of the people and the expression of their will, and it is right that it should be so.

We have also had the chance to hear, barely four days after an informal meeting of the Community Heads of State or Government, the President-in-Office of the European Council, François Mitterrand, confirming that the Twelve were politically united and setting out the additional measures that were being taken as a matter of urgency. We have also had the good fortune to hear Chancellor Kohl reaffirming the Federal Republic's faith in and commitment to our Europe, our Community. President Giscard d'Estaing put it well when he spoke of the political birth of your Parliament. It is a major leap forward, and the momentum must now be maintained.

(Applause)

I should just briefly like to tell you that the members of the Commission share your sentiments, that they are ready to lend strength to your action and help you to turn your hopes in the future into reality.

In the first place, we share your sentiments. The words recurring time and again have been emotion and joy. I would add, if I may, solidarity, which must find expression in our hearts, solidarity towards our German friends on both sides of this Iron Curtain now in the process of melting away.

(Applause)

Our thoughts are especially with them. When a family member experiences joy or hope, then all the other members of the family should share that joy and that hope.

I would also say that, for a militant European such as myself, for militant Europeans such as the members of the Commission, I do not believe that any of us can recall a decision so important in the area of foreign policy cooperation as the political position adopted last Saturday. I hope that we shall be able to learn our lesson from it and ensure that political cooperation, in other words foreign policy cooperation, moves forward at the same pace as economic integration.

As everyone here has been quick to emphasize, the Community has for many years acted as a centre of gravity, a yardstick for freedom and for prosperity, and no doubt this has played a certain role in the events which the peoples of Eastern Europe have triggered.

That is why we are very optimistic. But at the same time, as some of you have pointed out in this debate — which has been of the highest quality, apart from one exception — we must be on our guard. We want also to lend strength to your action. You know that the Commission — Vice-President Andriessen will reply to your questions on this point — has been instructed to coordinate aid to Hungary and Poland, and soon I hope other countries. You are familiar with the principal items: food aid, modernization of production structures, training, modernization of employment policies — for these countries have no experience of what a labour market involves — and, finally, joint measures in the field of the environment.

I will tell you very frankly, what we need is more resources, more coordination, more rapid implementation. That is the view I have formed after my recent trip to Poland and Hungary, and I do not think that the President-in-Office of the Council, Mr Dumas, who accompanied me, will have come to a different conclusion. When I speak of more rapid implementation, I have in mind the monetary and financial aspects which we shall have to tackle, not alone, but in cooperation with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. If there is urgency, it is certainly in this domain. A country that has run out of money or that rejects its currency is no longer capable of creating the foundations of a sound economy. I was therefore happy that the European Council should have declared its willingness, something I believe to be unprecedented in the history of our international organizations, to indicate to the International Monetary Fund that it was necessary and possible to decide quickly. When I was a junior employee with the Banque de France, the
governor would tell me: 'You might as well do everything in a day as in a week'. I believe that this precept still holds good today.

(Applause)

We wish to join you in turning into reality the hopes you have expressed today. To that end we must strengthen the Community, make it more dynamic, speed up its integration and sketch out already now the architecture of greater Europe.

First, then, strengthen the Community. Nothing must divert us from implementing the Single Act and the large internal market, all aspects of the Single Act, including its social dimension.

If we fail to implement the decision we have taken we shall be incapable of making progress beyond 1992.

We must go on to make the Community more dynamic above all, in my view, in regard to foreign policy cooperation. A good start was made last Saturday, and we must continue along that road so that, wherever Europe's responsibilities are brought into play, it can take an active part in the decisions and be able to show its generosity.

We must speed up European integration and, with circumstances as they are, I am confident that the European Council meeting in Strasbourg next month will take the only decision that will confirm our determination to move beyond the Single Act and commit ourselves fully to political integration.

To achieve all that, we shall need more resources.

(Applause)

I wanted to say that here, as you consider the 1990 budget. You will recall that in February 1988, after deciding on the great objective of the single market by 1992, after ratifying the Single Act, you adopted, under the German Presidency and with the notable support of Chancellor Kohl, the political and financial measures required to bring forward our common policies and demonstrate our solidarity within the Community.

I ask you, in the two years ahead, to take the same political and financial decisions so as to enable us to demonstrate our solidarity outside the Community, not only with the other European countries, but also with the countries of the Mediterranean, the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific.

(Applause)

Finally, we must sketch out the architecture of greater Europe. In 1985 it was necessity that led Europe to awake, for we had to decide between survival and decline. We opted for survival. Today, in 1989, it is necessity again, but also ideals, the ideals of freedom and democracy. We must from this moment on map out the design of this greater Europe, not by arresting the construction of the Europe of Twelve, but by showing the imagination and coming forward with the novel ideas required to build this greater Europe.

It is said that luck can sometimes help, but that courage does so always. The peoples of Eastern and Central Europe have offered us the opportunity. It is we who must display the courage. My hope is that we shall display great courage.

(Applause)

PRESIDENT. — Thank you, President Delors.

I have received six motions for resolutions with a request for an early vote to wind up the debate on Central and Eastern Europe. 1

The vote on the request for an early debate will take place at the end of the debate.

WALTER (S). — (DE) Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, I will begin with a sincere word of thanks to the President of the Commission for his very personal words on the situation in Germany.

(Applause)

In his inimitable fashion he has highlighted a previous contribution to the debate this evening. Let me therefore say this: what we are witnessing in Germany today is not an accident, but the result of a war which the Germans started, and we must never forget that.

(Applause)

I wish the Commission President's words could be heard by the Council because, whatever can and must be praised in connection with the meeting in Paris, it must surely be said that so far the Community has shown far less courage in reacting to the new situation in Eastern Europe than the people who are demonstrating on Wenceslas Square in Prague and elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

(Applause)

Much of what has been said here today calls for a great deal more. I feel we should take the President of the Commission at his word. We must get down to developing the European Community, which coalesces the hopes of the people in a political vision for the whole of Europe, a vision in which Germans too will be able to exercise their right of self-determination. I am talking about a European Community which, of course, steps up its own integration, as has been said several times, and there is nothing I can add to that. I am talking about a European Community that not only provides emergency aid but is also prepared for wide-ranging economic, ecological, scientific cooperation between East and West, perhaps along the lines of a comprehensive development plan for Eastern Europe's economic and social renewal. Details of a plan of this kind have already been referred to by Mr Giscard d'Estaing and Mr Klepsch in terms which I think we can approve.

I say this again because aid and support can also be delayed until the self-determination of the people in the

1 See Minutes.
countries where things are happening no longer has an economic and political chance.

*Applause from the left*

Chancellor Kohl said that those who refuse to have any part of this are betraying Europe. This is true of Poland, this is true of Hungary, this is true of other Eastern European countries, but it is particularly true of the GDR.

In the light of the debate that is taking place in some parts of the European Community and at home too, I say quite deliberately: anyone who lets the GDR go bankrupt will provoke unforeseeable developments in the middle of Europe, which none of us can want in this form.

*Applause from the left*

The open frontier between the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR reminds us that there is a fundamental difference between the GDR on the one hand and Poland and Hungary on the other. We must, of course, discuss the conditions under which help is provided. I can understand all that. But what I cannot understand is that some people are giving the impression that aid is being made dependent on the other side — let me put it that way — accepting our social system down to the last detail. That would not be the self-determination that people in Eastern Europe are taking to the streets for. That would be the kind of patronage that the people in Eastern Europe have been sick and tired of for ages, and we should beware of adopting any such attitude.

*Applause*

I am talking — as the President of the Commission was — about a European Community which tackles Europe as a whole institutionally, which cooperates with EFTA as closely as possible, which brings about pan-European institutions and agreements. Let me remind you of the European environmental agency and Willy Brandt's European disarmament agency. Everything is conceivable.

But at some time or other the Community itself will have to cross the border with Eastern Europe. The next goal should be the association of the reformed countries of Eastern Europe with the European Community if that is what they want. The same goes for the GDR.

Some people may wonder how one European Community is to manage all this, how it will look in the future. I can only say that change is in the offing, not only in thinking in Eastern Europe but also in thinking in Western Europe. Sometimes it helps to take a look at the documents that the European Parliament has approved. Take, for example, the draft treaty on constitutional reform, which was approved by the European Parliament and is now in danger of being laid to rest in a first-class funeral arranged by the parliaments of our Member States.

The Community we are talking about — and I take up what Mr Giscard d'Estaing has said — must now establish the political and institutional framework which will guarantee that the national flag cannot be played off against Europe anywhere, nor yet the question of the future unity of the Germans. By this I mean that the Community must now extend the European roof beyond the Community. Under this roof the Germans in the GDR and the Germans in the Federal Republic of Germany can then decide how they want to live in the future, in one house or two, with the connecting doors between them open to a greater or lesser degree.

I know there is a great deal of anxiety, in this Parliament as elsewhere, about so-called reunification. Let me therefore say once again very clearly: there can and will be no reunification of Germany within the 1937 boundaries. Poland as it is now has a right to live securely within its present boundaries.

*Applause from the left*

Poland's western boundary must therefore be recognized, with no ifs or buts. This is also a contribution to reform in a stable Eastern Europe.

The question about the future of the two German States, on the other hand, is open. No one, or at least no one who carries any weight, has it on the agenda for political debate in Germany at the moment. But nor can anyone — and I say this to Mrs Piermont — guide the feelings of the people with decisions taken by parliaments and party conferences. That is something we have learnt in recent days, weeks and months in Europe.

*Applause*

No one can seriously deny the people of the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany the right to decide about the future of their countries themselves. If there is such a debate and decision, no one knows how it will turn out. But everyone would have to respect the decision taken. We must all join in ensuring that the future of the two German States and the future unity of Europe remain closely associated.

Mr Giscard d'Estaing put it another way: the sooner the Community begins the construction of Europe as a whole, in which the various conceivable answers to the German question have their place, the sooner we can and will make fears about Germany going its own, separate way superfluous. This too is an aspect of pan-European conceptual works we have to face.

Whatever we say about the developments in Eastern Europe, we should try to steer clear of the self-righteousness that occasionally holds up western society as the 'promised land' — as if we had no problems. As if we had no unemployed, no homeless people, no poverty-stricken regions where people live under depressing conditions.

Of course, the countries of Eastern Europe need reforms. Of course, the GDR needs drastic political reforms — God knows it does — but we need social reforms in the European Community too. The dictator-
ship of ‘might is right’ in the West is no substitute for the dictatorship of one party in the East.

(Applause from the left)

Perhaps the people who are demonstrating in Eastern Europe have set standards for democracy that we should also apply in Western Europe. We cannot rejoice at the success of Solidarity in Poland while the Council of the European Community is blocking an effective social charter for the workers here.

(Applause from the left)

It would be ignominious for the European Community if the parliaments of the Easter European countries beat the European Parliament to it in gaining the rights which it has been fighting for for a long time and which it is still denied. Here too, there is still a great deal to be learnt.

(Sustained applause)

IN THE CHAIR: MRS FONTAINE
Vice-President

GORIA (PPE). — (IT) Madam President, ladies and gentlemen, what is happening in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe constitutes a process of an extraordinarily new kind. It is something that the European Parliament’s Committee on Political Affairs, of which I have the honour to be Chairman, has considered very carefully, with great commitment and solidarity, and will continue to do so. This process offers the European Community an outstanding opportunity to confirm its leading role in the construction of peace and world development, and it offers all of us an incredibly important opportunity to show the superiority of our political and economic systems over those of the Communist world.

To achieve those objectives, however, we have to understand the role that we are called today to play, and we have to exercise it with intelligence and determination. Strengthening the process of unification of the European Community is the first and fundamental condition that will enable us to continue setting an example and providing stimulus, to which action much of the results that are today before our eyes can be attributed. We must beware, lest, in our emotion and confusion, we were to lose sight of the objectives of internal cohesion that alone have allowed us, and will still allow us, to guarantee peace and development for us and for everyone.

Careful, firm support for the processes of democratization that have already begun is the second and equally fundamental condition that will enable us properly to fulfil our part at this exciting time in the history of the world.

It is very important to try to find, in collaboration with the other democratic industrialized countries, as general policy regarding the ways in which a possible change-over from a State-run economy to a market-oriented economy could be achieved. It will be equally important to make this political evolution towards freedom in the Central and Eastern European countries coincide with a perceptible improvement in the standard of living of the people, so as to avoid any summary, adverse popular view of the new political prospects. For those countries that we have to support in their efforts towards reform, substantial aid is therefore necessary — food and the other necessities of life — and this aid must go on until their own productive structure is sufficiently strengthened. With this in view it is at all events essential to provide for a massive transfer to those countries of machinery and appropriate technology, so as significantly to improve their means of production. It is equally important to make a great effort in terms of training and producing administrative and technical managerial staff, just as it is urgent to arrange for a strong system of insurance against political risks for private investments in Central and Eastern European countries.

Such a many-faceted and important initiative would however not be sufficient to consolidate peace and development if it were not accompanied by a number of highly significant commitments, particularly of a political nature. We must commit ourselves solemnly and with great conviction not to place any question marks over the commitments entered into within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, but should rather develop its political role alongside the military one. We must commit ourselves solemnly and with great conviction to respecting the present frontiers in Europe, without questioning them. We must commit ourselves solemnly and with great conviction to not reducing our support for the Third World, in the light of the new needs that have arisen; indeed, we have to make every effort to make that support greater, more effective and more intelligent. It is possible, but only if progress is made — and this is another absolute priority — with the process of disarmament and thus the reallocation to international cooperation of a large part of the enormous resources that are today expended on armaments.

With regard to the process that has begun in East Germany, I have left this to last, but only so as to be able to reserve for this question all of the attention that it deserves. I was 18 years of age when the Berlin Wall was built. It fixed itself in my imagination, and in the imagination of many young people at that time, as a symbol of everything that is opposed to freedom. This image has stayed with us until now, casting a shadow over the happiness that we felt in our freedom. Now, hope is reborn: our freedom can be enjoyed without having that shadow over it any longer. But we must not be timid — frightened almost — by what we never dared to hope for. We must also be intelligent in deciding our attitudes. Not being timid and being intelligent today means that we have today to stress forcefully and clearly the need at the earliest possible date for free elections in East Germany, and the fact that
these can only precede by a short period of time the exercise of the right of self determination, which we hope will be exercised for German reunification, and thus for the full accession of the East Germans to the European Community. Anyone with any objections can make them. If the reasons of heart and mind that impel us to express such a hope were to seem to us to be too imprudent, there are also the reasons of politics, which has almost never any heart and often not even a mind. It would be disastrous if our indifference were seen as hostility or even simply ambiguity, where reunification is concerned. In Germany, in today's two Germanies, there would explode again a nationalism that is out of place and out of date, that could only slow down—not to say weaken—the process of building a united Europe. That is all I have to say.

