



CONT Delegation visit
22 - 26 February 2012
Haiti



Fact-finding delegation of the Budgetary Control Committee to HAITI, 22-26 February 2012

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DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES
POLICY DEPARTMENT D: BUDGETARY AFFAIRS

Preparatory Note for the CONT delegation visit to Haiti

**DELEGATION VISIT OF
22 - 26 FEBRUARY 2012**

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EN

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACF - Action Contre la Faim

ACTED - Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development

CSCCA - le Cour Supérieure des Comptes et Du Contentieux Administrative

DG ECHO - Directorate General Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection

DG DEVCO - Directorate General Development and Cooperation

EDF - European Development Fund

Groupe URD - Groupe Urgence Réhabilitation Développement

IMF - International Monetary Fund

MDG - Millennium Development Goal

MdM - Médecins du monde

MSF - Médecins Sans Frontières

NGO - Non-Governmental Organization

UN - United Nations

WASH - Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

1. GENERAL OVERVIEW¹

Haiti has suffered from a long period of political instability and economic decline. Poverty is widespread and social indicators are at the lowest level as compared to other countries in the Western hemisphere. Since the establishment in 2004 of MINUSTAH, the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti, the international community, including the EU, has been providing assistance to Haiti for restoring democracy and promoting socio-economic development. The country faces a multitude of structural development challenges not least because of the damages and human suffering caused by tropical storms, the food crisis of 2008, the earthquake that struck in January 2010 and very recently the outbreak of a cholera epidemic.

More in particular, the 12 January 2010 earthquake resulted in approximately 230.000 dead, 300.000 injured and 1.000.000 homeless. The economic cycle was completely disrupted, with total damages worth an estimated US\$7.9bn, equivalent to 120% of Haiti's GDP.

At the International Donor Conference of 31 March 2010 in New York, the Government presented a strategy for post earthquake reconstruction and development to the international community. Donors pledged a total of USD 9.8 billion for medium and long-term reconstruction. The EU made a single pledge amounting to EUR 1.235 billion, pooling contributions from the European Commission, 18 EU Member States and the EIB. **Total pledge, including later contributions of the EC, is EUR 522 M.** Furthermore, an allocation of EUR 20 M has recently been decided under the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) initiative for a programme aiming at catalysing progress in MDG 1c.

In order to respond to the new needs and priorities, the EU has mobilised additional resources, adjusted ongoing programmes and adopted new programmes in line with Government's strategic priorities. At the request of the Haitian Government, focal sectors remain Infrastructure and Governance/Decentralisation, key sectors for the medium and long term development of the country.

In addition, the European Commission has mobilised **EUR 23 M for a programme that aims at rebuilding homes** to allow displaced people to return to their neighbourhoods. Important allocations are also earmarked for **Food Security and Agriculture**, under different instruments such as the Food Facility, the Food Security Thematic Programme and the MDG initiative.

Out of the EUR 522 M pledge made by the Commission at the International Donor Conference in New York in March 2010, **EUR 395 M have been committed.** End 2011, the total amount of **payments** in favour of Haiti since January 2010 reached more than **EUR 210 M**, which corresponds to an average of over EUR 100 M per year.

¹ DEVCO Briefing on EU cooperation with Haiti ; <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/393&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> ; EC Factsheet Haiti one year on

1.1 Summary of the EU Pledge

New York – 31 March 2010

Short term - Support for Early Recovery and Reinforcing State Capacity	100,0 M€
Medium Term - Recovery / Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Phase	200,0 M€
Increase 10 th EDF B-envelope (emergency reserve)	60,0 M€
Increase 10 th EDF A-envelope (programmable aid)	100,0 M€
TOTAL	460,0 M€

Additional Funds since New York

Additional funds available for reconstruction and development	29,0 M€
Support to the electoral process	5,0 M€
V Flex allocation 2010	26,0 M€
Pilot project for Microfinance for Agriculture in Haiti	2,0 M€
TOTAL	62,0 M€

GRAND TOTAL	522 M€
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2. HAITI PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC SERVICES ²

Prior to the earthquake, Haiti's public administration was already suffering from serious structural problems. Like the other national institutions, it did not have the trust of the population, who perceived it to be incapable of supplying essential services and affected by endemic corruption. The lack of technical skills and diligence and lack of resources greatly limited the capacity to meet the population's demands for basic services. A major reform of the public administration, in particular the Framework Programme for State Reform aimed at modernising the administration and decentralisation, was under way.

Following the earthquake, the public administration has sustained very high human and material losses. The destruction of office equipment, files and computer data has affected several key Ministries which were in the affected buildings, constituting major damage for the sector. The destruction of buildings such as the National Palace, the Prime Minister's Office, the Parliament and the Law Courts constitutes an inestimable symbolic loss for the nation of Haiti.

² http://www.refondation.ht/resources/PDNA_Working_Document.pdf

2.1 Budgetary control³

During 2004-2006, the Haitian Government made significant progress in the implementation of economic governance reforms. These included actions to improve the legal framework, create and strengthen core public institutions, and enhance financial management processes and procedures. Despite this progress, Haiti's country financial and accountability and procurement systems still face significant challenges.

The structure of Haiti's public spending, in particular the investment budget is mainly determined by foreign aid flows. Volatility of aid flows, limited absorptive capacity, and poor budget planning have resulted in low execution rates.

Despite a relatively comprehensive institutional and legislative framework, the internal and external oversight of the budget is not effective given the lack of capacity of the Institutions. Internal controls are very weak or not yet functioning. External controls are limited by the capacity of the Supreme Audit Institution: le Cour Supérieure des Comptes et du Contentieux Administrative (CSCCA).

The role of the parliament has been limited to the approval of draft appropriation laws during the past few years. Budget Review Acts as well as annual audit reports of the CSCCA, when available, were not subjected to parliamentary oversight.

3. EU RESPONSE TO THE EARTHQUAKE⁴

The earthquake of January 2010 in Haiti took place while the new institutions resulting from the Lisbon Treaty were being put in place. The new Commission was in the process of being nominated when the earthquake struck. The joint planning mechanisms between the Commission and the Member States which were established by the Lisbon Treaty were implemented and tested in practice for the first time. An extraordinary session of the Foreign Affairs Council was organized on 18 January, 6 days after the disaster. As soon as they had been nominated, the High Representative and the Commissioners were very active in providing coordination between the Haitian government, the United Nations (UN), the US government and the Secretary General's Special Envoy, Bill Clinton.

3.1 Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection⁵

The disaster took place only a few days after the European Civil Protection mechanism had been integrated into Directorate General Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO). Even though the integration was not yet running completely smoothly, this new DG ECHO department was able to ensure that there was a certain amount of coherence in the deployment of search and rescue teams, equipment and Member States' emergency relief thanks to past experience (when it had been attached to the Directorate-General for the Environment).

³ http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&theSitePK=523679&entityID=000333037_20080416035906&searchMenuPK=64187283&theSitePK=523679

⁴ http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2011/Groupe-URD_evaluation_Haiti_en.pdf ;

⁵ <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/393&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> ; http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2011/Groupe-URD_evaluation_Haiti_en.pdf ; http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/Haiti_general_handout_en.pdf

The European Union provided fast-track humanitarian aid for Haiti immediately after the earthquake struck with more than €300 million provided by the Commission and EU Member States for relief efforts in the country. The Commission's own emergency relief package was worth **EUR 122 million** distributed by DG ECHO (including €3 million in fast track funds allocated less than 24 hours after the earthquake struck, + over EUR 8 million of ongoing projects in Haiti being redirected, + Emergency Decision of EUR 19 million and a Decision of EUR 90 million follow up assistance was adopted on the 4th March). DG ECHO also reacted promptly by dispatching expert staff: 8 technical assistants that were in place just 14 hours after the earthquake.

Just before 2011 ended the European Commission allocated a further EUR 3 million to the 2011 humanitarian aid budget for Haiti. It brings the total of the European Commission's 2011 humanitarian funding to Haiti to **EUR 38.5 million**⁶. In 2012 the Commission has set aside **EUR 15.25 million** in humanitarian aid for Haiti. The 3 main focuses for this funding will be: response to displacement, cholera response and disaster risk reduction⁷.

For a complete overview of the ECHO earthquake response, see ANNEX 1, 2, 3⁸, 4 and 5⁹. For a complete overview of contracts with ECHO partners in 2010 and 2011 see ANNEX 7a and 7b.

3.2 Development and Cooperation Aid¹⁰

Beyond humanitarian aid, the medium and long-term support of the European Commission to Haiti is based on existing programmes (Haiti being already a priority country for the EU before the earthquake). Development and reconstruction programmes have multiannual implementation periods, over which programme activities are gradually put in place. This means that effective disbursements are spread over the whole duration of the programme according to advancement of activities. The Commission acts in the framework of joint programming of aid with other EU donors to enable a more efficient repartition of the tasks. Some Member States chose to be active in alternative areas to complement the Commission's work.

The EC's total allocation (2008-2013) foreseen for Haiti under the 10th European Development Fund (EDF) amounts to **EUR 551.8 million** (ANNEX 2B). After the earthquake a certain number of programmes, adopted end 2009, were revised and reworded in view of the post-earthquake context and finalised on this basis. Other ongoing programmes were extended, reoriented and/or topped up to better respond to the revised priorities and to face the additional needs. New programmes were also adopted. For a complete overview of programmes see ANNEX 6. For an overview of contracts with NGO's and other civil society organisations that received grants in 2010 and 2011 see Annex 7c¹¹.

⁶ http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/2012/20120104_en.htm

⁷ http://ec.europa.eu/echo/aid/caribbean_pacific/haiti_en.htm

⁸ http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/201201_factsheet_haiti2_en.pdf

⁹ http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/201201_factsheet_haiti2_en.pdf

¹⁰ http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/country-cooperation/haiti/haiti_en.htm ;

http://europa.eu/press_room/pdf/factsheet_haiti_4-1_en.pdf ; DEVCO Briefing on EU cooperation with haiti

¹¹ The complete list of beneficiaries of grants and contracts is published on a yearly basis on: <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/funding/beneficiaries/index.cfm?lang=en>

3.3 General Budget Support¹²

Since the earthquake, the European Commission has disbursed a total amount of **83.8 M€** through general budget support, allowing the Haitian government to maintain critical expenditure notably in education, health and security.

Four disbursements were processed between January 2010 and September 2010, in the framework of the General Budget Support Programme in force at the time of the earthquake and the Budget Support Component of the Food Facility allocation for Haiti:

01/03/2010	5.000.000
23/04/2010	30.000.000
21/09/2010	5.800.000
21/09/2010	17.000.000
TOTAL	57.800.000

To enable these disbursements in the very challenging post-earthquake context, a series of special measures were taken:

- Less than three weeks after the earthquake, a technical mission was sent to Haiti to assess the situation and make recommendations for strengthening the administration's PFM framework.
- On the basis of these recommendations, disbursements were subject to the fulfilment of a certain number of additional accompanying measures, in addition to the standard eligibility criteria, to ensure sufficient guarantees for disbursement.
- Several indicators linked to the performance assessment of the variable tranche were neutralised on the basis of "force majeure", as explicitly foreseen in the Financing Agreement.
- One tranche was frontloaded from fiscal year 2010/2011 to 2009/2010, through a rider to the Financing Agreement.

In September 2010, the new General Budget Support Programme for a total amount of **EUR 47 M** was adopted to cover fiscal **years 2010 till 2013**. The disbursement of the first tranche of EUR 26 M was suspended during the long and complex electoral process, but could still be processed after announcement of the final results within the first semester 2011, in line with International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasts. This disbursement was critical to allow the Haitian government to comply with its commitments under the ongoing IMF programme.


¹² DEVCO Briefing on EU cooperation with haiti

4. IMPLEMENTATION

4.1 Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection¹³

The European Commission's humanitarian aid in Haiti is implemented by its partners in the field. Of the 122 million euro that constitute ECHO's response in 2010 to the earthquake emergency and the cholera epidemic, almost two thirds was funding for Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO's). The second group which received more ECHO funds were the United Nation's different agencies, followed by the Red Cross Movement and other international organizations.

DG ECHO had some difficulty with disbursements of aid in Haiti, whether for the emergency decisions (EUR 19 million allocated in response to the earthquake and EUR 10 million in response to the cholera epidemic) or the ad hoc decision (90 million Euros allocated for 18 months). Figure 1¹⁴ shows the rhythm at which the money from the ad hoc decision was disbursed from 1 March 2010.



The ad hoc decision began on 1 March 2010 for a period of 18 months. Over the first three months, from March to May, around EUR 43 M were disbursed via 14 contracts, often for very large amounts, which were established with NGOs (such as Concern Worldwide: EUR 5.2 M and Save the Children: EUR 3.6 M), Red Cross Movement organisations (French Red Cross: EUR 5.6 M) and United Nations agencies (WFP: EUR 12 M ; IOM: EUR 4 M). From May to October, 24 contracts were signed, often for small amounts. At the end of October, EUR 15 M had yet to be allocated from the ad hoc envelope.

Figure 1 - Source : Groupe URD based on the operational files of DG ECHO projects

DG ECHO's partners had difficulty carrying out their programmes within the strict timeframes imposed by the emergency decisions (limited duration of 6 months). As a consequence, a large number of amendments had to be signed to re-adjust the projects in a rapidly changing context. Also, in a context which has received an enormous amount of media attention, there was a great deal of political pressure because they had to be present in the country and carry out the disbursement rapidly despite the fact that a lot of money was already present in the country and actors' capacity was saturated. Contrary to other crises and contexts, "large" NGOs received a lot of funding and encountered very little difficulty in funding their own crisis response strategies. As DG ECHO is often perceived to be a demanding donor, these NGOs did not always come to it first.

¹³ EEAS Factsheet EU humanitarian aid in Haiti August 2011 ;

http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2011/Groupe-URD_evaluation_Haiti_en.pdf

¹⁴ http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2011/Groupe-URD_evaluation_Haiti_en.pdf page 20

DG ECHO also claims that it had difficulty disbursing because of the low quality of the proposals which were submitted. The size of the ad-hoc decision caused numerous problems as the financial regulations which DG ECHO has to follow do not allow funds to be kept in reserve or allocated by phase. In order to overcome these problems, the decision was made to fund large contracts, particularly during the first months. In the end, the cholera crisis allowed the funds left over to be spent usefully.

4.2 Development and Cooperation Aid¹⁵

Part of the EU's development assistance has been channelled through General Budget Support. Budget support disbursements after the earthquake enabled the Government to keep functioning and secure priority expenditure and provision of basic services. As one of the largest providers of Budget Support in the country, the EU has managed to demonstrate substantial leverage capacity and impact on the policy dialogue, notably in the field of Public Finance Management. All disbursements made since the earthquake have been sampled and screened by the Court of Auditors in the context of the DAS exercise. The preliminary findings did not report any material errors.

Notwithstanding these achievements, implementation of EU Development Assistance to Haiti over 2010 and 2011 has been particularly challenging. Identification and formulation of programmes has been hampered by several factors, not least the long and complex electoral process with the absence of a formal Government until October 2011. In particular, the structural weakness of Haitian administrations and the related difficulties to steer the reconstruction process, to take strategic decisions and to coordinate the international aid efforts, have delayed the formulation of programmes and their implementation on the ground. For example, the formulation of the "Programme d'Appui à la reconstruction et à l'aménagement de quartiers pour faciliter le retour des populations sinistrées" has been hampered by the lack of a clearly defined Housing Strategy. Equally, the "Programme intérimaire d'Appui à la Gouvernance et à l'Investissement Local en Haïti" has suffered delays in the absence of a formal Government in place that should define the legal and strategic framework for the decentralisation process.

In this context, it should be noted that disbursements levels as such are determined by several parameters. Indeed, unlike humanitarian and emergency assistance, development aid is implemented over several years. Besides, the efficient implementation of activities requires a certain number of preparatory phases, such as for example feasibility studies or geological studies which are indispensable to define the best technical solutions, or procurement procedures needed to select solid contractors and guarantee best value for money. Finally, funds are disbursed according to advancement of activities. This explains why the rhythm of disbursements increases gradually over the years.

¹⁵ DEVCO Briefing on EU cooperation with haiti

5. RESPONSE TO CHOLERA EPIDEMIC¹⁶

A total of **EUR 12 million** which had not been used from the ad hoc decision of 90 million Euros in preparation for the Cyclone season, was re-allocated to respond to the cholera crisis which has been raging in Haiti since October 2010. In addition, a special cholera allocation of **EUR 10 million** was made to strengthen the response capacity. Also, the European Commission allocated funds for the emergency and reconstruction response via other financial instruments such as the Instrument for Stability (**EUR 20 million**¹⁷) and the B envelope (**EUR 23 million** of which for the issue of shelters), but did not re-orientate its development aid to emergency aid to any significant level.

Discussions between the partners often allowed funds which had already been allocated for the earthquake response to be re-allocated to the fight against the epidemic. DG ECHO tried to fund actors in all regions in order to achieve the broadest geographical coverage possible. This was initially made easier by the presence of organisations involved in the Health and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) sectors who were already established in the field due to the Global Plan, launched in 2009, such as Action Contre la Faim (ACF), Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED), OXFAM, Doctors of the World (MdM), CESVI and TdM. Further organizations then arrived to complement these.




Figure 2 - 2010 cholera epidemic response¹⁸

The time taken to deploy new WASH teams in the field was relatively long despite the fact that funding was made available rapidly by DG ECHO. On 19 November 2010, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) complained about the slowness of deployments in response to the cholera crisis despite the massive presence of international organisations in the field. For MSF, the fact that the epidemic had already caused more than 1 100 deaths and that there had been at least 20.000 cases in the country in less than a month (according to the national authorities) raised questions about whether the gravity of the situation had really been understood.

¹⁶ http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2011/Groupe-URD_evaluation_Haiti_en.pdf ;

http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2011/Groupe-URD_evaluation_Haiti_en.pdf


¹⁷ European Commission, Commission decision on Adoption of an Exceptional Assistance Measure under the Instrument for Stability to support the restoration of Haitian Government crisis preparedness capacity, draft.

¹⁸ http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/201201_factsheet_haiti2_en.pdf

ANNEX 1a

Haiti before the earthquake

Humanitarian assistance in Haiti:
81 million €, 1995 - 2009





The European Commission, through its Humanitarian Department, DG ECHO, has been supporting vulnerable populations in Haiti for the last 15 years. This assistance, totalling approximately 81 MEUR, has focused on responding to the emergency needs caused by natural hazards and socio-economic crisis, as well as disaster risk reduction. DG ECHO responded swiftly at the end of the 1990s and in 2004 to social and economic problems caused by political instability, to the 2004 hurricanes and floods in the countryside and Gonaives, and to the three consecutive hurricanes in 2008. In 2008, due to the high level of vulnerability that was identified in the country, DG ECHO re-opened a field office to more closely manage humanitarian operations and step up efforts to identify and address malnutrition and mother-child mortality through a comprehensive multi-sector response.

ANNEX 1b

2010 Haiti earthquake

Immediate response



Shelter: 7.8 M€

- Emergency Shelter:
 - Distribution of tents, plastic sheeting and building materials
 - Distribution of Non Food Relief Items: jerry cans, blankets, kitchen sets, mosquito nets, etc.
- Camp Management and Protection:
 - Site Identification, site planning and reorganization
 - Coordination and data collection in camps and sites (including security)

Food: 6.6 M€

- Food:
 - Provision of Ready to Eat Meals (January 2010)
 - Contribution to the global response targeting 4.5 million monthly food rations (February and March 2010)
 - Food and/or Cash For Work activities (April 2010 onwards)
- Nutrition:
 - Treatment and prevention of acute malnutrition in settlements (Ready to Use Therapeutic Food)
 - Blanket supplementary feeding for under-5s
 - Vouchers for access to fresh food available in markets
 - Breast feeding promotion

Health: 5.2 M€

- Provision of primary health care services (preventive and curative) in the directly affected areas through:
 - Emergency Response Units (basic health care unit and surgical unit)
 - Mobile clinics
 - Support to existing health facilities
 - Support to orthopedics, prosthetics and physiotherapy programmes
 - Psychosocial support and "baby tents"
- Provision of essential medicines and medical supplies to national authorities and humanitarian actors
- Support to Health Cluster coordination

Water, sanitation & hygiene: 6 M€

- Water
 - Distribution of safe water
 - Chlorination of water
 - Distribution of buckets
- Sanitation & Hygiene:
 - Provision of emergency latrines
 - Provision of de-sludging trucks
 - Distribution of hygiene kits
 - Hygiene promotion and training of promoters

Disaster Risk Reduction: 1.5 M€

- Reduction of vulnerability through:
 - Community based disaster preparedness (DIPECHO)
 - Hurricane preparedness
 - Mitigation works in camps
 - Advocacy for building back better




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ANNEX 1c:

Beyond the immediate response


What are we doing?

- Amount: 90 million €
- Beneficiaries: 4 million
- Areas of intervention: Port-au-Prince; Gressier/Leogane/Jacmel Triangle; Provinces hosting displaced population; National.
- Sectors of intervention: Shelter, Camp Management, Non Food Items, Water Sanitation and Hygiene, Health, Nutrition, Food Assistance, Coordination and Logistics, Protection, Disaster Risk Reduction.
- Constraints/ pending:
 - ⇒ Delays in Temporary Shelter solutions (land ownership issues, rubble removal in individual plots, lack of suitable public land for organized new temporary settlements)
 - ⇒ Lack of urban development strategy (mainly Port-au-Prince)
 - ⇒ Waste management
 - ⇒ Hurricane season and emergency preparedness
 - ⇒ Complexity of the transition between acute emergency and reconstruction/development
 - ⇒ Political and security context requiring presence of UN stabilization mission



http://ec.europa.eu/echo/index_en.htm

ANNEX 2a:



ANNEX 2b: 10th EDF Allocations (2008-2013)


	Allocations before Earthquake (€)	Additional allocations after Earthquake (€)
Programmable Aid (Envelope A)	291.000.000	100.000.000
Emergency reserve (Envelope B)	13.600.000	60.000.000
Regional Programme Caribbean	8.700.000	
Food Crisis	2.500.000	
Vulnerability FLEX 2009	30.000.000	
Vulnerability FLEX 2010		26.000.000
MDG initiative (MDG 1c)		20.000.000
SUBTOTALS	345.800.000	206.000.000
TOTAL 10th EDF		551.800.000

Other INSTRUMENTS (2008-2013)

Instrument	Amount (€)
Food Facility	20.000.000
Food Security Thematic Programme	24.000.000
European Initiative Democracy and Human Rights	6.000.000
Non State Actors/Local Authorities Thematic Programme	25.000.000
Instrument for Stability	25.000.000
EP Pilot Project Rural Micro-Finance	2.000.000
TOTAL Other Instruments	102.000.000


ANNEX 3:

European Commission earthquake response at a glance




ANNEX 4:

EU assistance to Haiti by sector



ANNEX 5:

2011 ECHO Strategy in Haiti



ANNEX 6 - DEVCO Aid Programmes

Programmes, adopted end 2009 that were revised and reworded in view of the post-earthquake context and finalised on this basis:

Programme d'Appui à la Politique Nationale des Transports	145.000.000
Programme d'Appui à la Gouvernance et à l'Investissement Local	5.500.000
Programme d'Appui à la Société Civile	7.800.000
Programme d'Appui aux Initiatives Culturelles	3.700.000
Food Facility – Budget Support component	5.800.000

Other ongoing programmes that were extended, reoriented and/or topped up to better respond to the revised priorities and to face the additional needs:

Top-up of existing programme to allow Rehabilitation of the two Bridges Mapou and Godin, particularly vulnerable in case of hurricane and flooding and serving as exit route from Port au Prince.	5.100.000
Top-up and reorientation of the Programme "Informations Territoriales pour le Développement", in order to compensate for the 100% destruction of infrastructure and equipment and to foresee training of the new team.	3.500.000
Top-up and reorientation of the "Programme d'Appui à la Qualité de l'Education" to reorient funding from the Training Component, to the rehabilitation of classrooms, purchase of schoolbooks and distribution of school kits.	6.200.000
Top-up and reorientation of the Programme "Facilité de Coopération Technique", to cover for increased needs in identification and formulation studies.	650.000
Adjustment of the General Budget Support Programme I, to include accompanying measures and frontload the last tranche.	35.000.000
Reorientation and extension of the duration of the "Programme d'Appui à la Formation professionnelle", to allow implementation of revised activities.	5.500.000
Top-up of the "Programme d'Appui à la Stratégie Nationale des Transports" to include the Rehabilitation of the Road stretch between Jimani/Malpasse at the Dominican border.	10.000.000
Top-up of the EP Pilot Project for Micro-Credits in rural areas, to face additional needs of rural communities in supporting family members fleeing the capital city.	2.000.000

Following new programmes were adopted:

2010	
General Budget Support Programme II	47.000.000
Rehabilitation of Ministries and Decentralised administrations	27.000.000
Cash for work Programme (Instrument for Stability)	5.000.000
Programme for Disaster Prevention (Instrument for Stability)	15.000.000
Support to Electoral Cycle (Instrument for Stability)	5.000.000

2011	
Support to the reconstruction and urban development of neighbourhoods in Port au Prince, to allow the return of displaced people	23.000.000
Bi-national Programme between Haiti and the Dominican Republic	18.700.000
Support to the "Ministère du Commerce et de l'Industrie"	4.500.000
Support to the Office of the National Authorising Officer	3.800.000
Rehabilitation of Ministries and Decentralised administrations	27.000.000

The following programmes are foreseen for 2012 and 2013:

Programmes	2012	2013
Top up of General Budget Support Programme II	30.000.000	
MDG Initiative (MDG 1c)	20.000.000	
Governance / Decentralisation		18.000.0000
Infrastructures in the Northern region		70.000.000
Reserve		7.000.000
Total	50.000.000	95.000.000

ANNEX 7a: ECHO Contracts 2010

CONTRACT TITLE	PARTNER'S SHORT NAME	BEGIN OF OPERATION DATE	END OF OPERATION DATE	CONTRACT AMOUNT
Emergency assistance to persons with injuries and persons with disabilities, through provision of essential rehabilitation support, both specific and basic.	HANDICAP (FR)	15/02/2010	14/08/2010	1.002.568
Réponse WASH aux besoins urgents des populations sinistrées suite au tremblement de terre	SOLIDARITES	16/01/2010	15/07/2010	575.000
Mass Sanitation Module Emergency Response Unit (ERU - MSM20) Haiti - supporting humanitarian aid operations after the earthquake	CROIX-ROUGE - AUT	13/01/2010	12/07/2010	454.533
Direct cares and rehabilitation of the victims of the earthquake in Haiti	HANDICAP (BEL)	15/01/2010	14/07/2010	500.000
Temporary shelter for the vulnerable people affected by earthquake in Haiti	CROIX-ROUGE - FIN	18/02/2010	17/08/2010	1.998.900
Logistic support for mass sanitation in Haiti	CARE - FR	04/02/2010	03/08/2010	789.393
Medical mobile outreach service, rehabilitation services and psychosocial support to earthquake victims in Haiti	DIE JOHANNITER, (DEU)	01/02/2010	31/07/2010	494.627
Assistance médicale et sanitaire auprès de populations affectées par le tremblement de terre du 12 janvier 2010 dans le quartier de Martissant à Port au Prince	AMI - FRA	30/01/2010	29/06/2010	500.000
Haiti earthquake - Information Management	MAPACT	13/01/2010	12/04/2010	81.211
Humanitarian assistance to victims of earthquake in the Republic of Haiti	CROIX-ROUGE - ESP	13/01/2010	12/07/2010	1.134.200
Water, Sanitation and Shelter emergency assistance to people affected by the earthquake in Haiti	CROIX-ROUGE - FRA	13/01/2010	12/07/2010	1.600.000
Life-saving assistance to vulnerable earthquake victims in Haiti	CONCERN WORLDWIDE	18/01/2010	17/07/2010	1.000.000
Provision of emergency relief to earthquake-affected populations in Haiti	ACTED	15/01/2010	14/07/2010	1.139.086
Debris removal through cash for work by earthquake victims in Jacmel	GERMAN AGRO ACTION	20/01/2010	19/07/2010	1.145.276
Immediate transitional shelters for earthquake affected communities of Haiti	UNOPS	01/04/2010	30/09/2010	2.000.000
Health Response to Haiti Earthquake – 12 January 2010	PAHO	13/01/2010	12/07/2010	500.000
Provision of assistance to vulnerable children and care-givers affected by the Haiti earthquake	PLAN INTERNATIONAL UK	18/02/2010	17/08/2010	387.297
Intervention d'urgence en Sécurité Alimentaire suite au tremblement de terre dans la région de Port au Prince (Haïti) le 12 janvier 2010	ACF - FRA	01/02/2010	31/07/2010	2.000.000
Post Earthquake Emergency Medical Aid for Vulnerable Populations in Léogâne Region	MALTESER HILFSDIENST	15/01/2010	14/07/2010	400.000
Disaster Response Support Service (DRSS) in Haiti	REDR	01/04/2010	30/09/2010	349.782
Emergency response coordination for Haiti	OCHA	01/05/2010	31/10/2010	948.127
Camp Coordination and Camp Management Operations for Earthquake Victims in Haiti	IOM	15/04/2010	14/07/2011	3.977.029
Improving the living conditions of the population affected by the earthquake of January 2010 in the Southeast Department of Haiti	OIKOS	01/04/2010	31/08/2011	1.600.001
Logistics, Telecommunications Augmentation and Coordination for relief Operations in response to the EQ in Haiti	WFP-PAM	01/04/2010	31/03/2011	4.000.000

CONTRACT TITLE	PARTNER'S SHORT NAME	BEGIN OF OPERATION DATE	END OF OPERATION DATE	CONTRACT AMOUNT
Réponses aux urgences post séisme et relance de l'agriculture dans les zones rurales du département de l'Ouest	SOLIDARITES	01/04/2010	31/08/2011	1.428.000
Evaluation des bâtiments d'habitation et réponse adaptée pour un logement de transition pour les sinistrés du séisme du 12 janvier en Haïti	ADU_04	15/03/2010	14/04/2011	979.044
Assisting earthquake-affected people in the rural areas of the West Department	GVC	01/05/2010	31/08/2011	1.136.381
Support à la livraison d'eau par camion dans l'aire métropolitaine de Port au Prince	ACF - FRA	01/05/2010	31/12/2010	2.545.000
Food Assistance to Earthquake Affected Populations in Haiti	WFP-PAM	01/04/2010	30/06/2011	9.000.000
Renforcement et réparation de l'habitat des ménages les plus vulnérables dans les communes de Carrefour et Léogâne	CARE - FR	01/06/2010	28/02/2011	2.996.259
Reducing the Vulnerability of Urban Populations - Concern Urban Response to 2010 Haiti Earthquake and subsequent rainy season (CUR2010)	CONCERN WORLDWIDE	01/04/2010	30/06/2011	5.210.619
Projet d'amélioration des conditions de vie des populations sinistrées par le séisme du 12 janvier 2010	CROIX-ROUGE - FRA	15/05/2010	31/08/2011	5.550.000
Reducing the Vulnerability of Rural Populations - Concern Rural Response to the 2010 Haiti Earthquake (CRR2010)	CONCERN WORLDWIDE	07/05/2010	31/08/2011	2.421.589
Emergency Assistance for Earthquake Affected Communities in Haiti	IMC UK	01/07/2010	30/06/2011	2.000.000
Emergency Livelihood Support and Disaster Risk Reduction amongst Earthquake Affected Communities in southern Haiti	GERMAN AGRO ACTION	18/06/2010	17/08/2011	1.949.357
Shelter Assistance to Earthquake Victims	ASF - DNK	01/08/2010	30/04/2011	750.000
Programme d'appui à la coordination des activités de gestion des risques et désastres en Haïti	UNDP-PNUD	15/08/2010	31/08/2011	1.000.450
Emergency Health, Nutrition, Water & Sanitation and Food Security for Children and families affected by the Earthquake in Haiti	SAVE THE CHILDREN - UK	18/05/2010	31/08/2011	3.556.788
To create a safe and dignified environment in earthquake affected schools in the West Department	CESVI	01/09/2010	31/08/2011	772.729
Improvement of Living conditions in IDP Camps through Water Supply and Technical Interventions and Enhancement of the Capacity of Civil Protection Actors	THW	01/05/2010	31/10/2010	1.201.824
Réduction de l'impact immédiat du séisme sur la santé physique et mentale et la protection des personnes affectées de Port au Prince	MDM - FRA	12/05/2010	31/03/2011	2.000.000
Post-earthquake relief and reconstruction	TEARFUND - UK	01/08/2010	31/08/2011	1.000.000
Projet de relèvement immédiat, de prévention et de gestion des risques et désastres dans le Département du Sud Est, Haïti	ACP	01/09/2010	31/08/2011	849.837
Programme d'appui à la Croix Rouge pour la réduction de la vulnérabilité des populations à haut risque	IFRC-FICR	24/08/2010	31/08/2011	999.763
Soutien à la reprise des activités médicales dans le Nord Artibonite suite à l'arrivée de populations déplacées fuyant Port-au-Prince	CAM	01/10/2010	31/08/2011	499.792
Effective Human Waste management	UNOPS	15/09/2010	31/08/2011	2.021.571
Appui à la lutte contre la malnutrition et la mortalité en Haïti par le renforcement de la sécurité alimentaire des populations les plus vulnérables dans les zones d'accueil des ménages sinistrés par le séisme	FAO	01/10/2010	31/08/2011	812.879
Proposal for Earthquake Relief: Community-based Integrated Mental Health / Psychosocial Support Program in the earthquake-affected areas and areas of displacement of the earthquake-affected population in Haiti	CORDAID	01/10/2010	31/08/2011	755.000
Strengthening shelter response in earthquake-affected Haiti	UNOPS	01/10/2010	14/08/2011	4.095.147

CONTRACT TITLE	PARTNER'S SHORT NAME	BEGIN OF OPERATION DATE	END OF OPERATION DATE	CONTRACT AMOUNT
Response to Cholera Outbreak in Haiti	OXFAM - UK	22/10/2010	22/04/2011	2.700.000
Provision of appropriate and quality services for the people in need of rehabilitation care in Haiti	HANDICAP (FR)	01/10/2010	31/08/2011	1.995.373
Integrated Emergency Protection Response to Haitian Earthquake	IRC - UK	15/10/2010	31/08/2011	977.158
Soutien aux personnes vulnérables vivant dans les zones accueillant de nombreux déplacés suite au séisme du 12 janvier 2010 dans le Nord Artibonite	ACF - FRA	01/09/2010	31/08/2011	1.515.480
Réponse d'urgence suite à l'éruption de choléra dans les zones affectées par l'épidémie	ACF - FRA	23/10/2010	22/04/2011	758.000
Humanitarian assistance to victims of earthquake in the republic of Haïti: phase II	CROIX-ROUGE - ESP	01/10/2010	31/08/2011	1.753.183
Prévention du choléra sur les berges du fleuve Artibonite, communes de Saint-Marc, Grande Saline et Marchand Dessalines	ACTED	22/10/2010	21/04/2011	753.447
Réponse à l'épidémie de cholera dans les départements de l'Ouest et de la Grande Anse - Haïti	MDM - FRA	22/10/2010	21/04/2011	1.450.000
Réponse d'urgence à l'épidémie de diarrhées aiguës (notamment Cholera) en Haïti à travers une approche intégrée	SOLIDARITES	23/10/2010	22/04/2011	2.021.067
Health Response to the Cholera Outbreak in Haiti	PAHO	15/11/2010	14/05/2011	1.450.000
Projet de réponse à l'Urgence Choléra en Haïti	CROIX-ROUGE - FRA	22/10/2010	21/04/2011	1.439.056
Response to the Cholera Epidemic in the Department of Grand Anse Haiti	CROIX-ROUGE - DEU	25/11/2010	24/05/2011	703.803
Concern Haiti Cholera Response Project (CRP)	CONCERN WORLDWIDE	22/10/2010	21/02/2011	668.750
Coordination of the Haiti shelter cluster	UNCHS - HABITAT	12/11/2010	09/08/2011	400.000
Mitigation works in IDP-camps that will exist over a longer period, assistance in the surrounding neighbourhoods.	THW	01/11/2010	30/06/2011	1.652.829
Projet pilote d'appui à la réinstallation des personnes sinistrées dans leur quartier d'origine	SOLIDARITES	01/10/2010	31/08/2011	3.152.876
Coordination and Representation of International NGOs working in Haïti	OXFAM - UK	01/11/2010	31/08/2011	225.000
Emergency Water chlorination for Haiti's Port au Prince and metropolitan area	CARE - FR	16/03/2011	31/08/2011	375.921
Reducing vulnerability of IDP population in relation to public health risk in priority IDP camps in Port au Prince, Haiti	IOM	01/07/2011	31/08/2011	100.000
Provision of basic health care services for the vulnerable people affected by earthquake in Haiti	CROIX-ROUGE - FIN	15/01/2010	14/04/2010	700.000
Humanitarian aid for earthquake victims in Haiti	CROIX-ROUGE - DEU	13/01/2010	12/04/2010	340.000
Soins médico-chirurgicaux d'urgence au bénéfice de la population affectée par le tremblement de terre du 12 janvier 2010, Haïti	MDM - FRA	13/01/2010	12/04/2010	300.000
Response to earthquake in Haiti	OXFAM - UK	15/01/2010	14/04/2010	500.000
Support en télécommunications satellitaires et centres de ressources informatiques pour des opérations d'urgence humanitaire en Haïti	TSF, FRANCE	13/01/2010	12/02/2010	60.000
Food assistance to earthquake-affected populations in Haiti	WFP-PAM	13/01/2010	12/04/2010	1.100.000
Réponse à l'épidémie de choléra dans le département des Nippes	MDM-B	01/12/2010	01/06/2011	700.000
Integrated Cholera Response	MERLIN	01/12/2010	30/05/2011	1.181.101

