Making EU Foreign Policy more effective, consistent and democratic: options and variables for the European External Action Service
Abstract:
At this moment, the preparatory measures for the EEAS have been put on hold. However, the need for a more coherent and consistent EU foreign policy persists. This paper proposes some pragmatic reforms on the basis of the existing treaties and related secondary law. They include informal measures for streamlining the day-to-day business of European foreign policy, instruments for making established EU foreign policy structures more effective, improvements of consular arrangements, the development of common training structures and practical cooperation in the field of diplomacy between member states. The paper also addresses different scenarios under the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty.
This note was requested by: The European Parliament's Committee on Constitutional Affairs

This paper is published in the following languages: EN.

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Manuscript completed in September 2008

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Contents

Making EU Foreign Policy more effective, consistent and democratic - Options and variables for the European External Action Service .................................................................1

Hidden agendas and vague outlines for the EEAS..............................................................................7

Cagey actors searching to act behind the scenes ..............................................................................7

Focussing the debate..............................................................................................................................8

Immediate tasks ......................................................................................................................................10

A gradualist approach for the EEAS’s establishment .......................................................................11

Let’s start.............................................................................................................................................12

Between Nice and Lisbonbis ..............................................................................................................13
The Lisbon Treaty provides for the establishment of a European External Action Service (EEAS), which may have tremendous potential for making European foreign policy both more consistent and more effective. Moreover, both the creation and the operationalisation of the EEAS do not encounter major problems with regard to the overall system’s efficiency and effectiveness if it is put under full control of the European Parliament. However, if the EEAS is to be more than a paper tiger, forceful efforts to pave the way for its establishment must be made in good time. There are two key priorities:

- firstly, to make sure that a core EEAS staff will be able to work effectively once the Lisbon Treaty enters into force; and
- secondly, to ensure that a pragmatic plan for the EEAS’s future establishment and continued development guarantees its long-term success.

The institutional changes set out for Europe’s external relations in the rejected 2005 European Constitutional Treaty are virtually identical to those contained in the Lisbon Treaty. Indeed, the provisions on the new post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HRUFASP) have remained largely unchanged. The title of HRUFASP will effectively combine the two current posts of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and External Relations Commissioner.

The HRUFASP, whom the Council will supposedly appoint by a qualified majority, that appointment then being duly confirmed by the European Parliament (EP) as part of the incumbent’s investiture by the European Commission, will chair the newly created formation of the Foreign Affairs Council. At the same time, as one of the European Commission’s Vice-Presidents, the HRUFASP will be fully responsible regarding the Union’s external relations and will be accountable to the EP. This institutional arrangement could give rise to synergy effects, since the ‘two-hat’ scenario will combine elements of European foreign policy that are currently accommodated at different levels. After all, not infrequently in the past the coexistence of CFSP activities and foreign policy measures for which the European Community is responsible has prevented the Union from adopting a coherent approach in the international arena.

However, new opportunity structures such as those outlined in the Lisbon Treaty are no guarantee for the implementation of a more coherent, consistent, and integrated European foreign policy. The pragmatic consolidation of the three elements of European foreign policy – the European Community’s external dimension, the CFSP and national foreign policies – while maintaining existing institutional constellations provides an opportunity but not a guarantee for more horizontal and vertical coherence for the Union’s external representation and action. A clash of diverging objectives due to hardly compatible ideas of an EEAS is still possible, since the Treaty’s provisions are only a rather unstable compromise between intergovernmental and supranational methods and concepts of EU foreign policy-making: At the United Kingdom’s insistence, the Lisbon Treaty is accompanied by two separate (legally non-binding) declarations (no's 13 and 14). Both these declarations stress the autonomy of national foreign policy and diplomacy vis-à-vis the new structures set up around the HRUFASP and reject any transfer of CFSP powers to the European Commission. These declarations could curb the scope for action by the HRUFASP, because presiding over the External Affairs Council will make him/her liable to the consensus that has to be reached between the Member States and thus susceptible to reservations expressed by those actors invoking the two aforementioned declarations.

The HRUFASP will have to come to terms with three other active players in the foreign policy domain: 1) the President of the European Council, a post newly created by the
Lisbon Treaty; 2) the President of the European Commission, whose position vis-à-vis his/her Commissioners has been strengthened; and 3) the EP, which will have more and extensive legislative powers in the field of International Trade policy and more budgetary powers in the Foreign policy domain that is directly linked to the CFSP/CSDP.

