
Peace and Security in 2018

Overview of EU action and
outlook for the future



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Peace and Security in 2018

Overview of EU action and outlook for the future

This is the first EU Peace and Security Outlook, produced by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS). The series is designed to analyse and explain the contribution of the European Union to the promotion of peace and security internationally through its various external policies.

The study provides an overview of the issues and current state of play. It looks first at the concept of peace and the changing nature of the geopolitical environment. It then focuses on the centrality of the promotion of peace and security in the EU's external action and proceeds to an analysis of the practical pursuit of these principles in three main areas of EU policy: development, democracy support, and security and defence. It concludes with an outlook to the future.

A parallel study, published separately, focuses specifically on EU peacebuilding efforts in the Western Balkans. The studies have been drafted with a view to their presentation at the Normandy World Peace Forum, in June 2018.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The promotion of global peace and security, following the model of its own peace project, is a fundamental goal and central pillar of the external action of the European Union (EU). Both within and beyond the EU, there is a widespread expectation among citizens that the Union will deliver results in this crucial area. Yet, the deteriorating security environment of the past decade has posed significant challenges. Following the release of its Global Strategy in 2016, and in line with the wording and spirit of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has been intensifying its work in pursuit of peace and security in a number of key policy areas. In this respect, 2017 was a year of implementation and of transforming vision into action.

The world has become more peaceful in recent centuries. Europe in particular has experienced the longest period of peace in its history, not least thanks to a regional network of international organisations, of which the EU is a major example. Today, peace is defined in a positive way, not only as 'the absence of war', but also in terms of the quality of government, the free flow of information and low levels of corruption. In this context, out of the 39 most peaceful countries in the world, based on the 2017 Global Peace Index of the Institute for Economics and Peace, 22 are EU Member States. Nevertheless, the instability that characterises the geopolitical environment has translated into a sharp deterioration of peace in the EU's neighbourhood and has challenged its internal security.

The over-arching objectives of the EU guide it in all facets of its activity in this area, including common foreign and security policy (CFSP); democracy support; development cooperation; economic, financial and technical cooperation; humanitarian aid; trade; and neighbourhood policy. As foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty, the 2016 Global Strategy introduced several elements to refine and improve the EU's efforts, including the promotion of resilience and capacity-building in the world. This approach is reflected in the EU's external policies.

As far as development is concerned, a significant share of EU aid goes to fragile states and to issues related to securing peace. In 2017 the EU committed to a 'new consensus on development', which emphasises the role of development cooperation in preventing violent conflicts, in mitigating their consequences and in aiding recovery from them. The new consensus clearly focuses on fragile and conflict affected countries, which are the main victims of humanitarian crises. On the ground, the EU has been able to strengthen the nexus between security, development and humanitarian aid through the implementation of comprehensive strategies, for example in the Horn of Africa and in the Sahel.

With the launching of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the European Defence Fund and other such initiatives, 2017 saw remarkable progress towards a more autonomous and efficient EU common security and defence policy (CSDP). Of all the policy fields in the area of peace and security, this is the one that has enjoyed the greatest support from EU citizens (75 %) for more EU spending. Through the CSDP, the EU also runs 16 missions and operations, making it one of the UN's main partners in peacekeeping. These elements of 'hard power', together with the EU's long-standing experience in the practice of soft power, form the backbone of its action for peace and security.

Looking to the future, the complexity of the global environment is expected to increase. At the same time, an analysis of ongoing EU legislation indicates that the EU is aiming to

strengthen its presence and efficiency in the area of peace and security. The discussions on the funding of specific initiatives in the context of the 2019 annual budget and the post-2020 multiannual financial framework (MFF) will focus on streamlining the EU's various programmes and instruments, allowing for sufficient flexibility to respond to unforeseen threats, as well as implementing innovative financial instruments. Underlying the quest for flexibility, efficiency and innovation, is the strategic goal to empower the EU in its global role as a promoter of peace and security, while adapting to the new realities of the international order.

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List of main acronyms used

ATT:	Arms Trade Treaty
CARD:	Coordinated Annual Review
CBRN:	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CFSP:	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP:	Common Security and Defence Policy
EWS:	Early Warning System
DCI:	Development Cooperation Instrument
DEVCO:	Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
ECHO:	European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
EDA:	European Defence Agency
EDAP:	European Defence Action Plan
EDF:	European Development Fund
EDTIB:	European defence technological and industrial base
EDU:	European Defence Union
EEAS:	European External Action Service
EEC:	European Economic Community
EFI:	External Financing Instrument
EFSD:	European Fund for Sustainable Development
EFTA:	European Free Trade Association
EIB:	European Investment Bank
EIDHR:	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
ELM:	External Lending Mandate
ENI:	European Neighbourhood Instrument
ESS:	European Security Strategy
EUCAP:	EU Capacity-Building Mission
EUGS:	Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy
EUNavfor:	EU Naval Force
EUTM:	EU training mission
GDP:	Gross domestic product
GFEA:	Guarantee Fund for External Action
IAEA:	International Atomic Energy Agency
IcSP:	Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
IDPs:	Internally displaced persons
IfG:	Instrument for Greenland
IfS:	Instrument for Stability
IGAD:	(East African) Intergovernmental Authority on Development
INSC:	Instrument for Nuclear Safety Co-operation
IPA:	Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance
JCPOA:	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran
MERCOSUR:	Mercado Común del Sur
MFF:	Multiannual financial framework
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT:	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

ODA:	Official development aid
PCIA:	Peace and conflict impact assessment methodology
PESCO:	Permanent structured cooperation
PI:	Partnership Instrument
PKO:	Peacekeeping operations
RBPA:	Recovery and peacebuilding assessment methodology
SDGs:	UN sustainable development goals
SHARE:	EU initiative for supporting the Horn of Africa's resilience
TEU:	Treaty on European Union
UN:	United Nations
UNGA:	United Nations General Assembly
WMDs:	Weapons of Mass Destruction

1. Introduction

1.1. A volatile geopolitical environment

The past decade has been characterised by volatility and disruption, leading to continual adaptation and transformation at the local, regional and global level alike. For some analysts, global instability is 'the new normal',¹ where disorder and tension have gradually replaced two decades of relative stability across the world. Since 2012, conflicts have been on the rise, with the number of civil wars and attacks perpetrated by states and armed groups increasing for the first time in a decade. Violent extremism, terrorism and hybrid threats have grown to constitute new sources of major risks to security, peace and stability around the world. In the words of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS), 'we live in a world of predictable unpredictability' (see Figure 2).

In this environment, actors – of various sizes – around the globe have reconsidered and adapted their strategies with regard to security and the preservation of stability. The recognition of new threats to peace and security is reflected in the national security strategies (or equivalent strategic documents) of all the UN Security Council members, the EU and other G20 states, some of which are summarised in Figure 1.

Figure 1 – Threats to peace and security recognised in strategic documents²

	EU Global Strategy											
		Terrorism	Hybrid threats	Economic crisis	Climate change	Energy insecurity	Violent conflicts	Cyber security	Disinformation / Information warfare	Fragile state	Transborder crimes	WMDs
UN Security Council	China	✗					✗	✗				
	France	✗		✗	✗	✗	✗	✗		✗	✗	✗
	Russia	✗		✗		✗	✗	✗			✗	✗
	UK	✗			✗	✗	✗	✗		✗	✗	✗
	USA	✗				✗		✗	✗	✗	✗	✗
Other G20 countries	Brazil	✗						✗	✗	✗	✗	✗
	Germany	✗			✗	✗	✗	✗	✗			✗
	Japan	✗		✗				✗				✗
	Australia	✗		✗	✗	✗		✗		✗	✗	✗

EU Member States


Other G20 countries

EU Member States
 Other G20 countries

Data sources: [EU Global Strategy](#); [China's Military Strategy](#); [Livre Blanc sur la defense et sécurité nationale \(France\)](#); [Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation](#); [National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: annual report 2016](#) (UK); [National Security Strategy of the United States of America](#); [Livro Branco](#) (Brazil); [Weissbuch 2016 zur Sicherheitspolitik und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr](#); [National Security Strategy](#) (Japan); [Strong and Secure: A Strategy for Australia's National Security](#).

¹ R. Muggah, [The UN Has a Plan to Restore International Peace and Security - Will it Work?](#), World Economic Forum, 2016.

² Some issues are also present in several strategies but not per se in the EUGS: migration (Germany, Australia), pandemics (US, Germany, UK), piracy (Brazil), outer space (China).

Figure 2 – Threats to peace and security in the current global environment

TERRORISM

Number of
civilians killed
by terrorists

in 2016
27 679

18 475
in 2017

22 487
Terrorist attacks in
2017



More than
5 000 people have
travelled from Europe to fight for
Islamist groups in Syria and Iraq and
become foreign fighters, with the majority
joining ISIL / Da'esh.

On average, 30 % of the 5 000 have
returned to their home countries to
date.

405 out of
a total of 691
suicide attacks in
2017 were in Iraq
and Syria

CYBERSECURITY

The EU holds cyberdialogues with China,
India, Japan, South Korea and the United States



The US has publicly blamed North Korea for
the so-called WannaCry cyber attack that affected hospitals,
banks and other companies across the globe in 2017.



Most cyber-attacked industries
in 2017

> US\$50 billion A YEAR
spent by Google, Amazon, Microsoft,
and Intel alone on digital innovation

data volume
is projected to increase 50-fold
between 2016 and 2020

US\$3.62 million
global average cost of a data breach

51%
of the world's people
connected to the
internet

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

56 states
have so far signed the Treaty on the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons


The US plans to spend US\$400 billion
over the 2017-2026 period to maintain and
modernise its nuclear forces.

North Korea
is estimated to have enough fissile material
for approximately 10–20 nuclear warheads

NATO Allies
recognised cyberspace as
a domain of operations
in July 2016

14 935 nuclear weapons worldwide in 2017

93 % of all nuclear weapons




Data sources: [UNHCR](#), [United Nations](#), [UNOCHA](#), [SIPRI](#), [Uppsala Conflict Data Program for 2016](#), [International Crisis Group](#), [OECD](#), [JTIC 2017 Global Attack Index](#); [IHS Jane's](#); [Washington Post](#); [2017 Ponemon Cost of Data Breach study](#), [Bloomberg](#), [NATO](#), [Official 2017 Annual Cybercrime Report](#), [EUISS 2017 Internet Security Threat Report](#), [2017 Internet Security Report](#); [SIPRI](#), [White House](#), [EPRS](#).

The EU Global Strategy, elaborated in 2016, echoes the concern about the state of the world by labelling our times as 'times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union'. The violation of the European security order in the east, the rise of terrorism and violence in North Africa and the Middle East, as well as within Europe itself, the lagging economic growth in parts of Africa, the mounting of security tensions in Asia and disruptions caused by climate change, are only a few of the threats documented in the Strategy.

As a consequence of the challenging security environment, emerging or re-emerging global actors, such as Russia, China and India, have increasingly boosted their defence spending (Figure 3) and upgraded their military capabilities. At the same time, and largely due to the effects of the economic and financial crisis, defence spending in the EU-28 had experienced a significant fall for almost a decade and only rose again for the first time – by 2.3 % – in 2014.³ The response to the need for a stronger and more capable EU in security and defence matters has been a particularly prominent issue on the Juncker Commission's agenda in recent years.⁴

Figure 3 – Change in military spending of major global actors in the past decade



Data source: IISS, [The Military Balance 2018](#), IHS Jane's.

According to the Global Peace Index, an annual report produced by the Australian think-tank, the Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017 was marked by a slight increase in peacefulness, for the first time since 2014.⁵ But the report also noted that, in 2017, violence has cost the global economy US\$14.3 trillion in purchasing power parity terms – equivalent to 12.6 % of the world's GDP. War alone has cost the global economy US\$1.04 trillion. At the same time, peacebuilding expenditure is an estimated US\$10 billion (less than one per cent of the cost of war). In this context, the EU's holistic approach to the promotion of peace, as outlined in Chapter 2, is particularly relevant, not only to fighting the roots of the disruption of peace, but also to reducing the cost of 'non-peace' in favour of investment towards development and peace.

³ [National Breakdown of Defence Data](#), European Defence Agency, 2016.

⁴ E. Bassot and W. Hiller, [The Juncker Commission's Ten Priorities](#), EPRS, 2018.


⁵ [Global Peace Index](#), Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017.

1.2. Is the world (and Europe) more peaceful?

In the past decade, controversy has emerged about the 'long-peace'. Some scholars, like Steven Pinker, have argued that over the past centuries of human history, and even though the First and Second World Wars were immensely destructive, there has been a global tendency towards a decrease in violence.⁶ In ancient societies, violence was everywhere (inside and outside the family) and legitimate. As a result, the likelihood of dying from violent causes was much greater in previous centuries than it is today.

As Norbert Elias pointed out 70 years ago, one central aspect of this decrease in violence lies in the fact that across the world, the modern state has monopolised most of the violence (army, police forces) as well as the means to wage war (taxation).⁷ This resulted in a dramatic drop in the number of homicides worldwide and in Western Europe in the last centuries, as showed by Max Roser (see Figure 4).

Figure 4 – Homicides per 100 000 people per year since 1800



Source: [Our World in Data](#), 2018.

As Europeans know well, this does not mean that violence disappeared, because bloody inter-state wars continued, equipped with deadlier weapons, in recent centuries. But Europeans also lived through long periods of relative peace in the second part of the 19th century and the first years of the 20th century. In the 50 years after the end of the Second World War, the continent lived under the threat of nuclear war, and the people of central and eastern Europe under violent authoritarian regimes. After the Cold War, wars and violence, and even genocide (Srebrenica) took place on the European continent, which

⁶ S. Pinker, *The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined* (2011). The idea has been criticised with regard to the use of data, especially from prehistoric times (D.P. Fry, *War, Peace, and Human Nature: The Convergence of Evolutionary and Cultural Views*, 2013). Nevertheless, the book gathered more comments on the reasons for the decline in violence (emergence of the state, urbanisation, literacy rates) than on the fact that our world is less violent.


⁷ N. Elias, *The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations*. Revised edition, Blackwell Publishing, 2000.

is not exempt from violence even today, with millions of displaced people in Ukraine⁸ and more than 10 000 casualties there.⁹

After the First World War, the first movements seeking European Union, such as 'Pan-Europa', founded by Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, a Hungarian-Japanese intellectual, mobilised European civil society. Meanwhile, the League of Nations, in Switzerland, brought together mostly European countries to ensure peace on the continent. Jean Monnet worked actively in that context to settle conflicts between Germany and Poland in Silesia, through international tribunals, and discovered a functionalist model that would later inspire him. However, the League of Nations failed to prevent a new war on the continent because of its very lax cooperation and monitoring mechanisms.

Nevertheless, in comparison with past centuries, it is clear that Europe has been experiencing a 'long-peace' since 1945. Under the EU and NATO umbrellas, the perspective of inter-state wars among member states disappeared and generations of Europeans lived their life without the prospect of fighting at their national borders.

Figure 5 – Peace and war among European states in the last five centuries



Source: [Our world in Data](https://ourworldindata.org), 2018.

In 1950, Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman and the other founding fathers of the EU decided to take a functional approach, by pooling the coal and steel resources needed to conduct war. It led to the creation of a very tight web of organisations and legal mechanisms for conflict resolution that enabled peace to be established between the Member States through cooperation in the fields of human rights and culture (Council of Europe), in the military alliance against the Soviet threat (NATO) and the progressive extension of economic cooperation (coal and steel with the ECSC, atomic energy with Euratom), and in a move towards economic integration (the European Economic Community (EEC), and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)). All these forms of cooperation, together

⁸ See [Ukrainian crisis](#), UNHCR, 2018.

⁹ See [Conflict in Ukraine](#), Council on Foreign Relations, 2018.


with the American assistance provided by the Marshall Plan, enabled Europeans to regain prosperity and further develop their democracies after the war. This led to what historians call 'democratic peace' – as democracies do not generally go to war with each other. By its very existence, European integration has saved the lives of countless Europeans who have lived through the greatest period of peace in the history of the continent, unlike those in previous generations who lived through wars in which millions of people died, and who launched this great continental project.

The EEC economic project gradually expanded towards western and northern Europe, then to the new democracies of the south, followed by the east after the end of the Cold War. Never in their history had European states been part of the same political body and, for the first time, it was their choice. This institutional and economic model that the European Union has managed to create is viewed with interest by the states and sub-regional organisations of Africa (African Union), Latin America (Mercosur) and Eurasia (Eurasian Union) for its peace-making virtues. Moreover, the European Union is committed to global peace: it is the world's leading donor of development aid and is very active in peace-keeping missions under the auspices of the United Nations. Since 2003, it has taken part in more than 30 civilian and military anti-piracy and peacebuilding missions.

1.3. How to measure peace?

If the world is more peaceful than it used to be, and if the situation is statistically more secure for each individual, where does the feeling of insecurity come from, and why is there a growing perception of a world at risk? One answer can be found in the 'Tocqueville paradox':¹⁰ the better the situation, the more the distance between the reality and the ideal situation is difficult to accept. For example, according to the World Bank, around 1.1 billion people have moved out of extreme poverty since 1990. In 2013, 767 million people lived on less than US\$1.90 a day, down from 1.85 billion in 1990.¹¹ Today, around 10 % of the world population lives in extreme poverty, down from 52 % in 1981.¹² Nevertheless, the perception of inequalities in the world remains very strong.

Figure 6 – 'A Violence-peace spectrum and manifestations of violence and peace'



Data source: [Stockholm International Peace Research Institute \(SIPRI\)](https://www.sipri.org/), 2016.

¹⁰ J. Elster, *A. de Tocqueville, the First Social Scientist*, Cambridge University Press, 2009.

¹¹ [Understanding Poverty](https://www.worldbank.org/), World Bank, 2018.

¹² M. Camdessus, *Vers le monde de 2050*, Fayard, p. 22.

This is why the modern definition of peace refers not only to 'an absence of war', but also includes elements of well-being: we demand more from peace. This positive dimension of peace is difficult to measure as it is a continuum, between inter-state war

Figure 7 – Components of the Positive Peace Index



Source: [Positive Peace Report](#), 2017.

and positive public perceptions. As demonstrated by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (see Figure 6), this continuum includes international (i.e. wars, hybrid conflicts) and intra-national violence (i.e. gang or police violence, forced displacements). Therefore, any measure of peace has to take numerous dimensions into account. One attempt has been made in recent years by the Institute for Economics and Peace.¹³ Its annual 'Positive Peace Index' (PPI) takes into account 24 indicators, including various aspects, such as ongoing domestic and international conflict, acceptance of the rights of others, societal safety and security or

militarisation (Figure 7).¹⁴ This index tries to go beyond a negative conception of peace as non-war to show that qualitative peace has to include a broad number of dimensions.

1.4. Europe: The most peaceful region, but the situation is degenerating

In the 2017 Positive Peace Report, all EU Member States score in the very high or high categories of the positive peace index. Out of the 39 most peaceful countries in the world, 22 are EU Member States. Of the 10 most peaceful countries in the world, 6 are EU Member States (Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and Germany) and 3 are very deeply connected to the EU market and policies through EFTA (Norway, Iceland and Switzerland). Wider Europe also appears to be peaceful, as Kosovo is the only European country ranked as 'low'.

Nevertheless, the state of peace, according to the same index, is no longer improving – on the contrary. The PPI of the 36 European countries decreased since 2005 in the fields of sound business environment, good relations with neighbours, high level human capital and equitable distribution of resources.

In addition, the EU's neighbourhood continues to be subject to a number of ongoing conflicts. Of the 84 crises in the world monitored by the International Crisis Group (ICG), 20 are either in the EU (Spain, Cyprus), in countries negotiating their accession to the EU or with a European perspective (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey) or in countries included in the European Neighbourhood Policy – ENP (Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya,

¹³ [Institute for Economics and Peace](#), 2018.

¹⁴ [Global Peace Index](#), Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017. Methodology: p. 114.


Moldova, Palestine,¹⁵ Ukraine, Syria, Tunisia). According to the ICG, Belarus and Morocco are the only two ENP countries not subject to a conflict, although this does not take into account the dispute on Western Sahara.¹⁶

1.5. European action on peace and security: What do Europeans and others think and expect?

1.5.1. Views from within the EU: what do Europeans think and expect?

Unlike the fixed EU competences enshrined in the Treaties, the preferences of citizens regarding EU involvement in certain areas change. These preferences vary significantly, depending on the policy area in question. They are inevitably influenced by the sense of instability and transition due to the migration crises and terrorist threats and attacks. According to a Eurobarometer survey conducted in 2016¹⁷ and then repeated in 2017,¹⁸ European citizens would like to see increased EU involvement in policy areas in the realm of peace and security. This preference for more EU level external actions was even stronger in 2017 than in 2016.