CONTRACT TITLE	PARTNER'S SHORT NAME	BEGIN OF OPERATION DATE	END OF OPERATION DATE	CONTRACT AMOUNT
Réponse Urgence Choléra Haïti	PU-AMI	01/12/2010	31/05/2011	500.000
Réponse d'urgence à l'épidémie de Cholera	COOPI	15/11/2010	30/04/2011	427.800
Réponse urgente à la crise de choléra en Haïti dans les départements de l'Ouest et du Sud	TERRE DES HOMMES - CHE	01/11/2010	30/04/2011	314.481
Emergency cholera awareness, prevention and response initiatives in the Upper Artibonite and Northwest departments of Haiti	CARE - FR	22/10/2010	21/04/2011	764.072
Emergency Cholera Response: GOAL emergency WASH intensification project in response to the threat of a cholera epidemic	GOAL	13/12/2010	12/06/2011	936.565
Cholera Preparedness, Mitigation and Response for Croix des Bouquets and Cité Soleil, Haiti.	TERRE DES HOMMES (TDH) - ITA	01/02/2011	31/07/2011	749.737
Support à la livraison d'eau par camion dans la Zone Métropolitaine de Port au Prince, Haïti	ACF - FRA	01/01/2011	31/05/2011	1.200.000
Emergency Response Support to the Cholera Epidemic in Haiti	GERMAN AGRO ACTION	01/03/2011	31/08/2011	665.198
Réponse post urgente à la crise de choléra en Haïti dans le département du Sud	TERRE DES HOMMES - CHE	01/04/2011	30/09/2011	299.583
Consolidation de l'intervention de prévention du choléra sur les berges du fleuve Artibonite.	ACTED	19/04/2011	18/10/2011	401.990
Programme de réponse d'urgence à l'apparition de nouveaux foyers de contamination de choléra	ACF - FRA	15/04/2011	14/10/2011	441.000
Consolidation de la réponse Choléra en Haïti à travers une approche intégrée	SOLIDARITES	15/04/2011	14/10/2011	504.171
				120.286.699

ANNEX 7b: ECHO Contracts 2011

CONTRACT TITLE	PARTNER'S SHORT NAME	BEGIN OF OPERATION DATE	END OF OPERATION DATE	CONTRACT AMOUNT
Projet de réduction des risques de catastrophes à base communautaire dans le département de l'Artibonite	CROIX-ROUGE - FRA	01/07/2011	30/09/2012	530.000
Disaster Risk Reduction in Haiti: Enhancing disaster preparedness and awareness capacities in three multi-risks exposed communities	GERMAN AGRO ACTION	01/07/2011	30/09/2012	650.000
Gestion des désastres pour les communautés et les institutions de la commune des Gonaïves, département de l'Artibonite.	ACF - FRA	01/07/2011	31/12/2012	680.000
Reducing the vulnerability of urban and rural populations in Haiti to disasters	CONCERN WORLDWIDE	01/07/2011	30/09/2012	699.819
Renforcement des capacités du Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population (MSPP), et des communautés pour la prise en charge et la prévention de la malnutrition aiguë dans le haut Artibonite, Haïti	ACF - FRA	01/01/2011	31/03/2012	870.000
Projet de lutte contre la malnutrition à travers un approche multisectorielle	CESVI	01/01/2011	31/03/2012	933.581
Projet humanitaire d'amélioration de la situation nutritionnelle et sanitaire des enfants de 0 à 5 ans et des femmes enceintes et allaitantes dans le département Sud Haïti.	TERRE DES HOMMES - CHE	01/01/2011	31/03/2012	1.056.576
Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction in the Department of les Nippes	CROIX-ROUGE - DEU	01/07/2011	30/09/2012	400.000
Promotion d'une approche communautaire et différencielle sur la réduction de risque de désastres en la zone métropolitaine de Port au Prince, Haïti	COOPI	01/07/2011	30/09/2012	399.870
Réduction de la vulnérabilité des communautés face aux événements naturels (catastrophes) dans le Département des Nippes	GVC	01/07/2011	30/09/2012	400.000
School-based Disaster Risk Reduction Education in the Municipalities of Petit-Goave and Grand Goave, Department Ouest, Haiti	ASB - DEU	01/07/2011	31/12/2012	315.026
Strengthening Haitian capacities for tsunami early warning and preparedness	UNESCO	01/08/2011	31/10/2012	487.396
Approche multisectorielle pour la réduction de la morbidité et de la mortalité materno-infantiles dans le département de la GA - Haïti	MDM - FRA	01/04/2011	30/06/2012	800.000
Soins Obstétricaux Gratuits à Martissant	PU-AMI	01/01/2011	29/02/2012	700.000
Lutte contre la malnutrition par la diversification de la production vivrière et la maîtrise de l'eau (Phase 2)	INITIATIVE DEVELOPPEMENT	01/07/2011	30/09/2012	451.670
Disaster preparedness to reduce community vulnerability	CROIX-ROUGE - ESP	01/08/2011	31/10/2012	411.555
Expanded Cholera Response to Affected Populations in Haiti	IMC UK	01/07/2011	31/12/2011	499.931
Concern Haiti Cholera Response Project (CRP)	CONCERN WORLDWIDE	20/05/2011	19/12/2011	338.867
Mobile Cholera Prevention Brigades in Haiti	HILFSWERK AUSTRIA	01/09/2011	30/03/2012	399.993
Integrated Medical and Preventative Response to Cholera Outbreak.	MERLIN	01/06/2011	31/01/2012	599.065
Réponse à l'épidémie de choléra dans le Département des Nippes-Haïti	MDM-B	01/06/2011	31/12/2011	648.000
Emergency Obstetric Care in Haiti	MSF - NLD	01/05/2011	30/04/2012	600.000
Response to Cholera Outbreak in Haiti	OXFAM - UK	03/06/2011	02/03/2012	500.000

CONTRACT TITLE	PARTNER'S SHORT NAME	BEGIN OF OPERATION DATE	END OF OPERATION DATE	CONTRACT AMOUNT
Reduction of water transmitted diseases and control of associated epidemic outbreaks in rural communes of Nippes Department, Haiti	GVC	15/08/2011	14/02/2012	500.000
Réduction de la malnutrition et de la morbidité dans l'Artibonite à travers le renforcement de l'accès aux soins et l'amélioration de la prévention multisectorielle	ACTED	20/08/2011	19/06/2012	744.426
Renforcement de la diversification alimentaire et amélioration des capacités de résilience des ménages vulnérables urbains de Port au Prince	ACF - FRA	01/04/2011	30/04/2012	899.239
Projet de développement d'un système de réponse aux pics épidémiques de Choléra en Haïti	CROIX-ROUGE - FRA	01/06/2011	31/01/2012	483.229
Développement d'infrastructures Eau et Assainissement dans 8 quartiers de Port-au-Prince afin d'accompagner le retour des populations affectées par le séisme du 12 janvier 2010	ACF - FRA	01/04/2011	31/03/2012	1.000.000
Renforcement des capacités en Nutrition en Haïti	UNICEF	01/04/2011	30/06/2012	300.000
Renforcement de la sécurité alimentaire et de l'accès aux services de base des Personnes en Situation de Handicap (PSH) en Haïti	HANDICAP (FR)	01/09/2011	31/08/2012	606.190
Reponse aux besoins de santé primaire et secondaire aux populations de Léogane suite au séisme.	MSF - CHE	01/01/2011	31/03/2012	600.000
Projet de soutien à la réinstallation durable des populations sinistrées dans leur quartier d'origine par la diminution de leur vulnérabilité aux risques environnementaux et sanitaires	SOLIDARITES	01/09/2011	31/08/2012	1.272.025
Réponse à l'épidémie de choléra dans le département de la Grande Anse (GA) - Haïti	MDM - FRA	01/06/2011	31/01/2012	650.000
Joint Advocacy and Representation of International NGOs Working in Haiti	OXFAM - UK	01/09/2011	31/08/2012	149.193
Concern's Urban Response II: Supporting return to neighbourhoods and care and maintenance in camps	CONCERN WORLDWIDE	01/09/2011	30/11/2012	1.027.771
Rebuilding the livelihoods of earthquake-affected communities	CONCERN WORLDWIDE	01/10/2011	31/12/2012	2.000.000
Assistance médicale pour les personnes vulnérables sur la zone métropolitaine de Port-au-Prince Haïti	MDM - FRA	01/04/2011	31/03/2012	915.000
Projet de soutien à la réinstallation durable des populations sinistrées dans leur quartier d'origine par la diminution de leur vulnérabilité à l'insécurité alimentaire	SOLIDARITES	01/09/2011	31/08/2012	1.000.000
Improved return solution for earthquake-affected communities of Haiti	UNOPS	01/11/2011	30/04/2012	1.798.872
Mainstreaming protection in the relocation process and establishing a more protective environment in IDP sites	IRC - UK	01/11/2011	31/08/2012	300.163
Programme de renforcement des moyens de subsistance alimentaire et économique des populations victimes du séisme sur leurs zones de vie	CROIX-ROUGE - FRA	01/09/2011	31/10/2012	1.054.314
CARE Haiti: WASH response to cholera outbreak in Grande Anse – WASH complement to medical response by MDM-France	CARE - FR	15/11/2011	14/05/2012	350.000
Enhancing Haitian Red Cross Disaster and Risk Management Capacity	IFRC-FICR	01/11/2011	31/10/2012	500.000
Programme d'autonomisation des populations victimes du séisme du 12 janvier 2010 dans la gestion de leurs zones de vie.	CROIX-ROUGE - FRA	01/09/2011	31/10/2012	1.200.000
Strengthening humanitarian coordination and advocacy in Haiti	OCHA	01/07/2011	31/12/2011	300.000
Transition from emergency to sustainable WASH services, for communities living in earthquake affected areas of Haiti	OXFAM - UK	01/06/2011	31/05/2012	770.592
GBV et Gouvernance a Croix des Bouquets	OXFAM - UK	01/08/2011	31/10/2012	340.909
Shelter & Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) Assistance in earthquake-affected areas of Haiti	IOM	01/11/2011	30/04/2012	484.470

CONTRACT TITLE	PARTNER'S SHORT NAME	BEGIN OF OPERATION DATE	END OF OPERATION DATE	CONTRACT AMOUNT
The Haiti Evaluation and Learning Support Office (ELSO): An innovative mechanism to support learning and evaluation in humanitarian action and in the transition from relief to development	HANDICAP (FR)	01/01/2012	31/12/2012	150.000
				32.767.743

ANNEX 7c: DEVCO contracts 2010 and 2011

DOMAINE	ANNÉE CONTRAT	INTITULÉ	CONTRACTANT	MONTANT	PAYÉ	SOLDE	SECTEUR	LOCALISATION
FED	2011	Amelioration des conditions sanitaires et d'accès a l'eau des populations du Bas Artibonite.	CROIX ROUGE FRANCAISE ASSOCIATION	2.500.000	2.500.000	2.500.000	Distribution d'eau potable de base et assainissement de base	Haiti - Bas Artibonite
FED	2011	Mobilisation des acteurs locaux en Eau, Assainissement et Hygiène pour la réalisation des Objectifs du Millénaire dans les 3 communes du Bas Nord-Ouest, Haïti	ACTION CONTRE LA FAIM	2.500.000	2.500.000	2.500.000	Approvisionnement en eau potable - dispositifs de base	bas Nord'Ouest - Haïti
FED	2011	ProgettoMondo Mlal : - Déployer de nouvelles opportunités de développement socio-économique par l'accès aux énergies durables dans le Plateau Central.	PROGETTOMONDO MOVIMENTO LAICI AMERICA LATINA (PROGETTOMONDO MLAL) ASSOCIAZIONE	1.235.518	1.235.518	1.235.518	Energie solaire	Haïti, Département du Centre, Commune de Hinche.
DCI-ENV	2010	Studies and pilot initiatives to promote environmental sustainability Dominican Republic and Haiti	FONDAZIONE AVSI	928.606	928.606	928.606	Politique de l'environnement et gestion administrative	HAITI ET ST DOMINGUE
DCI-FOOD	2010	Augmentation de la production agricole par le renforcement de la filière laitière à travers l'appui aux initiatives économiques locales et la gestion des ressources naturelles	CESVI FOUNDATION ONLUS ASSOCIAZIONE	1.459.749	1.459.749	1.459.749	Développement agricole	HT
DCI-FOOD	2010	Appui aux filières mangues et avocats à Saut d'Eau	CONCERN WORLDWIDE HAITI ASBL	1.500.000	1.500.000	1.500.000	Développement agricole	Haiti
DCI-FOOD	2010	CAPOSAC: Fonds de crédit et de garantie pour la production agricole	CAISSE POPULAIRE SAINTE ANNE DE CAMP-PERRIN (CAPOSAC) COOPERATIVE	295.500	295.500	295.500	Services financiers agricoles	DEPARTEMENT DU SUD
DCI-FOOD	2010	CAPAJ: Fonds de crédit et de garantie pour la production agricole	CAISSE POPULAIRE POUR L'AVANCEMENT DE JEREMIE (CAPAJ) SOCIETE COOPERATIVE	295.500	295.500	295.500	Services financiers agricoles	DEPARTMENT DE LA GRAND ANSE

DOMAINE	ANNÉE CONTRAT	INTITULÉ	CONTRACTANT	MONTANT	PAYÉ	SOLDE	SECTEUR	LOCALISATION
DCI-FOOD	2010	CAPOSOV: Fonds de crédit et de garantie pour la production agricole	CAISSE POPULAIRE SOLIDARITE DE VERRETTES (CAPOSOV) SOCIETE COOPERATIVE	295.500	295.500	295.500	Services financiers agricoles	DEPARTEMENT D' ARTIBONITE
DCI-FOOD	2010	ANACAPH: Renforcement et Supervision Projets de microcrédit pour la production agricole	ASSOCIATION NATIONALE DES CAISSES POPULAIRES HAITIENNES ASBL	197.000	197.000	197.000	Services financiers agricoles	Nationale: Departements di SUD, Grand Anse, Artibonite et Central
DCI-FOOD	2010	Réhabilitation de la productivité agricole de bassins versants dans le Centre et le Nord-Est de Haiti en soutien à la production fruitière et maraichère	PROGETTOMONDO MOVIMENTO LAICI AMERICA LATINA (PROGETTOMONDO MLAL) ASSOCIAZIONE	970.790	970.790	970.790	Développement agricole	
DCI-FOOD	2010	CORDAID: Sécurité alimentaire pour 550 familles agro-écologiques de Mombin Crochou, Haiti	STICHTING CORDAID	568.574	568.574	568.574	Développement agricole	SUD EST HAITI
DCI-FOOD	2010	COOPECLAS: Fonds de credit et garantie pour la Caisse Populaire Coopeclas	COOPERATIVE D EPARGNE ET DE CREDITLASCAHOBAS ASSOCIATION	295.500	295.500	295.500	Services financiers agricoles	Departement du Centre
DCI-FOOD	2011	KAPTAT - CAISSE POPULAIRE TOUS ENSEMBLE TERRIER ROUGE Fonds de crédit et de garantie pour la production agricole	KES POPILE TET ANSANM TERYE WOUJ SOCIETE COOPERATIVE	295.500	295.500	295.500	Services financiers agricoles	TERRIER ROUGE
DCI-FOOD	2011	KPLKM - Kès Popilè Leve Kanpe Milot - Fondes de crédit et garantie pour la production agricole	KES POPILE LEVE KANPE MILOT COOPERATIVE	295.500	295.500	295.500	Services financiers agricoles	Département du Nord
DCI-NSAPVD	2011	Renforcement des capacités de la commune de Jacmel dans le domaine de la propreté.	MAIRIE DE JACMEL	311.598	311.598	311.598	Traitement des déchets	Haiti, département du Sud-Est, Commune de Jacmel
DCI-NSAPVD	2011	Renforcement des Capacités et Promotion des Investissements dans trois communes du Département du Centre.	COMMUNE DE SAUT D'EAU	499.036	499.036	499.036	Gouvernement et société civile	Haiti Les Communes de Saut d'Eau, Lascahobas Belladère, Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite et St Raphael.
DCI-NSAPVD	2011	Appui aux initiatives locales et accompagnement des acteurs éducatifs dans la chaîne des Cahos	OGANIS POU KORE PWOJE KOMINOTE ASSOCIATION	222.000	222.000	222.000	Politique de l'éducation et gestion administrative	Haiti, Département de l'Artibonite, communes de Petite Rivière de L'Artibonite et

DOMAINE	ANNÉE CONTRAT	INTITULÉ	CONTRACTANT	MONTANT	PAYÉ	SOLDE	SECTEUR	LOCALISATION
								Dessalines
DCI-NSAPVD	2011	Partenariat durable pour le développement local par la promotion du tourisme communautaire à Saut-d'Eau	CONCERN WORLDWIDE	893.945	893.945	893.945	Gouvernement et société civile	Haiti, département du Centre, Saut d'Eau
DCI-NSAPVD	2011	Projet d'appui à la relance de la filière cacao dans la Grand' Anse	MAIRIE DES ABRICOTS	460.134	460.134	460.134	Développement agricole	Haïti, le département de la Grand' Anse, les communes des Abricots, de Dame-Marie, et Chambellan
DCI-NSAPVD	2011	BIBLIOTAPTAP : création de bibliothèques mobiles pour renforcer les capacités locales et promouvoir l'accès aux droits	BIBLIOTHEQUES SANS FRONTIERES ASSOCIATION	399.212	399.212	399.212	Culture et loisirs	Haïti : -
DCI-NSAPVD	2011	KANAPE VE LEVE KANPE Revitalisation de la zone Canapé Vert	STICHTING CORDAID	748.437	748.437	748.437	Développement et gestion urbains	Haïti : Commune de Port-au-Prince, Section Communale Turgeau, Zones Urbaines de Canapé Vert : Villa Rosa
DCI-NSAPVD	2011	Jesyon fatra Kafou Fey (Jefakaf) Dispositif intégré de gestion des ordures ménagères à Port-au-Prince	GROUPE DE RECHERCHE ET D'ECHANGES TECHNOLOGIQUES	485.000	485.000	485.000	Traitement des déchets	Haiti, Port-au-Prince, Quartiers de Petit Descayette et de Fort Mercredi et Savane Pistache
DCI-NSAPVD	2012	De l'aménagement d'espaces de démocratie locale et du renforcement des capacités des élus locaux pour une meilleure gouvernance de la commune de Kenscoff	MAIRIE DE KENSCHOFF	449.678	449.678	449.678	Gouvernement et société civile	Haiti, Oeust, commune de Kenscoff
EIDHR	2010	Hacia una cultura de derechos humanos y coexistencia pacífica en la frontera haitiano-dominicana	CHRISTIAN AID LBG	1.500.000	1.500.000	1.500.000	Droits de la personne	Republique Dominicaine (Dajabon y Montecristi, Elias Pina, Jimani et Pedernales) et Haiti (Nord-est, Fonds-Verettes, Haut et Bas plateau et Anse-a-Pitre).
EIDHR	2010	Observation des elections generales de Novembre 2010	CONSEIL NATIONAL D OBSERVATION DESELECTIONS	300.000	300.000	300.000	Participation démocratique et	Ensemble du territoire national d'Haiti.

DOMAINE	ANNÉE CONTRAT	INTITULÉ	CONTRACTANT	MONTANT	PAYÉ	SOLDE	SECTEUR	LOCALISATION
			ASSOCIATION CNO				société civile	
EIDHR	2010	Observations des Elections législatives et présidentielles en Haïti	RESEAU NATIONAL DE DEFENSE DES DROITS HUMAINS RNDDH ASBL	300.000	300.000	300.000	Participation démocratique et société civile	Les dix (10) départements géographiques du pays
EIDHR	2011	Education, porte d'entrée de la décentralisation: Mise en oeuvre dans le district scolaire de Jean Rabel.	ANSANM POU YON DEMEN MIYO AN AYITI ASSOCIATION	275.000	275.000	275.000	Droits de la personne	Commune de Jean Rabel, Bombardopolis, Môle St-Nicolas, Baie de Henne
EIDHR	2011	Ansanm kont vyolans sou timoun! Ensemble contre la violence à l'égard des enfants	PLAN INTERNATIONAL UK LIMITED BY GUARANTEE	280.000	280.000	280.000	Droits de la personne	Haiti, departement du Nord-Est
EIDHR	2011	Promotion et protection des droits des femmes en Haïti	ASSOCIAZIONE COMUNITA IMPEGNO SERVIZIO VOLONTARIATO	300.000	300.000	300.000	Droits de la personne	Haiti, Port-au-Prince
FED	2010	Gestion des crues dans la Plaine de Moustiques dans une approche GIRE	PROJEKT GROEP VOOR TECHNISCHE ONTWIKKELINGSSAMENWERKING VZW	150.000	150.000	150.000	Ressources en eau à usage agricole	Nationale

**DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION
POLICY DEPARTMENT**

Haiti



COUNTRY BRIEFING 2012

Abstract

On 12 January 2010, an earthquake measuring 7.3 on the Richter scale struck Haiti for 35 seconds. Today, two years after the earthquake, Haiti is still struggling to overcome the impact of the disaster, which claimed the lives of more than 220 000 people and displaced a fifth of the country's total population of 9.9 million.

The international response has been commensurate with the scale of the disaster: a United Nations Donor's Conference held on 31 March 2010 drew pledges of USD 10 billion. But reconstruction has been painfully slow and more than 550 000 people still live in overcrowded camps scattered across Port au Prince. By December 2011, the cholera outbreak that was declared in October 2010 had killed more than 7 000 people, making it one of the world largest epidemics recorded in the region in over a century.

After a contested election process, Michel Martelly was elected president of the country in March 2011. Following five months of political crisis between the newly elected president and the National Assembly, Gary Conille was finally appointed Prime Minister on 18 October 2011. It is widely hoped that his appointment will accelerate the reconstruction process.

FOR EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

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MAP OF HAITI



Map No. 9855 Rev. 4 UNITED NATIONS
June 2008

Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section

1 KEY DATA

Official name: Republic of Haiti

	Data	Source
Population	9 993 247 (2010)	World Bank
Land area	27.560sq km	World Bank
Main towns and population	Port-au-Prince: 2 100 000 Cap-Haïtien: 145 000 Gonaïves: 120 000 Les Cayes: 90 000	EIU Haiti country Report 1st May 2010
Climate	Tropical	EIU Haiti country Report 1st May 2010
Weather in Port-au-Prince (altitude 37 metres)	Hottest month, July, 23-34°C (average daily minimum and maximum); coldest month, January, 20-31°C; driest months: December and January, 33 mm average rainfall; wettest month: May, 231 mm average rainfall	EIU Haiti country Report 1st May 2010
Languages	Creole and French	EIU Haiti country Report 1st May 2010
Currency	1 gourde (G) = 100 centimes. An officially fixed rate of G5: US\$1 was abandoned in favour of a free-market exchange rate in 1991. Average exchange rate in 2009: G41.2:US\$1; exchange rate on April 5th 2010: G39.5:US\$1	EIU Haiti country Report 1st May 2010
Main Religion (and other)	Roman Catholic, 65%; other Christian religions; and over half of the population practice Voodoo (vodou).	Europa World Plus
Measures	Metric system	EIU Haiti country Report 1st May 2010
Time	5 hours behind GMT	EIU Haiti country Report 1st May 2010
GDP (based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) per capita GDP, Current international dollar)	1,329.11(2012 estimate)	International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook Database
Human Development rank	158 (out of 186 countries)	UNDP-Human Development Report 2011
Corruption rank	175 (out of 180 countries)	Transparency International: 2011 Corruption Perception Index
'Ease of Doing Business' rank	174 (out of 183 countries)	World Bank 2012
Press Freedom rank	52 (out of 179)	Reporters without Borders: The Worldwide Press Freedom Index 2012

FORM OF GOVERNMENT

The president, elected for a five-year term, chooses the prime minister from the largest party in the National Assembly; these two then appoint the cabinet, subject to approval by the National Assembly. The Assembly comprises a 99-member Chamber of Deputies (the lower house) and a 30-member Senate (the upper house), which is elected for six-year terms in staggered elections, with one third of seats contested every two years.

HEAD OF STATE

Michel Martelly was elected president with 67,57% of the votes (first round of the presidential elections: 28 November 2010; second round: 20 March 2011)

LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS

The most recent elections for the Chamber of Deputies and for one third of Senate seat took place on 28 November 2010 and 20 March 2011.

Composition of the Chamber of deputies (99 seats):

- INITE (46 seats),
- LAVNI (8 seats),
- Ayiti An Aksyon (8 seats),
- Alternativ (7),
- Ansanm Nou Fo (5),

A number of small parties took the remaining seats: Repons Peyizan, KONBIT, Plateforme Liberation, Rassemble, Pont, etc.

Composition of the Senate :

A total of 10 seats were contested in the latest legislative elections. INITE won 6 of these seats and Alternativ 4.

The composition of the Senate is as follows:

- INITE (15),
- Alternativ (4),
- Fusion des Sociaux-Démocrates Haïtiens (3)

The remaining seats are taken by small parties: Ayiti an Aksyon, KONBA, PONT, "Organisation du Peuple en lutte" and La Fanmi Lavalas.

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

Prime Minister Garry CONILLE (since 18 October 2011)

Composition of the Government¹

Thierry MAYARD-PAUL	Minister of Interior, Territorial Collectivities and National Defense
Pierre Michel BRUNACHE	Minister of Justice and Public Security
Laurent LAMOTHE	Minister of Foreign Affairs
Stéphane Balmis VILLEDROUIN	Minister of Tourism
Jude Hervey DAY	Minister of Planning and External Cooperation
Hébert DOCTEUR	Minister of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development
Pierre Raymond DUMAS	Minister of Culture and Communication
André Lemercier GEORGES	Minister of Economy and Finance
Florence D. GUILLAUME	Minister of Public Health and Population
François Richel LAFAILLE	Minister of Social Affairs
Wilson LALEAU	Minister of Commerce and Industry
Marie Yanick MÉZILE	Minister of the Rights of Women
Réginald PAUL	Minister of National Education
Jean Roosevelt RENE	Minister of Youth, Sport and Civic Action
Jacques ROUSSEAU	Minister of Transport, Communication and Energy
Joseph Ronald TOUSSAINT	Minister of Environment
Daniel SUPPLICE	Minister of Haitians living abroad
Ralph Ricardo THEANO	Minister in charge with Relations with Parliament

¹ Website of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Haiti (<http://www.primature.gouv.ht/index.htm>)

2 POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND ²

2.1 Short historical background

Political turmoil, often accompanied by violence, has been the rule rather than the exception ever since the country's inception.

Jean Bertrand Aristide was Haiti's first democratically elected president after the Duvaliers' regime, which lasted from 1950 to 1971 (Duvalier father) and from 1971 to the uprising in 1986 (Duvalier son). After a succession of military coups, the first democratic elections under international observation were organised in December 1990. Jean Bertrand Aristide was briefly in power before being ousted of power by a military coup in September 1991. Following a US military intervention in September 1994, Jean Bertrand Aristide was reinstated as president.

New presidential elections organised in 1996 led to the victory of René Préval before the re-election of Aristide in February 2001. As the country entered a new period of chaos, President Aristide resigned and fled the country in February 2004 after being accused of corruption and drug trafficking. Following several years of instability, René Préval was elected president for a second mandate in February 2006.

When the earthquake hit the country in January 2010, decades of poverty, environmental degradation, lack of public investment, violence and political instability had already made Haiti the poorest country in the Western hemisphere. The earthquake, which killed around 220 000 people and affected more than 3 million, provoked the almost complete disruption of the country and the State.

2.2 The controversial presidential and legislative elections

In the aftermath of the earthquake, President Préval was pressured to organise general elections, perceived as the only way to restore necessary political legitimacy and national leadership. As he could not run for another term in office, his party, INITE, nominated Jude Célestin as the party candidate.

The first round of the presidential and legislative elections took place on 28 November 2010. Voter participation was extremely low, at just 22.9%. Immediately after the elections, 12 of the 19 presidential candidates alleged that the voting process has been marred by fraud. However, a joint Caribbean Community-Organisation of American States (OAS-CARICOM) mission concluded that the observed irregularities were not sufficiently serious to invalidate the vote. According to preliminary results, Mirlande Manigat, an academic, secured the largest percentage of votes in the presidential ballot (31.4 %) followed by Jude Célestin (22.5 %) and Michel Martelly (21.8 %). As no candidate secured an absolute majority, a second round of voting between the two leading candidates was scheduled for 16 January 2011. However, doubts persisted over the validity of the preliminary results; these were inconsistent with results published by a national election observation organisation, which placed Martelly in second place.

Following international pressure and violent protests, President Préval requested OAS assistance to review the disputed results. The second round of voting (for both the presidential and legislative elections) was consequently suspended until the publication of the OAS report in January 2011. This report concluded that Martelly was the second-placed presidential candidate, ahead of Célestin.

The second round of the elections was finally organised on 20 March 2011. With 67.6 % of votes, Michel Martelly won the presidential elections against Mirlande Manigat, who secured 31.7 %. In parallel, the

² Sources: The Economist Intelligence Unit, IHS Global Insight, CIA world factbook, Europa World Plus.

results of the legislative elections gave a clear majority to INITE in both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.

The election campaign was further complicated by the return from exile of Jean Claude Duvalier (after 25 years) and former President Aristide, which prompted concerns that their presence could further exacerbate political tensions.

2.3 The current political challenges

A former musician, Michel Martelly (also known as 'Sweet Micky') officially assumed his mandate on 14 May 2011. So far, his political actions have been limited by the defiant posture of the National Assembly, which is dominated by INITE, the party of former President Préval. After five months of political disagreement over the proposed candidates for prime minister, the National Assembly finally approved Garry Conille on 18 October 2011. A former UN civil servant, the new Prime Minister served as chief of staff for the UN special envoy for Haiti from March 2010 to June 2011, and there is hope that his appointment will help with the acceleration of the reconstruction process. The prime minister has announced an ambitious policy programme based on '5 E's': education, employment, environment, energy and 'état de droit' (rule of law). His programme presupposes economic growth of 9 % over five years and a reduction in inflation from the current 14 %, which might prove overly-ambitious given the current financial constraints and the limited administrative capacity of the Haitian state.

The challenges faced by the new administration are enormous, particularly when it comes to fulfilling the reconstruction promises made at the UN Donor Conference on 31 March 2010. While the humanitarian response is now phasing out, more than five million cubic meters of rubble remain to be collected, and more than 550 000 people are still waiting for a housing solution in overcrowded camps scattered across the capital. Two years after the earthquake, there is still no clear national strategy on how to close the camps and resettle the people who live there. As of December 2011, the cholera outbreak that was declared in October 2010 had killed more than 7 000 people, making it one of the world largest epidemics recorded in the region in over a century.

The level of resentment among Haitians over the perceived lack of progress is increasing, and one of the first challenges of the new administration will be to deliver results in order to diffuse tension and avoid social unrest. For the time being, the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) remains a key factor in ensuring stability and security, but the perception of its role among the population has continued to deteriorate in recent months. Some UN staff have been accused of sexual and exploitation abuses and it suspected that the cholera strain was introduced into the country by Nepalese UN troops towards the end of 2010. In October 2011, the U.N. Security Council voted to reduce the size of its unpopular force in the country by 2 750, bringing MINUSTAH to just under 10 600 troops and police.

2.4 Some social and economic data

Poverty, corruption and poor access to education for much of the population are among Haiti's most serious disadvantages. According to the UNDP human development report 2011, Haiti ranks 158 out of 186 countries, with 77 % of the population living below the poverty line.

Approximately 70 % of the population lives in rural areas, and 65 % of economically active people depend on the agricultural sector to make a living, mainly through small scale subsistence farming. The severe erosion of fertile land (partly due to the massive deforestation and to the overexploitation of available land) has contributed to a sharp decline in agriculture output. As a consequence, food production for exports has also declined, and the amount of imported food has considerably risen; today more than 50 % of the country's food is imported.

Access to sufficient quantities of nutritious food remains an issue for millions of Haitians. Food insecurity in the areas directly affected by the earthquake has dropped but levels are still higher than they were prior to the earthquake. It is estimated that between 2.5 and 3.3 million Haitians are currently food insecure in the country.

The manufacturing sector has been in decline since its peak in the early 1980s. At that time, manufacturing accounted for more than 18 % of GDP, but by 2005/06 it had fallen to 7.8 %. Following the earthquake, international donors identified the garment-manufacturing sector as key to ensuring the country's economic development.

Haiti has one of the lowest rates of energy consumption per head in the world, estimated at 30 kWh per person. The vast majority of the population relies on charcoal for cooking and heating, and on kerosene oil for illumination. The absence of investment in the power sector over the last three decades has created major problems of power supply, and power cuts have become an everyday occurrence.

With little foreign investment and limited access to commercial credit, Haiti is heavily dependent on international development aid and loans. Under President Préval, the government continued to rely heavily on international assistance and worked closely with the International Monetary Fund to achieve a number of structural reforms. In June 2009, international finance institutions recognized the country's improvements and granted more than USD 1 200 million of debt relief, out of an estimated total external debt of USD 1 900 million. The outstanding external debt was cancelled by donor countries after the 2010 earthquake.

Inflows of foreign assistance and improvements in macroeconomic management contributed to continued GDP growth, which reached 3.2 % in 2006/07. However, GDP growth for 2007/08 was only 1.2 % as a result of food and fuel price shocks, declining US demand, and the hurricane season, which further damaged the agriculture sector. It is estimated that the 2010 earthquake caused the country's GDP to contract by an estimated 5.1 % in 2010.

The international reconstruction efforts have moved slowly, while poor organization and inadequate infrastructure have complicated the distribution of aid and limited the impact of efforts to create jobs and stimulate economic activity. If reconstruction efforts have created 300 000 temporary jobs, unemployment continues to affect 70 % of the population.

During his campaign, Michel Martelly pledged that poverty reduction would be one of the goals of his administration, along with economic development and decentralisation.

3 THE RECONSTRUCTION PROCESS

3.1 THE POST DISASTER NEEDS ASSESSMENT (PDNA)

3.1.1 Impact

On 12 January 2010, shortly before 5 p.m., an earthquake measuring 7.3 on the Richter scale struck Haiti for 35 seconds. It was the most powerful earthquake to hit the country in 200 years. The hypocentre of the earthquake was near the earth's surface (at a depth of 10 km), and its epicentre was near the town of Léogâne, about 17 km southwest of the capital. The effects were felt in the Ouest, Sud-Est and Nippes departments. The Port-au-Prince metropolitan area (including the towns of Port-au-Prince, Carrefour, Pétionville, Delmas, Tabarre, Cité-Soleil and Kenscoff) suffered substantial damage. Some 80 % of the town of Léogâne was destroyed.

The earthquake created a situation without precedent, made worse by the fact that it hit the country's most populated area as well as its economic and administrative centre. The human impact has been immense. According to different estimates, between 210 000 and 223 000 died, and around 300 000 were injured. About 1.5 million people were forced to live in temporary shelters in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area; while over 600 000 people left the affected areas to seek shelter elsewhere in the country.

