STUDY

Requested by the ENVI committee

European Parliament

The COP30 Climate Change Conference

November 2025, Belém, Brazil

Policy Department for Transformation, Innovation and Health
Directorate-General for Economy, Transformation and Industry
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PE 778.579 – November 2025

EN

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Abstract

This study provides an overview of the status of international climate negotiations ahead of the climate change conference in Belém, Brazil, from 10 to 21 November 2025. It covers the key topics under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement, namely the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions, the adaptation to the impacts of climate change, and the support to developing countries. The study also discusses the climate policies of key Parties, the positions of negotiating groups and the role of non-Party stakeholders.

This document was prepared by the Policy Department for Transformation, Innovation and Health at the request of the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety (ENVI).

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Manuscript completed: October 2025
Date of publication: November 2025

This document is available on internet at:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/supporting-analyses

For citation purposes, the publication should be referenced as: Moosmann, L., Siemons, A., Fallasch, F., Harthan, R., Urrutia, C., Wissner, N., Schneider, L. Brebeck, V., Lauer, S., Cuervo Blanco, T., Stjernquist, M., Janoska, P., Svensson, S., 2025, *The COP30 climate change conference*, publication for the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety (ENVI), Policy Department for Transformation, Innovation and Health, European Parliament, Luxembourg.

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ACE	Action for Climate Empowerment
ACTO	Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization
AFOLU	Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use
AGN	African Group of Negotiators
AI	Artificial Intelligence
AILAC	Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (Asociación Independiente de Latinoamérica y el Caribe)
ALBA	Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América)
AOSIS	Alliance Of Small Island States
BAR	Baku Adaptation Roadmap
BAU	Business-As-Usual
BECCS	Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage
BINGO	Business and Industry NGO
BRICS	Group of Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, China and South Africa
BTR	Biennial Transparency Report
CAN	Climate Action Network
CBAM	Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism
CBIT	Capacity-Building Initiative for Transparency
CCS	Carbon Capture and Storage
CCUS	Carbon Capture, Utilisation and Storage

CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CDR	Carbon Dioxide Removal
CER	Certified Emission Reduction
CMA	Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement
CMP	Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol
CO_2	Carbon dioxide
COP	Conference of the Parties
CORSIA	Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation
COVID-19	Coronavirus Disease 2019
COY	Conference of Youth
CRCF	Carbon Removals and Carbon Farming
CRI	Climate Risk Index
CTCN	Climate Technology Centre and Network
CVF	Climate Vulnerable Forum
DAC	Direct Air Capture
DACCS	Direct Air Carbon Capture and Storage
DPI	Digital Public Infrastructure
EACOP	East African Crude Oil Export Pipeline
EEA	European Economic Area
EIG	Environmental Integrity Group

EJ	Exajoule
ENGO	Environmental NGO
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency (USA)
ESABCC	European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change
ETF	Enhanced Transparency Framework
ETS	Emissions Trading System
EU	European Union
EUR	Euro
FID	Final Investment Decision
FRLD	Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage
FWG	Facilitative Working Group
G20	Group of Twenty
G77	Group of Seventy-Seven
GAP	Gender Action Plan
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFI	GHG Fuel Intensity
GFS	GHG Fuel Standard
GGA	Global Goal on Adaptation
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
GSP	Global Support Programme
GST	Global Stocktake
Gt	Gigatonnes

GW	Gigawatt
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICC	International Chamber of Commerce
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICLEI	International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives
ICVCM	Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market
IEA	International Energy Agency
IGO	Intergovernmental Organisation
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPO	Indigenous Peoples Organisation
IPPU	Industrial Processes and Product Use
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
ITMO	Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcome
ITUC	International Trade Union Confederation
JCM	Joint Crediting Mechanism
JETP	Just Energy Transition Partnership
LCIPP	Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform
LDC	Least Developed Country
LGMA	Local Governments and Municipal Authorities
LMDC	Like-Minded Developing Countries
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas

LTAG	Long-Term Aspirational Goal
LT-LEDS	Long-Term Low Greenhouse Gas Emission Development Strategy
LULUCF	Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry
MEPC	Marine Environment Protection Committee
MDB	Multilateral Development Bank
MRV	Monitoring, Reporting and Verification
Mt	Megatonne
MW	Megawatt
NAP	National Adaptation Plan
NCQG	New Collective Quantified Goal
NDC	Nationally Determined Contribution
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NMA	Non-Market Approach
NZF	Net Zero Framework
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OMGE	Overall Mitigation in Global Emissions
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PACM	Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism
PCCB	Paris Committee on Capacity-Building
PV	Photovoltaic

REDD+	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and the Role of Conservation, Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks
RCC	Regional Collaboration Centre
RFNBO	Renewable Fuels of Non-Biological Origin
RINGO	Research and Independent NGO
SAF	Sustainable Aviation Fuel
SBI	Subsidiary Body for Implementation
SBSTA	Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
SCF	Standing Committee on Finance
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SET	Sectoral Emissions Reduction Target
SIDS	Small Island Developing State
SOP	Share of Proceeds
t	Tonne
TEC	Technology Executive Committee
TFFF	Tropical Forest Forever Fund
TIP	Technology Implementation Programme
TS	Technical Specification
TUNGO	Trade Union NGO
TWh	Terawatt hours
UAE	United Arab Emirates

UNDRR	United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
VCM	Voluntary Carbon Market
WIM	Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts
WMO	World Meteorological Organization
YOUNGO	Youth NGO

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This year's UN Climate Change Conference – the 30th Conference of the Parties (COP) under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) – will take place in Belém, Brazil, from 10 to 21 November 2025. At this conference, delegates will review the progress made thus far and discuss further steps to be taken under the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement.

The Paris Agreement

The Paris Agreement was adopted in 2015. It is the first global agreement that requires ambitious climate change mitigation and adaptation actions from all its Parties. Currently, it has 195 Parties, including the EU. The Paris Agreement is guided by the three goals of (1) limiting the increase in the global average temperature, (2) increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change, and (3) making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.

The main issues at stake at COP30

All Parties to the Paris Agreement are required to communicate new Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) ahead of COP30. In their NDCs, Parties detail their efforts for the time frame up to 2035, in particular their targets for mitigating GHG emissions. While the contents of the NDCs are not subject to negotiations at the conference, there will be discussions on the overall level of ambition of these NDCs.

In the area of adaptation to climate change, Parties are currently developing indicators to facilitate the tracking of progress towards the global goal on adaptation. They are expected to conclude this work and adopt a list of indicators at the conference in Belém.

Following the adoption of a new collective quantified goal on climate finance in 2024, the Parties will conclude the 'Baku to Belém Roadmap to $1.3 trillion' at COP30, setting out ways to scale up climate finance for developing countries.

Delegates will also review progress and refine rules for a wide range of additional topics, including carbon markets, loss and damage associated with the adverse impacts of climate change, technology, capacity building, transparency, and follow-up activities to the first Global Stocktake, which was concluded in 2023.

Sectorial agreements and initiatives

Greenhouse gas emissions from international aviation and international maritime transport are addressed by two specialised United Nations agencies, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO). To achieve ICAO's long-term aspirational goal of net-zero emissions by 2050, the production of sustainable aviation fuels will play a key role. Under the IMO, guidelines for a net zero framework are under development.

The energy sector is the largest source of GHG emissions globally. While solar and wind power are key for decarbonising the sector, hydrogen and other low-carbon fuels are important for industries that are

difficult to electrify. For methane emissions in the energy sector, various mitigation technologies are available that are supported by international initiatives.

In order to further decrease net greenhouse gas emissions, and to achieve net negative emissions in the long term, CO_2 needs to be removed from the atmosphere using land-based approaches such as forestation and technical approaches such as direct air capture and storage.

Key Parties to the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement

Among the Parties to the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement, those with the highest greenhouse gas emissions are of particular importance. In China, greenhouse gas emissions continue to grow, but renewable power capacity has increased strongly in recent years. Similarly, there are efforts in India to expand renewable energy despite a continuing dependence on coal. In the European Union, greenhouse gas emissions are decreasing, which is due, inter alia, to the EU Emissions Trading System and energy policies. In the United States, the second-largest emitter of greenhouse gases, climate policies are being dismantled, thereby reversing the course taken in recent years.

Many developing countries have low GHG emissions per capita but are disproportionally affected by the impacts of climate change. Due to their limited resources, support is key to their mitigation and adaptation efforts.

Negotiating groups

In the climate negotiations, Parties with similar national circumstances organise themselves into negotiation groups. They coordinate their position ahead of the negotiating session, and a delegate speaks on behalf of the whole group. Important groups of developing countries include the 'Group of 77 and China,' the African Group, the Alliance of Small Island States, the Arab Group, the Least Developed Countries and the Like-Minded Developing Countries. The largest groups of developed countries are the European Union and the Umbrella Group.

Non-Party stakeholders

Non-Party stakeholders such as intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) play an important role by observing the negotiations, speaking at the opening and closing plenaries and at events, and by informing the public about progress in the negotiations. In the UNFCCC process, non-governmental organisations are organised into nine constituencies, including the constituencies of environmental NGOs, business and industry NGOs and research and independent NGOs.

Conclusions and outlook

At COP30, Parties are expected to finalise a set of indicators to help track progress towards the global goal on adaptation. In the area of mitigation, this will be the first opportunity for them to discuss the overall impact of new NDCs on GHG emissions up to 2035. However, large gaps will remain in terms of concrete ambition to decrease these emissions and in terms of the financial resources to mitigate and address the impacts of climate change.

1. INTRODUCTION

Given the current political and economic challenges and uncertainties, issues other than climate change have taken centre stage on the international political agenda. Nevertheless, with rising global temperatures and frequent extreme weather events, international cooperation to address climate change is more urgent than ever. Global greenhouse gas emissions are still increasing, while fast and deep emission reductions are needed to keep the goals of the Paris Agreement within reach. This is particularly true as the World Meteorological Organization (WMO 2025) found that 2024 was likely the first year on record that had a global mean temperature of more than 1.5 degrees Celsius (°C) above pre-industrial levels.

Against this backdrop, the 30th Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) will take place in Belém, Brazil, from 10 to 21 November 2025. Delegates will meet to discuss and advance the mitigation of climate change, the adaptation to climate change impacts, and the support to developing countries. Brazil as the COP Presidency puts a focus on topics which are of particular importance to developing countries. These include, among others, the protection of forests for climate and biodiversity, the adaptation to climate change, the role of indigenous peoples and the scaling-up of financial support to developing countries.

This study provides an introduction to the Paris Agreement and to the topics addressed in the climate negotiations. It summarises the climate policies of selected Parties to the Paris Agreement, the positions of Parties and non-Party stakeholders, and initiatives to mitigate climate change outside the UNFCCC.

The study has been drafted as a background document for the delegation of the European Parliament but may also be of interest to readers who wish to gain an overview of the topics addressed in the climate negotiations. This study is structured as follows:

Chapter 2 provides an overview of the international climate negotiations under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. It introduces the bodies meeting at climate change conferences and summarises the topics discussed there.

In **Chapter 3,** a more detailed explanation is given of the status of negotiations and the issues to be addressed at COP30. This chapter covers the main topics addressed by the Paris Agreement, as well as additional topics which are negotiated under the UNFCCC.

Chapter 4 focuses on relevant international agreements outside the UNFCCC relating to international aviation, international maritime transport, and the energy sector. It also discusses the role of carbon removals.

Chapter 5 contains country profiles of key Parties, including the major emitters of greenhouse gases.

In **Chapter 6**, the stakeholders in the negotiations are presented, namely the groups of Parties and various non-Party stakeholders.

Chapter 7 contains conclusions on issues at stake at COP30 and an outlook to issues coming up after the end of the conference.

2. OVERVIEW OF THE CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS

2.1. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

The development of the **United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)** was initiated by a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly in 1990 (United Nations 1990). The Convention was adopted in 1992 and opened for signature at the United Nations Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in the same year. Its objective is to stabilise atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) 'at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system' (UNFCCC 1992). The Convention entered into force in 1994.

In 1997, the **Kyoto Protocol** was adopted. Under this treaty, many developed country Parties committed to targets to limit or reduce their GHG emissions during the first commitment period from 2008 to 2012 (UNFCCC 1997) and the second commitment period from 2013 to 2020 (UNFCCC 2012). However, the United States did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol; Canada withdrew from it in 2011; and several developed countries did not commit to emission reductions in the second commitment period.

Delegates from Parties to the UNFCCC convene annually at the **Conference of the Parties (COP)**. The COP also serves as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement (see section 2.2). Table **1** provides an overview of the main bodies that meet at each COP.

Table 1: The main bodies meeting at each COP

Body	Purpose	Year(s) of first session	Upcoming session
Conference of the Parties (COP)	Keep under review and promote the implementation of the Convention.	1995	COP30
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP)	Adopt guidelines for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, review and promote its implementation.	2005	CMP20
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA)	Adopt modalities and guidance for the implementation of the Paris Agreement and take stock of its implementation.	2016 – 2018	CMA7
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA)	Provide information and advice on scientific and technological matters relating to the Convention. It convenes twice a year.	1995	SBSTA63
Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI)	Assess and review the effective implementation of the Convention. It convenes twice a year.	1995	SBI63

Source: UNFCCC (1992), UNFCCC (1997), UNFCCC (2015a).

Note: The upcoming session is the one taking place in November 2025.

2.2. The Paris Agreement

Against the backdrop of increasing GHG emissions, particularly from emerging economies, the Parties to the UNFCCC began debating the need for a broader international instrument than the Kyoto Protocol in the 2000s. Having failed to reach an agreement at COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, the Parties initiated negotiations on a new instrument under the UNFCCC applicable to all Parties in 2011 (UNFCCC 2011). These negotiations were concluded at COP21 in 2015, when the Paris Agreement was adopted (UNFCCC 2015a).

The **Paris Agreement** was opened for signature in 2016 and entered into force in November of the same year. Of the 198 Parties to the UNFCCC, all except Iran, Libya and Yemen are also Parties to the Paris Agreement[1]. In January 2025, the United States notified the Secretary-General of the United Nations of its intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. This withdrawal is set to take effect in January 2026 (see section 5.16 for details).

2.2.1. Goals of the Paris Agreement

According to Article 2, the Paris Agreement 'aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty'. It is guided by three goals, as shown in Table **2**.

Table 2: Goals of the Paris Agreement

Goal	Description	Article
Temperature goal	Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, recognising that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change.	2.1.(a)
Adaptation goal	Increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions development, in a manner that does not threaten food production.	2.1.(b)
Finance flows goal	Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.	2.1.(c)

Source: UNFCCC (2015a).

While these three goals provide an overall direction in the areas of mitigation, adaptation and finance, the Paris Agreement also includes more detailed provisions in these and other climate-related areas. These are contained in the various articles of the Paris Agreement, as depicted in Figure **1**.

[1] United Nations (2025b), Status of Treaties, available at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27&clang=_en.

Figure 1: Articles of the Paris Agreement



Source: UNFCCC (2015a), authors' own diagram.

The following provides an overview of the main topics covered by the Paris Agreement. Chapter 3 provides more details on the status of negotiations on each of these topics.

2.2.2. Mitigation

In order to mitigate climate change and keep the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement within reach, GHG emissions need to be substantially reduced, and the removals of GHG from the atmosphere by sinks (e.g. forests) need to be increased. According to Article 4 of the Paris Agreement, Parties aim to achieve 'global peaking of GHG emissions as soon as possible' and 'a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century' (UNFCCC 2015b, Article 4.1).

To contribute to the mitigation of climate change, each Party is required to prepare a **Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC)**. Each successive NDC has to represent a progression beyond the Party's current NDC and reflect its highest possible ambition. NDCs are due every five years, including in 2025 (UNFCCC 2015b, paragraph 23-24). For their 2025 NDC submissions, Parties are encouraged – but not required – to use an end date of 2035 (UNFCCC 2021c). Most NDCs submitted as of August 2025 have a time frame of 2031 to 2035.

In addition to the requirement of communicating an NDC, Parties should strive to formulate and communicate **long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies (LT-LEDS)** (UNFCCC 2015b, Article 4.19). The LT-LEDS have a time frame up to mid-century and lay out how Parties plan to

achieve a balance between GHG emissions and removals, also known as net-zero emissions or climate neutrality.

A separate article of the Paris Agreement, Article 5, states that Parties should conserve and enhance **sinks and reservoirs of GHG, including forests**.

2.2.3. Voluntary cooperation under Article 6

In the implementation of their NDCs, Parties have the option of cooperating with other Parties, which can allow for higher ambition than pursuing domestic mitigation measures alone. Under the Paris Agreement, the Parties can engage in **cooperative approaches**, where internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) are used towards the achievement of an NDC target (UNFCCC 2015a, Article 6.2).

In addition to allowing cooperative approaches between countries, the Paris Agreement established a **carbon crediting mechanism** under the authority of the CMA. This mechanism has recently been named as the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM). The aim of this mechanism is to contribute to GHG emission reductions in host countries, which can then be used by another Party to fulfil its NDC (UNFCCC 2015a, Article 6.4). It can be seen as the successor of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol.

Besides the carbon market approaches introduced under Articles 6.2 and 6.4 of the Paris Agreement, a framework for **non-market approaches** (NMAs) was established under Article 6.8. Examples of non-market approaches are presented on the NMA Platform[2]. As of September 2025, there are two examples on the platform, which focus on cooperation in the area of adaptation.

2.2.4. Adaptation

Besides mitigating GHG emissions, all countries need to adapt to the impacts of climate change, which become more evident from year to year. Article 7 of the Paris Agreement establishes a **global goal on adaptation**, which has three components:

- enhancing adaptive capacity;
- strengthening resilience; and
- reducing vulnerability to climate change.

Further, Article 7 highlights the importance of support and international cooperation for adaptation efforts. Areas in which cooperation should be strengthened and action should be enhanced include information sharing, strengthening institutional arrangements and scientific knowledge, assisting developing countries, and improving the effectiveness and durability of adaptation actions.

The Paris Agreement requires each Party to engage in an **adaptation planning process and to implement adaptation actions**. In addition, each Party should, as appropriate, provide and update

[2] UNFCCC (2025r), NMA Platform, available at https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/cooperative-implementation/Article-6-8/nma-platform/main/non-market-approaches.

periodically an **adaptation communication**, laying out its adaptation priorities, needs, plans and actions.

2.2.5. Loss and damage

There is only limited capacity to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change, such as extreme weather events and sea level rise. Such adverse effects are increasingly leading to loss of life, and to loss and damage of infrastructure and property. The topic of **averting, minimising and addressing loss and damage** has been a high priority for Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and is addressed in the Paris Agreement under Article 8.

This article lists areas of cooperation, including early warning systems, emergency preparedness, risk assessment and management, risk insurance, and the resilience of communities, livelihoods and ecosystems. Under the Paris Agreement, the **'Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage' (WIM)** is subject to the guidance of the CMA. The WIM was established by the COP in 2013, and its task is to promote the implementation of approaches to address loss and damage, inter alia by enhancing knowledge, strengthening coordination and enhancing action and support (UNFCCC 2013). The Santiago Network was established in 2019. This constituted body is responsible for catalysing technical assistance to developing countries from various organisations in the area of loss and damage (UNFCCC 2019).

2.2.6. Support

While many developing countries have relatively low GHG emissions, they are particularly affected by the adverse effects of climate change and have limited resources for mitigation and adaptation. Hence, the provision of support to developing countries is a key element of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. This support comprises three components, namely:

- finance;
- technology development and transfer; and
- capacity building.

Article 9 of the Paris Agreement reiterates the Convention's provision that **developed country Parties shall provide financial resources** for the mitigation and adaptation actions of developing countries. Although the Parties obliged to provide support are listed individually in an annex to the Convention, the Paris Agreement does not refer to this list, and it encourages other Parties to provide support on a voluntary basis. This reflects the economic development of many emerging markets, many of which provide climate change support, despite not being required to do so under the Convention. According to Article 9, Parties should aim to achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation in the provision of scaled-up financial resources.

Technology plays a key role in the response to climate change, from wind turbines to flood control and early warning systems. In order to support developing countries in developing and transferring such technology, a **Technology Framework** was established under Article 10 of the Paris Agreement. Its purpose is to guide the work of the Technology Mechanism, which consists of a policy body, the

Technology Executive Committee (TEC), and an implementation body, the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) (UNFCCC 2010). Article 10 of the Paris Agreement stresses the role of technology in implementing mitigation and adaptation actions and the importance of accelerating and enabling innovation.

Article 11 of the Paris Agreement focuses on enhancing the capacities of developing countries to take effective climate action. The COP decision on the adoption of the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2015b) established the **Paris Committee on Capacity-building (PCCB)**. The PCCB is responsible for managing and overseeing cooperation and knowledge-enhancing activities.

2.2.7. Education, training and public awareness

In order to enhance climate action, it is important to educate and train people, to raise public awareness, and to facilitate public participation and public access to information. These topics are addressed under Article 12 of the Paris Agreement, which states that Parties shall cooperate in taking measures in these areas.

2.2.8. Transparency and reporting by Parties

Article 13 of the Paris Agreement establishes an **Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF)**. Under this framework, Parties report biennially:

- a national inventory report on GHG emissions and removals;
- information necessary to track progress made in implementing and achieving the NDC;
- information on climate change impacts and adaptation; and
- information on financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support.

This information is to be reported in **Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs)**, the first of which were due in December 2024 (UNFCCC 2018a). The reported information is subject to a technical expert review and to a 'Facilitative Multilateral Consideration of Progress,' a question-and-answer format which is conducted in writing, and in person during the SBI sessions.