VON WECHMAR (LDR).—(DE) Madam President, ladies and gentlemen, I have three minutes of speaking time, and you will therefore forgive me if I consider only one aspect in these three minutes. The events in the GDR, in West Berlin and along the former Iron Curtain have created a situation which now makes the hitherto inconceivable seem conceivable. Forty years of division have not made two German nations out of one. The Germans in the GDR, like the Hungarians and Poles before them, have written a new chapter in the history of European freedom in the last few days and weeks. The leaders of the GDR have now been called upon to prepare the way for early general, equal and free elections by allowing new political parties and by withdrawing the SED's sole right to govern the country. The Wall is no longer a frontier but a monument to times past.

The process of reform in Central and Eastern Europe would not be conceivable—and we can be proud of this—without the exemplary and steady advance of integration in the European Community. The steadfastness of the West, the constancy of our policy in overcoming the East-West conflict have borne fruit. The dynamic integration of Western Europe and the dramatic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe are not opposites. On the contrary, they are drawing divided Europe together. For us Liberals this means staying on course with the policy of European unification, staying on course in the alliance with the USA and also staying on course in a broadly based policy of dialogue and cooperation with the East.

The European Community faces a great challenge, and we must react credibly and thoughtfully, but also with imagination and flexibility. We want to help Central and Eastern Europe—and we Germans, of course, particularly want to help the people of the GDR—but without giving patronizing advice. Mr Walter has just referred to this in another context. The citizens of the GDR must decide for themselves under what economic and social system they want to live, and they must also decide what relationship they want with their neighbours and the Federal Republic of Germany. This will also include the question of German unity. Overcoming the division of Europe also means ending the division of Germany, and I believe the more European a German policy is, the more national it is.

(Applause)

PRESIDENT.—Let me explain why I intend to be particularly strict. We still have 24 people down to speak which means that if everyone sticks to their speaking time, as Mr Wechmar just did, we will finish this debate towards 9.30 p.m. This means that if speaking time is not respected, we are likely to take all night.

JEPSLEN (ED).—(DA) Madam President, we have seen the collapse of the Wall, the introduction of pluralist systems and the return to free elections and freedom of the press. In short, the restoration of a series of basic democratic rights is under way in a number of East European countries. And we are entitled to hope that others which today are still under the yoke of rigid totalitarian regimes will soon follow suit and yield to their people's legitimate demands for freedom and democracy.

The revolutionary developments we are witnessing are an unbelievably important and encouraging signal seen in relation to our common efforts to break down distrust and promote détente between East and West. Time and again we in the West have pressed for the introduction of democracy and respect for human rights in the East in the knowledge that the distrust that has now reigns for decades between the two sides of our divided Europe would persist until an open dialogue was established between democratically elected governments. There is now a real prospect of this essential condition for détente, peace and freedom throughout Europe being fulfilled. However, we West Europeans are now clearly under an obligation to help our East European neighbours. The economic assistance we can offer and the cooperation we can establish with Eastern Europe will serve a twofold purpose. We shall be stretching out a helping hand to countries plunged into economic crisis by decades of disastrous planned economy, and at the same time we shall be giving tangible proof of Western Europe's commitment to peace, disarmament and the creation of political, economic and social stability.

In conclusion, I just wish to point out that all these years of cooperation between the Community countries have not only helped to increase economic growth and prosperity in Western Europe, but have also safeguarded us against war and political tension among the Member States. In the same spirit, we must now be ready to cooperate with the countries of Eastern Europe as they move towards democracy. The natural consequence will be disarmament and a secure peace in our part of the world.

GRAEFZU BARINGDORF (V).—(DE) Madam President, ladies and gentlemen, we too are shedding no tears for the system of so-called real socialism or for the
rulers and their insane claim to represent the objective interests of the people and the nations on behalf of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The historical penalty has been decided and has been executed by the grass-roots democratic movements and the people themselves. We also believe that the central planning of an economy of State capitalism has failed economically and ecologically under this so-called real socialism. To this extent there is agreement on the assessment of the situation. But what conclusions do we draw from these developments, this non-violent democratic revolution in the GDR and the Eastern European countries? There is no cause for gloating, nor do we have any cause for praising ourselves to the skies. We have to realize that these developments were not triggered off by those in the West who make such claims but by an independent force of the people and nations themselves, and we congratulate the people of Eastern Europe and the GDR on this historic achievement.

(Applause)

If anyone deserves recognition, then it is Gorbachev because of the developments in the USSR, not because he has left the tanks at the barracks, but because he was first to break with the logic of maintaining peace with deterrence and more and more weapons and because he has dared to think along different lines and to opt for a different course.

Chancellor Kohl said just now that we wants a united Germany in a united Europe, which will then serve peace in the world. We would point out that twice so far the world has been inflicted with war and destruction by a united Germany, and if this is never to happen again, where are the proposals from the Federal Government that take account of this new situation? Where are the disarmament plans, where the immediate cessation of the arms build-up? While Mr Walter does not want Germany going its own, separate way, I think it would be right if it went its own, separate way by demilitarizing. Let us have no more 90 fighters and instead make the 100 billion available to the GDR and Eastern Europe. In view of the peace movement in Europe, I call on the Federal Government to initiate demilitarization in the Federal Republic. The threat that once justified these things no longer exists. And call for the demilitarization of the GDR and the disbanding of the military blocs and so give the two German States the historic chance to have a fundamental peaceful order spread throughout Europe from German soil.

(Applause)

What lessons is the European Community learning from this? The summit in Paris did not produce a great deal. A bank is to be set up and managers are to be trained. They did not think of much else. I feel that, if the aid is going to be no different from the so-called development aid to the Third World countries, which are now making net capital transfers to us, Eastern Europe will be badly off. Its economy will be in danger of being sold out, and that may lead to the final division of Poland. We welcome free elections in the Eastern European countries but — as Mr Walter has already said — if we are going to talk about free parliaments, we should take a close look at the development of our own.

If our economic system is to be held up as an example, we should also consider the destructive effects our capitalist economic system is having on the ecology and society. I will not list them now. The Federal Chancellor wants reality. He knows what it is, and if the Federal Chancellor sides with the grass-roots movement today, I too must call him an opportunist because these movements are anathema to him in our own society. I therefore call not only for measures to promote economic development in Eastern Europe — that is risky if we are urging an acceleration of the internal market here — but also for an immediate review of our economic and social system. Modesty will be needed in this context if we are not to endanger the social and ecological achievements of these incipient movements at some time or other.

(Applause from the Green Group)

PAPAYANNAKIS (GUE). — (GR) Madam President, the popular movements in Eastern Europe, which are dismantling the existing socialism, are movements of vast size, profoundly democratic, of the masses, peaceful, and they correspond to what I feel as a Greek and a socialista about political change.

Madam President, they are movements which challenge us and raise questions which transcend the political contrasts between East and West as we knew them, and we must find answers which also transcend them and apply at an all-European level. We must pay due respect to the democratically expressed will and to the democratic process itself. Especially now that those movements will develop the social and political contrasts which we ourselves also know, and which will certainly never die away. We owe them an answer on the inviolability of their frontier. Territorial claims are suited only to primitive hordes, Madam President. We also owe them assistance free from political motivations and wheeling and dealing, and we owe them solidarity towards the rest of Europe, Madam President, towards Yugoslavia which pioneered the reforms, towards Rumania, which is under the nationalistic and supposedly socialist totalitarianism of the Ceausescu family. And, Madam President, we owe it to them to bring about changes of our own in relation to human rights, the environment, and our social development. Only then will we deserve their love and their solidarity.

DILLEN (DR). — (NL) Madam President, everyone is undoubtedly pleased to see the breaches that have been made in the Berlin Wall and particularly delighted for the Germans of the GDR. But pleasure must be accompanied by caution, delight with vigilance. Pleasure must not be accompanied by gullibility, delight by naivety. We can help the Poles, Hungarians, Balts, the Germans of the GDR and elsewhere, but not by giving unconditionally. If we do, we shall once again be in danger of falling into the open trap of Communist
convulsions. Because bankrupt though Communism may be, it is not dead yet. So we can only help, and help appropriately and effectively, if free Europe gives not unconditionally but with clear conditions attached, based on its own strength. The main condition must then be self-determination, self-determination for all nations enslaved by the Gulag Archipelago, self-determination for the Balts, self-determination for the Germans of the GDR and elsewhere. I underline my solidarity with Mr Schönhuber in this respect. There must be no more of the sentiment echoed by the slogan *um deutschen Wesen soll die Welt genesen* and any French equivalent. There must be no more national egotism or imperialism and no more national whinging or undignified begging. Europe is more than the EEC. In this larger Europe there is a place for a united Germany. In fact, a united Germany is a prerequisite for a larger Europe just as a larger Europe is a prerequisite for German reunification.

Finally, as a representative of a small, numerically small people I cannot celebrate until the three Baltic nations have regained their independence.

DE ROSSA (CG). — Madam President, on behalf of the Workers' Party of Ireland and the Left Unity Group I want to welcome the profound and democratic changes that are taking place in the GDR and in Eastern Europe generally. These developments are reminders to us that democracy is a constantly developing process on which no one can or should attempt to set limits.

These reminders are as necessary, even more necessary perhaps, in the European Community as they are anywhere else where commitment to what are politely known as Western values is lauded as a panacea in a society where there are tens of millions of people: women, unemployed, homeless, emigrant workers, migrant workers, the handicapped, nomadic groups and indeed the poor generally, who have no opportunity of participating effectively in our democratic political structures or indeed of controlling their own lives.

We should remind ourselves that movement towards disarmament in Europe arose from initiatives from Eastern Europe, not in response to the overwhelming demand which the people of Western Europe made for disarmament. We should remind ourselves that the Iron Curtain will not disappear until the tanks and the missiles on both sides of the divide in Europe are withdrawn and destroyed. We should, in fact, exercise some humility in our approach to the whole question of the democratic movement in Eastern Europe. Let us acknowledge that the ability of the Eastern European States to adapt themselves peacefully to the radical change that is taking place is an indication of their political maturity and treat them accordingly.

We must be conscious that revolutionary periods have always been times of great opportunities for human progress but that they carry great risks as well. We do not have to delve very deeply into history to find examples. There is evidence from my own personal experience of Ireland. In the late 1960s a great upsurge in demand for political and democratic reform in Northern Ireland which united progressive people of all political and religious persuasions was overtaken and exploited by arch-reactionaries and extreme nationalists and the situation very quickly descended into the communal violence and terrorism which has continued for 20 years and continues to this day.

This Parliament must ensure that it does nothing to encourage extreme nationalist feeling in any part of Europe. We must acknowledge that the unity of peoples, that the security of peoples is more important than territorial unity. The great movement in Eastern Europe has not developed out of thin air. It can be linked, I believe, back to the Helsinki Final Act where East and West agreed to seek ways of reducing tension, avoiding conflicts between them and recognizing their own frontiers and their traditions. We should carefully weigh what we do in our efforts to assist Eastern Europe. We do not want to attach pre-emptive conditions to the development of economic, cultural or other relations with Eastern Europe which could be counter-productive in the long run.

BLANEY (ARC). — Madam President, on behalf of the Rainbow Group, I wish to take the opportunity tonight of saluting the Solidarity movement in Poland, the will and determination of the people of Hungary and, since this debate really is about East Germany, the much more dramatic, the much more traumatic happenings that have taken place there in the recent past and the determination of the people that has brought about a change of which we are so far only feeling the ripples. Coming from Ireland, a partitioned country with which I have a very close association, I feel more than most for the people of both Germanies, partitioned as they are, with the wall now crumbling and about to disappear.

But I would warn against our being presumptuous; we should approach anything that we wish this Parliament to do to help the emerging democracies with some circumspection and not attach conditions that are impossible to meet to every aid and assistance that we may propose. Urgent help is indeed needed — concrete financial help, support and cooperation from our Community. The bank suggested by President Mitterrand is a good idea, but where is the money coming from? Should we not have a bigger budget? Is that not the bottom line? Can we wait until the private investor actually puts money into such a venture? Should we not be acting now and have a supplementary budget or an additional budget that will tide us over as we meet the immediate demands and needs of these emerging peoples? I should like to urge as well that those who feel that the conditions may lead to nationalism of a kind that is deemed objectionable, I would ask those who have used such words in their particular motions to change them to chauvinistic, imperialistic nationalism. Such nationalism is bad but nationalism, 'as I know it' and as you know it is good, namely a pride in one's own people, a pride in one's own culture.
PANNELLA (NI), — (FR) I should first like to raise a point of order.

If I am not mistaken, the Council is not represented, not even by an official. Is that correct?

PRESIDENT. — Yes, the Council is not here, but it will respond in writing to the remarks made by Members.

PANNELLA (NI), — (FR) Does that mean, Madam President, that you think it right, in a debate on the Council's statements, for the Council, an institution financed by European tax-payers, to show such a lack of dignity, decorum and basic good manners as not even to have an official in attendance?

PRESIDENT. — Mr Pannella, I note what you have said and I shall communicate this to the Bureau.

PANNELLA (NI), — (FR) Madam President, when President Delors spoke about the militants at the Commission he said something very important. The Commission deserves commendation for following our debates so meticulously and so attentively. I would ask Mr Andriessen to convey that message to President Delors.

Madam President, today's debate is significant above all because of what has not been said, and also because Mr Mitterrand and Mr Kohl came. The fact of their coming enhances the standing of both the Community and Parliament. But what they did not say is more significant than what they did.

The President of the French Republic — today the President-in-Office of the European Council — confirmed the statements he made last month. Nevertheless, we put to the Council this question: when and how will Parliament at last be given legislative powers? It is high time to make that clear, because it seems illogical to be asking the countries of Eastern Europe to accord to their Parliaments something denied to us in Western Europe, a situation that results in what we describe with truly bureaucratic nicety as 'the democratic deficit'.

Solidarity with East European countries ought to embrace assistance with not only material needs, but also shortcomings in systems of justice, political democracy and tolerance.

Our Community is today a caricature of a parliamentary system. Our national parliaments have ceded a number of their democratic powers and transferred them to a Commission — which does not itself succeed in operating in accordance with a democratic institutional and constitutional dialectic — but not to another parliament.

The Iron Curtain has fallen, the Wall is falling, but what we need in my view to focus our minds on in this debate is Chancellor Kohl's apparently reassuring, but for me rather alarming, reference — when he cited Adenauer — to a united and free Germany within a united and free Europe. Today this is dangerous. For Adenauer it was a very important standpoint, and one that we accepted as positive. Now, however, with the European Community in existence and with the issue of German unification to be seen only in terms of freedom and democracy, I believe all that to be out of date.

VERDE I ALDEA (S), — (ES) Most of what there was to say has already been said and perhaps the time has come to sum up the main points to emerge from this debate.