The HRUFASP could benefit from the support provided by a European External Action Service. Having said that, the form taken by the EEAS and its areas of intervention (and thus its potential contribution to a more effective and coherent European foreign policy) are still anything but clear, being the subject of tense negotiations between the EU’s institutions and Member States.

Hidden agendas and vague outlines for the EEAS

The provisions in the Lisbon Treaty governing the establishment of the EEAS leave a great deal of leeway for interpreting the service’s actual role and orientation in potential clashes between the intergovernmental CFSP/CSDP resulting from discretionary negotiations between the Member States, on the one hand, and supranational policies on external trade, international agreements, development, economic cooperation and neighbourhood relations, on the other, these policies being the joint responsibility of the European Commission and the EP.

Article 27(3) of the Lisbon Treaty states that the EEAS will comprise officials “from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services”. The plan is for the EEAS’s organisation and modus operandi to be determined by a unanimous Council Decision, acting “on a proposal from the HRUFASP after consulting the EP and after obtaining the consent of the Commission”. Yet the preliminary initial attempts to set up the EEAS after the signature of the Constitutional Treaty by the respective EU heads of state and government in October 2004 already underlined just how hard it is to reach a consensus on specific parameters for the Service’s establishment (see SWP-Comments 36/2004), for only the most threadbare of consensus was reached in a progress report on the results of the consultations between the Member States and EU institutions, which HR Javier Solana and Commission President Manuel Barroso submitted to the European Council in June 2005.

Cagey actors searching to act behind the scenes

Declaration 15 on the Lisbon Treaty states that preliminary work on the establishment of the EEAS should start immediately after the treaty’s signature. However, the Slovenian EU Presidency took its time in setting the ball rolling, citing ongoing ratification procedures in the EU Member States and in particular the Irish referendum in June 2008. Meanwhile, especially smaller EU Member States fear being marginalised when the EEAS is established. They are wary of the danger of the Union’s “major” partner countries (especially France, the United Kingdom and Germany) informally reaching agreement on EEAS structures, procedures and posts and thereby presenting them with a virtually unalterable take it or leave it offer. If previous European negotiating practices in the foreign and security policy domains are anything to go by, these fears may well be justified. Therefore, it is of major importance that supranational actors like the European Parliament and the Commission press for a common approach that incorporates and catalyses the views, ideas and interests of all EU member states. To take a negative, worst-case, but realist assumption as a basis for future reflection: The USA, Russia, or the emerging “powers” like China, India or Brazil do not have an interest in a coherent and consistent EU foreign policy. They will always welcome any kind of self-declared core or pioneer group approach that structurally risks functional and lasting
regional splits within the EU-27? Having said that, there should be no overestimating the degree of unanimity reached by the larger Member States regarding the future structure and remit of the EEAS, for although German and British ideas about European foreign policy aims have converged somewhat in recent years, their views on the institutional and procedural structure of the CFSP and supranational EU foreign policies remain very far apart. Germany still tends to favour persevering with the European Community method, i.e. and conducting common policies at the supranational level, including in the context of the EEAS, whereas actors in the UK are continuing to lobby for a greater predominance of more autonomous, bilateral solutions. Meanwhile, France’s position remains unclear. In the past, its representatives invariably spoke out in favour of a strong, effective EEAS, yet at the same time the government in Paris is mindful of retaining its foreign policy autonomy. Furthermore, its existing, extensive diplomatic network makes it less dependent on European diplomatic structures than other EU Member States, including key players. Therefore the position France takes up on the EEAS in potential sparring between Germany and the United Kingdom will be of particular importance.

Focussing the debate

The structure of the EEAS will throw down a number of challenges that can probably only be overcome if fundamental guideline decisions determining the effective scope of integration policy are made.