The destruction of infrastructure was colossal. About 105 000 homes were totally destroyed, and over 208 000 were damaged. More than 1 300 educational institutions and more than 50 hospitals and health centres collapsed or were rendered unusable. The Presidential Palace, Parliament, law courts and most ministerial and public administration buildings were destroyed.

3.1.2 Damage, losses and requirements

Overall damage and losses caused by the earthquake are estimated to be USD 7.9 billion. The value of the physical assets that were destroyed, which include housing units, schools, hospitals, buildings, roads, bridges, ports and airports, is estimated to be USD 4.3 billion (55 % of the overall cost of the disaster). The effect on economic flows (production losses, reduction of turnover, loss of employment and wages, increase in production costs, etc.) was USD 3.6 billion (equivalent to 45 % of the total).

Housing is undoubtedly the sector most affected by the earthquake, since overall damage in this domain amounted to USD 2.3 billion. This figure includes destruction of different types and qualities of housing units, the value of partially damaged houses and household goods. Losses to the housing sector are estimated at USD 739 million. The housing sector therefore represents about 40 % of the cost of the earthquake. The other sectors affected, in decreasing order of importance, are trade, transport and public administration buildings, and education and health.

The total value of requirements is USD 11.5 billion, broken down as follows: 50 % for the social sectors; 17 % for infrastructure, including housing; and 15 % for environment and risk and disaster management.

3.2 INTERNATIONAL AND EU RESPONSE ³

The international response was commensurate to the overwhelming scale of the disaster. Within hours after the earthquake, fast-track humanitarian aid was allocated, rescue experts teams were sent, and civil protection mechanisms activated. International public and private aid institutions instigated an unprecedented relief logistics operation. As the earthquake had provoked the almost complete disruption of the country, relief operations were carried out in a very difficult environment.


In terms of humanitarian aid, the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) provided EUR 122 million and financed projects in key areas such as health, shelter, water and sanitation, nutrition, food assistance, protection and disaster risk reduction.

³ More details can be found in the note prepared by the Policy Department D (DG IPOL) for the Budgetary Control Committee (fact-finding mission to Haiti, February 2012).

Humanitarian assistance in millions of euros

WASH: Water/Sanitation/Hygiene

DRR: Disaster Risk Reduction



Source: Haiti: one year on (memo/11/10)

In an attempt to overcome coordination, funding and operational shortages in reconstruction efforts, the UN hosted an International Donors' Conference, 'Towards a New Future for Haiti', in New York on 31 March 2010. There, the International Community agreed to contribute a total of USD 9.8 billion over the next ten years for medium- and long-term reconstruction. At the conference, the EU pledged USD 1.235 billion, pooling resources from the European Commission, the EU Member States and the European Investment Bank.

The international community endorsed the 'Vision and Action Plan' presented by the Haitian authorities, which included the results of the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA). The Plan envisaged decentralising Haiti, aiming to 'decongest' — rather than rebuild— the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince. The Conference also approved the Interim Commission for the Reconstruction of Haiti (CIRH) and the Reconstruction Fund, with the aim of effectively channelling financial and technical resources, as well as ensuring coordination among donors.

Of the EU's total pledge to finance medium and long-term reconstruction efforts, the European Commission committed EUR 460 million to be implemented as follows:

- Short term - Support for Early Recovery and Reinforcing State Capacity: EUR 100 m;
- Medium Term - Recovery / Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Phase: EUR 200 m;
- Increase 10th EDF B-envelope (emergency reserve): EUR 60 m;
- Increase 10th EDF A-envelope (programmable aid): EUR 100 m.

Since the New York conference, the European Commission has decided to increase by EUR 62 million the original EC pledge, which now totals EUR 522 million. The additional EUR 62 million will be allocated as follows:

- Additional funds available for reconstruction and development: EUR 29 m;
- Support to the electoral process: EUR 5 m;
- Vulnerability Flex allocation 2010: EUR 26 m;
- Pilot project for Microfinance for Agriculture in Haiti: EUR 2 m.

Out of this total, EUR 395 million have already been committed.

The European Commission has also undertaken an ad-hoc mid-term review of the Haiti Country Strategy Paper (CSP). Following the review, the existing focal sectors of the CSP – including infrastructure and governance/decentralisation – have been confirmed. A number of existing programmes were re-oriented in order to adapt them to the post-earthquake context.

Haiti benefits from a number of specific instruments, such as the Food Facility, the Food Security thematic programme, the European Initiative and Human Rights, the Non State Actors/Local Authorities thematic programme and the Instrument for Stability. The total amount contributed by these instruments is EUR 102 million.

Instruments	Amount (€)
Food Facility	20 m
Food Security Thematic Programme	24 m
European Initiative Democracy and Human Rights	6 m
Non State Actors/Local Authorities Thematic Programme	25 m
Instrument for Stability	25 m
TOTAL Other Instruments	100 m

3.3 IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES

Implementing humanitarian operations and recovery assistance during the period 2010-2011 has been particularly challenging. Serious delays in finding temporary shelter solutions occurred, due to the absence of land tenure system in Haiti and the lack of suitable public land to resettle people. Overall coherence and coordination was also difficult to achieve under the framework of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). While the 'cluster system' had proved its efficiency in the past, it has been less successful in Haiti given the extremely high number of humanitarian actors on the ground.

The preparation of the reconstruction/development programmes also faced some delays in the absence of governmental counterparts before the appointment of the Prime Minister in October 2011. Other difficulties have included the inability of the Haitian administration to steer the reconstruction process and to coordinate reconstruction efforts. As it is, the reconstruction process advances without clear operational frameworks and this problem is particularly acute when it comes to resettlement.

The Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission (IHRC), created in March 2010 to oversee the reconstruction efforts, has been severely criticised as inefficient and unable to coordinate the process. Several months were necessary to establish the Interim Commission and to decide on its mission,

mandate and *modus operandi*. The Interim Commission is co-chaired by Bill Clinton, acting as the UN Special Envoy for Haiti, and by the Prime Minister. Its main function is to have all reconstruction projects approved by a board comprised of Haitian national representatives and the representatives of international donors. A recent report by the US Government Accountability Office has criticised the Commission for delays in hiring staff, for a lack of transparency and for failing to meet reconstruction goals. By the end of December 2011, donors had delivered only 47.11 % of the USD 4.6 billion that had been pledged for the period 2010–11⁴.

A recent report prepared by the Office of the UN Special Envoy also highlighted the problem of donor fragmentation⁵. Although the report noted an increase from 14 % to 23 % of funding given directly to the Haitian government, most donors have continued to channel development assistance through bilateral and multilateral agencies, international and non-governmental organisations and private contractors.

Since the IHRC's 18-month mandate expired in October 2011, the Commission has been in stand-by mode, waiting for a decision about its future from the political authorities.

⁴ <http://www.haitispecialenvoy.org/assistance-tracker>.

⁵ Office of the UN Special Representative: 'Has aid changed, channelling assistance to Haiti before and after the earthquake', June 2011.

4 ANNEX 1

Situation in Haiti one year after the earthquake: humanitarian aid and reconstruction P7_TA(2011)0018

European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2011 on the situation in Haiti one year after the earthquake: humanitarian aid and reconstruction

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the International Donors' Conference Towards a New Future for Haiti, held in New York on 31 March 2010, and to the New York mission report of the delegation from Parliament's Committee on Development,
 - having regard to the March 2010 'Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti: Immediate Key Initiatives for the Future',
 - having regard to the conclusions of the extraordinary Foreign Affairs Council meeting held in Brussels on 18 January 2010,
 - having regard to the statement on the Haiti earthquake made by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on 19 January 2010,
 - having regard to the conclusions of the preparatory ministerial conference held in Montreal on 25 January 2010,
 - having regard to the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid signed by the three EU institutions in December 2007,
 - having regard to its resolution of 10 February 2010 on the recent earthquake in Haiti⁶,
 - having regard to the report on the mission to Haiti of Parliament's Committee on Development (25-27 June 2010),
 - having regard to the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly's report of 30 August 2010 on the fact-finding mission to Haiti and the Dominican Republic,
 - having regard to the June 2010 joint document issued by Catherine Ashton, Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and Commissioner Kristalina Georgieva on the lessons to be learned from the EU response to the disaster in Haiti,
 - having regard to the Commission communication of 26 October 2010 entitled 'Towards a stronger European disaster response: the role of civil protection and humanitarian assistance' (COM(2010)0600),
 - having regard to the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH),
 - having regard to the report by Michel Barnier entitled 'For a European civil protection force: Europe aid', published in May 2006,
 - having regard to Rule 110(4) of its Rules of Procedure,
- A. whereas the earthquake measuring 7.3 on the Richter scale which struck Haiti on 12 January 2010 killed 222 750 people, affected 3 million and displaced nearly 1.7 million, more than a million of whom are still living in makeshift camps that were supposed to be temporary, and whereas human rights associations continue to deplore the 'appalling' living conditions in these camps, in

⁶ OJ C 341 E, 16.12.2010, p. 5.

- particular the 'rape and sexual violence' to which women are subjected,
- B. whereas 2.5-3.3 million people are currently 'food insecure', in a country where 60% of the population lives in rural areas and 80% lives in absolute poverty,
 - C. whereas, a year on from the earthquake, the situation in Haiti remains chaotic, the country is still in a state of emergency and reconstruction work has barely started,
 - D. whereas decades of poverty, environmental deterioration, vulnerability to various natural disasters, violence, political instability and dictatorship have left Haiti the most impoverished country in the Americas, with most of its population of 12 million surviving on less than USD 2 per day before the disaster, and whereas the earthquake damage has further undermined the state's ability to provide basic public services and thus to play an active role in the relief and reconstruction efforts,
 - E. whereas to date only USD 1.2 billion of the USD 10 billion dollars pledged (with two deadlines: 18 months and three years) at the International Donors' Conference for the reconstruction of Haiti, held in New York on 31 March 2010, has actually been paid,
 - F. whereas the recent tragedy in Haiti has demonstrated that the tools available to the EU for responding to disasters (humanitarian aid and the Community Civil Protection Mechanism) need to be improved in terms of their effectiveness, speed, coordination and visibility,
 - G. whereas the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) was set up at Haiti's request to coordinate the resources and ensure that they are used effectively, and to implement the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti; whereas the Commission, as the leading donor, is a voting member of the IHRC,
 - H. whereas clearing the rubble is a major challenge in connection with the reconstruction of the country (only a tiny proportion has been cleared), and whereas at the current rate of progress it would take at least six years to remove the millions of cubic metres of rubble,
 - I. whereas the cholera epidemic that broke out on 19 October 2010 has claimed more than 3 000 lives to date and affected more than 150 000 people, whereas the spread of the epidemic has highlighted the obvious structural shortcomings of the Haitian State and the limitations of the international aid system and of MINUSTAH, and whereas the cholera response effort is being hampered by – among other things – the current political crisis in the wake of the elections,
 - J. whereas the UN has received only USD 44 million of the USD 174 million for which it appealed to fight the cholera epidemic,
 - K. whereas the WHO is predicting 400 000 new cholera cases over the next 12 months if the epidemic is not eradicated,
 - L. whereas the elections of 28 November 2010, the provisional results of which were announced in early December, sparked violent demonstrations in Haiti and numerous complaints of fraud, whereas the international community must support a transparent and fair election process in order to guarantee the clean elections that are essential for the reconstruction of the country, and whereas protecting the civilian population must be a priority,
 1. Reiterates its solidarity with the people of Haiti suffering as a result of the earthquake and the cholera epidemic, and stresses that reconstruction efforts must involve the consultation of, and include, the Haitian people and Haitian civil society;
 2. Urges a strong, long-term commitment from the international community, including the EU, to honour all the pledges made at the International Donors' Conference in New York and to deliver the funds without delay; stresses, further, that all EU humanitarian and reconstruction assistance must be provided in the form of grants rather than loans which have to be paid back;
 3. Recalls the international community's massive response to the devastating earthquake in Haiti,

and its genuine political will to take a new approach to supporting the reconstruction of the country – without repeating the errors of the past – and to tackle the deep-rooted causes of poverty in Haiti once and for all;

4. Laments the scale of the disaster in Haiti, the effects of which are still highly visible a year on from the earthquake; welcomes the extent of the humanitarian aid granted to Haiti by the Commission (EUR 120 million, including EUR 12 million to fight cholera) and the Member States (approximately EUR 200 million), and the commitment shown by the Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response and by DG ECHO and its experts;
5. Stresses that the establishment of 'clusters' has made it possible to coordinate humanitarian efforts on the ground, but that this approach has revealed its limitations in the face of the huge number of humanitarian agencies involved and the complex nature of the emergency owing to Haiti's high urban population density;
6. Commends the efforts and achievements of humanitarian organisations (the Red Cross, NGOs and the United Nations) and the Member States, and stresses the need to communicate the non-visible effects of humanitarian work and the fact that the situation was brought under control thanks to, inter alia, the provision of care for the injured, drinking water, food and temporary shelter;
7. Notes that the cholera epidemic has highlighted the near-total helplessness of the Haitian State in the face of an easily preventable and treatable disease, along with the limitations of the international aid system in a country benefiting from a massive humanitarian deployment (12 000 NGOs); stresses that humanitarian agencies cannot and must not continue to make up for the weaknesses of the Haitian State or to take its place, and that urgent action must finally be taken to ensure long-term development, in particular as regards access to healthcare and drinking water and urban renewal;
8. Welcomes the collective commitment made by the Commission and the Member States at the International Donors' Conference for the reconstruction of Haiti to donate a total of EUR 1.2 billion, including EUR 460 million in non-humanitarian aid from the Commission; reiterates its call for the EU, as the leading donor, to exercise political leadership in the context of the reconstruction effort;
9. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to incorporate local food production and food security into the reconstruction effort in Haiti, via the development of rural infrastructure and the provision of aid to small farmers, in the context of their joint approach to programming their resources for reconstruction in Haiti and of the mid-term review of the programming of the remaining Commission funds, i.e. the EUR 169 million still to be allocated from the EUR 460 million announced in New York; calls for the implementation of the new food security policy framework announced by the Commission in March 2010;
10. Deplores the late start to the work of the IHRC, which should be playing a central role in coordinating reconstruction; is disappointed at the lack of information concerning its operation and effectiveness, and calls on the Commission, as a member of the IHRC, to intervene with a view to speeding up the implementation of the latter's mandate and reviewing its operation and to submit a report to Parliament on the IHRC's activities, its use of resources and the proportion of the funds pledged at the New York conference that has actually been committed to reconstruction;
11. Acknowledges that the effective operation of the IHRC, as the central body responsible for managing the reconstruction effort, is contingent on rebuilding the capacity of the Haitian State and renewing Haiti's political leadership following transparent and fair elections, and on a genuine political will to take the decisions that will have to be made before embarking on this

- gigantic project;
12. Urges the Haitian Government to stand by and implement the commitments made in the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti to strengthen the state's authority, make local government more effective, build the capacity of local and national institutions and incorporate the concept of political, economic and institutional decentralisation;
 13. Takes the view that both local authorities and civil society representatives should be better supported and more involved in the decision-making process;
 14. Deplores the fact that the Haitians have only shovels, pickaxes and wheelbarrows with which to clear the tonnes of rubble now strewn throughout the capital, which seems totally inadequate in view of the gravity of the situation; stresses that removing the rubble is essential to the reconstruction of Haiti, and is disappointed that hardly any funds have been released for this purpose; calls on the Commission to provide financial aid and technical support for the removal of rubble;
 15. Calls on the UN to review MINUSTAH's mandate, with a particular focus on security issues, and is concerned about its effectiveness in the light of the latest events (the cholera epidemic and the elections in progress);
 16. Deplores the serious housing crisis in Haiti; stresses that rehousing of the homeless, most of whom are living in makeshift camps set up mainly in the capital, Port-au-Prince, is being hampered by a lack of available land, the absence of clear land ownership rules and the fact that many plots of land are owned by expatriate Haitians, and calls on the Haitian authorities to make a political commitment to proactive measures, including compulsory purchase;
 17. Is increasingly concerned about the situation of the most vulnerable groups of people, in particular women and children, in the wake of the earthquake, which has had a huge impact on more than 800 000 children, exposing them to the risk of violence, sexual abuse, trafficking, exploitation and abandonment, and calls on the EU and in particular the Commission to take firm action with a view to restoring living conditions that afford children protection and safety, so as to support the process of establishing a social protection system in Haiti and encourage education reform; calls for better living conditions and security in the camps;
 18. Calls on the EU to work with the Haitian Government with a view to drawing up a legislative framework that protects children's rights and ensuring that national law reflects the obligations arising out of the numerous international instruments ratified by Haiti concerning the rights of the child, human rights, the abolition of slavery and child protection;
 19. Considers it extremely important for the Commission to support the process of identifying and registering children separated from their families and tracing their relatives, and to take special precautions at Haiti's borders so as to prevent trafficking in children and illegal adoption;
 20. Stresses the need for immediate action to build the capacity of the Haitian State in terms of democracy and good governance, which are essential for national reconstruction, and to ensure that Haitian civil society and the Haitian people are involved;
 21. Expresses grave concern at the current political crisis following the presidential and parliamentary elections, the results of which have been widely contested and only cautiously endorsed by foreign observer delegations, and which are currently the subject of a recount by experts dispatched by the Organisation of American States (OAS), who – in their report submitted on 13 January 2011 – have recommended that the governing party's candidate, Jude Célestin, be replaced by Michel Martelly, owing to evidence of fraud;
 22. Calls on the EU to do its utmost to support fair and transparent elections and the proper conduct of the second round, postponed to February, so as to prevent Haiti from lapsing into a worse crisis; believes that only a legitimately elected president and parliament can take the necessary

decisions, and that reconstruction calls for stability and political determination;

23. Urges the international community and the EU to cooperate closely with the future Haitian authorities and to assist them – throughout the reconstruction process – with the organisation of their institutions and of the state’s powers, with a view to establishing a new equilibrium at all levels and a fully functioning democracy;
24. Stresses the pivotal importance of remittances from the Haitian diaspora in directing capital flows straight into the hands of the Haitian people, who can rapidly put such monies to use to meet pressing needs; asks the Member States and the Haitian Government to facilitate the delivery of remittances and to work towards reducing their cost;
25. Urges the EU and its Member States to keep the recovery and rehabilitation of Haiti high on their agenda, stresses that now is the time to help Haiti become an economically and politically strong and self-sustaining country, and calls on the international community to use this as an opportunity to tackle the root causes of underlying poverty in Haiti once and for all;
26. Calls on the Commission, in the spirit of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, to ensure that a significant effort is made – in conjunction with the government, local authorities and civil society – to incorporate disaster preparation and risk minimisation into the emergency and longer-term development phases;
27. Urges the Commission to put forward proposals as soon as possible for establishing an EU Civil Protection Force based on the EU Civil Protection Mechanism;
28. Notes that Haiti has been the recipient of humanitarian aid for decades, and that the link between emergency aid, reconstruction and development has only become more important in this crisis; emphasises that it is crucial for the UN to be – and remain – in charge of coordinating all civilian and military operations relating to the restoration of security and to humanitarian aid, reconstruction and development;
29. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the Member States, the President and Government of Haiti, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief, the World Bank and the IMF.

European Parliament resolution of 2 February 2012 on the budgetary control of EU humanitarian aid managed by ECHO (Rapporteur: M. Ehrenhauser)

▶ **European Parliament resolution of 2 February 2012 on the budgetary control of EU humanitarian aid managed by ECHO (2011/2073(INI))**

The European Parliament,

- having regard to Article 214 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which deals with humanitarian aid,
 - having regard to the Financial Regulation⁽¹⁾ and its implementing rules⁽²⁾,
 - having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid⁽³⁾,
 - having regard to its previous resolutions of 27 September 2011 on ‘Towards a stronger European disaster response: the role of civil protection and humanitarian assistance’⁽⁴⁾, of 19 January 2011 on ‘the situation in Haiti one year after the earthquake: humanitarian aid and reconstruction’⁽⁵⁾, of 10 February 2010 on ‘the recent earthquake in Haiti’⁽⁶⁾, of 29 November 2007 on ‘the proclamation of a European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid’, and of 18 January 2011 on ‘Implementation of the European consensus on humanitarian aid: the mid-term review of its Action Plan and the way forward’⁽⁷⁾,
 - having regard to its resolutions of 5 May 2010 on the discharge for implementation of the European Union general budget for the financial year 2008⁽⁸⁾ and of 10 May 2011 for the financial year 2009⁽⁹⁾,
 - having regard to the Annual Reports of the European Court of Auditors (ECA) on the implementation of the budget concerning the financial year 2008⁽¹⁰⁾ and the financial year 2009⁽¹¹⁾, together with the Institutions' replies,
 - having regard to the ECA's Special reports No 3/2006 on the ‘European Commission Humanitarian Aid Response to the Tsunami’, No 6/2008 on ‘European Commission Rehabilitation Aid following the Tsunami and Hurricane Mitch’, No 15/2009 on ‘EU assistance implemented through United Nations Organisations: decision-making and monitoring’ and No 3/2011 on ‘The Efficiency and Effectiveness of EU Contributions Channelled through United Nations Organisations in Conflict-Affected Countries’,
 - having regard to the Annual reports and Annual Activity reports for the financial years 2009 and 2010 of the Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO) and its annexes,
 - having regard to the Annual Report on Humanitarian Aid Policy and its implementation in 2009 (COM(2010)0138) and to the Commission staff working paper accompanying it (SEC(2011)0398),
 - having regard to the Annual Report on the European Union's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Policies and their implementation in 2010 (COM(2011)0343) and to the Commission staff working paper accompanying it (SEC(2011)0709),
 - having regard to the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) between the European Commission and the United Nations,
 - having regard to the Framework Partnership Agreement between the Commission and humanitarian organisations (FPA),
 - having regard to Rule 48 of its Rules of Procedure,
 - having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control and the opinion of the Committee on Development (A7-0444/2011),
- A. whereas the number, frequency, scope and severity of humanitarian disasters have dramatically increased, affecting more parts of the world;
- B. whereas the EU's leading global role as a humanitarian actor and the increase in the number and frequency of interventions inside and outside the EU, in conjunction with the current budgetary constraints, highlight the significance of sound financial management based on the principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness;
- C. whereas the mega catastrophes in Haiti and Pakistan have demonstrated once again that the instruments at the

EU's disposal for responding to disasters have to be improved in terms of effectiveness, speed and coordination;

Efficiency and effectiveness of the ECHO control, monitoring and supervision system

1. Notes the determination of DG ECHO and the measures taken to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid;
2. Recalls the ECA's opinion, as set out in its annual reports, that the overall ex-ante controls, monitoring and supervision systems, ex-post audit activity, and the internal audit functions of DG ECHO are generally effective; stresses, however, that in all these respects there is room for improvement;

Framework Partnership Agreement (FPA) partners: NGOs

3. Notes that the relations between ECHO and its partner NGOs are governed by the FPA, while the method used for budget implementation is direct centralised management;
4. Welcomes the enhanced flexibility and efficiency afforded by the 2008 FPA, by comparison with the 2005 FPA, including a more result-oriented approach, the introduction of the A- and P-control mechanisms, greater simplification and less ambiguity resulting from the introduction of guidelines; calls on the Commission to continue refining the measures which will improve the efficiency of cooperation with FPA partners in the post-2012 FPA; stresses that improving the efficiency of cooperation and reducing the excessive administrative burden for FPA partners is important, while at the same timing ensuring a high level of accountability and transparency;
5. Calls on the Commission to improve the methods for and practice of assessing whether a potential partner qualifies for the FPA or not; recalls that the experience gained prior to the signing of the 2008 FPA indicates that the initial assessment in favour of the partners under P-control mechanism, based on the reliability of their internal control systems and financial solidity, was too optimistic; notes that, once they have been granted this status on the basis of an initial assessment, partners under P-control mechanism are audited less frequently on their internal control systems and are allowed to use their own procurement procedures, and their actions are not subject to contractual limits on funding; recalls that, as a result of the assessment under the 2008 FPA, many of them had to be downgraded to A-partner status, i.e. brought under the A-control mechanism;
6. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the weaknesses identified during regular audits of the partners' systems are addressed by them in a timely manner and that the necessary measures are taken if they are not; recalls that the external auditors have to continue working on improving the quality of their recommendations to the partners, taking into account partners' specific structures so as to ensure their acceptance and feasibility; stresses that the documentation of evaluations of proposals for humanitarian aid actions needs to be further streamlined and standardised in order to allow an overall comparison to be made;
7. Believes that, thanks to the audit and monitoring mechanisms in place, there is greater accountability with regard to evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of the FPA partners than in the case with the UN partners; points out that, however, an international organisation such as the UN cannot be compared to FPA partners;

International organisations, UN

8. Notes that relations between ECHO and its UN partners are governed by the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA), whereas relations with the Red Cross family and the International Organisation for Migration are governed by the FPA with International Organisations (IOs); recalls that in both cases the method used for budget implementation has been joint management;
9. Points out that the terms for and the implementation of control and follow-up of EU funds under joint management have demonstrated serious weaknesses; urges the Commission to agree, notably with the UN agencies, on the measures required to be able to rely on the audit work carried out by UN bodies and to reinforce and enhance the assurance gained from the existing checks, including verifications;
10. Recalls that the ongoing revision of the Financial Regulation (FR) suggests that EU funds channelled through the UN and IOs are to be managed in accordance with the rules on indirect management;
11. Stresses that the control requirements for indirect management of the EU funds must be as rigorous as those for shared management; insists that the same level of accountability be established for the indirect management of EU funds by ECHO partners as that indicated in Article 57(5) of the Commission proposal for the FR; stresses that access to the audit reports of ECHO partners is essential in verifying sound financial management of actions financed from the EU budget;
12. Insists that audit results be made available in a timely fashion to the discharge authority, without prejudice to the ECA's or OLAF's powers and competences;

13. Regrets the general character of UN reports, in which insufficient information is provided on results; points out that, because of the single audit principle of the UN and the fact that the scope of the Commission's control remit is limited to verifications and monitoring, the UN reports are, however, an essential source of information with a view to ensuring accountability and transparency;
14. Calls on the Commission to ensure that UN reports contain sufficient information concerning the results – i.e. the output and outcome – of projects within the reporting time scale; stresses that measurable output and impact indicators must be an integral part of the reporting criteria; deplores the fact that over 70% of ECHO's replies to the ECA's questionnaires for its Special Report 15/2009 reveal that UN reports were late, and asks the Commission to indicate the latest situation in this regard;
15. Points out that there are differences between the Commission and the FAFA signatories regarding the interpretation of the FAFA verification clause, particularly on the issue of conducting checks; welcomes the adoption of standard Terms of Reference (ToR) for verifications in July 2009 as a means of providing further guidance for, and clarification on, the operation of the verification clause; recalls that, according to the latest findings of DG ECHO's External Audit Sector (EAS) and the ECA within the framework of the annual DAS exercise, there is room for further clarification on the agreed ToR and the verification clause;
16. Notes that the External Audit Service has hardly benefited at all from the increase in staff numbers at DG ECHO's headquarters in 2010 (from 247 to 289);
17. Deplores the difficulties the ECA has encountered in accessing information about the actions carried out by UN partners; recalls that, under the FAFA verification clause, the EU, and therefore the ECA, may carry out on-the-spot financial checks and that the UN is to provide all relevant financial information; stresses that the UN must provide the ECA with the necessary access to information and thus fulfil the FAFA verification clause;
18. Welcomes the positive results of the discussions with the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), as a result of which the WFP and UNICEF changed their rules to make their internal audit reports available to DG ECHO; calls on DG ECHO to conduct similar negotiations with the other UN agencies without delay in order to ensure easy and unbureaucratic access to their internal audit reports; calls on the Commission to inform Parliament's competent committees on the progress of the negotiations on a six-monthly basis; stresses that all the internal audit reports should be made available to the Commission electronically and not only on the premises of the relevant UN agencies;
19. Recalls that discussions started with the WFP in 2010 in order to agree on a common methodology under which the WFP would conduct audits of EU-funded projects; calls on the Commission to successfully complete this objective and to conduct similar negotiations with the other UN partners;
20. Welcomes the current efforts of the Working Group on Accountability for and Audit of Disaster-Related Aid established in the framework of the International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) and led by a Member of the European Court of Auditors; recalls that the two main objectives are: (i) establishing guidance and good practice with a view to ultimately arriving at a single integrated reporting model and (ii) establishing guidance and good practice in the area of disaster-related aid auditing;
21. Is of the opinion that this is an important step forward in addressing the challenges of transparency and accountability in cooperation with the UN and other international organisations; encourages the working group to fulfil its mandate within the set time frame;
22. Points out that, since the revelations of misuse of UN funds for humanitarian and development activities by the Government of North Korea in late 2006, there has been broad criticism regarding the lack of transparency, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness of the management of funds by the UN; regrets that the UN reform in matters of transparency and accountability has not yet made any significant progress; stresses that EU Member States need to demonstrate more political will, determination and coherence to advance the reform and ensure greater accountability; calls on the High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy to prioritise this issue and play a facilitating role;
- Efficiency and effectiveness of the implementation of EU humanitarian aid managed by DG ECHO***
23. Recognises the benefits of seeking new arrangements for the provision of funding by DG ECHO, together with its partners; calls at the same time for the diversity of the actors involved in financing and implementing the European humanitarian programmes – the United Nations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, NGOs – to be borne in mind, given that disasters often transcend national borders and require multilateral, coordinated responses; encourages the work being done to strengthen the capacities of local stakeholders and increase assessment and rapid response capabilities on the ground through DG ECHO's offices as well as field experts;

24. Points out that accurate and coherent needs assessment is an essential prerequisite for the effective implementation of humanitarian aid; acknowledges that, thanks to the Global Needs Assessment (GNA) and Forgotten Crisis Assessment (FCA), the humanitarian assistance managed by ECHO fulfils the vital criterion of being strictly needs-based; stresses the necessity for the Commission to continue its efforts in engaging in debate on setting up better coordinated and more coherent needs assessment; welcomes the dialogue between the Commission and the UN in this respect;

FPA partners

25. Draws attention to the high-quality work carried out by DG ECHO's partners, achieved by means of an effective selection method – in particular through the FPA – and the development of standards and practices applicable in the humanitarian field; stresses also that effective monitoring of the use of funds in the form of audits of the partners carried out by private audit firms is essential and helps to legitimise the humanitarian sector; notes, however, in the interests of safeguarding the diversity of the partners and guaranteeing access for small and medium-sized NGOs, the complexity of the administrative access procedures, the excessive administrative charges, which are very high for NGOs, and the difficulties experienced with undergoing audits, given the lack of human resources, and calls for the tools used to be appropriate to the specific requirements of the humanitarian sector and to local requirements, so that humanitarian aid is targeted appropriately and coordinated action by the various aid organisations involved begins at an early stage;

26. Commends DG ECHO's efforts to promote the use of innovative approaches such as the cash-based approach, and in particular unconditional transfers, which are directed at the most vulnerable groups; notes that, by using local markets, these approaches can be more efficient than assistance in kind, and do not necessarily carry a greater fiduciary risk; urges DG ECHO, therefore, to continue to develop these cash-based approaches and to encourage its partners to use them;

27. Recalls the conclusions reached following the three cycles of headquarter (HQ) audits carried out by DG ECHO's External Audit Sector (EAS) on the nature and solidity of financial relations between DG ECHO and its partners, to the effect that funds made available by the Commission have been used, on the whole, with reasonable care and in accordance with the rules and regulations in force;

28. Notes that most of the recommendations resulting from EAS HQ audits of the FPA partners refer to the procurement rules of the partners; draws attention to one of the main findings of the HQ audits, which is that not all FPA partners (coming under both the A- and the P-control mechanisms) have procedures in place which are fully compliant with the principles of Annex IV to the 2008 FPA; notes that there are issues relating to the provision of complete procurement files and the establishment of better-documented and solid procurement procedures;

29. Notes that the following issues must be addressed by the FPA partners: establishing appropriate internal control mechanisms, improving their financial cost allocation systems and making them more transparent, improving weaknesses in their accounting systems and their management's commitment to quality standards, establishing a risk management process for the whole organisation and raising awareness of the dangers of fraud and corruption;

30. Notes that ECHO partners can subcontract implementing partners to carry out activities to support humanitarian actions; deplores the lack of proper procedures, and of oversight and proper management by FPA partners of their implementing partners; calls on the Commission accordingly to address this issue, considering the risk to which this may give rise in cases of fraud, the lack of access to underlying documents and the fact that ECHO does not have mechanisms to identify the subcontracted implementing partners;

31. Believes that genuine and continuous involvement of beneficiaries in the planning and management of aid is one of the essential preconditions for high-quality, prompt humanitarian responses, particularly in the case of long-term crises; points out that in many cases there are no formal mechanisms in place to provide complaints/feedback from the beneficiary to the partner concerned or clear rules on the protection of whistleblowers; stresses that this is an important measure for improving the effectiveness and accountability, and preventing potential misuse of, aid materials; calls on DG ECHO to establish such mechanisms without delay;

32. Recalls the EAS recommendation according to which there is a need for improved distribution and post-distribution monitoring by staff not involved in the process itself, so as to evaluate whether needs assessment has identified all requirements and whether these requirements have been met; calls on the Commission to implement the lessons learned from these monitoring activities;

UN partners

33. Recalls the ECA opinion, as set out in its Special Report 15/2009, that the strategic and legal requirements for selecting partners in an objective and transparent way are insufficiently translated into practical criteria to support

decision-making in the case of UN partners; calls on the Commission to systematically carry out and document formal appraisals comparing the aid delivery mechanisms of UN partners and those of other partners;

34. Notes that, in addition to its contribution to indirect costs (up to 7% of the budget for an activity), i.e. costs that are not directly related to the implementation of a specific project, the Commission funds a variety of costs related directly (direct costs) to the project, including the support costs for local offices, staff and transport directly related to activities; points out that the level of support costs, such as transport, storage and handling (e.g. of food assistance) varies strongly; acknowledges that the reason for this can be country-specific, depending on the conditions, but points out that it can also be due to the need to streamline operations, in order to make them more cost-effective; suggests that the Commission assess the level of support costs with reference to a normal range or benchmark for the type of project concerned, in order to establish whether it is reasonable;

Various other issues

35. Stresses that, alongside essential criteria such as experience and expertise, past performance, coordination, dialogue and speed, cost-effectiveness must also be an important criterion for selecting partners; welcomes the fact that ECHO is currently working on the development of a comparative cost information system ('Cost Observed for Results') based on comparable unit costs; stresses the importance of using the information provided by this tool to analyse the cost-effectiveness of project proposals;

36. Draws attention to the frequent topping up of DG ECHO's budget, either through the use of the Emergency Aid Reserve or through transfers from other budget lines from the external aid heading of the EDF; considers budget top-ups to be a structural issue; stresses the necessity to draw up a realistic budget, allocating appropriations for natural disasters or humanitarian actions on the basis of confirmed experience with spending in previous years;

37. Stresses the fact that the European Union must strengthen its reaction capacity, given the growing number of major natural disasters; recalls, with this in mind, that Parliament has for many years been calling for a more realistic humanitarian budget in the interests of remedying the chronic underfunding of the relevant budget lines, making it possible to provide some financial leeway throughout the financial year, and maintaining a coherent balance between the financing of measures to prevent humanitarian disasters and of measures to ensure rapid responses to natural and man-made disasters;

38. Welcomes the recent Commission communication on the 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework, which provides for an increase in the humanitarian aid instrument budget of EUR 6.4 billion over this period (i.e. an annual average of EUR 915 million, as against EUR 813 million in 2007-2013); also notes with satisfaction the increase in the Emergency Aid Reserve for the same period, bringing it up to EUR 2.5 billion, as well as the proposal for unspent funds in the reserve to be carried over to the following year, and asks the Commission to ensure that these funds continue to be earmarked principally for urgent humanitarian needs;

39. Asks for the EU budget to support actions designed to anticipate disasters, prepare for them, avert them and react more quickly to them, as well as measures to ensure greater flexibility in launching development measures as a means of emerging from crisis situations; finds it regrettable that concrete progress on the link between emergency aid, rehabilitation and development remains limited despite the many political commitments made in recent years;

40. Calls therefore for more and better-managed resources to be deployed to guarantee continuity of aid in the transition phase between emergency and development, and for thought to be given to achieving greater flexibility and complementarity of the existing financial mechanisms, particularly in the context of EDF and DCI country/regional strategy papers; calls for particular care for children, as well as expectant mothers and mothers of young children, with regard to the provision of food, clothing, evacuation and transportation, and of medical facilities with a view to preventing unwanted pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases, as priority areas under the existing financial mechanisms;

41. Recommends that the primary focus of this transitional, rehabilitation-oriented phase between emergency aid and development should be capacity-building in local institutions and a high level of involvement of local NGOs and associations in the planning and implementation phases in order to facilitate and build a basis for high-quality and effective human development programmes;

42. Considers that there is satisfactory visibility for ECHO-funded actions; recognises the significance of measures to ensure visibility in terms of accountability and helping to reduce the risk of double financing; stresses that this should not become a means of brand promotion for humanitarian agencies and should not result in people competing for visibility at the expense of meeting the real needs of beneficiaries;

43. Considers that the increasingly large role accorded to consortia has a potentially positive effect in terms of scaling up the humanitarian response and improving coordination; calls on the Commission to provide clearer guidance to guarantee transparency and ensure that consortia do not negatively affect the diversity of the NGO

community, with particular reference to small and medium-sized organisations;

Need for sustainability, coherence and complementarity

44. Points to the significance of linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) in order to strengthen the links between relief, recovery and development and to ensure a smooth transition from humanitarian aid to development aid; stresses that there is still much work to be done to improve the coordination, efficiency, effectiveness and consistency of LRRD;

45. Welcomes the fact that DG ECHO promotes disaster risk reduction (DRR) through the DIPECHO programme and as an integral part of humanitarian actions;

46. Calls on DG ECHO to focus more closely on the sustainability of humanitarian actions; urges DG ECHO and other relevant Commission services to put greater emphasis on DRR and disaster preparedness, strengthen the resilience of the population at risk through capacity building, training and public awareness measures, and establish efficient early-warning systems in disaster-prone and crisis-hit countries, in order to enable them to react appropriately;

47. Believes that cultural sensitivity and knowledge is a key factor in delivering effective humanitarian aid; stresses, for example, that the products delivered during humanitarian actions must be suitable and acceptable to the local population;

48. Calls on DG ECHO to carefully consider the possible negative effects of humanitarian aid; points out that, for example, a surplus of food aid can discourage local food production and have a negative effect on the local markets, thus endangering food security in the long term;

49. Urges the Commission to ensure better coherence and complementarity between humanitarian aid and development aid, both on the policy level and in practice;

50. Believes that the current acute food crisis in the Horn of Africa is also the tragic consequence of a lack of coherence and complementarity in international humanitarian and development aid; points out that, unlike natural disasters, this has been a slow-onset crisis that has gradually escalated into a humanitarian disaster; recalls that, unfortunately, droughts and food shortages have taken on a chronic character in the Horn of Africa; deplores the fact that, despite this reality and the vast amount of development assistance that has flowed into the region over the past decades, there are no visible results in terms of strengthening the self-sufficiency of local farmers and thus ensuring sustainability;

Haiti and Pakistan

51. Regrets that 2010 will be remembered as the year of two mega disasters: the devastating earthquake in Haiti, followed by a cholera epidemic, and the unprecedented floods in Pakistan;

52. Notes that in 2010 ECHO allocated EUR 122 million to Haiti and EUR 150 million to Pakistan, and that the humanitarian assistance allocated to Pakistan by ECHO was the largest intervention ever conducted in one year;

53. Recognises that the scale of the disasters and the inherent difficulties, including physical access and security concerns, made the conditions extremely complex; points out that both disasters brought similar problems to light;

54. Points out that efficient international coordination is an essential prerequisite for efficient and effective humanitarian assistance, recognises the added value of operating – as well as the need to operate – under the umbrella of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) during humanitarian aid operations;

55. Notes that the Commission provides the OCHA with significant support; deplores the fact that the experience in Haiti and Pakistan highlighted the currently insufficient coordinating ability of the OCHA; stresses that the OCHA's ability to fulfil its coordinating role was undermined by low capacity, inadequate needs assessment and only partially functional electronic tools for processing the information;

56. Notes that the Commission has provided the UN with significant support in its efforts to develop and implement the cluster system; stresses that both disasters revealed that there is still much work to be done to improve its effectiveness, efficiency and coordination and to reinforce ownership and accountability;

57. Points out that the Commission did not provide Parliament's rapporteur with the final narrative and financial reports of the ECHO partners on the implementation of humanitarian actions in the aftermath of the catastrophes in Haiti and Pakistan in 2010, on the grounds that they included sensitive information on ECHO partners; stresses that Parliament must have access to such reports, or at least to the main facts about the efficiency and effectiveness

of the implementation of actions, in order to be able to judge as to their sound financial management;

58. Points out that the Committee on Budgetary Control will send a delegation to Haiti in light of the problems reported in connection with the aid allocated to Haiti;

59. Calls on the Commission to raise the matters relating to the UN with the relevant UN bodies;

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60. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

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- (1) OJ L 248, 16.9.2002, p. 1.
 - (2) OJ L 357, 31.12.2002, p. 1.
 - (3) OJ L 163, 2.7.1996, p. 1.
 - (4) Texts adopted **P7_TA(2011)0404**.
 - (5) Texts adopted **P7_TA(2011)0018**.
 - (6) OJ C 341 E, 16.12.2010, p. 5.
 - (7) Texts adopted **P7_TA(2011)0005**.
 - (8) OJ L 252, 25.9.2010, p. 1.
 - (9) OJ L 250, 27.9.2011, p. 1.
 - (10) OJ C 269, 10.11.2009, p. 1.
 - (11) OJ C 303, 9.11.2010, p. 1.

