It is my intention in the next 12 to 15 minutes to describe very briefly aspects of the maritime domain, which have an impact on the CSDP and I will conclude and recommend at the end. It will not be possible to cover all aspects during this intervention but I am looking forward to the Q&A period.

1. Increasing maritime insecurity, not least terrorism and illegal immigration and asymmetric threats caused by criminals and governments, has highlighted the need for better maritime safety, security and defence. More effective and coordinated collective action is the only appropriate way to respond to these different challenges. Many useful initiatives are already underway under the aegis of both Member States and the EU itself. The Commission’s “Integrated Maritime Policy” and associated project establishing a “Common Information Sharing Environment”
are encouraging developments for Europe. But there are well
developed initiatives already in place and working elsewhere such as
ReCAAP in South East Asia, the V-RMTC in the Mediterranean or
MSSIS, the Maritime Safety and Security Information System, which
is a long-established global system.
These systems all share two essential preconditions for delivering
maritime safety, security and defence:

1. The first is information sharing: we need to move from the
   “need to know to the “need to share” and, if lives are at stake,
   acknowledging the “responsibility to share”.

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**The Process**

**“Need to know” vs “Need to share”**

There are known knowns
there are things we know we know.

We also know there are known unknowns;
that is to say we know there are some things we do not know.

But there are also unknown unknowns
the ones we don’t know we don’t know.
These principles reflect one core element of Maritime Security, the principle of “Need to Know” is a relic of the days when communications and information systems were based on a very restricted band of radio frequencies shared between many different user communities transmitting formal messages through dedicated but extremely limited capacity networks. In contrast today, the life cycle of hardware gets ever shorter and software programs get ever more sophisticated with almost all information available on the internet and different social or other networks. So we now need a correspondingly different mentality with a change in our official mind set when it comes to information sharing in the maritime domain, and we can find an excellent example in the world of aviation world, where this open exchange has been the norm for years and is constantly being improved.

2. Maritime Surveillance provides a picture of the maritime situation for all stakeholders acting or involved in the maritime domain.
Who are the maritime actors from global and regional perspectives? The antithesis of “Maritime Domain Awareness” is “Sea Blindness”. Although affected differently, most maritime stakeholders in the EU, whether MSs or EU bodies, reflect the “sea blindness” endemic in the general population, their national Parliaments and in EU authorities. To understand properly the need for robust maritime security and thus improved maritime surveillance, it is important to appreciate the importance of the sea for the welfare and prosperity of the EU - as a means of commerce, as a source of energy and food, as a habitat and for power projection create good governance at sea. But for some the sea is a conduit for many kinds of illegal, dangerous and criminal activities as well. Unless and until this situation is fully recognised, the policy changes required will not be implemented and it will be impossible to increase maritime security to a satisfactory level.
There are six strategic key stakeholders in charge of Maritime Safety, Security & Defence

1. United Nations through the International Maritime Organization, IMO

2. United States Navy, Coast Guard and Marine Corps through their common "Maritime Strategy", United States Government through support to IMO


4. European Union through the Commission, the Military Staff, the Integrated Maritime Policy

5. The African Union through its ambition to implement an own African Maritime Security Strategy

6. Unaligned nations i.e. Brazil, Russia, India and China as well as Pakistan and Turkey as individual nations with own naval and maritime ambitions & Strategies

As part of the United Nations, the IMO provides very effective administration, acting globally and supporting regional initiatives through an enduring process of consolidation process. But the UN has very limited operational maritime experience and no mandate to enforce existing laws itself. The UN’s first naval mission is UNIFIL, enforcing a weapons embargo off the coast of Lebanon.

The United States is an actor at all three levels: strategic, operational and tactical and supports the IMO even though the US Senate has still not ratified UNCLOS.

The rapid implementation of the ISPS Code after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US homeland shows that, provided the collective political will exists, the response can be very rapid.
The US has the means to project power and conduct law enforcement missions, but US presence is becoming more limited overall. It has already reduced in the Med and the Atlantic, will probably continue at current levels in the Indian Ocean, increase slightly in the Arctic and significantly in the Pacific.

NATO has adopted both a Maritime Strategy and a Concept of Maritime Security Operations. The Maritime Strategy has been expanded from a purely military strategy into a much more comprehensive one, including civilian and military tasks and placing Maritime Security as a new task with a higher priority. NATO has the means to be active at all three levels, according to the political decision of the nations. NATO has a well developed and proven Command Structure, which can be used by the EU as well, when the political will permits. Four different Standing Naval Forces are operating on permanent missions in the MED, the Indian Ocean, the North Atlantic and the Baltic Sea. European Navies are participating in and may command three US led- Coalition Maritime task forces under bi-lateral agreements. Recent operations demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of the Alliance at the strategic and operational levels.