Figure 8 – Preference for more EU intervention in different policy areas



Data source: J. Nancy, [Two years until the 2019 European elections](#), EPRS, 2017.

The highest increase in preference for more EU intervention from 2016 to 2017 is in the field of foreign policy (a seven-point increase, up to 57 %), followed by the promotion of democracy and peace in the world (five-point increase, up to 73 %), and security and defence policy (two-point increase, up to 68 %). Albeit the fastest growing, citizens' interest in more EU involvement in foreign policy is lagging behind the significantly higher expectations related to specific aspects of foreign policy. We see this in the case of promotion of peace and democracy in the world, security and defence policy, and protection of external borders. It would appear that when the policy areas are more clearly defined, citizens find them somewhat easier to understand and relate to, and they

¹⁵ This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue.

¹⁶ For more on Western Sahara, see the [relevant section](#) on the UN website.

¹⁷ J. Nancy, [Europeans in 2016: Perceptions and expectations, fight against terrorism and radicalisation](#), EPRS, 2016.

¹⁸ J. Nancy, [Two years until the 2019 European elections](#), EPRS, 2017.

tend to express a stronger preference for more EU intervention. In addition, when evaluating particular issues and events related to peace and security, EU citizens see the benefit of joint EU action more clearly. For example, according to the same 2017 study, 73 % of Europeans consider joint EU action regarding the growing instability in the Arab-Muslim world as better defending their interests, and only 17 % consider individual national actions to be preferable. Similarly, 71 % prefer joint EU action regarding the increasing power and influence of both Russia and China.

A 2016 study by the Bertelsmann Stiftung, focusing on border protection and freedom of movement, shows that a clear majority of interviewees believe that an enhanced level of EU cooperation is necessary in order to meet security challenges. According to the study, 79 % of European citizens support a common European policy on migration, with 52 % declaring a preference for migration being an EU responsibility, and 27 % preferring shared responsibility between the EU and the Member States. Regarding border protection, 87 % believe that the EU has a common duty to protect its external borders.¹⁹

In the areas related to peace and security, the fight against terrorism is the field for which EU citizens demonstrate the highest support for EU intervention. In both the 2016 and 2017 Eurobarometer surveys, EU citizens demonstrated overwhelming and rather consensual support for increased EU intervention in this field. Some 82 % of all EU citizens in 2016, and 80 % in 2017, want expanded Union involvement in the future. Differences between countries are smaller than in other policy areas; it is also, therefore, the most consensually supported policy regarding EU intervention. Similarly, there is strong support amongst EU citizens for even greater EU involvement in the promotion of democracy and peace in the world, the issue of migration, the protection of external borders, and security and defence policy (between 73 % and 68 % of all EU citizens).


The Eurobarometer survey also shows that there is a clear gap between citizens' evaluation of EU involvement in these policy areas and their expectations of that involvement. Although in some policy areas the majority of citizens still find the level of EU involvement to be insufficient, the gap is closing and the number of those considering EU action to be inadequate is falling sharply. In all the listed policy areas, more citizens evaluate EU involvement as sufficient in 2017 than in 2016. The improved evaluation of the EU's performance and its positive impact reinforces the trend of increased preference for further EU intervention in the areas related to peace and security. The most significant improvement of citizens' evaluation of EU action is in the fight against terrorism (a 12-point drop, to 57 % of people considering the EU's action to be insufficient). It is followed by protection of external borders (nine-point drop, to 52 % who think it is insufficient, and an eight-point increase, to 34 % who think it is adequate), and the issue of migration (eight-point drop, to 58 %). However, there are significant discrepancies between the opinions found in different Member States. For example, 87 % of Greeks evaluate EU action on migration as insufficient, but only 41 % of Luxembourgers share the same opinion. Currently, only a minority of citizens share negative evaluations of the relevant policy areas: foreign policy – 36 % (four-point drop since 2016 in those who think it is insufficient, and five-point increase, to 42 % who think it is adequate); security and defence policy – 44 % (seven-point drop from 2016 in those who think it is insufficient, and six-point increase, to 41 % who think it is adequate); and promotion of democracy – 46 % (five-point drop from 2016 in those who think it is insufficient, and four-point increase, to 41 % who think it is adequate). The increased

¹⁹ C. de Vries and I. Hoffmann, [Border Protection and Freedom of Movement](#), Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016.

attention of EU institutions on policies related to peace and security is acknowledged by citizens. Nevertheless, there is still more to be done to match their expectations.

Although present, the preference to turn peace and security policies into an EU budget spending priority is somewhat lagging behind the clear preference of citizens for intensified EU involvement in this area.

Figure 9 – Preference for more EU spending in different policy areas



Data source: European Commission, [Special Eurobarometer 461](#), 2017.

According to a Eurobarometer survey, defence and security policy enjoys the strongest support for more EU spending amongst all peace and security-related policies.²⁰ With a two-point increase since 2015, seven per cent of citizens supported it as an EU spending priority in 2017. The changes in the preferences mirror the changes in the perceived security situation. Currently, security and defence is in sixth place in citizens' ranking of the most important spending priorities, which is a significant change compared to the tenth place it occupied in 2011. Nevertheless, there is no clearly declared preference for a significant increase in spending on peace and security policies.

Curiously, only four per cent of EU citizens would like to see migration issues as an increased spending priority in 2017, which is one point less than in 2015. This drop is despite the strong preference for more EU involvement in the issue. More research is required to determine to what extent the reason for that is a preference for budget-neutral EU policy involvement in migration issues, and to what extent the reason is the impression of EU citizens that the EU budget is already tilted in that direction. In 2017, when asked to rank the same policy areas according to people's perception of current EU budget spending, citizens rank defence and security at second place and immigration at third (the latter was positioned seventh when answering the same question in 2015). In other words, citizens perceive defence and security as the policy area with the second largest share of the EU budget. When comparing the citizens' perception of EU spending in a particular policy area with their preferences, the areas with a negative balance, i.e. where citizens think that the EU spends more than it should, includes all peace and security-related areas (assistance to EU neighbours, immigration issues, defence and


²⁰ [Public opinion survey](#), European Commission, Brussels, 2017.

security, and development and humanitarian aid). Although citizens' perception of EU spending priorities does not mirror the actual spending priorities in the budget, it can have a strong impact on their opinions.

There is a slight increase in the preference for EU spending in the area of development and humanitarian aid, but, despite this, it is still not a significant spending priority for EU citizens. Similarly, the preference for EU spending on assistance to EU neighbours remains the same and is positioned almost at the bottom of the spending priorities.

The lack of a complete overlap between the preferences for increased EU involvement in the peace and security area, on the one hand, and the support for increased EU spending in that field, on the other, points to the need to explore citizens' preferences for particular policy actions in greater depth.

Figure 10 – Support for potential EU policies in the field of peace and security



Data source: European Commission, [Special Eurobarometer 461](#), 2017.

Since 2015, EU citizens consistently demonstrate a preference for increased cooperation between the 28 Member States on defence and security programmes – approximately three quarters of citizens – and on foreign policy as a whole – approximately two thirds of citizens (data from a Eurobarometer survey).²¹ During the period since 1992 when EU citizens have systematically been asked this same question, support for common defence and security programmes and for a common foreign policy has remained relatively stable. There is a clear trend of a decrease in the number of people who have no opinion on the common EU foreign policy as the salience of the issue has gradually grown over the years. Despite some differences among Member States, common defence and security programmes enjoy the support of the majority of citizens everywhere; for common foreign policy, the only exception is Sweden, with 40 % support.

The support for common defence and security programmes and for a common foreign policy is more popular amongst better-educated and more affluent people. Support is closely related to trust and a positive image of the EU. However, even amongst citizens who declare that they do not trust the EU, 63 % support common defence and security programmes and 50 % support common EU foreign policy. Yet again, this demonstrates the popularity of common EU level involvement in the area of peace and security. The profile of people supporting the creation of an EU army is similar, but such support is shared by just above half of EU citizens – considerably less than the very strong support for common defence and security policy.

²¹ [Designing Europe's Future: Security and Defence](#), European Commission, Brussels, April 2017.

1.5.2. Views from outside the EU: what do non-Europeans think and expect?

The external action of the EU, as well as the way in which it is communicated, has an impact on how the EU is viewed from abroad. Moreover, perceptions and attitudes towards the EU influence its capacity to fulfil its foreign policy goals. They also affect its ability to promote free trade and the European integration model as an inspiration for regional cooperation worldwide – based on respect for national diversity and committed to the promotion of democracy, human rights, the rule of law and good governance. The universality of the values that the EU stands for – democracy, human rights and the rule of law – is also being increasingly challenged by alternative models of interaction between the state and society. Effective EU communication in third countries plays a key role in countering jihadist propaganda in the EU's neighbourhood and its spilling over into EU territory.

The EU's international standing has suffered as a result of its financial and migration crises, the outcome of the UK referendum on EU membership, and the perceived limited capacity of European governments to address these issues. There is also growing scepticism towards Western models of democracy in general, which feeds into the alternative narratives and political models being developed. According to the 2018 report on Freedom in the World by the watchdog, Freedom House, 45 % of the 195 countries evaluated around the globe are described as 'free', while 25 % of countries globally are described as 'not free'.

As seen in Figure 11, across the Eastern Neighbourhood, around half of the population has a positive impression of the EU, with the exception of Russia, where the share of people having a positive image of the EU is dropping over time. However, in all these countries, including Russia, there are grounds for more public diplomacy activities, as the majority of the population feels that there are sufficient common values to be able to cooperate with the EU. There is also room for improvement in the supply of information about the EU, since the share of those declaring that they have access to sufficient information in this area is rarely a majority.

Across the Southern Neighbourhood, there are far more variations in the perceptions held by citizens of different countries. In Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Palestine,²² clear majorities hold a positive image of the EU and see it as sharing sufficiently common values to allow cooperation. These are also the countries where people declare that they enjoy better access to information about the EU. On the other hand, only a minority of people in countries like Egypt, Jordan and Libya hold positive views of the EU, or see the Union as sufficiently close, in terms of values, to be able to cooperate.

With regard to the EU's ten strategic partner countries, its visibility has been limited. This may explain the small share of people sharing positive feelings towards the EU in some of its traditional partner countries such as the US and Canada. However, the EU enjoys strong positive feelings amongst citizens of other EU strategic partners such as India, Mexico, Brazil, China and South Africa.


According to a 2017 Eurobarometer survey, citizens in some of the key European partner countries (Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey and the US), perceive the most important assets of the EU to be its economic, industrial and trading power, as well as its respect for human rights, law and order, and

²² See footnote 15.

the good relationship between its Member States.²³ The EU's ability to promote peace and democracy outside its borders is most likely to be mentioned as an asset by those in Brazil (22 %), India (20 %) and Japan (19 %), and is least likely to be mentioned by those in China (8 %) and Turkey (9 %). In terms of political influence, respondents in the surveyed countries are more likely to think that the EU's political influence is currently stronger than that of Japan, Brazil, India and Russia, but the United States and China are perceived as being more politically influential than the EU.

Terrorism, security and migration issues are the most frequently mentioned by 'outsiders' as being the main challenges facing the EU. Nevertheless, the EU maintains an image as a place of stability for nine of the eleven surveyed countries, ranging from 82 % in India to 54 % in Japan. The exceptions are Russia (33 %) and Turkey (49 %). Despite that, the majority of respondents in ten of the eleven surveyed countries were most likely to say that peace is embodied by either the EU itself or the EU's partnership with other countries. Only Russians were most likely to say that peace is embodied by countries other than the EU.

Figure 11 – Perceptions of the EU: The view from abroad²⁴



Data source: [EU Neighbourhood Barometer](#), 2012-2014; [Analysis of the perception of the EU and EU's policies abroad](#), 2015.

²³ [Future of Europe – Views from outside the EU](#), European Commission, Brussels, August 2017.

²⁴ PI – Partnership Instrument; ENI – European Neighbourhood Instrument.

2. The EU and the pursuit of peace and security

2.1. Exporting peace? Peace and security in the EU's external policies

In 2012, the EU received the Nobel Peace Prize for advancing the causes of peace, reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe.²⁵ The Norwegian Nobel Committee said its decision was based on the 'stabilising role the EU has played in transforming most of Europe from a continent of war to a continent of peace'. Indeed, the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the initial step towards European integration, came after two world wars with devastating consequences for European states, and aimed to secure lasting peace on the continent.²⁶ Six decades later, the achievement of peace in the part of the continent that constitutes the EU is hailed as one of the Union's major achievements, having been enshrined in its Treaty as one of its main aims (Article 3 TEU).²⁷

At the same time, the promotion of peace globally, following its own 'success story', has become one of the fundamental pillars of the EU's external action. Article 3(5) TEU includes the contribution to peace first among the objectives of the EU's relations with the wider world, alongside security, sustainable development, the protection of human rights and others.²⁸ These objectives guide the EU in all facets of its external action including the common foreign and security policy (CFSP);²⁹ development cooperation;³⁰ economic, financial and technical cooperation;³¹ humanitarian aid;³² common commercial policy;³³ and neighbourhood policy.³⁴ It follows that the promotion of peace goes hand in hand with any type of EU engagement with the world. This has led scholars to argue that it is a characteristic of the EU's identity as a global actor. The Union's pursuit of the diffusion of its own values and norms, including peace, in its external engagement has led to it being described as a 'normative' power'.³⁵ In that sense, the EU's foreign policy derives directly from the very nature of the EU itself and its ambition to achieve long-lasting peace through integration. This inherent principle places particular emphasis on multilateral cooperation, the primacy of diplomacy (as opposed to coercion), the use of mediation to resolve conflicts and the promotion of human rights and the rule of law.³⁶

²⁵ [European Union receives Nobel Peace Prize 2012](#), European Union, Brussels, 2012.

²⁶ [A peaceful Europe – the beginnings of cooperation](#), European Union, Brussels, 2012.

²⁷ [Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union](#), Official Journal of the European Union, C 202, 2016.

²⁸ [Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union](#), Official Journal of the European Union, C 202, 2016.

²⁹ [Common Foreign and Security Policy \(CFSP\)](#), European External Action Service.

³⁰ [International Cooperation and Development – DG DEVCO](#), European Commission.

³¹ [Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Part Five, Title III, Chapter 2: Economic, Financial and Technical cooperation with third countries](#), Official Journal of the European Union.

³² EU legislation: [Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection](#), EUR-Lex.

³³ EU legislation: [Common commercial policy](#), EUR-Lex.

³⁴ [European Neighbourhood Policy \(ENP\)](#), European External Action Service.

³⁵ I. Manners, [Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?](#), Blackwell Publishers, 2002.

³⁶ S. Keukeleire and T. Delreux, [The Foreign Policy of the European Union](#), 2nd ed., Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

The EU model of regional integration

As the earliest and only project of regional cooperation to attain such a high level of supra-nationalism, the European project that led to the creation of the European Union in the early 1990s has been used as the central empirical object in the study of states' capacity to move from intergovernmental cooperation to fully fledged integration, guiding the conceptualisation of regionalism across a number of regions. So far, in the study of regional integration, no entity figures as prominently as the EU. In the main literature on the subject, the European integration project is often used as the key example for the building and testing of theories explaining why states choose to integrate, to build supranational institutions, share competencies and pool sovereignty.³⁷ While common markets, common currencies³⁸ and customs unions are not unusual, the EU has evolved from that level into a political community with its own institutions, legal system, policies, values and principles. In spite of suffering from the impact of the multiple crises of the past decade (the economic crisis, but also the migration crisis and the rise of populism) this 'EU model' of integration, coupled with the levels of prosperity attained, has been at the heart of the EU's 'soft power' of attraction in other regions such as Latin America, [Africa](#) and [Asia](#). This model is captured in the words of the High Representative/Vice-President, Federica Mogherini:

...we achieved security through cooperation. We built peace with multilateralism. And this is the real vocation of the European Union. We are a cooperative force for peace and security. We have a long history of violence that has taught us that our national interests are much better served through cooperation with our neighbours. This is the strength of the European Union experience.

[Speech](#) by the HR/VP at the Hessian Peace Prize Award Ceremony, Brussels, 20 July 2017.

Since the creation of the CFSP with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, it has become increasingly clear that, in order to pursue the aims of its external relations effectively, the Union needs to be able to speak with one voice and take common – or coordinated – action.³⁹ The first issue was addressed by the Treaty of Lisbon, which created the position of the 'High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy'.⁴⁰ Appointed for a five-year term, the High Representative steers EU foreign policy, represents the EU in diplomatic negotiations and international fora, including the UN, coordinates the EU's foreign policy tools (development assistance, trade, humanitarian aid and crisis response) and helps build consensus between the 28 EU Member States. The High Representative is assisted by the European External Action Service, the European Union's diplomatic service, also created by the Treaty of Lisbon.⁴¹ On the substantive level, the first major effort to strengthen the EU's presence as a global actor, by defining specific principles, aims and tools, was the elaboration in 2003 of the European Security Strategy and more recently the 2016 EU Global Strategy.⁴²

The EU has made the promotion of peace a quintessential part of its enlargement policy, offering the EU membership perspective as a vehicle and incentive for applicant

³⁷ E. Lazarou, [Brazil and regional integration in South America – lessons from the EU's crisis](#), *Contexto Internacional*, Vol. 35, No 2, December 2013, pp. 353-385.

³⁸ For example, the Latin Monetary Union was created in 1865 between France, Italy, Switzerland and Belgium. It lasted until 1927 and enabled users to pay in any other member state using national currency. K-H. Bae and W. Bailey, [The Latin Monetary Union: Some Evidence on Europe's Failed Common Currency](#). Korea University and Cornell University, 2003.

³⁹ [Common Foreign and Security Policy](#), EUR-Lex.

⁴⁰ [High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy](#), 2016.

⁴¹ [European External Action Service](#), 2016.

⁴² P. Pawlak, [A Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy for the EU](#), EPRS, 2016.

countries to consolidate peace and stability.⁴³ Beyond the limited group of potential members, it promotes regional cooperation, democratisation, rule of law and economic reforms as a prerequisite for peace through its neighbourhood policy (ENP), which covers sixteen countries to the south and to the east of the EU. The conception of the ENP is an example of how the EU aims to export its values, as a route towards achieving the 'democratic peace' that the EU itself enjoys. But beyond its immediate neighbourhood, similar principles are applied, aiming at the promotion of its model through its inter-regional and bilateral trade agreements, but also in development cooperation. Moreover, the EU promotes peace through active participation in mediation and diplomacy, including through the UN.⁴⁴ The Middle East Peace Process (Israel/Palestine),⁴⁵ Ukraine⁴⁶ and Colombia⁴⁷ are some examples of the wide-ranging involvement of the EU in diplomatic talks for peace.

Enlargement and the EU Neighbourhood

Since the very beginning of European integration, enlargement was an objective of the founding fathers, with the idea to unite the continent despite the Cold War. In 1950, the [Schuman declaration](#) stated that this innovative cooperation was 'open to the participation of the other countries of Europe' and would even play a role in the development of Africa. Already three years later, welcoming the European Assembly's project of political union, Georges Bidault [stated](#) that the objective was to unite the Europe of geography, the Europe of liberty and the Europe of will. The community of six members enlarged rapidly to the west ([1973](#)), south ([1981, 1986](#)) and east ([2004, 2007, 2013](#)) after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In the case of southern Europe, accession consolidated the rebirth of democracy, and in central Europe, it brought stability, protection of minorities, market economy and strengthened democracy. Now a union of 28 Member States, the EU has [plans](#) to respond positively to the Western Balkans accession process and to continue talks with Turkey, in a form to be discussed. In the north, the EU is linked with Norway and Iceland through the [European Economic Area](#) (EEA), which allows the intensive and easy circulation of people and goods. After 2004, the EU launched the [European Neighbourhood Policy](#), which is a privileged relationship between the EU and its closest partners, from Morocco to Belarus. For some of the partners, such as Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, the ENP has led to [visa liberalisation](#) and deep and comprehensive free trade agreements (DCFTAs), and, for Morocco, to an advanced status. The ENP has been reviewed several times since the 2011 'Arab Spring'. The revised ENP applies the incentive-based approach ('more-for-more'), under which the EU develops stronger partnerships with neighbours who make more progress towards democratic reform. This reform has been strengthened by the November 2015 [review](#), which calls for a more flexible, tailor-made, political and sectoral approach depending on the interests of the EU and its partners. The new [European Neighbourhood Instrument](#) (ENI) is the main financial instrument for implementing the ENP, with a budget of €15.4 billion for 2014-2020.