The reporting on climate change impacts and adaptation is not mandatory. The reporting on support provided and mobilised is mandatory for developed country Parties, while developing country Parties should report information on support needed and received.

Table **3** provides an overview of the key documents submitted by Parties under the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC. All documents are available on the UNFCCC website via the links provided in the table.

Table 3: Key documents submitted by Parties under the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC

Documents	Mandate	Topics covered	Link to submitted documents
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC)	Article 3, Article 4	Efforts in mitigation (and adaptation and support)	https://unfccc.int/NDCREG
Long-term low GHG emission development strategies	Article 4	Long-term GHG emission reduction	https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/long-term-strategies
Initial reports and annual information	Article 6	Information on cooperative approaches	https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/article-6/article-62/carp/reports
Adaptation communications	Article 7	Adaptation priorities, needs, plans and actions	https://unfccc.int/ACR
Biennial communications on financial support	Article 9	Indicative information including projected levels of financial support	https://unfccc.int/Art.9.5-biennial-communications
Biennial Transparency Reports	Article 13	GHG inventory, mitigation, adaptation, support	https://unfccc.int/first-biennial-transparency-reports
National Communications	UNFCCC Article 12	GHG inventory, mitigation, adaptation, support, research, education	https://unfccc.int/NC8; https://unfccc.int/non-annex-I-NCs

Source: UNFCCC (2015a), UNFCCC (2015b), UNFCCC (1992).

Notes: The listed articles are from the Paris Agreement, except the last entry, which is an article of the UNFCCC. The specific mandate for the biennial communication on financial support is, according to Article 9.5, 'indicative quantitative and qualitative information related to paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article, as applicable, including, as available, projected levels of public financial resources to be provided to developing country Parties'.

2.2.9. Global stocktake

When the Paris Agreement was adopted, it was not clear whether the contributions put forward by countries would be sufficient to reach the goals of the Agreement. Hence a mechanism was introduced to regularly **take stock of global progress and to help increase ambition**: the Global Stocktake (GST), which is set out in Article 14 of the Paris Agreement. The GST takes place every five years. The first GST was concluded by the CMA in 2023 (UNFCCC 2023b), and its outcome is to be taken into account by Parties when they prepare their 2025 NDC submissions.

2.2.10. Committee to facilitate implementation of the Paris Agreement

Finally, under Article 15 of the Paris Agreement, a committee was established to **facilitate implementation of the agreement and to promote compliance** with its provisions. In contrast to the Kyoto Protocol, the committee has a more facilitative role and may not take any punitive measures.

2.2.11. Overview of key milestones in the implementation of the Paris Agreement

Ten years after the Paris Agreement was adopted, all of its provisions are being implemented. While progress is slow in some areas, important advances have been made in others. Box **1** lists some of the milestones achieved since the Paris Agreement was adopted.

Box 1: Milestones in the implementation of the Paris Agreement

December 2015: The Paris Agreement was adopted at COP21 (see section 2.2)

November 2016: The Paris Agreement entered into force earlier than many had expected, after an important number of Parties, including large economies, ratified the agreement. The first meeting of the Parties, CMA1, took place in the same month at COP22 in Marrakech, Morocco.

October 2018: The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published its Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 °C. It highlighted the widespread negative impacts of temperature increases of 1.5 °C and 2 °C above pre-industrial levels. It contributed to discussions focusing on the 1.5 °C goal (rather than the 2 °C goal) of the Paris Agreement in subsequent years.

December 2018: A large part of a work programmes to elaborate the detailed rules under the Paris Agreement was completed at COP24 in Katowice, Poland: The CMA adopted rules for the implementation of the Paris Agreement in the areas of mitigation, adaptation, support and transparency, among others.

2020: Parties submitted updated or new NDCs. However, due to the COVID pandemic, the COP did not take place that year, and many Parties submitted their NDCs a year later.

November 2021: At COP26 in Glasgow, United Kingdom, the CMA adopted rules for voluntary cooperation under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. The CMA called for the phase-down of unabated coal power.

December 2023: At COP28 in Dubai, the United Arab Emirates, the CMA established a dedicated fund for addressing loss and damage. The Global Stocktake was concluded, with calls on Parties, inter alia, to contribute to global efforts in the area of mitigation and to pursue adaptation targets (see sections 3.4 and 3.8).

November 2024: At COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, Parties agreed on a new collective quantified goal for climate finance (see section 3.5.1).

2025: Parties submit new NDCs covering the period up to 2035. Many NDCs are expected to be communicated in the run-up to COP30. However, the emission reductions set out in the NDCs for the period up to 2030 continue to fall short of those needed to achieve the temperature goal set out in the Paris Agreement.

Source: UNFCCC (2015b), UNFCCC (2018b), UNFCCC (2021b), UNFCCC (2023b), IPCC (2018).

3. TOPICS ADDRESSED IN THE CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS AND MAIN ISSUES AT STAKE AT COP30

This chapter provides details on the main topics under the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC. It summarises the outcomes of the previous climate change conferences (mainly COP28 and COP29), and addresses the issues at stake at the upcoming COP30.

3.1. Mitigation

3.1.1. Communication of new NDCs

The Parties to the Paris Agreement have committed to **communicating their NDCs every five years**. Article 4 of the Paris Agreement establishes that each new NDC will be more ambitious than its predecessor and include the 'highest possible ambition' (Article 4.3). One way to advance ambition is, for example, to set an economy-wide target in an NDC if sectors of the economy were previously excluded from its scope. When elaborating their NDCs, Parties are expected to take into consideration the assessment of collective ambition undertaken in the Global Stocktake. Collectively, the implementation of the NDCs will contribute to achieving the goals of globally peaking and subsequently reducing greenhouse gas emissions to achieve 'a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of the century' (UNFCCC 2015a, Article 4.2).

According to decision 6/CMA.3 (UNFCCC 2021c), the next batch of NDCs is due in 2025, following the first Global Stocktake, which was concluded in 2023. **Parties are encouraged to establish targets for 2035**. The first Global Stocktake noted that collective action still falls short of what is required to keep the global temperature increase below the levels set out in the Paris Agreement. It also called for specific mitigation actions relating to land and marine ecosystems, energy systems and transport.

The Parties are required to submit their NDCs nine to 12 months before the relevant meeting of the Parties (CMA). This allows time for clarity, transparency and understanding of the NDCs and gives the UNFCCC Secretariat sufficient time to prepare a synthesis report (decision 1/CP.21, UNFCCC 2015b). In the past, however, only a minority of Parties have respected this deadline. As of August 2025, a total of 26 Parties had submitted a new NDC[3]. The early submission of NDCs and their level of ambition are important because they indicate political will, which may boost the cooperative spirit of Parties to take decisions at the conference that may significantly advance the implementation of the Paris Agreement.

In the Paris Agreement, the Parties set long-term mitigation goals for the second half of this century and established a five-year policy cycle for NDCs. The Paris Agreement acts as a link between setting long-term and short-term targets. It also includes an obligation relating to **long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies**, stating that all Parties 'should strive to formulate and communicate' a long-term strategy (UNFCCC 2015a, Article 4.19).

[3] All NDCs can be accessed via the NDC registry: UNFCCC (2025q), NDC registry, available at https://unfccc.int/NDCREG.

Adopting a long-term approach to climate policy planning – for example, by setting a goal to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050 – is essential for countries to ensure their successive NDCs and their level of ambition align with a pathway consistent with achieving their development goals and the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement. It also allows for a better assessment of collective ambition and progress. Hence, the CMA has urged Parties to prepare or revise their long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies, a call that was reiterated in the first Global Stocktake. As of August 2025, a total of 78 Parties had submitted long-term strategies[4].

The following agenda items and issues relating to mitigation are currently being negotiated. They all share a focus on the implementation of mitigation action.

3.1.2. Mitigation ambition and implementation work programme

The Parties agreed to engage in a '**mitigation ambition and implementation work programme'** to address the fact that the targets and measures of the current NDCs are insufficient to collectively achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement. The objective of the work programme is to 'urgently scale up mitigation ambition and implementation' before 2030. Scientific assessments deem the current decade critical for staying below the temperature limits specified in the Paris Agreement. The modalities of the work program were adopted in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt (decision 4/CMA.4)[5]. Starting in 2023 and ending in 2026, the work programme consists of two **global dialogues**, investment-focused events designed to unlock finance, and regional events.

The discussions undertaken in the dialogues find their way back to the negotiations and political discussions in three ways. Firstly, the subsidiary bodies are mandated to consider progress and key findings of the work programme and to prepare a decision for adoption by the CMA. Secondly, the Secretariat and the co-chairs of the dialogues are tasked with preparing a report on the global dialogues for consideration by the CMA[6]. Thirdly, the co-chairs present the annual report to the ministers gathering at the annual high-level **ministerial round table on creating pre-2030 ambition**. The work programme is designed to complement the Global Stocktake.

The topics of the work programme are decided at the beginning of each year, taking submissions from Parties and observers into consideration. In 2025, the dialogues focused on the waste sector, which is an important source of methane emissions in many countries. Table **4** provides an overview of the topics that have been addressed by the work programme thus far. In terms of the upcoming negotiations, diverging views can be expected on how much and what substance arising from the global dialogues should be included in the decision put forward to the CMA. It should be noted that the work

[4] Current long-term strategy submissions can be found on the dedicated portal: UNFCCC (2025o), long-term strategies portal, available at https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/long-term-strategies.

[5] The dedicated landing page for the work programme can be accessed here: UNFCCC (2025x), Sharm el-Sheikh mitigation ambition and implementation work program, available at https://unfccc.int/topics/mitigation/workstreams/mitigation-work-programme.

[6] The annual reports of 2023 and 2024 can be found here: UNFCCC (2023d), Sharm el-Sheikh mitigation ambition and implementation work programme, available at https://unfccc.int/documents/631986, UNFCCC (2024f), Sharm el-Sheikh mitigation ambition and implementation work programme , available at https://unfccc.int/documents/641886.

programme operates in a 'non-prescriptive, non-punitive, facilitative' manner and is not mandated to impose new targets or goals.

Table 4: Overview of topics addressed under the Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Programme

Year	Topic of global dialogues and investment-focused events
2023	Accelerating the just energy transition
2024	Cities: buildings and urban systems
2025	Actions and solutions in the waste sector, including through circular economy approaches

Source: Authors' own compilation.

Parties will also continue their deliberations on creating a digital platform that serves to improve collaboration between governments and sources of finance for concrete projects. While some Parties see such a platform as a useful tool, others consider it a potential distraction from the need to channel finance to mitigation action now.

3.1.3. United Arab Emirates' Just Transition Work Programme

The preamble to the Paris Agreement refers to the need for a 'just transition of the workforce'. This highlights the importance that the Parties ascribed to ensuring that the economic shifts towards a low carbon and resilient economy do not create or exacerbate inequalities. Building on the brief mention of this issue in the Paris Agreement, the Parties agreed to establish a **Just Transition Work Programme** in Sharm el-Sheikh in 2022 (decision 1/CMA.4) and agreed on its modalities the following year (decision 3/CMA.5)[7]. The **dialogues and ministerial round table** taking place as part of the work programme focus on pathways for achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement, taking into account equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities and national circumstances. The work programme addresses the transitions of energy systems, the workforce and socio-economic implications and considers how just transition pathways can mitigate the potential negative impacts of policies and measures that drive the transition. The specific topics for discussion at the dialogues and ministerial round tables are chosen based on submissions from Parties and observers. **Table 5** provides an overview of the dialogues conducted thus far.

7 The landing page of the just transition work programme can be accessed here: UNFCCC (2025ac), United Arab Emirates Just Transition Work Programme, available at https://unfccc.int/topics/just-transition/united-arab-emirates-just-transition-work-programme.

Table 5: Overview of topics discussed under the Just Transition Work Programme

Dialogue number	Year	Topic
1	2024	Just Transition pathways to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement through NDCs, National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and LT-LEDs
2	2024	Ensuring support for people-centric and equitable just transition pathways with a focus on the whole-of-society approach and the workforce.
3	2025	Approaches to enhancing adaptation and climate resilience in the context of just transitions
4	2025	Just energy transition pathways and holistic approaches to just transitions including socioeconomic, workforce, social protection and other dimensions, based on nationally defined development priorities

Source: Authors' own compilation.

Unlike the work programme on mitigation ambition, the work programme on just transition is implemented directly by the subsidiary bodies, which use the discussions under the dialogue to prepare decisions that may be adopted by the CMA. The Secretariat and the co-chairs of the subsidiary bodies are tasked with producing annual summaries of the dialogues, supporting the deliberations by Parties.

At their next session, the subsidiary bodies will continue their deliberations on a draft decision for the CMA. Contentious issues include how to capture the key messages from the dialogues, for example on the energy transition, whether to address unilateral trade measures, and whether to make changes to the implementation modalities of the work programme.

Box 2: Impacts of the implementation of response measures

Addressing the impacts of implementing response measures is closely related to the issues of a just transition. It involves taking action to address the cross-border negative impacts of implementing climate policies and to maximise positive impacts. This issue has been on the negotiating agenda since the UNFCCC was adopted and is also addressed in the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. It is currently addressed in the '**Forum on the Impact of the Implementation of Response Measures**', which was established in 2011 and serves all three instruments (Convention, Kyoto Protocol, Paris Agreement). In addition, this forum was complemented by the **Katowice Committee of Experts** on the Impacts of the Implementation of Response Measures, which was established in 2018. A decision on this matter is usually adopted at each conference, but currently the Parties disagree on how to address unilateral trade measures and on the relationship between the work on response measures and on just transition.

3.1.4. Further guidance on features of the NDCs

The mandate to discuss further **guidance on features of the NDCs** was given in Paris (decision 1/CP.21, UNFCCC 2015b) and as part of the Katowice Rulebook (decision 4/CMA.1, UNFCCC 2018b). There is currently no definition of what constitutes a feature of an NDC. However, the features are generally understood to be the characteristics of an NDC. Parties agreed that the features of NDCs 'are outlined in the relevant provisions of the Paris Agreement'. These include, for example, that they are communicated every five years, the progression in ambition, that Parties need to account for them and provide information on clarity, transparency and understanding, as well as their nationally determined nature. Parties also agreed to continue deliberations on further guidance in 2024.

The contentious issues covered by this agenda item include:

- The question of whether there is a need to define any additional features beyond those set out in the Paris Agreement. For example, the African Group of Negotiators, Norway and Chile consider this to be unnecessary, while other Parties support the addition of features beyond those set out in the Paris Agreement.
- Should guidance on additional features be provided, the Parties would need to agree on whether it should relate only to mitigation or also to adaptation and means of implementation. Saudi Arabia and Grupo Sur propose that features should address finance, while developed countries oppose this.
- Some Parties and groups, such as the European Union, the Alliance of Small Island States and Switzerland, are calling for guidance on features that could help to improve the ambition level and comparability of NDCs. This could be achieved by providing guidance on how the NDCs should respond to the mitigation outcomes of the Global Stocktake, or on the type of target they should include.

Deliberations on features are closely linked to the principles of differentiation and equity, which lie at the heart of the Convention, and which were carefully operationalised in the Paris Agreement. Ultimately, any potential guidance on features will need to respect the nationally determined nature of NDCs. The Parties' views as to whether a feature infringes on national determination are fundamentally opposed. The fact that the draft decision discussed during COP29 only included different options for when to defer the discussions highlights how contentious this topic is.

3.2. Voluntary cooperation under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement

3.2.1. Overview of the current rulebook

The rules governing Article 6 were adopted at three conferences. At COP26 in Glasgow, the foundational rules on Article 6 were adopted but some implementation issues remained unaddressed. These were finalised at COP27 in Sharm El-Sheikh, COP28 at Dubai (Article 6.8 only), and COP29 in Baku. As a result of the decisions made in Baku, the rulebook for Article 6 was completed. It will be reconsidered in 2028 when a review of Article 6 will take place. Accordingly, the focus of the COP agenda on Article 6 has shifted from development of the rules towards implementation.

a. Article 6.2 – A framework for engaging in international carbon markets and accounting for transfers

The decisions under Article 6.2 establish comprehensive accounting rules for the international transfer of carbon market units between Parties engaging in cooperative approaches: a Party that sells Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs, i.e. emission reductions or removals achieved by the Party) makes an addition to its emission level, while a Party acquiring ITMOs makes a subtraction. Both countries compare the adjusted emissions balance to their NDC target level when tracking progress towards implementing and achieving their NDC. The additions and subtractions are known as '**corresponding adjustments'** and ensure that only the buyer country can use transferred emission reductions, and thus avoids 'double counting' (Schneider et al. 2019).

The rules for cooperative approaches under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement also specify that carbon credits used for the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) are considered ITMOs. Hence, they are also subject to corresponding adjustments and must be reflected in the host country's emissions balance, avoiding double counting of such carbon credits. In addition, ITMOs may be used for 'other purposes', which may, for example, include the use by corporates to achieve voluntary climate mitigation goals.

The accounting rules also prohibit any carry-over of carbon market units from one NDC period to the next period (UNFCCC 2021a). This prevents countries from generating large amounts of carbon market units which are not backed by actual emission reductions, and carrying them forward to achieve future climate targets. More details on the accounting rules and on the integrity principles for cooperative approaches agreed upon in Glasgow can be found in, for example, Moosmann et al. (2022).

The decision reached at COP27 in Sharm El-Sheikh included further specifications of the registry infrastructure, the establishment of a platform for information reported by countries (including a 'centralized accounting and reporting platform' and an 'Article 6 database'), review guidelines and report outlines (UNFCCC 2022).

At COP29 in Baku, further important elements of the accounting framework work were adopted. This includes specific guidance on the information to be incorporated in the authorisation of ITMOs, the finalisation of the agreed electronic format for reporting on ITMO transactions, and an agreement on the international registry system, including connections between different registries.

b. Article 6.4 – The Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM)

At COP26 in Glasgow, comprehensive rules were established for the new Article 6.4 **Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM).** The PACM is overseen by a UN body, known as the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body. In many ways, the rules constitute a paradigm shift compared to the CDM established under the Kyoto Protocol. They contain new principles for demonstrating that the mitigation activities are additional, meaning that they would not have otherwise been implemented. They also require that more ambitious baselines are set that are aligned with achieving the Paris Agreement goals, that robust environmental and social safeguards are applied, and that a grievance mechanism to appeal decisions is established (UNFCCC 2021b).

The **achieved emission reductions should be shared between the seller country and the buyer country**, with 2% accruing to the atmosphere, referred to as the overall mitigation in global emissions (OMGE). In addition, a share of proceeds (SOP) must be transferred to the Adaptation Fund, which was a key demand from many developing countries. The application of such a SOP and the implementation of OMGE is mandatory under Article 6.4 and 'strongly encouraged' under Article 6.2.

At COP29 in Baku, the Parties agreed on **further guidance on the implementation of the mechanism**. At the first day of the conference, Parties endorsed two key standards developed by the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body: one on requirements for methodologies and one on requirements for mitigation activities involving removals. The latter includes mainly provisions for addressing non-permanence.

Following the endorsement of these two overarching standards, the Supervisory Body initiated and accelerated work to implement the mechanism. This includes the adoption of standards on demonstrating additionality, establishing baselines, and adhering to environmental and social safeguards. The Supervisory Body further aims to adopt a standard on non-permanence and a first methodology to quantify emission reductions by the time of COP30.

c. Phasing out the Clean Development Mechanism

When adopting the rules for Article 6 at the COP in Glasgow, the Parties also agreed to phase out the CDM. Specifically, they agreed that no certified emission reductions (CERs) can be issued for emission reductions occurring after 2020. Requests for registration and issuance of new CERs ended in June 2023, when the process for receiving requests under Article 6.4 was set up. However, under certain conditions, CDM projects can be transitioned to the new PACM and continue to issue carbon credits for emission reductions occurring from 2021 onwards. In addition, approx. 300 million CERs could be used directly to achieve NDCs after 2020 (Fearnehough et al. 2021).

As far as **ongoing activities under the CDM** are concerned, the Parties are still discussing how to phase them out. These include the issuance of CERs, work on methodologies and the CDM accreditation system. The possibility of forwarding the remaining funds in the CDM trust fund to the Adaptation Fund and other carbon-market related matters is also under discussion. At the SBSTA session held in Bonn in June 2025, no substantial progress could be made on this matter, and negotiations will continue in Belém.

3.2.2. Issues at stake at COP30 in Belém

Following the finalisation of the rulebook for Article 6 at COP29 in Baku, matters related to Article 6 will be a less important agenda item at COP30 in Belém.

Under Article 6.2, Parties will consider a report by the UNFCCC Secretariat that compiles and synthesises the **results of the Article 6 technical expert review** and identifies recurring themes and lessons learned. The first technical expert reviews of reports by countries on their implementation of Article 6 revealed considerable shortcomings, including with regard to ensuring environmental integrity.

Under Article 6.4, the Parties will consider the **annual report of the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body** on the implementation of the PACM. The Parties have the option of providing the Supervisory Body with additional guidance on the implementation of the mechanism.

The Parties will also consider once again the **phase-out of the CDM**, given that no agreement on this matter could be reached at COP28 in Dubai or COP29 in Baku. At the two last conferences, Brazil was the most vocal Party in supporting the continuation of the CDM. It remains to be seen whether progress on this matter can be made under the Brazilian COP presidency.

