REPORT on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2025

12.12.2025 - (2025/2165(INI))

Committee on Security and Defence
Rapporteur: Thijs Reuten

PR_INI

Amendments

• 001-004 (PDF - 109 KB)
• 001-004 (DOC - 42 KB)
• 005-014 (PDF - 144 KB)
• 005-014 (DOC - 49 KB)
• 015-024 (PDF - 140 KB)
• 015-024 (DOC - 50 KB)
• 025-025 (PDF - 108 KB)
• 025-025 (DOC - 41 KB)
• 026-028 (PDF - 109 KB)
• 026-028 (DOC - 42 KB)
• 029-029 (PDF - 99 KB)
• 029-029 (DOC - 72 KB)
• 030-039 (PDF - 150 KB)
• 030-039 (DOC - 52 KB)
• 040-048 (PDF - 148 KB)
• 040-048 (DOC - 51 KB)

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2025

 

(2025/2165(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular the provisions on the common security and defence policy (CSDP),

– having regard to the Versailles Declaration adopted at the informal meeting of Heads of State or Government on 11 March 2022,

– having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security, which was approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 25 March 2022,

– having regard to the Civilian CSDP Compact – Towards more effective civilian missions, approved by the Council on 22 May 2023,

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States[1],

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/890 of 18 March 2024 amending Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 establishing a European Peace Facility[2],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1092[3],

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 19 March 2025 for a Council regulation establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the reinforcement of the European defence industry Instrument (COM(2025)0122),

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 22 April 2025 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2021/694, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697, (EU) 2021/1153, (EU) 2023/1525 and 2024/795, as regards incentivising defence-related investments in the EU budget to implement the ReArm Europe Plan (COM(2025)0188),

– having regard to the conclusions of the European Council, particularly those of 26 June 2025, 20 March 2025 and 6 March 2025,

– having regard to the informal meeting of Heads of State or Government held in Copenhagen on 1 October 2025,

– having regard to the Council conclusions on Arms Export Control, adopted on 14 April 2025,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘A new European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through a responsive and resilient European Defence Industry’ (JOIN(2024)0010),

– having regard to the political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029, entitled ‘Europe’s choice’, presented on 18 July 2024 by the candidate for the European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen,

– having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ and, in particular, Chapter 4 thereof on increasing security and reducing dependencies,

– having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

– having regard to the joint white paper from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘Joint white paper for European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120),

– having regard to the security and defence partnerships signed by the EU and Canada on 23 June 2025 and by the EU and the United Kingdom on 19 May 2025,

– having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty, which came into force in 1949,

– having regard to the The Hague Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in The Hague on 25 June 2025,

– having regard to the 10th progress report of 10 June 2025 on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by the EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017,

– having regard to the three joint declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed by the Presidents of the European Council and the Commission and the NATO Secretary General on 10 January 2023, 10 July 2018 and 8 July 2016 respectively,

– having regard to its resolution of 9 October 2025 on a united response to recent Russian violations of the EU Member States’ airspace and critical infrastructure[1],

– having regard to its resolution of 2 April 2025 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2024[2],

– having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on the white paper on the future of European defence[3],

– having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on continuing the unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after three years of Russia’s war of aggression[4],

– having regard to its resolution of 24 October 2024 on the misinterpretation of UN resolution 2758 by the People’s Republic of China and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan[5],

– having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement[6],

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Security and Defence (A10-0265/2025),

A. whereas the EU must be able to protect its citizens; whereas 81 % of EU citizens favour a common security and defence policy, and 69 % are in favour of reinforcing the EU’s defence equipment capacity;

B. whereas the EU’s security environment has deteriorated, and strategic competition is increasing in our Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods and beyond; whereas the EU’s threat assessment should be based on a 360-degree assessment; whereas the EU is facing multifaceted threats that continuously manifest themselves in new ways, making them difficult to anticipate and counter; whereas the Euro-Atlantic, Middle Eastern, African and Indo-Pacific theatres are increasingly interconnected;