The main problem with the establishment of the EEAS concerns its headquarters’ institutional location in Brussels and its powers. Some EU Member States, especially smaller ones, are in favour of the EEAS being incorporated into or very close to Commission structures. Others, like the United Kingdom, would prefer to see the service based on structures of the Council Secretariat, and its Policy Unit in particular. During the consultations on the EEAS held in 2004/2005, the EU institutions and partner countries agreed to set up an independent service of its own kind with close structural ties to the Commission and Council. However, it remained unclear precisely what would emerge from this arrangement, and the scope of the EEAS’s future foreign policy powers was none too apparent either. If the EEAS is supposed to help make European foreign policy more coherent, the possibility of tying it closely to the Commission should be given due consideration, because even early on in the foreign policy cycle the aim must be to merge a wide range of complementary or overlapping policy domains. The new ‘two-hat’ post of HRUFASP already takes account of the fact that over the past 50 years the European Commission has developed foreign policy skills, structures and procedures within its areas of competence and can now fall back on a worldwide network of over 120 delegations. Against this backdrop, any measures designed to enhance the coherence of European foreign policy should set out to coordinate any foreign policy activities beyond the CFSP as well. But so far the relevant actors at European level and in the respective Member States have failed to agree on whether Commission units other than the External Relations Directorate-General (RELEX) should be incorporated into the EEAS. The only point on which unanimous agreement was reached after the discontinued consultations in 2004/2005 was that Directorate-General Trade (concerned with the most developed element in Europe’s external relations) should remain part of the Commission. The patent indecision at the time regarding the extent to which the development policy powers currently allocated to various units within the Commission should be integrated into the EEAS highlights the complex, persistent need for clarification in connection with the Union’s future foreign policy structures and procedures. Similarly, clear guideline decisions are required in this connection with respect to determining military structures and the continued development of consular practices.
If and when the Lisbon Treaty enters into force, the Union’s delegations will be under the control of the HRUFASP and represent the EU abroad in third countries and vis-à-vis international organisations (Article 221 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)). Even though the treaty makes no explicit provision for this, it can be assumed that the existing Commission delegations will form the basis for the new network of EU delegations. Otherwise the Service would be limited to a format comprising a complementary analytical and strategic unit based in Brussels merely allocating additional human and financial resources. Having said that, precedents involving a ‘two-hat approach’ by the EU, namely in Macedonia and the African Union (where the head of the Commission delegation is also an EU Special Representative (EUSR)) show how problematic it can be to merge institutional structures of the Council and the Commission. To overcome these problems, viable and sustainable rules for issuing instructions and reporting will need to be drawn up and the Commission’s and Council’s different security and data protection requirements will have to be harmonised. Past practices regarding EU-internal coordination in third countries – i.e. between Commission delegations, EUSRs and the representations of EU Member States – will have to be scrutinised anyway once the Lisbon Treaty takes effect, since its entry into force will mark the end of rotating six-month EU Presidencies in the domain of external relations. Up to now, it has been up to the country with the EU Presidency – or another EU Member State standing in for it – to run the Presidency in coordination rounds between the EU and third countries and to represent the European Council in the respective partner country. Under the Lisbon Treaty the Member States will have to hand over such duties to the future EU delegations or the EEAS, as appropriate.

Personnel and Recruitment issues constitute a third key point that needs to be satisfactorily resolved before the EEAS is established. More specifically, the status of the personnel deployed by the EEAS needs to be determined. On top of this, a sound staff rotation system will have to be devised, because rotation within the EEAS has to be rendered compatible with the practices of the Member States and EU institutions. This will entail answering the question of whether or not (and, if so, how) work done for the EEAS will count in the respective agents and officials’ career planning. In addition to this, rotation into and out of the EEAS will have to be organised in such a way that it contributes towards the development of a European diplomatic ‘esprit de corps’, for only then will the EEAS become established as a fully fledged institution concerned with the Union’s external relations. For instance, it can be assumed that in the long run staff working for the EEAS will only identify with it if postings to the Service adhere to the principle of equal treatment. This will necessitate robust legal arrangements and an adequate range of training and advanced training courses.