What we are witnessing is undoubtedly a genuine popular movement in Central and Eastern Europe. The pace at which the situation has been changing there has been truly historic. Let me underline once more one of the fundamental points: The driving force behind these changes, namely the peoples of the individual East European countries, has been fuelled by the existence of Gorbachev's perestroika in the Soviet Union, but the development of the European Community and the new perspectives for 1992 have also made a major contribution.

This is important, because it shows that we play a very relevant role in this Europe of ours, divided as it was as a result of the Second World War. The Eastern Bloc is disintegrating and it is too early to say what will become of the structures established since 1945. We cannot, therefore, conduct ourselves as if we were mere spectators at these events, because these countries are appealing to the West, to the European Economic Community.

Our response to this instability must be to reinforce the Community, not just economically, but also politically, so that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have an example to follow in this new Europe dedicated to freedom and a pluralist political system.

Madam President, this latest challenge makes it even more important for the Community to become strong, because it comes on top of many other challenges which the Community is already facing and which it must accept. Countries in other parts of the world are looking to Europe as a champion of liberty, a place where fundamental freedoms are upheld.

We are, then, striving for a Europe that is open to the world, not just to the East, a Europe that is not purely Eurocentric. Europe has other obligations, for as well as these new challenges there are others which are no less important merely because they are of long standing.

The Community is at the moment discussing the new Lomé Convention. It has obligations towards the ACP countries, which are the poorest in the world, not just in the political sense through deprivation of freedom, but also in the literal sense of the world. The Community has obligations towards Latin America, which has for some time been making progress along the road to democracy, undoubtedly not as spectacularly as in Eastern Europe, but with no less hope. Elections are to be held in Chile and in Nicaragua, and the Community must make its presence felt in those countries too.

Finally, Madam President, at a time when we are faced with such momentous challenges from the East we must
clearly look towards the future, not the past. At this juncture it might be tempting for Western Europe as well as for the East to look back, but this would be a grave mistake. Instead, we should call to mind Jean Monnet's words: 'We are determined to liberate Europe from its past'.

(Applause)

LUCAS PIRES (PPE). — (PT) Madam President, ladies and gentlemen, with the destruction of the Berlin Wall and with the collapse of all the symbols of oppression, we have suddenly leapt into what one could call a new world at the heart of the old Europe. Once again it has been proved definitively in an area where it was least expected that human freedom is stronger than the might of the greatest empire and is still the highest imperative even in the history of technological society and the future. We can say that the century is ending not as predicted in George Orwell's famous novel but, on the contrary, the culmination of the whole of human history promises to be one of freedom, democracy and peace.

From any point of view this is what really counts. However, we should look closely at the concrete facts because a great historical leap must be made with, above all, security and stability. Hence the Atlantic Alliance must be maintained, hence the European Community must be strengthened and the right of the nations of Europe, particularly Poland, to live within their existing frontiers must be solemnly guaranteed.

It was, in fact, the durability of these guarantees which enabled the long-awaited transition which we are now witnessing to take place. If the break-up of an empire is to take place without the violence of revolution or war the European Community will have to make greater progress along the road to unity. Now that Europe without walls has overtaken Europe without frontiers, the latter will have to make up lost time. Delay, indecision or failure on the road to the single market, social cohesion, monetary union and political union would signal uncertainty, weakness and discouragement and contradict the signs of hope which are evident throughout Europe today.

For this reason the EEC as it now exists must be strengthened before it is enlarged. It clearly needs to be strengthened in the light of the new events taking place in the East. Similarly, at this time of solidarity with Eastern Europe we must not overlook those who have always been the most forgotten, namely those who live to the South of the Continent of Europe in the area called the Lomé Convention. For all these reasons too aid to the countries of Eastern Europe which are happily freeing themselves from Communism should be aimed primarily — and this should take precedence over any international political objections — at concrete economic development and effective democratization through free elections in the near future. In this respect the democratization of Eastern Europe is clearly a global phenomenon.

Certain aspects of the events in Eastern Europe and particularly in Berlin have implications which affect us more deeply. Some people believed that East Germany would be the last problem to be solved, the strongest link in the chain of social societies. But the vagaries of human freedom have meant that it has in fact been the weakest link and the first problem to be dealt with. One should not be surprised that the sacred principle of self-determination should lead to the reunification of Germany. This even seems natural and almost a part of European unification. It should in no way inspire fear.

Of course, certain balances will be disturbed, but not the basic equilibrium of democratic construction on the basis of the will of the citizens of Europe. The fact of the matter is that this is the era of the fall of empires and not of their reconstruction in other hemispheres or in other forms. Even we who have travelled further along this road share the hazards and hopes of this 'hour or Europe'. What we have heard here today, from the two major protagonists of the present era confirms our hope in a more community-minded Community and a freer Europe.

VEIL (LDR). — (FR) Madam President, since its first election by universal suffrage the European Parliament has known emotional occasions and solemn occasions. Today the two have come together.

This is an emotional occasion because, as we listened to President Mitterrand and to Chancellor Kohl, our thoughts turned to a people discovering, or rediscovering, freedom. It is a solemn occasion by virtue of their exceptional presence in this House, a recognition of our Assembly's growing role. Such de facto recognition, however, can in no way replace the institutional recognition which the citizens of Europe expect in order to make up for the Community's democratic deficit.

We felt happy and privileged, Chancellor Kohl, to hear you set out in generous and emotional terms the manner in which your country intends to assume its responsibilities, and in particular to hear you restate your commitment to the political union of Europe, in regard to which your country's responsibilities are especially important.

It is true that the procedure followed is unconventional. But is it not right to bend protocol and even the rules of representation within the European Council when events run ahead of us? We in this House have so often condemned the division of Europe and castigated Central and East European governments for breaches of human rights, and so often expressed our solidarity with these oppressed peoples, that it would be unthinkable and absurd for us to restrain our joy, even though such a change of such magnitude necessarily gives rise to some uncertainty.

Let us rather salute the men and women in all these countries who were willing to sacrifice life and liberty in their struggle against bondage and dictatorship. Let us
VEIL

salute Jan Palach, who, by perishing in flames, became the symbol of this struggle.

But neither rhetoric nor the most fervent tributes are enough. We must show our solidarity through carefully weighed decisions and deeds, because the situation in these countries is still too precarious and unstable for us to speak of outright victory. It is up to us to ensure that enthusiasm does not give way to frustration and bitterness. Will our response measure up to the high hopes placed in us by these nations, inspired by their faith in democracy and their growing trust in our Community?

Whatever happens, we must not disappoint them. That would be to betray not only them, but also all those who have served the cause of European integration.

The President-in-Office of the European Council acknowledged the priority that the Community must give to strengthening its unity if it is not to be weakened by the shock wave produced by this revolution, even though its only violence lies in the determination that inspired it. We must also beware lest this Europe of ours be diluted by those who never really wanted it. Indeed, whilst Economic and Monetary Union is indispensable — and we shall very soon see whether the will exists to create it — I cannot conceal a certain disappointment, for nothing I have heard today offers the hope that we shall shortly take the significant and irreversible step towards federalism of which President Mitterrand spoke here in Strasbourg only a few weeks ago.

We know also that all these countries entertain high expectations because their needs are immense and their hopes great. It will take considerable imagination to respond adequately, with everyone cooperating to the full in all areas. Substantial financial transfers will also be required, for our assistance to our European brothers must not be a the expense of the peoples of the South.

Is it too much to ask that we renounce our petty attitudes and egotisms in the face of the enormous hopes placed in us by Eastern Europe, in the face of our historic responsibility?

(Applause)

BETHELL, The Lord (ED). — Madam President, having heard the initial contributions to this debate I rise to make a brief intervention of caution in the light of the contributions that have been made so far. Having returned recently from a week in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, it seems to me a little mysterious that the Soviet Government is prepared to contemplate the withdrawal of its military interests in the German Democratic Republic, in Hungary, Poland and maybe in Czechoslovakia, that it is prepared to think in terms of a pulling back of its previous interventions in Ethiopia, Angola, Nicaragua and Cuba and yet seems all the more determined to maintain a considerable amount of assistance, very extravagant assistance, to the regime of General Najib in Afghanistan, a person who was installed in Afghanistan by the Brezhnev invasion in 1979.

In Afghanistan Soviet influence remains even through the last soldier withdrew on 15 February. Millions of their mines remain in place exploding every day and maiming Afghan men, women and children. Their advisers are still there. 3000 million dollars a month are still contributed in military arms alone, including the devastating Scud missile and Mr Najib himself, the former head of the Afghan Secret Service is head of that government.

Is this essential to Soviet security? Can the Soviet people afford it? I am very dubious as to whether either question can be answered in the affirmative. In conclusion, therefore, I invite Mr Gorbachev to consider his position in Afghanistan, to think again, to end the war in Afghanistan, to allow the people to elect a true government, true democracy such as I profoundly hope will come to pass in Central and Eastern Europe.

IN THE CHAIR: SIR FRED CATHERWOOD

Vice-President

VERBEEK (V). — (NL) Mr President, Europe is an old volcano, and the volcano is active again, peacefully, we hope. Why are the leaders of Western Europe, including those who have spoken here this afternoon, so dreadfully wearsome? I am afraid it is because they think all the lava will come down on the eastern side, burning everything in its path, and that the thriving vineyards are on this side. This dreadful and dangerous feeling of superiority must change, and we must simply go on. One Member of this Parliament came straight out with it this afternoon, someone of whom all parliamentarians say they steer clear. He said: ‘Communism is dead.’ But how many people here think this? They think Socialism is collapsing, the free market is triumphant. Why have we not heard the leaders say a word this afternoon about capitalism itself being a permanent crisis and causing exploitation and destruction internally and externally, a system that causes poverty, leads to emptiness and kills minds and bodies. Why have we not heard a word about the West itself needing at least as radical perestroika. After all, the West accounts for 20 % of the world population but for more than 80 % of all energy consumed, all wealth, raw materials and reserves in the world. If other peoples were already able to live like this, how would the world manage?

Our deafening smugness about freedom and democracy, what does our compulsion to grow, our compulsion to consume, our conquering of markets have to do with freedom and a democratic order? I think the model of the internal Community market is the least suitable basis for the East-West dialogue. Mr Andriessen, I am grateful to you for showing the same stamina as ourselves this evening. But I hope you will tell President Delors that his concept of the EEC in the middle surrounded by the EFTA and Comecon countries, that this Euro-centrism cannot be the model
of a future Europe. We will help, but I would say 'physician, heal thyself first'. Our conditions, our Community regime, our IMF regime, our World Bank regime will suck the Eastern Bloc dry instead of helping it to find its feet.

(Applause)

MUSCARDINI (NI). — (IT) Mr President, the will, the enthusiasm and the hopes of peoples cannot be oppressed by any regime. The soul of the people runs through history, creating history. The collapse of the Berlin Wall, along with the great innovations that are starting to take shape in the East, reaffirm that the European people is finding again its own identity and is making each one of us feel the moral and political obligation to continue along the road on which it has embarked, which not even the strangely inexplicable Yalta Agreement was able to prevent. The bankruptcy of Marxism and of the dictatorship of the proletariat shows that the European people demand a social, free state, in which the different classes must collaborate and be integrated.

The European Parliament, which is the expression of the popular will of Member States, cannot accept that the problems and future of Europe shall be decided by agreements entered into between the Soviet Union and the United States.

That is why the Italian Social Movement, with a resolution and a letter to the President of the Assembly, has called for an extraordinary meeting of the Parliamentary Assembly to be held in Berlin, to emphasize the commitment of 320 million free Europeans to the German people and all the peoples of the East, and their readiness to help them. And in the meantime we also call on the President of the Council of Ministers to take the necessary steps to ensure Europe's presence at the Malta Summit, which was called by the two superpowers, so as to emphasize again the will for self-determination of the European peoples.

President Delors said: 'The same things can be done in a day or in a week'. But it is also true that one can promise to do, and then not do. And postponing, under certain circumstances, means not doing. Well then, let us find the courage to give immediate body to our words and to the commitments that Europe must have towards all people!

FORD (S). — Mr President, I am delighted to participate in this debate on recent events in Central and Eastern Europe and their impact on the future development of the European Community. May I congratulate Mr Kohl and Mr Mitterrand on their contributions and say how refreshing it was to hear someone who is committed to developing the future European Community compared with the kind of contribution we would have got if Mrs Thatcher had been here.

We are living in exciting times. Fifty years on from the start of the Second World War Hitler's last legacy to the Community, a divided, frozen Europe, is dissolving in front of our eyes. Exactly where we are going to go we do not know. As Kierkegaard said, life is lived forward and understood backward. In Poland, Hungary and East Germany major developments are taking place day by day. New and dramatic changes arrive and confound and thrill us. Dead parliaments flower again as the nourishment of democracy arrives in these countries. The continent is opening up. Much of this can be attributed to the courage of Mikhail Gorbachev in recognizing and acting upon the realities in the Soviet Union that his predecessors refused to see.

But we must recognize that in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union there will be checks and even reverses on the progress that we are seeing now. We must maintain our support for those whose aims and objectives in the long term match ours. Eastern Europe does not need fair-weather friends. But one principle must guide us — self-determination. The possibility for the GDR of forming part of a united Germany within a united Europe is something that must be there. But, of course, they must make the final choice.

We must also ensure that European aid is available to all the countries of Eastern Europe that are moving towards democracy, financial and economic aid plus technical aid. The East is one of the areas where we must ensure that the Cocom list, which is used as a weapon of US industrial and trade policy, is torn up. But those who have had the ultimate aim of an enlarged European Community to the East must recognize that we have to build a European Community and not just a common market. Social Europe will be a magnet of attraction to those countries. We must not have the savage capitalism espoused by Mrs Thatcher with her dog-eat-dog view of the world.

One consequence not much talked about, of course, is the implications for European security policy. We have to beware of how this is going to be changed by what is happening now in Europe. It is clear that the evolution, the metamorphosis even, of global capitalism means that the United States and Europe are drifting apart economically. The more successful Europe is the more that is going to happen. Exactly the same is true of our security interests. Our European security interests must not, cannot, be determined by interests other than our own. We must find fora to discuss these issues together — East and West in Europe. Of course we must also have a dialogue with the United States but we cannot afford, cannot allow, others to determine our future in our absence while we are kept waiting outside the conference room. We have a chance, a wonderful chance, to build a new Europe, a wider Community, simultaneously one and different. Of course, it is going to have to be a dynamic process, but I have to say I am not terribly favourable to the proposal where we are going to have a kind of Europe that has more classes than the Indian railway network. We need to build, if we want a Europe that eventually is going to be one and united.
On security policy how strange it is that within the past six months we have gone from a situation where modernization was the big debate, to one where now virtually no one in the European Community talks about nuclear modernization. We can achieve a new Europe through peace. We have the possibility of the abolition and the removal of nuclear weapons in the European Community East and West. We have the possibility of massive step-downs in conventional armaments East and West. That can unlock resources so desperately needed on both sides of the ruble that used to be the wall that divided us. We can do this together. We can do this ourselves. Let us start this process. It will be seen with hindsight as the beginning of a new Europe in which we can all live in peace and harmony.