3.3. Adaptation

Article 7 of the Paris Agreement establishes a **Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA)** through which countries have agreed to enhance adaptative capacity, strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability to climate change. For developing countries, anchoring a goal on adaptation in the Paris Agreement alongside its temperature limits was a key priority as they wanted to ensure that the mitigation and adaptation aspects of the global community's response to climate change are equitably reflected in the agreement.

However, in contrast to the Paris Agreement's mitigation goals, which include numerical temperature limits, the GGA was less clearly defined. Therefore, the Parties to the agreement decided in 2021 to establish the **Glasgow-Sharm-el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation** (UNFCCC 2021d), with the objective of better understanding, conceptualising, and ultimately achieving the GGA. At the conclusion of this work programme, the Parties adopted the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Framework for Global Climate Resilience at COP28 in Dubai in 2023 (UNFCCC 2023c). The framework includes several thematic and dimensional targets for adaptation, which should guide the achievement of the GGA (see Figure **2** and Figure **3**).

Figure 2: UAE Framework – thematic targets by 2030 and progressively beyond

Water	Significantly reduce climate-induced water scarcity
	Enhance climate resilience to water-related hazards
	Climate-resilient sanitation
	Access to safe and affordable potable water for all
Food security	Attain climate-resilient food and agricultural production and supply
	Increase sustainable and regenerative production
	Equitable access to adequate food and nutrition for all
Health	Attain resilience against climate change related health impacts
	Promote climate-resilient health services and significantly reduce climate-related mobridity and mortality, particularly in the most vulnerable communities
Ecosystems	Reduce climate impacts on ecosystems and biodiversity, and accelerate the use of ecosystem-based adaptation and nature-based solutions, including through their management, enhancement, restoration and conservation and the protection of terrestrial, inland water, mountain, marine and coastal ecosystems
Infrastructure	Increase the resilience of infrastructure and human settlements to climate change impacts to ensure basic and continuous essential services for all
	Minimise climate-related impacts on infrastructure and human settlements
Poverty	Substantially reduce the adverse effects of climate change on poverty eradication and livelihoods, in particular by promoting the use of adaptive social protection measures for all
Cultural heritage	Protect cultural heritage from the impacts of climate-related risks by developing adaptive strategies for preserving cultural practices and heritage sites and by designing climate-resilient infrastructure, guided by traditional knowledge, indigenous peoples' knowledge and local knowledge systems

Source: Moosmann et al. (2024).

Figure 3: Targets related to the dimensions of the iterative adaptation cycle

By 2030	All Parties to conduct up-to-date assessments of climate hazards, climate change impacts and exposure risks.
	All Parties to have in place country-driven, gender responsive, participatory and fully transparent national adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes or strategies.
	All Parties to have progressed in implementing their national adaptation plans, policies and strategies.
	All Parties to have designed, established and operationalised a system for monitoring, evaluation, and learning for their national adaptation efforts.
By 2027	All Parties to have established multi-hazard early warning systems, climate information services for risk reduction and systematic observation to support improved climate-related data, information and services.

Source: Moosmann et al. (2024).

To facilitate an effective measurement of overall progress made towards the GGA through the periodic Global Stocktake of the Paris Agreement, the Parties at COP28 established the UAE-Belém work programme on the development of indicators. The work programme received a mandate for a period of two years and the Parties are expected to adopt conclusions from the work programme at COP30 in Belém.

During its first year in 2024, deliberations under the UAE-Belém work programme focused on **mapping potentially suitable indicators** by reviewing those of existing multilateral frameworks that have interlinkages with the GGA such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) or the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. The process used for this mapping exercise included submission by the Parties, consultation of experts[8] as well as dedicated workshops.

At COP29 in Baku, the Parties considered progress made under the work programme and adopted a decision which further clarifies the nature of the outcome of the work programme (UNFCCC 2024c). In this decision, the Parties decided that the outcome of the work programme should include a set of no more than 100 globally applicable indicators to inform and analyse relevant global trends as well as a 'menu of indicators' that Parties can choose to report on given their national circumstances. At COP29, the Parties further agreed that the outcome should include quantitative and qualitative indicators for enabling factors for the implementation of adaptation action, including means of implementation. This has been interpreted as a concession to developing countries because it opens the door for including quantitative targets on adaptation finance in the final indicator list.

[8] A list of the experts selected to assist in the technical work under the UAE–Belém work programme can be viewed here: UNFCCC (2025z), The experts convened by the SB Chairs to assist in the technical work under the United Arab Emirates–Belém work programme, available at https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/19.09%20Expert%20table%20for%20web%20publishing.pdf.

In May 2025, experts met at a mandated workshop to **further refine the indicators**[9]. The UNFCCC Secretariat subsequently released a technical report summarising the progress made by technical experts (UNFCCC 2025y). This was accompanied by a consolidated list of indicator options[10], a consolidated progress report by the technical experts (UNFCCC 2025g) as well as technical reports on progress made on each of the targets[11].

After the session of the subsidiary bodies in June 2025, experts continued the consolidation of the indicators, with the goal of reducing the number of indicators to a maximum of 100 (UNFCCC 2025u). Any outstanding issues which the experts cannot resolve ahead of the upcoming COP will be forwarded to the subsidiary bodies session at the conference in Belém, where the work programme is expected to close, and the Parties are expected to adopt a decision containing the final indicators.

Another adaptation related outcome from COP29 in Baku was the adoption of the **Baku Adaptation Roadmap (BAR)** with the objective of creating a process for supporting the implementation of the GGA beyond COP30 (paragraph 29 of decision 3/CMA.6, UNFCCC 2024c). The Parties requested the subsidiary bodies to develop modalities for work under the roadmap. In their submissions, the Parties expressed divergent views on what such modalities should look like. Some Parties such as the European Union, Canada and the United Kingdom expressed a preference for not launching additional technical processes under the BAR but to focus on efforts to conclude existing workstreams first or launch the BAR at COP30 through a high-level event or declaration. Other Parties such as the Arab Group stressed the need for additional technical work. At the session of the subsidiary bodies held in June 2025, no progress was made on this issue. The Parties will continue to negotiate modalities and for of launching the BAR at COP30.

At COP29, the Parties further established the **Baku high-level dialogue on adaptation**, which will be convened by the COP presidency along with the presidency of the previous COP at the margins of each COP. The objective of the dialogue is to bring high-level decision makers together to identify ways to enhance the implementation of the UAE Framework for Global Resilience. It will form one component of the BAR.

3.4. Loss and damage

At the most recent COPs, negotiations on the topic of loss and damage mostly focused on the question of how countries can mobilise funding to support developing countries in response to the adverse effects of climate change. The establishment of a new dedicated multilateral fund, the **Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD)**, at COP28 represents significant progress in this context. The FRLD is hosted by the World Bank; its headquarters are located in Manila, the Philippines. As of 7 April 2025, the FRLD had received approximately USD 768 million in pledges from 27 contributors, of

[9] The workshop proceedings are summarised here: UNFCCC (2025aa), Third workshop under the United Arab Emirates–Belém work programme, available at, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sb2025_01.pdf.

[10] The list of indicator options is available as an Excel file here: UNFCCC (2025f), Consolidated list of indicator options, UAE-Belém work programme on indicators, available at https://unfccc.int/documents/647049.

[11] Progress reports for each of the targets are made available here: UNFCCC (2025v), Reports by technical experts, UAE-Belém work programme, May 2025, available at https://unfccc.int/topics/adaptation-and-resilience/the-big-picture/introduction-to-adaptation-and-resilience/loss-and-damage/reports-by-technical-experts-uae-belem-work-programme-may-2025.

which approximately USD 365 million has been made available to the FRLD trust fund.[12],[13] In addition to contributions made by several of its Member States, the European Union pledged EUR 25 million. In 2025, the FRLD Board's work has focused on developing the fund's funding criteria and a resource mobilisation strategy.

The main issue for the loss and damage negotiations at COP30 is the third **review of the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage (WIM)** (see section 2.2.5 for an overview of its role under the Paris Agreement). As with all constituted bodies under the UNFCCC, Parties will periodically review the effectiveness of the WIM. These reviews provide an opportunity for the Parties to refine existing mandates or assign new functions to these bodies. They are guided by terms of reference that are jointly developed by the Parties at preceding COPs.[14] Initially, the third review of the WIM was scheduled to conclude at COP29 in 2024. However, the Parties did not reach a consensus on a decision and agreed to continue negotiations at subsequent meetings[15].

The main issues on which the Parties have divergent views include the following:

- **The cost-effectiveness of the secretariat services provided to the Santiago Network by the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)**

  Further resources will be required to ensure the continuity of the secretariat services to the Santiago Network. It is currently unclear whether developed countries will provide the secretariat with additional budget contributions.

- **The development of a regular report on loss and damage**

  During the review of the WIM, some Parties suggested preparing a regular report that synthesises information on critical issues and lessons learned on loss and damage. It is proposed that this report should include information on the scientific, policy, financial and technological dimensions of loss and damage and that it would serve as a centralised source of information on loss and damage under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. Issues of divergence on the preparation of the report include, for example, the question of whether the report should quantify the resources required for Parties to respond to loss and damage.

- **The acknowledgement of a loss and damage finance gap**

  The informal note currently includes an acknowledgement of the 'significant gaps that remain in responding to the increased scale and frequency of loss and damage, and the associated economic and non-economic losses and recognizes the need for urgent and enhanced action

[12] For an overview of pledges, see the following website: FRLD (2025), Funding, available at https://www.frld.org/pledges.

[13] For an overview of current resources of the FLRD Trust Fund, see World Bank Group (2025), Financial Intermediary Funds (FIFs), available at https://fiftrustee.worldbank.org/en/about/unit/dfi/fiftrustee/fund-detail/frld#2.

[14] The terms of reference for the third review of the WIM are available here: UNFCCC (2024g), Terms of reference for the 2024 review of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts, available at https://unfccc.int/documents/638848.

[15] At the session of the subsidiary bodies held in June 2025, the Parties worked on an informal note, which will be forwarded to COP30 to serve as the basis for further negotiations The informal note can be accessed here: UNFCCC (2025m), Informal Note on SBI 62 agenda sub-item 13(b) / SBSTA agenda sub-item 6(b), available at https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/WIM_dt_sb62_0.pdf.

and support for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with climate change impacts'. This language comes from paragraph 19 of the decision on the new collective quantified goal on finance (UNFCCC 2024b).

The divergent views on the latter two issues have to be seen in the broader context of mobilising climate finance for loss and damage. During the negotiations on the new collective quantified goal (NCQG) on climate finance (see section 3.5.1 for a detailed discussion), a key objective for developing countries was to establish quantified sub-goals for adaptation and loss and damage. There was no consensus on these proposals and the NCQG does therefore not contain a quantified goal for loss and damage finance. However, proposals to acknowledge the finance gap in the third review of the WIM and for the preparation of regular reports on the status of loss and damage could pave the way for further discussions on numerical targets for loss and damage finance.

A cross-cutting topic in the loss and damage negotiations, which also features in the WIM review discussions, is the **coherence and complementarity** of the different bodies and structures established under the Convention to address loss and damage. There are several frameworks and constituted bodies which have similar mandates of facilitating and mobilising more support to developing countries, notably the FRLD, the WIM and its Executive Committee as well as the Santiago Network and its advisory board. Close coordination between the different bodies is essential to avoid the duplication of efforts and the creation of inefficiencies in the delivery of support. This is especially relevant for the emerging delineation of tasks between the FRLD and the Santiago Network. The latter's mandate is to facilitate access to and provide technical assistance to developing countries in addressing loss and damage. The FRLD, which is currently developing its funding modalities, could build on the work of the Santiago Network where relevant, allowing it to focus on supporting project proposals developed with technical assistance from the Santiago Network.

A development which likely will influence the loss and damage negotiations at COP30 is the advisory opinion of **the International Court of Justice** (ICJ 2025) that countries are obliged to make adequate contributions to limiting global warming to 1.5 °C. In its advisory opinion, the ICJ further stated that countries which fail to meet their obligations can, in principle, face liability for the climate harms resulting from such a failure (Carbon Brief 2025). Linking the consideration of loss and damage under the UNFCCC to the question of liability is something that developed countries have carefully tried to avoid at past COPs. The ICJ's advisory opinion will likely bring the issue back to the negotiating table as it provides the most vulnerable countries with important new arguments to discuss the creation of international mechanisms for addressing liability for loss and damage due to the adverse effects of climate change.

3.5. Support

3.5.1. Finance

Climate finance remains a key topic at COP30. The **new collective quantified goal (NCQG)** was adopted at COP29, which was considered a 'finance COP' due to the importance attached to defining a new climate finance goal (WRI 2024c). At the upcoming conference in Belém, climate finance will

again be a key issue in the negotiations, particularly with a view to gaining further clarity on how to reach the targets set with the NCQG.

a. The goal to provide and mobilise USD 100 billion annually by 2020

The NCQG replaces the **previous goal to provide and mobilise USD 100 billion annually by 2020**. The USD 100 billion goal was adopted at COP 15 in 2009, when developed country Parties collectively committed to 'mobilise jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 from a variety of sources'. This was an important signal to continue global cooperation in mitigating and adapting to climate change.

According to data by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the USD 100 billion goal was not reached in 2020, with USD 83.3 billion having been provided and mobilised in that year. However, it was met for the first time in 2022, when USD 115.9 billion was provided and mobilised by developed countries (OECD 2024). Bilateral and multilateral public climate finance makes up the largest part of the funding provided, accounting for about 80% of this figure (USD 91.6 billion). The other 20% comes from mobilised private finance and climate-related export credits. Further information on climate finance flows up to 2022 are available in the Sixth Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows[16] prepared by the UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance.

However, recipient countries and NGOs have repeatedly criticised donors for overstating their financial contributions to recipient countries by including non-concessional instruments (i.e. instruments offered on market-based terms) in their calculations as well as accounting for non-concessional instruments at face value, which is not compatible with the requirements set for Official Development Assistance (ODA) (ACT Alliance EU 2021; Oxfam 2023). According to estimates made by Oxfam, climate finance provided in grants and grant-equivalent amounts totalled about USD 28-35 billion in 2022, which is a vastly lower sum than the one estimated by the OECD (Oxfam 2024).

For building trust in the negotiations, demonstrating progress in delivering the financial means promised with the goal has been of key importance since it was adopted. Initially, **measuring progress towards the USD 100 billion goal** was challenging as methodologies for measuring and reporting the flows covered by the goal have only gradually been established and implemented by developed countries along with multilateral institutions such as the OECD. Harmonising measurement and reporting methodologies has enhanced the transparency of climate finance over time; however, gaps and inconsistencies in reporting remain (e.g. regarding reporting on private finance mobilised or reporting grant equivalents).

Although developed countries only achieved their commitment to provide and mobilise USD 100 billion of climate finance after a delay and despite continuous criticism from various actors, the USD 100 billion goal is considered to have successfully increased the amount of support available to developing countries for climate action. Additionally, it has increased the attention given to finance flows more broadly as an important lever for the climate transition under the UNFCCC. This broader perspective

[16] Standing Committee on Finance (2024), Sixth Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows, available at https://unfccc.int/topics/climate-finance/resources/biennial-assessment-and-overview-of-climate-finance-flows.

is also reflected in Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement, which sets the goal of making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.

b. The new collective quantified goal on climate finance

At COP21 in 2015, the USD 100 billion goal was extended to 2025 and an ad hoc work programme was established to support the creation of a **new collective quantified goal** at COP29 which should guide mobilisation efforts after 2025 (paragraph 53 of decision 1/CP21, UNFCCC 2015b). Under the work programme, eleven technical expert dialogues took place that discussed how the NCQG should be defined, particularly regarding overall funding levels, the time frame for reaching the goal, eligible sources, contributors and recipients. The negotiations on the NCQG thus had to address a number of highly political questions, including the extent to which other Parties besides developed countries that are 'in a position to do so' should contribute to the target as well and whether the goal should be divided into sub-goals for mitigation and adaptation finance.

The decision on the NCQG adopted in Baku in 2024 – at the last minute and after difficult negotiations – sets a **goal of providing at least USD 300 billion per year by 2035 to support climate action in developing countries**, with developed country Parties taking the lead in providing these funds (Decision 1/CMA.6, paragraph 8, UNFCCC 2024b).

At the same time, the decision calls on all actors to scale up **both public and private finance to developing economies to at least USD 1.3 trillion per year by 2035** (paragraph 7). Furthermore, the NCQG also aims **to triple the annual outflows of the climate funds between 2022 and 2030** (paragraph 16). The NCQG acknowledges that finance needs of developing countries by far exceed the climate finance provided so far (paragraph 3). Additionally, it puts a new emphasis on the delivery of impacts through climate finance by requesting financial institutions, including multilateral development banks and multilateral climate funds to enhance the effectiveness of climate finance provided and mobilised (paragraphs 23 and 24) as well as to enhance access to climate finance. The decision on the NCQG does not set a specific target for adaptation finance; it only stipulates that financial resources should aim to achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation (paragraph 17).[17] No specific target is set for funding for loss and damage either.

The **USD 300 billion goal** could be understood as a continuation of the previous USD 100 billion goal, primarily covering **bilateral and multilateral public finance, as well as private finance mobilised by public interventions**. However, the CMA Decision does not clearly indicate this, only stating that the goal should be met from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources. Developing countries are encouraged to (voluntarily) contribute to the USD 300 billion goal, according to paragraph 9 of the NCQG decision.[18]

[17] The COP26 commitment of developed countries to at least double adaptation finance by 2025 compared to 2019 levels is the latest specific goal set for adaptation finance.

[18] This may include multilateral development bank outflows that are attributable to developing countries as well, see WRI (2024a), Key Outcomes from COP29: Unpacking the New Global Climate Finance Goal and Beyond, available at https://www.wri.org/insights/cop29-outcomes-next-steps.

The broader **USD 1.3 trillion goal** can be understood to encompass the **total climate finance flows to developing countries and could include, from all countries as contributors, a diverse and broad range of financial sources** besides public funds and private investments, including alternative and innovative mechanisms[19] such as taxes on fossil fuels or rechannelled International Monetary Fund special drawing rights. Meeting the USD 1.3 trillion goal will require significant additional private sector investment in climate action. This is particularly important given the political opposition to international climate finance in many developed nations, which makes it challenging to enhance public bilateral climate finance (WRI 2025). In particular, the United States decided to cease all its funding pledged under the UNFCCC in 2025, and to withdraw from the Paris Agreement (including contributions to the Green Climate Fund and the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage) and to cut most climate-related aid (Harvey 10 Mar 2025). According to estimates, this might reduce global public climate finance flows by 10% (Gabbatiss 11 Mar 2025). The latest report by the Independent High-Level Expert Group on Climate Finance assumes that about half of the USD 1.3 trillion will be provided in the form of international private finance (Bhattacharya et al. 2024).

However, **the specific scope of the goals included in the NCQG in terms of financial instruments or accounting methodologies has not been defined (yet)** in the UNFCCC process. For measuring progress towards achieving the NCQG, the NCQG decision requests developed country Parties to provide information on support provided through common tabular formats and encourages other Parties providing support to do so as well (paragraph 28 NCQG decision). The Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) will report biennially on the progress made towards achieving the NCQG milestones (paragraph 30 and 32 NCQG decision). However, the broadened scope of the NCQG will complicate the tracking, attribution and reporting of contributions and require additional indicators and methodologies to be developed (Jachnik 2025) and additional data sources to be included (UNFCCC 2025j).

First analyses suggest that the USD 300 billion goal can be reached if Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) continue along their reformed path and countries maintain their recent levels of climate finance contributions. Yet, it remains important to ensure that the funds provided match resource needs and that finance reaches those who need it most urgently (WRI 2025). Further opportunities for countries to work towards achieving the NCQG include working with international financial institutions on climate-orientated reform, using innovative finance and capital enhancement and engaging for climate levies that can be channelled towards international climate finance through the Global Solidarity Levies Task Force (WRI 2024a).

c. The Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T

To further operationalise the NCQG, the decision of COP29 also launched **The Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T** (UNFCCC 2025e). This process is expected to set out how climate finance for developing countries can be scaled up to meet the USD 1.3 trillion target. The COP30 and COP29 Presidencies will jointly propose their report on this roadmap at CMA7 at the conference in Belém. The report is expected

[19] The inclusion of 'innovative sources' in international climate finance flows was rejected by the LDCs at COP29, see (IISD 2024), summary of the Baku Climate Change Conference, https://enb.iisd.org/baku-un-climate-change-conference-cop29-summary.

to cover the following five topics: MDB reform, expanding concessional finance and climate funds, country platforms to boost domestic capacity, innovative financial instruments for private capital mobilisation and strengthening regulatory frameworks (ODI Global 2025).

At the session of the subsidiary bodies held in June 2025, consultations on the roadmap revealed continuous conflicting views on the operationalisation of the NCQG, including the mix of public versus private finance, the role of non-concessional instruments and the focus to be put on adaptation finance (IISD 2025a). Overall, the session was marked by widespread disappointment among developing countries regarding the NCQG outcome. The adoption of the agendas was delayed by almost two days due to a proposal by the Group of Like-Minded Developing Countries to consider the implementation of developed countries' climate finance obligations under Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement as a separate agenda item. This was opposed by the European Union, by the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG) and other Parties who suggested a more holistic scope for the finance-related agenda items.

During the session, there was repeated disagreement among the Parties about the provision of climate finance, technology transfer and capacity building. Additionally, finance for adaptation emerged as a key and sensitive issue at the session. As part of a last minute compromise, the Parties agreed to **include indicators on the provision of adaptation finance in the list of indicators for measuring progress towards the Global Goal on Adaptation** (IISD 2025b). Countries are expected to negotiate on and adopt these indicators at COP30. Enhancing public funding for adaptation was and is a key priority for developing countries in the light of the funding gap for adaptation (UNEP 2023).