European Parliament resolution of 15 December 2011 on budgetary control of EU financial assistance to Afghanistan (Rapporteur: J. Geier)

Texts adopted

Thursday, 15 December 2011 -
Strasbourg

Provisional edition

Budgetary control of EU financial assistance to Afghanistan

P7_TA-PROV(2011)0578
A7-0388/2011

► **European Parliament resolution of 15 December 2011 on budgetary control of EU financial assistance to Afghanistan (2011/2014(INI))**

The European Parliament,

- having regard to its previous resolutions on Afghanistan, in particular its resolutions of 8 July 2008 on the stabilisation of Afghanistan⁽¹⁾, of 15 January 2009 on the budgetary control of EU funds in Afghanistan⁽²⁾, of 24 April 2009 on women's rights in Afghanistan⁽³⁾, and of 16 December 2010 on a new strategy for Afghanistan⁽⁴⁾,
- having regard to its resolutions on the discharge for implementation of the European Union general budget for the financial year 2007 of 23 April 2009⁽⁵⁾ and for the financial year 2008 of 5 May 2010⁽⁶⁾,
- having regard to its resolution of 5 July 2011 on the future of EU budget support to developing countries⁽⁷⁾,
- having regard to the Kabul Conference of 20 July 2010, at which the donors agreed to better align their programmes and commit to the principles of aid effectiveness, as well as the London Conference of 28 January 2010 at which the donors agreed to establish an independent Office of High Oversight and to channel more development assistance through the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), supported by reforms to structures and budgets,
- having regard to the Commission's replies to questions by the Committee on Budgetary Control dated 7 September 2010 and 22 June 2011,
- having regard to the European Court of Auditors' Special Report No 3/2011 on 'The Efficiency and Effectiveness of EU Contributions Channelled through United Nations Organisations in Conflict-Affected Countries',
- having regard to the audit reports of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR),
- having regard to the audit reports of the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) on Afghanistan,
- having regard to the audit reports of the Inspector General of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) on Afghanistan,
- having regard to the final report of the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan to US Congress, entitled 'Transforming Wartime Contracting',
- having regard to the draft Afghan 'Supreme Audit Office Law',
- having regard to the Mexico Declaration of the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) on the Independence of Supreme Audit Institutions, as endorsed in 2007,
- having regard to 'EU Action Plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan', as adopted by the Council on 27 October 2009, and to its biannually published implementing reports,
- having regard to Decision 2011/23 of the Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Population Fund and the United Nations Office for Project Services adopted at its annual session 2011 (6 to 17 June 2011),
- having regard to Rule 48 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control and the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and of the Committee on Development ([A7-0388/2011](#)),

A. whereas Parliament's resolution of 16 December 2010 on a new strategy for Afghanistan identified several issues of concern in relation to the budgetary control of EU financial assistance to Afghanistan,

B. whereas, according to the Integrity Watch organisation, bribes of over \$1 billion were paid in Afghanistan in 2009,

C. whereas the Committee on Budgetary Control is responsible for monitoring the cost-effectiveness of the implementation of the EU General Budget,

D. whereas the principles of accountability and transparency of public money are fundamental to democracy,

E. whereas Afghanistan is amongst the recipient countries receiving the most civilian aid from the EU General Budget,

F. whereas the European Commission has committed over EUR 2 billion and disbursed over EUR 1.8 billion in development and humanitarian aid to Afghanistan since 2002,

Benefits and drawbacks of the different funding channels for providing aid to Afghanistan

1. Reiterates that the Commission can consider different funding channels when spending EU funds in Afghanistan; recalls that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) does not receive direct (sectoral) budget support from the EU General Budget;
2. Notes that each of the funding channels carries its own specific benefits and drawbacks with regard to specific spending objectives as displayed in the table in the explanatory statement;
3. Takes the view that none of the funding channels should be excluded as all of them bear their specific benefits and drawbacks; considers it necessary to diversify aid in order to address individual needs through the appropriate funding channel;
4. Calls on the Commission to consider introducing direct budget support in Afghanistan under rigorous and well-defined conditions, as soon as the necessary macroeconomic stability and sufficiently reliable financial management have been shown to exist, as it is the best instrument for building capacity in the Afghan administration; believes this could achieve sustainable, long-term-oriented results;
5. Takes the view that the Commission should assess the capacity of the ministries of the GIROA, and believes that budget support could start with limited amounts applied under rigorous and well-defined conditions; notes the example of other donor countries in introducing sectoral budget support for those Afghan ministries for which the benchmarks on accountability and transparency are met; asks the Commission to consider introducing budget support under rigorous and well-defined conditions not only at central level but also at provincial and local level, as soon as the necessary conditions and criteria have been met, as this would increase capacity building at all governmental levels; believes that coordinated diversification of budget support for the different administrative levels would also strengthen the Commission's position vis-à-vis those entities and make the Commission more independent of its relations with a single entity; notes that this diversification must not undermine the central government's role and responsibility, and that it therefore requires the latter's approval;
6. Calls on the Commission, at the same time, to make potential future budget support dependent on rigorous and well-defined conditions which are clear and measurable; takes the view that these objectives must aim to achieve results which can be evaluated by way of indicators and pre-defined benchmarks on accountability and transparency; underlines that baselines assessing future progress need to be defined from the outset; considers mechanisms to fight corruption and fraud to be of the utmost importance in this context; states that the effectiveness of development policy measures in the partner countries must also be checked on the basis of local criteria; stresses in this connection the paramount importance of training for public servants, particularly the security forces and the police;
7. Reiterates the oversight role of Parliament and therefore demands of the Commission that it introduce these steps in a transparent way by making publicly available:
 - the agreements reached with the GIROA;
 - the baseline, indicators, targets, calculation methods and verification sources to assess progress and to determine decisions to disburse performance-based and variable tranches of potential future budget support;

- clear and standardised reports which assess – in an objective and transparent way – progress on the basis of the criteria defined and – if necessary – the reasons why progress may not have been achieved as initially planned;

Accountability and oversight of EU funds in Afghanistan
Weaknesses as reported by auditors

8. Notes the recent audit report of the European Court of Auditors (ECA) on EU funds, channelled through the United Nations Organisations in conflict-affected countries, which also covers Afghanistan; deplores the weaknesses in project management in Afghanistan identified by the ECA amongst which are:

- weaknesses in project design leading to unsustainable and ineffective projects;
- reporting by the United Nations Agencies to the Commission which is behindhand, too general and activities rather than results oriented and does not allow the Commission to check adequately the efficiency of a given project;
- frequent delays in projects resulting from unrealistic timeframes;

9. Is concerned about reports by other audit entities such as the United States Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Commission on Wartime Contracting and the Inspector General of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which have identified the following weaknesses:

- high risk of corruption and fraud in the country as evidenced by the Kabul Bank scandal in the recent past and by the final report of the Commission on Wartime Contracting, which has estimated that 5 to 9 per cent of total US aid spent in Iraq and Afghanistan was subject to fraud; according to the Integrity Watch report also, of the over \$ 1 billion in bribes paid by Afghanistan in 2009, one-third was used as payment for various public services (documentation, education, health), the police service being the most corrupt;
- lack of ability on the part of most Afghan ministries to tender and manage contracts owing to a high rate of illiteracy and poorly trained staff;
- unreliable databases of the Afghan National Police (ANP), as figures range from 111 774 to 125 218 policemen, which raises doubt as to the legality and regularity of the salaries paid to the Afghan policemen, which is the main objective of the single largest project funded by the EU, the Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA);
- high risk of waste of funds as evidenced by the final report of the Commission on Wartime Contracting, which has estimated that 10 to 20 per cent of total US aid spent in Iraq and Afghanistan was wasted;
- cascades of sub-contractors which lead to delays and overhead costs adding up, and also limit the exercise of oversight over the prime contractor, as well as limiting the proportion of Afghan locals benefiting from these projects;
- short-term projects being funded with limited chances of being sustainable in the long run;
- lack of full independence of the Control and Audit Office of Afghanistan from the GIRoA;

10. Takes the view that the Commission should also take into account shortcomings identified by the US and other non-European auditors which also indicate risk factors for EU-funded projects, as many are the same or at least similar in nature;

Addressing the weaknesses identified

11. Acknowledges the difficult circumstances under which the Commission has to deliver aid in a country which has been affected by war for decades; underlines that on-the-spot checks have to be also carried out under difficult security conditions; calls on the Commission to apply alternative audit and control checks which can still be carried out on the spot under current security conditions; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to address the weaknesses identified and to fund projects if they meet the following criteria:

- financial and operational long-term sustainability;

- encouragement of Afghan ownership of the project to the highest possible extent;
 - fraud and corruption risk factor eliminated to the highest possible extent;
12. Asks the Commission to identify the risk factors involved with regard to corruption, fraud, project sustainability, cascades of sub-contractors and other source of waste and misuse of funds; asks the Commission, furthermore, to continue to address these adequately in grant agreements and commercial contracts and to monitor closely the application of these rules;
13. Underlines the crucial importance for democracy of having a Supreme Audit Institution which is financially and operationally fully independent of the executive branch and which has sufficient capacity and funding to carry out financial, compliance and performance audits in line with international audit standards;
14. Is concerned about reports from various reliable and independent sources that Afghan authorities at the highest level obstruct anti-corruption investigations by Afghan prosecutors against officials such as governors;
15. Deplores the fact that the new draft legislation on the Control and Audit Office would still not establish full independence given that, for example, the Auditor-General and his deputy would be appointed by the executive branch instead of the legislative branch; points out that this is not compliant with the Mexico Declaration on Supreme Audit Institutions' Independence; calls on the Commission, therefore, to insist on the establishment of full financial and operational independence of the Control and Audit Office of Afghanistan in the legislation and on strengthening capacity; reminds the Commission that full independence, sufficient capacity and funding of the Control and Audit Office should be considered essential conditions for introducing direct budget support;
16. Invites the Commission to consider the idea of carrying out control and monitoring visits jointly with the Control and Audit Office of Afghanistan; suggests in this connection intensifying mutual exchange of auditing knowledge and training skills among the responsible bodies; views this as a chance to improve mutual understanding and to build capacity;

Improving the accountability of aid channelled via UN Agencies in Afghanistan

17. Recalls that some of the most important projects funded by the EU General Budget in Afghanistan are managed and implemented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP);
18. Recalls that under Article 287(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union the European Court of Auditors has the right, if necessary, to perform its audit on the spot in the premises of any body, office or agency which manages revenue or expenditure on behalf of the Union;
19. Recalls furthermore that Parliament has repeatedly asked the Commission to improve the transparency and accountability of UN-managed projects, especially multi-donor trust funds, e.g. by introducing a Statement of Assurance;
20. Notes the recent decision of the Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), adopted at its 2011 annual sessions (6 to 17 June 2011), to grant intergovernmental donor organisations such as the institutions of the European Union similar rights to access internal audit reports as are granted to UN Member States; believes, however, that further progress is needed in order to improve reporting on the use of EU funds by providing information about results rather than actions; urges the Commission, furthermore, to invite other UN agencies to adopt the same policy as UNDP, UNFPA and UNOPS; notes with satisfaction that the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) has taken a decision to follow suit;
21. Is, furthermore, of the opinion that a more far-reaching approach is required for the future in order to comply fully with Parliament's repeated requests for enhanced transparency and accountability combined with effectiveness and efficiency; calls on the ECA to seek an understanding with the UN agencies to agree on common audit standards which fully respect international audit standards and which would result in a Statement of Assurance;
22. Draws attention to the current efforts of the Working Group on 'Accountability for and Audit of Disaster-related Aid' established in the context of the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) and led by a Member of the European Court of Auditors⁽⁶⁾; supports its two main objectives:
- establishing guidance and good practice in the area of accountability by providing clear, transparent and standardised information to all stakeholders (donors, beneficiaries, international organisations, NGOs) with a view to ultimately arriving at a single integrated reporting model;

– establishing guidance and good practice in the area of audit with a view to ultimately arriving at a single audit concept, which would mean that every euro was only audited once, by an external auditor who would cover the assurance needs of all stakeholders;

23. Welcomes the efforts of the INTOSAI Working Group, and encourages the Working Group to fulfil its mandate within the set timeframe; is of the opinion that the results could also be applied in a more general context, as many of the challenges in disaster-related aid are also true for development aid in conflict-affected areas;

24. Views this as an appropriate way of dealing with accountability challenges such as that experienced with United Nations agencies;

25. Invites the ECA and the relevant UN offices, therefore, to enter into a dialogue with a view to finding a solution for the remaining issues; emphasises the benefits of a single audit regime in this context, as this would increase the efficiency of the audit work; judges the work of the INTOSAI Working Group to be highly relevant in this context and invites the ECA to seek an understanding with the UN offices on this basis;

26. Recalls in this context that Parliament has long been asking for a European multi-donor trust fund, and draws attention to the Commission's proposal that the revised Financial Regulation (**COM(2010)0815**) should provide for a legal basis on which to set up its own multi-donor trust funds; considers this to be a way of ensuring accountability to the highest possible extent as long as not all UN agencies managing multi-donor trust funds comply with EU standards on transparency and accountability;

Coordination of aid efforts by the donor community

27. Notes that aid effectiveness and coordination of donor actions in Afghanistan are structurally hampered by the fact that many donors have a tendency to aim for short-term results without sufficient alignment with the needs of the GIRoA and the people of Afghanistan; notes that the strict geographical preference linked to troop presence and regional segmentation by donor countries does not promote donor coordination, and increases the risk of duplications and inefficient use of financial assistance;

28. Notes the Council's conclusions on 'Strengthening EU Action in Afghanistan and Pakistan', the related biannual reporting, the European Commission's Blue Book 2009, which includes all aid coming from the EU General Budget and the Member States' national budgets, and the recent appointment of the double-hatted Head of the EU Delegation/EU Special Representative; judges these to be good steps towards better coordination of the efforts of the EU and its Member States;

29. Anticipates that the creation of the EEAS (European External Action Service) will result in better coordination and interaction, as well as greater transparency in the implementation of EU projects and the more sustainable and efficient use of EU funding in Afghanistan; expects also that responsibilities within the EU Delegation will be clearly established;

30. Calls on the Commission to pursue further efforts to coordinate the aid not only with the Member States but also with other international donors, for example by adopting joint sector-wide approaches to complement the geographical approach; underlines the important role of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the Afghan Ministry of Finance in this context;

31. Underlines the fact that investments by the international community in Afghanistan must be aligned with the needs of the GIRoA and the people of Afghanistan;

Improvements to reporting

32. Reminds the Commission that Parliament has called on the Commission⁽⁹⁾ to submit to it an annual report on Afghanistan containing a detailed evaluation of the effectiveness and impact of aid, as well as a statement of assurance clearly identifying the proportion of aid monitored, the weaknesses identified and the measures taken; reiterates this call and urges the Commission to fully implement the recommendation of Parliament to submit to it an annual report on aid implementation and its control in Afghanistan;

33. Sees the need to increase the transparency and accountability of the use of EU funds and to help EU Member States and other donors to avoid common pitfalls; calls, therefore, on the Commission to make publicly available the reports of its Results-Oriented Monitoring Missions, verification missions carried out on EU funds channelled through UN Agencies and other audit and evaluation reports;

Challenges for the future

34. Notes the recent announcement by the President of the United States of America to withdraw about one third

of American troops by the summer of 2012 and to hand over responsibility to Afghan security forces by 2014; recalls the importance of a stable security situation for proper oversight of EU funds, the deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan having already made it increasingly difficult for the Commission and other organisations to undertake on-the-spot control visits in Afghanistan;

35. Underlines the fact that a withdrawal of troops could have a negative effect on the economy of Afghanistan; recalls that the vast majority of the Afghan budget and Afghanistan's gross domestic product derives from foreign aid; notes that economic recovery is crucial to the overall development of Afghanistan; considers that civilian aid to Afghanistan will gain in importance as a result of the decrease in military aid;

36. Is of the opinion that this could also provide an opportunity to allocate the scarce resources to those projects which are most likely to achieve long-term results; reiterates the need for more economic sustainability of projects, and believes that this would avoid pressure on the donors to disburse the funds available at the current moment and on the recipients to implement projects that lack a long-term perspective;

37. Is of the opinion that civil society and parliamentarians must be involved throughout every stage of implementation, monitoring and the evaluation of results, and that this requirement must be a decisive eligibility criterion for budget support;

38. Considers a continuing and increased effort on the part of the international community to improve the capacity and independence of the judiciary to be essential for the future of Afghanistan; calls on the Commission and the Member States to increase their efforts in this regard and to engage in a constructive and strong dialogue with the GIRoA in order to ensure that an efficient and independent judicial body remains a shared objective of all actors involved in the development of Afghanistan;

39. Stresses that measures to combat corruption are a very important part of the peace process in Afghanistan, given that corruption causes funding to go astray, restricts access to basic public services such as health or education and creates an enormous obstacle to the socio-economic development of the country; furthermore corruption undermines confidence in the public sector and the government and gravely jeopardises national stability; urges the EU accordingly to devote particular attention to combating corruption in channelling aid to Afghanistan;

40. Is greatly concerned at the large proportion of international aid going astray during the distribution process and notes that there are four causes for this: waste, excessive intermediary and security costs, overbilling and corruption; urges the EU accordingly to monitor the cost and effectiveness of all EU aid to Afghanistan, with a view to ensuring that it is used more efficiently;

41. Considers the development of the security situation in Afghanistan to be a major future challenge for the reconstruction of Afghanistan and calls on the Commission to develop, together with the international community, a strategy on how to ensure security for Afghanistan and to stimulate a self-sustainable economy, inter alia with a view to being able to exercise proper control over aid;

42. Stresses that gender equality and women's rights are considered to be crucial issues both in the Afghan Government's national development strategy and the 2007-2013 national strategy document, which refers to future gender mainstreaming;

View from the foreign affairs policy perspective

43. Reiterates the EU's commitment to continuing to support Afghanistan; stresses that the overall objective of EU development assistance to Afghanistan should be to assist in the long-term sustainable development of the country, including improvement of socio-economic standards, facilitating job creation and proliferation of SMEs, strengthening the educational sector and ensuring gender equality; underlines the fact that the aid should further facilitate capacity-building in the public administration, strengthen the rule of law and reduce corruption, thus facilitating the transfer of security to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA); recommends that part of the financial assistance to Afghanistan be allocated to the five-year plan to phase out opium cultivation and replace it with alternative crops; stresses the need to facilitate sub-regional cooperation by means of assistance for issues of a cross-border nature;

44. Reiterates the urgent need to increase the efficiency of aid, as many development indicators still show no significant improvement, and corruption and the long distribution chain of international aid remain major obstacles to the provision of essential services to the people; calls on the European Union and the Member States to use available financial measures, including the future EU Trust Funds when established, in an efficient way which guarantees the provision of essential services to the population;

45. Notes that the majority of resources for socio-economic development in Afghanistan are channelled through international mechanisms, but that a significant proportion of this aid does not reach the intended beneficiaries, the people of Afghanistan; points out that the EU and, in particular, the Commission/EEAS should have a leading role

in improving donor coordination, in close cooperation with other key donors such as the US and Japan, and calls for detailed evaluations of aid efficiency in order to improve the transparency and donor accountability of the aid;

46. Takes the view that the European Union, as one of the major donors of official development and humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan (more than EUR 2 billion between 2002 and the end of 2010), has a particular responsibility to evaluate whether those funds reach the intended recipients and improve their living conditions;

47. Insists that, when using international organisations as an aid delivery channel, the EEAS and the Commission should pay close attention to eliminating waste, excessive intermediary costs, inefficiency, overbilling and corruption, and should insist on timely and adequate information on results and use of funds;

48. Reiterates its call on the EU to set up a centralised database on, and to analyse the costs and the impact of, all EU aid to Afghanistan, as the lack of up-to-date and reliable data undermines aid efficiency and transparency;

49. Is of the opinion that the Commission should consider introducing sectoral budget support; stresses, however, that such aid should be strictly conditional, with measurable impact indicators, and can only be used together with capacity-building measures and in administrations whose organisational structures and financial management capabilities have been properly assessed and considered adequate and transparent;

View from the development policy perspective

50. Stresses that directing aid towards conflict-affected countries implies the acceptance of a substantial level of inherent risk in terms of results; underlines that cooperation with the UN has made it possible to obtain development results in an extremely difficult operational environment; emphasises, however, that more progress is needed in terms of enhanced accountability and transparency vis-à-vis the EU as a major donor to the UN system;

51. Emphasises that the effectiveness of aid to Afghanistan can only be improved if there is a radical change of approach to the problem of corruption, which has blighted the country since 2001, from the highest to the lowest level of the administration; emphasises that the corruption at the top, which was implicitly accepted in the years immediately after 2001, is now in the eyes of the Afghan people almost irreversibly undermining the authority of the institutions established by the Afghan constitution; stresses, therefore, the urgent and absolute need to break with this acceptance of corruption and to take steps to ensure that the Afghan judicial system and the Afghan Court of Auditors can vigorously address this major problem and rely on the European Union as a strong, credible and firm ally that will take the lead in combating this challenge that is crucial to the future of the country;

52. Calls on the EEAS and the Commission to define a clear strategy for delivering aid in such a fragile, high-risk context; notes that the guiding principle of EU development policy is that aid must be effective; emphasises that adequate risk management is essential and that this means ensuring that sufficient financial and human resources are available to guarantee thorough monitoring of aid flows and results assessment;

53. Notes the donor commitment to channel at least 50 % of development aid through the Afghan Government's core budget within two years; emphasises, however, that budget support must go hand in hand with tangible improvements in the situation of governance in the country and increased donor confidence in Afghan public financial management (PFM), and requires urgent reforms and capacity building to strengthen PFM systems, reduce corruption and improve budget execution; invites the Commission to assess – taking into account the financial capacity of Afghan institutions and the pace of progress on key PFM reforms – whether specific Afghan ministries or other institutions, including at a decentralised level, could become eligible as recipients of sectoral budget support in the future, and if so, under what conditions;

54. Stresses the responsibility of the Afghan authorities with regard to structural, long-term development; urges the government to be more involved in the reconstruction, democratisation and poverty alleviation efforts and the fight against corruption; encourages EU donors to pay particular attention to the long-term sustainability of their interventions, by promoting Afghan ownership, systematically investing in capacity building and avoiding stand-alone projects that aim at short-term results only; underlines, in this context, the essential role of civil society organisations in ensuring ownership for the reconstruction process and guarding against the risk of corruption;

55. Calls, in particular, on the Afghan Government to focus on institutional capacity development in the public sector and to develop a single national programme for public administration reform (PAR); calls on the Commission and the Member States to advocate PAR collectively in their policy dialogue with the government, and to support the government's PAR objectives in a coordinated manner;

56. Urges the EU to remain committed to the sustainable, long-term development of Afghanistan and to continue to make available appropriate resources beyond 2014, when responsibility for security will be fully in the hands of the Afghan authorities, and other donors may start cutting funds; in this context, pleads for a strong EU offer emphasising the Union's commitment to developing a long-term partnership with Afghanistan with a view to the International Afghanistan Conference to be held in Bonn on 5 December; calls on the EU to seek new foreign

civil-society partners and donors;

57. Highlights the modest decline in civilian deaths since 2010; argues that, without enhanced domestic, regional and civilian security, development will continue to be stifled and lives will continue to be lost; calls on the Member States to recognise enhanced security as a prerequisite for development and to formulate their aid policies on this premise;

58. Points out that development aid from the EU has contributed to the empowerment of women in Afghanistan; argues that increased political and economic participation of women will improve their lives and help to reduce the risk of Afghanistan remaining mired in conflict;

59. Argues that the current fragmentation of donor assistance is having a negative impact on aid effectiveness and resulting in duplicated strategies; calls on the Commission, the Member States and the international community to coordinate their aid efforts better;

60. Argues that one of the most important issues facing Afghanistan is reform of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP); points out that performance ratings of both the ANA and ANP are not meeting agreed targets; calls on the Member States to enhance their assistance in this area by supplying training officers and exchanging best practice;

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61. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Court of Auditors and the Government and Parliament of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

(1) OJ C 294 E, 3.12.2009, p. 11.

(2) OJ C 46 E, 24.2.2010, p. 87.

(3) OJ C 184 E, 8.7.2010, p. 57.

(4) Texts adopted, **P7_TA(2010)0490**.

(5) OJ L 255, 26.9.2009.

(6) OJ L 252, 25.9.2010.

(7) Texts adopted, **P7_TA(2011)0317**.

(8) <http://eca.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/intosai-aada/home>

(9) OJ C 46 E, 24.2.2010, p. 93, paragraph 40.

European Parliament resolution of 5 July 2011 on the future of EU budget support to developing countries (Rapporteur: C. Goerens, DEVE)
with CONT opinion (draftsman: B. Staes)

Texts adopted

Tuesday, 5 July 2011 -
Strasbourg

Provisional edition

Budget support to developing
countries

A7-0206/2011

P7_TA-PROV(2011)0317

▶ European Parliament resolution of 5 July 2011 on the future of EU budget support to developing countries (2010/2300(INI))

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the commitments on aid volume, aid to sub-Saharan Africa and aid quality made by the G8 at the 2005 Gleneagles Summit and all subsequent G8 and G20 meetings,
- having regard to the Millennium Declaration adopted by the United Nations on 8 September 2000,
- having regard to the European Consensus on Development⁽¹⁾ and the European Union Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in Development Policies⁽²⁾,
- having regard to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action,
- having regard to Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which stipulates that ‘the Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries’,
- having regard to Article 25(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation (the ‘Development Cooperation Instrument’⁽³⁾ (DCI)),
- having regard to Article 61(2) of the Cotonou Agreement,
- having regard to its resolution of 6 April 2006 on aid effectiveness and corruption in developing countries⁽⁴⁾,
- having regard to its resolution of 5 May 2010 with observations forming an integral part of the decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth European Development Funds for the financial year 2008⁽⁵⁾,
- having regard to its position of 3 February 2011 on the Council position at first reading with a view to the adoption of a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation⁽⁶⁾,
- having regard to Court of Auditors Special Report No 11/2010 entitled ‘The Commission’s management of general budget support in ACP, Latin American and Asian countries’,
- having regard to the Green Paper from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the future of budget support to third countries (COM(2010)0586),
- having regard to the Commission’s 2007 document entitled ‘Guidelines on the Programming, Design & Management of General Budget Support’,
- having regard to the Commission’s 2008 report entitled ‘Budget support: The effective way to finance development?’
- having regard to the report of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly’s Committee on Economic

Development, Finance and Trade on budgetary support as a means of delivering official development assistance (ODA) in ACP countries,

– having regard to Rule 48 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Development and the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Budgetary Control ([A7-0206/2011](#)),

A. whereas the reduction and ultimate eradication of poverty is the European Union development policy's primary objective under the Lisbon Treaty,

B. whereas budget support has become one of the key forms of aid,

C. whereas many donors consider general and sectoral budget support as a means of fostering partner countries' ownership of development policies and lasting reform processes, strengthening national accountability institutions and systems, and facilitating growth, poverty reduction and the achievement of development objectives,

D. whereas operational capacity development is needed in order to create in the first place the preconditions for programme-based approaches, including budget support or more far-reaching models,

E. whereas budget support helps to overcome certain weaknesses of the traditional project-based approach (high transaction costs, fragmented parallel systems) and thus increase the coherence and efficiency of EU measures, aims which are stressed in the Lisbon Treaty,

F. whereas budget support should help to improve the quality and effectiveness of aid, with particular reference to the principles of ownership and harmonisation, given that political dialogue between donors and recipients makes it possible to tailor contributions to the priorities countries have set in their national poverty reduction strategies,

G. whereas, despite the risks mentioned by the European Court of Auditors in its reports on budget support, the 'dynamic approach' in the general conditionality of budget support is still a very important instrument of political dialogue; whereas budget support must nevertheless under no circumstances be considered as a 'blank cheque',

H. whereas the range of commitments made by beneficiary countries to all their partners may, in some cases, make their use difficult, given that the conditions imposed by donors are sometimes contradictory,

I. whereas the European Union has hitherto referred more frequently to violations of human rights ('first-generation rights') in partnership agreements rather than violations of social, economic and cultural rights ('second-generation rights'),

J. whereas all the donors should consult one another in order to prevent inconsistencies in conditionality,

K. whereas, pursuant to Article 2(3) of the Lisbon Treaty, it is an objective of the European Union to work for a sustainable social market economy, and whereas this should also apply with reference to development policy and relations under the neighbourhood policy,

L. whereas making a partner government publicly accountable for its budgetary management is an essential factor in the country's capacity building process through the exercise of scrutiny by its parliament and the provision of information to civil society in the field of public finance,

1. Welcomes the Commission's initiative through the Green Paper on budget support, which is aimed principally at promoting the development of partner countries from within, and calls for the budget support eligibility criteria to be clarified with a view to avoiding any loss of control over or misuse of this type of assistance, with due account being taken of factors such as the corruption index ratings for the countries concerned;

2. Welcomes the European-level consultation process; hopes that budget support award practice will be objectively analysed and improved in order to increase its effectiveness;

3. Recalls that, according to the Lisbon Treaty, poverty reduction and eradication is the EU's primary development policy objective; emphasises that poverty has multiple dimensions such as human, economic, socio-cultural, gender, environmental and political, which all need to be tackled by the EU development policy;

4. Is of the opinion that EU aid should generate real quality change in the partner countries and recognises budget support as an effective tool for achieving this goal, provided that, as well as implying conditionality, it is used alongside effective political and policy dialogue;

5. Emphasises the crucial and compulsory role of policy coherence in the implementation of a high-impact development policy; further calls for the EU foreign and security policy to focus on the promotion of democracy

and human rights, peace and security, all key preconditions for sustainable development; calls for more systematic efforts to mainstream climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction measures;