(Applause)

PENDERS (PPE). — (NL) Mr President, we see four groups of events occurring simultaneously, complementing each other. First, East-West détente with good prospects of arms reductions; secondly, perestroika and movements towards human rights and democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union; thirdly, the removal of the dividing lines between West and East Germany and reforms in the GDR; and fourthly, the completion and strengthening of the Community as it evolves into a European Union.

Four processes, four fantastic processes are taking place, and they call for crisis management. That is not really the right term. It would be better to say 'management of opportunities' or 'managements of developments'. I have a few words to say about this.

Where East-West relations are concerned, I would say that arms control should continue within the framework of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. I also hope that this will be the main item discussed by Bush and Gorbachev. The continued existence of these alliances will also give Europe a guarantee of the stability that is absolutely vital.

The developments in Central and Eastern Europe primarily affect the people there. They are the first consideration. We in the West, and particularly the Community, must respond to these developments with economic support. We are busily doing this, with the Commission in the van. I have the impression that the aid plans are highly compatible: balance-of-payments support, debt management, management training, other training and vigilance as regards hikes in inflation. Training and contacts are essential.

Germany. I am very pleased to see Chancellor Kohl here. His presence underlines the fact that Germany's problems are European problems and so call for European solutions and managers.

Mr President, let us be honest. Only a few people are saying it out loud. Of course, the possible unification or reunification of the two Germanies is in everyone's mind particularly the Germans'. That is quite natural. Let us be clear about that. But the questions is how we cope with and manage this situation, and I find it very laudable that the Government of the Federal Republic, led by the Federal Chancellor, should explicitly say that the developments in the GDR are a European matter, something that affects the Community in particular.

This brings us to the Community itself, to the strengthening of our own Community with the aim of creating a union. What a brilliant idea it was, Mr President, for the world summit of seven industrialized countries to make the Commission responsible for the coordination of aid to Poland and Hungary. From that moment the Community in fact took centre stage in the four groups of events I have referred to. But this, of course, imposes obligations on the Community. We can respond appropriately to the events in the GDR, in Central and Eastern Europe only if we go on down the road towards the European Union. This has been explicitly confirmed by President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl. I must say frankly that, if I had been told five months ago that all this would be happening in Europe, I would have been far more anxious about the debate between those who want progress towards the union and those who may apply the brakes. Things have turned out differently, and I am very pleased about that.

So there must be an Economic and Monetary Union and a foreign policy and a security policy in the Community, not a Community that glorifies itself, not a provocative Community, but a Community that is open to Central and Eastern Europe. It is a great pity that Mrs Thatcher refuses to recognize this link between the events in Central and Eastern Europe and the development and strengthening of the Community. That puts her in the camp of those who seek to slow down European development, those who see the strengthening of the Community as provoking Moscow and Eastern Europe, a very regrettable trend. I object to that, Mr President. I am therefore happy with the resolution before us, and I shall take pleasure in voting for it.

DE CLERQ (LDR). — (NL) Mr President, the historic and revolutionary developments we have witnessed in Central and Eastern Europe in the last few months and especially in recent weeks cannot and will not leave the European Community, the whole of Europe unmoved. Aid to Poland, Hungary and East Germany and perhaps to other countries must and will come. It must be primarily Community aid, and it must also have condition attached, not out of any misplaced desire to interfere, but certainly made dependent on developments in these countries, development both toward political democracy with a multiparty system and free elections, where the rights of man reign supreme, and towards economic democracy in which an ossified planned State economy actually gives way to a free market economy.

The European Community's policy towards the countries of Central and Eastern Europe has always been based on two Central and Eastern Europe has always been based on two principles, a policy of normalization and a policy of specificity. By this I mean tailor-made
treatment geared to the situation in the country concerned. It is therefore essential that optimum advantage be taken of the agreements that already exist between the Community and the various Eastern Bloc countries. In addition, if these countries continue to develop in the right direction, nothing must stop us entering into further agreements or adding to the existing ones. I am thinking, for example, of privileged and asymmetrical agreements like the one one concluded with Yugoslavia.

It is certainly not inconceivable that we shall eventually be considering association formulas or enlargement of the free trade area that we already form with the EFTA countries to include certain countries in Central and Eastern Europe, if that is what they want. But if these countries want to enjoy the fruits of their reforms, we must as a matter of urgency take additional and practical measures to make this possible. I am thinking, for example, of the establishment of an industrial development fund to provide risk capital for joint ventures between Community companies, and especially small and medium-sized firms, and Central and Eastern Europe. The Cheysson facility, as it is known, might be used to provide funds to finance joint ventures and, more specifically, vocational training and exchanges. Some of the funds needed could be obtained from a debt-equity swap programme. So you see there is a great deal of work to be done, but we must set to. The process of democratization and reform is a matter for the Central and Eastern European countries themselves, but without our help it will never succeed.

SPENCER (ED). — Mr President, more than 150 Members of this the third European Parliament, were born after the war. God willing, some of us may live to sit in the ninth European Parliament that will meet here in 2019. So, if I may, I want to look ahead.

My generation, Mr President, is one of the few since Charlemagne not condemned to a European civil war. That gives us the right, but much more the duty, to say gently but firmly how we want our Europe to be after the millennium. For me, at least, the future is clear. We need a Community of 20 or more countries; a Community that must at least include Scandinavia, Austria, all the German people and the countries of East Central Europe: Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Because only a whole Germany, embedded in the heart of a whole Europe, will give the Russians the confidence to help heal the wounds of history.

But, Mr President, this broader Europe will only be stable if its roots go deeper. It must have a defence identity. Debates about neutrality in Europe are now as dated as the long-dead rhetoric of vanished empires. The Community of Twenty will threaten nobody, but it must have the means to defend itself. We will need, Mr President, political skill of the highest order as the structures of the last 40 years break up. Let us urge the leaders of Europe to be careful about the next steps, but let us also urge them to link care to a clear vision of the ultimate destination.

Mr President, we, the 150 children of peace in this Parliament, need to assert that the Community method that worked here on the Rhine will also work on the Oder and the Danube. We must state history in the face and declare that only unity prevents war.

VAN DER WAAL (NI). — (NL) Mr President, a great deal that is worth considering has already been said about the political aspects of East-West relations. I will confine myself to a few reflections that are relevant in this context.

Recent events have again made it very clear to us how privileged we are to live in freedom and prosperity in the West. You cannot put a price on freedom, as the chairman of the Liberal, Democratic and Reformist Group very rightly said in this Parliament not long ago. And what we have prosperity to thank for in terms of education, health care and social services cannot easily be overestimated. But we must be careful about holding up western society to other countries as a model in every respect. That others are wrong does not mean that we are right. A review of the last 40 years, in which we have lived in freedom, is very instructive and humbling in this respect. Because not everything that can be said about western society is commendable. What we see is the gradual disappearance of a culture that for centuries has been stamped by Christianity. Marriage and the family have become largely discredited. The inviolability of life is no longer generally accepted. Sexual promiscuity is appallingly widespread. We are having to contend with various forms of addiction, isolation, increased crime and excessive concentration on material progress. All these phenomena indicate that the normative significance of the Ten Commandments has been lost to society.

We must say, sadly, that freedom in the West has been very much used as each country sees fit. People in Eastern Europe are badly off economically. The same is perhaps true of us culturally and intellectually. I think it will be a step in the right direction, Mr President, if the meeting between Eastern and Western Europe results in our reflecting on the spiritual foundations of western society as well as all the other things that need to be done.

DURY (S). — (FR) Mr President, what is so striking about this succession of demonstrations is their massive scale and peaceful nature. The Berlin Wall has been breached and will soon, I hope, collapse, and with it the entire political system produced by the Second World War.

In this state of elation at the renewal in Eastern Europe, it occurred to me that I had probably experienced similar feelings in May 1968. But then I realized that no, May 1968 was child's play by comparison with what is happening now. In the midst of all the current problems the Technical Group of the European Right must not think that they are the only ones to address themselves to the question of reunification. Whilst it is true that this is the slogan of the moment in Leipzig, the Socialist
Group, too, has carefully considered the issue. Last week in Brussels, in the presence of Willy Brandt, we had an animated debate in which the exchanges were frank, but also constructive.

For some among us the events of history are still fresh in our minds and fears have been expressed at the prospect of the re-emergence of a powerful Germany. They are understandable, as a number of speakers have pointed out. But we have also heard our friends, the German Social Democrats, say that the present is not the past, that democracy is a rock on which a secure and peaceful future can be built, and that the ghosts of the past should not paralyse us today.

For the Socialist Group it is the future that counts. The people must be free to decide under what political and economic system they wish to live. Moreover, with the possibility of a unified Germany taking shape, we insist that this would have to be as part of a united Europe.

We are not disturbed at the prospect of 17 million East Germans joining 320 million other Europeans in a Community based on solid institutions and policies. The situation would be different if 17 millions East Germans were to come together with 60 million West Germans to form a third world power. That is how the Socialist Group sees it. If there is to be unification, then it must be within the framework of a united Europe. But what kind of Europe? And what kind of a united Europe? That is what it is supposed to be, but has it always shown itself to be such?

What we Socialists — and no doubt others in this Parliament — want is a genuine political Europe, a social Europe, a Europe of the Environment.

The European Council will soon be meeting in Strasbourg, and Mr Giscard d'Estaing referred to two of the main items on the Summit's agenda: Economic and Monetary Union and the powers of the European Parliament. Unfortunately, he neglected to mention social Europe. For us a social Europe is a priority. And when I listen to some of the Heads of Government saying that they want a genuine Europe and a social Europe, I can only shake my head at the outcome of the meeting of 30 October on the Social Charter. The text produced is so watered down as to be unrecognizable. But what is important is that the Twelve adopt the Social Charter and show that social Europe can really come into being.

The European Community is more than merely a Community of business men, it is more than an internal market. It must have a human dimension. After the initial euphoria, for example, the East German refugees complained of a lack of child-minding facilities and about accommodation problems. A qualified engineer spoke of his difficulties in finding work.

I am not of course suggesting that this is a West German problem. It is, rather, a West European problem. Just what kind of Europe do we want to see? Is it a Europe of prosperity and social justice? If we are to serve as a model then that is surely the Europe we should create, a Europe for people, a citizens' Europe, a workers' Europe, a children's Europe!

I hope that the European Council in Strasbourg will also hear this message and that, over and above the points made today by the two Heads of State and Government — which I endorse — we shall move on the produce truly European policies, ambitious policies that will present to the world the image of a social Europe, a political Europe and a Europe of the environment.

(Applause)

BERNARD-REYMONT (PPE). — (FR) Mr President, witnessing one of the most momentous events of this century we share the profound joy of all the nations now rediscovering what Sophocles in his 'Antigone' called the salubrious era of freedom.

For all the joy we feel, we do not of course close our eyes to the fact that in the present unstable situation there are many unknowns and that relapses are unfortunately still possible.

We must therefore show both determination and prudence in our approach. The prudence necessary to avoid doing anything that might render Mr Gorbachev's task more difficult, for on his success depends the favourable evolution of the present situation in Central Europe.

Prudence with regard to leaders who are only just embarking on their democratic reforms and who still have to provide evidence of their good faith. Prudence in the face of totalitarian regimes that have not yet yielded to the pressure from their people. Prudence in a military situation where disarmament in certainly on the agenda but where the balance remains all the more precarious because one of the camps retains a massive stock of weapons and is at the same time politically destabilized. Prudence, wisdom, but also determination. Determination to provide immediate and adequate assistance to Poland and Hungary, who courageously pioneered the road towards democracy. Determination, too, in regard to the speed and nature of our own political integration. The success of the European Community provided an example and an incentive which have played an important role in shaping attitudes and transforming the situation in Eastern Europe. But precisely because of this transformation the organizational forms of the Community are no longer adequate. We must therefore progress rapidly to a new stage in European politics and move towards an integrated European Union based on a constitution that will indissolubly bind the destiny of our nations in a federation.

The crucial question in the days and months ahead is this: Will the decline of imperialism leave the field free for the re-emergence of nationalism and fundamentalism and put us back a century, or shall we succeed in showing that the Community is the most democratic, the most modern and the most effective form of organization for nations that want to share the same destiny, a kind of federation for the traditional States?
Furthermore, a truly integrated Community organization is also the only possible framework within which the German people may, if it so wishes, resolve the problem of its unity. And it is clear that, at the moment, the degree of integration achieved is inadequate for that purpose also.

Everything, therefore, dictates that we speed up European integration. The forthcoming Summit in Strasbourg will show whether the governments of the Member States are ready to go beyond mere declarations of intent and seize this challenge.

ROMEOS (S). — (GR) Mr President, with good reason have we all celebrated the great changes that have recently taken place in Eastern European countries. Changes which were triggered, let us not forget, by the bold policies of Mr Gorbachev. And all the more reason was there to celebrate the toppling of the Berlin wall, because it was a symbol of Europe’s division and of the cold war era, as President Mitterrand also stressed to the House this evening.

Today, however, we must give careful and serious consideration to the meaning of these changes, to where they are leading, and to what the Communities obligations might be. The presence in the European Parliament today, of President Mitterrand, the President of the Council, confirms that the Community appreciates the gravity of the changes taking place near us, of the important consequences they will have for Europe’s future, and of the decisive part the Community is called on to play.

The presence of Chancellor Kohl confirms that the German problem, and let us not hesitate to say this — is the axe around which the Community’s policy, but also that of the Soviet Union and even of the USA in Europe, will revolve.

The fact that they are both here together, President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl, together with their statements, must be interpreted as a definite and catholic decision that there will be a single Common policy in response to present and future developments in Central and Eastern Europe.

We should welcome President Mitterrand’s initiative in convoking an extraordinary Summit Conference in Paris. We express our satisfaction with the Declaration by the Twelve that the Community’s solidarity with the peoples of Eastern Europe progressing towards democracy, will be combined with more rapid steps towards European integration.

We did not expect that a Summit Conference lasting a few hours could consider in depth the future problems which may arise in Europe owing to these developments in Central and Eastern Europe. It was inevitable that the decisions made would be limited, and rightly so, to how the Community would respond to the economic problems faced by the new regimes in East Germany, Poland and Hungary. We agree with these views, but subject to two conditions: first, this aid must not assume the form, perhaps via the proposed new bank, of a new Marshall plan. I think we would all wish to avoid imitating political interventions and practices reminiscent of that past.