Against the background of criticism from recipient countries and observers regarding the outcomes in the NCQG decision, it is important for developed countries to **demonstrate ambition with regard to the quantity and quality of climate finance**. This could involve providing further clarification on how access to climate finance can be enhanced or what constitutes a 'balance' of mitigation and adaptation finance. It is also important to enhance clarity around the roles and responsibilities to achieve the NCQG in the 'Baku to Belém' process before and at COP30. This will be crucial for building trust in the negotiations and supporting the communication and implementation of ambitious NDCs from developing countries (ODI Global 2024).

d. Other negotiating items

Other negotiation items and developments related to climate finance since COP 29, besides the NCQG, include the following:

- **Operationalisation of Article 2.1(c):** The last two 'Sharm el-Sheikh dialogues' on how to operationalise Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement took place in 2025. This Article sets the goal of making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development. During the two workshops held in 2025, the Parties, relevant organisations and stakeholders exchanged views on the scope of this Article and its complementarity with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement, which focuses on the obligation of developed country Parties to provide climate finance.

- **Adaptation Fund:** At the SBI session in June 2025, the Parties discussed the arrangements for the Adaptation Fund to exclusively serve the purposes of the Paris Agreement, as well as the membership of the Adaptation Fund and its fifth review. These discussions will continue at COP30.
- **Guidance on the funds of the financial mechanism of the Convention:** This is a standing agenda item at every COP, where Parties have the opportunity to provide guidance to the operating entities of the financial mechanism. These are the Global Environment Facility, the Green Climate Fund, the Adaptation Fund and the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (Moosmann et al. 2024).
- In June 2025, the **Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development** took place in Seville, Spain. It concluded with the Seville Commitment, which reflects a growing political awareness of the links between the broader development finance framework and the UNFCCC decisions on climate finance. The Seville Commitment calls for resources to implement climate finance goals under the UNFCCC, as well as to support NDCs and national adaptation plans. It also emphasises the importance of transparency in climate finance reporting. It thus acknowledges that achieving the goals of the NCQG will be linked to discussions about reforms of the international financial architecture and to mobilising additional private finance for sustainable development (ODI Global 2025).

3.5.2. Technology

At COP29 in 2024, the Parties discussed the joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN). They decided to conduct a **review of the functions of the Climate Technology Centre** (CTC), which was established in 2010 as the implementation arm of the Technology Mechanism and is hosted by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Parties plan to decide whether to extend the term of the Climate Technology Centre at COP30. At the session of the subsidiary bodies held in June 2025, a draft text (UNFCCC 2025h) on extending the term was negotiated including an annex with revised functions of the CTC. At COP30, criteria for selecting a (new) host for the CTC will be discussed as part of this agenda item.

At COP29 and at the June 2025 session, the Parties also continued discussions regarding consideration of **linkages, collaboration and cooperation between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism**. They discussed various options for improving the comparability of the information on support available under the two mechanisms[20].

The Parties also discussed the **Poznan strategic programme on technology transfer** and how the lessons learned can inform the operationalisation of the technology implementation programme (TIP), which was established by the decision on the Global Stocktake in 2023. The Secretariat was requested to prepare a report on the evaluation of the Poznan strategic programme, taking stock of progress,

[20] A draft text developed by the SBI will be the basis for continuing negotiations in Belém: (UNFCCC 2025i), Linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism, draft negotiating text, available at https://unfccc.int/documents/648363.

challenges, successes and lessons learned by the SBI session in June 2026. A decision on this matter at COP31 shall then inform the technology implementation programme.

The modalities and governing arrangements of the **technology implementation programme (TIP)** were discussed at COP29. The purpose of the TIP is defined as 'to strengthen support for the implementation of technology priorities identified by developing countries, and to address the challenges identified in the first periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism' (UNFCCC 2023b). At COP29 and SBI62, views strongly diverged on the scope and mandate of the TIP. This included whether to focus on the outcomes of the GST, whether to prioritise specific technologies such as artificial intelligence, early warning systems, hydrogen or carbon capture and use or storage and whether to set quantifiable goals for the process. No consensus could be reached. Discussions will continue at SBI63 (IISD 2024; 2025b).

At COP29, the winner of the '**Artificial Intelligence (AI) Innovation Grand Challenge'** was honoured. This challenge intended to promote the development of AI-powered climate solutions in developing countries. Dr. Letetia Addison of Trinidad and Tobago won the challenge at COP29 for an 'AI-driven climate resilience platform for SIDS,' which aims to promote the adaptation of SIDS to climate change impacts (UNFCCC 2024h). This initiative highlights the potential of AI to drive transformative change and support developing countries in addressing climate challenges (UNFCCC 2023a).

Like the previous COP, COP30 will also spotlight technological innovation through themed 'innovation challenges'. These include the 'Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) for People and Planet Innovation Challenge,' which aims to engage global innovators in developing climate solutions using DPI. Also, the 'AI for Climate Action Innovation Factory' will organise a live pitching session, focusing on AI-driven solutions from start-ups tackling environmental challenges. Once again, an AI for Climate Action Award will be bestowed (COP30 Brasil 2025e).

3.5.3. Capacity building

The Paris Committee on Capacity Building (PCCB) provides capacity building support to implement NDCs, integrate climate considerations into national planning and budgeting, and address institutional gaps, for example.

At COP29, the PCCB's **annual technical progress report** for 2024 was discussed. The report highlights capacity building for designing holistic investment strategies, bankable projects and stakeholder engagement in mitigation and adaptation. For the next progress report, the Parties invited the PCCB to include information on how its work is linked to relevant outcomes of the GST. Furthermore, the Parties made a decision on the second review of the PCCB in which they extended the term of the PCCB for another five years.

COP29 also set out the terms of reference for the fifth comprehensive **review of how the capacity-building framework is being implemented in developing countries under the Convention**. The review commenced at SBI62 and will continue at the SBI session in Belém, alongside a review of related issues under the Kyoto Protocol. A decision on this may be adopted at COP30 (IISD 2024; 2025b).

Additionally, the **6th Capacity-Building Hub** took place at COP29, featuring 42 sessions with over 1,500 attendees. The sessions highlighted the need for enhanced national coordination between finance and environment ministries, fostering dialogue across the Rio Conventions, amplifying the voices of women, youth and Indigenous communities, leveraging innovative climate finance mechanisms (e.g. blended finance and Climate and Disaster Risk Finance and Insurance) and ensuring an equitable and transparent use of emerging technologies, including AI (UNFCCC 2025c).

At COP29, the key **role of the six UNFCCC Regional Collaboration Centres (RCCs)** in capacity building was also reaffirmed. Thirteen RCC events were held at the conference, featuring private sector engagement, regional-specific dialogues on NDCs, adaptation, Article 6 implementation, and climate finance (UNFCCC 2024a).

Regarding capacity building in the area of transparency, **the Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency – Global Support Programme (CBIT-GSP)** was launched in 2023 to strengthen the institutional and technical capacities of developing countries. It aims to support developing countries in adhering to the enhanced transparency requirements outlined in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement. For example, the CBIT provides tools and trainings to developing countries to help them prepare their BTRs.[21]

3.6. Education, training and public awareness

The topics listed in Article 12 of the Paris Agreement – namely education, public awareness, training, public participation, public access to information – along with international cooperation, are summarised under the term **'Action for Climate Empowerment' (ACE)**. Under the ACE work programme, events are organised during each COP and session of the subsidiary bodies. Information on these events is available on the UNFCCC website[22].

In addition, progress under the ACE work programme will be discussed at the Belém climate change conference under the SBI agenda item 'Matters relating to Action for Climate Empowerment'.

3.7. Transparency and reporting by Parties

The end of 2024 marked an important milestone for transparency under the Paris Agreement, as Parties were required to submit their **first Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs)**. By the deadline of 31 December 2024, 86 Parties had submitted a BTR; by 1 September 2025, a total of 106 Parties submitted a BTR (UNFCCC 2025k). Given that the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) are not required to submit such a report under the Paris Agreement, this includes most Parties and covers a large share of global emissions.

These BTR submissions provide comparable information from developing and developed country Parties. Besides the main reports, the submissions include GHG inventory data, information on progress towards implementing the NDC, and information on support in tabular format. All reports and the

[21] See the website of the Climate Transparency Platform: CBIT-GSP (2025) Climate Transparency Platform, available at https://climate-transparency-platform.org/.

[22] UNFCCC (2025a), Action for climate empowerment, available at https://unfccc.int/topics/education-and-youth/big-picture/ACE.

tabular data are available on the UNFCCC website[23]. In addition to the mandatory elements, many Parties provided information on the non-mandatory topics of adaptation, loss and damage, and support needed and received (Moosmann 2025). A synthesis report of the submitted information will be published by the UNFCCC Secretariat ahead of COP30.

While there are no dedicated negotiations on BTRs on the COP30 agenda, several other aspects relating to transparency will be discussed at the conference:

- Under the CMA, Parties discuss the **provision of financial and technical support for reporting**. The background to this agenda item is that many developing countries face challenges in compiling GHG inventory data and other climate change-related information due to their limited resources, and support is needed in this area. At the conference in Belém, the Parties will discuss, inter alia, the results of a workshop on experiences in preparing the first BTR.
- Under the SBI, Parties will discuss the status of report **submissions under the Convention**. Although most climate change-related information is included in BTRs under the Paris Agreement, some reporting obligations remain under the Convention, including annual GHG inventories by developed countries and National Communications which are due every four years.
- The SBI will host a session of the '**Facilitative, Multilateral Consideration of Progress**,' during which Parties present the information reported in their BTRs and respond to questions posed by representatives of other Parties.
- The SBSTA agenda contains several items of a technical nature, such as the development of a GHG data interface and reports from technical expert reviews.

3.8. The Global Stocktake

The **first Global Stocktake was concluded in 2023** and constituted the main outcome of the COP28 climate change conference. Decision 1/CMA.5 (UNFCCC 2023b) documents the Parties' consensus on the state of implementation of the Paris Agreement. In this decision, the CMA notes with alarm the findings of the IPCC's Sixth Assessment Report and calls on Parties to increase their ambition in terms of climate action and support. **Table 6** provides an overview of the key messages of this decision.

[23] UNFCCC (2025k), First Biennial Transparency Reports, available at https://unfccc.int/first-biennial-transparency-reports.

Table 6: Selected messages from the outcome of the first Global Stocktake

Topic	Key messages
Context and cross-cutting considerations	The CMA finds that 'Parties are not yet collectively on track towards achieving the purpose of the Paris Agreement and its long-term goals'.
Mitigation	Parties are called on to contribute to global efforts, inter alia the tripling of renewable energy capacity by 2030 and the transitioning away from fossil fuels.
Adaptation	Parties are urged to increase ambition towards the achievement of targets by 2030 in the areas of water, food, agriculture, health, and others.
Means of implementation and support	Adaptation finance will have to be significantly scaled up. Provision of support for activities to address loss and damage. Establishment of a technology implementation programme.
Loss and damage	Parties and relevant institutions are called on to improve coherence and synergies between efforts.
Response measures	Parties are encouraged to extend activities relating to the assessment of the impacts of the implementation of response measures.
International cooperation	Parties and non-Party stakeholders are urged to 'join efforts to accelerate delivery through inclusive, multilevel, gender-responsive and cooperative action.'
Guidance and way forward	An annual Global Stocktake dialogue and a 'Road Map to Mission 1.5' to enhance ambition in the next round of NDCs are launched.

Source: Decision 1/CMA.5, UNFCCC (2023b).

Notes: This table contains only a few key messages selected from the 196 paragraphs of decision 1/CMA.5.

It should be noted that the outcome of the first Global Stocktake constitutes a **compromise among all Parties**. Many Parties and stakeholders had called for more ambitious wording, which was not reflected in the final outcome. Several concepts, such as 'systems transformations' which are needed to effectively respond to climate change globally, had played an important role during the technical phase of the Global Stocktake, but were not included in the final CMA decision (Winkler and Akhtar 2025).

Ahead of COP30, when more and more new NDCs are being communicated, it will be critical to observe how the Parties have responded to the results of the Global Stocktake. According to decision 4/CMA.1 (UNFCCC 2018b), Parties have to specify in their NDCs how their NDC preparation has been informed by the outcomes of the Global Stocktake.

COP30 will also see **follow-up discussions to the first Global Stocktake** under the subsidiary bodies. These will cover procedural and logistical elements and the report of the most recent Global Stocktake dialogue, which took place in June 2025[24], as well as the modalities of the 'United Arab Emirates (UAE)

[24] UNFCCC (2025d), Annual GST NDC Dialogue – Mandated event, available at https://unfccc.int/event/annual-gst-ndc-dialogue-mandated-event-0.

dialogue on implementing the Global Stocktake outcomes'. The UAE dialogue was established in the finance section of the decision on the GST (paragraph 97 of decision 1/CMA.5) and diverging views remain on the focus of this dialogue, i.e. whether it should primarily address finance aspects, or whether it should address all outcomes of the GST (IISD 2025b).

3.9. The Committee to facilitate implementation of the Paris Agreement

The Committee to facilitate implementation of the Paris Agreement has been meeting two to three times a year since 2020. In cases in which a Party does not meet an obligation, such as the timely submission of an NDC or of a report, the Committee engages with this Party to facilitate resolution of this issue.

In 2025, the Committee had to address a large number of cases, as three mandatory deliverables were due under the Paris Agreement (for more information and links to these deliverables, see Table 3):

- **NDCs:** According to the decision on the adoption of the Paris Agreement (decision 1/CP.21, UNFCCC 2015b), Parties are required to submit their NDCs at least nine to twelve months in advance of the relevant CMA session. For the NDCs due in 2025, the relevant date is 10 February 2025, nine months before the start of the climate change conference in Belém. By that date, only 13 Parties had submitted a new NDC. Following its meeting in April 2025, the Committee notified the Parties which had missed this reporting deadline (UNFCCC 2025t).
- **Biennial communications on financial support:** The third biennial communications under Article 9.5 with indicative information, including projected levels of financial support, were due on 31 December 2024. Three Parties submitted these communications after the deadline. As these submissions had been completed at the time of the Committee's meeting in April 2025, the Committee did not engage with these cases (UNFCCC 2025t).
- **BTRs:** The deadline for submitting the first Biennial Transparency Report was 31 December 2024. At the time of the Committee's meeting in April 2025, 37 Parties had not submitted one or more of the mandatory elements of a BTR, and the Committee notified them accordingly (UNFCCC 2025t).

Under the Paris Agreement, the role of the Committee is a facilitative one, and it cannot sanction Parties that do not meet their obligations. This role is consistent with the overall approach of the Paris Agreement, which focuses on nationally determined action, rather than on central oversight.

At COP30 in Belém, the CMA will consider matters relating to the Committee. It can be expected that the CMA will discuss the annual report of the Committee, which will be published ahead of the conference. However, it is thought that the CMA will not request major changes in the work of the Committee.

3.10. Other topics under the UNFCCC

Several topics are closely linked to climate change, but they are not addressed in a specific article of the Paris Agreement. These topics are discussed at climate change conferences as agenda items under the UNFCCC. They include:

- the local communities and indigenous peoples' platform;
- gender and climate change;
- the Sharm el-Sheikh joint work on implementation of climate action on agriculture and food security; and
- research and systematic observation.

3.10.1. Local communities and indigenous peoples

Many local communities and indigenous peoples are affected by the impacts of climate change. They can also contribute their knowledge on how to reduce these impacts. **The Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform (LCIPP)** was established in 2015 (decision 1/CP.21, UNFCCC 2015b). Since 2019, a Facilitative Working Group (FWG) has facilitated the implementation of the LCIPP relating to knowledge, capacity for engagement and climate change policies and actions. Indigenous peoples are a particular focus of the Brazilian COP presidency. The presidency, along with agencies such as the Brazilian Ministry of Indigenous Peoples, is facilitating the participation of indigenous peoples at COP30 (COP30 Brasil 2025d). Information on related events during the COP will be available at the LCIPP web portal[25].

3.10.2. Gender and climate change

In many respects, women are disproportionally affected by the impacts of climate change, particularly in developing countries. At the same time, they are often underrepresented when climate change-related decisions are made. To address these issues, the **Lima Work Programme on Gender** was established in 2014. It was extended by ten years at COP29 in 2024 (UNFCCC 2024d). At the SBI session held in Bonn in June 2025, activities for a new **Gender Action Plan (GAP)** were discussed, covering the following priority areas:

- capacity-building, knowledge management and communication;
- gender balance, participation and women's leadership;
- coherence (across international and national processes);
- gender-responsive implementation and means of implementation; and
- monitoring and reporting.

[25] UNFCCC (2025n), Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform Web Portal, available at https://lcipp.unfccc.int/.

At COP30, the SBI is tasked with finalising the list of activities for the GAP and forwarding it to the COP for adoption. While a comprehensive list of activities is available in an informal note (UNFCCC 2025l), there are diverging views among the Parties on the details of many of these activities, from the terminology used to timelines and funding.

3.10.3. Agriculture and food security

Changes in weather patterns affect agriculture across the globe, and agricultural soils and livestock are major sources of greenhouse gases. These close ties between climate change and agriculture are addressed in the '**Sharm el-Sheikh joint work on implementation of climate action on agriculture and food security**'. At the session of the subsidiary bodies in Bonn in June 2025, a workshop was held on systemic and holistic approaches to climate action in agriculture, food systems and food security (UNFCCC 2025ad). The results of this workshop will be considered by the SBI and SBSTA at the climate change conference in Belém. However, no specific workshop on agriculture and food security has been scheduled for this conference.

3.10.4. Research and systematic observation

Research and Earth observation are central to the understanding of climate processes and to mitigating and adapting to climate change. Under the agenda item '**Research and Systematic Observation**,' the SBSTA discusses recent findings of the IPCC, the WMO and other organisations, and draws conclusions on research needs. This item is regularly on the SBSTA agenda, including at COP30.

4. SECTORIAL AGREEMENTS AND INITIATIVES

In addition to the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement, there are other global agreements and initiatives aimed at mitigating climate change. These agreements and initiatives are closely linked to the UNFCCC process. For example, countries often announce joint initiatives to mitigate GHG emissions at climate change conferences, and these conferences are also used as an opportunity to present and discuss the progress of these initiatives. This chapter covers the following topics:

- agreements on international aviation and maritime transport;
- international initiatives in the energy sector; and
- initiatives to increase the removal of carbon from the atmosphere.

4.1. International aviation and maritime transport

International aviation and maritime transport are important sources of GHG emissions. Options to mitigate these emissions are negotiated by the member states of two specialised United Nations agencies, the **International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)** and the **International Maritime Organization (IMO).**

In the climate negotiations, ICAO and IMO regularly report on their activities in addressing 'emissions from fuel used in international aviation and maritime transport'. These reports are then discussed by Party delegates under a specific agenda item of the SBSTA.

4.1.1. International aviation

Global aviation accounts for approx. 2.4% of global CO_2 emissions (Lee et al. 2021). While there was a temporary decrease in these emissions during the COVID-19 pandemic, air travel has been resurging (Figure 4). CO_2 emissions from international aviation amounted to 530 megatonnes (Mt) CO_2 in 2023 (ICAO 2024). The climate effect of aviation is much higher as the non-CO_2 effects have an additional global warming impact. As shown in the figure below, if no further policy and technical measures are taken, the emissions of international aviation are expected to rise considerably by 2050 due to increasing demand (CAT 2025a). In the EU, CO_2 emissions from fuels used in international aviation (i.e. in flights originating and ending in different countries) amounted to 122 Mt in 2023 (EEA 2025b).

Figure 4: Historical and future development of CO_2 emissions from international aviation



Source: Authors' own compilation based on ICAO (2022a), IEA (2023), OECD (2023), ICAO (2023), ICAO (2024), CAT (2024).

Note: The orange and red lines show business-as-usual (BAU) scenarios from Climate Action Tracker. The green lines show projections from ICAO for international aviation considering operational and technical efficiency improvements, and increases shares of SAF.

In 2022, ICAO Member States adopted the **Long-Term Aspirational Goal (LTAG) of net-zero emissions by 2050** (ICAO 2022b). The LTAG should be achieved by reducing emissions through various means, such as technical and operational measures, the uptake of Sustainable Aviation Fuels (SAFs), and the purchase of carbon offsets. The primary global policy addressing international aviation emissions is the **Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA)** under ICAO. CORSIA aims to achieve carbon-neutral growth of the aviation industry through offsetting the emissions above a baseline (which is 85% of the 2019 emissions level) and covers international flights between participating states. Airlines can reduce their offsetting requirements by using SAFs. However, aside from CORSIA running until 2035, there are currently no binding international policy measures in place to meet ICAO's LTAG of net-zero emissions by 2050 (Wissner and Graichen 2024). To date, ICAO has implemented various capacity building, assistance and training programs for CORSIA and SAFs (UNFCCC 2025u).

The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) for aviation works differently than CORSIA: it is a cap-and-trade system and applies to flights within the European Economic Area (which covers the EU Member States, Iceland and Norway) as well as to flights to the United Kingdom and Switzerland. ETS allowance prices are significantly higher than the prices of CORSIA offsets. A monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) system for non-CO_2 emissions is implemented as part of the ETS from 2025 onwards and an impact assessment in 2028 will evaluate whether the ETS will be expanded to include these

emissions (Graichen and Wissner 2023). The EU ETS Directive is currently under review, which includes an assessment of the implementation and environmental integrity of CORSIA. Depending on the outcome of this assessment, the European Commission may propose adjusting the ETS scope from 2027 onwards and potentially include a larger share of international flights.