For its part, the EU has a European Security Strategy with three objectives: Addressing the Threat, Building Security in the Neighbourhood and Achieving an International Order based on
effective Multilateralism. The ESS predates the Lisbon Treaty, which advocates further coordination and cooperation between MSs, the European Agencies and Third Countries. One role of the collective maritime services could therefore be to expedite this process of coordination and cooperation in some maritime tasks. Articles 47 and 222 of the Lisbon Treaty give clear guidance on how to act to prevent a terrorist threat on MSs’ territory. The EU must mobilize all available capabilities, including military resources made available by MSs. Article 222 of the Treaty also cites natural or man made disasters as a situation justifying a MS’s request for assistance. The EU could employ an on-call Naval Force such as EuroMarFor in the Med. Similarly, Frontex operations in the Med are an important element in achieving good governance at sea. Taking Operation “Atalanta” together with the Maritime Capacity Building programme in the Horn of Africa region is a huge step towards more cooperation in the Commission.

I now want to draw your attention to the vulnerabilities, risks and threats faced by the EU and its population:
Main Risks and Threats

1. Affecting directly nations territory and citizens from the sea:
   • Terrorism from the sea through infiltration of commandos or the use of explosives or weapons of mass destruction
   • Human trafficking, which exploits illegal immigration, endangering the stability of nations
   • Narcotics and arms trafficking, including small arms.
   • Navy to Navy engagement at small and medium seize dimension

2. Affecting the global maritime interests:
   • Piracy
   • Smuggling of goods of all kind, size and value
   • Disputes over maritime borders and the Exclusive Economic Zones between nations and the international community

3. Affecting global resources at sea:
   • Environmental degradation, such as dumping of toxic waste at sea
   • Risks to biodiversity in our sea bassins
   • Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing
   • Illegal pumping of oily bilge water into the high seas
   • Maritime accidents, collisions, groundings, wrecking which pose a continous threat to ships, ports, all seaborne maritime infrastructure and the global coastlines
All these risks and threats, as well as other criminal or unlawful activities at sea, affect not only Europe, but also countries around the globe. For example, illegal immigration and narcotics trafficking from overseas today constitutes significant internal threats to the EU. IUU fishing, toxic waste dumping and illegal oil bunkering severely undermine the economic viability and internal stability of African coastal states. The inability of weak or failed states to control their maritime areas is a contributory factor in destabilisation. A further European vulnerability lies in the large number of Europeans living and working in international trade, or working for European industries and commercial enterprises abroad, or as members of Non-Governmental Organisations. Tourists are similarly vulnerable, as they are increasingly attracted by exciting and exotic destinations regardless of risk. Emergency mass evacuations have been carried out recently by some MSs whose air and naval units have also extricated other Europeans from the affected areas either on their own initiative or on the recommendation of local diplomatic authorities. Some MSs maintain a permanent naval presence in certain conflict areas in order to be able to react rapidly in case of necessity. The Solidarity Clause could lead the EU through the offices of the EEAS to establish a more permanent set of arrangements.

As an intermediate conclusion, it is clear that an EU Maritime Security Strategy is needed, founded on a few basic principles. It should not be underestimated how simply achieving initial agreement
on such a strategy could significantly and promptly improve the present maritime security situation.

The principles should include:

- Collective and sustained political will, leadership and commitment
- Credible capability, whatever the mix of civilian and military forces
- Embracing a holistic, comprehensive approach to all security issues with a maritime dimension
- Understanding that the maritime context is worldwide and responses have global reach
- Taking a regional rather than centralized, EU level approach
- Encouraging evolutionary, step by step rather than radical change.
- Attempting to impose boundary lines in the sea, to separate or establish operational boundaries between different actors within a MS are simply a reflection of the standpoint of a single sector and hinders the potential effectiveness of any action.
- All MSs’ seagoing Law Enforcement Authorities should undertake collective force planning exercises, so that their different capabilities and limitations are understood and taken into account
- Extending stability outwards from Europe will require vision, political courage, generosity and sustained leadership
commitment. Establishing the political priority is a *sine qua non*.

- The EU has the necessary tools to fulfil its responsibility to safeguard the interests of EU citizens; the Lisbon enabled smooth, effective cooperation between the former pillars, but implementing this demands courage, enduring political will and support.

To conclude, the main recommendation is, in the first instance, to develop the regional dimension of all maritime security related activities in those sea basins that adjoin the continent of Europe. The requirement is to gain the involvement and cooperation of all stakeholders with a clear and equitable sharing of responsibilities between the MSs and all EU authorities: Parliament, Council, Commission and Military Committee/Staff.

To achieve this, we need urgently a European Maritime Security Strategy, which must be developed in a common process with all appropriate authorities. To consciously exclude any one authority from this process will undermine the impact of the Strategy as a whole and to achieve the necessary degree of unity therefore we will need strong political commitment and leadership.
The circle from “Early Warning” to “Conflict Prevention” to “Crisis Management” and “Post Conflict Peace building” is valid for Maritime Security as well. The circle

Needs a Maritime Security Strategy as a framework which enables to decide and act in an appropriate manner.

Needs a Maritime Security Strategy to achieve and improve civil-military co-ordination and co-operation to build trust and confidence between all stakeholders.

Needs a Maritime Security Strategy to avoid duplication of efforts, to focus investments on the purpose which will reduce the number of systems for Maritime Surveillance in particular and will minimize costs maritime security and defence as a global challenge.