All these policies, enlargement, the EEA and the ENP, embody the core EU philosophy inspired by Montesquieu, that 'the natural effect of commerce is to bring peace', and, in the medium term, comfort common values.

Throughout time, the EU has developed a broad crisis-management agenda, including conflict prevention, mediation, and peacekeeping as well as post-conflict stabilisation. With the establishment of the common security and defence policy (CSDP),⁴⁸ the EU

⁴³ [Growing Together: Enlargement - a key ingredient of the EU 'Peace Project'](#), European Commission, 2013.

⁴⁴ [Common Foreign and Security Policy \(CFSP\)](#), European External Action Service.

⁴⁵ [Middle East Peace Process](#), European External Action Service.

⁴⁶ [Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine](#), European External Action Service.

⁴⁷ [EU will support Peace Process in Colombia with Special Envoy Eamon Gilmore](#), European Union External Action, November 2015.

⁴⁸ [The Common Security and Defence Policy \(CSDP\)](#), European External Action Service.

began to engage in crisis-management activities outside its territory, aimed at 'peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security' (Article 42(1) TEU),⁴⁹ in line with the UN Charter. Nowadays, it is a major actor in peacekeeping, through its own peacekeeping operations (PKO), but also together with the United Nations, with which it has been cooperating systematically at strategic and operational levels, with consultation and coordination mechanisms now well established.⁵⁰ The UN recognises the EU as one of its most important regional partners in peacekeeping, both for its operational capacity but also due to the broad convergence of norms and values, including the overarching goal of achieving a peaceful world. Moreover, the EU and its Member States contribute around 33 % of the funding for UN peace-keeping.⁵¹ The EU's CSDP missions and operations carry out tasks such as military training, capacity-building, counter-piracy, rule of law and security sector reform, border assistance, etc. The majority of these missions have been in Africa, with some operating in parallel to UN PKOs or to African Union (AU) missions.

Mediation

Mediation is part of the EU's preventive diplomacy, and is an important tool used within the context of conflict prevention and peace-keeping. The EU has developed its own mediation support capacity based on the 2009 [Concept](#) on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities and its definition of mediation as a way of assisting negotiations between conflict parties and transforming conflicts with the help of an acceptable third party. 'The general goal of mediation is to enable parties in conflict to reach agreements they find satisfactory and are willing to implement'.

The EU carries out its mediation efforts through a variety of actors, including EU Special Representatives, EU Delegations and CSDP missions. Mediation efforts include direct mediation or facilitation by the EU; financing mediation efforts at different levels; leveraging mediation through political support; promoting mediation and good practice in peace processes and supporting mediation efforts of others, for example those of the UN, or regional organisations. In recent years, the EU has [engaged](#) in mediation activities in a number of conflict countries, including Mali, Myanmar, Lebanon, South Sudan, the Central African Republic and Ukraine. A number of [mediation initiatives](#) are undertaken by Members of the European Parliament.

⁴⁹ [Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union: Section 2: Provisions on the common security and defence policy - Article 42 \(ex Article 17 TEU\)](#), Official Journal of the European Union.

⁵⁰ C. Cirlig, [EU-UN cooperation in peacekeeping and crisis management](#), EPRS, 2015.

⁵¹ [The European Union at the United Nations](#), factsheet, European External Action Service.

2.2. The Global Strategy: First year of implementation (2016-2017)

2016 can be seen as a landmark year for the EU's approach to peace and security. In June 2016, based on the mandate received from the European Council and following a year-long process of strategic reflection and consultations, Federica Mogherini, in her capacity as High Representative and Vice-President of the European Commission, presented the new European Union Global Strategy.⁵² The strategy is based on an assessment of the current global environment as:

- a more **connected** world, in which a surge in global connectivity and human mobility challenges traditional approaches to migration, citizenship, development and health, while simultaneously facilitating crime, terrorism and trafficking;
- a more **contested** world, in which fragile states and ungoverned spaces are expanding, due to instability and violence triggered by poverty, lawlessness, corruption and conflict-ridden electoral politics;
- a more **complex** world, where power is shifting towards other regional players in the developing world and is increasingly shared between state and non-state actors.

In this environment, the strategy maintains, 'an appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy is important for Europe's ability to promote peace and security within and beyond its borders'. Furthermore, it recognises the intrinsic link between internal and external security, as well as internal and external peace: 'our security at home depends on peace beyond our borders'.⁵³ Based on this realisation and committed to the notion of 'principled pragmatism', the Global Strategy prioritises five broad areas:

1. Security of the Union
2. State and societal resilience in the EU's Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood
3. Integrated approach to conflict and crises
4. Cooperative regional orders
5. Global governance

Through the definition of these areas, the Global Strategy emphasises the need for EU action. Firstly, stressing that Europeans must take greater responsibility for their security (i.e. in respect of terrorism, hybrid threats, climate change, economic volatility or energy insecurity), the strategy calls for stronger security and defence cooperation in full compliance with human rights and the rule of law. This translates into concrete actions in the field of defence policy; counter-terrorism; strategic communications, energy security and cybersecurity. Secondly, recognising that fragility beyond EU borders threatens its interests, the EU will promote resilience in third countries and their societies as a means to ensure their growth and stability. This objective is to be pursued through a 'credible enlargement policy' based on strict and fair conditionality, elements of resilience in the European Neighbourhood Policy, and development policy. To address the root causes of migration and associated phenomena, such as trans-border crime, the EU will work towards a more efficient deployment of development instruments, through trust funds, preventive diplomacy and mediation.

With regard to conflict prevention and resolution, the strategy recognises the importance of an 'integrated approach' and of 'pre-emptive peace' – monitoring root causes, such as human rights violations, inequality, resource stress, and climate change

⁵² P. Pawlak, [A Global Strategy on foreign and security policy for the EU](#), EPRS, 2016.


⁵³ [Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe/ A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy](#), European External Action Service, June 2016.

– as a means to prevent conflicts from breaking out. Finally, the strategy recognises the importance of promoting and supporting cooperative regional orders and of a global order based on international law, including the principles of the UN Charter, as the basis for ensuring peace, security, human rights and sustainable development.⁵⁴

As the following chapters of this study illustrate, the period since the presentation of the Global Strategy has so far been focused on implementation, or, in the words of the HR/VP, on translating vision into action. According to the first-year implementation report⁵⁵ for 2016-2017, several of the strategy's proposals have been translated into concrete initiatives. In June 2017, the Commission and the High Representative released a joint communication on resilience.⁵⁶ A joint report on the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy Review⁵⁷ was published on 18 May 2017. The integrated approach is already being implemented, in conflicts ranging from the Sahel to Colombia.⁵⁸ In security and defence, a series of initiatives for closer and more efficient cooperation have been put in place.

In the spirit of the strategy, the EU is mobilising all tools at its disposal in a coherent and coordinated way, by investing in a credible, responsive and joined-up Union. This calls for a strengthening of all dimensions of foreign policy by improving the effectiveness and consistency of the EU's other policies in accordance with its values. In order to achieve the objectives of the strategy, the mobilisation and cooperation of all relevant EU institutions, actors and instruments is a prerequisite for peace and security (Figure 12).

Figure 12 – Who does what in the EU institutions?



Data source: [European Commission](#), 2015; for Parliament: [EP organisation chart](#), 2018; [EUISS](#), 2017.

⁵⁴ P. Pawlak, [A global strategy on foreign and security policy for the EU](#), EPRS, 2017.

⁵⁵ [Implementing the EU Global Strategy: Year 1](#), European Union Global Strategy.

⁵⁶ [Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU's external action](#), European Commission, June 2017.


⁵⁷ [Joint Report on the Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy Review](#), European Commission and European External Action Service, 2017.

⁵⁸ [Colombia and the EU](#), European External Action Service, May 2016.

2.3. Peace and security in the EU's budget

The EU budget includes a heading dedicated to external policy and to the role of the EU in the world. It is called 'Global Europe' and, in the context of the 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework (MFF), it accounts for approximately six per cent of the overall budget. Nevertheless, it has attracted considerable attention inside and outside the EU. The reason for this can be traced to the significant reach, scope and impact of the funded programmes. For example, the EU, together with its Member States, is the biggest donor of development and humanitarian aid in the world; it is also a key contributor to the economic development of the EU neighbourhood.

Figure 13 – EU budget 2018 (in million euros)



Data source: [European Commission, Directorate General Budget](#), 2018.

The Global Europe heading includes a number of instruments. Each of them has its own specific geographic or thematic focus, as well as a specific connection to the peace and security agenda in relation to the well-established link between conflict, security and development. The instruments allow for joint efforts between Member States and EU institutions, which maximise the impact and visibility of the external action. The instruments under the Global Europe heading give the EU the chance to further reinforce its role on the global stage and to promote its interests and values.

- *External financing instruments*

Global Europe is mainly composed of the external financing instruments (EFI), which provide support to third countries and people abroad contributing to peace and security, and operate under a single regulation for better harmonisation.⁵⁹ The EFIs include the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI),⁶⁰ the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR),⁶¹ the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI),⁶² the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP),⁶³ the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC),⁶⁴ the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II),⁶⁵ the

⁵⁹ [Regulation \(EU\) No 236/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council](#), Official Journal of the European Union, 2014.

⁶⁰ M. Parry with E. Segantini, [Development Cooperation Instrument](#), EPRS, 2017.

⁶¹ A. Dobrova, [European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights](#), EPRS, 2015.

⁶² M. Parry, [European Neighbourhood Instrument](#), EPRS, 2016.


⁶³ A. Dobrova with P. Wegner, [Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace](#), EPRS, 2017.

⁶⁴ M. Parry, [Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation](#), EPRS, 2017.

⁶⁵ M. Sváček, [Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance \(IPA II\)](#), EPRS, 2017.

Partnership Instrument for cooperation with third countries (PI),⁶⁶ and the Instrument for Greenland (IfG). Not funded through the EU budget, the European Development Fund (EDF), which works for the benefit of 78 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, is also an EFI and falls under the same programming period. It draws resources from EU Member States as voluntary donations. The total financial resources of the EDF for the 2014-2020 period amount to €30.5 billion.

Figure 14 – 'Global Europe' budget heading, 2018 (in million euros)



Data source: [European Commission, Directorate General Budget](#), 2018.

Although the recent EPRS European implementation assessment⁶⁷ demonstrates some shortcomings in the implementation of the EFIs (e.g. limited political steering and lack of sufficient flexibility and capacity), it also concludes that they contribute to peace and security in the world despite the increasing external challenges. There is a need for still greater flexibility in the use of the EFIs in order to be able to respond to unforeseen threats to security and peace. To achieve peace and security, the EFIs need to respond with short-term expediency on security threats, but also to provide for long-term needs related to development goals, support for democratisation, promotion of EU fundamental values and capacity-building, in order to guarantee sustainable results. This blending of the short- and long-term goals is also in line with the EU Global Strategy. Even if the EU budget cannot cover the increased spending demand to deal with all threats to peace and security, including the migration crisis, it is still a key instrument of influence and coordination of national efforts into a combined EU effort.

Of the EFIs, the IcSP is the one most directly related to promoting peace and security. Established in 2014, it contributes funding for crisis response, conflict prevention, peacebuilding and crisis preparedness, and to address global and trans-regional threats. The instrument thus plays a role in both EU foreign and development policy, providing short- and long-term assistance. Short-term assistance normally tackles emerging and existing crises. Long-term assistance addresses global and trans-regional threats and emerging threats. Due to the unpredictable character of the issues covered by IcSP-funded actions, the distribution of the funding under different themes provides an opportunity for flexibility and adaptation according to need. This indicative distribution

⁶⁶ M. Parry with P. Wegner, [Partnership Instrument](#), EPRS, 2017.

⁶⁷ I. Ioannides, [EU external financing instruments and the post-2020 architecture](#), European Implementation Assessment, EPRS, 2018.

of financial allocations earmarks 70 % of the funding for exceptional assistance measures, 21 % for global, trans-regional and emerging threats, and 9 % for conflict prevention, crisis preparedness and peacebuilding. The region with highest spending allocations is Sub-Saharan Africa, followed by the Middle East and North Africa, and European countries and Central Asia. The IcSP has been evolving to respond to changes in the security environment.⁶⁸

- *Common foreign and security policy*

Another programme under the Global Europe heading, which is focused directly on peace and security is the common foreign and security policy (CFSP).⁶⁹ It functions under its own regulation, adapted to its intergovernmental character. It is designed to preserve peace, prevent conflicts, strengthen international security and ensure the visibility and effectiveness of EU foreign policy. Spending under the CFSP covers only some EU foreign policy measures, namely CSDP civilian missions, EU Special Representatives and measures supporting non-proliferation and disarmament. The crisis management approach of the CFSP includes involvement in all phases of the crisis cycle; from preventive strategies, to post-crisis rehabilitation and reconstruction, as well as comprehensive and coordinated use of all foreign policy instruments. So far, expenditure with military or defence implications has been covered by the Athena financing mechanism. Established in 2004, it is not part of the EU budget, but its funds are based on allocations from the Member States based on their gross national income (except Denmark). Third countries and other international organisations are also allowed to participate under specific conditions.

The Athena mechanism

The [Athena mechanism](#) was [established in 2004](#) as a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations that have military or defence implications. It is part of the CFSP/CSDP, but is not funded via the EU budget. According to [Article 41\(2\) of the Treaty on European Union](#), participating Member States contribute to the annual Athena budget based on their gross national income (only Denmark opted out of the mechanism). A Special Committee, under whose authority the mechanism functions, consists of representatives from each participating Member State. It sets the financial rules applicable to each area of eligible expenditure under Athena. The [major types of expenditure](#) under the Athena mechanism include lodging; travel; administration; public communication; locally hired staff; force headquarters (FHQ) deployment; medical services; and infrastructure, including IT systems and information gathering. Following a special approval procedure, Athena may also finance additional equipment and services.

Currently, there are [six active EU military operations](#) and all of them benefit from Athena financing. They are: EUFOR Althea (Bosnia Herzegovina), EUNavfor Atalanta (Horn of Africa), EUTM Somalia, EUTM Mali, EUTM RCA (Central African Republic) and EUNavfor Med (Mediterranean). EU Member States (and third countries) that decide to contribute to an EU military operation pay for this from their national budgets, with no contribution from the Athena mechanism. Nevertheless, 'nation-borne costs', such as fuel, water and food, are managed under the Athena mechanism.

- *Humanitarian aid*

The European Union's expenditure for humanitarian aid provides needs-based, emergency response to natural disasters and man-made crises beyond the Union's borders, in order to preserve life, prevent and alleviate human suffering, and maintain

⁶⁸ See details about the budgetary changes in the IcSP in Chapter 4.

⁶⁹ A. Dobрева and C. Cirlig, [Common Foreign and Security Policy](#), EPRS, 2016.

the human dignity of those affected.⁷⁰ Such assistance provides first response to areas suffering from a lack of peace and security. The EU remains a leading global donor of humanitarian aid, as well as an example for a high standard of humanitarian aid delivery. Despite that, it still faces challenges in responding to the growing demand for humanitarian assistance worldwide. In order to close the funding gap for humanitarian aid, there are attempts to work towards reduction of humanitarian needs through an increase in conflict-resolution capacity in the international community, the bridging of the humanitarian-development divide in order to better tackle the protracted crises and its root causes, as well as a strong commitment to invest in disaster preparedness and risk mitigation.⁷¹

- *External Investment Plan*

In response to a sharp increase in the number of people trying to migrate to Europe, and as part of the mid-term review of the MFF, the Commission has proposed an external investment plan to tackle the root causes of migration from countries neighbouring the European Union, to support investment in the EU's partner countries, and to promote new forms of private-sector participation. It consists of a European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD) and quantitative and qualitative changes to the European Investment Bank's External Lending Mandate (ELM), which includes the Guarantee Fund for External Action (GFEA).⁷² The purpose of the EFSD as an integrated financial package is to provide support through the supply of financing capacity, in the form of grants, guarantees and other financial instruments to eligible counterparts, investments and increased access to financing, starting in African and Neighbourhood partner countries. The EU guarantee to the EIB covers the risks related to loans and guarantees granted to third countries, or for projects to be executed in third countries. The GFEA is designed to implement the EU guarantee, whilst protecting the EU budget. The two new objectives (tackling the root causes of migration and contributing to the long-term economic resilience of refugees, migrants, host and transit communities) are to be covered by the EU guarantee, with a maximum of €30 billion under a general mandate (of which €1.4 billion for projects in the public sector) and a maximum of €2.3 billion under a private-sector lending mandate.

- *Financial instruments outside the EU budget*

In addition to the EU budget instruments, there is a broader architecture for financing EU external policies and spending that is directly or indirectly related to peace and security. It complements the budget instruments and includes the European Development Fund (EDF) (mentioned above), EU external trust funds, blending grants and loans. The creation of funds and instruments outside the EU budget enables the EU to pursue its objectives with more flexibility, swiftness and innovativeness, but it has also led to more complexity and fragmentation. In the context of growing demands, these innovations have also contributed to the mobilisation of more resources, as well as to intensifying collaboration with a wide range of stakeholders.

The budget allocations of EU countries in the field of peace and security can also be seen in the context of NATO agreements. Over the years, European countries that are members of NATO have been under pressure from the US to increase their military spending. In 2014, an agreement set a target of two per cent of the economic output of

⁷⁰ A. Dobрева and A. Heinmaa, [Humanitarian Aid](#), EPRS, 2015.

⁷¹ A. Dobрева and M. Latek, [Funding gap: A challenge for the World Humanitarian Summit \(WHS\)](#), EPRS, 2016.

⁷² A. Dobрева and M. Parry, [Guarantee Fund for External Action and EIB external lending mandate](#), EPRS, 2018.

each country to be devoted to defence budgets by 2024. Increasing the spending on peace and security in the EU budget can contribute to reaching this target level.

The European Defence Fund

Complementing its NATO commitments, the EU has been intensifying its involvement in the peace and security field, which led to the creation of a [European Defence Fund](#) in mid-2017. The Fund will coordinate, supplement and amplify national investments in defence research, in the development of prototypes and in the acquisition of defence equipment and technology. It is expected to contribute significantly to the strategic autonomy and competitiveness of Europe's defence industry. It consists of two major components:

- **Research:** grants for collaborative research in innovative defence technologies and products, fully and directly funded from the EU budget, especially in electronics, metamaterials, encrypted software and robotics. The funding includes €90 million until the end of 2019, with €25 million allocated for 2017, plus €500 million per year after 2020.
- **Development and acquisition:** co-financing from the EU budget and practical support from the Commission for joint development and acquisition of defence equipment and technology by Member States. The funding includes €500 million in total for 2019 and 2020, under a dedicated defence and industrial development programme, and €1 billion per year after 2020.

2.4. Peace and security in the EU's multilateral engagement

The post-war world has seen the creation of a range of global and regional institutions, established to manage economic, political and security relations. With the end of the Cold War, several of these institutions extended into the 'more fully global multilateral system of governance' which exists to this day. The most notable and laudable achievement of this system has been the preservation of peace among the great powers and the provision of a degree of stability that has prevented major nuclear security crises.

Multilateralism is key to the EU's identity and to its engagement with the world. The first ever comprehensive European Security Strategy (ESS) – formulated in 2003 and entitled 'A secure Europe in a better world' – made 'strengthening the United Nations (UN), equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively' a European priority. The ESS placed advocacy of 'effective multilateralism' at the centre of the EU's strategic goals.⁷³

The EU Global Strategy⁷⁴ reiterates the EU's dedication to the promotion of 'a rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle and the United Nations at its core'. At the same time, the EUGS emphasises that 'the format to deliver effective global governance may vary from case to case', citing policy areas ranging from cybersecurity (where states, international organisations, industry, civil society and technical experts are actors to consider) and maritime policy (the UN, UN specialised agencies, NATO, strategic partners, and ASEAN), to humanitarian, development and climate policy (the UN, G20, new donors, civil society and the private sector).

Multilateralism

The most basic definition of multilateralism is 'three or more actors engaging in voluntary and (essentially) institutionalised international cooperation governed by norms and principles, with rules that apply (by and large) equally to all states'. As a foreign policy practice it is used to refer to 'seeking cooperative approaches to international problems'.