The decision on how the EEAS is financed will determine its operational potential for taking action and constitute a particularly controversial element in the negotiations on the Service’s establishment. It is then, at the very latest, that the views of the EP will have to be taken on board, for Parliament is certain to make full use of its extended supervisory and budgetary powers. Since member states did not articulate an interest in financing the EEAS from national contributions, the EP will have an ultimate voice in the design and functioning of the service. This parliamentary „key“ induces questions with regard to the accountability of the new service, and how to deal with the democracy deficit of the EU’s CFSP and CSDP. The EEAS should not require substantial additional expenditure if existing foreign policy expenditure is fused within the new architecture. Hence, one of the core motives to create the EEAS was to reduce institutional, procedural and operational duplication and costs. The EEAS personnel from the Council Secretariat and the Commission are already financed by the EU budget. The only area where an increase in expenditure would be justified would be limited to the cost of seconded personnel from
the Member States’ diplomatic services. However, one should not overestimate the cost 
reduction factor of the EEAS in the early stages of its existence. If one put the EU’s 
foreign policy expenditure into the larger picture of „Brussels+27“, it becomes obvious 
that „national diplomacy“ still has a strong appeal. There are not only new member states 
are very keen in „catching up“ with the „standard foreign policies“ of the EU-15 club. 
Overall the number of diplomatic missions has increased in recent years and it seems very 
unlikely the new Member States will be the first that will fuse their missions into a 
unified EEAS scheme.

Finally, power struggles between the various actors in Brussels can be expected when the 
EEAS’s internal European structures are determined. The outcome of these struggles 
will also affect the Service’s sphere of action. For example, one key issue will involve 
deciding who will chair the relevant Council bodies and thus effectively become future 
political agenda setters, no less. Clashes are also very likely over the question of who will 
be given access rights to the EEAS: the President of the European Council or the Member 
States themselves? To quell any such conflicts it would make sense to have the Council, 
Commission and Parliament negotiate an interinstitutional agreement that sets out 
conciliation procedures for political, budgetary and staff-related economic issues, 
organising them more flexibly than generally binding EU law.

Immediate tasks

The HRUFASP will take up office when the Lisbon Treaty enters into force. The 
appointed individual will have to submit a proposal on the organisation and modus 
operandi of the EEAS to the Council. The EP already made it clear that only the newly 
elected Parliament could approve a fully fledged HRUFASP in the context of the 
appointment of a new Commission. This is indication enough that the Service will not 
come into being within the next months. Nevertheless, during its start-up period viable 
solutions will have to be found that both enable the HRUFASP to fulfil his/her duties and 
simultaneously open up the way for the gradual establishment and expansion of 
institutional structures for European diplomacy. In the interim, EU Member States and 
institutions may be inclined to postpone decisions about the establishment of the EEAS 
and agree on makeshift solutions based on existing institutional structures. Yet that would 
do nothing to resolve the fundamental problem arising from the existence of highly 
divergent notions about the future orientation of a common European diplomacy. If the 
EEAS is to function as a prominent driver of a more coherent European foreign 
policy in the near future, the actors at the Member State and European levels will 
have to modify and approximate their partially diverging models.

This does not mean that the design and functioning of the EEAS should be definitively 
and irrevocably determined by the time the Lisbon Treaty enters into force. Rather, it 
means that essential preliminary decisions should be taken on the basis of a coordinated 
list of priorities. At the same time, a medium and long-term plan for the Service’s 
structure should be drawn up.

The Service could certainly be made flexible, providing for time-frames to review current 
practices. But first of all three fundamental decisions have to be made: firstly, the 
institutional arrangement concerning the EEAS; secondly, with respect to its powers; and 
thirdly concerning the concept for it’s financing up to 2013 (i.e. up to the end of the 

Another key point should involve the establishment of a core staff for the EEAS, led by 
the HRUFASP. That staff, which right from the outset for reasons of acceptance should 
comprise personnel from all three EEAS sources, must be given what it needs to draw up
initial organisational plans and coordination procedures, job descriptions and draft budgets for the various EEAS units.

Temporary provisions would also have to be drawn up governing the Commission’s or Union’s delegations and their collaboration with EEAS headquarters back in Brussels. The EU’s High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, can currently rely on reports submitted by Commission delegations. On the other hand, the Commission does not automatically gain access to status reports drawn up by the Council’s Policy Unit. In this connection, specific standards need to be drawn up in good time for the future, and chains of instructions have to be defined with a view to avoiding any duplication regarding information procurement and analysis and also eliminating any asymmetries in information processing.

Finally, before the Lisbon Treaty enters into force, agreement needs to be reached on the role and function of the EEAS among the EU Council’s foreign policy bodies. For whilst Commission staff currently only participate in the respective rounds of talks as ‘counterparts’ answerable to the Commissioner for External Relations, as EEAS staff members they could be entrusted with duties including the chairing of meetings and the mediation of initiatives stemming from the HRUFASP’s role as a Vice-President of the Commission. Here again, agreement needs to be reached with the Member States on how far the powers of the officials they post to the EEAS should extend.