C. whereas certain international actors, most notably authoritarian states, are jeopardising European security and stability through a vast set of hybrid tactics that includes, inter alia, cyberattacks, the sabotage of critical infrastructure, economic pressure, food and energy blackmail, the instrumentalisation of migration, subversive political influence and coordinated, continuous attempts to interfere in the democratic functioning of our countries through foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), especially in electoral processes; whereas the use of these hybrid tactics by foreign malign actors represent a fully fledged security threat to the EU and its Member States; whereas the EU should include provisions on how to counter these threats as an integral part of its CSDP;

D. whereas Russia and China are increasingly using hybrid tools to undermine the security of the EU; whereas there has been a noticeable increase in violations of the airspace and the territorial waters of EU Member States; whereas terrorism and extremism, not least when financed by foreign powers, require constant attention in order to be countered by the EU and its Member States;

E. whereas in response to the threats it faces, the EU urgently needs to enhance the effectiveness of its foreign, security and defence policy to defend its interests and values within the EU and in the Western Balkans and its immediate Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods; whereas the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans are in need of greater EU support, as well as increased defence cooperation, in order to preserve stability and security, especially in terms of the fight against disinformation and hybrid warfare; whereas the security situation in these regions is negatively affected by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which carries the risk of spillover effects;

F. whereas Europe needs to design its security and defence in a comprehensive and multifaceted manner by enhancing conventional military capacities, protecting critical civilian infrastructure, supply chains and energy facilities, countering disinformation and cybersecurity threats and enhancing societal resilience;

G. whereas the European continent is facing the most complex combination of both military and non-military threats as a result of Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, which has severely endangered the EU’s security and stability; whereas Russia’s allies – China, Iran, Belarus and North Korea, among others – also pose active threats both to Europe and to global peace and security; whereas in September 2025, Russia, together with Belarus and other partner countries, carried out the Zapad military exercises along the EU border;

H. whereas Ukraine needs to be provided with the necessary military capabilities for as long as it takes to end Russia’s illegal war of aggression and to restore its sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders; whereas the Russian invasion of Ukraine is an attack on the rules-based international order and has endangered the current multilateral world order; whereas Ukraine defends not only its sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also overall European security; whereas EU-NATO cooperation has been fundamental in coordinating weapons deliveries to Ukraine;

I. whereas NATO Heads of State and Government, in their Washington Summit Declaration of 10 July 2024, described China as a key enabler of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas China is expanding its military capabilities, thereby significantly altering the strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific and beyond;

J. whereas the joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030 provides a capability-driven roadmap for Member States and the EU by identifying critical gaps in and priorities for the EU’s security and defence, including air and missile defence, artillery and ammunition, drone and counter-drone systems, cyber and electronic warfare, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, strategic enablers and the protection of critical infrastructure; whereas the Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 translates strategic priorities into concrete flagship projects, notably the Eastern Flank Watch, the European Drone Defence Initiative, the European Air Shield and the European Space Shield, which are designed to deliver collective deterrence and resilience by 2030;

K. whereas the EU institutions and the Member States are adopting measures under the Defence Readiness Omnibus, with the aim of scaling up the EU’s defence capabilities and infrastructure to reach the required levels of readiness to prepare for and thereby deter a high-intensity conflict; whereas the Defence Readiness Omnibus package seeks to remove cross-border barriers, simplify licensing and permitting procedures, and incentivise joint innovation, thus laying the foundation for a genuine European defence market and greater industrial scaling;

L. whereas the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument establishes an EU-level facility of up to EUR 150 billion to support collaborative defence procurement, with a view to increasing industrial production capacity and providing pre-financing mechanisms linked to national implementation plans, thereby aiming to reduce duplication and strengthen the EU’s Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB);