⁷³ E. Lazarou, [The future of multilateralism - Crisis or opportunity?](#), EPRS, May 2017.

⁷⁴ F. Mogherini, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, [A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy](#), June 2016.

2.4.1. Participation of the European Union in the work of the United Nations

The EU's participation in the UN forms the basis of its commitment to multilateralism in the area of peace and security. According to its Charter, the UN was conceived as a place where people would 'unite our strength to maintain international peace and security and ... ensure ... that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest'.⁷⁵ The EU has developed a strong relationship with the UN, by working closely with the UN secretariat and the various UN agencies, funds and programmes. In 2011, the EU was granted the status of observer at the UN General Assembly (UNGA), the main deliberative, policy-making and representative organ of the UN. The status of observer allows the EU to present common positions, make interventions, present proposals and participate in the general debate at the UNGA. It seeks to coordinate among its 28 Member States to present a unified position. Two EU Member States, France and the UK, are Permanent Members of the UN Security Council.⁷⁶

On 17 July 2017, the Council of the European Union adopted the 'EU priorities at the United Nations and the 72nd United Nations General Assembly'.⁷⁷ The EU reiterated its commitment to 'reinvigorating multilateralism and supporting a strong United Nations as the bedrock of the rules-based global order', with a focus on three interlinked and mutually reinforcing priority areas, including stronger global governance, and peace and conflict prevention.

Non-proliferation and disarmament at the United Nations

Since its creation, the UN has pursued two parallel and mutually reinforcing goals: the elimination of weapons of mass destruction (biological, chemical and nuclear) and the regulation of conventional arms (in particular the illicit trade in small arms).⁷⁸ The EU is committed to pursuing these goals through its status in the UN and through the participation of its Member States in the various UN bodies responsible for disarmament and non-proliferation. These include bodies that have been created exclusively for that purpose, notably:

- The United Nations Charter grants the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Security Council has five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and United States) and ten non-permanent members, which are elected by the UNGA for two-year terms.
- The United Nations General Assembly is the chief deliberative, policy-making and representative organ of the United Nations. Its members include all United Nations Member States (as of 2017, 193 members). The UNGA meets in regular session principally from September to December each year. It has six main committees; the First Committee deals with issues related to disarmament and international security.
- The United Nations Disarmament Commission is a subsidiary organ of the UNGA, mandated to consider and make recommendations on disarmament issues. The Disarmament Commission consists of all UN Member States and holds annual sessions at the UN Headquarters in New York.
- The Conference on Disarmament is the sole multilateral body for negotiating disarmament treaties. It has 65 permanent members, which meet in Geneva in three sessions each year.
- Three Special Sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament have been held since the UN's establishment in 1945, most recently in 1988.

⁷⁵ [Charter of the United Nations](#), signed on 26 June 1945.

⁷⁶ Factsheet, [The European Union at the United Nations](#), 13 September 2017.

⁷⁷ ['EU priorities at the United Nations and the 72nd United Nations General Assembly'](#), Council of the European Union, 17 July 2017.

⁷⁸ M. Gillis, [Disarmament - A Basic Guide](#), Office for Disarmament Affairs, New York, 2017.

- The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs was established in 1982 to promote the goal of disarmament and non-proliferation.
- The three United Nations Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament, situated in Lomé (Togo), Kathmandu (Nepal) and Lima (Peru), provide practical assistance to states in substantive and technical areas, including firearms legislation, support in stockpile management and weapons destruction and registers of conventional arms.
- The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was set up to promote global cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology.
- The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons was established in 1997 to ensure the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
- The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation was established in 1996 to build the global verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which has not yet entered into force.

Within the United Nations and its related bodies, a number of important disarmament treaties have been formulated, including the Chemical Weapons Convention,⁷⁹ the Biological Weapons Convention,⁸⁰ the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),⁸¹ and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.⁸² Moreover, there are voluntary and informal measures on missile arms control, including the Missile Technology Control Regime⁸³ and the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.⁸⁴ In order to regulate the trade in conventional arms, the UNGA approved the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)⁸⁵ in 2013. It is the first-ever global treaty to establish common international standards to guide governments in deciding whether or not to authorise arms transfers, and regulates the international trade in almost all categories of conventional weapons, from small arms to battle tanks, combat aircraft to warships, as well as ammunition. The ATT promotes cooperation, transparency and responsible action by states in the international trade in conventional arms. As regards the trade in small arms and light weapons, two UN instruments were agreed in 2001. Under the Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, countries adopted a Firearms Protocol.⁸⁶ Governments that ratify the text commit to adopt a series of crime-control measures and implement three sets of provisions on firearms, namely (a) a licensing system relating to manufacture and trade, (b) the establishment of criminal offences on illegal manufacture and trade, and (c) provisions on the marking and tracing of firearms. In the same year, countries agreed on a Programme of Action focusing on preventing the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.

⁷⁹ [Website](#) of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

⁸⁰ Website of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, [The Biological Weapons Convention](#).

⁸¹ Website of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons](#).

⁸² Website of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, [Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty](#).

⁸³ Website of the [Missile Technology Control Regime](#).

⁸⁴ Website of the [International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation](#) (HCOC).

⁸⁵ Website of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, [The Arms Trade Treaty](#).

⁸⁶ Website of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, [United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto](#).

Nuclear disarmament


Global nuclear disarmament – in other words, a world free of nuclear weapons – is one of the United Nations' most long-standing objectives. The first ever resolution adopted by the UNGA in January 1946 called for 'control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes' and for 'the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons'.⁸⁷

The 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime.⁸⁸ The NPT is built on three pillars – nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy – and aims to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, promote cooperation among states parties on civilian nuclear energy, and ultimately achieve complete nuclear disarmament. It grants the five nuclear-weapon states recognised by the NPT – China, France, Russia, the UK and the United States – exclusive rights to possess nuclear arsenals, but also obliges them 'to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race ... and to nuclear disarmament' (NPT, Article VI). Moreover, the NPT enshrines the right of non-nuclear weapon states parties to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Nuclear powers

Nine states are known to have military nuclear programmes: China, France, Russia, the UK and the US, are recognised as nuclear-weapon states (NWS) under the NPT; India, Pakistan and Israel have never signed the NPT; North Korea left the Treaty in 2003 to develop its nuclear weapons programme.

Figure 15 – Nuclear weapons worldwide in 2017



Data source: [SIPRI](#), January 2017, all figures are estimates.

⁸⁷ [Resolution on the Establishment of a Commission to deal with the Problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy](#), United Nations General Assembly, 24 January 1946.

⁸⁸ C. Cirigli, [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty – State of Play](#), EPRS, April 2016.

The number of nuclear weapons worldwide has been declining since the mid-1980s, when they had reached an all-time peak of nearly 70 000 nuclear warheads. The decline has been due primarily to cuts made in the Russian and US nuclear forces as a result of three arms limitation treaties since 1991, as well as unilateral force reductions. However, the pace of the reductions in nuclear arsenals is slowing. Moreover, neither Russia nor the US – which together account for nearly 93 % of nuclear weapons in the world (see Figure 15) – has signalled any intention to make further reductions in its strategic nuclear forces beyond the modest cuts mandated by the 2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START). At the same time, both Russia and the US are implementing extensive modernisation programmes for their remaining nuclear delivery systems.⁸⁹

The global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime, which also comprises the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), five treaties establishing Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, and a number of informal and/or voluntary initiatives.

The Nuclear Ban Treaty

Beginning in 2013, a group of United Nations member states and non-governmental organisations launched a 'humanitarian initiative' to reframe the nuclear disarmament debate by emphasising the devastating effects of a nuclear detonation on citizens all over the world.⁹⁰ The initiative led to the adoption, on 7 July 2017, of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the first multilateral, legally binding instrument for nuclear disarmament to have been negotiated in 20 years. This new instrument has been hailed as historic by supporters of the humanitarian initiative, of which Austria was one of the key drivers. However, opponents of the Ban Treaty, including many other EU Member States, argue that the conditions for disarmament do not currently exist, and point to the danger of undermining the NPT. Entrenched disagreements between supporters and opponents of the treaty are likely to impact on future negotiations under the NPT and may derail the 2020 NPT review conference, potentially further weakening the existing non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The treaty may also undermine the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards regime. The treaty has also been criticised as having been hastily drafted and as lacking rigorous verification and enforcement provisions. It may also pose a risk to Euro-Atlantic and international security by delegitimising nuclear deterrence relationships. Moreover, there are concerns that the Ban Treaty will be used mainly to put pressure on France, the UK and the US, to the detriment of European and East Asian security, rather than to address genuine security issues posed by other NWS or states known to have nuclear weapons. Among EU Member States, only Austria, Cyprus, Ireland, Malta and Sweden voted in favour of the Ban Treaty and, so far, only Austria and Ireland have signed it.⁹¹

⁸⁹ S. Kile and H. Kristensen, [Trends in World Nuclear Forces](#), SIPRI Fact Sheet, July 2017.

⁹⁰ M. Gillis, [Disarmament - A Basic Guide](#), Office for Disarmament Affairs, New York, 2017.


⁹¹ [Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons – the 'Ban Treaty'](#), EPRS, January 2018.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran (JCPOA)


Iran has been a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT since 1970. In 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors found Iran in non-compliance with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, amid international suspicion that Iran was seeking to develop a nuclear weapon. The following year, the United Nations Security Council adopted the first of a series of resolutions calling on Iran to suspend all uranium enrichment and heavy-water-related activities, and imposing sanctions. Starting in 2003, Iran, the IAEA and several other countries made a number of attempts to negotiate a settlement concerning Iran's nuclear programme. After three years of intense negotiations, in 2015, Iran and the E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as the European Union, which played a new and significant role in this context), reached agreement on the [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action](#) (JCPOA). The JCPOA is a 25-year agreement limiting Iran's nuclear capacity in exchange for sanctions relief. On 16 January 2016, nuclear-related sanctions on Iran were lifted. The negotiations between the E3+3/P5+1 and Iran that led to a comprehensive deal on Iran's nuclear programme represent the most significant development in the NPT's non-proliferation pillar.

While the United States under President Donald Trump has expressed scepticism towards the deal and is considering [withdrawing](#) from it, the EU remains committed to ensuring the full and continued implementation of the JCPOA by all parties. However, it [acknowledges](#) that there are concerns related to issues outside the scope of the agreement, such as the development of ballistic missiles by Iran.

KEY STIPULATIONS OF THE JCPOA



CONTEXT: TIMELINE - THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMME



Data source: EPRS, [The nuclear agreement with Iran](#), January 2016.


2.4.2. EU sanctions

The EU's sanctions policy is guided by its overarching foreign policy principle of effective multilateralism, with the United Nations (UN) at its core. Sanctions or restrictive measures (the two terms are used interchangeably) are one of the EU's tools to promote the objectives of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP): peace, democracy and

the respect for the rule of law, human rights and international law.⁹² Sanctions are an instrument of a diplomatic or economic nature, which seek to bring about a change in activities or policies, such as violations of international law or human rights, or policies that do not respect the rule of law or democratic principles. EU sanctions are always part of a wider, comprehensive policy approach involving political dialogue and complementary efforts.

There are three different major categories of EU sanctions, mandatory sanctions, supplementary measures and autonomous sanctions.⁹³ The EU implements mandatory UN sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council to maintain or restore international peace and security. The EU can also adopt autonomous sanctions that go beyond UN sanctions. These are referred to as supplementary measures. Finally, the EU can adopt autonomous EU sanctions applied in the absence of UN sanctions. These can be used in situations where the UN Security Council cannot reach a common position, due to the opposition of a Permanent Member. Autonomous EU sanctions are always targeted and form part of a comprehensive approach, including political dialogue, incentives, conditionality and, as a last resort, coercive measures. Autonomous sanctions are often implemented in cooperation with other states or regional organisations in order to enhance their effectiveness.

Figure 16 – Countries targeted by an EU arms embargo (as of March 2018)



Data source: [European Union Restrictive measures \(sanctions\) in force](#); [SIPRI](#).

Restrictive measures imposed by the EU may target governments of third countries, or non-state entities and individuals (such as terrorist groups and terrorists). There are different types of sanctions, including diplomatic sanctions (expulsion of diplomats, severing of diplomatic ties, and suspension of official visits); suspension of cooperation; trade sanctions (general or specific trade sanctions, arms embargoes); financial sanctions (freezing of funds or economic resources, prohibition of financial transactions,

⁹² [Sanctions Policy](#), European External Action Service.

⁹³ T. Bierstecker and C. Portela, [EU sanctions in context: three types](#), European Union Institute for Security Studies, July 2015.

restrictions on export credits or investment); flight bans; boycotts of sports or cultural events, and restrictions on admission.⁹⁴

Arms embargoes may be applied to interrupt the flow of arms or military equipment to conflict areas or to regimes that are likely to use them for internal repression or aggression against a foreign country. Arms embargoes generally comprise a prohibition on the sale, supply, transfer or export of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts.⁹⁵

EU arms embargoes – in the form of UN mandatory, EU supplementary or EU autonomous sanctions – are currently in place against 20 states or non-governmental forces operating within a specific country. Moreover, arms embargoes are in place against two terrorist organisations – al-Qaeda and ISIL/Da'esh – and associated entities. EU sanctions are reviewed at regular intervals.⁹⁶ The Council of the EU decides whether sanctions should be renewed, amended or lifted. The European Parliament does not have a formal role in the adoption of CFSP sanctions, but it has the right to be informed.

EU restrictive measures against North Korea

The EU first introduced restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in December 2006. Those measures implemented the United Nations' sanctions regime, which was adopted following the DPRK's claim that it had conducted a nuclear weapon test. The EU also reinforced the UN's sanctions regime by adopting supplementary measures, complementing and reinforcing the UN Security Council resolutions. The EU has continued to implement the restrictive measures imposed through resolutions of the UN Security Council and reinforced them through supplementary measures. Sanctions were last renewed on [22 January 2018](#), adding 17 citizens of the DPRK to the list of those subject to an asset freeze and travel restrictions. The EU's restrictive measures against the DPRK target its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile-related programmes. The ongoing nuclear and ballistic missile-related activities of the DPRK represent a serious threat to international peace and security. They undermine the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime which the EU has supported for decades. In its 2016 [resolution](#) on North Korea, the European Parliament urged Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. MEPs pointed to the human rights situation and called on the international community to bring those responsible for crimes against humanity before the International Criminal Court, while imposing targeted sanctions.

⁹⁴ G. Grieger, [Sanctions as an EU foreign policy instrument](#), Library Briefing, European Parliament, May 2013.

⁹⁵ [Restrictive measures](#), European Commission, spring 2008.

⁹⁶ [Restrictive measures \(sanctions\) in force](#), European Union, 4 August 2017.

3. Peace and EU democracy support

3.1. What existing research says about the link between peace and democracy

There is quite a wide consensus among scholars that democracies tend to avoid war with each other, and are more peaceful in general in their relations with other states, whether democratic or not. This constitutes the central thesis of the 'democratic peace theory', which goes back to the Enlightenment, with one of its most prominent defenders having been the German philosopher, Immanuel Kant.⁹⁷ He stated that republican states, by which he meant states governed by a representative government and characterised by the separation of powers, are generally more pacific than other forms of government. According to him, such states would be less inclined to go to war since the consent of citizens would be required. Ordinary citizens are quite reluctant to bear the burden of war and accept the inherent risks. The democratic peace theory does not deny that war remains possible, even between democracies. Based on existing historic evidence, it can be inferred that 'levels of violent conflict, especially wars, within democratic pairs of states are significantly lower than levels of violent conflict within other pairs of states.' Historically, while democracies have confronted each other in different ways, they have made big efforts to avoid wars and violent conflicts.⁹⁸

It is important to avoid oversimplifying the theory, as peace is driven by a multiplicity of factors, not just democracy, and different degrees of democratisation have a different impact on peace. According to Baliga, Lucca and Sjöström, data on war for the period 1816-2000 suggests that 'limited democracies are more aggressive than other regime types, including dictatorships, and not only during periods when the political regime is changing [...] Thus, while full democratization might advance the cause of peace, limited democratization might advance the cause of war'.⁹⁹ The researchers quoted above have also found that democratic countries are more aggressive in a hostile environment, such as a region dominated by non-democratic countries.

Since the 1950s, interstate wars have been clearly outnumbered by civil conflicts.¹⁰⁰ Does the link between democracy and peace hold true at domestic level as well? The dominant view in the international community is that domestic peace can be promoted by supporting democracy. Evidence indeed shows that democracies are clearly more resilient to conflict. A recent report¹⁰¹ commissioned by the Community of Democracies has concluded that consolidated liberal democracies are the best path towards internal and international peace and security. Democracies are less likely to suffer internal armed conflicts or to experience terrorism, because they provide channels for expressing dissent and respond to violence with due respect for human rights. On the other hand, according to the same report, 'states at intermediate stages of democratization – hybrid regimes with mixed features of democracy and autocracy, elite-driven patronage systems, and/or weak institutions – are generally the most vulnerable to insecurity, whether from violent crime, terrorism, or entrenched poverty'. Whether democratising states are more prone to violence remains a matter of controversy among

⁹⁷ I. Kant, *Perpetual Peace; A Philosophical Essay*, 1795.

⁹⁸ D. Reiter, '[Is Democracy a Cause of Peace?](#)', *Oxford Research Encyclopaedias*, January 2017.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ M.G. Marshall and G. Elzinga-Marshall, [Global Report 2017. Conflict, Governance and State Fragility](#), p. 7.

¹⁰¹ M. Albright and M. Jomaa, [Liberal democracy and the path to peace and security](#), September 2017.

researchers.¹⁰² Recent experience from states where democracy was attempted, such as in North Africa, or Iraq and Afghanistan, indeed suggests that the potential for instability in such situations is considerable.

A further important question is whether political settlements based on democratic mechanisms (such as holding free and fair elections) are an effective way of terminating civil conflicts. In fact, most civil wars end with decisive military victories either by the government or by the rebels, with only about a quarter ending through negotiated settlements.¹⁰³ Even in such cases, the resulting democratic structures may remain fragile, as for example in Bosnia.

3.2. EU support to democracy and its link to peace

Both democracy and peace are enshrined in the EU Treaties as fundamental principles. Article 2 TEU recognises democracy as one of the values on which the EU is based, and Article 3 defines peace as one of the EU's primary objectives. According to Article 21 of the same Treaty, outlining the Union's external policies, the EU's action on the international scene has to be guided by democracy, as one of the values that inspired its creation, and its external policies and international cooperation shall aim at fostering both democracy and peace in the world. The Council conclusions from November 2009 on 'increased coherence in the EU's support to democracy' – a guiding document which gave an important impetus to EU democracy support at the time of the Lisbon Treaty's entry into force – recommended that EU partnerships and dialogues should aim at promoting democracy and peace, along with human rights, the rule of law and good governance. The strong connection between peace and democracy was explicitly acknowledged in the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, adopted in 2012: 'Sustainable peace, development and prosperity are possible only when grounded upon respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law'. In the Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (2015-2019), the EU emphasises 'the key contribution that civil society actors and human rights defenders make to peace and security, stability and prosperity.' The strong link between democracy and peace comes to the fore in the EU Global Strategy. The strategy mentions the imperative of pursuing consistency with EU fundamental values, and it describes democracy as an indispensable aspect of 'resilient societies'. The integrated approach to conflicts and crises advocated by this strategy focuses on the use of all available policies and instruments aimed at conflict prevention, management and resolution. The Global Strategy acknowledges that the connection between democracy and peace is a bidirectional one, with democracy and peace presupposing and reinforcing each other. The concept of resilience best expresses this mutually reinforcing relation:

A resilient state is a secure state, and security is key for prosperity and democracy. But the reverse holds true as well. To ensure sustainable security, it is not only state institutions that we will support. Echoing the Sustainable Development Goals, resilience is a broader concept, encompassing all individuals and the whole of society. A resilient

¹⁰² Collier and Rohner ([Democracy, Development, and Conflict](#), 2008) argued that democracy makes rebellion easier, but this effect only appears in poorer democratic countries. Wealthy democracies are made safer by democracy. Gleditsch and Ruggery ([Political opportunity structures, democracy, and civil war](#), 2007) found that democracy in itself does not increase the risk of civil conflict onset. The risk of civil war depends on other factors, such as state weakness as assessed by irregular political leader changes. Uwe Sunde and Matteo Cervellati ([Democratising for peace](#), 2014) found that the character of the democratic transitions matters: peaceful transitions to democracy are more likely to reduce conflict than violent transitions.