SAFs are widely recognised as the most effective mitigation tool for aviation emissions. While ICAO has yet to adopt any binding SAF policies, the EU has taken a leading role through the ReFuelEU Aviation Regulation (European Union 2023b). From 2025 onwards, ReFuelEU obliges fuel suppliers to gradually increase the share of SAFs supplied to EU airports. The uptake of SAF is further incentivised by means of an upcoming fuels support mechanism which compensates airlines for the additional costs of SAF uptake compared to fossil kerosene on ETS flights (20 million allowances, EU ETS Directive Article 3c) (European Union 2024b).

4.1.2. International maritime transport

International maritime transport is responsible for the largest share of maritime transport emissions: 785 Mt CO_2eq of a total of 911 Mt CO_2eq of global maritime transport in 2023 (Mao et al. 2025). Emissions have grown steadily over recent decades despite a temporary decrease during the COVID-19 pandemic (Figure **5** below). Improvements in energy efficiency have not been sufficient to counteract the increase in absolute emissions. In business-as-usual scenarios, emissions from global maritime transport are projected to increase significantly up to 2050 in line with global trade. While CO_2 emissions represent the largest share of maritime transport emissions, methane emissions have increased significantly due to an increased use of liquefied natural gas (LNG), resulting in fugitive methane emissions (Mao et al. 2025). EU-related maritime transport emissions accounted for approximately 126 Mt CO_2 in 2023, with international maritime transport accounting for around 65% of this total (European Commission 2025a).

Figure 5: Historical and projected CO_2 emissions of international maritime transport



Source: Authors' own compilation based on IMO (2009), IMO (2015), IMO (2020), CAT (2023), CAT (2023), Mao et al. (2025).

Note: Historical emissions are based on bottom-up data from the IMO of the activity of the global fleet. The latest IMO greenhouse gas study IMO (2020) refines the methodology by using a voyage-based approach compared to the previous vessel-based approach which decreases the share of international maritime transport of the total maritime transport from 2012 onwards. Historical data of recent years is taken from Mao et al. (2025). Projections are based on business-as-usual data of the IMO and an analysis of emission development based on 1.5 °C- and 2 °C-compatible pathways of the Climate Action Tracker (2023).

The IMO adopted a revised GHG strategy in 2023, aiming for net-zero emissions by or around 2050, with interim targets of 20–30% reductions by 2030 and 70–80% by 2040.

Box 3: The Draft Net Zero Framework of the IMO

In April 2025, the IMO's Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) approved the draft IMO Net Zero Framework (NZF). The NZF includes a GHG Fuel Standard (GFS) with an economic element. The GFS gradually imposes more stringent requirements for reducing GHG Fuel Intensity (GFI) on a per-ship annual basis, and introduces a two-tiered pricing system for GHG emissions above the GFI requirements. The collected revenue feeds into the Net-Zero Fund, which aims to support a just and fair transition in developing countries and rewarding for the use of zero or near-zero GHG emission fuels. The NZF is expected to enter into force by 2028 and will apply to ships with a gross tonnage of over 5,000. The NZF complements several existing short-term measures which focus on energy efficiency at ship-level. Further details and guidelines on the IMO NZF are still to be developed.

When the MECP convened in October 2025, many expected that it would formally adopt the draft NZF. However, after public criticism from U.S. President Donald Trump, and following a proposal by Saudi Arabia, the MEPC voted to adjourn discussions on the NZF for one year.

Source : IMO (2025b), Draft revised MARPOL Annex VI, available at: https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/Documents/Circular%20Letter%20No.5005%20-%20Draft%20Revised%20Marpol%20Annex%20Vi%20%28Secretariat%29.pdf; (IMO 2025a); (Hand 2025).

At the EU level, the ETS was expanded to include maritime transport in 2024 and now includes 50% of emissions from international voyages departing from or arriving at an EU port (Wissner and Cames 2023). In the first year, shipping companies were required to surrender allowances for 40% of their verified reported emissions. By 2026, 100% of emissions covered will be subject to surrender obligation under the ETS. From 2026 onwards, the EU ETS for maritime transport will also cover methane and nitrous oxide emissions; these emissions are already included in the EU MRV system for maritime transport. Offshore ships[26] will also be included from 2027 onwards. The FuelEU Maritime Regulation (European Union 2023a), effective from January 2025, complements the ETS by setting annual GHG intensity limits for energy used onboard ships, starting with a 2% reduction target in 2025 and increasing to 80% in 2050. FuelEU also covers 50% of the emissions of ingoing[27] and outgoing international voyages.

The European Commission is required to review the EU ETS and FuelEU rules at regular intervals and in the light of new IMO measures. A review of the EU ETS is already ongoing. Among other things, it will consider whether to include smaller ships with a gross tonnage below 5,000 and whether (and how) the EU ETS could be amended to ensure coherence between EU policy and ambition and the new IMO NZF.

[26] According to the StatCode 5 Shiptype Coding System (S&P Global 2023), offshore ships are work vessels which encompass tug and supply vessels for offshore platforms, supply vessels to transport crews/supplies, drilling and construction vessels, and pipe construction/support vessels, among others.

[27] International ingoing voyages are those from a port outside the European Economic Area (EEA) to a port within the EEA.

4.2. International initiatives in the energy sector

Globally, the energy sector is the largest source of GHG emissions (Climate Watch 2025). The growth of installed solar and wind power in many countries in recent years is a key component for the decarbonisation of the sector. In this section, two specific aspects of the energy sector are discussed: the role of hydrogen and other low-carbon fuels, and initiatives to reduce methane emissions.

4.2.1. Hydrogen and other low-carbon fuels

Low-emissions hydrogen and other low-carbon and alternative fuels, such as advanced biofuels, synthetic fuels, ammonia and biomethane, are expected to play a key role in decarbonising certain industries that are difficult to electrify. Currently, over 99% of hydrogen is produced using fossil fuels, which are associated with high GHG emissions (IEA 2025g). Low-emission hydrogen, such as renewable hydrogen produced via water electrolysis powered by renewable electricity, and low-carbon hydrogen from fossil-based production with carbon capture and storage (CCS), has seen limited growth in the past two years. However, if the projects that have been announced are realised, low-emission hydrogen could increase from 1 Mt to 49 Mt per year by 2030 (IEA 2024). Figure **6** shows the distribution of announced low-emissions hydrogen projects in 2024: while most operational capacity is currently concentrated in China, Europe, and the United States, new projects are increasingly being announced in other regions.

Figure 6: Map of announced low-emissions hydrogen production projects, 2024



Source: IEA (2024).

Note: CCUS = carbon capture, utilisation and storage; FID = final investment decision.

The role of hydrogen in the energy sector remains limited and highly sector-specific. Low emissions hydrogen is expected to play a role in decarbonising the chemical industry, the iron and steel sector and heavy-duty transportation; however, demand in these applications still accounts for less than 1% of global hydrogen demand (IEA 2024). Applications in passenger transport and residential heating have also been discussed, but battery-electric vehicles and heat pumps are generally more cost-effective options for these sectors (Dulian and Erbach 2025).

In this context, EU initiatives include funding instruments, infrastructure planning and a dedicated legislative framework to support hydrogen deployment. In the EU, hydrogen is funded through the Innovation Fund, Important Projects of Common European Interest, Projects of Common Interest, the EU Hydrogen Bank and the Clean Hydrogen Partnership (Dulian and Erbach 2025; European Commission 2024a). Infrastructure planning is supported by the European Hydrogen Backbone and by the creation of integrated hydrogen valleys. The legislative framework was strengthened by the Hydrogen and Decarbonised Gas Market Package (European Union 2024e; 2024a), which sets internal market rules and network governance. In addition, the ReFuelEU Aviation and FuelEU Maritime Regulations establish binding uptake targets for Renewable Fuels of Non-Biological Origin (RFNBOs), while the Net-Zero Industry Act (European Union 2024d) supports scaling up EU manufacturing capacity for electrolysers, fuel cells and other strategic technologies.

Policy support for hydrogen and alternative fuels is also expanding on an international level. As of September 2024, 58 governments had a national hydrogen strategy (IEA 2025g). Plans to determine the GHG emissions of hydrogen production are also gaining traction. Initiatives such as the technical specification ISO/TS 19870:2023 of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO 2023), the International Partnership for Hydrogen and Fuel Cells in the Economy (IPHE 2025a), and the European Commission's CertifHy scheme are advancing methodologies for certification and standardisation of hydrogen on an international level (CertifHy 2025). The IPHE recently launched a global hydrogen workforce database and a new international hydrogen certification platform (IPHE 2025b).

At COP 28, 37 governments signed a **declaration of intent for the mutual recognition of certification schemes for renewable and low-carbon hydrogen** (COP28 UAE 2023). At COP29, 62 countries signed **a declaration to increase the production of renewable and low-carbon hydrogen** (COP29 Baku 2024). Other types of international initiatives include the **Clean Hydrogen Mission**, which seeks to reduce the costs of clean hydrogen to USD 2 per kilogram by 2030 (Mission Innovation 2025), and the **Clean Energy Ministerial Hydrogen Initiative**, which promotes collaboration on standards, trade and policy alignment (CEM 2019). During the United Nations' Climate Week held in New York in September 2025, the COP30 Presidency announced plans to promote a global pledge to quadruple sustainable fuel production (including biofuels, biogases, synthetic fuels, and hydrogen and its derivatives) by 2035 (COP30 Brasil 2025c).

Regional cooperation is also growing. Examples include the Africa Green Hydrogen Alliance, comprising Egypt, Kenya, Mauritania, Morocco, Namibia and South Africa (Green Hydrogen Organisation 2025), and the Asia-Pacific Hydrogen Association, which aim to coordinate investment, standards and trade corridors across regions (Asia-Pacific Hydrogen Association 2025).

Despite this policy momentum, significant challenges remain, particularly with regard to competitiveness and infrastructure. Renewable hydrogen, produced via grid or renewable-powered electrolysis, remains uncompetitive compared to fossil-based hydrogen. In 2022, production costs of hydrogen from fossil sources reached approximately EUR 6 per kilogram due to high natural gas prices during the energy crisis. However, even at this elevated cost, fossil-based hydrogen was still less expensive than hydrogen based on renewable sources, which was estimated to cost over EUR 10 per kilogram in most EU Member States (European Hydrogen Observatory 2023). Beyond costs, the lack of infrastructure poses a critical barrier. Significant gaps remain in the essential infrastructure required for transporting hydrogen and scaling up its use, including pipelines, storage facilities, refuelling stations, and port infrastructure (IEA 2024).

4.2.2. Initiatives to reduce methane emissions

Methane is the second most important GHG after CO_2. Approximately 39% of anthropogenic methane emissions come from the energy sector (primarily from the fossil fuel sector), 42% from agriculture, and 18% from the waste sector (Climate Watch 2025). Although the atmospheric lifetime of methane is shorter than that of CO_2 at around 12 years, its global warming potential is about 84 times higher over a 20-year period. This makes reducing methane emissions rapidly a cost-effective way to limit near-term warming (IEA 2025f; European Commission 2025b).

The IEA estimates that around 70% of methane emissions from the fossil fuel sector could be abated using existing technologies. Up to half of these reductions could be achieved at no net cost since captured gas can be sold (IEA 2025f). By contrast, it is more difficult to mitigate emissions in agriculture and waste, as this requires more systemic changes, such as improved manure management, dietary shifts, new feed additives, and improved waste management practices (UNEP; CCAC 2021).

In 2024, the EU introduced the first comprehensive regulation targeting methane emissions in the energy sector. The EU Methane Regulation introduces monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) requirements, mandatory leak detection and repair, bans or restrictions on venting and flaring, and transparency requirements for both EU-based operators and importers of fossil fuel (European Commission 2025b). The regulation requires fossil fuel importers to provide methane emissions data from the end of 2024, which will be published in an EU database with methane performance profiles from 2026. From 2027, importers must demonstrate that they have applied EU-equivalent MRV standards for methane emissions. Following a review, a methane intensity import standard will take effect from 2030 (European Commission 2024b).

Nevertheless, methane emissions in the energy sector remain difficult to address. This is particularly true of methane emissions from abandoned wells and mines, which can be a significant source of emissions and are more challenging to mitigate if the previous owner or operator no longer exists (IEA 2025f). Governments play an important role in mitigating emissions from abandoned facilities. For example, under the EU Methane Regulation, each Member State must establish inventories and mitigate emissions from such facilities. A further challenge is that methane emissions are widely underreported as most countries rely on limited measurement-based data. New studies and satellite detections indicate that real energy-related emissions are about 80% higher than emissions provided

in the Parties' reports under the UNFCCC (IEA 2025f). Although existing data can inform efforts to mitigate methane emissions, more accurate data could make these efforts more efficient.

At an international level, there are several initiatives that aim to strengthen methane reduction and transparency. At COP26 in 2021, the European Union and the United States launched the **Global Methane Pledge**. Under this pledge, over 160 countries committed to collectively reducing global methane emissions by 30% by 2030 compared to 2020 levels (CCAC 2025). Complementary initiatives under UNEP include the **Oil and Gas Methane Partnership 2.0**, which engages industry in reducing emissions, and the **International Methane Emissions Observatory**, which collects independent data from satellites, companies and research institutions (OGMP 2025; UNEP 2025b). During the United Nations Climate Week in New York in September 2025, the Executive Director of the Brazilian COP30 presidency, Ana Toni, emphasised that accelerating methane emissions cuts will be at the centre of the discussions at the upcoming COP (COP30 Brasil 2025b). The UNEP's annual 'Eye on Methane' report provides up-to date information on developments in methane data collection and analysis (UNEP 2025a).

4.3. The role of carbon removals

As pointed out in the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (IPCC 2023), carbon dioxide removals (CDRs) are necessary to achieve net negative CO_2 emissions. CDRs are activities that remove and store CO_2 from the atmosphere. There are various options ranging from nature-based to technological solutions. CDRs can help counterbalance residual emissions from hard-to-abate sectors such as agriculture, aviation, shipping or certain industries and help achieve net negative CO_2 or GHG emissions in the long term.

Land-based removals are the most widely applied form of CDR. Forestation, soil carbon sequestration, biochar application and wetland restoration are some of the methods used. Removals on land can have co-benefits or adverse effects on ecosystems, biodiversity, food and water security and people depending on the method and site used (IPCC 2023). The **ocean** also plays a key role as the planet's largest carbon sink, and while several ocean-based CDR methods are being explored, most remain in the research stage (United Nations 2025c; WRI 2022).

The most common options for **technical CDRs** are currently **bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS)** and **direct air capture and storage (DACCS)**, which capture 2 and 0.01 Mt CO_2 per year respectively (IEA 2025a; 2025e). BECCS is a process in which the CO_2 emissions resulting from the use of biomass for energy production are captured and stored. It is the only CDR technology that can also provide energy. DACCS involves capturing and storing CO_2 directly from the atmosphere. It is the most expensive method of capturing carbon because CO_2 in the atmosphere is more diluted than when it is captured directly in an industrial process.

While there are some national and voluntary initiatives, there are still **no internationally agreed approaches to certifying CDRs**. This is a critical gap as transparent MRV is needed to ensure that removals are credible when used for compensation (WRI 2024b). The EU has adopted the Carbon Removals and Carbon Farming (CRCF) Regulation, which sets out criteria for a voluntary framework for certifying carbon removals and establishes an MRV process (European Union 2024f). Other jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom, have also begun developing MRV systems for certain CDRs

(IEA 2025e). Furthermore, organisations such as the Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market (ICVCM) set standards within the framework of voluntary carbon markets (ICVCM 2025).

Despite the growing international focus on CDRs, significant challenges remain regarding large-scale deployment. The costs of technical CDRs remain far above current carbon market prices, and scaling land and ocean removals could conflict with biodiversity, food security, and local communities (IPCC 2023). Therefore, achieving large-scale, sustainable deployment of CDR will require coordinated and transparent MRV systems, structures to finance removals, and safeguards for the related environmental and social risks.

5. COUNTRY PROFILES OF KEY PARTIES

This chapter presents short profiles of 16 Parties to the Paris Agreement. These include large economies as well as smaller countries which could be of particular interest to the delegation of the European Parliament. Table **7** provides a list of these Parties, their greenhouse gas emissions and their NDC targets.

Table 7: GHG emissions and NDC targets of selected Parties

Party	GHG emissions (without LULUCF)		NDC targets	
	Total (Mt CO_2eq)	Per capita (t CO_2eq)	2030	2035
Bangladesh	237	1.4	Emission reduction compared to a business-as-usual scenario	Emission reduction compared to a business-as-usual scenario
Brazil	1,234	5.9	Economy-wide emission reduction target	Economy-wide emission reduction target
China	14,314	10.1	Targets for CO_2 emissions peaking, CO_2 emission intensity, non-fossil energy share, forest stock volume, and installed wind and solar power capacity	Economy-wide emission reduction target (announced)
Colombia	183	3.6	Emission reduction compared to a business-as-usual scenario	Economy-wide emission reduction target
European Union	3,366	7.5	Economy-wide emission reduction target	Economy-wide emission reduction target [28]
India	3,768	2.6	Targets for emission intensity, installed capacity of non-fossil fuel-based power generation, and increase of carbon sink	Not yet communicated
Japan	1,135	9.1	Economy-wide emission reduction target	Economy-wide emission reduction target
Maldives	2	4.5	Emission reduction compared to a business-as-usual scenario	Emission reduction compared to a business-as-usual scenario

[28] In September 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted a statement of intent (Council of the European Union 2025a), available at https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12986-2025-INIT/en/pdf), but did not communicate a new NDC. On 5 November 2025, the Council confirmed the range target for 2035 indicated in the statement (66.25-72.5% compared to 1990), submitted as the EU NDC, available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2025-11/DK-2025-11-05%20EU%20NDC.pdf.

Party	GHG emissions (without LULUCF)		NDC targets	
	Total (Mt CO_2eq)	Per capita (t CO_2eq)	2030	2035
Mexico	757	5.9	Emission reduction compared to a business-as-usual scenario	Not yet communicated
Nigeria	328	1.5	Emission reduction compared to a business-as-usual scenario	Economy-wide emission reduction target
Philippines	230	2.1	Emission reduction compared to a business-as-usual scenario	Not yet communicated
Saudi Arabia	717	23.3	Targets for emission reduction compared to a business-as-usual scenario and for the renewable energy share	Not yet communicated
South Africa	476	7.6	Economy-wide emission reduction target	Not yet communicated
Uganda	47	1.0	Emission reduction compared to a business-as-usual scenario	Not yet communicated
United Arab Emirates	253	25.1	Economy-wide emission reduction target	Economy-wide emission reduction target
United States[29]	6,343	19.0	Economy-wide emission reduction target	Economy-wide emission reduction target

Source: First Biennial Transparency Reports (BTR), https://unfccc.int/first-biennial-transparency-reports; Nationally Determined Contributions, https://unfccc.int/NDCREG, World Bank population data, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.

Notes: LULUCF: Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry. For illustration purposes only, the three countries with the highest GHG emissions and emissions per capita are shown in red, and the three countries with the lowest GHG emissions and emission per capita are shown in green. Economy-wide emission reduction targets are highlighted in green because such targets are of particular importance for decreasing global GHG emissions and keeping the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement within reach. GHG emissions are shown for the most recent year for which data is available in the Party's BTR (2020, 2021 or 2022). Where no BTR is available, emissions for 2022 have been taken from Climate Watch Data, https://www.climatewatchdata.org/ghg-emissions.

At the time of writing this report, several major economies have not yet communicated NDCs with a target for 2035. However, at the UN Climate Summit in September 2025, almost 100 countries presented or announced new climate targets (United Nations 2025a). It can be expected that several new NDCs will be communicated close to the start date of COP30[30].

[29] The United States is in the process of withdrawing from the Paris Agreement.

[30] All NDCs can be accessed via the NDC registry: UNFCCC (2025q), NDC registry, available at https://unfccc.int/NDCREG.

The following presents climate-change related information, climate policies and NDC targets for the selected Parties. As the COP presidency, Brazil is presented first, followed by the other Parties in alphabetical order.

5.1. Brazil (COP30 presidency)

Since Lula da Silva returned to power as president in 2023, Brazil has made efforts to re-establish itself on the multilateral stage and as a climate leader. This is reflected in the country hosting COP30 in Belém this year. The country's 2024 BTR notes that 'Brazil is back' (Brazil 2024). The country also hosted the Group of Twenty (G20) summit in 2024, which focused on 'Building a just world and a sustainable planet' and has the **presidency** of the group comprising Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, China and South Africa (**BRICS**) this year (BRICS Brasil 2025).

Brazil is one of the world's largest emitters of greenhouse gases although its per capita footprint is moderate (see Table 7). **LULUCF accounts for nearly 40% of GHG emissions**, followed by agriculture (almost 31%), energy (almost 21%), Industrial Processes and Product Use (IPPU) and waste. Approximately 50% of the domestic energy supply comes from renewables, and almost 90% of its electricity comes from renewable sources. The electricity mix is dominated by hydropower (60%), and wind and solar capacity has sharply increased in recent years (Brazil 2024; IEA 2025c). The country also intends to become a global producer of green hydrogen (Agora Industry 2024).