M. whereas the current complex geopolitical situation highlights the need to step up efforts to strengthen the EDTIB, notably by building on the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) and its European Defence Projects of Common Interest (EDPCIs); whereas EDIP should be used to its full potential to boost common procurement and ensure reliable access to essential military products to handle potential supply crises; whereas EDPCIs are collaborative industrial projects designed to promote the joint development, production, acquisition and management of strategic military capabilities, while simultaneously strengthening the governance framework for coordinated and efficient defence investments;

N. whereas the EU needs to further boost research, technological development and innovation in the field of security and defence, especially regarding cybersecurity;

O. whereas military mobility is a strategic pillar of the CSDP and an essential tool for ensuring the EU’s readiness, interoperability and deterrence, particularly along its eastern and southern flanks;

P. whereas EU defence spending is estimated to hit a record of EUR 381 billion  by the end of 2025, reflecting a more than 10 % increase since 2024; whereas defence investment hit EUR 106 billion in 2024 and is projected to be close to EUR 130  billion by the end of 2025; whereas NATO’s Defence Investment Plan sets a trajectory towards 5 % of GDP in defence expenditure by 2035, with at least 3.5 % dedicated to core defence; whereas several EU Member States have already announced national plans to move in this direction, reflecting a step change from earlier commitments to the 2 % benchmark; whereas relevant Member States’ commitment to meet the target of 3.5 % of GDP would require spending a total of more than EUR 630 billion per year, as estimated by the European Defence Agency (EDA); whereas the plan comprises a commitment by NATO allies to spend up to 1.5 % of GDP on protecting critical infrastructure, defending information technology networks, ensuring civil preparedness and resilience, and innovating and strengthening the defence industrial base, among other measures; whereas the EU Member States have agreed on more, better and smarter defence spending that should primarily be channelled into cooperative initiatives; whereas previous agreements to do so failed to achieve set targets;

Q. whereas the CSDP has 12 civilian missions, eight military operations and one civilian-military mission, with around 4 000 personnel on three continents; whereas Operation EUFOR ALTHEA sets a route towards peace, stabilisation and the European integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and still plays a pivotal role in preserving the security and stability of BiH and the region; whereas the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya and Operation EUNAVFOR MED IRINI are contributing to sustainable peace, security and stability by implementing the arms embargo, fighting illicit weapons and human trafficking and training the Libyan coastguard;

R. whereas it is becoming increasingly important to further develop existing partnerships with allies and establish more strategic partnerships around the world; whereas the EU needs tailor-made security and defence partnerships that focus on delivering results, enhancing capabilities and reducing overall dependencies on single actors and providers; whereas NATO is an important pillar of the defence of many EU Member States;

S. whereas the EU needs to be able to effectively and autonomously protect all EU Member States and citizens by taking full advantage of Article 42(2) TEU and developing a European Defence Union; whereas there is the need to further strengthen the operational value of the mutual assistance clause of Article 42(7) TEU and to provide more clarity on its practical arrangements in case of its activation by a Member State;

T. whereas Parliament’s active role in shaping CSDP policies bolsters the EU’s democratic foundations;

A deteriorating geopolitical context

1. Emphasises that Russia represents the primary and most significant threat to the EU and its Member States; stresses the gravity and urgency of the threats to European security posed by Russia and its allies such as Belarus, Iran and North Korea; reiterates its full support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in the face of Russia’s continued war of aggression and barbaric attacks on civilians; strongly opposes any initiative that would deny Ukraine its sovereignty, reward Russia for its aggression, lead to territorial changes through the use of force, result in impunity and see the future of Ukraine decided on without Ukraine, and the security of Europe decided on without Europeans; underscores that Russia is also attacking Member States and other vulnerable countries in the EU neighbourhood and aims to undermine our societal resilience through its recent, repeated, intensified and increasingly frequent violations of EU airspace, affecting Estonia, Poland, Romania, Latvia and Lithuania, among other countries, and its hybrid warfare including (attempted) assassinations, arson, cyberattacks, sabotage of critical infrastructure, economic coercion, weaponisation of migration and border pressure, lawfare tactics, support to extremist and separatist groups, interference in electoral processes and information manipulation; notes with concern that Russia portrays itself as a global defender of so-called ‘traditional values’, using this narrative as a tool to expand its influence abroad; calls for specific measures to be integrated into the CSDP to counter this influence; notes that Russia engages in the online recruitment of citizens and criminal gangs from EU and other European countries for its hybrid attacks;