¹⁰³ B.F. Walter, [The Four Things We Know About How Civil Wars End](#), October 2013.

society featuring democracy, trust in institutions, and sustainable development lies at the heart of a resilient state.

In line with the obligations enshrined in the Treaties, the EU has developed a wide array of tools for supporting democracy in third countries. These range from political and human rights dialogue, to support for civil society and human rights defenders, to development aid for good governance and the rule of law, and to the conditionality enshrined in its bilateral trade and cooperation agreements and in its unilateral trade preferences. In many of these fields, EU efforts in favour of democracy have a more or less direct impact on peace and stability. Representative democracies that are based on free and fair elections, that are inclusive of women and youth, but also of marginalised groups, that provide efficient public goods to citizens and are transparent and accountable, are clearly less prone to internal conflicts. Various groups in society will find ways to express their grievances and to have their interests and concerns adequately taken into account. Conceptually, the EU takes a comprehensive approach to democracy ('deep democracy'),¹⁰⁴ emphasising a multiplicity of aspects.



EU support for democracy in the Western Balkans

The Western Balkans are a test case for the EU's capacity to support democracy in third countries in post-conflict situations. The region witnessed the most significant episodes of war in post-World War Two Europe in terms of casualties and duration, the states in the region having been affected to varying degrees. Tensions still remain in most states in the region. Western Balkan states are candidates or potential candidates for accession, which gives the EU the strongest leverage in promoting democratic values. More concretely, four countries have candidate status: Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. Bosnia and Herzegovina has applied for it, while Kosovo has not. All six countries have concluded stabilisation and association agreements (SAA) with the EU.

The current situation in the region illustrates the tension between the search for stability and respect for democratic standards. Based on democratic indicators, the status of democracy in the region is declining. A number of worrying [developments](#) have been identified, such as erosion of democracy, rule of law and media freedom and fast-rising nationalist sentiments. This has happened despite EU efforts to uphold democratic standards in the region using the tools at its disposal. The EU has strengthened its monitoring of the countries' progress towards compliance with the fundamental values, namely the rule of law, economic governance, strengthening of democratic institutions and fundamental rights. However, the EU has been [criticised](#) for promoting stability at the expense of democracy.

EU development aid in the field of government and civil society funds a wide range of measures that have the potential to strengthen the resilience of societies to conflict. EU support for measures to improve the accountability and transparency of public administration, to fight corruption, to reform and strengthen judiciaries, to reform the security apparatus, including through training in human rights, increases the legitimacy of state institutions and reduces the potential for civil conflict.

¹⁰⁴ The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) introduced a commitment to promote 'deep democracy' in the EU's neighbourhood as part of its reframing following the 'Arab Spring' in 2011. Deep democracy includes free and fair elections, freedom of association, expression and assembly, the rule of law, the fight against corruption, security and law enforcement reform, and democratic control over armed and security forces, civil society, gender equality and anti-discrimination.

Figure 17 – Share of EU aid for government and civil society going to fragile statesData source: [OECD](#), CRS data, disbursements.**Figure 18 – Share of EU aid for peace and security in total EU aid for government and civil society**Data source: [OECD](#), CRS data, disbursements.

As can be seen in Figure 17 above, an important share of EU development aid for government and civil society is granted to states in situations of fragility.¹⁰⁵ This share has represented between 30 % and 40 % of total EU development aid for government and civil society since 2007. This highlights the importance attached by the EU to supporting good governance and civil society in fragile states. The share of EU governance aid granted specifically to ensuring peace and security increased after 2007 to represent around one quarter (see Figure 18), which highlights the importance of the issue in EU development policy.

Another array of measures aim to build more inclusive societies through increased involvement of women and youth, as well as marginalised groups, in political processes. One of the defining features of many democracies today is a lack of youth participation in politics. Involving young people more in political processes reduces the risk of the political radicalisation of youth, which can lead to violence and terrorism. The EU has put in place various programmes and initiatives to increase the political participation of young people. For example, the EU4Youth Programme awards grants to organisations proposing actions addressing the active participation of young people in their societies in Eastern Partnership countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) in the 2017-2020 period. One of its objectives is to enable youth organisations to participate in the policy dialogue and to cooperate with public and private bodies and institutions. The EU supports gender equality and better political opportunities for women. The involvement of women in politics is believed to decrease the risk of conflict.¹⁰⁶ As an example of EU action, one of the priority areas for funding under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights in the 2016-2017 period was strengthening the political participation of women and youth via political parties.


At the global level, the EU, together with its Member States, is an important provider of official development aid (ODA) specifically targeted at government and civil society. Together, their share represented more than 50 % of the ODA disbursed in the world for this sector in 2016 (see Figure 19).

¹⁰⁵ As the data about the sectorial amount of EU development aid come from OECD, the classification of fragile states for the purpose of the statistical calculations is done by the OECD, taking into account data from other multilateral financial institutions and the Fund for Peace Fragility Index. For more information, see the [OECD list of states of fragility](#).

¹⁰⁶ 'There is overwhelming quantitative evidence that women's empowerment and gender equality are associated with peace and stability in society. In particular, when women influence decisions about war and peace and take the lead against extremism in their communities, it is more likely crises will be resolved without recourse to violence.' M. O'Reilly, [Why Women? Inclusive Security and Peaceful Societies](#), October 2015.

Undoubtedly, a central instrument of democracy support is represented by the EU's electoral observation missions (EOMs). For more than two decades, the EU has sent EOMs to many regions of the world. The effectiveness of these missions in building trust among opposing groups in society, and therefore in preventing conflicts, has been recognised. An evaluation report¹⁰⁷ for the European Commission (covering EOMs from July 2016 to January 2017) has found that EU election observation activities can contribute to the identification of irregularities and fraud and to the deterrence of fraud and malpractice, thereby fostering confidence in the electoral process and mitigating the potential for election-related conflict. The report concludes that EU election observation activities contribute to reducing the risk of future electoral conflict and violence in both the short and long-term. The EU EOMs take a comprehensive approach to the entire electoral cycle, putting forward recommendations for improving the overall electoral environment in third countries. The EU's contribution to electoral reform 'likely has a peace dividend' too.

Figure 19 – Official development assistance worldwide for government and civil society in 2016




Data source: [OECD](#), CRS data, disbursements.

According to the study quoted above, 'in elections with a high risk of security and stability issues, there can sometimes be heightened internal and external pressure to deploy an EOM'. Many EOMs have in fact taken place in countries that had experienced some degree of external and internal conflict, or in countries that were still prone to instability and civil conflict. Based on the annual state fragility scores by the Fund for Peace,¹⁰⁸ EU EOMs since 2006 have mostly taken place in countries with some level of fragility, at either warning or alert level (see Figure 20).¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷ Particip GmbH & GOPA Consultants, [Evaluation of EU Election Observation Activities July 2016 – January 2017](#), European External Action Service.

¹⁰⁸ [Fund for Peace](#).

¹⁰⁹ Excluding the countries/territories for which the Fund does not provide data: Fiji, Kosovo and Palestine.

Figure 20 – Countries that have received EU EOMs between 2006 and 2017, and their level of fragility in the respective year¹¹⁰

Data source: [EEAS website](#) for EOMs, [Fund for Peace](#) for fragility scores.

It should be noted, however, that the EU does not send electoral observation missions to the regions covered by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (encompassing Europe, Central Asia and North America), as this organisation observes elections itself using a similar methodology. A European Parliament delegation is, however, often involved in the International Electoral Observation Missions (IEOM) organised by the ODIHR – the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights – of the OSCE. Note that Figure 20 does not include such missions, including those in which the European Parliament participated.

The European Parliament (EP) has established its own measures to support parliamentary democracy in third countries identified as priority partners for democracy assistance. Some of these measures aim specifically at building trust and facilitating dialogue and consensus-building on legislative issues among conflicting political forces, in parliamentary environments characterised by a lack of political trust, such as in Ukraine. The European Parliament plays a central role in these missions, which enjoy a high degree of independence in conducting their electoral monitoring and have thus acquired a reputation for impartiality. It is consulted on the planning of EU EOMs and on follow-up missions. The EP delegation is integrated in the EU EOM, which is always chaired by a Member of the European Parliament.

¹¹⁰ The following countries/territories have also received EOMs, but the Fund for Peace does not provide fragility data for them: Fiji (2006), Kosovo (2017, 2014, 2013), Palestinian Territory (2006). They do not therefore appear on the map.

4. Peace and EU development cooperation and humanitarian aid

Development cooperation and humanitarian aid are long-standing EU commitments, enshrined in the Treaties.¹¹¹ Aid cannot prevent or end conflicts by itself, but has a conspicuous place in conflict-affected zones, as half of the world's poor live in fragile or conflict-affected states. There is a strong correlation between development issues and conflict-affected situations. Youth unemployment, lack of economic opportunities and difficult access to resources are often combined with the rise of violent armed groups, drug trafficking, social or ethnic conflicts. Conversely, conflicts hinder development, reducing GDP growth by two points a year on average.¹¹² The refugee crisis is also mostly due to conflicts: 95 % of 65.6 million refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) originate from just ten conflict zones. In addition, almost all humanitarian crises arise in conflict situations.¹¹³ Conflict-prone 'fragile states' all combine economic development issues with weak legitimacy, a limited capacity to deliver services to the population, and security issues; but each fragility or conflict situation involves a complex matrix of deficits in those various areas. This complexity has to be taken into account in the context of development and humanitarian programmes where actions undertaken must be carefully planned and coordinated, to avoid any possible negative impacts.

4.1. The EU approach

4.1.1. A new 'consensus on development' (2017)

In June 2017, EU institutions and Member States renewed their 'consensus on development', originally adopted on 20 December 2005. The new consensus clearly targets fragile and conflict-affected countries.¹¹⁴ Streamlined with the UN sustainable development goals (SDGs) and the concept of 'resilience' outlined in the EU Global Strategy,¹¹⁵ the new consensus highlights that development cooperation is a pivotal instrument for preventing violent conflicts, mitigating their consequences, or recovering from them. The EU also strives to build its own resilience to shocks mainly driven by external conflicts, namely the migration 'crisis' and terrorist attacks on its soil.

On the global stage, the EU is also committed to most aid effectiveness frameworks.¹¹⁶ It endorsed the new deal for engagement with fragile states (November 2011) which focuses on five peacebuilding and state-building goals, where employment and access to social services are placed on an equal footing with inclusive politics, justice and security.¹¹⁷

¹¹¹ [Treaty on European Union](#), Article 21; [Treaty on the Functioning of the EU](#), Article 4(4) and Title III.

¹¹² Data source on conflict and fragility: [World Bank](#).

¹¹³ S. O'Brien, [Opening remarks to the Humanitarian Affairs Segment of the 2017 Economic and Social Council](#), Geneva, June 2017.

¹¹⁴ [The new European Consensus on Development](#), Council press release, 7.6.2017. See also: [European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid \(2008/C 25/01\)](#).

¹¹⁵ [Shared vision, common action: A stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy](#), 2016.

¹¹⁶ E. Pichon, [Understanding 'development effectiveness'](#), EPRS, 2017.

¹¹⁷ G. Grieger, [The 'New Deal' for engagement in fragile states](#), Library briefing, European Parliament, 2013.

Figure 21 – A quarter of EU aid goes to the most fragile states

FSI ranking	Country	EU aid (institutions + Member States, current US\$, million)	% of total EU aid
1	Somalia	594.85	1.26%
2	South Sudan	725.90	1.54%
3	Central African Republic	258.95	0.55%
4	Sudan	283.16	0.60%
4	Yemen	481.25	1.02%
6	Syria	1 887.26	3.99%
7	Chad	217.18	0.46%
8	Democratic Republic of Congo	748.71	1.58%
9	Afghanistan	1 593.39	3.37%
10	Haiti	224.54	0.47%
11	Iraq	907.78	1.92%
12	Guinea	196.57	0.42%
13	Nigeria	770.09	1.63%
14	Pakistan	970.52	2.05%
15	Burundi	207.90	0.44%
16	Zimbabwe	280.74	0.59%
17	Guinea-Bissau	146.45	0.31%
18	Eritrea	19.25	0.04%
19	Niger	433.10	0.92%
20	Kenya	699.19	1.48%
EU aid to 20 most fragile states in 2016		11 646.79	24.63%
Total EU aid		47 286.49	

Data source: [Fragile state index](#), 2016; EU aid: 2016 Official development aid (ODA) from EU institutions and member states (gross disbursement, current US\$); [EU Aid explorer](#) (OECD data).

4.1.2. Policy frameworks and regional strategies

'The EU should ensure that its objectives in the fields of development policy, peacebuilding, conflict prevention and international security are mutually reinforcing.'¹¹⁸ This comprehensive approach is reflected in several policy frameworks and operational guidelines: the EU policy coherence for development (2005), the code of conduct on the division of labour in development policy (2007), the operational framework on aid effectiveness (2011) and the EU resilience action plan (2013), among others. This has materialised in some common strategies, as is the case for the Sahel and the Horn of Africa (see boxes below). However, the funding is 'siloed' so that these strategies still have to be financed through a mix of EU budgetary resources, European Development Fund money, and trust funds combining public and private contributions.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁸ [COM\(2011\) 637 final \('Agenda for change'\)](#), European Commission, October 2011.

¹¹⁹ See Introduction and Chapter 2.3 on the EU Budget.

The EU strategy for security and development in the Sahel

The instability of the [Sahel](#) is a particular concern for the EU: EU leaders believe that improving development and security in the Sahel should help to limit the migration of populations, the risk of attacks on European soil, illegal trafficking and problems of hydrocarbon supply. The 'EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel' was adopted in March 2011 to improve the synergy between measures in favour of development and those aimed at improving the security of the region. It defines four main lines of action: development, good governance and internal conflict resolution; political and diplomatic action, security and the rule of law; the fight against extremist violence and radicalisation. The 2015-2020 Regional Action Plan in the framework of the EU Strategy for the Sahel region has reinforced the security dimension, due to new risks linked to the fall of the Libyan regime, the rebellions in northern Mali, and the rise of ISIL/Da'esh. More than a new policy, the strategy aims to bring together existing tools and means. Since June 2017, a regional coordination cell supports capacity-building in the five target countries (Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad) and cooperation between them through the G5 Sahel group. The coordination cell also aims to harmonise the interventions of the three civilian support missions to national security forces: EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUCAP Sahel Mali, and for the training of armed forces, EUTM Mali. The EU also finances and trains the G5 force, implemented in summer 2017.

The EU strategic framework for the Horn of Africa

The EU's policy for the [Horn of Africa](#) initially focused on development, before tackling more political problems in the wake of piracy attacks off the Coast of Somalia. The EU strategic framework for the Horn of Africa aligns various external policy programmes and instruments towards five objectives: good governance and human rights; peacebuilding; preventing the insecurity spillover; poverty reduction; and cross-border cooperation. A Special Representative is the main EU interlocutor with the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). A common operational centre (OPCEN) coordinates the three CSDP missions: the EU naval force (EUNavfor), and a civilian capacity-building mission (EUCAP Somalia) help strengthening the maritime security off the coast of Somalia, while EUTM-S provides strategic advice on sustainable security to the Somali military. In line with the strategic framework, the EU Commission's Directorates-General for Development (DEVCO) and for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO) have launched a common programme: 'Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience' (SHARE). SHARE targets climate-based food crises by linking short-term humanitarian aid and longer-term development policy. Thematic working groups on migration or countering violent extremism in the Horn of Africa bring together the EU departments concerned. In addition to improving the coordination of EU staff and Member States, the EU is endeavouring to foster regional cooperation on security and development issues within the African Union and IGAD. The EU also acknowledges the importance of addressing Horn of Africa issues with interlocutors such as the Gulf States, the Sahel countries and the EU's southern neighbours.

4.2. The conflict-sensitivity approach

4.2.1. The discussion on conflict and aid

Research challenges the intuitive notion that aid and relief necessarily appease tensions. Princeton's Empirical Studies of Conflict (ESOC)¹²⁰ show, for example, that in the Philippines, increases in employment led to further violence, possibly because better living conditions empower citizens to resist. Investments in infrastructure also correlated with further violence, because the government adopted tougher measures to protect a

¹²⁰ <https://esoc.princeton.edu/> See also: 'Aid for Peace: Does Money Buy Hearts and Minds?' ForeignAffairs.com, 21.1.2015.

source of taxes and jobs, or because insurgents attempted to seize or sabotage the projects. If they focus only on certain populations (e.g. religious minorities, women) or geographic areas, development programmes risk aggravating dissent and rejection. Other researchers have shown that a humanitarian presence in the Central African Republic contributed to economic distortions: for example, it caused an increase in rents, thus further weakening the local population; better job opportunities and wages offered by aid agencies attracted local civil servants – often unpaid for months – thus hindering the EU efforts to support better governance. In-kind or financial aid may also be diverted by the government and/or armed groups, reinforcing their grip over populations.¹²¹

By contrast, other findings show that aid can be efficient in reducing the level of violence when it is informed by a good knowledge of the social context that led to conflict, for example, sectarian divisions. Small-scale assistance, carefully targeted and implemented, such as conditional cash transfer, has proved efficient in Iraq and the Philippines. However, research also shows that similar conclusions cannot be drawn for all conflict zones: avoiding negative impacts requires an understanding of the context of each conflict in its historic, political and socio-economic dimensions, and an analysis of the potential impact of every planned intervention ('conflict sensitivity'). Political commitments, reflected in the new consensus on development, must be supported by appropriate expertise and tools, broadly referred to as the 'do no harm approach'.¹²² The EU has been able to draw lessons and provide guidelines for staff working in conflict areas.¹²³

4.2.2. *Conflict prevention: early warning for better efficiency*

The Treaty on European Union identifies conflict prevention as a key mission of the EU's external action. Addressing the root causes of a potential violent conflict before it erupts is indeed vital, since emerging from an entrenched conflict is a long and costly process: conflicts that ended in 2014 and 2015 had lasted on average respectively 26 and 14.5 years.¹²⁴ The deployment of a conflict early warning system (EWS)¹²⁵ has been a way of fulfilling the Treaty's commitment. The EWS involves all concerned actors across the relevant Member States' and EU services, both centrally (EEAS, DEVCO, ECHO) and in the field (EU delegations, ECHO field offices, EU Special Representatives, Member States' embassies). Every year, based on statistical risk information and input from the field, EU staff establish priorities for EU action, based on EU interests and benefit. For each priority country, a conflict prevention report proposes relevant actions, which are monitored and revised during the following yearly EWS iteration. This makes it possible for interventions to target inequalities, weak governance and security issues where they are most urgently needed and most likely to be efficient. For the time being, few assessments of the EU EWS are available.

¹²¹ See: T. Vircoulon and C. Arnaud, [Penser et anticiper les impacts socio-économiques de l'intervention humanitaire en République centrafricaine](#), IFRI note, June 2015; [Warlord Business CAR's Violent Armed Groups and their Criminal Operations for Profit and Power](#), Enough Project, June 2015.

¹²² Although 'do no harm' originally refers to a [specific framework](#), the expression now often encompasses all conflict-sensitivity approaches, see for example [Operationalising the Humanitarian-Development Nexus, Council conclusions](#), 19 May 2017.

¹²³ [Resilience and Fragility – Analytical tools](#), European Commission, International Cooperation and Development.

¹²⁴ Source: [World Bank Group, United Nations](#), 2017.

¹²⁵ [Council conclusions on conflict prevention](#), 20 June 2011 – [EU Conflict Early Warning System... SWD \(2016\) 3 final](#), High Representative/European Commission, 14 January 2016.

4.2.3. *Ongoing conflict: challenges of the comprehensive approach*

At the heart of conflicts, the peace and conflict impact assessment (PCIA) methodology provides for a two-way assessment of the possible impacts of a conflict on external intervention, as well as the possible impacts of an intervention on the dynamics of the conflict. Other methodologies focus on the peacebuilding relevance of development interventions (aid for peace) or of the gender aspects of conflicts and interventions (gender and conflict sensitivity).