Secondly, the basic conditions laid down by the Paris decisions for this aid are a return to democracy, respect for human rights, and the holding of free elections. We must agree with that, but also be careful about the implementation of such a policy, because in those countries there have been some social acquisitions which not only must we avoid destroying by our interventions, but might even do well to adopt ourselves for a social Europe that conforms with the vision we all entertain.

These decisions provide a first answer to the immediate problems. However, we must soon find answers to the problems connected with Europe’s future and the Community’s role. It is hardly difficult to agree that the Community now has a historic role, and to respond to that role it must first make its own progress towards economic, social and political integration and the building of its own identity, as President Mitterrand stressed.

The Intergovernmental Conference which it was initially decided to convene to discuss economic and monetary union, must now cover all the sectors in which institutional changes are needed to speed up European integration. But there is no need to achieve European integration to decide, from today, that the Community of Twelve, with the mechanisms available to it and with its institutional bodies, can and must undertake initiatives to create, in cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries, a common European home founded on the principles of democracy and freedom, respect for human rights, the self-determination of peoples, solidarity, and the spirit of the Helsinki Agreement, so that all Europe’s peoples can live securely within their present frontiers. If those principles are respected by everybody, they will surely lead to the completion of disarmament and to a guarantee of peace.

In conclusion, Mr President, the two leaders Bush and Gorbachev, who are due to meet in Malta next week, must also be given the message that Europe’s future will be decided by the Europeans. What we expect from them, and would welcome, is a decision to limit still further their military presence in Europe, since as we hope, it will eventually come to be unnecessary.

PIRKL (PPE). — (DE) Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, we are all happy to be able to discuss at this time a new and, we hope, long positive period in European history. As a German Member I am, of course, particularly pleased that so many speeches in today’s debate have shown our European friends to be willing to stand by the German people as it moves towards free national self-determination.

We are very grateful for this and assure you all that we have learnt the necessary lessons from the disasters of our recent history and will never forget them. You need
not worry about Germany's future development. It is firmly established in and with Europe, and we shall do all we can to cope with 'accidents' on the German party political scene, an example of which we have witnessed today, and to minimize the resulting damage to Germany and Europe.

But despite all the satisfaction at current developments in many parts of Eastern Central Europe and Eastern Europe, we must not overlook the negative aspects and dangers that remain. There have been tremendous developments, but we must nevertheless say that, although the Wall has some holes in it, it is still standing. Neither overcritical pessimism nor unconcerned gullibility is helpful at the moment. We must face up to the demands of the hour in a spirit of cool realism.

At this historic moment free Europe, and especially the Community and its Member States, must help by acting realistically. We must help even at a personal level if there is a danger of hunger and of lives being lost this winter. Towns and regions should find partners they can help. We must support the establishment of free and cultural associations wherever we are asked to do so. There must be no petty-minded discussions or decisions on effective economic aid. and that goes for the Community too.

But allow me to say in this context, in view of what has been said by several Members in this debate, that we certainly must not make this aid dependent on petty conditions being satisfied. But a minimum of freedom in the economic order is needed if this aid is to be prevented from seeping away.

Another thing we should always remember is that the developments that have been sparked off in the Eastern Bloc did not happen of their own accord. It was not a free decision taken by Gorbachev but the persistent solidarity of the Atlantic Alliance and the really magnetic force of the process of European unification that triggered these developments — besides the unrestrained striving after freedom that lives in everyone, including the people of Eastern Europe.

Let us urge on both the Atlantic Alliance and the process of European unification. That is what is needed at the moment, and that is the guarantee of the freedom that is still to come to much of Eastern Europe.

(Appause from the centre and right)

ROTH-BEHREND (S). — (DE) Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, for me — and you will surely forgive me, a Berlin representative, for seeing it this way — the changes in Eastern Europe reached their high point in Berlin and the GDR on 9 November, when the people of the GDR patiently and reasonably set in motion a peaceful, an unstoppable and democratic revolution.

With admirable tenacity and discipline, the peaceful power of the masses has achieved a degree of democracy and freedom of movement that no one, even in his wildest dreams, would have thought possible only six weeks ago.

The government and all the people of the GDR now face a difficult test. Everyone outside would do well to be sparing with advice but generous with willingness to help.

If this revolution is not to founder on the people's own impatience, it will need our solidarity, a solidarity of deeds, not a long list of conditions and requirements attached to aid that clearly cannot be met at present. Of course, we are all concerned about what happens in the GDR, but the people of the GDR certainly do not want to swap being told what to do by a party for being told what to do by outsiders.

Those who are sincere and do not just pretend to be happy about the new freedom of movement in the GDR know that what is needed now is rapid and unconditional aid, not some hesitant, petty, wait-and-see attitude.

The government and all the people of the GDR face difficult economic problems, to which solutions must be found very quickly if the sell-out that many people in the GDR fear is not to happen.

The GDR's economy must become internationally competitive so that it can earn hard, convertible currency and, with it, foreign exchange for its citizens. We should offer every support in this respect, but without repeating the mistakes that have been made in the past. This is not the time for our economic interests to take the forefront: the emphasis must be on what benefits the GDR. It should go without saying that we will not export our own mistakes in the environmental field, for example, as we have so often done in the past, and that we will recognize the strong ecological movement in the GDR. The GDR should be able to go its own way, and we must help it to do so. What is needed now is imagination, flexibility — a word we perhaps do not always know the true meaning of in the Community — and creativity applied to interim aid.

Whether temporary foreign exchange funds are provided or the exchange rate is supported up to a certain level, whatever is done, help will be needed from economic experts, but quickly and without lengthy and time-consuming analyses. Special situations call for special measures. We can show here how mobile and spontaneous we can be, and we of the European Parliament should insist that the European Community offer support as quickly as possible.

The frontier between the two Germanies was not only a national problem, not only a German problem. The whole of Europe was split by this frontier, and with the toppling of the Wall we have suddenly made so much more progress in our efforts to achieve a united Europe and a secure peaceful order for Europe.

Suddenly frontiers are actually losing their divisive power. For all those who are still in the Chamber at this late hour and stand up for peace and freedom in Europe and for the relaxation of tension between the two blocs the last few days have undoubtedly been very moving. For us in Berlin at least this has certainly been very true.
The morning after the first night of open frontiers the Governing Mayor of Berlin, Walter Momper, said: 'The German people are now the happiest people in the world.' We of the Socialist Group in the European Parliament are convinced that everyone in Europe can join with all Germans in feeling happy at this time.

(Applause)

SIOS CRUELLAS (PPE). — (ES) We have talked at great length about the recent events in Central and Eastern Europe and their possible implications for the Community. What is now needed is for the Community and its Member States to react with prompt and effective political action and economic aid, intelligently deployed so as to prepare the way for this greater democratic Europe which we all want to see.

As far as the economy is concerned, cooperation is urgently required to assist these countries in preparing themselves through training of manpower and creation of the necessary structures, so that public and private investment, whether domestic or foreign, produces the desired social and economic results. It would be quite wrong to think that it will be enough to arrange for loans to be made available to these countries, even if they are channelled through a development bank specially set up for this purpose. If this were to be our sole effort, these countries would end up in even greater debt and ruin than they are already. This is a problem with which Poland is only too well acquainted.

Furthermore, we must remember that cooperation is not a one-sided affair. Specifically, we must plan simultaneously for technical, training and financial aid. Firstly, in order rapidly to introduce professional training schemes, not just at the managerial level as referred to earlier, but at all levels. Trained manpower must be available if companies are to survive in a market economy. Secondly, in order to create the necessary economic and financial structures, which are at the moment either non-existent or inadequate. Thirdly, in order to carry out infrastructure projects which will enable these countries to catch up in an area where they are so far behind the West. And, fourthly, guarantees must be provided as the present arrangements are not attractive enough to encourage investment. The guarantees must be reciprocal, by arrangement with the countries concerned, and should be ratified by the national parliaments of the signatory states.

Unless we proceed in this way, loans will not solve the problems of these countries, nor will sufficient private investment be generated to create a market economy that can pull them out of their present predicament. If the programme for their economic recovery were to fail, so would their fragile democracies, and we should bear a heavy responsibility for that failure.

Let us not, therefore, be content with the sterile policy of empty gestures lest we put a risk the democratization process that has only just begun. Moreover, we should lose precious time, which our very alert competitors would not fail to exploit. For example, Japan and Korea are already making investments in Hungary, to which we certainly have no objections — the more help and investment, the better — but we do prefer a European democratic Europe to a Japanese or Korean Europe.

(Applause)

COONEY (PPE). — Mr President, we have to see this debate in the context of European history over the last 50 years. The outstanding event in that time was the world war which has affected the history of our continent since. I come to this debate as a Member of a small island country physically, but only physically, divorced from the mainland of Europe — a country which was neutral and took no part in that conflict. The merits or demerits of that neutrality are something for academic debate though I have to say that the merits of neutrality in the contemporary sense are nil. However, that is for another day's work.

The fact of our neutrality enables me to have a different perspective from many of our colleagues who have spoken. My views on the recent developments and principally those in Germany are untrammelled by any residual considerations arising out of the alignments of that conflict. That conflict is lurking in the background unmentioned throughout this debate. And while the title of the debate is East Europe I do not think that we can deny that the event which sparked off this debate was the drama in Berlin some weeks ago. I think essentially this debate is about Germany.

I was in Berlin on that historic occasion when the Wall was breached. I witnessed the joy and indeed the euphoria with which the East and West-Berliners greeted each other. I was a recipient of greeting from East Berliners — they did not know I was a foreigner. I do not know German but it was quite clear to me that the one slogan that I was hearing loud and clear throughout that historic morning was One Fatherland. I have no doubt that there is a great wish among the German people for unity and it would be incredible in human terms if it were to be otherwise. The will of the people is for unity and we must not put any institutional impediment in the way of that will being achieved. It was the will of the people which brought freedom to Hungary and Poland, and it is the will of the people which will bring freedom to Czechoslovakia and, I hope, eventually to Romania.

What would those people have said to us if we had said you must go slow in realizing your will because of institutional difficulties. We would not have been thanked. We encourage that will and here in our own Community we must encourage that will. I have no fears about that will being realized because I am satisfied that the Community as presently structured is a sound edifice commanding the loyalty of all its constituent parts, not least the Federal Republic of Germany. I am satisfied that the Community will be able to absorb any movement towards unity among the German people. I am satisfied from the statement that have been made by German Statesmen, not least by
COONEY

Chancellor Kohl here this afternoon. I am satisfied from the views of my colleagues in this Parliament. We must not stand in the way of the will of the German people.

(Applause)

PESMAZOGLOU (PPE). — (GR) Mr President, during this extraordinary sitting the European Parliament has truly expressed its warm solidarity towards the peoples of East Germany and Central and Eastern Europe. The European Community now has the self-evident obligation to react without delay and in an effective way to these headlong developments, while remaining aware that reversals and retrogressions are not beyond the bounds of possibility. The work of reform and reconstruction in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is much greater and more complicated than is often imagined. The European Commission must be helped to cope with the difficult task assigned to it.

My second comment is that the Community itself must be strengthened, as was stressed very correctly and responsibly by the President of the Commission. This means moving more rapidly towards monetary and political union, enhancing the powers of the European Parliament, and adopting the Social Charter. Those are the issues which the European Council in Strasbourg must decide upon. The groundwork and the specific proposals are mature and have already been put forward. It is of major importance that the President of France and of the Council, and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, both confirmed this evening that the problems of Central and Eastern Europe, and the new equilibrium in Europe, can be dealt with only from within the European Community. That is a message of world-wide significance.

Mr President, I conclude with the comment that the nucleus and driving force of our Common European Home is the European Community of Twelve, with its institutions and its powerful political cohesion.

PRESIDENT. — Commissioner, do you wish to speak?

ANDRIESEN, Vice-President of the Commission. — Thank you, Mr President, but the debate was such that after the speech of President of the Commission, Mr Delors, I have nothing to add.

PRESIDENT. — Nonetheless, on behalf of the House, I would like to thank you for staying with us until the end of this long debate. Thank you, Mr Andriessen.

(Applause)

The debate is closed.

We shall now proceed to the vote on the request for an early vote on the five motions for resolutions to wind up the debate on Central Europe. I would like to point out that motion for a resolution Doc. B3-598/89 has been withdrawn.

COT (S). — (FR) Mr President, I endorse this request but would like the Bureau to consider a proposal supported by several of us, namely that the vote be taken at 3 p.m. so that a sufficiently large number of Members can give their backing to the views of this Parliament.

PRESIDENT. — You do not want to vote now or do you want the vote tomorrow at 3 p.m. instead of 6.30 p.m.?

COT (S). — (FR) That is correct. I should like the request for an early vote to be put to the vote now, with the vote itself being brought forward to 3 p.m. tomorrow to enable more Members to take part in this important vote at the conclusion of an important debate.

CHANTERIE (PPE). — (NL) Mr President, I approve Mr Cot's proposal, but perhaps the possibility of voting on all other important items at 3 p.m. might also be considered.

PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr Chanterie. I shall pass on the idea that we should let the House decide tomorrow morning whether to vote at 3 p.m. or at 6.30 p.m.

(Parliament agreed to the request for an early vote)

(The sitting was closed at 9.35 p.m.)

1 Agenda for next sitting: see Minutes.
6. Recent events in Central and Eastern Europe

— Doc. B3-599/89/corr.