2. Reiterates its support for any initiative that would enable the EU and its Member States to take coordinated, united and proportionate action against all violations of their airspace, including shooting down airborne threats; reiterates its calls on the Commission and the Council to develop an action plan on preventing and countering the escalation of Russian hybrid warfare against EU Member States in the terrestrial, aerial, maritime and digital domains originating in Russia or any other country, including options for EU retaliatory measures that match the severity and intensity of hostile activities undertaken against the EU; calls on the Member States to review, in coordination with NATO and NATO allies, the rules of engagement for all types of threats to ensure they are capable of responding to the most innovative threats; stresses that the EU must show resolve and signal that any attempt by a non-EU country to violate the sovereignty of its Member States will be met with immediate retaliation; underlines that Russia’s hybrid warfare will continue unabated unless its actions elicit political or military retaliation; underlines that the EU, in close coordination with NATO, should take further action to prevent hybrid warfare on European soil, including through appropriate restrictions on Russian diplomats and the interdiction of the Russian shadow fleet using all available means; calls on the Council and the Commission to increase the effectiveness and impact of sanctions on Russia in order to definitively undermine Russia’s ability to continue waging its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine and threatening the security of other neighbouring countries; urges the EU and its Member States to work together to ban trade and commercial activities with Russia and Belarus, particularly focusing on any potential dual-use items, as well as the transit of goods to and from the EU via their territories, and to reinforce sanctions; calls for further sanctions targeting Russia’s primary sources of revenue; calls on the Council, along with its US partners, to maintain and extend its sanctions policy against Russia, to apply a similar sanctions policy to all enabling states, including Belarus, Iran and North Korea, and to sanction Chinese entities supplying dual-use goods and military items essential for the manufacturing of drones and missiles; calls for targeted sanctions against Russia’s shadow fleet and for further action against it using the full spectrum of legal means to halt, obstruct or impede its operations, given its possible involvement in the launch of drones targeting critical infrastructure; calls on the Council to systematically tackle the issue of sanctions circumvention by malicious non-EU entities based in the EU through thorough investigations and tougher penalties for entities that violate sanctions or fail to exercise due diligence in export controls and end-user verification; reiterates that any form of military support provided to the aggressor by states such as Iran, North Korea and China must entail direct consequences for all other relations with those countries;

 

3. Emphasises that, while NATO and the EU Member States collectively hold a strong conventional advantage over Russia, in the light of Russia’s battlefield experience and aggressive military doctrine, further efforts are needed to draw on Ukraine’s experience and enhance capabilities in key areas such as asymmetric and hybrid warfare, drones, ballistic missiles, electronic warfare and air defence, in order to deter Russia;

4. Notes that the regime in Belarus continues to play a destabilising role in the region by aligning fully with Russia’s aggressive policies; stresses the importance of closely monitoring military movements by Russia and Belarus along the EU’s border and strengthening resilience against potential hybrid threats along the eastern frontier; highlights the urgent need for Member States bordering Russia or Belarus to be provided with appropriate and relevant resources to secure the EU’s external borders against military incursions and attacks, including through the Eastern Flank Watch;