A gradualist approach for the EEAS’s establishment

The EEAS will not suddenly materialise from one day to the next. A more conceivable scenario is a gradual process, analogous to that associated with European Monetary Union, which passed through three stages between the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 and the introduction of the Euro. Consequently, looking to the medium and long term, it would make sense to fix threshold values characterised by individual stages in the EEAS’s development.

The first piece of the puzzle is provided by the EU budget deal for 2007-2013, which delimits the time frame for the Union’s income and expenditure, both overall and in individual policy domains. As a result, any decision made by the Council on the procedure associated with the establishment of the EEAS should be reviewed once more towards the end of the current budget deal. The following measures could conceivably be implemented during the period up to 2013:

- **Development of a rotation system** for EEAS officials that is accepted by all actors and puts paid to ‘taking sides’ (with a ‘Brusselised’ core group of Commission and Council officials in one camp and a ‘nationally shaped periphery’ of diplomats from EU Member States in the other). Another factor to bear in mind with respect to the group of national officials is the need to make sure that contingents from individual countries are distributed within the EEAS in such a way that no nationally dominated domains comes into being in the various departments in the EEAS’s Brussels headquarters or EU delegations.

- **Expansion of existing training courses** in EU institutions and the Member States. Based on the Cutileiro report (COM(2006) 278 final), the Commission has already started reforming its own training system, opened up its training programmes to the Member States and intensified exchanges of personnel. In this connection, further developments at the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) should be monitored, since discussions about expanding and institutionalising the ESDC’s structures are currently under way, against the backdrop of the experience gained since the virtual college was set up in 2005.
Drafting a ‘European Code of Diplomatic Conduct’ with the proviso that in the long run it is legally anchored by a Council Decision.

Conversion of the first Commission delegations into Union delegations. Suitable candidates for this would be third countries and organisations 1) that are in line with the EU’s strategic interests; 2) where not all EU Member States are represented by bilateral embassies; and 3) where none of the partner countries is asserting any particular national interests. Examples would include European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries, the Central Asian Republics and the secretariats of those regional organisations with which the EU concludes EPAs, like the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and so on. When preparing pilot projects, initial experience accumulated by the EU delegation to the African Union set up in late 2007, should be taken on board.

At the very latest by 2013, when the current financial period comes to an end, strategic coordination capabilities under the leadership and responsibility of the HRUFASP should be thriving well enough to ensure that the EEAS can be evaluated in pilot representations that will need to be selected by that date. Then, on the basis of the experience gained by these first Union delegations, a general, transnational model for the design and modus operandi of the future EU delegations could be developed and policy-, case- and region-specific standards for the EU’s foreign commitments devised. To make this possible, efficiency and performance indicators already need to be defined now and then used to help ascertain when a certain critical ‘EEAS mass’ has been reached. After the evaluation process (Foreign Policy Impact Assessments analogous to the tried-and-tested Sustainability Impact Assessments in trade policy) these same indicators should go on to serve as benchmarks for the number and quality of external representations and their functions.

The expansion of the EEAS should be monitored by a body in which representatives of Member States, the Commission, the Council Secretariat, the EP and independent experts meet up regularly. A group of this kind outside the existing Council and Commission apparatus would probably provide a better guarantee of the EEAS’s long-term perspectives being monitored by a body with no narrow institutional interests. After all, the aim, beyond resolving inevitable technical issues, is to make sure that the overall context is taken into account when individual phases of the Service’s development are thought through.

Let’s start

Brussels and the EU’s capitals are currently working on various models for the establishment of the EEAS, and it would be advisable at an early stage to consider the competing concepts with a view to reaching a consensus. Otherwise the Union may risk losing sight of the strategic elements of institutional reforms while engaging in hurried negotiations of a purely technical nature, and that would undoubtedly impair the EEAS’s effectiveness.