RESOLUTION

on the recent developments in Central and Eastern Europe

The European Parliament,

A. having regard to recent developments in the GDR, and notably the opening of the Berlin Wall and the border installations between the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany,

B. conscious that developments in the GDR form part – and are a result – of changes in Central and Eastern Europe, and notably in Poland and Hungary, changes made possible by the new policy pursued by President Gorbachev and facilitated by the policy of East-West cooperation, in particular within the framework of the CSCE process and disarmament negotiations,

C. aware that the economic problems of the states of Central and Eastern Europe and the desire for freedom of their inhabitants have played a decisive role in these developments,

D. aware that the peoples of Central Europe brought about these changes in their countries through the pressure exerted by their non-violent, mass demonstrations,
E. having regard to the outcome of the European Council meeting held on 18 November 1989 in Paris on the initiative of President Mitterrand,

F. whereas the forthcoming Bush/Gorbachev summit will contribute to strengthening world peace, and to consolidating detente between the military alliances and cooperation between peoples,

1. Emphasizes the historic nature of these events in Central and Eastern Europe, brought about by the determination of their peoples to exercise their right to self-determination in a free and democratic manner, with due respect for human rights;

2. Supports the demand of GDR opposition groups for an end to the Socialist Unity Party's monopoly of power and for free elections;

3. Stresses that the closer integration of the EEC will create the basis for closer cooperation with the states of Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and closer ties between the two German states, and that European integration should be seen as a way of overcoming nationalist claims;

4. Considers that the people of the GDR should be entitled to exercise their right to self-determination, i.e. their right to determine which political and economic system should be developed and which form their state should take, including the possibility of forming part of a unified Germany within a united Europe;

5. Declares that, in the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act, all the peoples of Europe including the Polish people are entitled, both now and in future, to live in security within their present borders;

6. Emphatically advocates that the EEC should pursue a policy towards all the states in Central and Eastern Europe which adopt a course of reform so as to incorporate the emergency aid for Poland, Hungary and the GDR within the framework of longer-term financial, economic and environmental cooperation;

7. Emphasizes that developments in Central and Eastern Europe require a rapid response from the EEC and that the EEC must rapidly draw up a plan for support and cooperation within which framework an offer of institutionalized ties could be made to all countries desiring this kind of association when the time is ripe;

8. Stresses that a policy to ensure reciprocal security must be pursued in Europe, desires that the summit meeting between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev may make a positive contribution to this and to developments in Central and Eastern Europe and hopes that this summit meeting will contribute to the establishment of an order in Europe based on the principles of freedom, self-determination, security and peace;

9. Considers that the success of disarmament negotiations at all levels for all categories of weapon systems is important if further progress is to be made in Central and Eastern Europe, and calls therefore for rapid progress in this field and proposes that the resources released through the further reduction in the military threat be used to promote freedom and democracy in Central and Eastern Europe and to combat hunger and further development in the Third World;

10. Calls on the Council and Commission to report to the Presidents of the two superpowers on the overriding importance that the European Community attaches to the ongoing process of balanced mutual disarmament and to urge them to continue their efforts in this area by making significant progress in conventional and nuclear disarmament and to embark with determination on the process of achieving a definitive ban on chemical and biological weapons;

11. Stresses its support for the people of Czechoslovakia in the desire for freedom they are at present demonstrating in such an impressive way throughout that country;

12. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the Foreign Ministers meeting in EPC and the governments of the Member States and of the USA, the USSR, the GDR, Hungary and Poland.
2. Situation in Yugoslavia

— Joint resolution replacing B3-1325, 1360, 1371, 1372 and 1390/91

RESOLUTION
on the situation in Yugoslavia

The European Parliament.

A. deeply disturbed at the recent events in Yugoslavia.
B. whereas the European Community has a fundamental role to play in resolving the problems jeopardizing peace or respect for human rights in Europe by applying the principles and procedures of the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter,

C. welcoming the efforts of the Community's Foreign Ministers, supported by the CSCE, of which Yugoslavia is a co-signatory, to play a constructive role despite the difficult circumstances,

D. considering that European Community mediation constitutes the main hope for a peaceful solution to the problems of the Yugoslav peoples,

E. whereas the conflict between the Serb and Croat population is continuing; whereas there is a risk that other republics may become involved in this conflict, in particular Bosnia-Herzegovina,

F. whereas the peoples of Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia have overwhelmingly demonstrated their wish for self-determination in votes in their democratically elected parliaments and in subsequent referenda,

G. whereas the situation in Kosovo and elsewhere is one of permanent violation of democratic legitimacy and inter-ethnic conflicts are spreading throughout Yugoslavia,

H. having regard to the risks to security and peaceful coexistence which an irreversible crisis would entail for the Balkan region, the neighbouring countries and the process of democratization under way in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe,

I. recalling its previous resolutions, most recently of 10 July 1991 (\(^\d\) ),

1. Condemns the violence in Yugoslavia, and particularly the role of significant parts of the Federal Army, which have been engaged in military actions outside any control by the federal authorities;

2. Condemns also the activities of paramilitary elements on both sides of the conflict in Croatia;

3. Fully supports the initiative of the European Community in convening a peace conference;

4. Urges all the Yugoslav republics and the Federal Presidency to uphold the commitments undertaken in the ceasefire declaration they made in The Hague; calls, furthermore, for Community observers to be given every possible assistance and to be allowed to move freely throughout Yugoslav territory;

5. Requests that a democratically elected legitimate representation from the Kosovo and Vojvodina Parliaments participate in the peace conference;

6. Reiterates its belief that the right to democratic self-determination on the part of each of the constituent republics and autonomous provinces of the Federation is inalienable; believes that internal frontiers should only be amended following peaceful negotiation and, given the terrible violence of recent weeks, with the assistance of international mediation;

7. Insists strongly that, whatever becomes of Yugoslavia as it is presently constituted, guaranteed human rights and minority rights in each of the republics are indispensable if mutual trust between the peoples concerned is to be restored;

8. Considers that the protection of minority rights should be supported by the establishment, as a Community initiative, of a Court of Appeal, to operate according to the definitions and procedures set out by the Council of Europe;

9. Underlines the importance of all signatories of the CSCE Paris Charter strictly following the principles set out in that document in their approach to the Yugoslav crisis;

\(^{\dagger}\) Part II, Item 12 of that day's minutes.
10. Considers that political settlements of differences can not be based purely on ethnicity and rejects any attempt to expel people from the places where they live;

11. Believes that it is desirable for the process of self-determination to be complemented by new processes of cooperation between republics and autonomous provinces with a view to exercising jointly those elements of sovereignty which could most appropriately be pooled in this manner in order that populations of the same origin should not believe themselves to be separated by new barriers;

12. Considers that the current break-up of the Yugoslav State must be accompanied by proposals aimed at reintegrating the republics into a new regional and, possibly, institutional grouping on a strictly voluntary basis;

13. Believes that future cooperation, including financial assistance, between the Community and the federal authorities and individual republics must continue to be determined by the extent to which they respect the points outlined above; reiterates its belief that the strongest possible sanctions should be used against any party obstructing efforts to establish a comprehensive peace;

14. Recalls the hopes of the Community, set out in the Hague statement of 3 September, that normalization of the situation will permit it to unblock as soon as possible the substantial aid provided under the financial protocols;

15. Warmly endorses the Community’s promise to consider emergency aid to the victims of violence;

16. Considers that freedom and plurality of information between republics must be maintained or restored;

17. Is convinced that political parties, churches and social organizations can make a valuable contribution, using their own contacts and experts, towards encouraging peace and reconciliation in Yugoslavia, using channels other than political ones;

18. Expresses its support for peace initiatives in Yugoslavia such as the protests of soldiers’ mothers and the ‘European Peace Caravan’ which will travel across Yugoslavia in the next few days;

19. Believes that it is essential for Community action to develop on a coordinated basis and for the position on Yugoslavia to be adopted jointly by the Member States;

20. Considers that European Political Union urgently requires responsibilities in the field of foreign affairs, security and defence to make the policy of the coming Union more coherent and more influential;

21. Recalls its concern that the Council should urgently formulate an action plan to ensure the maintenance of adequate transport routes between Greece and the rest of the Community, if necessary by negotiating alternative routes;

22. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, European Political Cooperation, the parliaments of the Member States, the Federal Government and the governments and parliaments of the constituent republics of Yugoslavia and the participants in the peace conference in The Hague.
3. Enlargement — Agenda 2000

(a) A4-0368/97

Resolution on the Communication from the Commission ‘Agenda 2000 — for a stronger and wider Union’ (COM(97)2000 — C4-0371/97)

The European Parliament,

— having regard to the Commission communication (COM(97)2000 — C4-0371/97) (1),
— having regard to the conclusions of the European Councils of Copenhagen (21-22 June 1993), Essen (9-10 December 1994) and Madrid (15-16 December 1995),
— having regard to the conclusions of the European Council of Florence in June 1996 that accession negotiations with Cyprus should start six months after the conclusion of the intergovernmental conference,
— having regard to the European Council of Amsterdam in June 1997 which concluded that with the successful conclusion of the intergovernmental conference the way is now open for the launching of the enlargement process in accordance with the conclusions of the Madrid European Council,
— having regard to its resolution of 20 January 1993 on the structure and strategy for the European Union with regard to its enlargement and the creation of a Europe-wide order (2),
— having regard to its resolution of 12 July 1995 on Cyprus’s request for membership of the European Union (3),
— having regard to its resolution of 17 April 1996 on the White Paper: ‘Preparing the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe for integration into the internal market of the Union’ (4),
— having regard to its resolution of 19 November 1997 on the Amsterdam Treaty (5),

(1) C4-0329/97, C4-0374/97, C4-0375/97, C4-0381/97, C4-0380/97, C4-0376/97, C4-0379/97, C4-0389/97, C4-0382/97, C4-0383/97.
(2) C4-0001/97, C4-0042/93, p. 124.
(3) C4-0042/93, 599/95, p. 74.
(4) C4-0042/93, 599/95, p. 135.
(5) Minutes of that sitting, Part II, Item 20.
having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy, and the opinions of Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, the Committee on Budgets, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy, the Committee on Research, Technological Development and Energy, the Committee on External Economic Relations, the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on Regional Policy, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection, the Committee on Culture, Youth, Education and the Media, the Committee on Development and Cooperation, the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs, the Committee on Institutional Affairs, the Committee on Budgetary Control, Committee on Fisheries and the Committee on Women's Rights (A4-0368/97).

A. whereas any country which is situated in Europe and which has democratic institutions can legitimately aspire to join the Union,

B. whereas enlargement is a moral, political and economic challenge for the EU and presents an historic opportunity to shape the future of Europe,

C. whereas enlargement is a response to the changes that have taken place on the European continent since the largely peaceful liberation of Central and Eastern Europe between 1989 and 1991,

D. whereas a well-functioning Union, reinforced by the enlargement rather than weakened, is in the interest of both the applicant countries and the current Member States, and is expected to lay the foundations for a broader Communitarian Europe based on the rule of law, democracy, peace, solidarity and human dignity,

E. taking into account the Commission's assessment of the result of the Amsterdam European Council in 1997, bearing in mind the need to reform the institutions of the Union before enlargement takes place,

F. whereas, in any event, accession to the European Union is possible only after the institutional reform of the European Union,

G. convinced that the enlargement of the EU must be considered and handled as part of an overall design for the task of European integration,

H. whereas the European Council of Copenhagen in 1993 stipulated that applicant countries must have:

1. stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities,
2. a functioning market economy,
3. the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union,
4. the ability to take on the obligations of membership, which are related to the acquis, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union,

I. whereas the European Council at its Madrid summit in 1995 called on the Commission to submit, as soon as possible after the intergovernmental conference, the opinions on the individual applications and to prepare a composite paper on enlargement,

J. noting that according to Agenda 2000 the process leading to accession will start simultaneously for all applicants within the framework of the Reinforced Accession Partnerships,

K. insisting that an inclusive enlargement strategy, implying the involvement of all applicants in the accession process, is essential to avoid negative side-effects in certain applicant countries,

L. aware of the complexity of the accession process in which several types of negotiations will take place: bilateral negotiations about the way in which the criteria of membership can be met (RAP negotiations), leading to negotiations on the specific constitutional place of the country in the EU, as well as on transition measures and other similar issues, and multilateral talks on common interests in the sectors of the Second and Third Pillars.
M. taking account of the Commission’s view that enlargement is an opportunity for the Union not only in terms of its security and economy but also in terms of its culture and that the multilateral talks should concern a common vision of the educational, cultural and information dimension of European integration,

N. noting that, according to the opinion of the Commission, all Central and Eastern European countries, with the exception of — for the time being — the Slovak Republic, fulfill the political criteria of democracy to a sufficient degree,

O. noting the Commission remarks that none of the applicant Central and Eastern European countries at present fulfills the economic criteria of ‘Copenhagen’, thus acknowledging the logic of all applicant countries participating in the Reinforced Accession Partnership,

P. aware of the measures being taken in the applicant countries to improve the capacity and quality of the administrative procedures in the public sector and stressing the need for continued improvement which could be further advanced through an overall strategy in the applicant country as well as in the EU,

Q. taking account of the Commission’s view that, given the highly developed and complex character of the internal market, accession must be based on principles like full respect of the acquis, no ‘opt-outs’ and no derogations, and the restriction of transition measures to duly justified cases for limited periods of time,

R. taking account of the Commission’s view that the decision to open negotiations with Cyprus should be seen as a positive development which could promote the search for a political settlement,

S. taking account of the opinion of the Commission that Turkey is of high importance to the EU and deserves special attention, but reminding Turkey of Parliament’s expectation of visible progress in improving human rights, democratic reform, in the treatment of the Turkish Kurds and in finding a solution to the continuing occupation of the north of Cyprus,

T. aware of the gaps in the knowledge of the citizens of the Central and Eastern European countries concerning European integration and the operation of the European Union, and the similar lack of information in the European Union about the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the consequences of enlargement to the east,

U. conscious of the importance of involving all sectors of society in the European Union and the applicant countries, as much as possible, in the process of enlargement and integration,

V. convinced that reform of the common agricultural policy (specifically in those sectors that were excluded from the 1992 reform) and of the regional and cohesion policy is imperative, independently of the accession of one or more new member states,

W. stressing that enlargement to include the 11 applicant countries will bring about a considerable increase in the Union’s agricultural potential and will extend the market in raw and processed produce to an additional 100 million consumers;

X. whereas the devising and implementing of major projects on a European scale in the field of infrastructure, land, sea and air communication routes, regional development, environmental protection, etc., could be facilitated by the enlargement of the Union to include the applicant countries,

Y. convinced that European integration and the forthcoming enlargement will only succeed if the issue of reconciling respect for national interests with the need for solidarity amongst the Member States, whether old or new, is successfully resolved,

Z. whereas enlargement could constitute a major opportunity for the Union, in so far as it will enhance its political and economic potential, offer the 15 Member States the chance to secure new trade outlets, increase the Union’s weight in the field of foreign relations and in international institutions, strengthen its position on the international markets and extend its own internal market for trade in goods and investments, and encourage the creation of new jobs,

AA. whereas in view of the levels of democratic and economic development of the applicant countries and the economic, social, strategic and political challenges of enlargement, the forthcoming enlargement will be an event of historic scope which is not comparable with previous enlargements,
AB. believing that given the requisite political will, the end result of the process will be a stronger Union within a more stable Europe, better able to discharge its duties towards its citizens and take up its responsibilities in the international community,

AC. whereas the decision taken by the Commission to preselect the countries that in the medium run would be able to take on the obligations relating to their membership of the European Union is appropriate neither in political terms, since a further break is thus created between the applicant countries, nor in economic terms, since it penalizes the capacity for attracting direct foreign investment of those central and eastern European countries not taken into account, for economic reasons, when the accession negotiations began,

AD. whereas all the applicant countries have the right to participate in the enlargement process from the start, on the understanding that the duration of negotiations may vary subject to the ability of each country to accept the acquis communautaire and fully meet the criteria laid down at the Copenhagen European Council,

**Enlargement strategy**

1. Solemnly declares the European Union open to all European democracies that fulfil the criteria for membership, wishing to support its objectives as laid down in the Preamble to the 1957 Treaties of Rome, namely 'to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe and by thus pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty';