6. Takes the view that taxation guarantees an independent source of financing for sustainable development and provides an important link between the governments and citizens of developing countries; calls for the development of a viable fiscal administration and a comprehensive tax infrastructure to be made one of the highest priorities of budget support; recommends that budget support policy should incorporate measures to combat tax havens, tax evasion and illicit capital flight;
7. Stresses the need to use sectoral budget support wherever appropriate in order to ensure better targeting of basic social sectors, particularly health, education and assistance for the most vulnerable groups, especially persons with disabilities;
8. Points out that budget support must not be used to reinforce the EU's particular economic and strategic interests, but to reach development objectives of and for developing countries, especially to eradicate poverty and hunger;
9. Draws attention to the innovative role played by the EU in the field of budget support and the added value which the Commission brings, owing to its expertise in this area;
10. Notes that budget support can enhance not only the accountability of governments but also donor coordination through the necessary dialogue on budgetary issues; points out that this is a possible way forward for better coordination with emerging donors;
11. Stresses that the Union has a responsibility to pass on its experience to other institutional stakeholders, in particular at the High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan;
12. Stresses that the dynamic approach adopted by the Commission and a majority of budget support providers entails a number of risks which must be duly taken into account; calls on the Commission to carry out national assessments of the likely risks and benefits of budget support in partner countries;
13. Calls on the EU to administer budget support in such a way as to take full advantage of its complementarity with other forms of aid;
14. Stresses the need to strengthen both the Commission's monitoring mechanisms and parliamentary scrutiny and the provision of information to civil society in countries in receipt of budget support; stresses also that optimum procedures must be established for auditing the public finances of recipient countries as a precondition for any disbursement of funds;
15. Recalls that clearly defined, widely supported and closely monitored indicators are essential in order to demonstrate the concrete effects of budget support in third countries and that the relevant budgetary authorities should be updated regularly on the indicators and guidelines that shape the decision-making process in relation to budget support; emphasises that these indicators must be better tailored to the specific needs of partner countries in order to avoid the 'one size fits all' approach taken by the Commission, which is potentially counterproductive;
16. Calls for budget support to be made contingent on democratic parliamentary scrutiny of the budget in recipient countries; calls for the broad participation of parliaments and consultation of civil society in partner countries, so as to ensure that decisions about the use of budget support funds can be taken democratically;
17. Calls on the Commission to ensure, before budget support is granted, that the aims of the intervention are part of the national programmes of the recipient country and that the principles of coordination, complementarity and coherence in relation to other donors are respected, as well as additionality to the resources allocated by the recipient country;
18. With a view to ensuring the relevance of EU budget support, calls on the Commission to streamline its programming and design process by improving the preparation and documentation of decisions to launch budget support operations and, given resource constraints in Delegations, which often limit their capacity to perform certain activities, calls on the Commission to provide sufficient qualified staff for the implementation process, as budget support requires different analytical skills from project and programme financing;
19. Insists on the leading role that national parliaments of recipient countries, civil society organisations and local authorities should play as they are best placed to identify priority sectors, prepare Country Strategy Papers and monitor budget allocations; demands that national parliaments adopt Country Strategy Papers and the multiannual budget in consultation with civil society, prior to policy dialogue with donors on budget support, in order to empower parliamentary scrutiny;
20. Emphasises the importance of the effectiveness of EU development aid; calls on developing EU-level independent evaluation systems and a complaints mechanism open to those affected by EU aid, as well as

supporting in-country accountability mechanisms;

21. Calls on the Commission to supply a comprehensive financial analysis of general and sectoral budget support granted to local government and to consider whether part of budget support should be decentralised with a view to ensuring genuine ownership by local government stakeholders, as well as to assess the risks involved in doing so;

22. Calls on the EU to respect and promote genuine ownership of developing countries over their development strategy and to refrain from crowding out national policy-makers through policy dialogue surrounding budget support, which undermines democratic accountability and contributes to depoliticising domestic political realities;

23. Considers that budget support should focus as a priority on the government departments that have the greatest impact on poverty reduction, in particular health and education ministries;

24. Considers, furthermore, that there is a need for gender mainstreaming in budget support, with attention being paid to gender issues at all stages in the budget process, dialogue being promoted with women's associations and gender-differentiated indicators being introduced;

25. Stresses that, with a view to enhancing mutual accountability, the Commission should step up its role as a facilitator between government, members of parliament and civil society, and considers, to that end, that a percentage of the budget support earmarked for technical assistance to sectoral ministries could also be used for capacity building in parliaments and civil society in order to enable them to play their budget support oversight role to the full;

26. Stresses the prominent role of donor organisations in supporting partner countries in their capacity development and the positive influence of local project aid on reducing poverty and promoting inclusive growth and sustainable development in partner countries;

27. Is concerned at the effects of macro-economic destabilisation and the impact on the most vulnerable sections of the population which a sudden break in budget support might cause; proposes that, on the basis of concerted action by donors and following consultation of the civil society and parliament of the partner country concerned, a mechanism be set up for the gradual reduction of budget support payments, which could attenuate such impacts, encourage political dialogue and enable concerted solutions to be found to the difficulties encountered;

28. Believes that budget support just like programmed aid should be treated as a transitional instrument and should not hamper efforts to strengthen countries' capacities to raise own resources, such as taxes, in order to become independent from third country donations;

29. Calls on donor countries to coordinate budget support more effectively and make such support more predictable, and points out that they need to be willing to enter into long-term commitments with partner countries;

30. Calls on the EU to take the appropriate measures, so that there is commitment from the third countries that they will be investing in a mechanism which promotes their financial stability;

31. Insists on the effective implementation of the requirement contained in Article 25(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation (the DCI Regulation), which stipulates that the Commission shall consistently use an approach based on results and performance indicators and shall clearly define and monitor its conditionality and support efforts of partner countries to develop parliamentary control and audit capacities and to increase transparency and public access to information'; urges the Commission to extend these provisions to budget support to beneficiary countries of the European Development Fund (the ACP countries), for which – so far – only the more technical criteria of Article 61(2) of the Cotonou Agreement apply;

32. Considers that, since the use of budget support is an important strategic decision in the Union's relation with its partner countries, Article 290 TFEU (delegated acts) must apply to the definition of the eligibility criteria for this aid modality, giving the Council and Parliament, as co-legislators, full codecision powers over its adoption, including – if necessary – the right of revocation of the delegated act;

33. Recalls that major deficiencies in capabilities, in particular weak governance, are liable to deprive many developing countries of budget support;

34. Takes the view that financing decisions on budget support must be driven not only by expected benefits but also by the short-term and long-term risks incurred in both donor and partner countries; notes that the Court of Auditors, in its Special Report⁽⁷⁾, is in full agreement with this assessment by highlighting that a sound risk management framework is still to be developed and implemented;

35. Is concerned that the Court of Auditors ('the Court') in its Annual Report on the activities funded by the Eighth, Ninth and Tenth European Development Funds (EDFs) for the financial year 2009 found budget support

payments to be affected by a high frequency of non-quantifiable errors due to the lack of formalised and structured demonstration of compliance with payment conditions; at the same time takes note of and welcomes a substantial improvement in the demonstration of eligibility noted by the Court under the Tenth EDF owing to the clearer assessment frameworks that are now routinely used;

36. Points out that public investments in public goods, such as education, social security, infrastructures and productive capacities, especially with regard to smallholder farming and support to local markets, are crucial for successful development strategies;

37. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the specific conditions for performance-based variable tranches clearly specify the indicators, targets, calculation methods and verification sources and that Delegations' reports provide a structured and formalised demonstration of public finance management progress by clearly setting the criteria against which progress is to be assessed, the progress made and the reasons why the reform programme may have not been implemented according to plan;

38. Calls on the Commission to take all necessary measures in order to combat corruption in the recipient countries, including suspension of disbursements if necessary; in this context calls on the Commission to maintain a close and regular dialogue with partner governments on corruption issues and pay sufficient attention to the capacity-building needs of particular recipient countries in terms of accountability and anti-corruption mechanisms;

39. Considers the predictability of aid flows to be one of the most important factors for ensuring the quality of spending, as it enables the partner countries to undertake long-term expenditure planning and to sustain improvements in sectoral policies; advocates that such an approach be reinforced by partner countries' fiscal policies and mobilisation of domestic revenue which, in the long term, should reduce aid dependency;

40. Recalls that the lack of progress as regards the management of public finances still disqualifies many countries from receiving budget support;

41. Takes the view that budget support should be introduced gradually in developing countries, starting with a limited amount and increasing it as the partner countries build capacity;

42. Reiterates that budget support should be spent in pursuit of poverty reduction, including the pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals and to principles such as partnership, aid effectiveness and policy coherence for development; expresses its support for results-based incentives but emphasises that variances of disbursement must be predictable as far as possible so as not to impact negatively on budgetary planning; reiterates that budget support should only be granted to countries meeting and upholding minimum standards of governance and respect for human rights; underlines that conditions linked to macro-economic reforms must be compatible with human and social development;

43. Encourages developing countries and the Commission to promote participatory development, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Cotonou Agreement and of Articles 19 and 20 of Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006, in particular with regard to the promotion and consultation of civil society and local and regional authorities;

44. Points out that, when granting budget support to banana-supplying ACP countries benefiting from accompanying measures in this sector, it is important to include in the variable tranche based on governance indicators the specific conditions contained in the new Article 17a that Parliament is proposing be inserted in Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 (DCI Regulation), as set out in an amendment in the position of the European Parliament adopted at second reading on 3 February 2011 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) No .../2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation;

45. Demands that the Commission publish the agreements with developing countries on budget support and MDG contracts;

46. Underlines that sectoral budget support can constitute under certain circumstances a useful intermediary option to give the concerned governments and parliaments more ownership over aid funds while earmarking them for the MDGs;

47. Considers that oil and mineral rich countries have the potential to finance their own development and fight against poverty through transparent tax collection systems and fair redistribution of wealth;

48. Takes the view that, in principle, MDG contracts are an example of high-quality, results-oriented budget support (long-term, predictable, targeted at social sectors, etc.); calls accordingly on the Commission to publish an assessment of MDG contracts in 2011 and to look into the feasibility of extending them to a larger number of

countries;

49. Calls on the Commission also to publish the conditionalities and performance indicators in Country Strategy Papers on the occasion of the mid-term review; takes the view that budget support performance should be measured in terms of progress towards poverty reduction targets and the MDGs;

50. Reiterates its previous calls on the Commission to move from control over inputs to the checking of results against indicators, by improving its reporting system so that it concentrates on the effectiveness of the programmes;

51. States that the effectiveness of development-policy measures in the partner countries must fully take into consideration local conditions and respect the EU values as stated by the Treaty including the principle of rule of law and democracy; stresses that needs must remain a crucial criterion for the allocation of EU development aid;

52. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to create a public register in which budget support agreements, procedures and development indicators are transparently listed, with a view to reinforcing the domestic democratic institutions and to ensuring mutual accountability;

53. Calls on the Member States to show greater consistency at national and Community level as regards development aid policy; calls on the Member States to make use of the European External Action Service to strengthen their coordination with the Commission as regards budget support so as to avoid duplication and inconsistency;

54. Reminds the Commission and the Member States to harmonise their development cooperation and to improve mutual accountability;

55. Is firmly convinced that a thorough analysis of the future of EU budget support to third countries must address the issue of budgetisation of the European Development Fund; is aware of the historical and institutional background to the current situation but believes that the time has come for the Council, the Member States and the ACP countries to acknowledge that this situation is detrimental to the efficiency, transparency and accountability of EU budget support; emphasises, however, that budgetisation must not entail a decrease in the overall financial envelope for development policies;

56. Calls on the Member States, the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS), in line with the practice established in other policy fields, to improve the coordination of their respective budget support to third countries in order to avoid overlap, inconsistencies and incoherencies; deplores the reviews showing that, at sectoral level, weak policies, institutions and service delivery systems have prompted donors to use their own systems to implement projects, and to act bilaterally rather than in a coordinated manner, a situation which is all the more unacceptable in a context of scarce funding and which also makes it very hard for the EU to live up to its promises on making aid more predictable; maintains that a focus on specific areas offering the greatest added value should drive EU budget support throughout all phases of preparation and delivery;

57. Calls on the Commission to raise public awareness of the risks entailed by the practice of budget support and to highlight the positive impact of budget support on partner emancipation;

58. Calls on the EU and its Member States to continue to promote and preserve their financial support and at the same time to provide consultative support for technocratic management of public finances;

59. Emphasises that the aims of improved coordination are to optimise the allocation of resources, enhance the exchange of best practices and boost the efficiency of budget support;

60. Considers that the Union should recognise and utilise the added value generated by its huge political weight and the potentially broad scope of its action, ensuring political influence proportional to the financial support given;

61. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

(1) OJ C 46, 24.2.2006, p. 1.

(2) Council Conclusions 9558/07, 15.5.2007.

(3) OJ L 378, 27.12.2006, p. 41.

(4) OJ C 293 E, 2.12.2006, p. 316.

(5) OJ L 252, 25.9.2010, p. 109.

(6) Texts adopted, **P7_TA(2011)0030**.

(7) European Court of Auditors Special Report No 11/2010: 'The Commission's

management of general budget support in ACP, Latin American and Asian countries’.

► **OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY CONTROL (31.3.2011)**



**for the Committee on Development
on the future of EU budget support to developing countries
(2010/2300(INI))**

Rapporteur: Bart Staes

SUGGESTIONS

The Committee on Budgetary Control calls on the Committee on Development, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:

1. Is aware that budget support is a controversially discussed instrument of development, implying opportunities and challenges; acknowledges that it respects development principles by increasing ownership and enhancing dialogue between partners and donors, and provides the advantage of low transaction costs while at the same time involving the risk of misappropriation and unwanted use of funds when public finance management by recipient countries is not sufficiently transparent, accountable and effective; stresses that budget support is not the right answer to every situation and should never be perceived as the sole option;
2. Calls on the Commission to ensure, before budget support is granted, that the aims of the intervention are part of the national programmes of the recipient country and that the principles of coordination, complementarity and coherence in relation to other donors are respected, as well as additionality to the resources allocated by the recipient country;
3. With a view to ensuring the relevance of EU budget support, calls on the Commission to streamline its programming and design process by improving the preparation and documentation of decisions to launch budget support operations and, given resource constraints in Delegations, which often limit their capacity to perform certain activities, calls on the Commission to provide sufficient qualified staff for the implementation process, as budget support requires different analytical skills from project and programme financing;
4. Calls on the Commission to formulate the objectives in a way which makes it possible to measure the effectiveness of the programmes and to hold the Commission accountable; urges the Commission to take due account of a given recipient country’s priority capacity-building needs;
5. Reiterates its previous calls on the Commission to move from control over inputs to the checking of results against indicators, by improving its reporting system so that it concentrates on the effectiveness of the programmes;
6. With a view to reducing the risks in public finance management associated with budget support programmes, calls on the Commission to put in place an efficient risk management system;
7. Is concerned that the Court of Auditors (‘the Court’) in its Annual Report on the activities funded by the Eighth, Ninth and Tenth European Development Funds (EDFs) for the financial year 2009 found budget support payments to be affected by a high frequency of non-quantifiable errors due to the lack of formalised and structured demonstration of compliance with payment conditions; at the same time takes note of and welcomes a substantial improvement in the demonstration of eligibility noted by the Court under the Tenth EDF owing to the clearer assessment frameworks that are now routinely used;
8. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the specific conditions for performance-based variable tranches clearly specify the indicators, targets, calculation methods and verification sources and that Delegations’ reports provide a structured and formalised demonstration of public finance management progress by clearly setting the criteria against which progress is to be assessed, the progress made and the reasons why the reform programme may have not been implemented according to plan;
9. Calls on the Commission to take all necessary measures in order to combat corruption in the recipient countries, including suspension of disbursements if necessary; in this context calls on the Commission to maintain a close and regular dialogue with partner governments on corruption issues and pay sufficient

attention to the capacity-building needs of particular recipient countries in terms of accountability and anti-corruption mechanisms; notes that among the 27 ACP countries that are not in a fragile situation and for which general budget support (GBS) has been planned in the country strategy papers for the Tenth EDF, 12 of them, on the basis of the 2009 Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International, are classified as having 'rampant corruption', and of the six Latin American and Asian countries with GBS programmes, five of them have the same classification;

10. Reiterates its opinion that the involvement of national parliaments, civil society and local authorities in partner countries is indispensable for achieving genuine ownership of the process, and repeats its call on the Commission to make every effort to improve dialogue with these bodies at all the different stages of the programming process;
11. In this respect, insists on the effective implementation of the requirement contained in Article 25(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation ('the DCI Regulation')⁽¹⁾, which stipulates that 'the Commission shall consistently use an approach based on results and performance indicators and shall clearly define and monitor its conditionality and support efforts of partner countries to develop parliamentary control and audit capacities and to increase transparency and public access to information', and urges the Commission to extend these provisions to include budget support to the beneficiary countries of the European Development Fund (the ACP countries), to which – so far – only the more technical criteria of Article 61(2) of the Cotonou Agreement apply.

⁽¹⁾OJ L 37, 27.12.2006, p. 41.

Programmes HAITI

Decision Title	Decided Amount (EUR)
Programme d'informations territoriales pour le developpement durable PITDD	7.000.000,00
	3.500.000,00
	10.500.000,00
Decision Title	Decided Amount (EUR)
Programme de réhabilitation et de relance économique post-crise (PRPC)	95.400.000,00
	26.309.575,59
	3.500.000,00
	27.000.000,00
	0,00
	152.209.575,59
Decision Title	Decided Amount (EUR)
PROGRAMME DE REHABILITATION DE LA VILLE DE GONAIVES ET DE SA REGION	9.990.000,00
	5.100.000,00
	15.090.000,00
Decision Title	Decided Amount (EUR)
RENFORCEMENT DES CAPACITES LOCALES POUR LA GESTION DU RISQUE EN HAITI	6.000.000,00
	6.000.000,00
Decision Title	Decided Amount (EUR)
CONVENTION FORMATION PROFESIONNELLE	560.944,00
	5.036.756,00
	5.597.700,00
Decision Title	Decided Amount (EUR)
PROJET ENVIRONNEMENT TRANSFRONTALIER	934.000,00
	1.362.400,00
	203.600,00
	2.500.000,00
Decision Title	Decided Amount (EUR)
PROJET D'APPUI AU BUREAU DE L'ORDONNATEUR NATIONAL	2.500.000,00
	2.500.000,00
Decision Title	Decided Amount (EUR)
PROJET D'APPUI AU BUREAU DE L'ORDONNATEUR NATIONAL	1.000.000,00
	1.000.000,00
Decision Title	Decided Amount (EUR)
PROGRAMME D'AIDE BUDGETAIRE	21.960.000,00

	2.580.000,00
	756.298,00
	3.283.702,00
	0,00
	28.580.000,00

Decision Title	Decided Amount (EUR)
TCF-TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY	2.116.000,00
	2.116.000,00

Decision Title	Decided Amount (EUR)
PROGRAMME DE RENFORCEMENT DE LA QUALITE DE L'EDUCATION EN HAITI II (PARQUE II)	14.000.000,00
	100.000,00
	14.100.000,00

Decision Title	Decided Amount (EUR)
APPUI BUDGETAIRE GENERALE A LA STRATEGIE NATIONALE POUR LA CROISSANCE ET LA REDUCTION DE LA PAUVRETE (ABG-SNCRP)	26.000.000,00
	0,00
	5.000.000,00
	30.000.000,00
	61.000.000,00

Decision Title	Decided Amount (EUR)
FACILITE DE COOPERATION TECHNIQUE	3.650.000,00
	3.650.000,00

Decision Title	Decided Amount (EUR)
Programme d'appui à la politique nationale des Transports	38.500.000,00
	145.000.000,00
	500.000,00
	0,00
	184.000.000,00

Decision Title	Decided Amount (EUR)
Programme Intérimaire d'Appui à la Gouvernance & l'investissement local (AGIL)	5.500.000,00
	5.500.000,00

Decision Title	Decided Amount (EUR)
Programme d'Appui au Renforcement de la Société Civile Haitienne (PARSCH)	7.800.000,00
	7.800.000,00

Decision Title	Decided Amount (EUR)
Appui au Renforcement de la Culture & l'Art pour le Développement Economique et Social (ARCADES)	3.700.000,00
	3.700.000,00

Decision Title	Decided Amount (EUR)
Programme d'appui au Commerce	4.500.000,00

	0,00
	4.500.000,00
Decision Title	Decided Amount (EUR)
Programme d'appui budgétaire général en appui au PARDH et au DSNCRP	21.000.000,00
	26.000.000,00
	47.000.000,00
Decision Title	Decided Amount (EUR)
Programme d'Appui au Bureau de l'Ordonnateur national du FED en Haïti, deuxième phase (Appui au BON II)	3.080.000,00
	3.080.000,00
Decision Title	Decided Amount (EUR)
Programme d'appui a la reconstruction et a l'aménagement de quartiers pour faciliter le retour des populations sinistrées	23.000.000,00
	23.000.000,00
Decision Title	Decided Amount (EUR)
Facilité de Coopération Technique II (FCT II 10ème FED)	2.350.000,00
	0,00
	2.350.000,00
Decision Title	Decided Amount (EUR)
Micro-Finance pour la production agricole en Haïti	1.000.000,00
	1.000.000,00
	2.000.000,00
Decision Title	Decided Amount (EUR)
Restoration of Haitian government	20.000.000,00
	20.000.000,00
Decision Title	Decided Amount (EUR)
Programme to Support Presidential and Legislative Elections in Haïti-2010	5.000.000,00
	5.000.000,00

COTONOU - EDF – ROLE OF AUTHORISING OFFICER

Relevant Chapters of the EDF Financial Guide:

1. STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION OF THE 10TH EDF

1.1. Legal framework

The ACP-EU Partnership Agreement signed on 23 June 2000 in Cotonou by the Member States of the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP), which entered into force on 1 April 2003. The Cotonou Agreement has been amended by:

- the Agreement signed by the same States on 25 June 2005 in Luxembourg;
- Decision No 1/2008 of the ACP-EU Council of Ministers of 13 June 2008 regarding the revision of the terms and conditions of financing for short-term fluctuations in export earnings;
- Decision No 3/2008 of the ACP-EU Council of Ministers of 15 December 2008 adopting amendments to Annex IV to the revised Cotonou Agreement concerning awarding contracts, awarding grants and performing contracts;
- the Agreement signed by the same States on 22 June 2010 in Ouagadougou.

1.2. Financial resources

The European Development Funds, each established by the relevant Internal Agreement, are global allocations of funds committed by the EU Member States for the purpose of implementing the ACP-EU Conventions and Partnership Agreements and the EU Council Decisions on the association of the OCT with the EU.

The Cotonou Agreement was concluded for a period of 20 years with a clause for revision every five years and a financial protocol or multiannual financial framework for each concerned period. The EU Council Decision on the association of the OCT with the EU (2001/822/EC) runs for 10 years.

Under the Cotonou Agreement, the second period (2008-2013) of EU aid to the ACP States and OCT is funded by the 10th EDF with total funds of EUR 22 682 million, of which:

- EUR 21 966 million allocated to the ACP countries in accordance with the multiannual financial framework in Annex Ib to the revised Cotonou Agreement;
- EUR 286 million allocated to the OCT in accordance with Annex II Aa of the Council Decision on the association of the OCT with the EU;
- EUR 430 million for the European Commission to finance the costs arising from the programming and implementation of 10th EDF resources, in accordance with Article 6 of the Internal Agreement.

1.3. Management modes

In most cases the European Commission undertakes the financial implementation of 10th EDF resources by means of decentralised management with the ACP States in accordance with the conditions set out in the revised Cotonou Agreement, based in particular on the sharing of responsibilities provided for in Article 57 of that Agreement (concerning guidelines for development finance cooperation) and in Articles 34, 35 and 36 of Annex IV to the Agreement (on agents responsible for the management and implementation of EDF resources³³).

In decentralised management the European Commission delegates some financial implementation tasks to the ACP States. Generally, contracts are concluded by representatives of the ACP States but the corresponding payments are made by the European Commission (partially decentralised management). In the cases set out in the Practical Guide to procedures for programme estimates (project approach), payments may be made by the representatives of the ACP States (partially decentralised management).

The ACP States' implementation of operations financed from EDF resources is subject to scrutiny by the European Commission. Such scrutiny may be exercised by means of prior approval (ex ante control), ex post control or a combined procedure.

1.4. Financial actors responsible for execution

Annex IV to the revised Cotonou Agreement, Regulation No 2304/2002 and the Financial Regulation specify the financial actors responsible for the execution of EDF resources.

1.4.1. Authorising Officer by delegation

The European Commission, which acts as authorising officer for all the EDFs, has appointed as EDF Authorising Officer by delegation the Director-General of DEVCO, who in turn has delegated his powers to the Directors of DEVCO/E (SubSaharan Africa and Horizontal ACP Matters), DEVCO/H (Latin America and the Caribbean) and DEVCO/G (Asia, Central Asia and the Pacific), making them authorising officers by subdelegation. These Directors, with the express written consent of the Director-General, have delegated some of their powers to authorising officers by subdelegation in their Directorates and to Heads of Delegation and other European Commission's authorising officers by subdelegation in the devolved EU delegations in the ACP and OCT geographical areas.

The Authorising Officer by delegation is thus responsible for managing the resources of the EDF. He is in charge of implementing revenue and expenditure in accordance with the principle of sound financial management and for ensuring that the requirements of legality and regularity are complied with. To implement expenditure, the Authorising Officer by delegation and the authorising officers by subdelegation make commitments, validate expenditure and authorise payments and undertake the preliminaries for the implementation of EDF appropriations. Implementation of revenue comprises drawing up estimates of amounts receivable, establishing entitlements to be recovered and issuing recovery orders. It may also involve the waiver of entitlements.

Depending on the delegation received, the Authorising Officer by delegation and each authorising officer by subdelegation must sign, either the 'Charter of authorising officers by delegation entrusted with managing the resources of the EDF' or the 'Charter of authorising officers by subdelegation entrusted with managing the resources of the EDF'. These charters identify their tasks, their mission, rights and duties and the responsibilities incumbent on them in the exercise of their functions.

1.4.2. Head of Delegation (authorising officer by subdelegation)

The EU is represented in each ACP State, in some OCTs and in each regional grouping which expressly so requests by a delegation placed under the authority of a Head of Delegation, with the approval of the ACP State(s) concerned. He is part of the European External Action Service (EEAS) but also represents the European Commission in all spheres of its competence and in all its activities. The Head of Delegation is the main contact for the ACP States, OCTs and bodies or organisations eligible for EU financial support. He cooperates and works in close cooperation with the National, Territorial and, where appropriate Regional, Authorising Officer.

1.4.3. National, Regional, intra-ACP and Territorial Authorising Officers

The authorities of each ACP State appoint a National Authorising Officer to represent it in all EDF-financed activities. The authorities of each OCT appoint a Territorial Authorising Officer to represent it in all EDF-financed activities. For regional programmes and projects, the relevant body or organisation appoints a Regional Authorising Officer whose functions correspond mutatis mutandis to those of a National Authorising Officer. For intra-ACP programmes and projects, the ACP Committee of Ambassadors appoints an intra-ACP Authorising Officer whose functions correspond mutatis mutandis to those of a National Authorising Officer. If the ACP Secretariat is not the Authorising Officer, the Committee of Ambassadors should be notified of the implementation of projects and programmes as required by the financing agreement.

Wherever the conditions regarding institutional capacity and sound financial management are met, the National or Territorial Authorising Officer may delegate his functions for implementation of the programmes and projects concerned to the body responsible within the national or territorial administration, notifying the Head of Delegation accordingly.

In connection with the decentralised management of EDF resources, the main tasks of the National, Regional, intra-ACP or Territorial Authorising Officer are to:

- be responsible for the coordination, programming, regular monitoring and annual, mid-term and end-of-term reviews of the implementation of cooperation, and for coordination with donors;
- in close cooperation with the Head of Delegation, be responsible for the preparation, submission and appraisal of projects and programmes;
- prepare tender dossiers and, where appropriate, documents for calls for proposals;
- submit tender dossiers and, where appropriate, documents for calls for proposals to the Head of Delegation for approval before launching invitations to tender and, where appropriate, calls for proposals;
- in close cooperation with the Head of Delegation, launch invitations to tender and, where appropriate, calls for proposals, receive tenders and, if applicable, proposals, preside over their examination and establish the results thereof;

- approve and submit to the Head of Delegation for approval the results of examination of tenders and, where appropriate, proposals, and also the proposals for the award of contracts and grants;
- submit contracts and contract riders to the Head of Delegation for approval and endorsement;
- submit programme estimates and riders thereto to the Head of Delegation for approval and endorsement;
- sign contracts and contract riders approved by the Head of Delegation;
- validate and authorise expenditure within the limits of the funds assigned to him;
- make any adaptation arrangements necessary to ensure the proper execution of projects or programmes from the economic and technical viewpoint;
- make minor adjustments and technical changes to projects and programmes provided that they do not affect the technical solutions adopted and remain within the limit of the reserve for adjustments included in the budget of the financing agreement, provided that he
- informs the Head of Delegation without delay;
- decide on the imposition or remission of penalties for delay, provided that he informs the Head of Delegation without delay;
- decide on the discharge of guarantors, provided that he informs the Head of Delegation without delay;
- decide on final acceptance, provided that the Head of Delegation is present at provisional acceptance, endorses the corresponding minutes and, where appropriate, is present at the final acceptance, in particular where the extent of the reservations recorded at the provisional
- acceptance necessitates major additional work;
- sign final payments for works and supply contracts.

The National, Regional, intra-ACP or Territorial Authorising Officer must assume financial responsibility for the executive tasks assigned to him.

Where the Authorising Officer by delegation becomes aware of problems in carrying out procedures relating to management of EDF resources, he will, in conjunction with the National, Regional, intra-ACP or Territorial Authorising Officer, make all contacts necessary to remedy the situation and take any steps that are necessary.

Where the National, Regional, intra-ACP or Territorial Authorising Officer does not or is unable to carry out the tasks incumbent on him, the Authorising Officer by delegation may temporarily take his place.



Aide humanitaire

Partenaire:	IFRC
Convention :	ECHO/-CR/BUD/2010/02023 National

Titre:	Program to support the Red Cross in reducing the vulnerability of populations at high risk
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Objectif spécifique:	Reinforce Haitian Red Cross human resources and management capacity at departmental and national levels to ensure that the national society fully assumes its humanitarian role within the national Disaster and Risk management System (SNGRD)
Indicateur 1	Number of trainers in preparedness and community-based education trained by the Haitian Red Cross Training Center by the end of the project
Indicateur 2	Haitian Red Cross Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy adopted and aligned with that of the National System
Indicateur 3	Preparedness activities developed by the Haitian Red Cross and supported by international partners in 30 communes at highest risk, in coordination with civil protection committees
Indicateur 4	Baseline on target communities established along with local indicator of risk management

Résultat 1:	The International Federation has access to material, human and management resources to provide technical support to the Haitian Red Cross in reducing the risk of disasters
Indicateur 1	Monthly coordination meetings between the Red Cross and the SNGRD
Indicateur 2	The Haitian Red Cross Disaster Management Department and the Haitian Red Cross National Training Centre each have an organigram, Terms of reference for all positions and all staff recruited by the end of the project
Indicateur 3	The IFRC and Haitian Red Cross Disaster and Risk Management department has access to the necessary operational resources at National and Departmental level
Indicateur 4	The Haitian Red Cross Training Centre is functional and has basic facilities and infrastructure
Indicateur 5	The Training Centre has a training plan until 31 December 2011 and a work plan until December 2012

Résultat 2:	The Haitian Red Cross adopts a Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Strategy, in line with that of the National Disaster and Risk management System (SNGRD)
Indicateur 1	Red Cross DRR strategy adopted and presented to the Permanent Secretariat for Disaster and Risk management (SPGRD) before the end of the project
Indicateur 2	An operational implementation plan of the strategy is adopted before the end of the project
Indicateur 3	A memorandum of understanding (MoU) is agreed with the SNGRD before the end of the project regarding the establishment of an SMS Early Warning System
Indicateur 4	By the end of the project a MOU to be in the development stage for Disaster preparedness with the Civil protection Directorate
Indicateur 5	By the end of the project, a MoU to be in the development stage for Disaster Response with the Civil protection Directorate

Résultat 3:	Coordination of red Cross red Crescent partners in disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) is carried out
Indicateur 1	Monthly meetings on DRR held between Movement partners based in Haiti
Indicateur 2	Red Cross participates in international, national and departmental DRR coordination platforms as well as knowledge and information sharing activities
Indicateur 3	By the end of the project, a work plan is adopted by the Haitian Red Cross and Movement partners in Haiti for implementation of support programs

Résultat 4:	Harmonization and standardization of community-based intervention methodologies (training, material, pre-positioning)
Indicateur 1	Inventory of community-based disaster preparedness intervention methodologies completed before the end of the project
Indicateur 2	Agreement on systematization and standardization of methodologies between Haitian Red Cross and DPC signed before the end of the project
Indicateur 3	Community-based disaster preparedness methodology (Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment, Community Disaster Response Teams, social micro-projects, basic training skills for community education) approved by Haitian Red Cross before the end of the project
Indicateur 4	4 red Cross movement and external partners use the community based disaster preparedness intervention methodology adopted by the Haitian Red Cross
Indicateur 5	Red Cross Movement partners participate in the annual simulation exercise organized by the Civil protection directorate

Département	National
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Durée:	12 mois
Date démarrage:	24-Aout-10
Date fin:	24-Aout-11

Montant total:	999,763 EUR
Contribution DG ECHO:	999,763 EUR

Bénéficiaires:	4,405 personnes
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Partenaire:	IFRC
Convention :	ECHO/HTI/BUD/2011/91039 National

Titre:	Enhancing Haitian Red Cross Disaster and Risk Management Capacity
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Objectif spécifique:	To enhance institutional Haitian Red Cross capacity for risk and disaster management in coordination with the National Disaster Risk Management System, aiming at increasing knowledge, skills and resources of vulnerable communities to prepare for, respond to and recover from disasters
Indicateur 1	By the end of the project the Haitian Red Cross Disaster operates in accordance with its revised National Emergency Response Manual
Indicateur 2	Throughout the project implementation the Haitian Red Cross National Training Centre provides trainings in accordance with the service requests received
Indicateur 3	At the end of the project the Haitian Red Cross works in accordance to its disaster and risk management plan of action
Indicateur 4	At the end of the project partner National Societies with disaster and risk management programs have these aligned with the Haitian Red Cross disaster and risk management Plan of Action

Résultat 1:	The Haitian red cross has improved the efficacy of its material, human and management resources to implement the Disaster Risk management program at national level
Indicateur 1	By month 12 80% of Haitian Red Cross regional branches have participated in at least 75% of the departmental civil protection activities taken place during the project implementation
Indicateur 2	By month 6 of the implementation period the first response structure is established and applied at national and regional levels
Indicateur 3	By month 7 a planning, monitoring, evaluation and reporting (PMER) system in place and used to monitor and report on the project implementation
Indicateur 4	Haitian Red Cross, IFRC and Partner National Societies have participated in the SIMEX and by the end of the project in a Movement-wide simulation exercise

Résultat 2:	Haitian Red Cross has the operative and management capacity to run the National Training Centre and offer training services to Red Cross and non-Red Cross partners
Indicateur 1	By month 5 of the implementation period 4 National Training Centre certified trainers are available in all 13 regional branches and one of them is identified as regional focal points
Indicateur 2	Starting from month 1 of the project implementation period a monthly tentative training schedule exists and is visible at the National Training Centre
Indicateur 3	By the end of the project at least 7 National Training Centre training modules are validated by the Civil Protection Directorate

Résultat 3:	Vulnerable urban communities in West Department have increased capacity to prepare for and respond to disasters
Indicateur 1	At the end of the project at least 80% of community brigades will be able to demonstrate disaster risk management knowledge
Indicateur 2	By the end of the project implementation period, micro-projects will be established in at least 60% of locations where a vulnerability and capacity assessment was conducted
Indicateur 3	By the end of the project at least 50% of the targeted population will have increased knowledge of key risk reduction topics
Indicateur 4	By the end of the project at least 60% of the community brigades will have conducted a disaster simulation exercise

Résultat 4:	Harmonization and standardization of community-based intervention methodologies (training, material, pre-positioning)
Indicateur 1	Inventory of community-based disaster preparedness intervention methodologies completed before the end of the project
Indicateur 2	Agreement on systematization and standardization of methodologies between Haitian Red Cross and DPC signed before the end of the project
Indicateur 3	Community-based disaster preparedness methodology (Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment, Community Disaster Response Teams, social micro-projects, basic training skills for community education) approved by Haitian Red Cross before the end of the project
Indicateur 4	4 red Cross movement and external partners use the community based disaster preparedness intervention methodology adopted by the Haitian Red Cross
Indicateur 5	Red Cross Movement partners participate in the annual simulation exercise organized by the Civil protection directorate

Département	National
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Durée:	12 mois
Date démarrage:	01-Nov-11
Date fin:	30-oct-12

Montant total:	797,565 EUR
Contribution DG ECHO:	500,000 EUR

Bénéficiaires:	4,324 personnes
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FICHE ACTION POUR HAÏTI/CARAÏBES

1. IDENTIFICATION

Intitulé	Revitalisation du quartier de Martissant		
Coût total	2 millions d'euros		
Méthode d'assistance / Mode de gestion	Approche Projet - Gestion décentralisée		
Code CAD	43030	Secteur	Gestion et développement urbains

2. MOTIF

2.1. Contexte sectoriel

Haïti sort d'une longue crise de vingt années. La transition initiée après le départ du Président Aristide a permis la tenue d'élections générales (présidentielle, législatives, locales et municipales) en 2006, qui ont restitué une légitimité aux institutions.

