




European Parliament

POLICY DEPARTMENT ON CITIZENS' RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS



TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE EU INSTITUTIONS




DATE

22 September 2015

TIME

10:15- 12:00

TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE EU INSTITUTIONS



**Transparency and
integrity in
lobbying**


**JANOS BERTOK,
OECD**



Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying: a Comparative Perspective

**Workshop for Committee on Constitutional Affairs
European Parliament
22 September 2015**


Trust in government is low and has been decreasing



Source: Gallup World Poll


Transparency in policymaking is a lever for trust in government

Correlation between public trust in politicians and transparency in government policymaking (2013)




Source: World Economic Forum – Global Competitiveness Report (2013-2014)

Transparency drives lobby reforms



Regulation of lobbying is accelerating


16 countries have regulated lobbying
8 in the past 5 years, including Ireland in 2015



Implementation: How to make it effective?

Raising awareness with tailored measures

Most effective ways to learn about lobbying rules/guidelines according to legislators; and integrity standards and transparency tools according to lobbyists




Implementation

What measures are considered effective?

Incentives for compliance

There are generally no effective rewards for agreeing to comply with lobbyist codes of conduct




Implementation

What measures are considered effective?


Sanctions

Are there compelling sanctions for breaching the lobbyist code of conduct?




Areas of Concern 1: Revolving doors


Are there restrictions on public officials engaging in lobbying activities after they leave the government?




Generally no restrictions are in place (e.g. a "cooling-off" period) to restrict **legislators** from engaging in lobbying activities after they leave Parliament



Pre-public employment: OECD countries' restrictions on lobbyists to fill regulatory or advisory posts in government




Pre-public employment: lobbyists' view on restrictions to fill regulatory or advisory posts in government




Areas of Concern 2: Advisory-expert groups


A balanced composition of interests?



Lobbyists are sitting on advisory groups in a personal capacity



Availability of information on advisory-expert groups



The way forward

- **Compliance by incentives and enforcement remain a challenge**

Intensify efforts in addressing lobbying concerns and risks in order to foster confidence in policy making


- **Limited measurement of costs and benefits**

Identify relevant data, benchmarks, and indicators in relation to transparency in lobbying


- **The broader integrity framework remains vital**

Establish a whole-of-government 21st-century integrity framework

Types of information that stakeholders believed should be made publicly available




Actors & types of communication that stakeholders believe should be covered by lobbying rules



What incentives?


Easy registration





www.oecd.org/gov/ethics

TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE EU INSTITUTIONS



Institutional and Constitutional Aspects of Interest Representation

(Policy Department study for
AFCCO)

DAVID COEN

University College London

INSTITUTIONAL & CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF SPECIAL INTEREST REPRESENTATION


**DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES
POLICY DEPARTMENT C: CITIZENS' RIGHTS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS**

Presentation September 2015.

Professor David Coen & Alexander
Katsaitis.


University College London.
School of Public Policy.

Accredited Individuals across committees; 2012-2014



Interest groups contact during different phases of the policymaking cycle (Q6).

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%



■ Commission Proposal Preparation

■ Commission Proposal


■ European Parliament Committee Amendments

■ Trialogue Negotiations

■ Plenary Amendments

■ Plenary Vote

Interest groups' influence (Q4)




MEPs Perceptions regarding the TR

	Completely Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Completely Agree
Improves the behaviour of interest groups	2	10	27	53	8
Reduces inappropriate influence caused by lobbying	3	19	27	41	10
Improves the transparency of the EU	5	0	17	46	32
Is helpful for public interest groups	5	5	24	49	17

Conclusions/ Recommendations

- The EP could consider further **augmenting the activity of public interests that surround it, especially in committees with less activity.**
- **Further enhance the European Parliament Research Service &** expand resources provided to committee secretariats to support rapporteurs and MEPs directly.
- The EP could further **incentivize administrators** across EU institutions and levels to **communicate primarily with special interests registered** on the TR.
- **The EP could make information regarding special interests entering the Institution and meeting with specific MEPs and administrative staff publicly available.**
- The EP could further increase its transparency & legitimacy by making **information on accreditations (and registrations) more easily available** to the public.
- **Special interests**, both those registering as well as those with accreditations, could be given options **to indicate clearly which committees and DGs they are most interested in lobbying.**
- **The inclusion of the Council of the EU in the TR would considerably assist the mapping and understanding of EU inter-institutional lobbying.**

TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE EU INSTITUTIONS



Scrutiny of declarations of financial interests

(Policy Department study for
AFCO)

**ROLAND
BLOMEYER,**
Blomeyer & Sanz




Scrutiny of declarations of financial interests in national legislatures

Roland Blomeyer, 22 September 2015

Contents

- (1) Context
- (2) Conclusions
- (3) Recommendations



(1) Context

- Code of Conduct adopted in December 2011 / Implementing Measures in April 2013
- Accordance with relevant moral values and norms
- Rules versus values

(1) Context

Asset disclosure

No GRECO
recommendation
GRECO
recommendation
not applicable




(1) Context

Codes of Conduct

Code > 10 years


Code < 10 years

not applicable



(2) Conclusions

- **Why?** More integrity / transparency?
- **What?** Review existing experience / practices.
- **How?** Exchange with Member State parliaments.
- **When?** Proactive / ongoing reform.



(3) Recommendations - rule


- Identification of debts (map)
- Actual income / detailed income brackets
- Revolving doors
- Family members (map)



(3)

Recommendations:
debts


applicable
not applicable



(3)



Recommendations:
family

applicable
not applicable






(3) Recommendations - guide

- Leadership 
- Strategy 



(3) Recommendations - monitor




(3) Recommendations

Publication of declarations

Database

Integrated document


Individual documents







(3) Recommendations - monitor

Resources for monitoring (members per 1 monitor)





(3) Recommendations - sanction

- Integrity issues affecting the President or a member of the Advisory Committee 
- Judging by peers versus external independent assessment 



(3) Recommendations - report


- Evaluation of performance  

Thank you

Roland Blomeyer, rblomeyer@blomeyer.eu / www.blomeyer.eu



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DEBATE