2. Considers the forthcoming enlargement of the European Union to be an entirely new stage in the process of the European integration requiring a thorough appraisal of all the institutional, political, economic and social implications for the Union and the applicant countries, and is convinced that this deepening can be enhanced by the full involvement of the national parliaments and the general public of all the countries concerned;

3. Asks the European Council to set in motion the enlargement process by a common act with all applicant countries; believes that all the applicant countries which do at present meet the criterion of a stable democratic order, respect for human rights and the protection of minorities laid down at Copenhagen, have the right to open the reinforced accession and negotiating process at the same time, and that this process should begin for all these countries early in 1998;

4. Believes, however, that the length of, and rate of progress in, negotiations could vary from country to country in terms of their ability to adopt the acquis communautaire, develop a market economy capable of facing the pressures of the single market, and equip themselves with stable institutions which respect the rule of law, democracy, human rights and the rights of minorities;

5. Furthermore, believes that the intensity of the negotiations and the timetable for their conclusion will depend upon the extent to which each applicant country fulfils the requirements for accession;

6. Therefore believes that intensive negotiations on an individual basis should begin with the countries which have made the most progress and — while noting some factual inaccuracies — supports the Commission's evaluations of which these countries presently are;

7. Maintains its view that the Union should neither directly nor indirectly determine in advance the date of full membership, as this date depends on the efforts made by the applicant countries;

8. Considers that the enlargement strategy should conform to the following principles:
   (a) the aim of the European Union in this process is to enable all the applicant countries to meet the Copenhagen criteria and accede to the Union in the shortest achievable timescale,
   (b) it should therefore begin from an encouraging stance toward the applicants, acknowledging their moral right to enter the Union, yet continuing to insist on fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria and so feeding the dynamism of the accession process,
   (c) the invitation to participate in the Reinforced Accession Partnerships should provide the political commitment to the membership of those applicant countries which seek to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria, and should be considered as the common starting line of the accession process as proposed in Agenda 2000,
   (d) the preparations for membership should include all Central and Eastern European countries on the basis of equal treatment, while acknowledging the vast differences in the state and speed of development which determine the type of topics to be handled,
(e) the annual assessments should underline the flexibility of the rank order of the applicant countries, which depends on the results attained and should not be considered as a static fact,

(f) the progress of the candidate countries in human rights protection should be regularly monitored and included in the annual assessments that the Commission intends to issue;

9. Stresses the importance it attaches to progress in particular in the following areas, while acknowledging that improved respect for human rights and democratic principles is a continuing challenge for both current and future EU Member States:
   – the ratification and implementation of legal human rights standards,
   – the legal accountability of police, military and secret services,
   – respect for the rights of minorities,
   – the right to free speech, and the freedom of the media,
   – the abolition of capital punishment, where applicable,
   – the eradication of torture and ill-treatment,
   – the acceptance of the principle of conscientious objection to military service,
   – the acceptance and encouragement of the non-profit-making sector as an important partner in the task of continually improving respect for human rights;

10. States that only a country which has abolished the death penalty can become a member of the European Union;

11. Is convinced that regional cooperation among applicant countries should be encouraged and facilitated and that this should be seen as a positive step towards EU membership; is of the opinion that EU accession should not hinder existing processes of regional cooperation such as the one between the Baltic Republics, nor should existing regional cooperation be an obstacle for any applicant’s membership;

12. Believes that an efficient and trustworthy public administration is a vital element in preparations for EU membership to strengthen the rule of law and economic and social cohesion, and that measures to improve the quality of public administration in all applicant countries must figure largely in the pre-accession strategy; supports with regard to the Reinforced Accession Partnerships the emphasis to be placed on education and training of civil servants and the accompanying financial facilities in order to increase the quality of government;

13. Calls on the applicant countries to establish efficient local, regional and national administrative structures under their constitutional systems, to encourage non-state sector operators at these levels and to improve financial control systems so that they can as future members make effective use of the Structural Funds and thereby reduce the enormous regional disparities and development problems;

14. Recalls that in the years to come the European Union has deadlines to meet, each one of which will constitute a challenge to European integration and will influence the others, namely the introduction of a single currency, the revision of the financial perspective and enlargement to include Cyprus and the countries of central and eastern Europe;

15. Considers the results that will be achieved during the accession process as building blocks in an organic process leading to Union membership, and expresses the wish that candidate countries will participate increasingly in existing EU programmes;

16. Stresses the fact that culture and education will be vital to the pre-accession strategy and that the development of the cultural and educational programmes will have an equal value for the Member States and the applicants;

17. Stresses that cultural and educational activity – which has, through its financial resources, an important multiplier effect – is an integral part of economic development, a direct and indirect source of job creation, and an essential factor in the quality of life and in strengthening European citizenship;

18. Believes that the institutional framework which has emerged from the Amsterdam Treaty does not meet the necessary conditions for achieving enlargement without endangering the operation of the Union and the effectiveness of its actions;
19. Confirms the view set out in its resolution of 19 November 1997 on the Amsterdam Treaty regarding the institutional reforms which must be achieved before any further enlargement and, in particular, repeats its calls for:

- adjustments to be made to the weighting of votes in the Council and to the number of Commission members, with the Member States retaining equal status with each other,
- qualified majority voting to become the general rule in the Council,
- the requirement of unanimity to be restricted to decisions of a constitutional nature (amendments to the Treaties, accessions, decisions on own resources, electoral procedure, application of Article 308 (former 235) EC),
- all other reforms required for enlargement to be adopted;

20. Regarding the methods to be adopted for this reform, reaffirms in particular

- its request that the Commission submit to it in good time before the meeting of the European Council in December 1998 a report containing proposals for a reform of all the Treaties needed in particular in the institutional field and in the context of enlargement,
- its request that this document be forwarded to the parliaments of the Member States, their views being awaited with interest,
- its intention to define its own position in good time as part of this process so that it may then engage in a political dialogue,
- its request that it be fully involved in the next intergovernmental conference and that it be decided by common binding agreement (on the model of the interinstitutional agreements) that the Treaty may enter into force only with Parliament’s approval;

21. Opposes the suggestion implicit in the idea that institutional reform could be postponed until the number of Member States exceeds twenty, because this idea reinforces the fear that there will be one privileged group of candidates and one with an uncertain future as to its membership;

22. Regards the European Conference as an essential instrument for political cooperation in order to involve all European countries aspiring to membership and linked to the Union by association agreements in multilateral talks with the Union on issues regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), on the basis of a concrete agenda reflecting the needs and interests of the participants, to be held once a year at the level of Heads of State and Government, including the Presidents of the Commission and the European Parliament;

23. Is of the opinion that the European Conference must not replace the bilateral negotiations on enlargement, but must be seen as a separate instrument of pan-European cooperation;

24. Considers that participation in the European Conference does not imply automatic accession on any defined timetable to the European Union;

25. Draws attention, in the context of accession terms, to the fact that the applicant countries should not grant third country products or businesses more favourable trade or financial treatment than their European Union counterparts with the aim of attracting direct foreign investment;

26. Points out that at the end of the accession negotiations it will be asked to ratify any further enlargement of the Union and stresses therefore that it has an important role to play in the European Conference and that the Council should take the appropriate measures to guarantee its full participation in this new forum;

27. Suggests to the applicant countries that ensuring continuity with regard to their respective negotiating delegations is of great importance for the rapid progress of the accession process;

28. Believes that the abolition of any visa obligation will be of priority for the countries concerned, as it will ease the traffic with, and the development of, the applicant countries involved;
29. Considers it urgent that all applicant countries should unconditionally ratify and implement the Geneva Convention and set up asylum procedures which are in line with the acquis and EU standards;

30. Proposes that the Union engage in a more active policy towards Cyprus in order to contribute effectively to the restoration of its integrity and encourage efforts to seek a political solution;

31. Takes the view that Turkey's application for EU membership needs serious consideration and underlines the need for a special relationship at high level between this country and the Union that goes beyond the existing Customs Union;

32. Stresses that the budgetary costs of enlargement are but a fraction of the economic peace dividend gained after the Cold War and that investing in enlargement sustains this peace dividend;

33. Considers it important that a special strategy be adopted to ensure that cooperation across the EU's external borders to reduce disparities in the standard of living and safeguard peace and stability can continue after enlargement;

34. Recognizes that regions adjoining applicant countries are particularly affected because of their geographical position and that they therefore require special support in the shape of programmes and resources, aimed especially at promoting cross-frontier cooperation and preventing abrupt changes in the competitive situation;

35. Considers that the European Union must ensure that enlargement does not reduce the amount of appropriations allocated in aid to traditional developing countries;

36. Stresses that the EU's relationships with the developing countries, including development cooperation, must be regarded more clearly than in the past as a part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy; in the context of enlargement the new Member States must also be integrated, to the extent their resources permit, into the EU's policy on developing countries and development aid;

37. Supports the view that the Phare funds should be used in a more decentralized way, thus enabling local and regional authorities to play a more active role in the use and monitoring of those funds; also welcomes the Commission proposals to make the Phare funds accession-driven instead of demand-driven;

38. Calls on the Commission to intensify its information campaign to the Central and Eastern European countries about the background and goals of the Union, its federal perspective and its fundamental values, as well as the implications inherent in the adoption, by the applicant countries, of the acquis communautaire and the obligations deriving from accession to the European Union;

39. Wishes to see special attention paid to the programme on democracy and human rights within the Phare programme;

40. Calls for the establishment of appropriate monitoring mechanisms by the EU institutions to keep under review the human rights situation in applicant countries, taking into account the standards set by the Council of Europe and the UN and utilizing the results of the work of the Council of Europe and the OSCE;

41. Calls on the Commission, further, to provide European public opinion with ongoing, comprehensive information about the enlargement, thereby involving it in this process, the success of which depends largely on public support;

42. Urges the Commission to encourage a broader range of direct links between socioeconomic players in the Union Member States and their counterparts in the applicant countries, particularly in the so-called sensitive economic sectors (agriculture, iron and steel, textiles, fisheries, shipbuilding), in order to foster mutual understanding and a constructive approach to problems which might give rise to tension, or even disputes, at the accession negotiations;
Impact on EU policies

43. Notes that the Commission’s view that 1.27% of GNP is enough to meet the challenges facing the EU over the period 2000-2006 depends on its assumptions about GNP growth, reform of Community policies and the outcome of the enlargement process; considers that a periodic re-assessment of such data is called for in order to make sure that the Commission’s estimates reflect the true implications of enlargement;

44. Considers that, given the inevitable uncertainty of these assumptions, the new financial framework must provide for a revision clause dealing both with expenditure limits, resources and policies in the event that the Commission’s assumptions prove not to be on target;

45. Firmly believes that the current system of own resources is likely to be a constraint on the funding of a successful enlargement and calls for this to be taken into account;

46. Considers that, although the Commission’s financial framework may appear too long for this kind of perspective, the very success of enlargement requires the budgetary stability provided by an interinstitutional agreement accompanied by the relevant financial perspective;

47. Asks the Commission, within the scope of its declared ‘policy against corruption’ to work with candidate countries to put in place policies and instruments which effectively dissuade, detect and punish corruption in public administration;

48. Believes that the existence of effective and credible public audit and financial control institutions, able to work closely with their EU equivalents, must be a pre-requisite for accession to the European Union;

49. Recalls the overall positive outcome of preceding enlargements, which have improved the Union’s position on international markets, increased trade between Member States and enhanced the Union’s international dimension, and thereby increased the total resources available for Member States and the Union;

50. Considers that enlargement will strengthen the weight and influence of the European Union in the international economic system, in international organizations and, more particularly, in the World Trade Organization; in this regard, wishes the European Union and the applicant countries to define forthwith a coordinated strategy for the commitments to be made in the World Trade Organization (the new Agenda themes) and the OECD and with regard to other multilateral economic and financial fora in which it is possible to engage in concerted action;

51. Considers it essential that the phased integration of the applicant countries into the internal market should go hand in hand with a more determined policy of harmonizing that market’s external aspects and coordinating the commercial policies of the applicant countries with the European Union’s commercial policy, and that this will offer numerous advantages, given the strengths of the applicant countries in terms of geographical position, natural resources and investment opportunities, in this way increasing economic growth in Member States and thus expanding the total income of the Union;

52. Calls for the applicant countries to be linked to the single market action plan in order to minimize the frictional losses which will arise as a result of joining the single market;

53. Calls in the framework of the approximation strategy and accession negotiations for greater encouragement for small and medium-sized businesses and the setting up of new businesses, including those in the area of trades and crafts, as this sector is underdeveloped in comparison with the existing Union of fifteen and needs a favourable social environment so that an SME culture can develop;

54. Considers the agreements on EMS II to be an extremely suitable framework in which to facilitate the entry of the Central and Eastern European countries into monetary union, and thinks it worth considering the idea of allowing those Central and Eastern European countries which are willing and able to do so to acquire associate member status in EMS II;
55. Recalls, however, that because the level of development of the applicant countries is lower than the Union average — the new members will all be net beneficiaries — enlargement will lead to a considerable drop in average per capita income in the enlarged Union, yet membership of the Union will in particular stimulate economic growth in the new Member States and will thus rapidly reduce this income gap.

