

Enabling the future

European military
capabilities 2013-2025:
challenges and avenues

Overview

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- Successes
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State of play

- The EU possesses capable and effective armed forces alongside an advanced industrial and scientific base.
- Yet, in general suffers from:
 - limited awareness of emerging challenges
 - basic disinterest in strategic matters
 - segmented political and institutional landscape regarding defence and military matters.

Successes

- Retirement of Cold War-era equipment;
- Adoption of new military doctrines and structures;
- Shift towards professional, smaller, mobile forces
- The consolidation of cooperation within the EU:
 - 1) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)
 - 2) European Defence Agency (EDA)

Shortfalls

- Flatlining or decreasing defence budgets (exacerbated by the financial crisis)
- Modest deployability levels
- Fragmentation of the EU defence equipment market
- EU policy spread across distinct and often separate 'boxes'
- General reluctance to make the maintenance of effective armed forces a political priority
- These could cause:
 - additional reductions in EU military capacity
 - a potential exodus of the defence industry
 - a loss of technological leadership
 - In short: creeping 'demilitarisation' coupled with partial deindustrialisation


Trends 2013- 2025

- Combination of dynamic instability and systemic interdependence
- Rise of new regional powers and players (particularly in Asia)
- The US 'pivot'
- Greater globalisation
- Developments relating to new weaponry

Strategic interests

The EU may also need to reassess its 'strategic interests' (as mentioned, but not defined in art.26 of the Lisbon Treaty). These could now well include, along with a peaceful, stable and prosperous neighbourhood:

- 1) Safeguarding the European 'homeland' from attacks, as perpetrated by (surrounding or distant) state or non-state actors
- 2) Securing maritime communication lines and strategic communications infrastructure from blockade or hostile actions
- 3) Protecting supplies of energy and raw materials in overseas territories and remote lands from exploitation or annexation by foreign players




- 4) Maintaining regional balances of

Open questions

- What sort of armed forces are Europeans likely to have (and need) by 2025?
- How might Europeans better organise themselves to take part in the new global competition for wealth, influence and power?
- The only solution to counter potential risks and tackle existing constraints

Avenues



- Implementing consolidation to generate military *efficiency*
- This suggests a coordinated reduction of redundant and obsolete capabilities to generate immediate and future savings
- Member states may consider asking the EEAS and its specialised bodies to undertake, in cooperation with the EDA, a targeted EU *Military Review* (more than a Green and less than a

- Favouring optimisation to boost military *effectiveness*
- With respect to equipment, member states could devise a framework whereby armed forces cooperate across service lines for the development of future capabilities
- A second solution would be to introduce a fresh procurement concept - 'total life-cycle EU-wide management' - for new military

- Promoting innovation to enhance military *technology*
- Innovation is not only a source of efficiency and effectiveness, but also of technological advancement (R&T funding, savings into investments)
- Tailored solutions to promote innovation may include borrowing ideas from funding schemes originally adopted by NATO (e.g. for the AWACS) or proposed by the European Commission in other policy areas (e.g. the so-called 'project bonds')

- Framing and reinforcing regionalisation to bolster operational *width* and *depth*
- Targeted (bilateral or mini-lateral) integration could lead to pay-offs in the maintenance and acquisition of a wider spectrum - and to some extent greater depth - of military forces
- This will especially be the case if these 'islands' of cooperation established by some EU countries with their neighbours or partners can be coordinated at EU level, so as to form an 'archipelago'
- The 'Europeanisation' of certain *new* capabilities could also be considered a higher form of regionalisation

Avenue 5

- Moving towards integration to further increase *depth* and elevate *sustainability*
- Bringing together the armed forces of member states under an EU-wide force structure (though not a ‘Euro-military’) would enable Europeans to boost their logistical capacity and undertake the most demanding operations that any future security environment may necessitate
- This may require establishing a new ‘family’ of targeted *Headline Goals for 2025* and synchronising national armament

Conclusions

- Europeans are losing sovereignty by *not* consolidating, *not* optimising, *not* innovating, *not* regionalising and *not* integrating their military capabilities
- Policy challenges call for a common, systematic, comprehensive and regular (re)assessment of ends, ways and means - cutting across traditional boundaries
- Lessons, examples and cases of best practice can be drawn - and duly adapted - from other policy areas (mostly civilian) as well as from mini-lateral and NATO cooperation
- All these (cumulative rather than alternative) avenues require political