La relative stabilité politique et sociale observée jusqu'à ces derniers temps, reste extrêmement fragile, particulièrement en milieu urbain. Cela résulte de la situation de précarité, de la pauvreté et d'un chômage élevé auxquels sont confrontés les ménages et les individus dans leur grande majorité. L'augmentation rapide et récente du coût de la vie est un facteur supplémentaire qui a aggravé la situation et fait basculer le pays dans le désordre et la violence pendant quelques jours d'avril, occasionnant du même coup la chute de Gouvernement en place. À côté de ces raptus de violence, l'insécurité touche de façon chronique toute la population. Elle a un impact particulièrement important sur les familles les plus démunies. Les quartiers populaires ont souvent été armés par des groupes politiques ou des groupements d'intérêts. La criminalité organisée, qui s'y est rapidement développée, et le recours aux armes pèsent fortement sur le pays et sur sa capacité à se reconstruire.

Le pays est encore démunie de vant les attentes de la population auxquelles il ne peut répondre et le risque politique de déstabilisation est réel. Les événements du 7 au 9 avril 2008 sont là pour en témoigner. À l'instar d'autres pays confrontés à la cherté de la vie, Haïti vient d'être le témoin de manifestations importantes. Contrairement à d'autres ces manifestations ont rapidement dégénéré en scènes de violence et de pillage secouant Port-au-Prince et les grandes villes du pays. Les entreprises publiques et privées n'ont pas été épargnées et ont subi de lourds préjudices qui aggravent un peu plus la situation du pays. Pour accompagner le retour à une meilleure gouvernance et pour stabiliser les institutions, il est essentiel de répondre rapidement au défi de l'insécurité urbaine en démontrant, par des projets ciblés, que la ville peut être un véritable espace de vie et de dialogue, et qu'une alternative existe à la violence.

Le quartier de Martissant était récemment encore très exposé à la violence et considéré comme une zone de non-droit marquée par l'absence des pouvoirs publics. En Janvier 2007,

la Police Nationale Haïtienne et la MINUSTAH ont repris possession de cette zone, mais ce retour de la force publique doit s'accompagner rapidement d'actions concrètes afin de démontrer la volonté de l'Etat de réinvestir le milieu urbain. Ces progrès sont très fragiles. Il suffit pour cela de constater qu'à l'occasion des récentes manifestations contre la cherté de la vie, Martissant a été l'un des premiers quartiers de Port au Prince à basculer dans la violence et l'un des derniers à retrouver un semblant de paix.

Le programme financé par la Commission Européenne au titre de l'Instrument de Stabilité, et démarré en Février 2008, qui voit intervenir trois acteurs familiarisés à la zone, FOKAL, CONCERN et OXFAM INTERMON, vise à améliorer rapidement l'environnement et le climat de ce quartier en prenant en compte des activités d'éducation à la paix et à la citoyenneté, promotion du dialogue communautaire, formation professionnelle, accès à l'emploi, animation communautaire, réhabilitation d'espaces publics et travaux à haute intensité de main d'œuvre qui répondent bien aux besoins les plus importants du moment.

En complément des ces actions, le programme proposé vise à développer des actions additionnelles dans la même zone d'intervention afin de favoriser la création de synergies entre les deux projets financés par la Commission Européenne. Il s'agit d'améliorer l'accès aux services de base, l'éducation, l'eau et l'assainissement tout en permettant aux autorités municipales de mieux s'impliquer dans la gestion de la collectivité. Aux côtés de la municipalité, les partenaires de ce projet seront des organisations non gouvernementales ayant l'expertise dans leur domaine d'intervention respectif et une excellente connaissance des interventions en milieu urbain difficile.

Ce programme entre dans le cadre des actions menées par les autorités haïtiennes dans les zones précaires, dites zones rouges, en vue de maintenir, voire d'asseoir, la stabilité politique acquise après les multiples efforts opérés par les pouvoirs publics au cours des derniers mois.

La logique des actions proposées se base sur la conviction que le retour esquissé de la force publique doit absolument s'accompagner rapidement d'actions concrètes qui démontreront le retour de l'Etat de droit et le redémarrage des services sociaux.

Si la sécurité reste l'un des principaux enjeux de la stabilisation, il est fondamental d'avoir une réponse multiforme adaptée en mobilisant les jeunes et la population autour d'actions communautaires au service de tous.

Ce programme s'inscrit dans le cadre de notre programmation qui retient les infrastructures et la gouvernance comme domaines prioritaires. Il retient l'approche projet parce qu'elle permet de démontrer rapidement la faisabilité d'un programme intégré urbain, par des opérateurs connus et en bonne coordination avec les acteurs publics. Aujourd'hui, la décentralisation est encore à l'étape de réflexion et notre intervention prochaine dans la gouvernance et dans l'appui à la décentralisation bénéficiera de l'expérience de ce projet.

Le gouvernement s'est engagé dans un renforcement de l'Etat dans ses fonctions de programmation, de mise en œuvre et de coordination de l'aide. Les bailleurs de fonds, dans le cadre de coopération intérimaire et du Document de Stratégie Nationale pour la Croissance et la Réduction de la Pauvreté 2008-2010, s'inscrivent dans les principes de la Déclaration de Paris : appropriation, alignement, harmonisation, gestion axée sur les résultats et responsabilité mutuelle.

Enfin, le programme permettra de renforcer les autorités municipales et d'amorcer ainsi un des objectifs du 10^{ème} FED qui a retenu la « gouvernance – décentralisation » comme secteur prioritaire. Le suivi sera donc assuré par le 10^{ème} FED. Cet appui à la décentralisation/déconcentration contribuera à la consolidation de l'Etat et des collectivités territoriales pour les rendre aptes à assumer l'ensemble de leurs prérogatives dans la transparence et l'efficacité requises.

2.2. Enseignements tirés

Le quartier de Martissant a été laissé pour compte pendant des années de par la situation sécuritaire qui y régnait. Vu l'accalmie des derniers mois, relative et précaire comme le démontrent les événements d'avril, les partenaires au développement ont lancé plusieurs missions et études visant à identifier les priorités de la zone et à y développer des actions en vue d'y consolider la paix.

Les résultats de ces diverses enquêtes ont été partagés lors des rencontres mensuelles portant sur le quartier sous l'égide de la municipalité de Port-au-Prince et de la MINUSTAH.

Parmi celles-ci, un bilan mené en août et septembre 2007 par AVSI sur mandat de l'UNICEF, qui mentionne que la violence continue, qui affecte la vie communautaire de cette zone, a eu un impact important sur la psychologie des enfants comme sur leur perception de la réalité : les enfants ne reconnaissent pas aux adultes leur rôle dans la vie civique et familiale. Ils ne font pas confiance aux adultes et à leur enseignement et développent des logiques et des stratégies de survie alternatives. Nombre de ces stratégies, mises en place comme réponses des enfants exposés au climat de violence, livrés à eux-mêmes, ou bien victimes d'exploitation, sont identifiables comme comportements illégaux, déviants ou délinquants.

D'autre part, une enquête MARP (méthode accélérée de recherche participative) a été lancée mi-2007 pour valider certaines hypothèses d'intervention. En avril 2008, cette enquête est en cours de finalisation.

Il est important de noter que cette intervention multisectorielle constitue un prélude essentiel à une action en profondeur et de longue durée sur cette zone métropolitaine et qu'un travail à long terme nécessite une recherche plus approfondie. Conformément au contrat de gestion qu'elle a signé avec le Gouvernement Haïtien, la FOKAL, également désignée chef de file d'une intervention européenne sur Martissant, a lancé en mars 2008 une enquête d'une durée de 6 mois afin d'établir un diagnostic socio-économique et démographique complet mettant en exergue les principaux enjeux du quartier.

2.3. Actions complémentaires

Jusqu'à l'année dernière, le domaine urbain n'était pas trop investi par la coopération internationale. Récemment, des initiatives d'envergure ont été développées dans les zones urbaines par divers bailleurs en concordance avec l'engagement du Gouvernement d'Haïti à répondre aux besoins de créer un climat de stabilité durable dans les poches anciennement considérées comme zones de non-droit.

Parmi celles-ci, le programme "Initiative de Stabilisation pour Haïti" lancé en avril 2007 par le Gouvernement américain dans la commune de Cité Soleil pour un montant total de vingt (20) millions de dollars qui prévoit le renforcement de la police, un appui au système judiciaire, des actions de développement communautaires et la construction d'infrastructures.

En complément de ces interventions américaines à Cité Soleil, on note également le programme 'Bati Lavi' que la coopération canadienne a inauguré en février 2008 dans les communes de Cité Soleil et de Gonaïves. Ce programme, qui dispose d'un budget de six (6) millions de dollars, prévoit le financement de projets portant sur l'assainissement des quartiers, l'adduction et la distribution d'eau potable, l'aménagement d'écoles, la construction de centres communautaires, l'aménagement d'aires de jeux et de sport, ainsi que sur des projets visant spécifiquement la qualité de vie des enfants et des femmes.

Tout récemment la Banque Mondiale a mobilisé dix sept millions USD pour des projets pilotes dans des quartiers sensibles de Cap haïtien, Gonaïves et Port au Prince où les quartiers de Cité Soleil et Martissant devaient bénéficier de l'intervention. Des contacts préliminaires ont été établis avec la délégation qui laissent présager d'une bonne concertation et complémentarité de nos actions.

Le programme proposé s'inscrit aussi dans le cadre de l'*Appel transitionnel* lancé en 2007 par les Nations Unies, qui invite les principaux bailleurs de fonds à apporter un soutien unifié et coordonné au gouvernement dans sa stratégie de restauration de l'Etat de droit et de retour de la Force publique. Il contribue également aux objectifs du récent *Programme d'Actions Gouvernementales Contre la Vie Chère* (1.6 milliards HTG sur budget de l'Etat) qui vise des actions à haute intensité de main d'œuvre et à impact local.

Ce programme est également complémentaire des expériences urbaines financées par la Commission Européenne sur d'autres lignes budgétaires, tout particulièrement l'Initiative européenne des Droits de l'Homme et de la démocratie (IEDDH) sur laquelle plusieurs projets sont actuellement en cours dans les domaines de la promotion citoyenne et de la résolution de conflits.

Enfin, ce projet entre dans le cadre et complète un important programme de revitalisation du quartier de Martissant souhaité par le Gouvernement et financé à hauteur de trois (3) millions d'euros par l'Union Européenne au titre de l'Instrument de Stabilité. Ce programme démarré en février 2008 et mis en œuvre par 3 ONG prévoit des activités d'éducation à la paix et à la citoyenneté, la promotion du dialogue communautaire, la formation professionnelle, l'accès à l'emploi, l'animation communautaire, la collecte et l'évacuation des ordures ménagères, la réhabilitation d'espaces publics et des travaux à haute intensité de main d'œuvre.

2.4. Coordination des bailleurs de fonds

Pour faciliter la coordination entre les différentes parties prenantes, l'ONG FOKAL, seule institution haïtienne du groupe et la mieux implantée sur la zone a été désignée comme chef de file du projet pour assurer la **coordination technique** de l'ensemble des actions.

Ainsi, parallèlement aux actions concrètes menées sur le terrain, des sessions de réflexion et d'échanges sont prévues afin de mieux profiter de l'expérience collective, de maintenir un espace ouvert de discussion autour de l'action et dans l'idée de systématiser les résultats. Un

espace physique sera maintenu par FOKAL à cet effet et des ressources affectées à ce travail de coordination et de réflexion.

D'autre part, un **comité de pilotage** sera plus particulièrement en charge d'accompagner les actions opérationnelles et regroupera les principaux opérateurs et les autorités urbaines. Il sera co-présidé par le Bureau de l'Ordonnateur National et la Mairie de Port au Prince, et assisté de la Délégation de la Commission Européenne.

Au niveau de la coordination avec les intervenants non financés par l'Union européenne, la participation des partenaires, représentés par FOKAL ou directement par eux selon le cas, sera assurée à la **réunion de coordination mensuelle** organisée par la Mairie de Port-au-Prince en collaboration avec la MINUSTAH. Ces réunions assureront la bonne coordination entre les acteurs et servira de relais dans les négociations avec les services déconcentrés de l'Etat, les ministères et l'exécutif. Elles permettront également d'assurer la bonne synergie entre l'action financée par la Commission Européenne et celles mises en place par d'autres bailleurs.

3. DESCRIPTION

3.1. Objectifs

Objectifs globaux et finalité (objectif spécifique) du soutien de la CE.

Objectif général

- ✓ Participer au retour durable de la stabilité à Martissant.

Objectifs spécifiques

- ✓ Lutter contre la violence par la fourniture de certains services publics de base;
- ✓ Améliorer la qualité de l'enseignement primaire et l'organisation communautaire de la gestion de l'eau;
- ✓ Favoriser le retour progressif et durable de l'autorité publique en associant très étroitement la municipalité aux choix stratégiques et au suivi du programme (cf. Comité de Pilotage);
- ✓ Accompagner les autorités dans la mise en place de services administratifs décentralisés par la création d'un bureau communal et leur donner la possibilité de fournir un certain niveau de d'investissements dans la zone suite à l'identification des priorités par les élus locaux.

3.2. Résultats escomptés et principales activités

- Amélioration de l'accès potable à un prix raisonnable par la réhabilitation de la source Lecler, la construction ou réhabilitation de réseaux secondaires et fontaines communautaires, la sensibilisation aux méfaits du gaspillage et la sensibilisation à la

protection des sites et au renouvellement de la ressource (organisation de journées de reboisement).

- Amélioration des conditions sanitaires et de l'accès interne au quartier par l'aménagement ou réhabilitation des voies d'accès (escaliers, routes piétonnes, sécurisation des ravines avec passerelles), la réalisation de canaux de drainage, la construction de latrines et de douches communautaires, la sensibilisation aux problèmes de l'hygiène et la sensibilisation aux problèmes des déchets.
- Renforcement de la mobilisation et les capacités d'action collectives dans le quartier par l'identification et l'implication de comités d'appui, l'organisation d'élections pour crédibiliser le comité de gestion, la formation des comités et leaders en développement local, animation, gestion, comptabilité etc).
- Amélioration de l'accès à l'éducation primaire par l'identification de 1.000 enfants à insérer selon le niveau de vulnérabilité et la durée de non scolarisation de l'enfant, l'établissement du rapport de collaboration avec les écoles partenaires, le suivi des démarches administratives liées à la scolarisation, la fourniture du matériel scolaire et de l'uniforme, le suivi de l'apprentissage des enfants et le recrutement d'enseignants complémentaires.
- Renforcement des capacités du personnel enseignant par la tenue de séances de formation en pédagogie et didactique de différentes disciplines, l'établissement du programme et des modalités de l'intervention avec la collaboration des professionnels du Centre de Formation Continue des Enseignants Henri Deschamps et la fourniture du matériel didactique.
- Réaménagement et équipement des écoles partenaies par l'identification des actions des accords de collaboration mutuelle avec les écoles, l'identification des besoins de chacune des 8 écoles, l'élargissement de la capacité d'accueil des 8 écoles et l'équipement de 2 salles de classe par école.
- Service d'appui psychosocial aux enfants le nécessitant.
- Création du bureau communal (des Casec et Assec) de la 8^{ème} section de Martissant et son équipement.
- Renforcement des capacités des Élus locaux dans l'identification des besoins de la population et dans la conduite d'actions en faveur de leur quartier.
- Renforcement de la présence de la Mairie représentée par les élus locaux par la fourniture de service utiles aux habitants de la zone et d'investissements selon les priorités identifiées (petite voirie, infrastructures, eau et assainissement,...).

3.3. Parties prenantes

Les actions seront mises en œuvre par trois intervenants œuvrant dans le milieu urbain et disposant déjà de la compétence et des réseaux d'animateurs sur le terrain:

- *GRET Haiti* (Groupe de Recherche et d'Échanges technologiques): eau potable et assainissement, animation communautaire et structuration organisationnelle, ingénierie sociale.
- *AVSI* (Associazione Volontari per il Servizio Internazionale): formation et recyclage d'enseignants, intégration scolaire d'enfants non scolarisés, réaménagement d'écoles, suivi psychosocial.

- *Mairie de Port-au-Prince* : création du bureau communal de la 8^{ème} section, formation des élus locaux, fourniture de services administratifs de base, gestion d'un fonds d'investissement par les élus locaux.

Ce projet a été défini avec les autorités centrales ainsi qu'avec les autres intervenants qui travaillent sur ces problématiques urbaines et d'accès au service de base. L'objectif est de faciliter l'arrivée d'autres intervenants publics, privés et internationaux afin de compléter ce projet. Les autorités municipales ont été fortement impliquées dans la définition des actions et piloteront ce projet à travers un suivi régulier, en particulier via le Comité de pilotage. L'appropriation puis le transfert de responsabilité seront progressif et proportionnels aux capacités locales.

3.4. Risques et hypothèses

Les risques majeurs de ce projet reposent sur la recrudescence des actes de banditisme entre bandes rivales dans le quartier et une incapacité des autorités à y apporter un soulagement.

En ce qui concerne le volet d'accès au service d'eau potable, l'incertitude sur un problème de gouvernance qui prévaut à la CAMEP constitue également un risque à prendre en compte.

La participation et la disponibilité à s'impliquer de la part des bénéficiaires, en particulier les familles et les enfants sont aussi une condition essentielle à la réussite du projet.

Par l'ouverture du bureau communal de la 8^{ème} section, les autorités locales de cette zone seront sûrement vues comme des privilégiés par les autres élus des autres sections. Il conviendra de planifier une extension de ce programme aux autres sections de la Commune et la Mairie devra assurer les moyens de pérenniser ce bureau à la fin du projet.

3.5. Questions transversales

Les actions qu'il est prévu de réaliser convergent vers un but de durabilité. Les quartiers dits défavorisés de Port Au Prince sont nés de constructions anarchiques, et donc par définition ne répondent à aucune politique d'urbanisme, d'où la difficulté d'y intégrer des réseaux d'eau potable ou d'électricité classiques. Dans ces quartiers, le drainage des eaux usées aussi bien que des eaux de pluie étant un véritable problème, les pluies font souvent des ravages (éboulements, inondations...). Les travaux de drainage envisagés ici doivent donc permettre au quartier de supporter les périodes pluvieuses sans dommage.

Pour ce qui est de l'égalité des genres, une importance particulière est donnée à l'implication des femmes dans la gestion des structures communautaires. Celles-ci seront encouragées à prendre des responsabilités au sein des comités de gestion, d'autant qu'à certains postes, elles se montrent souvent très impliquées et efficaces.

La bonne gouvernance sera encouragée par l'articulation entre ces quartiers où règne le non-droit et les institutions publiques dans une logique d'inclusion de ces quartiers à l'espace public et non dans la création de nouvelles formes de gouvernance spécifiques et propres aux seuls quartiers. Les relations institutionnelles nouées entre les quartiers illégaux et les services

publics, la reconnaissance des comités de gestion et des écoles par les Ministères montrent la stratégie d'insertion institutionnelle des acteurs des quartiers dits « illégaux » et donc la reconnaissance de leur existence et de leur légalité de fait auprès des pouvoirs publics.

Il est essentiel de considérer les habitants de Martissant comme des ayant-droits. Les habitants de ces quartiers souvent négligés auront ainsi accès à la fourniture d'eau potable et à l'éducation de base. En ce qui concerne les enfants de Martissant, il apparaît que le respect de leurs droits est constamment mis en péril. La réalité que ces enfants vivent dans leurs foyers et dans la rue est toujours une réalité de violence étant donné que les adultes qui en ont la charge ne dispose d'un bagage éducatif et culturel très faible. Le projet entend sensibiliser les enfants et leurs familles aux conditions minimales de tutelle.

4. QUESTIONS DE MISE EN ŒUVRE

4.1. Méthode de mise en œuvre

Le projet sera mis en œuvre en gestion décentralisée, dans le cadre de la Convention de financement "Standby Facility" signée entre la République d'Haïti et le CARIFORUM en sa qualité d'Ordonnateur Régional.

Aux termes de cette convention de financement, le CARIFORUM a accepté de déléguer la mise en œuvre des projets ayant une portée nationale à l'Ordonnateur National du pays correspondant. La responsabilité globale pour l'exécution de la présente action incombe dès lors à l'Ordonnateur National de la République d'Haïti en tant qu'autorité contractante.

La composante mise en œuvre par la Mairie de Port au Prince sera gérée à travers des opérations décentralisées directes, via devis-programmes. La gestion et l'exécution de cette composante seront donc confiées à un Régisseur et un Comptable désignés à cette fin par l'Ordonnateur national, suite à l'approbation par le Chef de Délégation.

Les autres composantes seront mises en œuvre à travers la signature de deux contrats de subventions attribués sans appel à proposition préalable au GRET et à AVSI.

4.2 Procédures de passation de marchés et d'octroi de subventions

Tous les contrats mettant en œuvre l'action doivent être attribués et exécutés conformément aux procédures et aux documents standard établis et publiés par la Commission pour la mise en œuvre des opérations extérieures, tels qu'en vigueur au moment du lancement de la procédure en cause.

La préparation, la gestion et la mise en œuvre des devis-programmes du projet devront être conformes aux règles et procédures décrites dans le guide pratique des procédures applicables aux devis-programmes financés par le Fonds européen de développement (FED) et le budget général des Communautés européennes (BUDGET) (approche projet).

L'attribution directe des subventions au GRET et à AVSI est justifiée par le monopole de fait dont jouissent les deux organisations, chacun dans son domaine d'expertise. Ce monopole est basé sur la crédibilité et les contacts privilégiés dont ils jouissent dans le quartier de Martissant. Le GRET est également un partenaire de longue date de la CAMEP avec laquelle

elle collabore sur plusieurs quartiers de Port-au-Prince et avec laquelle elle a identifié toutes les actions à mettre en œuvre sur Martissant. D'autre part, ces deux ONG disposent d'une expérience avérée de gestion de projets similaires dans les quartiers de Cité-Soleil, Cité l'Eternelle, etc

Le taux de cofinancement maximal envisageable pour les deux contrats de subventions est de 80 %.

4.2. Budget et calendrier

La contribution CE totale est de **2.000.000** d'euros.

Ce budget se décompose comme suit:

- GRET: budget total de 1.531.250 euros, la contribution CE sera de **1.225.000** euros (soit 80 %)
- AVSI: budget total de 656.250 euros, la contribution CE sera de **525.000** euros (soit 80 %)
- Mairie de Port-au-Prince: la contribution CE sera de **200.000** euros.

De plus, il est prévu que la Délégation procédera à une évaluation/audit de l'impact de ses activités conduites par les 3 partenaires. Une allocation de 50.000 euros est prévue à cet effet.

La fin de mise en œuvre opérationnelle est fixée au 31/12/2011 et la fin d'exécution au 31/12/2013 selon la Décision concernant l'enveloppe B régionalisée.

4.3. Suivi de l'exécution

Le suivi de l'exécution du projet sera assuré de diverses façons :

- ▷ Un comité de pilotage du projet mettra en présence tous les autres acteurs au projet, les organes de mise en œuvre, le BON, l'UE et les autorités locales. Il se réunira régulièrement pour faire le point sur l'état d'avancement et le bilan des actions entreprises dans les quartiers.
- ▷ Un comité de suivi des activités composé des différents partenaires de mise en œuvre sera convoqué régulièrement par le chef de file FOKAL.
- ▷ Des comités d'appui technique au projet seront créés en guise d'instance de concertation thématique de proximité au sein des quartiers concernés regroupant les différentes organisations et des notables de la zone.
- ▷ Des missions de suivi par les sièges des deux organisations non gouvernementales seront menées afin de superviser le travail de terrain.
- ▷ Un organisme de supervision sera recruté pour le suivi des activités menées par la Mairie.
- ▷ Des rapports périodiques d'activité seront présentés à l'ON et à l'UE comme spécifiés dans les conditions contractuelles.

4.4. Évaluation et audit

Le programme sera suivi par le Bureau de l'Ordonnateur National de la République d'Haïti.

La mesure de l'impact est rendue difficile par le manque de données initiales pour les quartiers de Martissant et l'informalité des secteurs concernés. Toutefois, des indicateurs objectivement vérifiables seront établis dans la mesure du possible avant le démarrage de l'action par les différents partenaires soit le nombre d'élèves, le nombre d'instituteurs, le nombre de filles et de garçons enrôlés dans le cycle primaire des écoles concernées, le nombre de gens ayant un meilleur ou nouvel accès à la fourniture d'eau,...

Une **évaluation finale** permettra d'apprécier le programme et de prévoir une éventuelle poursuite des actions entreprises dans le cadre du 10^{ème} FED et plus particulièrement dans le cadre de l'appui à la décentralisation. Une évaluation intermédiaire est également prévue dans la décision sur l'enveloppe B régionalisée.

La Commission et la Cour des Comptes européenne pourront réaliser, sur le terrain, des vérifications et inspections afin de garantir la bonne utilisation des fonds des Communautés européennes.

Un ou plusieurs audits externes seront menés par des cabinets d'experts comptables reconnus internationalement au cours et en fin de projet selon le montant alloué aux différents partenaires.

4.5. Communication et visibilité

Le présent projet aura une importante visibilité pour la Commission Européenne. Situé au cœur de la capitale, au service d'une population très exposée et en appui à une municipalité légitimée, il permettra de démontrer, avec le retour des services collectifs, que le milieu urbain peut être à nouveau gouverné et qu'il est essentiel de le « réinvestir » durablement afin de préserver et de consolider la stabilité.

Annexe

1. IDENTIFICATION

Intitulé/Numéro	Programme d'appui à la reconstruction et à l'aménagement de quartiers pour faciliter le retour des populations sinistrées – CRIS - FED/2011/023-144		
Coût total	23 millions d'EUR sur Enveloppe B Avec un cofinancement de : - AFD : 10.500.000 EUR - ONU-Habitat: 200.000 EUR Montant total : 33.700.000 EUR		
Méthode d'assistance / Mode de gestion	Approche projet Gestion conjointe – Gestion centralisée indirecte		
Code CAD	16040 43030	Secteur	Logement à coût réduit Développement et gestion urbaine

2. MOTIF

2.1. Contexte sectoriel

Le séisme du 12 Janvier 2010 a eu des conséquences dramatiques sur le secteur du Logement. Les estimations font état de 105.000 maisons détruites et 208.000 maisons endommagées. 1,5 million de personnes se sont retrouvées sans abri, contraintes de se regrouper dans des camps de fortune répartis dans la zone métropolitaine de Port-au-Prince.

Les destructions et les dommages ont encore accentué de façon dramatique la crise du logement qui prévalait avant le séisme. La majorité des destructions a eu lieu dans les quartiers précaires qui abritaient 80% de la population urbaine avant le séisme. Ces quartiers précaires, qui n'occupent que 20% du territoire de la ville, sont extrêmement denses, manquent cruellement des services de base et sont le plus souvent exposés aux risques naturels.

Les faibles capacités de l'État central à encadrer le processus d'urbanisation et à coordonner les nombreux acteurs, y compris publics, conjugués au faible niveau de décentralisation effective rendant pratiquement inopérante les administrations municipales dans le domaine de l'urbanisme et de l'aménagement urbain, ont laissé la place à une urbanisation chaotique portée par des initiatives individuelles dictées par des stratégies soit de survie, soit d'enrichissement rapide. Accaparements et envahissements de terrains, faible accès des populations aux services de base et services de mauvaise qualité, mobilité urbaine très difficile, engorgement du système de drainage par les ordures, concentration des services au centre de Port-au-Prince et de Pétienville (la banlieue chic qui accueille aussi de nombreux quartiers informels pour loger les employés de service),... sont quelques unes des caractéristiques urbaines résultant de cette quasi-absence de l'État et des collectivités publiques dans la planification et la gestion urbaine avant le séisme.

Le Plan d'Action pour le Relèvement et le Développement d'Haïti (PARDH) élaboré en mars 2010 a comme priorités de faire face à l'urgence, de redémarrer les activités économiques, gouvernementales et sociales, de réduire la vulnérabilité du pays face aux catastrophes naturelles et de relancer Haïti sur la voie du développement.

Dans le plan stratégique pour le restant du mandat de la Commission Intérimaire pour la Reconstruction d'Haïti (CIRH), le principal résultat visé est de réduire de 400 000 personnes la population des camps. Ceci n'est possible qu'en offrant aux personnes déplacées les conditions leur permettant de retourner dans leur quartier d'origine auquel ils sont attachés et dans des logements sûrs.

Le retour dans les maisons et les quartiers d'origine a donc été défini comme prioritaire par le gouvernement pour répondre au problème des camps et de l'occupation des espaces publics et privés. L'ensemble des partenaires, impliqués dans le secteur du logement, appuie cette idée et souligne l'importance de pouvoir entreprendre au plus vite et à grande échelle des réparations/reconstructions de logements et de réaménagement des quartiers.

Une telle stratégie d'appui au retour dans des quartiers sûrs nécessite de placer les communautés, souvent particulièrement dynamiques dans les quartiers populaires, au centre de la démarche et de la prise de décision. Un enjeu particulièrement important est de pouvoir assurer l'équité dans les initiatives d'appui aux quartiers. Sans cette équité, de graves problèmes pourraient se poser remettant en cause la cohésion sociale.

Le projet prend tous ces éléments en compte en intégrant la reconstruction/réparation dans une approche urbaine globale et durable accompagnée par la restructuration des quartiers. Vu les contraintes financières existantes pour la reconstruction et réparation de plus de 300 000 maisons, le projet fournit un appui technique et financier à l'auto-reconstruction encadrée. Pour assurer la cohérence et la qualité des activités, le projet participe à l'établissement d'un cadre et de mécanismes communs multi-bailleurs ainsi qu'à la mise en place d'un système national permettant au Ministère des Travaux publics, Transports et Communications (MTPTC) de définir les règles et normes et d'assurer le contrôle de qualité.

Le MTPTC a entrepris avec l'appui de la Banque Mondiale et du Bureau des Nations unies pour les services d'appui aux projets (UNOPS), une évaluation de sécurité des logements. L'UE a contribué à cet exercice, notamment au niveau de la sensibilisation des communautés concernées. Jusqu'à ce jour près de 400 000 bâtiments ont été évalués, dont plus de 80% sont des bâtiments résidentiels. Les résultats montrent que 53% des bâtiments sont verts et peuvent être réoccupés immédiatement, 26% sont jaunes et doivent faire l'objet de réparations avant d'être réoccupés, et 21% sont rouges dont 14% peuvent faire l'objet de réparations structurelles. Pour cette mise en œuvre des évaluations structurelles des bâtiments, le Ministère a créé le bureau technique d'évaluation des bâtiments (BTEB) et a formé près de 410 ingénieurs qui ont conduit ces évaluations. La combinaison de la formation théorique avec la pratique de l'évaluation a permis de créer un pool d'ingénieurs haïtiens qui ont acquis une compréhension de la nécessité de mettre en œuvre une ingénierie sismique et de prendre en compte les problèmes de qualité des matériaux.

Avec l'appui de partenaires internationaux (dont ONU-Habitat, UNOPS, la Banque Mondiale, USAID, des ONG spécialisées) le Ministère a également publié des lignes directrices pour la réparation des maisons endommagées par le séisme et un guide de bonnes pratiques pour la construction de petits bâtiments en maçonnerie chaînée.

Le Ministère des Travaux Publics, fortement affaibli par le séisme, ne dispose pas à ce jour de tous les moyens nécessaires pour jouer son rôle normatif et notamment pour diffuser l'information, offrir un cadre commun pour les activités de formation et mettre en place un

mécanisme de mise en cohérence des initiatives de réparation/reconstruction des maisons et de restructuration des quartiers. Le projet s'attachera à donner les moyens au Ministère pour jouer ce rôle qu'il est seul à pouvoir jouer.

2.2. Enseignements tirés

Au fil des désastres naturels récents, une part importante de la communauté internationale, au sein de laquelle ONU-Habitat a joué un rôle de sensibilisateur avec d'autres acteurs, s'est progressivement convaincu que dans une première phase, la stratégie la plus efficace pour le gouvernement est d'aider les sinistrés à rentrer dans leur quartier d'origine.

L'alternative est le déplacement des populations dans des villes nouvelles et des quartiers neufs, ce qui demande des ressources qui ne sont pas à la portée des pays les moins avancés (PMA) tel Haïti, même avec l'aide internationale exceptionnelle mobilisée après un désastre de grande ampleur. Comparée à la première option exposée ci-dessus, l'apparente simplicité technique de la construction d'une ville nouvelle séduit encore nombre de partenaires internationaux, mais surtout une grande partie de l'élite nationale tentée par une ville nouvelle utopique qui ferait table rase des problèmes de la ville ancienne et serait le symbole d'un élan moderniste de développement. Dans un pays comme Haïti, en dehors de son coût inabordable, cette solution est en fait presque aussi complexe que la restructuration urbaine, notamment avec les difficultés de mobilisation du foncier nécessaire. Le cas de l'envahissement irréversible des terrains prévus pour le développement de Port-au-Prince à la suite de l'installation d'un camp de réfugiés par la communauté internationale est à ce titre exemplaire.

Le projet se base sur les enseignements tirés du projet de la Banque mondiale en cours d'exécution : ce projet de développement communautaire participatif en milieu urbain (PRODEPUR) vise à améliorer l'accès aux infrastructures et aux services de base. Après le tremblement de terre la Banque mondiale a ajouté des volets à ce projet incluant : le déblayage des débris résultant du tremblement de terre, la réparation et la reconstruction des maisons, ainsi que la réparation et l'amélioration des infrastructures de proximité. Un nouveau projet PREKAD (65 millions USD) financera la réparation de logements et la construction de nouveaux logements pour environ 12 000 ménages bénéficiaires (60 000 personnes) et un total de 210 000 personnes de la communauté bénéficieront de l'amélioration des infrastructures. Ces deux projets s'appuient sur et responsabilisent fortement la dynamique communautaire et les associations de quartiers dans les activités de reconstruction.

En outre, ce projet s'appuie sur les quelques initiatives en cours de réparations de maisons (UNOPS, Pan American Development Foundation (PADF), Croix Rouge, Fondation Architectes de l'Urgence), sur la base desquels il a été possible d'estimer le coût moyen de réparation d'un logement et d'étudier la pertinence des mécanismes d'appui technique et financier.

Le projet s'appuie aussi sur les actions de planification communautaire engagées sur les quartiers appuyés par le projet financé par la Banque mondiale, le projet de l'Agence française de Développement (AFD) et les projets d'ONU-Habitat. Ces actions permettent d'entrevoir déjà les attentes des communautés en termes d'amélioration des conditions de vie dans les quartiers, d'identifier les actions à entreprendre et d'évaluer leurs coûts et la faisabilité de ces actions.

2.3. Actions complémentaires

- Actions UE:

L'Union Européenne est intervenue pour apporter une réponse d'urgence au problème humanitaire que le tremblement de terre a provoqué. Des abris d'urgence ont été fournis immédiatement aux victimes du séisme. Par la suite, l'aide humanitaire de l'UE a permis de financer environ 8 000 abris transitionnels par l'intermédiaire de diverses ONG, d'agences des Nations Unies et du mouvement Croix Rouge. L'aide humanitaire de l'UE contribue également à la réparation des maisons jaunes par la distribution de 3.506 réhabilitations/kits de reconstruction, ainsi qu'à l'enlèvement des débris et à la fourniture d'infrastructures pour l'accès à l'eau et à l'assainissement.

- D'autres partenaires:

Banque mondiale : La BM finance le projet PRODEPUR (30 millions USD) et a reçu des fonds délégués du Fonds de Reconstruction d'Haïti (FRH) pour un nouveau projet PREKAD (65 millions USD) - cf. supra. Elle finance également sur un an un dispositif d'appui au MTPTC.

Banque Interaméricaine de Développement : la BID finance un projet de construction en 100 jours de 400 maisons situées en périphérie de Port-au-Prince.

L'USAID finance des opérations de relogements temporaires et durables, ainsi que des activités d'énumérations participatives et de déblaiement. Un projet de nouveaux quartiers sur des terrains à viabiliser en périphérie de la ville est également en instruction.

Des approches intégrées sur les quartiers de retour ont été initiées par un certain nombre de partenaires dont : CHF international sur Ravière Pintade, CORDAID sur Villa Rosa et Carrefour, Habitat for Humanity sur Simon Pelé, Cabaret et Léogane, ONU-Habitat, Solidarité Internationale et UNOPS sur Bristout-Bobin, Fort Mercredi-Cité Neuf et Ti-Savane et le mouvement des Croix Rouges sur certains quartiers de Delmas. L'ensemble de ces initiatives bénéficient d'une plateforme d'échange d'expérience autour du groupe de travail « Logement-Quartiers », animé par ONU-Habitat, qui depuis avril 2010 alimente la réflexion, le développement de stratégies et la préparation de la politique de reconstruction du logement et des quartiers.