56. Believes that it is imperative that the regional and cohesion policy be reformed by readjusting its objectives and making available the funds required to ensure its smooth operation during the pre-accession period and to enable it to cope with the pressures for sectoral and regional adjustment which will follow enlargement; notes furthermore that this imminent reform is not one that has been imposed as a result of enlargement but represents what is necessary in this area of policy in the light of past experience;

57. Believes that unless adequate financial resources are forthcoming there may, depending upon what reforms there are, in particular in regional policies and in the CAP — irrespective of the enlargement process — be a considerable cut in the funding currently earmarked for the Union regions benefiting under the cohesion policy, and the imbalance between the rich and poor regions of the Union will increase;

58. Stresses that it is important that the financial repercussions of enlargement should not undermine the principles of solidarity and economic and social cohesion within the Union;

59. Underlines the importance of developing the participation of the population in the process of European integration; calls therefore upon the Commission to support NGOs in the environmental, social and cultural fields, to promote the twinning of cities between East and West and to favour the access to information on EU policies, particularly on consumer protection, environmental and social policy and public health;

60. Insists that the acquis communautaire be included de jure and de facto in all social control mechanisms when the applicant countries accede and also notes that it is absolutely essential for the applicant countries to adjust to the European social model if social peace is to be ensured; also takes the view that the basis for broad social acceptance in the question of enlargement is an institutionalized social dialogue between autonomous partners on the two sides of industry, who must be involved in all relevant government decisions and flows of information at the accession negotiations;

61. Calls, with regard to the free movement of workers, especially in view of the phenomenon of commuting, for appropriate flexibly applied transitional periods based on assessment standards to be agreed, in order to:
   - ensure an urgently needed, socially compatible integration process,
   - reduce the pressure on the European social model,
   - ensure continuous economic, social and regional upward development in the applicant countries;

62. Notes with concern that the social question is listed in Agenda 2000 only as an issue to be considered, and that unfortunately no more than secondary importance is attached to the treatment of the social dimension itself; calls, therefore, for a White Paper on the social situation and social policy in the applicant countries to be drawn up as part of the pre-accession strategy, incorporating the following points:
   - urgent consideration of a common employment strategy in view of the unemployment situation in the EU Member States and the problems of the border regions,
   - particular attention to the importance of initial and continuing training for social integration and
   - a broad approach to social concepts and consideration of such aspects as the social implications of regional development tendencies, socio-cultural effects of migratory pressures and social consequences of transformation processes in agriculture;

63. Considers it essential for the applicant countries to be gradually but steadily brought into line with the Union's environmental and social standards; calls on the countries likely to join the European Union to ratify ILO Conventions 138 and 29 on forced labour and the employment of children, and to do so before any accession;
64. Considers that the *acquis communautaire* on equal opportunities for men and women must be imposed on the applicant countries and that in the negotiations respect for the application of the Treaty’s provisions (in Article 119) and current Directives on the equal treatment of women and men must be one of the criteria for assessing the Central and Eastern European countries’ state of preparation for accession;

65. Is concerned at the trafficking in human beings, particularly women originating in the Central and Eastern European countries, for the purposes of sexual exploitation in the Member States of the Union and considers that urgent measures need to be taken by the relevant authorities of the Central and Eastern European countries and the Member States to stop this clandestine immigration from those countries for trade of this particular kind;

66. Insists that the political criteria for accession must explicitly include respect for the freedoms and fundamental rights of women; considers that there is a need to revise the Treaty of Amsterdam before enlargement to incorporate the fundamental right to equal treatment of men and women;

67. Recalls, however, that the EU as a whole must be successfully overhauled and structural reforms, especially reform of the common agricultural policy, successfully concluded if the integration of the Central and Eastern European countries, which has been decided and makes sense, is to be a success for both sides;

68. Regrets that, in the section of Agenda 2000 dealing with agriculture, the Commission has put forward only piecemeal detailed proposals for individual production sectors instead of developing an overall approach which could have formed the basis for the orientation of all sectors of agricultural production;

69. Regrets that the Commission has not developed a specific policy framework for the rural community, as announced at the Cork Conference; fears that the effectiveness of using agricultural structural funds will be diminished because they are to be split between various objectives and support frameworks;

70. Points out that the economic situation is not identical in all applicant countries, especially in the farm sector, and that the specific situations in those countries must be taken into account when drawing up the measures and timetables for preparations for accession and the transitional measures and timetables that are to apply following integration;

71. Believes that, given the considerable difference in prices and the appropriateness of encouraging a rural development policy, the common agricultural policy in its current form should not be extended to the new members, and that perhaps it would be appropriate to consider whether to set long transitional periods for the application of the common agricultural policy to the new Member States;

72. Believes that, with regard to the common fisheries policy, the Commission should assist the new fleets and processing sectors in reaching the safety and hygiene standards required and recommends that all possible Community financial assistance be extended to the fishing sectors of the applicant states so that they can be modernised as quickly as possible;

73. Considers that the Commission should defend strongly all newly acquired third country fishery agreements, and allocate on a just and fair basis TACs and quotas always taking account of relative stability and historic fisheries performance; believes, moreover, that the environmental issues of pollution have to be resolved in the Black Sea so that a viable fishing industry can be re-established;

74. Considers that there is an urgent need to include in the 1992 reform all those market sectors which have so far been excluded from this reform (e.g. the sugar regime), as the 1992 reform is a prerequisite for extending the common agricultural policy to the accession countries;

75. Stresses the importance of mobility and of exchanging researchers and the establishment of more energy centres for protecting the environment and guaranteeing nuclear safety;

76. Draws attention to the established nuclear power activity in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and requires the Commission to prepare, prior to accession, an agreed programme to:

(a) bring existing nuclear power plants up to Western safety standards,

(b) ensure that operational safety is overseen by an independent authority recognized by the IAEA, and
(c) put in place safeguard procedures in line with the Euratom Treaty to ensure the protection of highly radiated material,

(d) arrange for nuclear power stations that cannot be brought up to the necessary level of international safety to be closed and not to go into operation;

77. Points out that coal is a significant component of primary energy sources in the applicant countries and calls on the Commission to prepare with the countries concerned an initiative supported by the Phare programme to improve the productivity of coal mining as well as the introduction of clean coal burning technology;

78. Stresses that via the funds earmarked for the reinforced pre-accession strategy, more attention should be given to the establishment of Trans-European Networks in Central and Eastern Europe;

79. Considers respect for fundamental rights and the protection of minorities in the applicant countries to be a matter of crucial importance and calls on the Commission as a matter of urgency to encourage and assist the applicant countries to solve outstanding problems;

80. Calls on the Commission, the Council, the Member States and the applicant states to give priority to all measures, including financing, which will create the conditions for the full attainment of an area of freedom, security and justice, in which controls at internal frontiers are dismantled, in order to avoid lengthy transitional periods in these fields;

81. Notes that the independence of the judiciary is one of the pillars upholding the rule of law and fundamental to the effective protection of the rights and civil liberties of all, including the citizens of the applicant countries and, in particular, those brought before the courts; reaffirms its respect for defendants' rights, victims' rights and means of redress, and the protection of witnesses in connection with the fight against international organized crime;

82. Notes with great concern the Commission's findings regarding the applicant countries' administrative and judicial capacity to apply Community law and calls for greater efforts by the Union in terms of financial and human resources to retrain judges, lawyers and administrators; points to the need, therefore, to establish a programme to raise awareness within the professions involved in the administration of justice, organized along similar lines to the Robert Schuman Action Plan;

83. Points out that the activities of the Union's credit institutions in some applicant countries are still severely hampered by the fact that, as a means of securing loans, real estate is worthless not least because of legal uncertainty about the possibility of realizing it in the event of the debtor's financial failure; points out furthermore that priority must be given to developing efficient and reliable land and business registry systems;

84. Recalls the importance, fully respecting the principle of subsidiarity, of further developing horizontal policies (social policy, environment, consumers, science, research and development and the information society) so as to take account of the specific features of the applicant countries and not weaken their impact on the populations of the Member States;

85. Believes that speedy and full accession of all applicant states will, in the long term, improve the environment throughout Europe, assuming a more intensive approach to important policy areas such as the environment, transport and energy, with special attention being paid to nature conservation in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in order to avoid loss of biodiversity;

86. Requests the Commission, in order to make the accession criteria realistic, to draw up a list of the most important elements of EU environmental legislation which applicant countries must satisfy at the time of accession, a list which should be established on the basis of objective criteria with the Council and Parliament; considers that in establishing transitional arrangements, particular attention should be paid to implementing provisions to improve air, water and soil quality and food safety and protection of health as a matter of priority, since in some instances very poor environmental conditions in the Central and Eastern European countries are already damaging the health and reducing the life expectancy of their citizens;
87. Asks the Commission, in accordance with the commitment in the Treaty, to integrate environmental and consumer protection considerations in other policy areas when EU policy is reformed with the environmental and consumer affairs ministers of both the EU and the Central and Eastern European countries being explicitly involved in working out the details of the reforms;

88. Points out that the applicant states should protect the health of their citizens by taking public health considerations into account in other policy areas and considers that the EU and the applicant states should actively support the development of NGOs and voluntary organizations in the health sector;

89. Calls on the Member States of the Union and the Commission to make every effort to combat unemployment effectively and thereby create the preconditions for the free movement of workers in an enlarged Europe;

90. Considers it necessary for the accession process to cover all aspects of the common transport policy, with particular reference to environmental, social and safety considerations, and for emphasis to be placed, wherever possible, on the use of modern technologies and intelligent systems, and that consideration must therefore be given to driving hours, engine emissions, vehicle standards, road-traffic regulations and all the legislation concerning the *acquis communautaire*;

*Opinions on the various countries*

**Bulgaria**

91. Considers that Bulgaria has recently made substantial efforts towards transition to a market economy, although decisive measures still need to be taken in the spheres of the environment, transport, agriculture, energy and justice; considers that a wide-ranging administrative reform at all levels is also needed if the *acquis communautaire* is to be applied properly;

92. Stresses Bulgaria’s compliance with the main political criteria and in this sense is convinced that the opening of negotiations would promote and encourage continuation of the reforms undertaken and would prevent the Bulgarian people from feeling excluded, whilst reaffirming the Union’s presence in a region of great political instability;

**Estonia**

93. Welcomes Estonia’s successful development into a functioning market economy and a democracy with stable institutions, but states that efforts have to be sustained fully to implement the *acquis*, to improve the quality of public administration and to further extend citizenship to members of minority groups;

94. Notes that Estonia can be regarded as having a functioning open market economy, despite economic inequalities between Tallinn and the rest of the country and the alarming trade imbalance which has partly been offset by foreign direct investment and tourism;

**Hungary**

95. Welcomes Hungary’s strong attachment to democracy and its exemplary minorities policy as well as the substantial progress made over a number of years in harmonizing its legislation to comply with the *acquis*, but states that further efforts are needed to meet the *acquis* in sectors such as environment, customs control and energy;

96. Assumes that the reinforced pre-accession strategy will help Hungary to prepare itself better to meet the obligations of membership and to overcome shortcomings with regard to modernizing its economy;
Latvia

97. Considers that Latvia has made substantial efforts towards the building of national institutions although, if the *acquis communautaire* is to be applied properly, measures still need to be taken in public administration and in the application and enforcement of the rule of law; considers also that the country has made successful reforms towards transition to a market economy;

98. Notes the existence of a certain number of problems such as the status of the Russian minority, the as yet uncompleted privatization process and the need to reform the legal and administrative systems;

Lithuania

99. Considers that Lithuania has made impressive political reforms and has a functioning market economy strong enough to meet many of the economic obligations of membership and has made progress in transposing the *acquis communautaire*; notes that important measures still need to be taken in public administration and in the application and enforcement of the rule of law;

100. Notes that the details of the Commission opinions on Lithuania show that the country has made very significant progress in its continued preparation for membership; appreciates the improvement of the economic situation and the lifting of restrictions on foreign exchange, prices and movements of goods; expects that the reinforced pre-accession strategy of the applicant state will further prepare the country for membership in those areas where continued progress is considered desirable such as enforcing legislation to tackle corruption and improving the system of rules covering the labour market;

Poland

101. Is conscious that Poland is by far the largest of the applicant countries, and that its accession would have a critical effect on existing EU policies, and takes note of the enormous progress towards reforms achieved since 1989, but states that further change and reform measures are required in areas such as the state-owned industries, agriculture, transport, the environment and border controls;

102. Assumes that the reinforced pre-accession strategy will help to overcome in the medium term Poland’s economic and environmental structural problems as well as to improve its capacity to control effectively its external borders;

Czech Republic

103. Calls on the Czech authorities to improve substantially the operation of the legal system, especially in order to guarantee fair trials within acceptable periods of time, and to establish rapidly a global policy which aims to avoid any kind of discrimination or marginalization of the Roma minority, not least by ratifying without further delay the European Council’s framework convention on national minorities;

104. Takes the view that the pre-accession strategy provides a good opportunity for the Czech Republic to carry out the necessary modernization of the state administration, reforming it on the basis of principles of quality and efficiency, and to carry out those economic reforms which are compatible both with the functioning of the internal market of the European Union (e.g. the national banking and financial structure) and with a European social model which allows for strong measures to combat unemployment and maintain a welfare state which meets the needs of the population;

Romania

105. Applauds the political and economic reforms implemented by Romania in preparation for its accession to the European Union, in particular those carried out since November 1996, and encourages Romania to continue its adjustment measures in line with the requirements of the *acquis communautaire*;

106. Notes the positive role played by Romania in maintaining the stability of the region, whether through the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty concluded with Hungary, the trilateral cooperation arrangements with neighbouring states or its participation in the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Agreement (BSECA);
107. Considers that the reinforced pre-accession strategy will allow Romania to tackle the economic and structural reforms needed to allow it to face the challenges of enlargement;

Slovenia

108. Recognizes Slovenia’s economic dynamism, which has allowed the country to reach the highest level of per capita revenue among the applicant countries;

109. Notes the fact that this country meets the political criteria laid down in Copenhagen and the decision of the Slovenian Parliament to ratify the European agreement with the Union and to adopt the constitutional changes requested;

Slovak Republic

110. Stresses the Slovak Republic’s European aspirations and notes that it has achieved, under difficult circumstances, good economic results which would qualify it for accession to the European Union at the same time as the more advanced countries if its political life were not tainted by certain practices which are not consistent with accepted democratic standards in the Union Member States;

111. Requests, nevertheless, that the Slovak Republic should, like the other applicant countries, benefit from the reinforced pre-accession strategy in order to continue to adapt its economy to the conditions of the single market and to ensure that it is not left behind when the political conditions for its accession are met; calls, in particular, for the accession partnership to be negotiated with this country to make provision for measures in the sphere of democracy — including minority rights — and for the democracy-related appropriations from the Phare programme to be used to support the measures which will be determined by joint agreement in this sphere;

112. Notes that the Slovak authorities are starting to send the European Union signals regarding their determination to democratize political life in the Slovak Republic and now looks to that country to take practical measures to implement the three recommendations issued by the Joint Parliamentary Committee;

Cyprus

113. Reasserts its position in its abovementioned resolution of 12 July 1995 that the accession negotiations with Cyprus must begin six months after the end of the intergovernmental conference, as has already been confirmed on a number of occasions by the European Council;

114. Calls on the Council and the Commission to do everything in their power to promote a peaceful solution to the Cyprus question in accordance with the UN Resolutions, without the accession negotiations with the Cypriot Government being linked to a solution to the dispute; invites the Commission to persuade the two communities on the island of the advantages of EU membership and to involve both communities in the enlargement process;

115. Calls on the Commission and Council to give proper acknowledgement to the Republic of Cyprus’s excellent economic and financial position which would enable the island to meet the EMU criteria as of now, thus facilitating the accession negotiations which must not, under any circumstances, depend on the state of relations with Turkey and which must be concluded without delay;

* * *

116. Notes with satisfaction that the Council intends to consult the European Parliament on the general Regulation on pre-accession partnership, but stresses that it should also be consulted on the individual Regulations, bearing in mind that this should not slow down the pre-accession process;

117. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the applicant countries.
Part of the new European Parliament History Series, this study analyses the events that led to democratic change in Central and Eastern Europe in the years 1989-90, from the perspective of the Parliament, as detailed in materials to be found in its Historical Archives. It traces Parliament's discussions and positions during this crucial period, including its debates on Post-Communism and on Eastern enlargement.

The studies in the European Parliament History Series are primarily based on documents preserved in, and made available to the public by, the Historical Archives of the European Parliament.