Brazil is home to 60% of the **Amazon basin**, and its biodiversity accounts for 10–20% of the world's species diversity. Tackling deforestation has been a major government priority, as demonstrated by the 2023 Amazon Summit, which brought together leaders of the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO) and resulted in the adoption of the Belém Declaration (Amazon Cooperation Treaty 2023). Brazil is committed to zero deforestation and notes the importance of Indigenous Peoples' knowledge to combat deforestation (Brazil 2024). Programmes that were abandoned under the previous president, Jair Bolsonaro, have been reinstated, including the Amazon Fund, which is supported by international partners (Brazil 2024). Deforestation rates fell between 2022 and 2023, though high peaks persist due to fires, illegal logging and the insufficient enforcement of environmental laws (Maisonnave 2023; Fonseca 2025). At COP28, Brazil's National Bank for Economic and Social Development launched the Restoration Arc, aiming to recover 24 million hectares of the Amazon by 2050. The initiative calls on international partners to contribute (Brazil 2024).

Brazil is home to over 213 million people and is one of the ten largest economies in the world. Agribusiness contributes 24% to its gross domestic product (GDP), while industry contributes 26% (of which 2% is oil and gas). Brazil is the largest oil producer and second largest natural gas producer in Latin America. The Energy Expansion Plan forecasts an increase in oil production (EPE 2024). Brazil is also the second largest producer of ethanol and biodiesel in the world. However, 30% of the population live in poverty (2022), a problem that is especially prevalent in the north of the country and among Afro-Brazilians (World Bank 2022a). Over half of Brazil's Indigenous Peoples and around a third of quilombolas live in the Amazon, where deforestation has a significant impact on their lives (Brazil 2024).

In early September 2025, Brazil formally requested to join the International Energy Agency (IEA) as a member. The IEA recognised the country's contribution to global energy security in its capacity as a net oil exporter and a leader in the energy transition, thanks to its low-emission power system, renewable energy resources, and robust biofuel sector (IEA 2025b).

Brazil's climate policy framework is guided by the updated **2024–2035 Climate Plan.** Building on the National Policy on Climate Change, the Plan coordinates national and sectoral actions on mitigation and adaptation. Complementary strategies include the National Mitigation Strategy and the National Adaptation Strategy. Meanwhile, the Ecological Transformation Plan promotes sustainable development with energy transition forming a key pillar. The National Energy Transition Plan and the National Hydrogen Programme focus on decarbonising energy, advancing research and development, and increasing investment (Brazil 2024). Sectoral instruments include the Safra Plan, which supports sustainable agriculture, the Pathways to a Sustainable Bioeconomy initiative (New Climate Institute 2025), and the 2024 ETS, which is a national cap-and-trade system that will allow companies to trade carbon credits over the next five years. Brazil is also preparing to engage in international carbon markets under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, thereby aligning its domestic efforts with global cooperation frameworks (World Bank 2025c).

In November 2024, Brazil communicated its **new NDC**, setting an economy-wide target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by between 59% and 67% below 2005 levels by 2035, with the aim of achieving net zero by 2050. Brazil states that it would welcome developed countries to adopt earlier net zero targets.

As **COP30 President**, Brazil reaffirms its commitment to multilateralism and to the UNFCCC as the central platform for global climate governance, and calls for collective action to tackle climate change. This commitment is reflected in the **priorities of the COP30 President**, **André Aranha Corrêa do Lago** (COP30 Brasil 2025f). The stated priorities include:

Global Mutirão and COP30 Action Agenda: Brazil introduces the Global Mutirão, which is a joint effort inspired by Indigenous traditions, to unite governments, businesses, and civil society in a shared commitment to climate action and the concept of a 'Global NDC'. The COP30 Action Agenda (COP30 Brasil 2025a) is structured around six pillars and 30 objectives and provides a framework to mobilise non-state actors and align cross-sector efforts with the Paris Agreement. The pillars are: Energy, Industry, and Transport; Forests, Oceans, and Biodiversity; Agriculture and Food Systems; Cities, Infrastructure, and Water; Human and Social Development; and Cross-cutting Issues (including Finance, Technology, and Capacity Building).

International Climate Finance: Brazil has emphasised the importance of scaling up climate finance through the Baku to Belém Roadmap, which aims to mobilise USD 1.3 trillion annually. Produced jointly by Brazil and Azerbaijan, the Roadmap is set to be released in October 2025 and discussed at a high-level COP30 event in Belém. However, the outcomes of COP29 in Baku left many developing country Parties dissatisfied, which could present challenges for negotiations in Belém (Chiaretti and Palermo 2025).

Just Transition and Adaptation Indicators: Equity and inclusivity are stated as central, with emphasis placed on Indigenous Peoples and local communities and their knowledge as essential to climate action. At the same time, Brazil has underscored that adaptation is no longer optional and highlighted its resolve to fulfil the mandate on global adaptation indicators and to advance the Baku adaptation roadmap, building on the preparatory work done in Bonn (Chiaretti and Palermo 2025).

Accelerating Ambition and Action: Brazil is calling for greater ambition in line with the 1.5 °C target and is emphasising the need for countries to update their NDCs. Key objectives include halting deforestation by 2030, tripling renewable energy capacity, doubling energy efficiency improvements, and translating commitments into concrete, measurable action under existing agreements.

Protecting Forests for Climate and Biodiversity: Forests are recognised as vital carbon sinks, as well as being vital assets for biodiversity and sustainable development, with COP30 aiming to mobilise investment and innovation to halt deforestation and promote forest-based solutions.

Private Sector Engagement: Brazil is calling on the private sector to engage actively, highlighting the economic opportunities linked to climate action. The country is stating that COP30 can serve as the world's largest marketplace for transformational climate solutions, where businesses and stakeholders could collectively shape the future global economy.

However, hosting COP30 in Belém has drawn criticism due to infrastructural challenges, deforestation for highway construction, and high accommodation costs. Governments and civil society organisations have reported difficulties in securing affordable accommodation, which has raised concerns about participation. Some stakeholders have suggested relocating the conference to Rio de Janeiro to address these issues, but the government remains firm in its commitment to hold COP30 in Belém (Abnett 2025).

5.2. Bangladesh

Bangladesh is categorised as a least developed country under the United Nations classification system (Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2025). It is a sub-tropical country characterised by a **flat topography and a low-lying delta**. It is particularly prone to extreme weather events, such as floods, droughts, extreme temperatures and precipitation, as well as rising sea levels and increased salinity in freshwater (Bangladesh 2021). Although it has been one of the countries most at risk of climate-related disasters, effective risk prevention measures have significantly reduced cyclone-related mortality in recent decades (Haque et al. 2012; Adil et al. 2025).

Bangladesh relies mainly on fossil fuels for its energy supply, with 71% of domestic energy produced by natural gas (IEA 2025d).

A central pillar of Bangladesh's climate policy is **to expand the use of renewable energy**, particularly solar energy. The Renewable Energy Policy was first launched in 2008, with a target of sourcing 10% of total power demand from renewables by 2020 (Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources Bangladesh 2008). In June 2025, a new Renewable Energy Policy was adopted, which set a target of achieving 20% renewable electricity generation by 2030 and 30% by 2040 (Bangladesh 2025b).

In addition, Bangladesh adopted action plans and initiatives in the area of energy efficiency, improved cook stoves and waste management (Bangladesh 2023).

Bangladesh submitted its **new NDC in September 2025** (Bangladesh 2025a), Its target is to reduce total cumulative GHG emissions between 2026 and 2035 by approximately 20% compared to a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario, with additional reductions conditional to international climate finance. As GHG emissions in the BAU scenario are projected to increase considerably up to 2035, the NDC target translates into an absolute increase of GHG emissions between current levels and the level of 2035.

5.3. China

China is by far the **largest emitter of greenhouse gases** worldwide, with GHG emissions amounting to 14.3 gigatonnes (Gt) CO_2eq (excluding LULUCF) in 2021 (China 2024). This corresponds to a global share of approximately 28% (Climate Watch 2025). Furthermore, since 1990, China has experienced the largest average yearly increase of all major economies (Crippa et al. 2024)[31], at 4.4%. At around 10 t CO_2eq year, its per capita CO_2 emissions are now above those of some developed countries, but still below the per capita emissions of several countries with economies centred on fossil fuels (see Table 7). China plays a prominent role as the largest emitter, as well as in terms of the required efforts to decarbonise the economy.

China will play an even more **pivotal role in climate negotiations** after the withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement (section 5.16). In a joint press statement, China and the European Union confirmed their commitment to climate action and to the international climate change process (EU; China 24 Jul 2025).

Between 2014 and 2024, China's electricity generation has increased by almost three quarters, amounting to approximately 10,000 TWh in 2024 (Energy Institute 2025). Although China is still heavily reliant on coal-based generation (accounting for 58% in 2024), its wind, solar and hydropower generation accounts for around one third of total electricity generation.

There has been a staggering **increase in renewable capacity**. Solar capacity has increased from 28 gigawatts (GW) in 2014 to 888 GW in 2024 and wind capacity rose from 97 GW to 522 GW in the same period (Energy Institute 2025).

China has prepared a document outlining its policies and actions regarding climate change (China 2022). This covers various areas of action, including industry, the energy mix, or the carbon sink capacity of ecosystems. A mandatory **National Carbon Market** was launched in 2021, which was complemented by a voluntary carbon market in 2024. To date, the National Carbon Market has completed two compliance cycles, covering approximately 5.1 Gt of CO_2 emissions per year from more than 2,000 large sources (China 2024).

[31] The so-called 'Compound annual growth rate calculates annual changes over a specified number of years as if this change had happened steadily each year over that time period' (Crippa et al. 2024).

In addition to an increased promotion of renewable electricity generation, China has succeeded in significantly increasing its share of electric vehicles[32] in car sales. While electric vehicles accounted for 6% of car sales in 2020, the figure rose to almost half (48%) of all new sales in 2024. In 2024, electric vehicles accounted for 11% of all cars in use (Our World in Data 2025).

China submitted its **updated first NDC in 2021** (China 2021). Accordingly, CO_2 emissions are expected to peak before 2030, and carbon neutrality is to be achieved before 2060. CO_2 emissions per unit of GDP are to be reduced by more than 65% from 2005 levels by 2030. Further targets relate to the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption, to the forest stock volume, and to the installed wind and solar capacity.

In September 2025, President Xi Jinping announced China's **new NDC target** of reducing GHG emissions by 7% to 10% below peak levels by 2035. The target was criticised for a lack of ambition, given today's high GHG emission levels and China's potential in the area of renewable energy (Harvey 24 Sep 2025).

5.4. Colombia

Colombia is home to nearly 10% of the planet's biodiversity and to some of the world's most important carbon sinks (CBD 2025; WRI 2023). This includes, among others, nearly 50 million hectares of the **Amazon rainforest**, and over 40% of the world's páramo – unique high-mountain ecosystems that serve as significant carbon repositories (TNC 2025). However, these ecosystems face increasing pressures: 75% of Colombia's deforestation occurs in the Amazon, and 40-60% of two of the most important páramos areas have been replaced by crops, pastures and planted forest over the past decades (OECD 2025). This has resulted in nearly half of Colombia's greenhouse gas emissions being linked to deforestation and land-use change, although deforestation rates have recently decreased (Colombia 2024). In parallel, Colombia's transition from decades of armed conflict has expanded access to previously restricted territories, creating opportunities for rural development but also heightening the risks of ecosystem exploitation (IUCN 2024). Beyond land-use pressures, Colombia's high reliance on fossil fuels makes its economy particularly vulnerable to climate-change related impacts. The country is the sixth-largest coal exporter worldwide and the largest in Latin America, with regions heavily dependent on mining revenues (World Bank 2025c; Arond and Araújo 2024).

In this context, Colombia has taken the lead in launching several initiatives in the region focused on halting deforestation and finding **synergies between biodiversity and climate targets**. These include **supporting the Tropical Forest Forever Fund** (TFFF) ahead of COP30, which aims to mobilise public and private finance to reward rainforest nations for reducing deforestation and GHG emissions. Colombia has also co-launched the **Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty Initiative**, becoming the first major fossil fuel producer in Latin America to endorse a managed global phase-out (Fossil Fuel Treaty 2023). In addition, Colombia has played a pivotal role in **biodiversity diplomacy** by hosting COP16 on Biodiversity in 2024, where it introduced the world's first biodiversity bonds to fund conservation and restoration projects. Ahead of COP30, Colombia will assume the **presidency of AILAC** (Independent

[32] Battery-electric vehicles and plug-in hybrid vehicles.

Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean, see section 6.1), coordinating the negotiating group's positions and promoting the integration of biodiversity and climate agendas in the negotiations.

Colombia has developed a robust domestic **climate policy framework** that supports national mitigation and adaptation efforts. This framework includes a wide range of components, grouped into regulations, planning, economic and financial instruments, and information systems, as summarised in the country's first BTR (Colombia 2024). Central to this framework are the following: a net zero target (2050) included in the Long-Term Strategy for Carbon Neutrality and Climate Resilience; a Climate Law; and additional economic instruments such as the National Programme of Tradable Quotas for Greenhouse Gas Emissions, a carbon tax and its non-taxation mechanism (which allows companies to avoid paying the tax if they instead buy certified carbon credits from projects that reduce or absorb emissions), and a voluntary carbon market including REDD+ projects (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and the Role of Conservation, Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks). The Climate Law establishes the principal institutional aspects, the instruments through which the regional authorities define measures for financial mechanisms for climate adaptation, and the Comprehensive Territorial Climate Change Management Plans.

In particular, Colombia's voluntary carbon market is significant for mobilising finance to protect the Amazon. However, REDD+ projects in the country face governance and equity challenges that call for stronger safeguards and transparency (GFI 2025).

Colombia submitted a **new NDC** in September 2025 (Colombia 2025). In this NDC, the country set a net GHG emission target for 2035 of between 155 and 161 Mt CO_2eq and, in addition, a black carbon emission target. The GHG emission target corresponds to a reduction of approximately 43% to 45% compared to 2021, the most recent year for which national GHG emission data are available.

5.5. European Union

The European Union and each of its 27 Member States are individual Parties to the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. The obligations of the Paris Agreement, such as the implementation of mitigation actions, the provision of support to developing countries, and the submission of reports, apply to the EU as whole and to each Member State. The EU and its Member States opted to implement a **joint NDC**, as provided by Article 4.16 of the Paris Agreement. The GHG emission reduction target of the EU's NDC applies to the sum of the GHG emissions of all Member States. Progress towards implementing and achieving the joint EU NDC is documented in the Biennial Transparency Report of the EU (European Union 2024c).

With emissions of approximately 3.4 Gt CO_2eq excluding LULUCF (European Union 2024c), the EU is the fourth largest emitter of GHGs worldwide. The LULUCF sector constitutes a net sink of GHG of approximately 0.2 Gt CO_2eq; however, CO_2 removals on forest land have decreased in recent years (EEA 2025a). In 2022, EU institutions and Member States provided approximately EUR 28.5 billion of **public climate finance to developing countries**, which corresponds to 31% of total public climate finance provided from developed to developing countries (Standing Committee on Finance 2024).

Considerable differences exist between EU Member States with regard to the share of renewables in the energy mix, the types of industries, and the GDP per capita (European Union 2024c). In order to account for these differences, individual **climate and energy targets** were agreed for each Member State. The Member States' contributions to reach these targets are documented in national climate and energy plans, and progress is monitored and corrective action taken if needed (European Union 2018). Through this system, the EU and its Member States are aiming to achieve a reduction of net GHG emissions of 55% below 1990 levels by 2030.

The **European Climate Law** (European Union 2021) stipulates that a new GHG emission reduction target will be set for 2040, and that the EU will reach climate neutrality by 2050. The 2040 target is currently being discussed among the European Parliament, Council and Commission. For this target, the European Commission proposed reducing net GHG emissions by 90% compared to 1990 (European Commission 2025c). This proposal took into account the recommendations of the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change (ESABCC). Unlike the EU's 2030 target, the European Commission's proposal for the 2040 target would permit the use of international credits under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement to help achieve it. On 5 November 2025, the Council reached an agreement to set the headline target for cutting emissions to 90% by 2040, composed of a domestic reduction target of 85% with up to 5% reduction through international carbon credits (Council of the EU, 2025b).

The main EU policies for achieving the envisaged GHG emission reductions include the European Union **Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), the Renewable Energy Directive, the Energy Efficiency Directive** and specific policies in transport, industry, waste and other sectors (European Union 2024c). To help reduce the economic impacts of the EU ETS on companies and workers within the EU, and to encourage cleaner production in other countries, a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) has been introduced. This mechanism imposes a price on GHGs emitted during the production of carbon-intensive goods imported into the EU (European Union 2024c).

The European Union's **NDC target for 2030** is a net GHG emission reduction of at least 55% compared to 1990, without contributions from international credits (European Union 2023c). On 18 September 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted a statement of intent (Council of the European Union 2025a), which contains an indicative range for the **2035 NDC target** of net GHG emission reductions between 66.25% and 72.5% compared to 1990. Following the Council decision of 5 November 2025, the EU 2035 NDC target was confirmed as indicated in the statement, between 66.25% and 72.5% compared to 1990, and submitted on the same day. While the European Union still submitted an NDC ahead of COP30, it has been criticised for not completing the process at a time when several other major economies had already done so (e.g. Climate Action Network Europe 2025).

5.6. India

India is the world's most populous country, one of the fastest growing economies and the third largest emitter of GHG emissions with coal representing 75% of its electricity supply (India Energy 2025). It has experienced a rapid growth in power generation capacity from all sources while also **increasing its share of renewables**. It achieved its target of having 50% of its installed power capacity coming from non-fossil fuels in July 2025 (Ministry of New and Renewable Energy 2025). Solar makes up around 50%

of renewable capacity (India Energy 2025). It has reduced the GHG emission intensity of its GDP while lowering poverty rates (India 2024). GHG emissions per capita amount to around 2.6 tonnes per year. Key emitting sectors are energy (>75% of total GHG emissions), and agriculture (14%). Besides renewable energy, India is exploring technologies like green hydrogen and planning to expand its nuclear power capacity (Climate Scorecard 2025; Department of Atomic Energy 2025). Crude oil is an important part of the energy supply, and 85% of it is imported, making energy security a priority (Moda 2025).

India is one of the world's most **climate-vulnerable countries**. It is the world's second-largest producer of wheat and rice and farmers are badly affected by erratic weather. Although adaptation expenditure has increased, adaptive capacity varies across regions. In the climate negotiations, India has played a leading role in representing the Global South, emphasising the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities of Parties and historic debt. This was evident at COP29 where India criticised the adopted NCQG (see section 3.5.1) for failing to address the needs and priorities of developing countries (D'Souza 2024). India has also criticised the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM, see section 5.5), calling it a trade barrier for developing countries (Kumar and Ohri 2024).

India's long-term target is to reach net zero by 2070. India's **National Electricity Plan** (2023–32) sets out to scale renewables to about 68% of capacity by 2032, backed by storage to manage variability. Although coal will remain part of the energy mix, its share is expected to decline. Other important policies include the Long-Term Low-Carbon Development Strategy that outlines actions in various key sectors to achieve the net zero target. The 2022 Green Hydrogen Policy aims to produce 5 million tonnes (Mt) of hydrogen annually by 2030, and the 2023 Agricultural Demand Side Management Program aims to improve energy efficiency in agriculture (New Climate Institute 2025).

In November 2024, discussions on a potential coal-focused Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) ended without a result, as India views coal as important for energy and income generation (Srivastava and Wettengel 2024).

In July 2024, India launched a **carbon credit scheme** for nine energy-intensive sectors, alongside a voluntary programme. In March 2025, the country approved eight crediting methods, including renewables and green hydrogen, marking a shift from its existing energy efficiency scheme (World Bank 2025c). In August 2025, India established a National Designated Authority to oversee carbon trading and align domestic schemes with Article 6 of the Paris Agreement (Mohan 2025).

At the time of writing of this report, India has not submitted a new NDC. Its **updated first NDC** (India 2022) commits to reducing emission intensity of its GDP by 45% by 2030 (from 2005 levels), to achieving a 50% share of installed non-fossil fuel based electricity capacity by 2030 and to creating an additional carbon sink of 2.5-3 billion tonnes of CO_2eq with additional forest cover by 2030. The NDC also aims to promote sustainable lifestyles, enhance investments in adaptation in key sectors and regions, mobilise additional funds from developed countries and build capacities in new technology.

5.7. Japan

Japan continues to use **fossil fuels as a main source of electricity generation**. While the energy mix for electricity generation in the fiscal year 2010 was 29% liquefied natural gas (LNG), 28% coal and 25% nuclear, the respective shares of LNG and coal increased to 34% and 31% in 2022 as a consequence of the earthquake in 2011 and the subsequent shutdown of nuclear power plants (Japan 2024). However, it should be noted that while the share of fossil fuels in electricity generation increased between 2010 and 2022, overall electricity generation decreased by about 10% in the same period, thereby contributing to emission reductions. In 2023 and 2024, the share of hydropower amounted to approximately 8% and other renewable electricity to approximately 15% of total electricity generation. Nuclear accounted for 8% of electricity generation in both years (Energy Institute 2025).

Japan aims to reduce GHG emissions by 60% in 2035 and by 73% in 2040 compared to 2013 levels (Japan 2025). Japan's GHG emissions peaked in 2013, reaching 1,241 Mt CO_2eq including LULUCF. By 2022, GHG emissions had decreased to 981 Mt CO_2eq, which corresponds to a reduction of 21% (Japan 2024). The most important reductions during this period were in energy industries (including public electricity and heat production), amounting to 148 Mt CO_2eq, and in manufacturing industries and construction, amounting to 70 Mt CO_2eq.