The EU has a manifold role, and tensions between its various mandates are unavoidable: development actors insist that addressing the root causes of migration is not the same as tackling illegal migration;¹²⁶ the humanitarian response endeavours to limit the effects of armed conflicts but does not seek to address the parties' responsibilities, as development projects aimed at setting up transitional justice do. However, when the conflict is ongoing, streamlining interventions is vital to ensure that there is no gap between urgent interventions and predictable aid. Most stakeholders acknowledge that better coordination would foster the complementarity of short-term humanitarian interventions and longer-term development programmes (the 'humanitarian-development nexus'). Joint analyses are already performed within the EU services, and the Council has advocated 'new approaches in policies and legal frameworks'.¹²⁷ This 'operationalisation' is currently being tried out in Darfur (Sudan) where various EU services are brought together to help ensure a better transition from emergency assistance to sustainable development, when conditions are met.¹²⁸

4.2.4. *Post-conflict interventions: making recovery possible*

In areas emerging from conflicts, the recovery and peacebuilding assessment methodology (RBPA) is designed to analyse the drivers of the conflict and to assess its impacts, in order to draw up a roadmap for the implementation of recovery measures. RBPA is a process rather than a set of tools. In this process, the EU and other international organisations play a crucial role: they coordinate their actions to create the conditions for effective recovery under the ownership of a legitimate government. Conducted under the Joint EU-World Bank-United Nations Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments and Recovery Planning,¹²⁹ RPBA was used in 2015, for example, at the request of the Nigerian government, to stabilise the north-east of the country, after the region was recaptured from a Boko Haram insurgency. The Central African Republic requested a RBPA from those three international institutions to help draft its National Plan for Recovery and Peacebuilding, presented in November 2016 at the Brussels conference for the Central African Republic.

4.3. The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace

As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)¹³⁰ is one of the external financing instruments that were adopted as a package in 2014,¹³¹

¹²⁶ See, for example, interview with Maria-Manuela Cabral, Head of Unit for Fragility and Resilience, DG DEVCO, European Commission, in [Voice Out Loud, issue 26](#), November 2017, p. 14.

¹²⁷ [Council conclusions on operationalising the humanitarian-development nexus](#), 19 May 2017.

¹²⁸ As argued by the [Head of the EU Delegation in Sudan](#) and [DG ECHO](#).


¹²⁹ [Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessments \(RPBA\): FAQs](#), World Bank, 10 June 2016.

¹³⁰ [Regulation \(EU\) No 230/2014](#) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing an instrument contributing to stability and peace, OJ L 77, 13.3.2014, pp. 1-10.

¹³¹ The 2014 EFIs package included three geographical instruments (the Development Cooperation Instrument, the European Neighbourhood Instrument and the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance), three thematic

as part of the implementation of the CFSP. The idea behind the IcSP, which replaces the Instrument for Stability (IfS), was to increase the efficiency and coherence of the European Union's actions by creating a more explicit link between security and development policies. The focus was specifically on crisis management and peacebuilding (i.e. crisis preparedness, crisis response, conflict prevention and peacebuilding), and on addressing global and trans-national threats (i.e. terrorism, cybersecurity and illicit trafficking). In doing so, the IcSP's objectives link two major EU policy areas, namely foreign policy, and international cooperation and development. A list of cross-cutting issues, such as promotion of democracy, climate change and gender equality, are to be taken into consideration wherever possible.

Figure 22 – IcSP projects: Distribution of funds per sectors (as of January 2018)



Data source: European Commission, 2018; EPRS.

4.3.1. Rationale

The 2011 World Bank report on Conflict, Security and Development¹³² explored the theoretical link between conflict, security and development issues. The report noted that at least 1.5 billion people globally were (at that time) affected by ongoing violence or its legacies. It found that organised violence increased when other factors were present, such as youth unemployment, income shocks, tension among ethnic, religious or social groups, and trafficking networks. Risks of violence were greater when high pressures combined with weak capacity or a lack of legitimacy among key national institutions. Societal, economic, technological and geopolitical developments point to the growing vulnerability of the world's population to shocks and stresses, including: interstate conflicts, natural disasters, extreme weather events, water crises, state collapse and

instruments (Democracy and Human Rights Worldwide, the Partnership Instrument and the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace), and a horizontal regulation with common implementing rules. IcSP is managed partly by the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) and partly by the Commission DG for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO).

¹³² [World Development Report](#), World Bank, 2011.

cyber-attacks.¹³³ In such a rapidly changing environment, complex and interconnected risks do not fit neatly into categories defined by geographical borders or legal boundaries.¹³⁴ In turn, they challenge the usefulness of traditional funding instruments that aim to maintain clear dividing lines between peace and security on the one hand, and development on the other.¹³⁵ Moreover, the increasingly complex security environment is having a direct impact on the definition of the development objectives, requiring a redefinition of the respective missions of actors involved in delivering security and development functions.

While the EU recognises a clear link between security and development – as reflected in the 2006 European Consensus on Development,¹³⁶ the EU's support for the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, and the Council conclusions on the EU's comprehensive approach¹³⁷ – like other international donors, it faces a number of constraints when committing funding for peace and security through traditional development channels. Therefore, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace was created to support security initiatives and peacebuilding activities in partner countries. The instrument can provide short-term assistance, for example in countries where a crisis is unfolding, or long-term support to global and trans-regional threats.

The IcSP was amended¹³⁸ in 2017 to strengthen the EU's role as a security provider, by introducing new funding opportunities for military capacity-building in third countries. An extra €100 million has been allocated to the IcSP for that purpose. The amendments extend the Union's ability to support capacity-building of partners through training and mentoring, provision of non-lethal equipment and improvements in infrastructure. Moreover, the amendments will allow the Union to help to build the capacity of military actors in partner countries to deliver development assistance and provide security for development activities. Such help will be provided only in exceptional circumstances, and only if EU objectives cannot be achieved by recourse to non-military actors, and if the functioning of state institutions and human rights and fundamental freedoms are threatened. The EU position that Union assistance may not be used to finance recurrent military expenditure, the procurement of arms and ammunition, or training which is solely designed to contribute to the fighting capacity of the armed forces, remains unchanged.

4.3.2. *Projects funded by the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace*

The IcSP currently funds around 270 projects in over 70 countries. Figure 23 shows the geographical distribution of the funds in 2017. The largest proportion of the funds in 2017 went to Africa, followed by projects covering multiple regions.

A large single-country project funded by the IcSP sought to address the refugee crisis in the Mediterranean Sea. The €20 million project aimed to strengthen the operational

¹³³ [Global Trends to 2030: Can the EU meet the challenges ahead?](#), European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS), March 2015.

¹³⁴ P. Pawlak, [Risk and Resilience in Foreign Policy](#), EPRS, September 2015.

¹³⁵ B. Immenkamp, [The EU's New Approach to funding peace and security](#), EPRS, November 2017.


¹³⁶ European Parliament, Council, European Commission Joint Statement, [The European Consensus on Development](#), OJ C 46, 24.2.2006, pp. 1-19.

¹³⁷ [Foreign Affairs Council conclusions on the EU's comprehensive approach](#), Council of the European Union, 12 May 2014.

¹³⁸ [Regulation \(EU\) 2017/2306](#) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 amending regulation (EU) No 230/2014 establishing an instrument contributing to stability and peace, OJ L 335, 15.12.2017, pp. 6-10.

capacity of the Turkish coastguard to manage migration flows in the Mediterranean Sea, in order to end illegal migration and trafficking, and rescue castaways. Better life-saving equipment and training provided by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has allowed the Turkish coastguards to enhance their search and rescue missions in the Mediterranean Sea. The project began in August 2016 and ended in February 2018.

Figure 23 – IcSP projects: Distribution of funds per region, € million (projects active in January 2018)



Data source: European Commission, 2018.

In response to the war in Syria, the IcSP is funding a project to promote civil society leadership in Syria, in preparation for a post-conflict transition in the country. The €15 million project has three aims, namely to promote civil society leadership in key areas, to support women in taking a leading role in Syrian society, and to help encourage a diverse and independent media. The project started in August 2015, to run until April 2018.

The largest multi-country project under the IcSP is the Chemical, Biological, Radiological & Nuclear (CBRN) Risk-Mitigation Centres of Excellence initiative, a worldwide programme involving 56 partner countries.¹³⁹ The initiative aims to mitigate risks related to CBRN material and promote the establishment of a culture of security. The causes of CBRN incidents are either natural (e.g. pandemics), accidental (e.g. industrial accidents) or intentional. The intentional or malevolent use of CBRN materials for terrorist attacks¹⁴⁰ is of particular and increasing concern to the international community. It is an issue which this project seeks to address, through the development of risk mitigation activities aimed at critical areas of CBRN security such as border control, field detection and response, forensics and adequate waste management. The project – which has an overall budget of €250 million – started in 2010¹⁴¹ and is currently scheduled to run until December 2020.

In the area of counter-terrorism, funds from the IcSP fund technical assistance to law enforcement and judicial officials in an area stretching from Africa, via the Arabian Peninsula, to Pakistan.¹⁴² Projects include training aviation administrations and law enforcement authorities in aviation security; training counter-terrorism, law enforcement,

¹³⁹ [Website](#) of the European Union Chemical, Biological, Radiological & Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence initiative (EU CBRN CoE).

¹⁴⁰ B. Immenkamp, [ISIL/Da'esh and 'non-conventional' weapons of terror](#), EPRS, May 2016.

¹⁴¹ Until 2014, funds came from the Instrument for Stability (IfS).

¹⁴² B. Immenkamp, P. Pawlak, G. Barzoukas, [EU efforts on counter-terrorism - capacity-building in third countries](#), EPRS, December 2017.

and investigation and prosecution officials; and advising on the optimal inclusion of a human rights approach in counter-terrorism strategies. In the Horn of Africa, South Sudan, Uganda, and Yemen, IcSP-funded projects seek to enhance the capabilities of intelligence officials, law enforcement agents and prosecutors to disrupt terrorist activities and prosecute terrorism suspects. In Pakistan, the IcSP funds training of judicial officials responsible for investigating, prosecuting, convicting and detaining terrorists.

4.4. Evaluation

In June 2017, the European Commission and the High Representative evaluated the implementation of the EU resilience policy framework.¹⁴³ This evaluation recognises the closer working relationships between EU services, but points out that the current mandates and instruments of DG DEVCO and ECHO do not allow for a consistent division of labour. The Commission and High Representative highlight the need to strengthen the EU's analytical capacities and for greater 'active consideration on how the EU could contribute to conflict reduction'.

As cooperation has grown between the EU institutions and Member States, the next step might be better streamlining of financial instruments: negotiations on the next multiannual financial framework (post-2020 MFF), covering the future financing of the Union, have begun. A report commissioned by DG DEVCO¹⁴⁴ has identified gaps and overlaps in the seven current EU external financial instruments (EFIs); it proposes a simplification to better address present challenges and better match the security-development nexus. In the same vein, the aforementioned amendment (2017) to the regulation governing the IcSP allows for the EU budget to be used to support third countries' militaries in their efforts to strengthen peace and security.

The European Parliament has insisted¹⁴⁵ that EU development cooperation policy should continue to 'tackle the root causes of forced displacement and migration', and called for improvements in the EU's conflict prevention and conflict management policies and tools. Parliament has also called for better linkage between EU humanitarian aid and development cooperation, while emphasising that this should not be detrimental to humanitarian neutrality, critical in conflict zones. In a number of resolutions, Parliament has stressed that the eradication of poverty and respect for human rights should not be hindered by security considerations.

¹⁴³ [EU resilience policy framework...](#), SWD(2017) 227 final, European Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 7 June 2017.

¹⁴⁴ [Coherence Report: Insights from the External Evaluation of the External Financing Instruments](#), European Commission, July 2017.

¹⁴⁵ See for example: resolution of 7 June 2016 on the EU 2015 Report on Policy Coherence for Development ([2015/2317\(INI\)](#)); resolution of 14 February 2017 on the revision of the European Consensus on Development ([2016/2094\(INI\)](#)); resolution of 5 April 2017 on addressing refugee and migrant movements ([2015/2342\(INI\)](#)).

5. EU Security and Defence Policy

5.1. Peace and security in the CSDP

As analysed in chapter 2, 'the EU's work on security and defence is part of a broader picture where security and development go hand in hand'. These were the words of HR/VP Federica Mogherini addressing the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 12 December 2017.¹⁴⁶ In the face of the new unstable security environment, the EU has boosted its efforts to enhance and develop its security and defence policy, particularly following the launch of the EU Global Strategy. But the founding principle behind these efforts is the link between defence and security and peace, as enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty. Indeed, Article 42(1) TEU, which sets out the context and overarching purpose of the common security and defence policy (CSDP), stipulates that:

The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.

In this context, defence is seen as a means for security and peace. The progressive framing of an EU defence policy is incorporated in Article 42(2) TEU.¹⁴⁷ Together, these articles underpin the EU's internal collective defence efforts. Decisions relating to the CSDP are taken by the Council of the European Union by unanimity. However, there are some exceptions, for instance when the Council adopts certain decisions implementing an EU decision, or relating to the European Defence Agency (EDA) and permanent structured cooperation (PESCO), where decisions are taken by qualified majority voting. The HR/VP is responsible for proposing and implementing CSDP decisions.¹⁴⁸

The Global Strategy recognises the undeniable link between a stronger and more autonomous EU defence policy and the EU's capacity to provide peace internally and externally. It thus argues that:

In full compliance with international law, European security and defence must become better equipped to build peace, guarantee security and protect human lives, notably civilians. The EU must be able to respond rapidly, responsibly and decisively to crises, especially to help fight terrorism. It must be able to provide security when peace agreements are reached and transition governments established or in the making.

This premise is linked to the assessment that in the current geopolitical context, soft power must go hand in hand with hard power, i.e. with an enhancement of the EU's security and defence policy and the associated credibility. The Strategy maintains that, in order to achieve its goals of crisis-response, building capacity and resilience and protecting Europe's peace and security, Member States must boost defence expenditure


¹⁴⁶ [EU High Representative](#).

¹⁴⁷ Article 42(2) TEU underlines that the 'common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy'. Article 42(2) requires the EU to frame a common defence policy which can be established without further treaty changes. Through a '*passerelle*' clause, the TEU envisages in Article 42(2) that such a 'common defence' will be put in place if the 'European Council, acting unanimously, so decides.' Article 42(2) para. 2 further stipulates opt-outs. For example, the EU's policy 'shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States' (a reference to the neutrality policies of Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden); moreover, it 'shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)'.

¹⁴⁸ See, [Common Security and Defence Policy \(CSDP\)](#), EUR-Lex glossary.

(see Figure 24), make the most efficient use of resources, and meet a collective commitment of '20 % of defence budget spending devoted to the procurement of equipment and research and technology'.¹⁴⁹ The emergence of security threats, particularly of Russian aggression in the Eastern Neighbourhood, has indeed led to an increase in defence budgets in eastern European EU Member States. At the same time, significant efforts are being made to boost and – where possible – pool together EU capabilities towards more effective and efficient spending.

Figure 24 – Defence spending in the EU, 2014-2016



5.2. From the Global Strategy to the new security and defence initiatives

In December 2016, the European Council discussed a defence package presented by the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP), including: 1) specific actions to implement the security and defence component of the Global Strategy;¹⁵⁰ 2) the European Commission's European

¹⁴⁹ EU Global Strategy.

¹⁵⁰ [Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy](#), European External Action Service, June 2016.

defence action plan (EDAP);¹⁵¹ and 3) proposals to strengthen EU-NATO cooperation within the framework of the Warsaw Joint Declaration.¹⁵² At the December 2016 European Council meeting, EU leaders set a timetable for specific actions related to the package; the HR/VP was tasked to submit proposals for a permanent operational planning and conduct capability, aimed at streamlining the conduct of both civilian and military EU operations, and on further improving the development of civilian capabilities.¹⁵³ The European Council also invited the Commission to make proposals for the establishment of a European defence fund, including a financing structure ('window') on the joint development of capabilities commonly agreed by the Member States in the first half of 2017. Significant progress on all fronts was made during 2017 with the cooperation of all EU institutions.

The implementation plan on security and defence seeks to mobilise various tools and policies that will allow the EU to respond to external conflicts and crises, build partners' capacities, and protect the European Union.¹⁵⁴ The plan aims at deepening defence cooperation, moving towards permanent structured cooperation (PESCO), enhancing the EU's military and civilian response tools, improving the planning and conduct of missions, and enhancing CSDP partnerships with third countries.¹⁵⁵

In June 2017, the Council established the military planning and conduct capability (MPCC).¹⁵⁶ The MPCC will serve as a command and control structure for non-executive EU military training missions. The MPCC will work under the political control of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and aims to improve the EU's crisis management structures, as the lack of such a structure undermines its capacity to plan and run its own operations independently. The Council also decided to create a civilian/military joint support coordination cell that will increase synergies between civilian and military work.¹⁵⁷

In its March 2017 meeting, the Council also welcomed¹⁵⁸ the work launched on the coordinated annual review on defence (CARD), a voluntary Member State-driven tool for deepening cooperation, fostering capability development, and ensuring optimal use and greater coherence of defence spending plans. Essentially, CARD is a process of monitoring the defence plans of EU Member States to help coordinate spending and identify possible collaborative projects.¹⁵⁹ A trial run of CARD began in autumn 2017.

5.2.1. *Permanent structured cooperation*

PESCO was launched in December 2017 with the participation of 25 EU Member States.¹⁶⁰ It operates on the basis of concrete projects and commitments, several of

¹⁵¹ [European Defence Action Plan: Towards a European Defence Fund](#), press release, European Commission, November 2016.

¹⁵² [EU-NATO joint declaration](#), European Council, July 2016.

¹⁵³ [Outcome of the European Council of 15 December 2016](#), EPRS, December 2016.

¹⁵⁴ [Implementation Plan on Security and Defence](#), European External Action Service, May 2017.

¹⁵⁵ [Permanent structured cooperation](#), EUR-Lex glossary.

¹⁵⁶ [Council conclusions on progress in implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of Security and Defence](#), press release, Council, March 2017.

¹⁵⁷ EU defence cooperation: [Council establishes a Military Planning and Conduct Capability \(MPCC\)](#), press release, Council of the European Union, June 2017.


¹⁵⁸ [Security and defence: Council reviews progress and agrees to improve support for military missions](#), press release, Council, March 2017.

¹⁵⁹ [Coordinated Annual Review on Defence \(CARD\)](#), European Defence Agency, 2018.

¹⁶⁰ E. Lazarou, [Permanent structured cooperation \(PESCO\): From notification to establishment](#), EPRS, 2017.

which are geared towards a strengthening of the EU defence sector. For example, PESCO members commit to increase national defence budgets in real terms, increase defence investment expenditure towards 20 % of total defence spending, and invest more in defence research and technology – towards 2 % of total defence spending (see Figure 24 for EU-28 defence spending compared to the 2 % target). In addition, they pledge to develop and provide 'strategically relevant' defence capabilities in accordance with the Capability Development Plan (CDP), the Coordinated Annual Review (CARD) and the European Defence Agency (EDA), and to act jointly and make use of the financial and practical support provided by the EDF. Finally, they assume the obligation to contribute to projects that boost the European defence industry and the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB).

Figure 25 – Members of EU, NATO and PESCO



Source: EPRS, 2018.

The decision to launch PESCO is in line with the EU's new 'level of ambition' enshrined in the Global Strategy. The political intent to activate PESCO formed part of the implementation plan and, on 22 June 2017, the European Council acknowledged the 'need to launch an inclusive and ambitious Permanent Structured Cooperation'.¹⁶¹ HR/VP Federica Mogherini referred to this as 'a historic moment in European defence'.¹⁶² Indeed, while proposals for the EU to move towards common defence have been around since as early as the 1950s, the vigour and speed with which security and defence initiatives have progressed in the past couple of years has been unprecedented, particularly in the case of PESCO.

Ireland and Portugal joined the 'group of 23' on 7 December 2017, following the consent of their respective parliaments. On 11 December, PESCO was established, with 25 EU Member States undertaking to act within the PESCO framework and to issue an initial list of 17 projects, which were adopted by the Council in March 2018 (see Figure 26).¹⁶³

PESCO is to be integrated into a wide range of already existing EU institutions, instruments and mechanisms in the field of security and defence. Thus, the Coordinated

¹⁶¹ [European Council conclusions on security and defence](#), press release, European Council, 22 June 2017.

¹⁶² [Speech](#) by Federica Mogherini on the Permanent Structured Cooperation [PESCO] on defence, European External Action Service, November 2017.

¹⁶³ E. Lazarou, [Permanent structured cooperation \(PESCO\): From notification to establishment](#), EPRS, December 2017.

