Context

- Public transport is an attractive target
    - Open and accessible ground, anonymous territories
    - High volumes of passengers in small spaces, especially during peak hours
    - many escape points difficult to control
- Public transport systems may be target, tool and by-catch
    - Systems are vulnerable, but essential for cities as well incident response
- Counter measures always comprise design and technology, staff and procedures
- Concepts have to address prevention, response and recovery

Lessons learned

- Alignment of plans and procedures needed between authorities and transport sector
    - Improved intelligence sharing may facilitate more stringent and less disruptive decision taking
    - Discussion of operational consequences of decisions
- Need for credible information for operators not affected by incidents
    - Lack of information leads to rumors and loss of confidence and motivation among staff
- More focus on business continuity
    - Security plans need to be up-scaled fast and in line with events, down-scaling has to happen with plan and reason
    - Duration of extra measures needs to be assessed

Way forward

- **Consistent measures and continuous plans**
    - Security discussion are incident driven - risk of inefficient use of resources, risk of over-reacting and overlooking
    - New threats need to be evaluated against known ones and existing counter measures
- **Realistic concepts**
    - measures discussed need to be in line with capacities on the spot
- **Proportional response**
    - even new threats do not have the same impact in all systems and places
    - Over-focus may lead to gaps elsewhere