



REINFORCING THE IMPACT OF CSDP THROUGH PARTNERSHIPS

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Presentation for the SEDE Committee Hearing European Parliament, 12 November 2015

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Overview

- + CSDP: Extensive Partnerships
- + The State Dimension: Impact and Challenges
- + The EU-IO Dimension: Impact And Challengeds
- + Way Forward
- + What the EP can do...





CSDP: Extensive Partnerships

- + CSDP has been inherently linked to EU cooperation with third state contributors and International Organizations
- + Reflection of a general trend in IO crisis management and peace and security tasks (see UN peacekeeping partnerships, NATO partnerships)
- + Institutionalisation of partnerships at member state level (Framework Participation Agreement) and EU-IO level (EU-UN, EU-NATO, EU-AU capacity-building)
- + Partnership as sign of strength (interest in CSDP) but also weakness (lack of EU states' contribution)





Partnerships with Third States

- + Cooperation with external states since the beginning of CSDP operationalisation (also a way of dealing with WEU-EU transition and 'non-discrimination' of WEU non-EU states- e.g. Turkey and NATO members US, Canada, Norway, Iceland)
- Almost 50 third states have contributed to CSDP missions during the last 12 years
- + Most important: Turkey in EUFOR Althea, Norway, Canada and Russia (important strategic airlift in EUFOR Chad 2008), but also Georgia (EUFOR RCA) and USA (EULEX Kosovo)





Partnerships with Third States

- + EU-Third State cooperation serve Technical/Operational and Political Aims and can have differing impacts
- + Operationally, third states can fill important gaps (either force generation, or niche capabilities) provides countries also opportunities to familiarize themselves with EU procedures and crisis management expertise (e.g. Republic of Korea Korea / Japan)
- + Politically, partnerships as an EU instrument for forging practical networks and cooperation links with either strategically important countries or Association countries. Increases legitimacy, visibility and 'integrative pull' of CSDP





Impact and Challenges (1)

- + Third states can make impact to CSDP missions by filling crucial gaps (Russia in EUFOR Chad; Georgia in RCA; Turkey in Althea) and by providing core competences in training/civilian missions (e.g. USA in EULEX Kosovo or Congo)
- + Third states can increase 'legitimacy through multilateralisation' or regional expertise (e.g. South Africa and Brazil in Artemis in 2003 or Malaysia, Brunei, Thailand, Singapore and Philippines in Aceh) see also NAVFOR Atalanta coalition
- + CSDP cooperation as a legacy of EU-NATO relations (see e.g. Morocco and re-hatted contributors in SFOR-Althea transition in 2004)
- CSDP third state partnership can serve as signal and practical example of developing political EU partnerships





Challenges

- + Core Challenges relate to formalisation, institutionalisation and effective integration of contributors within EU early decision-making procedures and planning (here EU lags behind NATO)
- + Difficulties of diverging interests and agendas
- High administrative and coordination burden on part of EU for often- small numbers of troops
- Continuing frictions with regards to EU-Turkey cooperation
- + EEAS move towards 'priority' partners?
- Inter-organizational Lessons Learned from partnerships should be encouraged (e.g. from NATO and UN)





CSDP Cooperation with IOs

- + CSDP strong inter-organizational dimension and located firmly within EU discourse of 'effective multilateralism'
- Highly institutionalised (although divergently effective) relations with NATO and UN since 2003
- + Strong cooperation in the field (EU-NATO in Macedonia and Bosnia 2003 and EU-UN in all remaining military operations and wide range of civilian operations, particularly in Africa)
- Developing relations with African Union, particularly in Capacity-Building





CSDP Cooperation with IOs

- + Institutionalisation: No other regional organization proceeded as far and extensively in its formalised partnerships with other organizations (esp. NATO and UN) than EU
- + EU-NATO relations limited to Berlin Plus operations and below potential, but recent developments offer chances for reinvigoration (e.g. Ukraine more intensive relations with Turkey, despite continuing concerns)
- + EU-UN Cooperation advanced considerably since 2003(farreaching Inter-organizational and Institutional Advances such as Steering Committees, UNLOPS, Action Plan)





Impact of EU-IO Cooperation

- + Cooperation with NATO and UN helped "kick-start" military dimension of CSDP in 2003
- + Strong dimension of legitimacy-seeking in EU-UN partnership and initial operational support/kick-start in NATO' case
- + Increasing influence of lessons learned in EU-UN Cooperation as a result of Artemis, EUFOR RD Congo, EUFOR Chad, EUFOR RCA and ambitious inter-organizational dialogue (yet to translate into stronger engagement and buy-in from EU member states)
- + EU-AU Cooperation in Capacity-Building politically important, but EU "as one of many players" in African inter-organizational web





Challenges

- Institutionalisation and Formalisation still does not translate into unlocking full potential of EU-IO partnerships
- + Tensions between EU autonomy and visibility of CSDP vs. mutually reinforcing EU-IO relations on the ground
- + Continuing strains on EU resources (lack of EU member states' contributions) also affect inter-organizational effectiveness (in some cases resource rivalries)
- + Despite initial successes, further operationalisation of systematic lessons learned of EU-IO cooperation needed






Way Forward

- Strengthen CMPD and EEAS Multilateral Division's vision, processes and strategic planning on issues related to EU-IO and EU-3rd state cooperation in CSDP Matters
- + Ensure significant and 'mutually reinforcing' relations for both sides, instead of ad hoc gap-filling
- Learn from more advanced partnership arrangement and experiences of other organizations (e.g. UN partnership unit in DPET, NATO)
- Address wider issue of uncertain future of CSDP and Euroepan commitment global peace & security and UN peacekeeping





What the EP Can Do...

- Continue to follow regularly and closely the EU's relations with 3rd states and particularly IOs, within context of future of CSDP and inter-organizational approaches to global security governance
- + Build up EP expertise on lessons learned from EU cooperation schemes and implementations (e.g. CSDP missions and operations) on the ground
- Contribute to strategic debate on role and purpose of CSDP and the tensions between EU Autonomy vs. Support of Partners
- + Follow closely opportunities for EU-NATO Reinvigoration and member state buy-ins to giving full effect to CSDP-UN Action Plan and Commitment of strong European dimension of UN Peacekeeping



Many thanks - Questions?

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