Annual Review, the European Defence Agency and the European Defence Fund are meant to assist PESCO participants in providing 'strategically relevant' defence capabilities.¹⁶⁴ This entails a commitment to a strengthened European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB), which is essential for the EDA.¹⁶⁵ The HR/VP made clear that PESCO will be complementary to NATO structures and that 'deepening and strengthening the European Union of Defence goes hand in hand with deepening and strengthening of the EU-NATO cooperation'.¹⁶⁶ PESCO's added value lies in its modular design, which allows for more flexible cooperation.

Figure 26 – PESCO projects and participants

PESCO Projects	IT	ES	EL	FR	NL	DE	BE	CY	PT	RO	HR	SK	FI	BG	AT	CZ	SE	HU	IE	LV	LT	LU	PL	SI	EE	Total
Military Mobility																										24
Network of Logistic Hubs in Europe and Support to Operations																										13
European Union Training Mission Competence Centre (EU TMCC)																										13
European Medical Command																										9
European Secure Software defined Radio (ESSOR)																										8
Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance																										7
Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information Sharing Platform																										7
Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security																										7
Maritime (semi-) Autonomous Systems for Mine Countermeasures (MAS MCM)																										6
Deployable Military Disaster Relief Capability Package																										5
EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core (EUFOR CROC)																										5
Energy Operational Function (EOF)																										4
Harbour & Maritime Surveillance and Protection (HARMSPRO)																										4
Strategic Command and Control (C2) System for CSDP Missions and Operations																										4
Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle / Amphibious Assault Vehicle / Light Armoured Vehicle																										3
European Training Certification Centre for European Armies																										2
Indirect Fire Support (EuroArtillery)																										2
TOTAL	14	12	9	8	7	7	6	6	6	5	5	5	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	1

Project Leader Participant

Data Source: [Council of the EU](#), 2018; [Council of the EU](#), 2017.

5.2.2. The European Defence Fund: Boosting the EU's capacity in procurement and R&T

In November 2016, the Commission unveiled the European Defence Action Plan, which would involve setting up the European Defence Fund to support collaborative research in innovative defence technologies and the development of defence products jointly agreed by the Member States. The Fund was launched in June 2017, consisting of two legally distinct, but complementary, windows: (a) the research window¹⁶⁷ and (b) the capability window, supporting joint development and joint acquisition of key defence

¹⁶⁴ [Notification on Permanent Structured Cooperation \(PESCO\)](#), European Council.

¹⁶⁵ [Strategy for the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base](#), European Defence Agency.

¹⁶⁶ [Remarks by Federica Mogherini at the Rome 2017 Mediterranean Dialogues](#), European External Action Service, December 2017.

¹⁶⁷ This is already delivering, in the form of the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (launched on 11 April 2017).

capabilities. Through the Defence Fund, the EU will – for the first time ever – dedicate part of its budget to defence research, but also, through the provision of co-financing, give Member States incentives to increase their defence spending.

The EU therefore offers grants for collaborative research in innovative defence technologies and products, fully and directly funded from the EU budget. Projects eligible for EU funding will focus on priority areas agreed by Member States, and could typically include electronics, metamaterials, encrypted software or robotics. Essentially, research funding is already operational in the form of the preparatory action on defence research (PADR), which aims at demonstrating the added value of EU supported defence research and technology (R&T). Financing for the PADR (€25 million for 2017) was approved in April 2017.¹⁶⁸ The EDF research envelope sets aside a total of €90 million in funding until the end of 2019 (including the €25 million allocated for 2017). In 2018, the Commission will propose a dedicated EU defence research programme with an estimated annual budget of €500 million. The EDF aims to address concerns about weak R&T and the need for more defence cooperation and innovation.

Through the funding allocated to development and acquisition, the EDF will promote Member State cooperation on joint development and the acquisition of defence equipment and technology, through co-financing from the EU budget and practical support from the Commission. Only collaborative projects will be eligible, with a proportion of the budget earmarked for projects involving cross-border participation of SMEs. Studies suggest that up to 30 % of annual defence expenditures could be saved through the pooling of procurement at EU level. The fund will also help Member States reach two of the benchmarks established in 2007, namely: (1) to invest 20 % of total collective defence spending on equipment procurement, including R&D and R&T; and (2) to invest 20 % of total R&T spending on European collaborative defence.

In order to finance the Defence Fund, in June 2017 the Commission published a proposal for a regulation on a European defence industrial development programme. The aim of the proposal is to improve the competitiveness and innovative capacity of the EU defence industry, including cyber-defence, by supporting cooperation between undertakings in the development phase of defence products and technologies. The programme would fund projects such as defining common technical specifications, prototyping, testing, qualification and certification of new and updated defence products, as well as feasibility studies and other support activities. It would offer financial assistance through grants, financial instruments and public procurement to projects implemented by at least three undertakings established in at least two Member States.¹⁶⁹ A 'credible' proportion of the overall budget would benefit SMEs.

5.2.3. EU-NATO cooperation

The Global Strategy underlines the fact that the EU's efforts to strengthen its defence and security policy and its identity as a security provider should advance in close partnership with NATO. Yet, it recognises a fundamental difference between the two organisations: 'while NATO exists to defend its members – most of which are European – from external attack, Europeans must be better equipped, trained and organised to contribute decisively to such collective efforts, as well as to act autonomously if and when necessary'.¹⁷⁰ Therefore, the strategy understands the partnership between the

¹⁶⁸ [Preparatory action on defence research](#), European Defence Agency, 2017.

¹⁶⁹ European Parliament [Legislative Train Schedule](#).

¹⁷⁰ [EU Global Strategy](#), 2016.

EU and NATO as being essential, but allowing for an 'appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy' on the part of the EU in order to be able to 'foster peace and safeguard security within and beyond its border'. It also recognises NATO as the primary framework for collective defence for most Member States, but views the strengthening of the EU itself as a security community as an undeniable necessity for the security and defence policy of non-NATO EU Member States. One example in this context was the first ever activation of Article 42(7) TEU following the terrorist attacks in France in 2015. Article 42(7) incorporates a collective self-defence clause in the rules applicable to the CSDP.¹⁷¹ It stipulates that when an EU country is the target of armed aggression on its territory, the other EU countries must assist it by all the means in their power. While such commitments are to be consistent with the commitments made by EU countries as members of NATO, the added value of the article is that it also applies for non-NATO EU members.¹⁷²

The EU and NATO share 22 members (see Figure 25). Overall, the CSDP respects the obligations of those Member States that see their common defence realised in NATO and provides for complementarity with NATO. The NATO Secretary-General meets regularly with his EU counterparts and has addressed the European Council, the Council and the European Parliament on several occasions. Meetings also take place at the level of ministers, ambassadors and staff. The NATO-EU Capability Group, established in 2003, aims to ensure coherence between the two organisations in the area of capability development.

As a result of the challenges emanating from Europe's Southern and Eastern Neighbourhood, greater cooperation between the EU and NATO was agreed in Warsaw on 8 July 2016, in the form of an EU-NATO Joint Declaration.¹⁷³ On 6 December 2016, the Council endorsed a set of 42 specific proposals for the implementation of the Joint Declaration and adopted conclusions for its implementation. These will see enhanced cooperation in the areas of countering hybrid threats; operational cooperation; interoperability; irregular migration; cybersecurity; the defence industry; joint exercises; and supporting partners' capacity-building efforts in the Western Balkans as well as the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods.¹⁷⁴ The Global Strategy takes note of the importance of the EU's partnership with NATO.

On 19 June 2017, the European Council welcomed the progress made on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed in December 2016. Among other things, it welcomed the positive contribution of non-NATO EU Member States to NATO activities. Issues highlighted in the progress report submitted to the EU leaders by the HR/VP and the Secretary-General of NATO included:¹⁷⁵

¹⁷¹ S. Anghel. and C. Cirlig, [Activation of Article 42\(7\) TEU. France's request for assistance and Member States' responses](#), EPRS, 2015.

¹⁷² [Collective defence](#), EUR-Lex glossary.

¹⁷³ [EU-NATO joint declaration](#), press release, European Council, July 2016.

¹⁷⁴ E. Lazarou E., with M. Littlehale, [EU-NATO cooperation and European defence after the Warsaw Summit](#), EPRS, 2016.

¹⁷⁵ European Council, conclusions, 19 June 2017.

Hybrid threats

A [hybrid threat](#) is a phenomenon resulting from the convergence and interconnection of different elements, which together form a more complex and multidimensional threat. As such, it is a useful concept that embraces the interconnected nature of challenges (i.e. ethnic conflict, terrorism, migration, and weak institutions); the multiplicity of actors involved (i.e. regular and irregular forces, criminal groups); and the diversity of conventional and unconventional means used (i.e. military, diplomatic, technological). The concept of hybrid threats has been revived in relation to Russia's actions in Ukraine and the ISIL/Da'esh campaigns going far beyond Syria and Iraq.

- On hybrid threats: the establishment of the EU hybrid fusion cell and its interaction with the newly created NATO hybrid analysis cell; joint exercises for response to hybrid scenarios. Building resilience, situational awareness, and strategic communications.
- On human trafficking: cooperation and coordination between Operations Sophia and Sea Guardian.
- On defence capabilities: efforts to ensure coherence of output between the NATO defence planning process and the EU capability development plan (CDP).
- On defence industry and research: the establishment of a mechanism for interaction to further develop a dialogue on industrial aspects, with focus on areas of common interest such as small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
- On partnerships: strengthening cooperation on the ground and at headquarters level; cooperation in key areas of interaction (strategic communications, cyber, ammunition storage, and safety) in three pilot countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova and

Tunisia); the EU plans to allocate funds as a contribution to NATO's integrity-building programme.¹⁷⁶

In December 2017 the original projects were complemented with 34 new proposals, covering new topics such as counter-terrorism, women, peace and security and military mobility.¹⁷⁷ The next progress report is planned for June 2018. In the meantime, following pressure from the new US administration, on 25 May 2017, NATO leaders agreed to develop annual national plans which will outline how they intend to meet the two per cent pledge and indicate progress in the areas of spending, capabilities and contributions.¹⁷⁸ They also agreed that NATO would support the global coalition against ISIL/Da'esh through airborne warning and control system (AWACS) surveillance planes and improve the Alliance's information-sharing on terrorism.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁶ [Progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016.](#)

¹⁷⁷ [EU and NATO cooperation to expand to new areas, including counter-terror; military mobility; women, peace and security](#), European Union External Action, December 2017.

¹⁷⁸ [NATO leaders agree to do more to fight terrorism and ensure fairer burden sharing](#), North Atlantic Treaty Organization, May 2017.

¹⁷⁹ [Guiding Principles from the Global Coalition to defeat Daesh](#), The Global Coalition, February 2018.

EU-NATO cooperation on cybersecurity

The EU-NATO Joint Declaration of 8 July 2016 highlighted the need to expand coordination on cybersecurity and cyber-defence. A set of concrete proposals was adopted by the EU and NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 6 December 2016. Some of the [measures](#) included in the list are the exchange of concepts on the integration of cyber-defence aspects into planning, and conduct of respective missions and operations to foster interoperability in cyber-defence requirements and standards; strengthening cooperation on training through harmonisation of training requirements, where applicable, and opening of training courses for mutual staff participation; fostering cyber-defence research and technology innovation cooperation by further developing the links between EU, NATO and the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence to explore innovation in the area of cyber-defence; strengthening cooperation in cyber-exercises through reciprocal participation in respective exercises, including 'cyber coalition' and 'cyber Europe' in particular.

The EU itself has responded to the increase of threats in cyberspace through a multifaceted approach. This includes [initiatives](#) under its digital single market initiative, such as the promotion of cooperation between Member States; the nurturing of cyber-related technological innovation through support for cutting-edge research and industrial collaboration; and the European certification of digital products and services to ensure safe use. The Commission has also proposed a 'blueprint' for how the EU and its Member States can respond quickly and jointly to large-scale cyber-attacks. In addition, it has decided to develop the existing European Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) into an EU Cybersecurity Agency that will help Member States and EU businesses to confront and prevent cyber-attacks. As shown in Figure 2, the EU is also engaging in cyber dialogues with strategic partners, such as the US, China, India, Japan, South Korea and, soon, Brazil. Within the CSDP context, the European Defence Agency is currently [working](#) on cyber-defence situation awareness for operations and on how to integrate cyber-defence in the conduct of military operations and missions.

5.3. CSDP missions and operations

In 2014, the then UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, requested that the UN set up high-level panels to deliberate on the future of peace operations and the peacebuilding architecture. The ensuing report noted, among other things, that 'a stronger global-regional peace and security partnership is needed to respond to the more challenging crises of tomorrow. [...] The United Nations system too must pull together in a more integrated manner in the service of conflict prevention and peace'.¹⁸⁰

Through the CSDP the EU has developed a broad crisis management agenda which includes conflict prevention, mediation, peacekeeping and post-conflict stabilisation, in accordance with the principles of the UN. The UN has recognised the EU as one of its most important regional partners in peacekeeping. Currently, the EU has 16 CSDP missions and military operations on three continents, with a wide range of mandates (e.g. military training, capacity-building, counter-piracy, rule of law and security sector reform, border assistance, etc.) and deploying over 6 000 civilian and military personnel (see Figure 27). The majority of these missions have been in Africa and, as mentioned earlier, in many cases they have operated in parallel with UN PKOs or to African Union (AU) missions. EU civilian missions carry out tasks consistent with the Global Strategy's commitment to strengthening the resilience and stabilisation of partner countries recovering from or threatened by conflict and instability. Military missions are currently focused on areas such as countering terrorism, irregular migration, piracy and capacity-building of armed forces.

Women in CSDP

The EU has [committed](#) to increasing the number of women in institutions dealing with crisis management and peace negotiations by signing the UN Security Council Resolution UNSCR 1325 (2000) on 'Women, Peace and Security.'

HR/VP Federica Mogherini has pledged to increase the percentage of women in the EU's internal decision-making mechanisms and management positions – to 40 % by the end of her mandate in 2019. This also applies to CSDP.

According to [research](#), women deployed abroad help to overcome gender stereotypes and demonstrate the EU's commitment to gender equality. Studies also [indicate](#) a correlation between gender inequality and armed conflict.

EU contributions to UN peacekeeping

EU Member States' [contributions](#) to UN missions consist of capabilities and funding. According to the UN, in 2016 the EU contributed 5 549 persons or 5.5 % of the overall international contribution to UN missions. With regard to funding, EU Member States represent the main financial contributor to UN peacekeeping, with a cumulative contribution of around 40 % of the total UN peacekeeping budget. Additionally, several CSDP operations/missions have either acted as 'bridging missions' until a UN operation was set up (e.g. EUFOR RCA),¹⁸¹ or were conducted in parallel to and in close cooperation with a UN operation (e.g. EUSEC RD Congo;¹⁸² the first UN/EU pre-deployment assessment mission in Mali which evaluated the Malian security sector), or were set up as a follow-up to a UN operation (e.g. EUPM BiH).¹⁸³

In 2015 the Council outlined seven priorities for 2015-2018 in the document 'Strengthening the EU-UN Strategic Partnership on Peacekeeping and Crisis Management'. Among others, these

¹⁸⁰ [Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects](#), United Nations, June 2015.

¹⁸¹ EU-led operation in the Central African Republic.

¹⁸² EU mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the area of defence.


¹⁸³ European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

included facilitating EU Member States' contributions to UN operations; cooperating on rule of law and security sector reform (SSR); logistics support; information exchange and supporting African peace and stability through increased UN-EU-AU cooperation.

According to the 2017 Report on CSDP missions, in 2016 EU missions conducted around 700 training events for almost 9 000 people (of whom at least 1 300 were women) on topics such as human rights in policing, forensic techniques, crime scene management, human resources management, recruitment, legislative drafting, public order policing, community policing, public communication, combating corruption, identifying document fraud, the application of local laws on irregular migration, civil registration, integrated border management, maritime security, human rights and gender, and interview techniques.¹⁸⁴

Executive and non-executive military missions and operations held multiple long-term training events (up to 14 weeks at a time) for around 2 000 people on topics such as mortar firing, infantry skills, force organisation, sniper skills, engineering, logistics, tactical air control party (TACP) support, and intelligence gathering. Among their activities the report includes mentoring senior military officials on Security Sector Reform (SSR), and supporting SSR and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration activities.

Figure 27 – CSDP missions/operations and the state of peace



Data source: [SIPRI](#); [Global Peace Index 2017](#).

In 2016, CSDP missions and operations cooperated with over 150 national counterparts (local ministries of the interior, security, justice, and foreign affairs, and law enforcement


¹⁸⁴ European Union External Action Service, [Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union: Missions and Operations Annual Report 2016](#).

associations such as judicial councils and policing boards, as well as local civil society organisations), and almost 180 international partners (for example, EU delegations in-theatre, EU agencies such as Frontex and Europol, the United Nations, OSCE, Interpol, the African Union, non-governmental organisations, such as the International Organization for Migration, and other country development agencies both EU and non-EU, such as Japan, the US, and Canada).

CSDP naval operations

The EU has two CSDP naval operations, one in the Mediterranean ([EUNavfor MED](#) – Operation Sophia) and one in the Western Indian Ocean ([EUNavfor Somalia](#) – Operation Atalanta), with a total fleet of around 30 ships and helicopters, which intervene to counter piracy and to combat human trafficking and smuggling. The most recent operation, [EUNavfor MED](#), was established by the Council in May 2015 to disrupt the business model of human smugglers and traffickers in the southern central Mediterranean Sea. The second phase of the operation, now renamed Operation Sophia, was launched in October 2015, with the UN Security Council giving a one-year mandate to intercept vessels on the high seas off the Libyan coast suspected of migrant smuggling. The EU mission continues to operate in international waters, rather than – as originally intended – in Libyan waters. The Council has extended the Operation Sophia mandate twice (currently to 31 December 2018). In the process it has added two supporting tasks: training for the Libyan coastguard and navy; and a contribution to the implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya. In July 2017, it amended the operation's mandate to: set up a monitoring mechanism of trainees to ensure the long-term efficiency of the training of the Libyan coastguard; conduct new surveillance activities and gather information on illegal trafficking of oil exports from Libya; enhance the possibilities for sharing information on human trafficking with Member States' law enforcement agencies, Frontex and Europol.

Operation Sophia takes places alongside the Frontex joint operations, [Triton and Poseidon](#), in the Central and Eastern Mediterranean, which aim to save lives at sea, strengthen border control and disrupt the business model of traffickers and human smugglers.



Source: [Council of the European Union](#), General Secretariat, 2018.

The European Parliament has been a longstanding advocate of a stronger and more effective CSDP. In 2016 it [called](#) for more spending (two per cent of GDP) on defence, and a fairer and more transparent defence industry. Parliament highlighted the importance of compatibility and cooperation with NATO, but also stated that that 'the EU should aspire to be truly able to defend

itself and act autonomously if necessary, taking greater responsibility' in cases where NATO is not willing to take the lead, a statement that is in line with the idea of 'strategic autonomy' as embodied in the EU Global Strategy. The European Parliament has [urged](#) the Council to move towards the harmonisation and standardisation of European armed forces, so as to facilitate the cooperation of armed forces personnel. It has also called for a white paper on security and defence and a roadmap with clear phases and a calendar towards the establishment of a defence union and a more effective common defence policy.

6. Looking ahead

6.1. The geopolitical context

Looking to 2018 and beyond, the EU is preparing for great challenges, but also potentially remarkable achievements in the field of security and peace. A number of initiatives in the policy areas analysed in this paper are already delivering, and more are in the process of formulation and implementation. At the same time, EU citizens share strong support for EU external action, especially if it relates to security and defence. They expect and rely on the EU to be a major actor in defending them from external threats. Despite some differences among Member States, the perceptions of the EU's external action – including in peace and security – is improving, but there is still more work to be done in order to meet the expectations of EU citizens.

At the same time, the global and regional environment remains uncertain and instability continues to grow. The forecasts are challenging. The 2018 US national defence strategy signals a shift of the global geopolitical environment towards the re-emergence of long-term inter-state strategic competition, listing revisionist powers (Russia and China) and 'rogue regimes' (North Korea and Iran) as primary competitive threats for the destabilising of prosperity and security.¹⁸⁵ Experts and strategic forecasting agencies are cautious, and their analyses point to a world of multiple – in terms of nature and geography – threats. Illustrating the high level of insecurity and fear for the state of peace, global defence spending is forecast to reach US\$1.67 trillion by the end of 2018, the highest level since the end of the Cold War.¹⁸⁶

The Middle East is likely to remain a locus of conflict and insecurity. According to BMI Research, conflict and violence in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Bahrain are likely to persist, while Saudi Arabia and Iran engage in a proxy war for control of the region, and relations between Israel and several of its Arab neighbours deteriorate.¹⁸⁷ Tensions between Iran and the US may have implications for the stability of the implementation of the JCPOA on the Iranian nuclear programme.¹⁸⁸ Still on nuclear, North Korea is very likely to continue to challenge the established order of the non-proliferation regime.