5. Underlines that Russia’s defeat by Ukraine and ensuring Ukraine’s success are the most effective and cost-efficient investments in European security for the short and medium-term; recalls that Ukraine’s security contributes to that of Europe as a whole; strongly condemns the drone incursions from Hungarian territory into Ukrainian airspace and the recent statements by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán questioning Ukraine’s sovereignty; considers the United States’ policy ambivalence and its reduction in military support as counterproductive to bringing a swift and permanent end to Russia’s aggression; urges Europe, alongside key, like-minded partners, to enhance their military support to Ukraine, including through the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) training initiatives and the financing and provision of military support such as air defence systems and deep strike capabilities, in order to create the conditions for peace; reiterates its call on the Member States, together with their G7 partners, to immediately endorse the Commission proposal to use all frozen Russian assets as the basis for a substantial loan to Ukraine; welcomes the fact that, as a result of deliveries from European countries, military aid allocations to Ukraine in the first half of 2025 exceeded those of the 2022-2024 period, despite decreased US contributions; notes, however, critical gaps in tech delivery of air defence and deep strike capabilities; calls for a coalition of willing EU Member States to explore how to set up a defensive European-led Integrated Air Protection Zone (IAPZ), employing combat air patrols (CAPs) over uncontested areas of Ukraine to intercept Russian projectiles; stresses that an IAPZ would help to protect Ukrainian civilians from indiscriminate attacks, offer proactive defence against Russian incursions into EU airspace, and shift the balance of power to help force Russia to the negotiation table; calls for enhanced coordination among the EU Military Staff in response to threats along the eastern flank, including real-time monitoring and rapid information sharing; underlines that valuable insights can be gained from Ukraine’s battlefield experience to improve the EU’s overall situational awareness and hybrid threat response; calls for better coordination among European countries in the provision of both economic and military support to Ukraine;

6. Underlines that in order to ensure effective deterrence against Russian aggression and sustainable peace in relation to Ukraine, credible and robust security guarantees must be offered, and coordinated collaboratively by all able and willing European and non-European partners; underscores that security guarantees should be established as Treaty obligations, guaranteeing an adequate response should Ukraine’s security be compromised, and complemented by measures to strengthen Ukraine’s own military deterrence;

7. Deplores the Hungarian Government’s continued obstruction of the European Peace Facility (EPF), including through legal action before the General Court of the EU, which undermines the EU’s ability to provide timely and effective military assistance to Ukraine, as well as its continuous blocking of EPF support to Armenia; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) to find an alternative solution to overcome this blockage;

8. Calls for strategic measures to proactively counter hybrid threats and prevent interference in the democratic processes of accession countries, which seek to undermine EU interests and values; recognises the direct attempts to alter the results of electoral processes through FIMI campaigns and other hybrid tactics as fully fledged security threats; encourages increased funding for and investment in strategic communication, media literacy and the fight against FIMI;

9. Stresses that hybrid warfare goes beyond cyber or information attacks alone, and encompasses the economic, technological and societal dimensions of strategic confrontation; considers that Europe’s dependence on external data, critical technologies and supply chains constitutes a major vulnerability that can be exploited for coercive purposes; calls on the Commission to propose a comprehensive EU-wide strategy to ensure that the EU can attract, maintain and retain critical technologies within the EU, including by limiting foreign takeovers;

10. Highlights Russia’s growing aggression and hybrid war against the Republic of Moldova with a view to destabilising its pro-EU government through unprecedented levels of malign interference and the continued militarisation of Transnistria; condemns Russia’s continued illegal occupation of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia in Georgia, as it poses a serious threat to peace and security in the region; underlines that inadequate responses to Russia’s aggression against Georgia in 2008 have allowed its imperialist ambitions to go unchecked, seriously undermining the European security architecture; is concerned about Russia’s significant military build-up in the occupied regions and ‘borderisation’ along the Administrative Boundary Line; supports Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and is concerned about the Georgian Government’s alignment with false Russian narratives; emphasises the strategic importance of the Black Sea region for European security, energy resilience and regional stability; welcomes the adoption of the EU’s new Black Sea strategy, which highlights the critical geostrategic importance of the Black Sea for the security, stability and prosperity of Europe; underlines the EU’s enhanced engagement in the region to promote stability and strengthen its deterrence and resilience; highlights the need for the effective and credible implementation of the strategy and calls for the EU to ensure the full and equal participation of all states concerned in shaping policies and initiatives related to Black Sea security and connectivity;