Japan has established a **Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM)**, through which it supports climate change mitigation projects in developing countries. These emission reductions are assessed by Japan and its partner countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2025). Japan plans to use contributions from JCM projects to achieve its NDC, in line with Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement.

In order to achieve its climate targets, Japan introduced a '**Plan for Global Warming Countermeasures**' (Japan 2021). This plan includes a variety of 'global warming policies and measures' in several sectors, such as in industry, commercial, residential and transport. For instance, the plan contains a feed-in tariff system for renewable electricity. The plan also includes removal policies, such as those relating to forests and agriculture.

Japan's Biennial Transparency Report (Japan 2024) includes mitigation policies and measures covering the energy, industry, tertiary, residential, transport, agriculture, LULUCF, and waste sectors. A wide range of measures is described, including the promotion of renewable energy and electric vehicles. Cross-cutting measures are also covered, such as the JCM or the 'realization of a hydrogen society'.

Japan submitted its **new NDC in February 2025** (Japan 2025). While the first NDC envisaged reducing GHG emissions by 46% by 2030 compared to 2013, the new NDC increased its **GHG reduction target** to **60% by 2035 compared to 2013** and to **73% by 2040**. The updated NDC includes the use of the JCM and of contributions from measures in developing countries to achieve its NDC. It is envisaged that accumulated emission reductions and removals will reach approximately 100 Mt CO_2 by 2030 and 200 Mt CO_2 by 2040.

5.8. Maldives

The Maldives are a small island state located in the Indian Ocean and grouped into 26 natural atolls. Due to their low elevation — with approximately 80% of the islands lying less than one metre above sea level

— they are extremely **vulnerable to climate change** and its severe consequences, especially sea level rise (MEEW 2007). The country has a warm and humid monsoon climate. Its coral reefs and mangrove ecosystems are crucial for the ecological stability and economic activities, particularly tourism and fishing (Maldives 2024). Due to limited diversification of economic activities and a high import dependency, the country's economy is vulnerable to external shocks. One of the biggest environmental challenges has been solid waste management, given the islands' limited land area. Furthermore, the island state is heavily exposed to extreme and intensifying weather events such as flooding, storm surges, and droughts (Maldives 2025).

The Maldives have prioritised various sectors in which to implement **adaptation measures**. These include enhancing water security through groundwater protection and desalination and reinforcing infrastructure against extreme weather events. In addition, research and conservation efforts are being expanded to help safeguard coral reefs and biodiversity, and sustainable tourism and fisheries are being promoted. Limited financial, land, human, and technical resources have been identified as the main barriers to adaptation (Maldives 2024).

In order to meet its energy demand, the country relies almost entirely on fossil fuels. The Maldives have committed to reducing GHG emissions and developing a sustainable economy targeting their main emission sectors: electricity generation, transport, and waste management (Maldives 2025).

In 2023, President Muizzu announced that the government aimed to increase the share of **renewable energy in electricity** to 33% within five years (The President's Office 2023). Solar photovoltaic (PV) technology is the main renewable energy technology installed in the Maldives. The Maldivian government also encourages private investment in solar PV (Maldives 2024).

In terms of energy efficiency, two national mitigation programmes have been initiated: one programme for replacing old light fixtures with LED lights and one programme for developing comparative energy efficiency labels for products. The mitigation measures in the waste management sector comprise of three waste-to-energy projects located in different parts of the island state (Maldives 2024).

The Maldives submitted a **new NDC in February 2025**. In this NDC, the country states its commitment to reducing its GHG emissions by 1.52 Mt CO_2eq by 2035 below the business-as-usual level of 6.03 Mt CO_2eq (Maldives 2025). The resulting emissions are considerably higher than the current emission levels, which were approximately 2.4 Mt CO_2eq in 2022 (Maldives 2024). The key sectors targeted are electricity generation, transport, and waste management. The NDC emphasises that achieving the mitigation target depends on receiving adequate financial, technology and capacity building support (Maldives 2025).

5.9. Mexico

Mexico is an important **oil producer**. Its production amounted to 1.91 million barrels daily in 2024. Production has remained at a constant level since 2019, and Mexico's share in global oil production amounted to 2.0% in 2024 (Energy Institute 2025). Mexico's oil production roughly corresponds to its domestic oil consumption (1.85 million barrels daily in 2024).

GHG emissions in the energy sector totalled 480 Mt CO_2eq in 2022, accounting for 63% of total GHG emissions excluding LULUCF. Fugitive emissions from oil production totalled 33 Mt CO_2eq in 2022, accounting for 7% of energy sector emissions (Mexico 2024). In Mexico, a relatively high amount of gas needs to be flared per unit of oil produced, leading to CO_2 and methane emissions (World Bank 2025b).

In 2024, energy supply from renewables (including hydro) corresponded to 5% of total energy supply (Energy Institute 2025). The same share in the total North American energy supply,[33] as well as the global share, amounted to 8%. Electricity generation from renewables (including hydro) amounted to 21% in 2024. While installed solar capacity almost doubled from 6.2 GW in 2019 to 12.0 GW in 2024, little progress has been made with regard to wind energy in recent years (from 6.5 GW in 2019 to 7.3GW in 2024). With reference to countries with similar national circumstances such as Chile or Brazil, an analysis by the environmental think tank Ember suggests that an increase of 36 GW of solar energy and of 10 GW wind energy by 2030 would be feasible (Ember 2025).

Mexico's **General Climate Change Law** (Cámara de Diputados del H. Congreso de la Unión 2022) includes general principles and strategies on climate change, requirements regarding the institutional framework and the distribution of competences. Mexico's Biennial Transparency Report (Mexico 2024) includes policies and measures for mitigating climate change in the energy, industry, residential, tertiary, transport, agriculture, LULUCF, and waste sectors. Measures include, inter alia, renewable energy, energy efficiency, public transport, and electric mobility. At COP29, Mexico **pledged to reach zero net emissions by 2050** (Gobierno de México 2024).

At the time of writing of this report, Mexico has not submitted a new NDC. Its **updated first NDC of 2022** (Gobierno de México 2022) includes a 35% reduction of GHG emissions by 2030 compared to a baseline. At least 30% are to be achieved by national means and 5% with international cooperation and finance for clean energies. A conditional target of reducing emissions by 40% by 2030 could be achieved if international finance is increased, including innovation and technology transfer and if other countries, specifically major emitters, make corresponding efforts.

5.10. Nigeria

Nigeria's **oil and gas industry** 'is the main source of government revenue in Nigeria. Over the last five years, the sector has contributed over 60% of government revenue, approximately 10% of the country's GDP and more than 80% of export earnings' (Nigeria 2024b). Nigeria's oil production in 2024 was approximately 1.6 million barrels daily. Nigeria is thus Africa's largest oil producer with a share of 22% (Energy Institute 2025). Total GHG emissions in 2022 amounted to 678 Mt CO_2eq including LULUCF. LULUCF is the largest source sector with net emissions of 226 Mt CO_2eq in 2022, due to deforestation and wood removal for firewood (Nigeria 2024a). The second largest sector after LULUCF is the energy sector, at 200 Mt of CO_2eq in 2022. Fugitive emissions from oil and gas amounted to 25 Mt CO_2eq, which represents 13% of GHG emissions of the energy sector (Nigeria 2024a).

[33] Canada, Mexico, United States.

Nigeria, like many other African countries, is especially **vulnerable to the impacts of climate change**. Since the 1980s, 'there has been a high recurrence of floods and epidemics that can be directly associated with the more intense heavy rainfall episodes and the warmer temperatures respectively' (Nigeria 2021b). According to the Climate Risk Index (CRI) 2025, developed by the NGO Germanwatch, the country ranks 8th worldwide. The index states that 22 million people were affected by climate change in 2022, resulting in a GDP loss of around 0.9% (Germanwatch 2025). Hence, the adaptation to the adverse impacts of climate change is a key priority for Nigeria. Related actions include the diversification of livestock and crops, integrated water resource management and community-based forest resources management (Nigeria 2024b).

The policy commitments included in Nigeria's first NDC refer to eliminating kerosene lighting by 2030, increasing bus rapid transit, halving crop residue burning by 2030, and implementing forest programmes (Nigeria 2021b). Furthermore, with support from different donors, further assessments and analyses of climate policies were carried out. Conditional mitigation measures are included in the NDC, such as 30% on-grid electricity from renewables, or zero gas flaring by 2030.

In addition, a National Climate Policy for Nigeria 2021-2030 was prepared (Nigeria 2021a). The same includes policy measures in different sectors, such as AFOLU, energy, industry, oil and gas, transport, and waste. Nigeria's Biennial Transparency Report (Nigeria 2024b) provides information on mitigation policies and measures, covering, inter alia, description, objective, type of instrument, status, and sectors affected. Important policies include renewable electricity, energy efficiency, public transport, aeration of rice paddy fields, afforestation and reforestation.

Nigeria submitted its **new NDC in September 2025** (Nigeria 2025), which includes an emission reduction target of approximately 32% below 2018 levels by 2035. With this NDC, Nigeria moved from a target relative to BAU to an absolute economy-wide emission reduction target. Of the targeted emission reduction, 20% is unconditional, while **80% depends on international support**. According to Nigeria's NDC, natural gas will continue to play an important role in its energy mix.

5.11. Philippines

The Philippines are among the most **vulnerable countries to climate change** due to their location in the tropical monsoon region. According to the Germanwatch 2025 Climate Risk Index, they were the 10th most affected country by climate change between 1993 and 2022. The Philippines are actively engaged in the Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF 2025), a South-South cooperation platform of countries highly vulnerable to climate change.

In 2020, the energy sector was responsible for about 36% of the GHG emissions in the Philippines, followed by the agricultural sector (19%), other land use (16%), transport and waste (each about 10%) and IPPU (6%), while the forest sector was a sink in 2020 (Philippines 2025). In 2023**, coal accounted for 62% of all electricity generated in the Philippines** – a share higher than in other countries in the region such as China and Indonesia. The average age of coal-fired power plants in the Philippines is just about 13 years (The Philippines Department of Energy 2025a; 2025b; 2025c), suggesting that many of the coal-fired power plants would have to be retired before the end of their economic lifetime to effectively mitigate GHG emissions. In 2021, around 87% of the coal used in the Philippines was

imported (ICSC 2024), creating energy security issues due to their reliance on other countries for coal supply.

In December 2020, the Philippines was the first country in Southeast Asia to announce a **moratorium on the construction of new coal-fired power plants** (The Philippines Department of Energy 2020). The country also signed the coal exit pledge at COP26 in Glasgow. It recently developed the Philippines Accelerating Coal Transition Investment Plan through which it will receive USD 500 million from the Climate Investment Funds, a partnership of multilateral development banks, to bring forward the retirement of 900 Megawatt (MW) of existing coal generation capacity to 2027 and to add 1,500 MW of renewable energy capacity (CIFs 2024).

The **Philippine Energy Plan** 2023-2050 aims to increase the share of renewable energy in the power mix from 21% in 2020 to 35% by 2030 and 50% by 2040. It also aims to establish 4,800 MW of nuclear capacity by 2050 (The Philippines Department of Energy 2023). Policies that support the expansion of renewable energy include a Green Energy Auction Programme and an offshore wind roadmap developed with the support of the World Bank (World Bank 2022b). The Energy Efficiency and Conservation Programme has been introduced in 2019 and aims to achieve energy savings in liquid fuels and electricity across in the transport, industry and agriculture sectors. Additional mitigation measures include regulations for refrigerants and the introduction of waste digesters with methane capture (Philippines 2025).

At the time of writing of this report, the Philippines have not submitted a new NDC. The **update of their first NDC in 2021** (The Philippines 2021) contains a target to reduce GHG emissions by 75% below a cumulative business-as-usual pathway for 2020-2030. Around 2.7% of this target is unconditional, while the rest is conditional upon receiving international support. As the unconditional target only constitutes a small reduction compared to business as usual, it would allow the country to exceed the emissions projected under current policies (CAT 2025b). This means that the Philippines would meet this target without taking further action. Conversely, the conditional target represents a substantial reduction in emissions compared to historical levels (CAT 2025b).

5.12. Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is the world's second-largest oil producer after the United States and the **largest oil exporter** (Energy Institute 2025). The energy sector makes up approximately 81% of total GHG emissions, and per-capita GHG emissions are among the highest worldwide, alongside other major oil and gas producers such as the United States or the United Arab Emirates (see Table **7**). As an economy centred on fossil fuel production, Saudi Arabia has played an active role in climate change negotiations from the outset, highlighting the potential impact of mitigation measures on oil- and gas-producing countries' economies.

Saudi Arabia sends large delegations to climate change conferences and often **speaks on behalf of the Arab Group**. At recent conferences in particular, Saudi Arabia has opposed wording that calls for ambitious mitigation action. During the negotiations on the mitigation work programme at COP29, Saudi Arabia did not support references to a transition away from fossil fuels, a wording which had been

agreed a year earlier under the Global Stocktake (Ramdani 2024). At COP29, Saudi Arabia also opposed progressive wording relating to human rights and diversity under the work programme on gender (IISD 2024).

Saudi Arabia's climate policies are guided by the '**Saudi Vision 2030**', a strategy launched in 2016 with the aim of diversifying the country's economy (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 2024; Saudi Arabia 2021). Climate change mitigation is framed as a co-benefit of Saudi Arabia's adaptation actions and its economic diversification plans. Initiatives with mitigation co-benefits range from developing climate-resilient infrastructure to carbon capture and use or storage, energy efficiency and renewable energy projects.

As an arid country with limited water resources, Saudi Arabia recognises the need to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change. Its adaptation actions include integrated water and coastal zone management planning, and early warning systems for extreme weather events (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 2024).

At the time of writing of this report, Saudi Arabia has not submitted a new NDC. In its **updated NDC**, Saudi Arabia commits to implementing actions that aim at reducing GHG emissions by 278 Mt CO_2eq by 2030, compared to a BAU scenario.

5.13. South Africa

South Africa is an emerging economy and has the largest overall GDP in Africa. With a GDP per capita of approximately USD 15,500 in 2024 (World Bank 2025a), it is characterised as an upper-middle-income economy. South Africa is ranked in the top 20 among the highest global emitters, with emissions per capita comparable to those of developed countries because of a high dependency on fossil fuels. **Electricity is mainly generated from coal**, which makes up approximately 70% of South Africa's primary energy supply (South Africa 2024a). South Africa's GHG emission sources are highly concentrated, with a small number of entities responsible for over 60% of national emissions (DFFE 2024).

South Africa traditionally plays a strong role in the UNFCCC negotiations as an important regional actor and convener of different negotiating blocks. In the past, South African negotiators have spearheaded work on issues such as loss and damage, Article 6 and the Global Stocktake.

In 2024, South Africa enacted a **Climate Change Bill,** which articulates key elements in the country's overall approach to climate change mitigation and adaptation (South Africa 2024b). It builds on and further advances the National Climate Change Response Policy of 2011 and defines meeting the NDC as the objective of all mitigation actions in the country. The bill provides a foundation to two regulatory-based climate policies: Sectoral Emission Reduction Targets (SETs) and carbon budgets. SETs provide quantitative targets for GHG emission reduction in key economic sectors over rolling five-year periods.

SETs aim to help South Africa by driving mitigation efforts required to deliver its NDC in the following sectors: agriculture, industry, energy, mining, human settlements, transport, and environment. Under the draft SET, the electricity sector as the key emitter is expected to reduce GHG emissions by 71 Mt CO_2eq compared to 2022 levels, which were 196 Mt CO_2eq (DFFE 2024). As an additional

quantity-based instrument, carbon budgets will set maximum GHG emission levels for individual entities over five-year periods. The Climate Change Bill provides a direct link to the country's main carbon pricing instrument: the carbon tax. Non-compliance with carbon budgets will result in a penalty in the form of a punitively high carbon tax rate levied on emissions exceeding the company's carbon budget. As part of the carbon tax policy package, South Africa has allowed entities to offset their emissions in sectors that are not currently covered by the carbon tax, e.g. AFOLU or waste (National Treasury of South Africa 2024). The offset scheme is built on the basis of voluntary carbon markets and is expected to spur investments in domestic carbon offset projects.

Delivery of the ambitious climate change mitigation targets will require extensive transformation of the South African economy. The **Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP)** was agreed between South Africa and several developed countries as a climate financing mechanism to support South Africa's just transition to a low carbon and climate resilient economy and society, mobilising an initial USD 8.5 billion over the next three to five years in the form of grants and concessional debt finance (Presidential Climate Commission 2025). The South African government developed a Just Energy Transition Investment Plan as a key planning document, which outlines the key priority investment areas, as well as the key actions for the energy transition. Key priority investment areas are the following: electricity sector transition, new energy vehicles, green hydrogen, skills development and municipal capacity. The electricity sector in particular is a major focus – almost 50% of investment needs are in this sector (Presidency of the Republic of South Africa 2022).

At the time of writing of this report, South Africa has not submitted a new NDC. In its **updated NDC** of 2021, it commits to achieving a range of greenhouse gas emissions levels of 398-510 Mt CO_2eq by 2025, and 350-420 Mt CO_2eq by 2030. The aim is to align these targets with reduction objectives in the Climate Change Bill. The country has set the goal of reaching net zero emissions by 2050 in its Low-Emission Development Strategy, which was submitted in 2020.

5.14. Uganda

The Republic of Uganda is classified as a least developed country, with a GDP per capita of approximately USD 1,146 in 2024 (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2023). Over 70% of the population is employed in the **agricultural sector**. From 1995 to 2019, the total GHG emissions increased by about 2.5 times. The largest emitter is the AFOLU sector at 76%, followed by the waste and energy sectors (Uganda 2025).

Uganda is a landlocked country that is largely situated on a plateau in East Africa. Its diverse topography includes mountains, river basins and rain forests. In 1990, natural forest covered 24% of Uganda's land area. Due to conversion from forest to agricultural land, this area was reduced to 10% in 2015 (Ministry of Water and Environment, Uganda 2018). Currently, woodlands and forest plantations dominate the share of forested area. Energy consumption is dominated by biomass, mainly firewood followed by charcoal and crop residues, amounting to about 90% of total primary energy consumption. The main electricity source is hydropower (Uganda 2025).

In 2006, crude oil was first discovered by drilling in the area of Lake Albert. Fifteen years later, the French oil and gas company Total signed an agreement with Uganda and Tanzania to start building the

East African crude oil export pipeline (EACOP). This pipeline has a length of almost 1,500 km from Uganda's Lake Albert oilfields to the port of Tanga on the Indian Ocean in Tanzania. From there, the oil is planned to be sold onwards to world markets (East African Crude Oil Pipeline 2025). Building the EACOP through Uganda and Tanzania is very controversial for its impacts on the local environment and people living along the planned route, and there have been several protests in Uganda (Abaho 9 Jun 2025). In 2022, the European Parliament raised concerns about human rights violations linked to the project (European Parliament 2022).

Uganda had issued about 33 million **carbon credits** by 2023 (Uganda 2025). It is one of the most active countries in international carbon markets. The majority of credits were issued through compliance under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) accounting for 70% of the total. The next largest proportion was issued under Voluntary Carbon Market (VCM) standards. Most of the projects implemented between 2010 and 2023 were carried out in the AFOLU sector, followed by renewable energy projects, particularly implementing small hydropower projects (Uganda 2025).

Uganda developed a REDD+ strategy and recently submitted a REDD+ Technical Annex to qualify for Green Climate Fund results-based payments (Uganda 2025).

At the time of writing of this report, Uganda has not submitted a new NDC. In its **2022 NDC**, the country set an economy-wide mitigation target of reducing emissions by 24.7% below the BAU scenario by 2030 (Uganda 2022).

5.15. United Arab Emirates

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) had an **oil production** of approximately 4 million barrels daily in 2024. This corresponds to 13.3% of total oil production in the Middle East and of 4.1% of world production (Energy Institute 2025). Over the last ten years, oil production has been fairly stable. The UAE ranks sixth in the world in term of oil reserves. Their oil reserves amounted to 113 billion barrels in 2024 (WorldAtlas 2025). Based on 2024 production, this corresponds to 77 years of potential oil production. The UAE is also an important gas producer, but production volumes are lower than those of several other countries in the region (Iran, Qatar and Saudi Arabia) (Energy Institute 2025).

In the first 9 months of 2024, non-oil activities in real GDP accounted for approximately 75%, while oil-related activities contributed 25% (Economy Middle East 2025). Crupi and Schilirò (2023) find that the share of non-oil GDP rose steadily from 67% in 2012 to 73% in 2021. The authors conclude that in promoting 'a knowledge-based economy, encouraging entrepreneurship, and investing in strategic sectors, the country is effectively trying to decrease its reliance on oil revenues while nurturing a dynamic and resilient economy, with the ambitious goal of becoming a key player in the emerging industries of the future'. Important **sectors for diversification** include tourism, real estate, industry, construction and transport (UAE 2024). A further potential field for diversification is the production of low-carbon hydrogen. A National Hydrogen Strategy is available (UAE 2023), which aims to make the UAE a leading global producer of low-carbon hydrogen by 2031. However, it should be noted that this hydrogen would be produced, inter alia, from fossil gas using CCS, and hence would only be an intermediate step towards decarbonisation.

The UAE's NDC (UAE 2024) describes various climate policies in several sectors such as power and water, industry, transport, waste, buildings and agriculture. Policies include increasing **renewable capacity** from 3.7 GW at present to 19.8 GW in 2030, constructing a concentrated solar power plant (inaugurated), using **hydrogen and CCUS** in iron and steel production, a national policy for electric vehicles, and installing solar thermal and efficient cooling systems in buildings. **Negative emissions** are also part of UAE's climate policies. These comprise mangrove afforestation, DAC and CCS/CCUS.