The Economist Intelligence Unit, among many other sources, predicts that EU-Russia relations – already at a low point in 2017 – are likely to remain 'difficult, competitive and conflict-prone' in 2018 and beyond.¹⁸⁹

The management of migration will continue to challenge the EU and the world. According to the Spanish think-tank, CIDOB, humanitarian emergencies will accumulate throughout the year and 'migration flows will continue to undermine international commitments to the internationally displaced. ... There will be two orders of migration: the formal, based on some minimal commitments and drained of political will; and the everyday, which will be ever more fragmented and reactive'. CIDOB also foresees terrorism and disinformation assuming new and challenging facets in 2018.¹⁹⁰

The situation in the Sahel and in the Horn of Africa will most likely continue to be

¹⁸⁵ J. Mattis, [Summary of the National Defence Strategy of The United States of America](#), US Department of Defense, 2018.

¹⁸⁶ J. Daniels, [Global defence spending](#), CNBC, 2017.

¹⁸⁷ [BMI Research](#).

¹⁸⁸ [2018 Annual Forecast: Middle East and North Africa](#), Stratfor, 2017.

¹⁸⁹ [The Economist Intelligence Unit: Country Analysis](#).

¹⁹⁰ E. Soler i Lecha, [The World in 2018: Ten Issues that Will Shape the International Agenda](#), CIDOB, 2017.

characterised by insecurity and by the struggle against violence. According to Stratfor's 2018 Annual Forecast, major powers will maintain or step up their efforts in the region against militant groups.¹⁹¹

As highlighted in the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS) 2015 report 'Global Trends to 2030', the European Union will continue to face major external challenges in its neighbourhood and beyond. Moreover, the Trump administration has signalled, so far at least, that the US – the EU's traditional ally in issues of security and peace – is likely to be less engaged in global matters.

Against this backdrop, the ESPAS report recommends that the EU take greater collective responsibility for its security and defence – a process already in motion, as described in Chapter 5. In addition, the report emphasises that the EU needs to work on fostering stability and development in its wider strategic neighbourhood; engaging more deeply with key actors; and reinforcing the global system, by efficiently promoting a multilateral framework that is adapted to the newly multi-polar world but still remains based on universal values. New or reinforced partnerships with other major actors are needed. In particular, the report stresses that 'the rise of China, as a fundamental game-changer, calls for a reassessment of the European Union's relationship with this country in a way that matches its future importance'.¹⁹²

The EU remains committed to delivering on the basis of the EU Global Strategy. In this second year of its implementation, work will continue in the field of security and defence and beyond. According to the EEAS, the Council and the Commission may also consider exploring 'other fields for the implementation of the EUGS, possibly focusing on strategic goals such as the support for cooperative regional orders and global governance, as well as means such as the establishment or empowerment of more responsive and flexible tools in the fields of diplomacy and development'.¹⁹³ The approach of joining up internally – among institutions, Member States, agencies – and externally through diplomacy, mediation and missions, will be maintained and reinforced.

In security and defence matters, the years 2018 and 2019 will be years of PESCO implementation. Following the adoption of the initial list of projects and of the implementation roadmap by the Council on 6 March, the next steps will be the review and assessment process of the national implementation plans, which detail how participating Member States plan to fulfil the more binding commitments they have made to one another.¹⁹⁴ The roadmap also provides a calendar regarding the proposal of, and agreement on, possible future projects. Once proposals for new PESCO projects have been received, a common and coherent set of governance rules is due to be adopted by the Council by the end of June 2018.

At a high-level event on 'Building on vision, forward to action: delivering on EU security and defence', on 13 December 2017, HR/VP Federica Mogherini laid out new ideas for further work in the area of security in the coming year(s). They include:

1. making full use of existing EU capacities and instruments, for instance activating the EU battlegroups;

¹⁹¹ [2018 Annual Forecast: Sub-Saharan Africa](#), Stratfor, 2017.

¹⁹² [Global Trends to 2030: Can the EU meet the challenges ahead?](#), European Strategy and Policy Analysis System, 2015.

¹⁹³ [Implementing the EU Global Strategy: Year 1](#), European Union Global Strategy.

¹⁹⁴ [Press Release: Defence cooperation: Council adopts an implementation roadmap for the Permanent Structured Cooperation \(PESCO\)](#), Council, March 2018.

2. ensuring that sufficient means and resources are available for common EU action through the next multiannual financial framework, e.g. launching a European peace facility to plan and deploy military missions more efficiently;
3. strengthening partnerships with NATO, the UN, the African Union and beyond, for example: creating a mechanism for closer cooperation with non-European countries and international organisations;
4. continuing to invest in civilian missions and capabilities;
5. ensuring synergy effects and coherence between all EU defence initiatives, for instance setting up a 'defence union task force';
6. working towards a common strategic culture within the EU and boosting European military training and education.¹⁹⁵

In March 2018, the High Representative and the Commission presented an Action Plan on Military Mobility, for Member States' endorsement. This plan recommends actions, implementing actors and ambitious timelines, for addressing identified barriers which hamper military mobility on European territory, building on the results of the European Defence Agency's Ad Hoc Working Group on Military Mobility, established recently to provide expert input.¹⁹⁶

Finally, as reflected in the words of UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, 2018 and 2019 will mark an intensification of UN efforts to address the current and future geopolitical environment through reform.¹⁹⁷ In the spirit of the Global Strategy, the EU will be an active participant in supporting this process and working for a more effective UN delivering for peace and security.

Brexit and EU Security

The prospect of the UK's withdrawal from the EU (Brexit) has aggravated concerns regarding the capacity of EU defence. The UK is the largest EU defence spender, which for some analysts suggests that Brexit will mean a 20 % reduction in the EU's overall capabilities – assuming there is no alternative agreement on security and defence cooperation.¹⁹⁸ It is also a permanent UNSC member and a nuclear power, with high-level expertise in the field of defence. Brexit will also have serious implications for the EU's overall budget, creating a financial gap in the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) under which the European Defence Fund should be financed. In September 2017, the UK government declared that its commitment to European security will remain steadfast and outlined the areas where the UK and the EU have common security and defence interests.¹⁹⁹ However, these issues and the related financial arrangements are yet to be formally discussed and settled. During a transition period, the UK is expected to continue its involvement and financial contributions to ongoing policies, for example ongoing CSDP missions, unclosed European Development Funds, EU Trust Funds and the Facility for Refugees for Turkey.²⁰⁰ The outcome of the Brexit negotiations will determine the precise arrangements for its post-2020 commitment to European security, and its participation in and

¹⁹⁵ Speech by Federica Mogherini, [Building on vision, forward to action: delivering on EU security and defence](#), December 2017.

¹⁹⁶ [Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on the Action Plan on Military Mobility](#), European Commission/High Representative, March 2017.

¹⁹⁷ [Remarks to the General Assembly on the Secretary-General's Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace](#), 5 March 2018.

¹⁹⁸ [The Implications of Brexit for European Defence Cooperation](#), Clingendael, 2017.

¹⁹⁹ [Foreign policy, defence and development – a future partnership paper](#), UK Department for Exiting the EU, September 2017.

²⁰⁰ A. D'Alfonso, E.-M. Poptcheva, J. McElDowney, L. Tilindyte, [The Brexit negotiations: Issues for the first phase](#), EPRS, June 2017.

financial contribution to certain programmes and funds, for example participation in the European Defence Fund, ad hoc involvement in CSDP missions or other programmes.

6.2. Future financing of EU policies on peace and security: 2019, 2020 and the post-2020 multiannual financial framework.

The discussion of the 2019 budget takes place in the context of the most complicated and uncertain security environment the EU has faced for decades, and, from a budgetary point of view, in the context of the mid-term review of the 2014-2020 MFF and the preparation of the post-2020 MFF. A major goal of peace and security spending is to allow for the building of more effective foreign policy and defence instruments and capabilities, as well as maintaining the EU's role as the world's leading provider of development and humanitarian aid, and promoter of good governance, democracy, the rule of law and human rights, and sustainable economic development. The security of the EU itself is addressed as part of stability and security abroad, in particular in Europe's immediate neighbourhood, and tackling the root causes of global challenges, such as irregular migration and violent extremism. In order to deliver on all these goals, EU spending could look for intelligent synergies with Member States' programmes, and with international financial institutions, mobilise private investments, and introduce innovative financial instruments where possible and appropriate.

6.2.1. Outlook until the end of the 2014-2020 MFF

Although the 2019 and 2020 budgets fall under the 2014-2020 MFF and its general ceilings, certain amendments to the financing of peace and security in the EU are to be expected. In line with both the policy context and the budgetary procedure, there are a number of recently adopted legislative changes that will realise their full impact on the peace and security field over the coming months and years. Examples of such changes are the adopted amendment of the IcSP Regulation, the Defence Fund and the increased cooperation between Member States in the area of peace and security.

With the recent amendment of the IcSP Regulation, activities aimed at enhancing cooperation with the defence sector and the military in third countries are included in the scope of the instrument.²⁰¹ Thus, in the future the IcSP can provide support for capacity-building programmes in third countries aimed at training and mentoring, the provision of non-lethal equipment and assistance with infrastructure improvements, and help with strengthening the capacity of military actors in order to contribute to the achievement of peaceful and inclusive societies and sustainable development.

In the coming years, the European Defence Fund will intensify its activities and will reach the full projected capacity in coordinating, supplementing and amplifying national investments in defence research, in the development of prototypes and in the acquisition of defence equipment and technology. Due to the limitations of the Treaties, the EU budget is not able to cover all EU areas of action in the field of security and defence. Therefore, the funding is distributed between research, and development and acquisitions.²⁰² Its research branch, devoted to innovative defence technologies and products, will gradually increase its funding – starting with €25 million allocated for 2017, and €90 million until the end of 2019, and €500 million per year after 2020. In the development and acquisition branch of the EDF, the funding will also increase from €500

²⁰¹ [Amending Regulation \(EU\) No 230/2014 2011. Instrument contributing to stability and peace: military actors \(2017-2020\)](#), 2017.

²⁰² [European Defence Fund](#), press release, European Commission, 2017.

million in total for 2019 and 2020 to €1 billion per year after 2020. Depending on the particular scope of work of the EDF after 2020 and the outcome of the post-2020 MFF debates, the budgetary contributions after 2020 might change. Nevertheless, these significant budgetary investments would contribute to the establishment of a true European Defence Union. According to an agreement between the Member States, 35 % of their equipment spending will be used for collaborative projects. Such financial regulations will encourage further cooperation between Member States. National armies will benefit from the EU Defence Fund, as well as private research companies and institutes. Cooperation will be intensified further under the recently established PESCO, not only through common policies, but also by pooling together resources and providing for more efficiency in spending on peace and security. PESCO will enhance collaboration in the areas of investment, capability development and operational readiness – areas that have been underfunded in some EU countries in the past. PESCO is underpinned by the new Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the EDF, which will provide financial incentives to foster defence cooperation from research to the development phase.

The mid-term revision of the 2014-2020 MFF calls for more flexibility in order to further increase the EU's capacity to respond to unforeseen events, and simplified rules and procedures for programming and delivering EU assistance in order to ensure more effective delivery of EU assistance.²⁰³ The aim is to increase the capacity of the EU budget to address unforeseen events and new priorities, against a backdrop of persistent challenges inside and outside the EU. Following the Council meeting of 20 June 2017 regarding the mid-term review of the MFF, more resources are envisaged in two areas – jobs and growth and addressing the migration crisis. In particular, for the years 2017-2020, €2.55 billion will be available to address migration, enhance security and strengthen external border control, and €1.39 billion will be available for tackling the root causes of migration. This budgetary increase is due to the acknowledgement of the significant pressure experienced as a result of the migration and refugee crisis causing security challenges, including by programmes under the Global Europe heading. Measures to tackle these challenges also include the use of special instruments (the Flexibility Instrument and Emergency Aid Reserve), setting up instruments, such as the Facility for Refugees in Turkey and the EU Trust Funds for external action, pooling together EU budget resources and other contributions. In addition, the new initiatives already approved or proposed – such as the establishment of the European Border and Coast Guard, the reinforcement of Europol and of the European Asylum Support Office, the creation of the Instrument for Emergency Support within the EU and the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD) – will all have budgetary implications.

The current €292 million annual budget of the European Border and Coast Guard should be increased to €335 million annually by 2020.²⁰⁴ This new EU spending reflects the security challenges faced by the EU as well as the political understanding that cooperation would provide a more efficient and effective response. The future development of the European Border and Coast Guard will depend on the policy and financial decisions in the post-2020 MFF. According to different scenarios being discussed, the funding could vary between €8 and €150 billion for the seven-year period of the next MFF (assuming that it will indeed be a seven-year framework). Depending on

²⁰³ A. D'Alfonso, [2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework \(MFF\): Mid-term revision](#), EPRS, 2017.

²⁰⁴ [A new, modern Multiannual Financial Framework for a European Union that delivers efficiently on its priorities post-2020](#), European Commission, February 2018.

the scale of funding, the European Border and Coast Guard could cover activities ranging from equipment provision and information sharing, to a full EU border-management system.

A new challenge to the EU in the area of peace and security is cybersecurity; the lack of sufficient capacities to counter cyber-attacks at Member State level demands enhanced cooperation and pooling of resources at the EU level. Failing to invest enough resources in this area, or failing to do so quickly, might undermine EU security. The establishment of a European Cybersecurity Agency would respond to that demand, building on the existing European Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA).²⁰⁵ In budgetary terms, this would mean a gradual increase of the annual budget of the agency from €11 million per year to €23 million in four years. Member States are also encouraged to include cyber-defence within the framework of PESCO and the EDF, in order to support cyber-defence projects.

6.2.2. Outlook for the post-2020 MFF

The preparation of the post-2020 MFF takes place in the context of numerous challenges and opportunities for change.²⁰⁶ Different options are being debated, from the duration of the MFF, through its size and distribution of spending. One important issue under discussion is also the type of resources of the budgetary funds (e.g. a common consolidated corporate tax base including the digital sector, or revenues from the Emissions Trading System), as well as the size of the national contributions based on the gross national income (GNI). This debate is not only focused on modernising the revenue sources of the EU budget, but also on compensating for the budgetary impact of Brexit on the post-2020 MFF. The Commission adopted its overall proposal for the post-2020 MFF on 2 May 2018,²⁰⁷ and detailed proposals for individual programmes will follow in May and June. The expected overall approach of the post-2020 MFF,²⁰⁸ which would affect spending on peace and security programmes as well, is to fund and do 'more with less', and therefore to put more emphasis on performance and spending efficiency. Increased flexibility is also a trend that is expected to be strengthened, particularly with regard to the peace and security area.

Together with employment and growth, areas such as security and military cooperation, and management of migration flows into the EU are outlined as priorities, and are therefore unlikely to receive budgetary cuts, even in the case of a smaller overall EU budget. These areas are considered as delivering EU added value and a truly European public good. Therefore, more EU level cooperation is encouraged. However, securing the funding for such programmes depends on either shifting funds away from existing priorities, more efficient use of existing funds, or compensation for the budgetary impact of Brexit (i.e. increased GNI-based contributions to the EU budget by the Member States or introduction of additional own resources).

Another point of discussion regarding the post-2020 MFF is the 'budgetisation', or integration into the EU budget, of the off-budget mechanisms. A streamlining of the

²⁰⁵ European Commission, [State of the Union 2017 - Cybersecurity: Commission scales up EU's response to cyber-attacks](#), 2017.

²⁰⁶ [Legislative package for the Multi-annual Financial Framework beyond 2020](#), Legislative Train Schedule, European Parliament, February 2018.

²⁰⁷ [EU budget: Commission proposes a modern budget for a Union that protects, empowers and defends](#), Commission press release, 2 May 2018.

²⁰⁸ [A new, modern Multiannual Financial Framework for a European Union that delivers efficiently on its priorities post-2020](#), European Commission, February 2018.

financial mechanisms is expected to contribute to efficiency and synergies in their application, but also to their transparency and accountability. For the peace and security field, an example is the European Development Fund. There is also a suggestion to introduce more widely, but only where appropriate, innovative financial instruments, external trust funds or facilities, which will also be able to attract private resources. In the area of peace and security, the Guarantee Fund for External Action (GFEA) is an example of such an instrument.

All these anticipated characteristics of the post-2020 budget are expected to further enhance the EU's capacity to respond to external challenges and to maintain its role on the international scene from international cooperation, migration management, investment, governance, human rights and the rule of law, to promoting the sustainable development goals, humanitarian assistance, crisis response and conflict prevention.

6.3. The EU: An actor for peace and security?

The world today is more peaceful than it has been in past centuries. Europe in particular has been experiencing a protracted period of 'long-lasting peace' since the end of the Second World War. This period coincides with the lifetime of the European Union, itself a product of a commitment to peace and security through functional cooperation and integration – in short, of 'ever closer' union. Yet, the increasing complexity of the environment in which the EU operates has raised concerns regarding the preservation of security – including within its own borders – and about the efficiency of the EU as an actor in the promotion of peace globally. These concerns are not only reflected in the policy initiatives launched by the EU institutions in recent years, but also in EU public opinion polls in which citizens increasingly refer to security as a top priority for EU-level policy-making.

The EU's external action, which includes the common foreign and security policy, as well as other areas of engagement with the rest of the world (such as trade, development and humanitarian aid), has always been guided by its own model of integration, collective security and multilateralism and a commitment to the principles of the United Nations. The 2016 Global Strategy, which guides the EU's foreign policy, reiterates the dedication to the promotion of 'a rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle', echoing the spirit of the Lisbon Treaty. This dedication is emphasised continuously by the European Parliament, which, empowered by the Treaties in the area of EU foreign policy, has brought a stronger element of legitimacy and democratic representation to the EU's global action.

In line with the Treaties' provisions and with the Global Strategy, the pursuit of peace and security by the EU is carried out through a holistic view of the international system. Acknowledging the link between democracy and peace, the EU has developed a wide array of tools for supporting democracy in third countries. These range from political and human rights dialogue, and support for civil society and human rights defenders, to development aid for good governance and the rule of law, and the conditionality enshrined in its bilateral trade and cooperation agreements and in its unilateral trade preferences.

At the same time, the EU has refocused its development policy to clearly target fragile and conflict-affected countries through the new consensus on development (2017). In line with the UN sustainable development goals (SDGs) and the concept of 'resilience' outlined in the EU Global Strategy, the new consensus highlights that development cooperation is a pivotal instrument for preventing violent conflicts and minimising their

negative consequences. The EU also strives to build its own resilience to shocks driven mainly by external conflicts, namely the migration 'crisis' and terrorist attacks on its soil.

Within this context, the Global Strategy has been part of a renewed vigour in the pursuit of a more effective and efficient EU security and defence policy. Initiatives such as permanent structured cooperation (PESCO), the European Defence Fund, and the modernisation of EU CSDP missions and operations to respond to new threats such as cybersecurity, are only some of the steps in that direction. Through the progressive framing of an EU defence policy, the EU aims not only to work in cooperation and complementarity with NATO, but also to add value to European defence, for example by coordinating EU Member States' efforts for more efficient defence procurement and capability development, and by committing EU funds to defence research – for the first time ever.

Geopolitical and financial challenges, including those posed by Brexit, will continue to preoccupy policy-making decisions in the EU institutions and Member States in the coming years. New types of threats and destabilising factors such as climate change, terrorism and uncontrolled migration, call for innovative thinking and new types of resources and solutions. Yet, as this study has illustrated, these challenges have in many ways reinforced the EU's commitment to preserving and promoting peace and security, and have led to renewed determination on all policy fronts. The proliferation of new strategies and initiatives in all EU policy areas related to peace and security, ranging from development, humanitarian aid and defence to EU-UN relations and nuclear non-proliferation, is more than evident from the preceding sections. Based on the existing timelines for the unveiling and execution of the various actions involved, the years ahead are projected to continue along the same lines. The focus will be firmly fixed on rendering the EU a more efficient, holistic actor for peace and security, bringing together elements of normative, soft and hard power and adapting to the rapidly transforming world with strategy, steadfastness and resilience.

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