11. Stresses the need to further safeguard the US-brokered agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan through the swift conclusion and signing of a comprehensive and lasting peace treaty in line with, and with full respect for, Armenia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and including the withdrawal of foreign troops from its territory; notes the constructive role played by Armenia in securing regional peace and stability; strongly underscores the need for further efforts to overcome the deep impact of Azerbaijan’s aggressive policy towards Armenia, while acknowledging current efforts to build relations and confidence; highlights the need for engagement and the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Türkiye to reduce tensions and strengthen confidence-building in the South Caucasus;

12. Remains concerned about Türkiye, a member of NATO, displaying ambiguous behaviour through its lack of sanctions against Russia and its continuous challenges to the sovereignty and sovereign rights of EU Member States; condemns Türkiye’s violation of Syria’s territorial integrity; is deeply concerned by attacks led or supported by Türkiye in north-eastern Syria, as they not only result in civilian casualties and increase the number of internally displaced persons, but also threaten the effectiveness and continuity of the fight against Daesh;

13. Denounces Russia’s ongoing efforts to undermine stability and democratic governance in the Western Balkans, particularly through dis- and misinformation campaigns, political interference and energy leverage aimed at undermining stability and democratic governance and promoting pro-Russian sentiments fuelled by anti-Western rhetoric; notes China’s negative influence in the region; notes that EU efforts to counter these developments have been insufficient and ineffective; calls for the evaluation and streamlining of all efforts and further investment to counter pro-Russian and anti-European FIMI; expresses concern about the stability of BiH and the persistent tensions between Kosovo and Serbia; stresses that the Western Balkans is an area of strategic and geopolitical interest for the EU and that the stability, security and democratic resilience of the region directly influences that of the entire continent;14.  Notes the deep instability in the Middle East and the West, North and Central Africa regions, and its linkage to the Jihadist terrorist threat;

15. Deplores the fact that escalations and the violation of international law in Gaza and the broader region diminish the chances of long-term peace for all people in the Middle East; welcomes the US-negotiated peace plan between Israel and Hamas leading to a ceasefire; calls on all parties to fully comply with the ceasefire, to deliver the bodies of all deceased hostages to their families, to allow the rapid delivery of humanitarian aid and access for other civilian assistance missions, and calls for a workable roadmap towards a two-state solution, the restoration of security and public order, including the disarmament of Hamas, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza, the reform and empowerment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip as necessary priority steps; considers it a pivotal moment for the entire region and a starting point towards further de-escalation and stability; urges the EU to swiftly broaden the mandate of its EU Border Assistance Mission to Rafah (EUBAM Rafah) and the EU Mission for the Support of Palestinian Police and Rule of Law (EUPOL-COPPS) in order to play a pivotal role in progress towards a viable political solution, including through support for the rule of law, security-sector reform and transitional justice;

16. Notes with concern the escalation of conflict between Israel and Iran, and in the broader region, including Lebanon, Syria and Qatar; remains concerned about internal tensions in Lebanon and Syria; supports the contribution of the UN Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL) to southern Lebanon and welcomes the extension of its mandate for one year; recalls that the majority of UNIFIL contingents come from EU Member States; condemns Iran’s persistent attempts to destabilise the region, either directly or through its proxies; highlights the need for the EU to support its partner, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, also by increasing EPF funding for the protection of the Jordan-Syria border, which is being used by traffickers as a crossing point for arms and drug trafficking and has been weakened by the ongoing crisis in the Middle East;

17. Welcomes the commitment to increase security cooperation with Southern Mediterranean partners and calls for enhanced cooperation with Mediterranean partner countries in the field of maritime security, countering sanctions circumvention and ensuring the security of submarine cables, while also combating extremism, terrorism and illicit arms trade;