The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) will provide a first litmus test for the EEAS. Once Chancellor Merkel had succeeded in persuading French President Nicolas Sarkozy to drop his original idea of setting up an autonomous ‘Mediterranean Union’ outside or ‘alongside’ the EU, in March 2008 the heads of state and government reached agreement on the institutional cornerstones of the UfM in the form of an autonomous Secretariat and a rotating double Presidency provided by the EU, on the one hand, and its southern Mediterranean neighbours, on the other. Since the UfM will be the first example
of the organisation of European foreign policy after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU’s establishment of the respective structures should be guided by the new provisions of the treaty. Accordingly, any presidential duties fulfilled by the EU should be discharged by the President of the European Council (at the level of the heads of state and government) and the HRUFASP (at foreign minister level). From the EU’s point of view, the UfM Secretariat should be conceived of as belonging to the EEAS. The initial provisions of the Lisbon Treaty should then serve as a basis for detailed discussions about the organisational conditions under which other functional departments should be involved in the UfM and how their work is to be coordinated. After all, the treaty contains no provisions for any kind of rules governing coordination between the presidential duties of the HRUFASP in the Foreign Affairs Council and the continuing rotating presidencies of ministers in other domains, which alternate between Member States.

Both the next EU summits as well as the next investiture of the 2009 Commission will show whether or not Europe’s heads of state and the Commissioners can agree on a recipe for ‘Europeanising’ their foreign policy that takes sufficient account of 1) the supranational elements in the HRUFASP’s powers; 2) the intergovernmental structures surrounding European Council Presidencies; and 3) the multilevel, polyarchical nature of specific European policy domains between 1) and 2). Unless this comes about, there is a real danger of parallel foreign policy structures being created, which would not only undermine the coherence to which the Lisbon Treaty aspires, but already do so immediately upon the treaty’s entry into force.

Consequently, the European Parliament and “like-minded” actors should vigorously pursue the debate on the establishment of the Service. Mindful of the UK’s and France’s reservations about any swift merger of foreign policy powers within the EU (for which the Lisbon Treaty clearly paves the way and which both the UK and France officially support), the Parliament should seek to strengthen the group of actors with a particularly strong interest in seeing a forceful and “rather supranational than intergovernmental” EEAS, i.e. one that plays a prominent role and is capable of taking effective action. From this position the EP could endeavour to mediate between the various conflicting points of view. In so doing, it will have to bear in mind that other European actors will probably have to be excluded as potential co-mediators, because the Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council are pursuing strong interests of their own where the EEAS is concerned. As a result, both the Service itself and the HRUFASP are reliant on a universally recognised mediator.

**Between Nice and Lisbon**

Since the Irish No to the Lisbon treaty, the preparatory measures for the EEAS are on hold. However, there are several possibilities that could lead to a more coherent and consistent foreign policy within the EU institutions, between the EU institutions, between the EU institutions and member states as well as between the member states through pragmatic reforms on the basis of the existing treaties and related secondary law. They include informal measures for optimising the day-to-day business of European foreign policy, instruments for streamlining established EU foreign policy structures, possibilities for improvements – with regard to the efficiency, identity and effectiveness of EU foreign policy - in terms of consular arrangements, the development of common training structures and practical cooperation in the field of diplomacy between member states.