The UAE was the first Party that submitted, in November 2024, a **new NDC** with a target for 2035. This NDC (UAE 2024) includes a target of reducing net GHG emissions (including LULUCF) by 47% by 2035 compared to the level of 2019.

5.16. United States

The United States is the second largest emitter of greenhouse gases after China, accounting for approximately 12% of global GHG emissions excluding LULUCF (Climate Watch 2025). While coal production and use has decreased in recent years, the United States has been the **largest producer of both oil and natural gas** since 2017 (Energy Institute 2025).

Following Donald Trump's inauguration as president in January 2025, the direction of US climate policy changed fundamentally. On his first day in office, the president ordered the **withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement** (Executive Office of the President 2025). This withdrawal was documented as a depository notification of the UN Secretary-General (United Nations 2025d). Pursuant to Article 28 of the Paris Agreement, withdrawal will take effect one year after receipt of the notification, i.e. on 27 January 2026. Hence, the United States is currently still a Party to the Paris Agreement and to the UNFCCC.

When the United States withdrew from the Paris Agreement under the first Trump administration (2017–2021), its delegates still actively participated in the negotiations in order to represent US interests in areas such as mitigation and finance. However, in the session of the subsidiary bodies under the UNFCCC held in Bonn in June 2025, no US government representative was present (UNFCCC 2025w). The U.S. delegation will also not participate in COP30 in November 2025 (Volcovici, 2025). On a related topic, in October 2025, President Trump publicly criticised the Net Zero Framework under the IMO (see section 4.1.2), which contributed to the postponement of its adoption by one year (Hand 2025).

In terms of domestic climate action, many climate policies introduced during previous administrations are now being dismantled. As an example, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is in the process of **rolling back regulations relating to oil and gas development, electricity generation and vehicle emission standards**, among others. In August 2025, the EPA published its proposed reconsideration of GHG-related rules (EPA 2025). Importantly, the proposed changes would also rescind the EPA's finding of 2009 that greenhouse gases endanger public health and can therefore be regulated under the Clean Air Act.

In recent years, Congress had introduced federal funding for climate action in the form of grants and tax credits in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and the Inflation Reduction Act. However, in July 2025,

Congress rescinded such funds for climate research, corporate climate action and forest resilience, among others (119th Congress 2025).

On an international level, the **withdrawal of support from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)** and other federal agencies resulted in the termination of mitigation and adaptation measures in many developing countries. The withdrawal of a key economy from the Paris Agreement also poses the risk of other countries following suit or reducing the ambition of their climate policies. However, at the time or writing this report, no other Party to the Paris Agreement has announced a withdrawal.

In December 2024, the outgoing Biden administration communicated a **new NDC** which contained a GHG emission reduction target of 61% to 66% below 2005 levels by 2035 (United States of America 2024). This target was expected to be achievable through a combination of federal and state actions. However, as the United States is in the process of withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, this NDC will become obsolete. Should a future administration decide to rejoin the Agreement, a new NDC would need to be communicated. This occurred in 2021 when the United States accepted the Paris Agreement and communicated a new version of its first NDC (United States of America 2021).

6. STAKEHOLDERS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS

In the climate negotiations, a distinction has to be made between Parties and non-Party stakeholders. The **Parties** comprise the 197 countries that have ratified the UNFCCC plus the European Union. The European Union is known as a 'regional economic integration organisation' under the UNFCCC, and it has ratified the Convention and Paris Agreement.

In the preparation for and during the negotiation sessions, most Parties organise themselves in **negotiating groups**. These comprise countries with similar national circumstances and priorities. During the negotiations, a delegate from one country speaks on behalf of the group, an approach which reduces the number of interventions and the number of different positions that have to be reconciled in the negotiation room.

While only Parties participate in the negotiations, representatives of **non-Party-stakeholders** such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) play an important role by observing the negotiations, speaking at the opening and closing plenaries and at events, and by informing the public about progress in the negotiations.

This chapter provides an overview of the groups of Parties and of the non-Party stakeholders.

6.1. Groups of Parties

Most groups of Parties represent developing countries. This is due to the fact that developing countries represent approximately three quarters of all Parties, and that many developing countries are members of several groups.

The group of **G77 and China** is the largest association of Parties. The G77 group was founded in 1964 to represent the interests of developing countries and today has 134 Member States (G-77 2025). At the climate negotiations, the G77 coordinate together with China to represent the position of developing countries. However, most members of this group are also members of regional negotiating groups, as described below.

The **Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean** (Asociación Independiente de Latinoamérica y el Caribe – **AILAC**) comprises Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama and Peru. These countries can be characterised as progressive developing countries, calling for ambitious mitigation actions and transparency, alongside adaptation and support. At COP30, AILAC can be expected to emphasise, among others, the importance of multilateralism, human rights and gender-responsive action – topics which the group also raised at the previous conference (IISD 2024).

The **African Group of Negotiators (AGN)** represents the 54 African countries. The group's focus is on adapting to the adverse impacts of climate change and on averting, minimising and addressing loss and damage. As an association of low- and middle-income countries, the group calls for financial, technology and capacity building support from developed countries.

The **Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America** (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América – **ALBA**) comprises several Latin American and Caribbean countries with left-of-centre governments. Its representatives emphasise the importance of common but differentiated

responsibilities between developed and developing countries, and they are proponents of concepts such as climate justice and non-marked approaches. While ALBA has been less active in the negotiations in recent years, it can be expected to play a more important role at COP30, because the conference takes place in the region, and ALBA shares priorities with the COP presidency, for instance the promotion of the role of indigenous peoples.

The **Arab Group** represents 22 countries from Northern Africa and the Middle East. As many of its members are fossil fuel producers, one of its priorities is addressing the economic and social impacts of the implementation of response measures (see Box **1**).

The **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)** brings together small island and low-lying coastal developing states (AOSIS 2025). These countries are particularly at risk of impacts from sea level rise and extreme weather events. Hence, the group calls for ambitious mitigation action to limit the increase of global temperatures, and it focuses on averting, minimising and addressing loss and damage associated with climate change impacts.

The **Grupo Sur** consists of the South American countries Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Agriculture plays an important role in their economies, and the land use sector is of particular interest to them. It can be expected that Brazil, as the COP30 presidency, will not speak on behalf of the group but will rather guide the negotiations, for example by chairing negotiations on critical issues. Under this constellation, Brazil will shape the overall outcome of the conference, while the role of Grupo Sur may be smaller than at other recent COPs.

The **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)** comprise several large developing countries, including Bangladesh, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Vietnam. Many of them have emerging economies with rising greenhouse gas emissions. They stress, among other things, the historic responsibility of developed countries that emitted a large part of the greenhouse gases which are still in the atmosphere today.

The **Least Developed Countries (LDCs)** is a category of countries under the United Nations which are highly vulnerable to economic and environmental shocks. Currently, 44 countries are categorised as LDCs (Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2025), and they speak as a group in the climate negotiations. Their focus is on adaptation, loss and damage, and financial, technology and capacity building support.

The **Environmental Integrity Group (EIG)** plays a bridging role in many negotiating rooms because it brings together emerging economies (Georgia, Mexico, and the Republic of Korea) and developed countries (Liechtenstein, Monaco and Switzerland). The EIG highlights the importance of science in addressing climate change. It regularly criticises the unspecific language found in SBSTA conclusions when it comes to the work of the IPCC or the WMO, most recently at the subsidiary bodies' session in Bonn in June 2025 (IISD 2025b). The **European Union** is the largest association of developed countries, and in the climate negotiations it acts in a similar way as a negotiation group. Representatives of EU Member States coordinate their positions, and one representative speaks for the EU as a whole. Priorities of the EU include ambitious mitigation actions and transparency.

Many other developed countries are associated in the **Umbrella Group**, which comprises Australia, Canada, Japan, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom, among others. As historically large emitters of GHG, their aim is to reduce domestic GHG emissions and they also call on major emerging countries to contribute the climate change mitigation. The Umbrella group does not coordinate as closely as other groups, and several of its members speak in the negotiations. Up to 2024, the United States was a very active member of the group and spoke in most negotiation rooms. With its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, other members of the group will have to fill the gap left by the United States to make the position of the group heard in all negotiation rooms.

Important **countries without a group affiliation** include Türkiye, which is an OECD member but sees itself as a developing country, and the Russian Federation, which was associated with the Umbrella Group until 2022. Members of the Umbrella Group ceased coordinating with the Russian Federation following the latter's invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

6.2. Non-Party stakeholders

The UNFCCC process distinguishes between the following groups of non-Party stakeholders:

- The United Nations system and its specialised agencies;
- intergovernmental organisations (IGOs); and
- non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

The NGOs are organised into nine constituencies, as depicted in Figure **7**. Additional NGOs outside these constituencies include faith-based organisations; education, communication and outreach stakeholders; and parliamentarians.

Figure 7: Non-Party stakeholders: number of admitted organisations



Notes: The figure shows the total number of admitted organisations. Not all organisations participate in every COP. The nine NGO constituencies are shown in dark blue. United Nations agencies and intergovernmental organisations are shown in red. LGMA: Local Governments and Municipal Authorities; TUNGO: Trade Union NGOs.

Source: UN – Designated contact points, https://unfccc.int/documents/645801; admitted IGOs, https://unfccc.int/process/parties-non-party-stakeholders/non-party-stakeholders/admitted-igos/list-of-admitted-igos; admitted NGOs, https://unfccc.int/process/parties-non-party-stakeholders/non-party-stakeholders/admitted-ngos/list-of-admitted-ngos.

In the following, an overview of the UN agencies, IGOs and NGOs is provided.

6.2.1. United Nations system and its specialised agencies

In the climate negotiations, the United Nations system is represented by delegates of various organisations such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) or the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (UNFCCC 2025ab). Relevant UN specialised agencies include ICAO and IMO (see section 4.1) as well as the IPCC, among others.

Box 4: The seventh assessment cycle of the IPCC

The **Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)** is the United Nations body that assesses the science relating to climate change. Its main products, the **assessment reports**, provide comprehensive information on:

- the physical science basis of climate change;
- mitigation of climate change; and
- impacts, adaptation and vulnerability.

The assessment reports are developed during a multi-year process. The Sixth Assessment Report cycle was completed in 2023, ahead of the first Global Stocktake.

At the 62nd meeting of the IPCC held in Hangzhou, China, in February-March 2025, delegates agreed on the **outlines of the three working group contributions to the Seventh Assessment Report**, i.e. the distinct parts comprising (1) physical science, (2) mitigation and (3) adaptation. However, delegates were unable to agree on the implementation plan for the Seventh Assessment Report, which means that the timeline for completion of the various contributions is still open. The synthesis report, which summarises the contributions of the three working groups, is scheduled to be published in the second half of 2029. Hence, unlike for the first Global Stocktake, there will be no new IPCC synthesis report available in time for the second Global Stocktake.

From 27 to 30 October 2025, the IPCC met for its 63rd session in Lima, Peru, to continue its discussion on the implementation plan for the Seventh Assessment Report.

Source: IPPC, https://www.ipcc.ch/about/; IPCC (2023); IISD (2025c).

6.2.2. Intergovernmental organisations

IGOs comprise a **wide range of organisations with an interest in climate change issues**, from multilateral development banks to the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (UNFCCC 2025b). Many intergovernmental organisations have a regional focus, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) or the Pacific Island Development Forum, to give two examples.

6.2.3. Non-governmental organisations

This section provides an overview of the NGOs participating in climate change conferences.

Environmental NGOs (ENGO) are a critical voice in the international climate change process, calling on Parties to increase their ambition and informing the public about the status of the negotiations. Most environmental NGOs are members of Climate Action Network (CAN 2025), which plays a coordinating role before and during the climate change conferences. Over 1,900 NGOs in 130 countries are CAN members. During each COP, CAN publishes the daily 'Eco' newsletter with background and comments on the status of the negotiations.

For **business and industry NGOs (BINGO)** the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) acts as the focal point under the UNFCCC (ICC 2025a). In June 2025, the ICC published the 'ICC Principles for Sustainable Trade and Trade Finance,' with the aim of directing trade capital toward activities that advance environmental and social goals, while preventing green- or social-washing (ICC 2025b).

Local governments and municipal authorities (LGMA) are coordinated by the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI). ICLEI brings together more than 2,500 local and regional governments which are active in the area of sustainable development. The ICLEI's activities are organised along five pathways towards sustainable urban development, namely the zero-emission, nature-based, equitable, resilient and circular development pathways (ICLEI 2025). One of the activities with ICLEI involvement is the Compact of Mayors, an agreement by city networks and their members to reduce GHG emissions at city level and to adapt to a changing climate.

In the United States, many state governments and civil society representatives continue to promote climate action, in a similar way as they did under the first Trump administration. Under the 'America is all in' initiative, the governors of California and Illinois, among others, aim to fulfil the obligations of the Paris Agreement, despite the United States' withdrawal (America is all in 2025).

Indigenous peoples organisations (IPOs) are coordinated by the International Indigenous Peoples' Forum on Climate Change (IIPFCC 2025). The presidency of COP30 plans to amplify the voices of Indigenous peoples, to deepen recognition of Indigenous groups and to integrate their traditional knowledge (Corrêa do Lago 2025).

Research and independent NGOs (RINGOs) are key in analysing the state of climate change and in developing solutions for mitigation and adaptation. For researchers, the COP serves as an opportunity to exchange with peers and to make their findings known to a wide audience.

Trade union NGOs (TUNGOs) are coordinated by the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). A focus of trade union NGOs is to promote a just transition of the workforce during the industrial transformation needed to decarbonise the economy (ITUC 2025).

Women and gender NGOs play a key role in highlighting the effects of climate change on women and in promoting their participation in climate action. These NGOs follow, in particular, the activities under the Gender Action plan (see chapter 3.10.2)

The **Youth NGOs (YOUNGOs)** constituency brings together children and youth organisations as well as individuals engaging in climate action. Ahead of each COP, YOUNGO members meet in a Conference of Youth (COY), usually in the same city as the COP (YOUNGO 2025). Youth representatives make their voice heard, inter alia, in statements during the opening and closing plenaries of the COP and its main bodies.

Farmers are a group that is particularly affected by the adverse effects of climate change. Their constituency played an important role in the establishment and development of the 'joint work on implementation of climate action on agriculture and food security' (see chapter 3.10.3).

Not all NGOs are affiliated to one of the nine constituencies listed here. Other groups which are not organised in a constituency but nevertheless have an important role as non-Party Stakeholders include faith-based organisations; education, communication and outreach stakeholders; and parliamentarians. Members of the latter group participate in the climate change conferences as country delegates, but do not speak for their government in the negotiations.

7. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK

The COP Presidency brought the conference to the Amazon this year to highlight the **importance of tropical rainforests** in the global climate system and the links between climate change and biodiversity loss. One of Brazil's initiatives in this area is the 'Tropical Forests Forever Fund' (TFFF), under which countries will receive payments for conserving areas of tropical and subtropical forests (COP30 Brasil 2025g).

However, the selection of Belém as the host city has also created challenges, such as the limited and high-priced accommodation options, which make participation difficult for representatives from many developing countries and many NGOs (Abnett 2025).

Since the rules for implementing the Paris Agreement were agreed at previous conferences, COP30 will focus on the status of implementation of the agreement, and on how to address existing gaps in the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions, the adaptation to climate change, and the provision of support to developing countries.

7.1. Mitigation: addressing the ambition gap

The recently submitted NDCs will be a key subject of discussions at the conference in Belém, although there is not yet any formal agenda item that addresses them. NDCs are expected to be addressed in opening statements, in mandated and side events, and in negotiations relating to mitigation and support. Besides the NDCs of individual Parties, the **collective impact of all NDCs** will be of key importance.

The NDC synthesis report of the UNFCCC Secretariat[34], which was published in October 2025, provides an estimate of global GHG emissions in 2035 resulting from the implementation of the new NDCs, but could only be based on a limited number of NDCs (64) submitted by 30 September 2025. As there is still a large gap between global emissions resulting from current NDCs up to 2030 and scenarios that would limit global warming to 1.5 °C or 2 °C (UNFCCC 2024e), it can be expected that there will also be a large gap based on the new NDCs for 2035.

Hence, the NDC synthesis report shows that the mitigation ambition put forward by Parties in their NDCs is **not sufficient to meet the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement**. The main avenue of reducing this ambition gap will be the update of NDCs, which is possible at any time. Alongside the target headline, important aspects to consider in NDCs will be whether developing countries have moved towards setting economy-wide targets for reducing GHG emissions, which are key to lowering global GHG emissions, and whether their targets are conditional on receiving support. How to address this ambition gap by increasing the ambition in the years to come will be a key topic at COP30, regardless of whether it is formally added to the agenda. Looking beyond the COP, civil society – encompassing environmental NGOs, researchers, businesses, and others – will play an important role in proposing solutions to reduce the ambition gap in current NDCs.

[34] NDC synthesis reports are published on the NDC webpage: UNFCCC (2025p), Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), available at https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/nationally-determined-contributions-ndcs.

7.2. Adaptation: addressing the information gap

As the adaptation to the adverse impacts of climate change varies from country to country, measuring collective progress towards the Global Goal on Adaptation is challenging. Although a wide range of information on adaptation actions is available, this information is not easily comparable across countries.

The **UAE-Belém work programme on the development of indicators**, which is expected to be concluded at COP30, will provide a set of indicators which will help tracking progress towards the Global Goal on Adaptation. Still, it will remain a challenge to collect and report information that is comparable across countries, and above all, to implement the adaptation actions needed to respond to a changing climate in a timely manner.

7.3. Support: addressing the finance gap

At COP30, some developing countries are expected to voice their continued disappointment with the **goal of delivering at least USD 300 billion per year by 2035 for developing country Parties for climate action** agreed under the NCQG in the previous year, given that this goal only covers a fraction of the overall climate-related finance needs of developing countries. The United States' withdrawal from the Paris Agreement makes it even more difficult to increase public financial support.

To achieve the NCQG, it will be important that other developed countries increase their contributions and that more countries make contributions to achieve this goal. In addition, all countries need to explore new flows of climate finance, including private investment, and the redirection of subsidies towards climate-friendly activities. This would bring the Parties closer to the goal of the Paris Agreement of making finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate-resilient development. Important input on how to address the gap in climate finance will come from the report of the COP29 and COP30 presidencies under the '**Baku to Belem Roadmap to 1.3T,'** which is scheduled to be published by the end of October 2025[35], and which will be presented at a high-level event during the COP.

7.4. Other challenges at COP30

When the Paris Agreement was adopted in 2015, it was seen as a positive example of multilateral collaboration. However, at a time of global economic and political uncertainties, **multilateralism** is being put to the test. While some Parties have submitted ambitious NDCs, others have submitted targets that make achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement increasingly difficult. Many have also failed to submit new NDCs in time for the COP. This situation may make it more challenging for the COP Presidency to generate momentum and to achieve ambitious outcomes on the various topics negotiated at the COP.

[35] The roadmap is expected to be published on the 'Baku to Belém Roadmap' webpage: UNFCCC (2025e), Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T, available at https://unfccc.int/topics/climate-finance/workstreams/baku-to-belem-roadmap-to-13t.

The withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement poses the risk of others decreasing their ambition as well. In this situation, it is crucial that COP30 maintains the resolve of all participating Parties to continue their commitment to the Paris Agreement and its implementation.

Box 5: Decision on the host country of COP31

The COP presidency rotates between the five regional groups of the United Nations: African States; Asia-Pacific States; Eastern European States; Latin American and the Caribbean States; and Western European and other States. The latter group is responsible for deciding the presidency and host of COP31, which is scheduled for November 2026.

Both **Australia and Türkiye** have bid to host COP31, and the decision on the COP presidency must be made by consensus among the members of the regional group. Australia has proposed holding the COP in Adelaide and stated that it would partner with Pacific nations. Türkiye has proposed holding the conference in Antalya. It highlights its central geographic location between Europe, Asia and Africa and that it is not a major exporter of fossil fuels. The decision on the presidency and host country is expected to be made during the COP in Belém at the latest.

Source: Albanese will need to resolve the standoff with Turkey if Australia is to host Cop31, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2025/jun/28/albanese-will-need-to-resolve-the-standoff-with-turkey-if-australia-is-to-host-cop31.

7.5. Outlook

No major milestones are scheduled in the overall climate process during 2026. Towards the end of that year, Parties will submit their **second biennial transparency reports**, which are due in December. These reports will provide new information on the Parties' progress towards their NDC targets for 2030, and new data on GHG emissions, and on support provided to developing countries. These reports will serve as one of the inputs to the **second Global Stocktake**. The 'collection of inputs' phase of the second Global Stocktake is expected to begin towards the end of 2026, followed by the technical assessment phase in 2027. The process will conclude with the consideration of the outputs in 2028.

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This study provides an overview of the status of international climate negotiations ahead of the climate change conference in Belém, Brazil, from 10 to 21 November 2025. It covers the key topics under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement, namely the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions, the adaptation to the impacts of climate change, and the support to developing countries. The study also discusses the climate policies of key Parties, the positions of negotiating groups and the role of non-Party stakeholders.

This document was provided by the Policy Department for Transformation, Innovation and Health at the request of the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety (ENVI).

PE 778.579
IP/A/ENVI/2025-01

Print ISBN 978-92-848-3128-9 | doi:10.2861/2463450 | QA-01-25-244-EN-C
PDF ISBN 978-92-848-3127-2 | doi:10.2861/6256232 | QA-01-25-244-EN-N