A la demande de la Commission Intérimaire pour la Reconstruction d'Haïti (CIRH), ONU-Habitat a dirigé la formulation d'un Programme d'appui à la reconstruction du logement et des quartiers visant à fournir les outils d'aide à la décision, à l'information et à la coordination pour la reconstruction, et au-delà la refondation. Notamment, ces outils comprennent (i) un dénombrement / énumération de la population et de l'habitat dans les zones affectées, (ii) un système d'information géographique et de suivi sur le logement et les quartiers, (iii) des unités de coordination au sein du Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe et du Ministère de l'Intérieur et des Collectivités Territoriales ainsi que des centres d'appui municipaux et communautaires pour la coordination de la reconstruction et du développement local, et (iv) des plans stratégiques de développement régional et urbain et les stratégies de reconstruction y relatives. Les capacités formées et déployées par les ministères concernés seront hébergées dans les centres d'appui municipaux et communautaires (ex. ingénieurs). Ces outils seront non seulement utiles au Gouvernement et à la CIRH mais aussi à l'ensemble des partenaires techniques et financiers. Le Programme doit démarrer sous peu.

Agence Française de Développement : L'AFD a octroyé en 2011 à l'Etat haïtien un financement de 5,814 millions EUR pour le premier volet d'un projet d'aménagement intégré et restructuration des quartiers de Martissant et Baillergeau. 3,414 millions EUR sont destinés au financement des aménagements et infrastructures prioritaires ; 2,4 millions EUR sont axés sur de actions de renforcement des capacités des acteurs en charge de la reconstruction (MTPTC, CIAT, Municipalité).

2.4. Coordination des bailleurs de fonds

Les principaux bailleurs et acteurs dans le secteur du logement (Banque mondiale, AFD, UE, BID, USAID, ONU-Habitat, CIRH) sont réunis au sein d'un groupe de travail animé par la Banque mondiale. Ils se sont mis d'accord sur la nécessité d'un cadre commun multi-bailleurs qui est en phase d'élaboration avec le MTPTC. Ces mécanismes devraient comprendre un service d'instruction de ses initiatives de réparation/reconstruction au Ministère des Travaux Publics qui sera utilisé par les bailleurs finançant ces activités. Les partenaires ont développé ce projet en discussion avec le MTPTC, les partenaires locaux et internationaux impliqués dans l'appui au retour des camps vers les quartiers d'origine.

Des tables et groupes sectoriels sur la thématique du logement ont lieu régulièrement où la plupart des intervenants du secteur participent pour discuter et s'échanger des stratégies à mettre en place et des activités en cours. Ces réunions servent aussi à uniformiser l'approche envers le gouvernement haïtien et à harmoniser les procédures de mise en œuvre.

3. DESCRIPTION

3.1. Objectifs

L'objectif général de ce projet est d'appuyer le relogement des populations déplacées suite au séisme en créant les conditions de retour en toute sécurité dans leurs quartiers d'origine. Selon une approche intégrée dite « quartier-logement » comprenant i) des actions planifiées de réparation/reconstruction sécurisées de logements endommagés/détruits par le séisme, et ii) la réalisation programmée d'aménagements/infrastructures et la mise en place de services de base (voirie, drainage, AEP, assainissement), le projet permettra un retour des populations sinistrées dans un logement sûr et un environnement urbain amélioré par rapport à la situation qui prévalait avant le séisme.

Le projet axera ses activités sur:

- les quartiers de Martissant (8^e section) et Baillergeau (7^e section) de Port-au-Prince, en lien avec les financements déjà orientés sur ces zones par l'Agence Française de Développement (AFD).
- d'autres quartiers d'intervention à identifier en fonction des fonds disponibles et des initiatives en cours.

Dans tous les cas sera appliqué l'approche intégrée dite « quartier-logement » décrite ci-dessus. A condition de satisfaire aux conditions nécessaires, les quartiers ayant bénéficié d'interventions de l'aide humanitaire UE seront retenus en priorité, en ligne avec les principes de "Linking Relief and Rehabilitation to Development".

Les objectifs spécifiques du programme sont :

- Reloger les populations sinistrées et reconstruire/réhabiliter les logements endommagés par le séisme dans des zones sécurisées et au travers d'appuis (techniques, financiers, en nature) à l'auto (re)construction ;
- Intégrer la reconstruction/réparation des logements dans une approche urbaine globale et durable par l'établissement de plans d'aménagement urbain sur base participative et le financement d'infrastructures de base et d'équipements publics.
- Accompagner et renforcer les autorités, et plus particulièrement le MTPTC, dans le pilotage de la reconstruction, permettant au Ministère de définir les règles et normes à appliquer à la rénovation urbaine et à la réparation/reconstruction des maisons ; de superviser, de contrôler la qualité, de suivre et d'évaluer les actions de réparation/reconstruction et de restructuration des quartiers.

▪ *Résultats :*

Sur les zones d'intervention : amélioration globale de la sécurité des maisons et de leur occupation, ainsi que de la sécurité et de la fonctionnalité des quartiers, qui seront réoccupés sur la base d'une planification communautaire dont l'approche visera à « reconstruire mieux ».

Volet I.1 « reconstruction/réparation de logements »:

- Des logements endommagés ou détruits par le séisme réparés/reconstruits aux normes et dans un environnement viabilisé et sécurisé ;
- Des personnes déplacées relogées dans des conditions décentes ;
- Secteur de la construction relancé (filière matériaux, emploi maçons, ...)

Volet I.2 « aménagement urbain »:

- Schémas d'aménagement urbains approuvés (par les autorités et les communautés) et mis en œuvre ;
- Cadre de vie des populations sécurisé et amélioré durablement :
 - Infrastructures urbaines structurantes réalisées
 - Quartiers assainis et sécurisés (eaux pluviales et usées drainées, pentes renforcées par des murs de soutènement, ravines réhabilitées, mobilité et accès internes aux quartiers facilités par l'élargissement et la création de voiries,...)
 - Espaces récupérés et transformés en lieux publics entretenus
 - Statuts d'occupation foncière sécurisés
 - Accès aux services de base (eau, assainissement, électricité)
 - Accès aux services sociaux (santé, éducation / formation,...)
 - Activités socio-économiques relancées : création de zones ou de conditions permettant le développement d'activités artisanales et commerciales.
- Présence publique sur le territoire matérialisée

Volet II « appuis institutionnels »:

- Les acteurs publics en charge de la reconstruction (notamment MTPTC, Municipalités, CIAT) sont renforcés et jouent effectivement leur rôle de « pilotes » de la reconstruction ;
- La cellule d'analyse et de coordination au sein du Ministère est utilisée par tous les bailleurs/ONG/opérateurs pour leurs projets ;
- Les maisons sont réparées/reconstruites en respectant les normes et règles du MTPTC qui encadre les activités par une supervision et un contrôle-qualité continus ;

- Les acteurs de la construction et les organisations sont formés et exécutent la réparation, le « retrofitting » et la reconstruction selon les normes ;
- La population est informée sur l'importance de la construction parasismique ;
- Les travaux de réparations/reconstruction de logement et de restructuration de quartiers sont encadrés par les communes.

- *Principales activités:*

Volet I.1 "Reconstruction/réparation de logements":

A l'issue d'un processus de planification participative (incluant des volets cartographie et sécurisation foncières, cartographie des risques, identification des emprises publiques), et en tenant compte i) des évaluations du bâti effectuées fin 2010 par le MTP TC (classification vert, jaune, rouge des maisons) et ii) des résultats des enquêtes socio-économiques (cf. volet « aménagement urbain »), les bénéficiaires seront appuyés pour effectuer eux-mêmes la reconstruction / réparation de leur logement, en lien avec les « boss » du quartier. Conformément aux directives fixées par les autorités, les populations se verront attribuer (sous forme de cash, matériels ou coupons) des appuis. Ces « subsides » à la reconstruction seront octroyés sous forme de dons et en plusieurs versements conditionnés à inspection; ils constitueront également des encouragements aux familles pour mobiliser des financements complémentaires (transferts de fonds de la diaspora, recours au microcrédit, apports personnels,...). Les bénéficiaires seront encadrés pour cela par les opérateurs sociaux intervenant dans les quartiers (cf. point 3.5 infra); les artisans employés par les familles bénéficieront des formations et de l'encadrement mis en place au travers du volet « appuis institutionnels » (en particulier, les ingénieurs recrutés au MTPTC sur financement de la Banque mondiale, en lien avec ONU-Habitat). Les normes de construction parasismique et para-cyclonique seront respectées. De même, des campagnes d'information et de sensibilisation seront réalisées (cf. volet « appuis institutionnels ») pour garantir le principe de « reconstruire en mieux », dans des zones sécurisées et en respectant lesdites normes.

Volet I.2 « aménagement urbain » :

Dans les quartiers d'intervention, des activités de planification participative seront réalisées, suivies d'opérations d'aménagement en infrastructures et équipements.

De telles activités sont déjà en cours sur les quartiers Martissant et Baillebois, à partir de la première enveloppe de financements octroyée par l'AFD (cf. point 2.3 supra). Un groupement de bureaux d'études réalise actuellement, selon une approche participative, les schémas d'aménagement des 2 quartiers. Les rapports incluront des propositions d'actions à réaliser dans le court terme : des actions « structurantes » d'aménagement en infrastructures (voiries, drainage,...), et des actions urgentes d'équipements et d'appuis sociaux (pouvant être mises rapidement en œuvre avec l'appui des opérateurs sociaux présents dans les quartiers et recensés par les études).

Les schémas d'aménagement et de reconstruction finalisés incluront des propositions d'actions sur les différents secteurs concernés (fonciers, logement, voirie, infrastructures, services et équipements, espaces publics, risques). Sur la base de ces schémas validés par les autorités et communautés, les différentes maîtrises d'œuvre et entreprises de travaux seront recrutés pour réaliser les projets d'infrastructures et d'équipements, en tenant compte des interventions des autres acteurs de la reconstruction sur les quartiers ou à proximité. Une approche similaire sera systématiquement reproduite sur les autres quartiers d'intervention retenus.

Volet II. « appuis institutionnels »:

Une cellule d'analyse et de coordination sera créée au sein du MTPTC. Elle aura pour objet d'étudier les projets liés à la réparation et la reconstruction du logement et la restructuration de quartiers afin de s'assurer qu'ils s'inscrivent dans le cadre et les modalités définies par le Ministère. Après instruction par la cellule, les projets non financés seront dirigés vers les guichets de financement ; les projets déjà financés seront approuvés et mis en œuvre selon les modalités du Ministère. La cellule développera aussi des Chartes de mise en œuvre devant être signés entre les partenaires de mise en œuvre (ONG et opérateurs privés) et le Ministère, et comprenant les modalités de mise en œuvre, d'encadrement, de contrôle de qualité et de rapportage.

Par ailleurs, dans la perspective de s'assurer de la qualité des activités de réparation et de reconstruction, un programme massif de formation sera mis en place ; il ciblera les acteurs de la construction, notamment les "boss", pour leur faire acquérir le savoir-faire nécessaires sur la construction parasismique et para-cyclonique. Aussi, une plateforme regroupant les partenaires clés travaillant sur les programmes de formation sera créée au sein du MTPTC pour s'assurer du développement de curricula communs pour les réparations, la mise aux normes (retrofitting) et la reconstruction répondant au cadre normatif défini par le Ministère sur ces questions. Des sessions de formation de formateurs et formation des acteurs de la construction au profit de toutes les organisations engagées dans la réparation, le retrofitting et la reconstruction seront organisées.

Enfin, en vue de vulgariser les notions de construction parasismique et para-cyclonique auprès des populations, une vaste campagne d'information du public sera lancée. Elle reflétera de manière adaptée les préceptes du MPTCT en matière de réparation et de construction et permettra aux populations d'avoir une meilleure compréhension sur le niveau de qualité (dont la qualité des matériaux) devant être requis des boss qu'elles engageront pour la reconstruction et plus tard pour la construction de nouveaux logements.

Le projet apportera également, au travers du financement de l'AFD, un appui au Secrétariat Technique du Comité Interministériel d'Aménagement du Territoire, lequel assure le cadrage et la mise en cohérence globale de la reconstruction en Haïti. En fonction des besoins, des appuis complémentaires pourront être apportés au MTPTC et aux Municipalités (en particulier celle de Port-au-Prince).

3.2. Risques et hypothèses

- Implication des pouvoirs publics : le portage et le pilotage de la reconstruction doivent se faire par les acteurs locaux et nationaux ; dans un contexte de transition politique, de confusion dans la répartition des compétences, de faible disponibilité des ressources humaines, il est aujourd'hui difficile de s'appuyer sur le bon interlocuteur. Pour minimiser ce risque, les partenaires techniques et financiers ont convenu de concentrer leurs appuis au niveau du MTPTC qui dispose de la légitimité juridique pour approuver les plans directeurs et piloter les travaux d'infrastructures.
- Maîtrise de « l'industrie » de la reconstruction : cette industrie fait aujourd'hui face à des difficultés en termes de manque d'entrepreneurs et maçons formés, d'insuffisance de matériaux de qualité, de faiblesses des normes de construction (parasismique et para-cyclonique),... Les appuis apportés par ONU-Habitat permettront notamment de répondre à ces enjeux par : le lancement d'un programme massif de formation des professionnels de la construction ; l'accompagnement à la mise en place de filières de production et d'apprentissage en

matériaux de construction de qualité (et à des coûts contrôlés par les autorités), la mise en place de mécanismes de supervision et de contrôle de qualité de la reconstruction du logement. S'agissant du risque d'augmentation du coût de matériaux de construction, les ministères concernés devront mobiliser le secteur privé afin de s'assurer que l'approvisionnement soit suffisant et que le coût des matériaux de construction ne subisse pas d'inflation. La mise en place d'un mécanisme de coordination entre les bailleurs et le MTPTC devrait permettre aussi de minimiser ce risque en fixant des conditions de vente pour les fournisseurs. De même, il faudra s'assurer que les prestations des maçons qualifiés restent financièrement abordables pour les ménages dont la maison a été touchée.

- Problématique foncière et sécurisation de l'occupation : la question foncière est une problématique récurrente en Haïti et se pose d'autant plus depuis le séisme. Plusieurs approches sont actuellement adoptées pour tenter de résoudre cette difficulté ; des solutions harmonisées sont proposées par le CIAT qui coordonne les réflexions en cours sur le sujet. S'agissant des quartiers d'intervention du projet, les schémas d'aménagement permettront d'identifier les zones par rapport à leur usage et ainsi de définir les terrains qui devront éventuellement faire l'objet de déclaration d'utilité publique pour l'aménagement d'équipements ou infrastructures. Pour le volet « logement », c'est avant tout la sécurisation de l'occupation du bâti qui sera recherchée à travers des processus d'énumération participative et de médiation des conflits éventuels entre propriétaires et locataires.
- Insécurité : les quartiers d'intervention, en particulier celui de Martissant, sont régulièrement en proie à l'insécurité. L'implication des organisations communautaires et l'accompagnement des activités de reconstruction par les opérateurs sociaux permettront de limiter ces risques.

3.3. Questions transversales

- Les quartiers ayant déjà en place une bonne structure organisationnelle et participative communautaire seront privilégiés dans la sélection. Ces structures seront renforcées au cours du projet et contribueront non seulement à la coopération et consolidation sociale et communautaire mais aussi au renforcement de la société civile des quartiers.
- L'énumération participative qui sera réalisée avant le début des travaux servira entre autres à déterminer les bénéficiaires vulnérables (femmes chefs de famille, personnes âgées, handicapées).
- Le renforcement des Ministères et des communes contribuera à des meilleures prestations de ces institutions étatiques et favorisera la décentralisation. Au travers des activités du projet, on s'attachera particulièrement à créer le dialogue entre les communautés et leurs élus locaux mais aussi entre les collectivités territoriales et les départements ministériels concernés. Grâce à la coproduction des actions à ces différents niveaux, le projet contribuera à la mise en place d'un système de gouvernance participative basée sur la confiance mutuelle.
- L'approvisionnement en services de base va réduire les risques de santé et le développement de la voirie va à moyen terme contribuer à la création d'activités génératrices de revenus mais aussi permettre la gestion des ordures.

3.4. Parties prenantes

Les interventions se feront en étroite collaboration avec les autres partenaires techniques et financiers du secteur, en particulier la Banque mondiale pour les aspects de renforcement

institutionnel du MTPTC. Les mécanismes communs d'instruction des initiatives de reconstruction « quartier-logement » au MTPTC serviront à l'ensemble des autres bailleurs finançant ces activités.

Partenaires institutionnels :

- Le MTPTC (Ministère des Travaux Publics, Transports et Communications) assurera la maîtrise d'ouvrage du projet en garantissant ainsi l'implication de l'Etat central sur les activités d'aménagement / reconstruction, et la bonne coordination avec les activités d'appui de la Banque mondiale et des autres Partenaires.
- Le Secrétariat Technique du Comité Interministériel pour l'Aménagement du Territoire assurera le cadrage et l'appui / conseil au processus global de reconstruction, en adoptant une approche territoriale et à l'échelle de la métropole de Port-au-Prince. Il facilite la mise en cohérence des différentes interventions dans les domaines de l'aménagement urbain, de la sécurisation foncière, du logement,...
- Les communes seront associées aux opérations de restructuration des quartiers situés sur le territoire dont elles assurent la gestion. Des appuis spécifiques, type formation, pourront être fournis à cet effet. Le projet prévoit de leur apporter un soutien par la mise à disposition d'ingénieurs et de techniciens du MTPTC dont l'objectif est le renforcement des services du génie municipal.

Partenaires techniques et financiers :

- La Banque Mondiale assure le rôle de leader dans l'établissement et l'implémentation du cadre programmatique de reconstruction « quartier-logement » post-séisme. Ce cadre commun, établi en accord avec les pouvoirs publics (MTPTC), sera utilisé par l'ensemble des bailleurs et ONG actifs dans le logement et l'aménagement des quartiers sur Port-au-Prince.
- Au fur et à mesure de la réalisation d'opérations de réhabilitation de logements/quartiers, des partenaires tel que USAID, les Croix Rouge, et d'autres disposeront de financements pour des interventions d'aménagement/reconstruction. Ces financements seront mis en œuvre conformément au principe de ce programme qui repose sur : un pilotage des réalisations d'infrastructures par le MTPTC.

Opérateurs:

- ONG's, mouvement Croix-Rouge
- La Direction Nationale de l'Eau Potable et de l'Assainissement (DINEPA)
- Agences intergouvernementales, Nations Unies
- Secteur privé
- Les artisans et maçons

Bénéficiaires finaux :

- Les communautés et populations et les comités de quartiers : ils sont un outil de co-gouvernance publique indispensable pour la négociation avec la population et seront

placés au cœur du projet, en tant que bénéficiaires mais aussi en tant que parties prenantes de l'élaboration du projet.

4. QUESTIONS DE MISE EN ŒUVRE

4.1. Mode de gestion

Les Volets "Réparation et reconstruction de logements" et "Aménagement urbain" seront mis en œuvre à travers la gestion centralisée indirecte avec l'Agence Française de Développement (AFD), sur base de l'Article 26 du Règlement (CE) No 215/2008 sur le règlement financier applicable au 10ème FED. Une convention de délégation sera signée entre l'UE et l'AFD afin de définir les modalités de cette coopération déléguée.

L'AFD a été sélectionnée pour la mise en œuvre de ce volet sur base des éléments suivants:

- L'aménagement urbain est un secteur focal pour la coopération bilatérale de la France en Haïti depuis plusieurs années. De ce fait, l'AFD a acquis une expertise spécifique dans ce domaine.
- L'AFD a déjà démarré un certain nombre d'étapes préalables indispensables au démarrage des activités, en coordination avec les acteurs locaux et les ministères techniques.
- L'AFD cofinancera le projet à hauteur de 10.5 millions EUR
- La coopération déléguée met en application les principes de division du travail, en particulier au sein de l'UE.

Le volet Appui institutionnel sera mis en œuvre en gestion conjointe via la signature d'une convention de contribution avec ONU Habitat sur base de l'Article 29 du Règlement (CE) No 215/2008 sur le règlement financier applicable au 10ème FED.

ONU Habitat a sélectionné pour la mise en œuvre de ce volet sur base des éléments suivants:

- ONU Habitat détient une expertise technique reconnue dans le domaine de l'Urbanisation et du Logement.
- Son rôle de coordinateur du Groupe Logement quartiers lui donne une connaissance approfondie du terrain.
- ONU Habitat a joué un rôle majeur auprès du Gouvernement haïtien et des équipes du nouveau Président Martelly, notamment dans la définition d'un cadre stratégique et dans l'identification des actions à mettre en œuvre dans le secteur.

La gestion conjointe avec ONU Habitat s'inscrit dans le cadre du FAFA (l'accord cadre financier et administratif entre la Commission européenne et les Nations Unies). Par ailleurs, ONU Habitat remplit les critères prévus par le Règlement financier applicable.

L'AFD et ONU Habitat mettront en œuvre les activités concrètes en partenariat avec des opérateurs de terrain, présents dans les quartiers d'intervention.

Tout changement du mode de gestion constituera un changement substantiel à la présente décision, excepté les cas où la Commission "re-centralise" ou diminue le niveau de tâches préalablement déléguées au pays bénéficiaire (gestion décentralisée), à l'organisation internationale (gestion conjointe) ou à l'organisme délégataire (gestion centralisée indirecte) en question.

Le projet s'appuiera sur des services existants de la Direction de Travaux Publique du MTPTC pour assurer la maîtrise d'œuvre, l'analyse et la définition des normes et sur les services techniques des communes pour assurer le suivi. Ces services seront renforcés avec du personnel local qui fera partie du personnel de l'administration pour assurer les missions de suivi, contrôle qualité. Il n'est pas prévu de créer des structures parallèles pour mettre en œuvre le programme.

4.2. Procédures de passation de marchés et d'octroi de subventions

Tous les contrats et subventions mettant en œuvre le volet I "Réparation et reconstruction de logements" et "Infrastructures et Aménagement urbain" seront attribués et exécutés conformément aux procédures et aux documents standard établis et publiés par l'AFD.

Tous les contrats mettant en œuvre le volet Appui institutionnel seront attribués et exécutés conformément aux procédures et aux documents standard établis et publiés par ONU Habitat, et aux dispositions de l'accord cadre financier et administratif (FAFA) signé entre la Commission européenne et les Nations Unies le 29 avril 2003.

4.3. Budget et calendrier

Composantes			
Volet I	UE	AFD	
Reconstruction et réparation de logements			
Infrastructures et aménagement urbain			
UE	20 367 000,00	8 100 000,00	
Volet II	UE	AFD	UN-Habitat
Renforcement des capacités du MTPTC et des autres acteurs de la reconstruction			
Formation pour la réparation			
Campagne d'information			
Communication			
	2 033 000,00	2 400 000,00	200 000,00
Evaluation	100 000,00		
Imprévus	500 000,00		
Total	23 000 000,00	10 500 000,00	200 000,00

La durée de mise en œuvre opérationnelle est estimée à 48 mois à partir de la signature de la convention de financement.

4.4. Suivi de l'exécution

La suivi sera réalisée par un Comité de pilotage dans lequel le Gouvernement, le MTPTC, la Municipalité de Port-au-Prince et les services techniques, la Délégation de l' UE, l' AFD et ONU Habitat concernés seront représentés. Le comité se réunira chaque 6 mois et vérifiera la mise en exécution satisfaisante des actions et les résultats que le programme atteindra. Il assurera aussi les orientations stratégiques du programme.

Les indicateurs clefs pour mesurer l'état d'avancement de projet pourront notamment inclure le nombre de logements reconstruits, le nombre de logements réhabilités, le nombre de personnes bénéficiaires des aménagements en infrastructures et équipements et le nombre de maçons formés.

Pour les volets mis en œuvre par l' AFD, l' Agence de Port-au-Prince sera en charge du suivi local du projet. Des rencontres périodiques seront effectuées avec les différents partenaires du projet (maître d'ouvrage, opérateurs,...).

4.5. Évaluation et audit

Une provision pour des évaluations à mi-parcours et ex-post est prévue dans le budget du projet. Les modalités de ces évaluations seront définies entre les différents partenaires, afin d'éviter des duplications.

Vu la modalité de mise en œuvre du projet à travers la gestion centralisée indirecte et la gestion conjointe, une provision pour audit n'est pas prévue.

4.6. Communication et visibilité

Les recommandations du manuel de visibilité de l'UE seront mises en œuvre par l'AFD et ONU-Habitat et l'ensemble des intervenants au projet se les verra appliquer au titre de ses obligations contractuelles.

La communication sur les activités du projet fait partie intégrante des activités.

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Mission Statement

The mandate of the Interim Commission for the Reconstruction of Haiti (CIRH) shall be to conduct strategic planning and coordination and implement resources from bilateral and multilateral donors, non-governmental organizations, and the business sector, with all necessary transparency and accountability. The CIRH shall work to optimize the investments and contributions of these entities. The CIRH shall be responsible for continuously developing and refining development plans for Haiti, assessing needs and gaps and establishing investment priorities. It shall approve project proposals based on their consistency and coordination with the Haiti Action Plan. While it shall be able to draw up and solicit projects that fit within the priorities of the Haiti Action Plan, it shall decide on the eligibility of external submissions.

The CIRH shall operate within the framework of the State of Emergency Law. Consequently, it shall be vested with the powers necessary to conduct its activities. It shall ensure the expeditious implementation of development projects and priorities, including facilitating the issuance of property titles and permits for the construction of hospitals, power generation systems, ports, and other economic development projects.

In order to facilitate the rapid and effective implementation of the priorities and projects approved by the CIRH, the relevant ministries shall appoint members of their staff to work in the CIRH. Given the critical and immediate importance of identifying and mobilizing land for the purpose of relocating displaced populations, building long-term housing and schools, and creating jobs, the individuals appointed for such purpose by the Ministry of Economy and Finance shall be given the necessary authorities to examine applications and issue property titles requested by the CIRH within 15 business days.

The CIRH shall provide the relevant ministries with the international technical assistance necessary so that they may strengthen their capacities to fulfill their mandate in relation to development priorities and projects effectively and promptly.

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- [IHRC Bylaws \[PDF, 234kB\]](#)

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Pledges »

With support from the international community we seek to provide immediate help to relaunch economic,

governmental, and social activity, and to put Haiti back on the road to development.

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Recovery Plan

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Port-au-Prince, Haiti
General information
(509) 25 19 31 31



LIBERTY EQUALITY FRATERNITY
REPUBLIC OF HAITI

ORDER

RENÉ PRÉVAL
PRESIDENT

In view of:

Articles 19, 24, and 136 of the Constitution;

The Law of April 15, 2010, amending the State of Emergency Law of September 9, 2008;

The Order of April 20, 2010, maintaining the state of emergency throughout the territory of Haiti for a period of 18 months;

Whereas:

Given the severity of the situation following the earthquake that devastated the country on January 12, 2010, it is necessary to take specific measures to provide effective assistance to the affected populations and implement the Haiti Development Plan to rebuild a strong country;

The international community has expressed its willingness to contribute to the reconstruction of Haiti;

It is necessary to ensure effective coordination and deployment of resources and support furnished by the international donors;

It is important to that end to organize the Interim Commission for the Reconstruction of Haiti (CIRH) established pursuant to Articles 7(17) and 14 of the April 15, 2010 Law amending the State of Emergency Law of September 9, 2008;

It is also necessary to grant the CIRH the necessary powers relative to the resources placed under its management.

Pursuant to the report by the Prime Minister and following deliberation by the Council of Ministers,

Hereby ORDERS

Article 1. This Order governs the organization and operation of the Interim Commission for the Reconstruction of Haiti (CIRH) established pursuant to Articles 7(17) and 14 of the April 15, 2010 Law amending the State of Emergency Law of September 9, 2008.

Article 2. The CIRH is established for a period of 18 months. It shall be comprised of Haitian officials and members of the international community.

Article 3. The CIRH shall be co-chaired by the Prime Minister and a prominent foreign official involved in the reconstruction effort. These co-chairs shall be assisted by an Executive Secretariat in charge of the daily management of operations.

Article 4. The CIRH shall be comprised of voting and non-voting members.

The voting members of the CIRH shall be:

- i. The two co-chairs;
- ii. Two representatives designated by the Executive Branch;
- iii. Two representatives designated by the Judicial Branch;
- iv. Two representatives designated by the local authorities;
- v. One representative designated by the Senate;
- vi. One representative designated by the Chamber of Deputies;
- vii. One representative designated by the labor unions;
- viii. One representative designated by the business community;
- ix. One representative of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM);
- x. One representative of each of the bilateral and multilateral donors having offered to sit on the Commission and having pledged to contribute at least US\$100,000,000 (one hundred million U.S. dollars) for the reconstruction of Haiti as a gift over a period of two consecutive years or at least US\$200,000,000 (two hundred million U.S. dollars) in debt relief;
- xi. One representative, on a rotating basis, of the bilateral and multilateral donors that do not meet the criteria set forth in item x of this Article.

The non-voting members of the CIRH shall be:

- i. One representative designated by the Organization of American States (OAS);

- ii. One representative designated by the community of national NGOs;
- iii. One representative designated by the community of international NGOs;
- iv. One representative designated by the Haitian expatriate community.

Article 5. The number of voting Haitian representatives must at all times be at least equal to the number of voting representatives of the international community.

In the event that the number of Haitian representatives falls below the number of representatives of the international community, namely owing to the admission of a voting donor, the Executive Branch shall designate a Haitian representative in order to ensure the requisite parity.

Article 6. The members designated by their respective institutions to serve on the Commission pursuant to Articles 4 and 5 of this Order and the co-chairs stipulated in Article 3 above shall be formally appointed by a presidential commission.

Article 7. An audit and performance office shall assess the work of the CIRH, report on the execution of projects, identify deficiencies and areas for improvement, and ensure accountability and transparency.

This office of financial management and performance shall report directly to the two co-chairs.

Article 8. The CIRH shall have legal personality.

Article 9. The mandate of the CIRH shall be to conduct strategic planning and coordination and implement resources from bilateral and multilateral donors, non-governmental organizations, and the business sector, with all necessary transparency and accountability. The CIRH shall work to optimize the investments and contributions of these entities.

Article 10. The CIRH shall be responsible for continuously developing and refining development plans for Haiti, assessing needs and gaps and establishing investment priorities. It shall approve project proposals based on their consistency and coordination with the Haiti Action Plan. While it shall be able to draw up and solicit projects that fit within the priorities of the Haiti Action Plan, it shall decide on the eligibility of external submissions.

Article 11. Proposals to the CIRH shall be evaluated by Secretariat staff, which shall then recommend projects and priorities for approval. The Commission shall convene at least once every two (2) months to agree on a set of programs and priorities. Each voting member shall have one vote. A simple majority shall be necessary for approval, although the Commission shall seek consensus.

Article 12. The CIRH shall operate within the framework of the State of Emergency Law. Consequently, it shall be vested with the powers necessary to conduct its activities. It shall ensure the expeditious implementation of development projects and priorities, including facilitating the issuance of

property titles and permits for the construction of hospitals, power generation systems, ports, and other economic development projects.

In order to facilitate the rapid and effective implementation of the priorities and projects approved by the CIRH, the relevant ministries shall appoint members of their staff to work in the CIRH. Given the critical and immediate importance of identifying and mobilizing land for the purpose of relocating displaced populations, building long-term housing and schools, and creating jobs, the individuals appointed for such purpose by the Ministry of Economy and Finance shall be given the necessary authorities to examine applications and issue property titles requested by the CIRH within 15 business days.

The CIRH shall provide the relevant ministries with the international technical assistance necessary so that they may strengthen their capacities to fulfill their mandate in relation to development priorities and projects effectively and promptly.

Article 13. In order to be enforceable, decisions of the CIRH on significant projects and priorities must be confirmed by the President of the Republic.

Any decision that is not vetoed by the President of the Republic within ten (10) business days after his receiving formal notice from the CIRH shall be deemed confirmed.

Article 14. Any issues pertaining to organization and operation not stipulated in this Order shall be established by the internal regulations adopted by the CIRH.

Article 15. This Order shall be printed, published, and executed at the behest of the Prime Minister and all of the Ministers, in their respective areas of authority.

Done at the National Palace at Port-au-Prince, April 21, 2010.

By:

The President	René Preval
The Prime Minister	Jean Max Bellerive,
The Minister of Interior and Territorial Collectivities	Paul Antoine Bien Aimé
The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship	Marie Michèle Rey
The Minister of Economy and Finance	Ronald Baudin
The Minister of Planning and External Cooperation	Jean Max Bellerive
The Minister of Justice and Public Security	Paul Denis
The Minister of National Education and Professional Training	Joel Desrosiers Jean Pierre

The Minister of Commerce and Industry	Josseline Colimon Fethiere
The Minister of Tourism	Patrick Delatour
The Minister of Culture and Communication	Marie Laurence Jocelyn Lassègue
The Minister of Women's Affairs and Rights	Marjory Michel
The Minister of Public Works, Transport, and Communications	Jacques Gabriel
The Minister of Haitians Living Abroad	Edwin Paraison
The Minister of Youth, Sports, and Civic Action	Evans Lescouflair
The Minister of Social Affairs and Labor	Yves Cristalin
The Minister of Public Health and Population	Alex Larsen
The Minister of Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Rural Development	Joanas Gue
The Minister of Environment	Jean Marie Claude Germain
The Minister-Delegate to the Prime Minister in Charge of Relations with Parliament	Joseph Jasmin



OCHA

United Nations Office
for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs

- FOREWORD
- OCHA STORIES
- STRATEGIC PLAN
- FIELD ACTIVITIES
- FINANCIAL PLAN

HAITI

OCHA led the humanitarian response to Haiti's devastating earthquake in January 2010, which killed 217,300 people and affected 2.1 million Haitians. Tens months later, with the country still struggling to recover from the earthquake, a cholera outbreak added to Haiti's woes.

While much progress has been made in helping the country recover, the requirement for strong humanitarian coordination is expected to continue in 2012. OCHA will focus on supporting the Government to identify and implement durable housing solutions and accelerate recovery efforts. It will address security concerns for vulnerable groups, such as the elderly, women and children, and strengthen access to basic services, such as water and sanitation. OCHA will support national authorities to lead a comprehensive response to the cholera epidemic, and work to strengthen national disaster preparedness and contingency planning.



CONTEXT ANALYSIS

THE SOCIO-POLITICAL SITUATION

After widely contested elections, Michel Joseph Martelly was sworn in as President of Haiti on 14 May 2011. Political volatility followed, with President Martelly's first two proposed Prime Ministers-designate rejected by the Legislature. In October 2011, Mr. Garry Conille, an international public servant

and former UN official, was confirmed Prime Minister following difficult consultations with opposition MPs and Parliament.

Although the political impasse has been broken, the newly formed presidential coalition remains weak. Only three of 94 representatives in the Lower House and no senators of the 30-member Upper House are from President Martelly's Repons Peyizan party. The coalition's sustainability and strength will depend on the President's ability to negotiate and find common ground with opposition MPs, especially those from the former ruling party, Inite, which remains a major political force in the Legislature.

In the medium term, Haiti will continue to rely on international support, currently coordinated by the UN and the Interim Reconstruction Commission (Commission Intérimaire pour la Reconstruction d'Haïti - CIRH). The security situation in Haiti remains precarious, with social unrest related to the ongoing challenging political transition likely to remain throughout most of 2012. General security will be handled by the National Police (PNH), supported by approximately 9,000 international peacekeepers from the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).

MINUSTAH's mandate under Security Council resolution 1944 was renewed in October 2011. In the lead-up to the renewal, the mission was subjected to heightened public criticism and resentment related to the cholera outbreak. The majority of Haitians believe that mission troops brought cholera to the island. President Martelly has indicated that he wants to see MINUSTAH's mandate increasingly focused on development, with the wider UN system playing a larger role in Haiti's reconstruction. The 2012-2016 mission concept of operation outlines a roadmap for a phased transfer of its tasks to the UN Country Team (UNCT), other partners and, where possible, State institutions.

To assess the implications of the political delays, an extension of the current Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) for Haiti, from 31 December 2011 to 31 December 2012, was requested. MINUSTAH and the UNCT in Haiti will develop a new ISF for the period 2013-2016, to coincide with MINUSTAH's drawdown plans for Haiti.

THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

Nearly two years after the 12 January 2010 earthquake, there are still almost 600,000 IDPs living in 895 camps in the West Department of Haiti, mainly in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. According to the International

Organization for Migration (IOM), the number of people in camps has decreased by 63 per cent, from 1.5 million in July 2010 to 550,560 in October 2011.

Forced eviction is a key threat to the remaining camp populations. According to the Camp Coordination Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster, 67,162 people were evicted between July 2010 and July 2011. During this same period, the number of camps under threat of eviction increased by 400 per cent.

The Ministry of Public Health and Population reported 492,098 cases, and 6,749 deaths associated with the cholera epidemic, as of 4 November 2011. The epidemic peaked again in early June 2011, but since then the number of new cases has been declining, with a 50 per cent decrease in new cases reported between July (40,873) and August (20,093). While the nationwide mortality rate of 1.4 per cent has significantly decreased, the Health Cluster reports that if the current trend continues, there will be approximately 50,000 new cases in 2011. Many WASH partners are ending their activities, primarily due to funding shortfalls.

Haiti faces many underlying vulnerabilities including recurrent flooding, landslides, hurricanes, earthquakes and tsunami-related risks, particularly in the northern Departments. The flood-prone areas of the Artibonite and the West Departments are at particular risk given the large number of people still in camps in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area.

Frequent droughts and hurricanes have affected domestic food production. A recent Ministry of Agriculture report indicates that 45 per cent of the country's population is food insecure, representing a significant increase from the 30 per cent prior to the earthquake.

THE HUMANITARIAN STRATEGY AND RESPONSE

Ten UN entities are involved in the response to the humanitarian/earthquake and cholera epidemic with preparedness and disaster risk reduction activities. They are FAO, OCHA, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHABITAT, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO and UNOPS. Approximately 195 international NGOs, the Red Cross Movement and 200 national partners actively participate in the cluster system. Reduced levels of humanitarian funding have led to a downward trend in the number of humanitarian partners, which is expected to continue. Advocacy with the Government and development agencies is a priority, in

order to ensure residual humanitarian needs are incorporated into longer-term strategies.

At the midyear review of the 2011 CAP, the funding requested decreased dramatically from \$915 million to \$382 million. As of November 2011 the CAP was funded at 59 per cent. Although some donors have indicated that additional funds would be available to respond to a new crisis, both NGOs and UN partners indicate funding shortfalls as the main reason for reducing activities, including cholera response and WASH in camps.

The humanitarian community in Haiti focuses on two strategic objectives: address gaps in critical unmet humanitarian needs in order to save lives and protect the vulnerable groups; and support targeted action focusing on emergency preparedness and response.

Under OCHA's leadership, the Inter-cluster Coordination (ICC) mechanism plays an important role in uniting humanitarian actors and working with national and local authorities to ensure a strategic, balanced and prioritized response. The HCT, led by the HC, provides strategic guidance to the ICC on response and preparedness activities. These include setting common objectives and priorities, developing strategic plans, and providing guidance to clusters on operational issues and to cluster lead agencies on the use of resource mobilization mechanisms.

While Haitian authorities are taking more responsibility for and ownership of the country's needs and response, national and local institutions remain weak. Therefore, the underlying premise of the humanitarian strategy is to complement national efforts through working with development partners to strengthen institutions and build capacities for preparedness and disaster response. Involving and supporting local NGOs will be a key part of this strategy.

The humanitarian community will continue to ensure a minimum standard of basic services for people living in camps, given the delays in implementing return and relocation programmes. President Martelly has voiced his intention to rebuild communities and to implement vital infrastructure and social services. A key objective for humanitarian partners will be to support the Government to identify and implement durable solutions for the return and relocation of the hundreds of thousands of IDPs still in camps. Humanitarian partners will work with recovery and development actors to identify and

prioritize projects to build permanent shelters and repair earthquake-damaged houses. The UN is supporting the Government's "6/16" pilot project, which aims to return IDPs living in six priority camps to 16 communities in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area.

Efforts to mitigate the impact of the cholera epidemic will continue. As the epidemic stabilizes, strengthening hospitals' capacity and integrating cholera-treatment centres into the national health system will be emphasized. Awareness-raising campaigns and advocacy to improve access to clean water, hygiene and sanitation services will remain important.

There is a crucial need to bolster national capacity for contingency and response planning. Key activities will be to support the Government to prepare and plan for new emergencies, and to develop disaster preparedness and response coordination structures, such as the Centre des Opérations d'Urgences National (COUN) of the Direction de la Protection Civile (DPC).

PROJECTIONS

The evolving humanitarian situation will continue to be influenced by the political situation. In the likely political scenario of continuing differences between President Martelly and the opposition-dominated Legislature, periods of political tension and impasse are expected to continue. In this scenario, the country is likely to make little progress and could experience deterioration in the economic and humanitarian situations. Violent protests and difficulty in establishing the Government will be the main threats to progress in Haiti.

In the best-case scenario, a political compromise between the President and the Parliament would stabilize Haiti and allow for reconstruction to move ahead. Greater stability would improve the humanitarian situation and attract critical funding for development projects from international partners.

If the current pace at which IDPs are leaving the camps is maintained, the number of IDPs is expected to decrease to between 100,000 and 200,000 by the end of 2012. Increased evictions and the withdrawal of humanitarian partners providing services in camps could accelerate this trend. Without durable alternative housing solutions, the number of urban squats and slums is expected to increase, especially in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. Protection concerns, particularly for women and children, are expected to increase in affected neighbourhoods.

Strengthened prevention efforts and improved response capacities, combined with acquired immunities, are expected to stabilize the cholera epidemic. While the number of new cases will continue to decrease, localized outbreaks can be expected, especially in remote areas. The Health Cluster estimates that the current trend will continue for the next two to three years, with recurrent but lower peaks, until it reaches an endemic phase.

Against continuing humanitarian needs, significantly reduced humanitarian funding will be a major challenge. Many NGOs already have or are planning to end their programmes due to funding constraints. Humanitarian partners' withdrawal will erode the sub-standard living conditions of vulnerable people, especially those in camps. Food insecurity and high malnutrition rates will continue and could deteriorate depending on the impacts of climate-related events, such as droughts and hurricanes. Another significant natural disaster would result in a return to a large-scale emergency.

STRATEGY

BACKGROUND

OCHA has maintained a presence in Haiti since 2004. It has increased or decreased this presence depending on the crisis. OCHA played a critical role in coordinating the hurricane relief response in 2008 to over 150,000 families throughout the country. Cluster mechanisms were introduced and later scaled down. In 2010, OCHA scaled up dramatically to address the large-scale humanitarian needs following the 12 January earthquake. Responding to the humanitarian needs of hundreds of thousands of IDPs, in a context of acute endemic poverty and recurrent political crises, has posed serious challenges for OCHA and the wider humanitarian community.

The office has focused on three main humanitarian priorities: (i) coordinating relief and services to IDPs living in camps, while working with the Government to identify and implement durable solutions for the return or relocation of IDPs; (ii) supporting Government efforts to reduce the spread of the cholera epidemic, and decrease mortality rates through treatment and prevention efforts throughout the country; and (iii) contingency planning and response preparedness, given Haiti's extreme vulnerability to climatic events, such as heavy rains, flooding, landslides, earthquakes and tsunami-related risks.

CURRENT FOCUS

Since the January 2010 earthquake, OCHA has worked to mobilize humanitarian partners to implement a comprehensive range of measures, including establishing a cluster-based coordination structure to support planning, advocacy and resource mobilization. The ICC remains a critical forum for coordinating response activities and identifying humanitarian needs and gaps.

The current structure of the office includes three pillars: (1) the coordination pillar composed of a national coordination section (responsible for the ICC), HCT national-level structures, and a field coordination section to oversee the work of sub-offices in Gonaïves, Jacmel and Léogane, and a unit for the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area that liaises with local government institutions and humanitarian partners to coordinate field-level operations; (2) a communications pillar, comprising public information and information management, which provides critical information products for advocacy and coordination purposes; and 3) a support pillar in charge of administration and finance.

A small Emergency Relief and Response Fund (ERRF) Unit manages funds for allocation to humanitarian activities. The unit assesses project proposals and allocates grants to address priority needs, especially targeting people affected by the earthquake and the cholera epidemic.

FORWARD STRATEGY

OCHA's main focus in Haiti is to advocate and facilitate for more coordinated and strengthened engagement between international and national humanitarian partners, including the Government, local NGOs and donors. OCHA will advocate more durable solutions for return, and will ensure that critical humanitarian priorities are addressed.

OCHA will strengthen the HCT's decision-making process and will continue to identify synergies between the HCT and the UNCT. OCHA will promote senior-level representation within the HCT strengthening it as a decision-making forum, particularly on transition issues. OCHA will strengthen ties between the field and the national ICC so that issues from the field can be addressed at the State level. There will be a review of ICC management in the earthquake-affected areas at the departmental level so that it can begin to phase down according to reducing needs. Focus of support will progressively move to government-led inter-sector forums. The cluster system will be

reviewed and rationalized, and some (if not all) components phased down in 2012.

A national contingency plan for 2012 will be supported, based on lessons learned from the 2011 plan. The development of a multi-risk contingency plan and improvements in the Government's coordination of the response are targets for 2012.

The international community will continue to support the DPC, COUN and its departmental and communal branches (COUD and COUC) in strengthening their preparedness capacities.

Direct operational support from the humanitarian community for preparedness and response coordination will continue, including the provision of humanitarian assets, particularly in remote field areas.

Continued advocacy to integrate the cholera response into a strengthened national health system will remain important. Health partners will be encouraged to work more closely with the Health Ministry to ensure that appropriate training is provided to medical staff, and that isolation wards are established to treat reoccurring cholera cases. Prevention efforts will focus on awareness-raising campaigns through the media and through mobilizing community volunteers. Improved access to quality water and sanitation facilities will support further outbreaks of the disease.

OCHA will work to improve needs assessments to ensure that priority needs and gaps are identified and used to inform decision-making. Similarly, vulnerability criteria will be used to inform where humanitarian partners should be located. Poor road networks and the lack of transportation alternatives in remote areas present a major challenge. This was demonstrated during the evolution of the cholera epidemic. In the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, cholera mortality rates were relatively low (0.7 per cent), largely due to the availability of medical facilities and health partners. Mortality rates in the remote South-East Department were higher as a result of the limited humanitarian presence and poor access to medical facilities.

Given ongoing serious protection issues in camps and return communities, OCHA will advocate protection and safeguarding the rights and dignity of vulnerable people. The Port-au-Prince metropolitan area will remain a priority due to the large number of IDPs still in camps, as will the Artibonite

Department as one of the most vulnerable areas to hurricanes. Other priorities areas include Grande Anse, Nord, Nord-Est and Sud-Est Departments, due to the cholera epidemic, and the northern Departments for earthquake- and tsunami-related risks.

A mapping of humanitarian activities will help OCHA assess the need to continue, stop or handover current activities. A stakeholder analysis will be undertaken to identify relevant speakers to inform partnership strategies. The two will form key tools in developing a detailed transition process to be implemented over the next two years. Participation in other planning processes, such as the Integrated Strategic Framework and eventually, the UNDAF, will also inform transition priorities, handover arrangements and residual areas of focus. Given the large military presence in Haiti and MINUSTAH's continued role, civil-military coordination will remain important.

The Communications Unit will continue to support national institutions by providing training to enable better information sharing. OCHA will help IM working groups and national institutions to develop information management and communication strategies on humanitarian issues. The humanitarian bulletin, situation reports and snapshots will aim to reach a wider audience with information on needs, response activities and gaps. Advocacy with the donor community and Member States will focus on the requirement for continued funding for core humanitarian needs and funding for recovery and development.

The 2012 CAP will focus on underfunded humanitarian priorities. The Communications Unit will continue to provide humanitarian and donor communities with information products to highlight funding needs and gaps in support of advocacy.

OCHA will improve its management of the ERRF, which will target displaced and returning populations, the cholera outbreak and needs stemming from natural disasters. The ERRF Unit will strengthen its interface with field sub-offices to support more systematic monitoring of ERRF projects. Progress will be tracked through an ERRF database, and reporting will be strengthened through regular updates. The gender marker will be fully integrated to support project prioritization and criteria, further developed to facilitate decision-making on budgets. The unit will prioritize local NGO projects to strengthen local capacity.

PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK

RESULT 1: AN EFFECTIVE HUMANITARIAN COORDINATION SYSTEM ESTABLISHED IN-COUNTRY	
Indicator 1. Decisions taken by Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) led to improved delivery of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable people.	
CURRENT STATE	Two main strategies, one on return and relocation and a second on Guidelines for civil-military coordination in Haiti have been produced by the ICC and endorsed by the HCT. Approximately 80 per cent of HCT recommendations have been followed-up up to date. Key thematic priorities for 2011 have been identified, although the HCT has made some improvements to move from primarily an information sharing role to a strategic decision making body on humanitarian issues, additional strengthening is required. The level of HCT participation remains an issue with frequent changes and inconsistent participation from Heads of Agencies/Deputies, despite the agreed ToRs. Partners rarely suggest HCT agenda items. Overlapping issues discussed within UNCT and HCT meetings is also of concern.
TARGET 2012-13	2012: OCHA will strengthen the HCT, in particular to improve the decision-making process while also identifying synergies between the HCT and the UNCT. Adherence to TOR on Representative-level participation will work to move the main focus from information sharing to decision making, including efforts to move forward on transition planning. 95per cent of HCT recommendations will be followed-up. 2013: OCHA will work with partners to review the continuing relevance of the HCT to strategically transition humanitarian coordination into structures lead by the Government of Haiti (GoH), in which the humanitarian community will continue to play a support role.
Indicator 2. Level of satisfaction expressed by key stakeholders (government, donors, humanitarian actors) with coordination leadership.	
CURRENT STATE	Stakeholders (notably donors and the ICC) have requested the HCT to play a more strategic role, especially with regards to leadership and vision as well as stronger decision making. Balancing the sometimes conflicting mandates and priorities covered by the HC, namely DSRSG/HC/RC remains a challenge.
TARGET 2012-13	2012: Active participation of designated officials as per agreed TOR. Discussions focused on critical humanitarian needs. On behalf of the humanitarian system, OCHA will also engage in aggressive fund raising efforts at national and international level. 2013: OCHA will ensure a coordination leadership role in support of the government of Haiti with regards to the humanitarian response, even after the phasing out of the cluster system in the country.
Indicator 3. Effective inter-cluster coordination in place, documenting decisions and tracking adherence.	
CURRENT STATE	Since February 2011, OCHA has strengthening its leading role in inter-cluster coordination. A work plan, based on the HCT strategic priorities has been developed. Meetings are held on a fortnightly basis and 90per cent of the members attend the meeting on a regular basis. To date, 95 per cent of the recommendations and action points have been followed-up.
TARGET 2012-13	2012: OCHA will strengthen linkages between the national and sub-national ICC, with a view to ensuring that humanitarian issues from the field are raised and acted upon. OCHA will also begin the process of rationalizing the ICC at department-level in earthquake affected areas. A progressive phase down of ICC at sub-national level is expected, due less critical needs and a diminishing number of partners. At the same time, attention will be paid to government-led inter-sectoral fora. Phase down of the cluster system is tentatively planned for 2012. 2013: Inter sectoral forum, led by GoH and supported by OCHA and the presence of key partners will ensure the follow up of residual humanitarian needs in country.
RESULT 2: A SHARED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OF HUMANITARIAN NEEDS GUIDES A COMMON RESPONSE	
Indicator 4. Joint assessment and analysis of needs guide response planning.	
CURRENT STATE	In April 2011, OCHA provided training on the new IASC guidelines on coordinated needs assessments to raise awareness amongst clusters' members and lead agencies on agreed international standards. A series of sector-specific needs assessments have been undertaken in 2011 both at national and

RESULT 2: A SHARED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OF HUMANITARIAN NEEDS GUIDES A COMMON RESPONSE	
	departmental level, however, limited coordinated inter-sectoral assessments have taken place in 2011. Consolidation of indicators and corroboration of data remains a challenge.
TARGET 2012-13	2012: Joint field assessments to identify at-risk areas, humanitarian needs (ie. Cholera, mitigation, wash, etc), and areas suitable for durable solutions are undertaken and facilitated by OCHA. Clusters share quarterly updates on needs assessments through the ICC. Relevant government entities supported to assume leadership and ownership of needs assessment. 2013: Needs assessment incorporated in national planning apparatus.
Indicator 5. Common response plan endorsed by the HCT fully reflecting priority needs in line with IASC-approved appeal policy and guidelines.	
CURRENT STATE	Needs assessments implemented during the year 2011 fell short of the new standards, despite specific requests made by the HC and OCHA during the process of the CAP MYR 2011.
TARGET 2012-13	2012: Rigorous needs assessment plan developed and implemented by HCT. 2013: Unless there is a new emergency, it is likely that humanitarian needs assessments will decrease and increasingly be replaced by assessments looking at development related issues and indicators.
Indicator 6. Percentage of an appeal's requirements prioritised in the highest category.	
CURRENT STATE	24.3 per cent of high priority projects in CAP 2011 have received funding
TARGET 2012-13	2012: 70 per cent of high priority projects in CAP 2012 expected to be funded. 2013: It is unlikely that a CAP/Appeal will be launched in 2013.
Indicator 7. Percentage of projects in each Gender Marker code (0, 1, 2a, 2b).	
CURRENT STATE	The gender marker was poorly implemented in the CAP 2011 at country level and was introduced through the HQ-level revision. Scores were 8.3 per cent at 0, 28.4 per cent at 1, 58 per cent at 2a, 5.3 per cent at 2b. Gender marker is not rolled-out in the ERRF.
TARGET 2012-13	2012: Gender marker implement in 100per cent of CAP 2012 and CAP MYR 2012 with the following break-down: 20 per cent projects with 0: 20 per cent projects in 1: 35per cent projects in 2a: 25per cent in 2b. Gender marker is rolled-out in the ERRF – 40per cent of projects received in 2012 with marker code. 2013: It is unlikely that a CAP/Appeal will be launched in 2013. 90per cent of ERRF funded projects get a marker code.
Indicator 8. Level of satisfaction expressed by stakeholders with the IM products supporting the analysis and monitoring of the programme cycle.	
CURRENT STATE	OCHA has not yet conducted a satisfaction survey on its information management products. However, feedback received from several partners, especially national and international NGOs, indicates stakeholders find OCHA's IM products very useful. IM products to advocate on funding needs are based on FTS and OCT information (CAP and ERRF info graphics). Other IM activities include collecting and maintaining humanitarian data on: 3W, UN presence, meeting calendar, contacts list, snapshots, administrative detailed maps humanitarian bulletin, and ad hoc products on request. OCHA also maintains the Haiti humanitarian response website. Most clusters have IM capacities but OCHA provides support to those clusters without IM capacities as well as to relevant governmental entities (Ministry of Planning, Civil Protection, National Center of Geo-spatial information). OCHA coordinates IM activities and chairs the IM network meeting; facilitates the GIS Working group and co-chairs with CNIGS the GIS Working Group meeting.
TARGET 2012-13	OCHA will work to extend the IM Network to governmental, early recovery and development partners and will increasingly focus on support to strengthen IM capacities of NGOs and Government partners, including joint work on developing IM products with and for government partners and adapting IM products to the new context. Data collection and monitoring as well as the dissemination of information will be continued country-wide. IM activities will continue to support advocacy efforts and humanitarian funding needs.
RESULT 3: A WELL-RESOURCED COMMON RESPONSE PLAN REGULARLY MONITORED	
Indicator 9. Percentage of CERF and CHF allocations that are made towards highest priority projects.	

RESULT 3: A WELL-RESOURCED COMMON RESPONSE PLAN REGULARLY MONITORED	
Percentage of ERF project allocations that are made in accordance with agreed criteria.	
CURRENT STATE	75 per cent of ERRF-funded projects are made in accordance with agreed criteria.
TARGET 2012-13	2012: 80 per cent of ERRF-funded projects are made in accordance with agreed criteria. 2013: 90 per cent of ERRF-funded projects are made in accordance with agreed criteria.
Indicator 10. All clusters publish information on collective outputs vs. targets as expressed in their cluster response plans.	
CURRENT STATE	With strong IM capacity, the 11 clusters in Haiti regularly monitor data and indicators. In April 2011, OCHA introduced a CAP Monitoring tool, which ensured that clusters could also track and report on a 3 month basis on progress towards the strategic objectives.
TARGET 2012-13	2012: Systematization and harmonization of the reporting system by clusters and continuation of the CAP monitoring tool. 2013: Cluster approach expected to be phased down.
Indicator 11. Percentage of country-based pooled-fund projects monitored according to agreed monitoring plan.	
CURRENT STATE	A simple monitoring system and a monitoring plan are in place but not regularly used (10per cent of projects being monitored)
TARGET 2012-13	2012: 50 per cent ERRF-funded projects monitored 2013: 75 per cent of ERRF-funded projects are monitored
Indicator 12. Level of stakeholders' satisfaction of OCHA resource mobilization and management of pooled fund processes.	
CURRENT STATE	According to the survey conducted in 2011, the ERRF had an average rating of 3.97 (1=Highest, 10=Lowest)
TARGET 2012-13	2012: Average rating improves to 3.5 2013: Average rating of 3
RESULT 4: IMPROVED ACCESS BY ALL VULNERABLE POPULATIONS TO SERVICES AND ASSISTANCE	
Indicator 13. Increased access to previously inaccessible regions and populations.	
CURRENT STATE	OCHA's advocacy has been successful in strengthening the presence of humanitarian partners in rural areas, many of which were previously mainly based in urban areas. For the cholera response, mobile medical teams are reaching remote rural areas to provide treatment and raise awareness on prevention measures. However, accessibility due to limited transportation options remains a challenge in some remote areas for a variety of reasons including: limited transportation options and roads, little or no presence of humanitarian partners, lack of medical facilities. In Cité Soleil (Port-au-Prince metropolitan area) criminal gangs create insecurity which impacts access for humanitarian partners.
TARGET 2012-13	2012: Improved access to essential WASH and other basic social for the most vulnerable people living in camps, and an increased to healthcare services, especially for the people affected by the cholera epidemic, especially in remote areas. 2013: Basic humanitarian services accessible to all the vulnerable groups in need.
Indicator 14. Number of arrangements to facilitate access developed and implemented through engagement with the relevant actors.	
CURRENT STATE	Access to remote areas has been facilitated by coordination of different actors including local authorities, MINUSTAH, UN agencies and NGOs, in particular for logistical assistance. The humanitarian community also works with UNDSS to monitor the security situation and with MINUSTAH which provides security for certain humanitarian operations. In the departments, a good interaction between the Logistics Cluster and RJOC exists.
TARGET 2012-13	Continued access facilitated through engagement with and the support of above listed partners.
Indicator 15. Percentage of key stakeholders (Humanitarian Coordinator, Cluster Coordinators, Agency	

RESULT 4: IMPROVED ACCESS BY ALL VULNERABLE POPULATIONS TO SERVICES AND ASSISTANCE	
Heads, donors, etc.) report being more informed on access.	
CURRENT STATE	Survey to be conducted Q1 of 2012.
TARGET 2012-13	To be updated following the survey's results.
RESULT 5: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION INFLUENCES A BROADER AGENDA	
Indicator 16. Humanitarian principles and priorities are reflected in the strategies/plans of non-humanitarian actors.	
CURRENT STATE	Humanitarian concerns are embedded in the mandate of the Peace-Keeping mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions adopted in the aftermath of the earthquake, resulting in advocacy oriented partnerships (disaster risk reduction and response to natural disasters, protection of IDPs, response to the cholera epidemic) while preserving humanitarian space. Mapping of flood prone IDP camps in the national contingency plan designed with the support of development actors. Successful advocacy with the transitional team of President Martelly to speak out against forced evictions of IDP from camps. An Advocacy Group was created in September 2011 to provide an analysis of humanitarian and transition issues; to support the HC and the HCT, in partnership with the communication Group co-chaired by OCHA, in their lobbying activities at the national and global levels.
TARGET 2012-13	2012: Advocacy strategy implemented with main targets of donors, the Haitian government, development actors and the media. Advocacy will reflect the humanitarian context to seek sufficient funding for residual humanitarian needs and disaster preparedness programs; support implementation of the return strategy of camp residents to their neighbourhoods of origin, the importance of rehabilitation of water and sanitation systems and the handover of the cholera response to Haitian authorities. In addition, OCHA will continue its support to the development of the ISF framework and the linkages with strategic humanitarian frameworks. 2013: Sufficient level of bilateral funding to address remaining humanitarian needs. Development actors step up their activities in support of the government to address broader structural issues.
Indicator 17. Percentage of humanitarian partners viewing OCHA as effective in influencing the broader agenda.	
CURRENT STATE	High visibility in national and international media of major humanitarian concerns and challenges based on strong inter-cluster messaging and proactive media strategy.
TARGET 2012-13	2012: Implementation of a stronger advocacy strategy to donors and the Haitian government leading to an integrated approach of humanitarian and development activities. 2013: Advocacy efforts for a coherent humanitarian/development approach lead to a significant decrease in humanitarian needs while solutions to structural issues are being implemented (rehabilitation of communities, water and sanitation systems, health capacities).
RESULT 6: GOVERNMENTS AND HCT BETTER PREPARED TO COORDINATE AND RESPOND TO FUTURE EMERGENCIES	
Indicator 18. Integration of international tools and services in national contingency plans and other government plans.	
CURRENT STATE	OCHA plays a critical role in supporting the GoH on emergency preparedness and response, as the main interface for the humanitarian community. OCHA chairs the Emergency Preparedness & Response Working Group and is integrated into the emergency coordination structures led by the GoH. Through this forum, international tools and guidelines are mainstreamed to improve compliance and coordinate clusters' responses. The HCT has identified emergency preparedness and response as a priority and it is reflected in the CAP 2011 and CAP MYR 2011.
TARGET 2012-13	In light of Haiti's vulnerabilities to different national disasters, emergency preparedness and response will remain a priority for the 2012. OCHA will support the development of a national contingency plan for 2012, following the results of the national contingency plan for 2011. Efforts to strengthen the government's capacity to respond and coordinate future emergency will continue by

RESULT 6: GOVERNMENTS AND HCT BETTER PREPARED TO COORDINATE AND RESPOND TO FUTURE EMERGENCIES

	humanitarian and development actors. OCHA will work with humanitarian partners on the prepositioning of materials, and availability of human resources, especially in remote field areas.
Indicator 19. Inter-agency contingency plan in place to address new or resurgent emergencies.	
CURRENT STATE	The humanitarian community decided to have one contingency plan under the leadership of the Department of Civil Protection (DPC) for the hurricane season 2011. OCHA played a central role in support of the DPC and Haitian authorities in finalizing the plan and establishing coordination structures at National and sub-national levels for emergency response.
TARGET 2012-13	Development of a multi-risk contingency plan (hurricane, flooding, earthquake, tsunami, etc) and improvements in the coordination of the response by the government of Haiti.

RESULT 7: RECURRENT HUMANITARIAN CONCERN ADDRESSED THROUGH LONGER-TERM DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES

Indicator 20. Humanitarian issues reflecting analysis of vulnerability are integrated into development strategies (UNDAF, PRSP, etc.).

CURRENT STATE	Haiti is a country facing chronic vulnerabilities compounded by structural and endemic poverty. Although humanitarian concerns are widely acknowledged, they are not fully integrated into longer term development strategies. There is still a lack of access to basic services (water, sanitation, health, etc) for the majority of the population in Haiti. Improving the living conditions in the neighborhoods and in the relocation sites to facilitate the return of the IDPs and access to basic services in cholera-affected and disaster prone areas is a medium to longer term priority.
TARGET 2012-13	2012: Residual humanitarian concerns are integrated into development strategies and projects. OCHA will support bridging from humanitarian assistance to development aid at all levels (communal to national level). Increased leadership and ownership on coordination structures and the required humanitarian response by the GoH. 2013: Humanitarian concerns are fully integrated in longer term reconstruction and development strategies. All departments and communes have integrated plans.

PLANNED STAFFING AND TOTAL COSTS

TOTAL STAFF	PROFESSIONAL		NATIONAL		GENERAL SERVICE		GTA
	XBPB	XBAB	XBPB	XBAB	XBPB	XBAB	XBPB
TOTAL STAFF 2012	15	3	9	0	0	0	21
TOTAL STAFF 2013	7	1	4	0	0	0	8

XBPB: Extrabudgetary Programme Budget | XBAB: Extrabudgetary Administrative Budget | GTA = General Temporary Assistance |

UNV: United Nations Volunteers

TOTAL COSTS (US\$)	PROGRAMME STAFF COSTS - FVC	ADMIN STAFF COSTS - FPSC	PROGRAMME NON-STAFF COSTS - FVC	ADMIN NON-STAFF COSTS - FPSC
TOTAL COSTS 2012	3,905,744	339,867	1,597,609	0
TOTAL FUNDS REQUESTED 2012				
TOTAL COSTS 2013	2,070,074	178,596	1,329,207	0
TOTAL FUNDS REQUESTED 2013				

FVC: Funded from voluntary contributions | FPSC: Funded from programme support costs

To: Delegation of MEPs from Budgetary Control Committee to Haiti

VOICE input for visit to Haiti

QUESTIONS:

1. How can the humanitarian and development funding mechanisms of DG ECHO and the EU delegation be linked and better streamlined to allow NGOs and other relevant actors to link relief, rehabilitation and development? If the political will is there, what are the regulatory blockages in Brussels and in Haiti?
2. What should be the main Haiti priorities for the EU for the next two years?
3. Given the high level of vulnerability to recurrent natural disasters in Haiti, are disaster preparedness and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) priorities in the EU strategy for Haiti?
4. Can the EU support the national health system, and/or will they ensure that other donors do so, in order to achieve more sustainability of ECHO investment and NGOs' work?
5. Is it possible to enhance the transparency on how choices to fund projects are made by the EU delegation and how funding is implemented?
6. What should be the main priorities for reconstruction for the next few years? Which steps are being taken to permit the different actors involved in reconstruction to be as effective as possible?
7. What is the strategy for the estimated two million people without access to basic facilities and infrastructure, and if there is one, what will be the focus?
8. Will a national emergency response plan be developed to enhance preparedness for future disasters, given the high vulnerability of Haiti to natural disasters?
9. Given the increasing level of criminality and sexual and gender based violence, is there an action plan to address protection concerns, in particular in the camps?
10. There seems to be little progress with regards to documentation and solving land ownership issues. Which ways forward are considered to address this issue?
11. How can procedures for funding for national/international NGOs be made more effective for disbursement of funding from the CIRH?
12. Is the government considering to tax international NGO staff, and if so, will they duly consider the potential consequences of this in terms of impact on humanitarian programmes?

For the rationale behind these questions, please read further below.

➤ TO: the EU delegation and ECHO representative

- How can the humanitarian and development funding mechanisms of DG ECHO and the EU delegation be linked and better streamlined to allow NGOs and other relevant actors to link relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD)? If the political will is there, what are the regulatory blockages in Brussels and in Haiti?

Background:- In 2012, some critical humanitarian needs will continue to be present (including displacement and cholera), while capacity building and appropriate technical assistance needs to be provided to Haitian counterparts in order to build long-term sustainability. Therefore, an integrated approach to LRRD is essential. Division of labour within the EU institutions and with member states should not leave any critical gaps of

coverage, especially with regards to basic social services (such as education, health and shelter) and to child protection. With the current funding mechanisms, humanitarian funding is made available via ECHO for limited periods (12 months, 18 months) which often does not provide the time in complex emergencies to link relief, rehabilitation and development.

- The on-going long term programmes need to be sufficiently flexible and adaptable to changed needs on the ground given that there are still many constraints. Moreover, future development programmes need to be flexible if a new natural disaster occurs.

- Currently NGOs face the challenge to bridge the gap between the different EU funding mechanisms, and often have to use their own funds in order to ensure the sustainability of the EC projects. This is the case in many humanitarian settings.

- What should be the main Haiti priorities for the EU for the next two years?

- Given the high level of vulnerability to recurrent natural disasters in Haiti, are disaster preparedness and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) priorities in the EU strategy for Haiti?

Background: DRR measures are needed before the event, not after, when the humanitarian crisis strikes and humanitarian funding becomes available. The EU should support preparedness of disaster prone populations, including building up their institutional capacity. Moreover, development instruments should be able to directly fund DRR initiatives, especially those which address vulnerabilities at a grassroots level. Close coordination between humanitarian and development funding instruments is essential to ensure that the DRR experience of the humanitarian community is effectively carried through into development programmes. This will not only lead to a better sustainability of DRR activities undertaken by humanitarian actors and to poverty reduction, but it will also save money by mitigating future crises.

- Health services: Can the EU support the national health system, and/or will they ensure that other donors do so, in order to achieve more sustainability of ECHO investment and NGOs' work?

Background: The health system is now at a crossroads. Without support of the government, programmes cannot be sustained. For example, ECHO planned to link their 2012 cholera assistance to capacity building of the existing staff in the Ministry of Health (MoH). However, MoH staff are not available as the World Bank stopped the funding of health staff salaries. Therefore, the ECHO cholera axis will be a failure if the MoH capacity is not quickly reinforced.

-Reporting and transparency of EU development funding (EDF, Food facility etc.): Is it possible to enhance the transparency on how choices to fund projects are made by the EU delegation and how funding is implemented? Annual reporting and an updated website would very much contribute to a better transparency and a better global picture, leading to a better complementarity between the various projects and partners.

➤ TO: Haitian government, Haitian parliament, Interim Haiti Recovery Commission

- There currently seems to be a lack of an overarching strategy for reconstruction. What should be the main priorities for reconstruction for the next few years? Which steps are being taken to permit the different actors involved in reconstruction to be as effective as possible?

- Access to services: What is the strategy for the estimated two million people without access to basic facilities and infrastructure, and if there is one, what will be the focus?

Background: Recently, the debate focused on the 500,000 people who are still living in camps, but this group is part of a much larger group of an estimated two million people living below the poverty line without access to basic facilities and infrastructure. There

needs to be a clear strategy in relation to this entire population. NGOs feel that the focus of such a strategy should be on addressing poverty, and that the “return to neighbourhoods”-approach should be complemented with livelihoods, education, shelter and WASH components.

- Will a national emergency response plan be developed to enhance preparedness for future disasters, given the high vulnerability of Haiti to natural disasters?

- Security-protection: Given the increasing level of criminality and sexual and gender based violence, is there an action plan to address protection concerns, in particular in the camps?

Background: Certain groups in Haiti suffer particular vulnerability, especially among children. Many are at risk of trafficking, sexual or labour exploitation. Adequate attention to protection is needed by all parties involved in humanitarian, transitional and long term development planning. Moreover, local leaders should be held accountable for full implementation of protection plans.

- Land ownership: There seems to be little progress with regards to documentation and solving land ownership issues. Which ways forward are considered to address this issue? The lack of clarity around this issue hampers progress on many fronts (e.g. rubble clearance).

- Administrative procedures for funding from Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (CIRH): How can procedures for funding for national/international NGOs be made more effective for disbursement of funding for rehabilitation and reconstruction from the CIRH?

Background: As the mandate of the CIRH will change to increase Haitian ownership, distribution of funding through this Commission has been slowed down. Moreover, the administrative burden to get subsidies from the CIRH is very high and time-consuming. A main obstacle is that NGOs have to demonstrate a strong partnership with the Haitian government, who is however not always able to respond to all the practical demands of such a partnership.

- humanitarian access: Is the government considering to tax international NGO staff, and if so, will they duly consider the potential consequences of this in terms of impact on humanitarian programmes?

Background: The NGO community fears that the current residence permit exercise of the Haitian government is a first step towards taxation of the international NGO staff. The NGO Coordination Committee (CCO) estimates that this taxation will be about 30% of the available funds. This will lead to significant impact reduction of the humanitarian programmes. The Haitian Government needs to consider the possible impact this will have on the recovery and development of Haiti.

➤ **TO: World Bank and other donors**

According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, US\$ 231 million are required for 2012 to address immediate unmet necessities and to carry out longer-term projects. In 2011, half of the financial needs were not met. ECHO is the only major remaining humanitarian donor in Haiti, despite the fact that very real humanitarian needs still exist. Donor focus is elsewhere at the moment and Haiti seems to be in danger of being forgotten. While some donors may also not be disbursing funding because of a lack of government capacity, development actors need the pledged funding to assist in building that government capacity.