As far as the EEAS future structure and policy framework is concerned, it is particularly the following reforms that could be realized in an anticipatory manner (See table 1).
### Table 1: Options for developing the EEAS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options</th>
<th>Implementation options</th>
<th>Involved parties</th>
<th>Mention/ state of play as far as known</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Within EU institutions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council General improvement of the working methods of the Council and the European Council</td>
<td>Informal, RP</td>
<td>ECou, C, C working groups, COREPER</td>
<td>SR 12/06: first examples of improvement (external dimension of energy policy, JHA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved consultation between the different Council formations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Paper 06/06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved coordination between sectoral and regional working groups and COREPER I and II</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SR 12/06: first examples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of the HR upgraded in dialogue with third parties; greater involvement in the workings of the European Council</td>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>ECou, C, HR</td>
<td>During the German presidency, HR chaired EU meetings with third parties more often than has been so in the past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal separation of the GAERC formation; HR to chair the Council on External Relations; HR to chair the PSC; HR staff to chair the relevant Council working groups</td>
<td>Informal, RP</td>
<td>C, HR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission Strengthening of the role of the RELEX group (expanded in terms of commissioners); ad-hoc group meetings; guiding discussions within the college; improvement of the collaboration between DGs</td>
<td>Informal, RP</td>
<td>COM (President, college of commissioners, DGs)</td>
<td>Cutileiro Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of the reporting and analysing capabilities, (including flexibility in handling resources and developing training courses at headquarters and in the delegations); more input for the PSC, the Council working groups and the EP committees</td>
<td>Informal, RP</td>
<td>COM, C, PSC, C working groups, EP</td>
<td>Cutileiro Report SR 12/06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faster policy decision-making</td>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>COM</td>
<td>Cutileiro Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Between EU institutions</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Commission-Council General improvement of the collaboration between COM and CS</td>
<td>Informal, IIA</td>
<td>COM, HR, CS, PC, EUSRs, Commission offices and Policy Unit, SitCen, COM’s crisis centre</td>
<td>Part of the work programme of the German Presidency SR 12/06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual involvement in procedures and decisions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cutileiro Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint policy proposals: written comments and papers (for the work within the C and its working groups); use of the expertise of the Heads of Delegations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Paper 06/06</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint analysis and reporting (also EC delegations and EUSRs)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SR 12/06; SR 06/07</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coordinated and joint press statements</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint visits to third countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cutileiro Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participation of the HR to the RELEX group</td>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>COM, HR</td>
<td>According to a senior member of the COM, the HR did not respond adequately to the invitations extended by the COM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support of the HR through the EU’s delegations; more involvement of EUSRs in country visits of the members of the COM; EC delegation’s support (also for visits by EP committees)</td>
<td>Informal, IIA</td>
<td>COM, CS, HR, EUSRs</td>
<td>Cutileiro Report SR 06/07: increased cooperation between the Commission delegations, HR, EUSRs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission-Council-EP</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Between EU institutions and Member States</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Internalisation of common positions: intensified coordination in Brussels; better use of EC delegations, EUSRs and bilateral embassies</td>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>C, PC, HR, COREPER, COM</td>
<td>Cutileiro Report Non-Paper 06/06 SR 12/06: pre-GAERC briefing meetings between PC, HR, COM; involvement of COREPER at initial stages; support of evaluation reports of EU Heads of Mission SR 06/07: strategic planning for summit meetings with the USA, Russia, Canada and Japan under German Presidency based on concept papers, prepared by PC, CS and/or COM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advance preparation of meetings at European level and with third parties</td>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>C, PC, HR, COREPER, COM</td>
<td>Cutileiro Report Non-Paper 06/06 SR 12/06: pre-GAERC briefing meetings between PC, HR, COM; involvement of COREPER at initial stages; support of evaluation reports of EU Heads of Mission SR 06/07: strategic planning for summit meetings with the USA, Russia, Canada and Japan under German Presidency based on concept papers, prepared by PC, CS and/or COM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advance preparation of the PC in the foreign policy domain (every 6 months)</td>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>HR, Pres C, Pres COM, Pres ECoa, RELEX Commissioner</td>
<td>Cutileiro Report Non-Paper 06/06 SR 12/06: pre-GAERC briefing meetings between PC, HR, COM; involvement of COREPER at initial stages; support of evaluation reports of EU Heads of Mission SR 06/07: strategic planning for summit meetings with the USA, Russia, Canada and Japan under German Presidency based on concept papers, prepared by PC, CS and/or COM.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coordination meetings between PC and COM</td>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>PC, COM</td>
<td>SR 06/07: Meeting under German Presidency (9.1.2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practical cooperation</td>
<td>Informal, agreement</td>
<td>BS- und multilateral embassies, EC delegations and EUSRs</td>
<td>Non-Paper 06/06 SR 12/06: evaluation of practical cooperation between MS/PC and the EC delegations; issues raised during discussions: better availability documents and analysis of COM, better planning and coordination of activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint reports and analysis</td>
<td>Informal, IIA, agreements</td>
<td>COM, CS, MS</td>
<td>Non-Paper 06/06 SR 12/06.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensified exchange of personnel</td>
<td>Programme</td>
<td>COM, CS, MS</td>
<td>Cutileiro Report Non-Paper 06/06 SR 06/07: Measures agreed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint training structures, launch of mutual education programmes, training measures at EU level, intensified EU training at national level</td>
<td>Framework programmes, programme, decision of the PSC</td>
<td>COM, C, CS, MS</td>
<td>Cutileiro Report EDP runs since the end of the 90s DESP in pilot phase since July 2006 (PC, MS, RS, COM) SR 12/06.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diplomatic academy of the European Union</td>
<td></td>
<td>C Decision (see CEPOL)</td>
<td>Covered in the Draft TCE (Convention version) but.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Extension of the ‘double hats’ or at least continuation and cooperation between COM and EUSRs</td>
<td>Two legal bases (CFSP-joint action and COM-internal decision)</td>
<td>COM, C, MS</td>
<td>Cutileiro Report Non-Paper 06/06 SR 12/06; SR 06/07 Test case in Macedonia, currently preparation of a ‘double-hatted’ function in the AU in Addis Ababa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharing of premises and supporting services</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
<td>MS, COM (EC Delegations and bilateral embassies)</td>
<td>Cutileiro Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visa policy: better and more effective cooperation of MS in involving the COM; Joint centres for visa applications; Formulation of a Community Code on Visas</td>
<td>REG</td>
<td>COM, C, MS</td>
<td>Different proposals of the COM for a modification of the Common Consular Instructions and the introduction of a Community Code on Visas SR 12/06; SR 06/07: efforts enhanced regarding the establishment of common visa application centres: pilot project by Hungary in Chisinau (April 2007, initial partners Austria and Slovenia); proposal of an EU Common Visa Centre for ADS in Beijing; BLODEV pilot project on the cooperation in collecting data of visa applicants (supported by eight member states, launched in July 2007 in 13 third country locations and 9 locations within the EU)</td>
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<td>Measures to ensure the implementation of Art. 20 TEU (diplomatic and consular protection); creation of joint centres in test areas</td>
<td>REG</td>
<td>COM, C, MS</td>
<td>Green Paper of the COM (November 2006) Non-Paper 06/06 SR 12/06 SR 06/07: improvement of exchange of information and cooperation between MS; lead state approach in the context of consular crisis (pragmatic and limited supporting role of EC delegations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EuropeAid: Creation of an operational centre; development of training courses; merging of consular structures; creation of a contact point within COM; flying consular teams; common European consulates; Community Code on Consular Affairs</td>
<td>Established procedures. If not possible recourse to enhanced cooperation</td>
<td>COM, C, MS</td>
<td>Barnier Report General reservation on the part of Germany SR 12/06: discussion on consular crisis mechanism, reinforcement of the Presidency mission and formulation of a framework/lead nation concept</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improvement of advance coordination for consensus building on relevant EU issues; united front on international stage WTO and other international organisations as examples to emulate</td>
<td>(implementation of Art. 19 TEU)</td>
<td>MS, (C), (COM)</td>
<td>Cutileiro Report SR 12/06 SR 06/07: discussions and reporting concerning EU positioning within OSCE, Council of Europe, IMF, UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrangements of diplomatic representation to be adapted to the current situation</td>
<td>Update of arrangements, nonbinding guidelines</td>
<td>MS</td>
<td>SR 12/06: RELEX Counsellors’ working group: update of the existing arrangements on the diplomatic representation of the Presidency in third countries (dating from 1977) in progress; to be concluded at the end of 2006: nonbinding guidelines for the diplomatic representation of the Presidency by another Member State in third countries in the field of CFSP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cooperation of embassies - Sharing of premises</td>
<td>Bilateral agreements</td>
<td>MS</td>
<td>Test cases (e.g. Nordic embassies Germany, UK-German embassy Iceland)</td>
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<td>Exchange of personnel</td>
<td>Programmes</td>
<td>MS</td>
<td>Exchange programmes for diplomats in progress</td>
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</table>

**Abbreviations:**

ADS = Approved Destination Status; C = Council of the European Union; COM = European Commission; COREPER = Committee of Permanent Representatives; CS = Council Secretariat; DESP = Diplomatic Exchange and Secondment Programme; DG = Directorate General; ECou = European Council; EDP = European Diplomatic Programme; EP = European Parliament; EUSR = EU Special Representative; GAERC = General Affairs and External Relations Council; HR = High Representative for the CFSP; IIA = Interinstitutional Agreement; JHA = Justice and Home Affairs; MS = Member States; PSC = Political and Security Committee; PC = Presidency of the Council; Pres = President; REG = Regulation; RP = Rules of Procedure; TCE = Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe

**References:**

SR 06/07 = Stocktaking report: Measures to increase the effectiveness, coherence and visibility of EU external policies, Council of the European Union, 13 June 2007 (8909/07).

SR 12/06 = Stocktaking Report on the implementation of measures to increase the efficiency, coherence and visibility of EU external policies and future work, Council of the European Union, 8 December 2006 (16419/06).