18. Expresses deep concern over the persistent instability in Libya and the setbacks in the Sahel region, which has developed into a hotbed of jihadist violence from the Sahel to Mozambique and Somalia, with the risk of spillover into neighbouring regions and, ultimately, Europe; deplores the continued instability in Yemen and condemns Houthi attacks against Israel and on shipping vessels; stresses the long-term security risks for Europe of such developments in these regions; remains concerned over the ongoing humanitarian turmoil with security implications in Africa’s Great Lakes region; urges the EU to take measures to counter the rising influence of Russia and China, which is weakening countries in the region and undermining the EU’s positive contributions to regional stability; reiterates the paramount importance of preventing Daesh and other jihadist groups from reorganising, following the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, and calls for sustained cooperation to that end between the Syrian transitional authorities and the global coalition against Daesh; strongly believes that a reliable and sustainable solution must be found, through increased dialogue with the Kurdish communities in Syria, concerning the jihadist prisoners and their families in prisons and camps in north-eastern Syria, which represent both a serious risk and a humanitarian challenge;

19. Reiterates its concern about Russia’s intensified militarisation and its aggressive posture towards the EU Member States, increased geopolitical, climate-change- and resource-driven competition in the Arctic as well as malign activities in European territorial waters and exclusive economic zones, including through the activities of the Russian shadow fleet; is also concerned about increased Chinese presence and the deepened cooperation between Russia and China in the Arctic, including joint exercises; stresses that it is essential to counterbalance Russia and China’s growing influence and military presence in the region; underlines the importance of overall stability and peace in the Arctic in accordance with the principles of international law; calls for concrete and effective action by the EU and its Member States using all available means and maximum strategic creativity to stop the shadow fleet, enhance Arctic and maritime domain awareness through enhanced surveillance, intelligence sharing and satellite monitoring, and protect critical infrastructure; stresses the need for the EU to ensure the effective monitoring of its external maritime borders to prevent illegal activities; is concerned by non-EU countries’ interference in Greenland, notably inflammatory narratives and the conduct of hybrid actions on Greenland’s territory, as well as the US Government’s formulation of explicit threats against Greenland’s sovereignty;

20. Recalls the EU’s commitment to its ‘One China’ policy as one of the principles of EU-China relations; is concerned by China’s accelerated militarisation and its assertive posture towards its neighbours; notes with growing concern the continued pressure on freedom of navigation and critical infrastructure, with attempts to unilaterally change the status quo in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait; underlines that such actions undermine freedom of navigation and that China’s refusal to exclude the use of military coercion to advance its irredentist ambitions towards Taiwan poses a serious threat to regional stability; expresses deep concern about China’s increasingly aggressive actions in the South China Sea and the Indo-Pacific region, as well as the use of economic coercion, hybrid warfare tactics and dangerous manoeuvres against its neighbours; emphasises that any military escalation in the Taiwan Strait would have serious consequences for Europe’s security and supply chains; highlights the importance of preserving stability in the South China Sea in the light of the strategic need for security and defence cooperation with certain countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); commends the recent freedom of navigation operations carried out by the United States, the UK, France and Germany in the Taiwan Strait, which demonstrate strong international commitment to upholding international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and to ensuring freedom of navigation;

21. Stresses the strategic significance of the Indo-Pacific region within the EU’s defence framework, recognising the need to address growing security concerns linked to China’s regional activities and their broader implications for global stability; considers it important to shift China’s strategic calculus regarding support for Russia through sanctions, including measures against Chinese banks involved in circumventing EU sanctions, and to strengthen the EU’s presence and partnerships in this region;

22. Expresses deep concern about the intensified military-technical cooperation between Russia and China, which poses a growing threat to stability in the Indo-Pacific and beyond, and risks undermining global peace, the rules-based international order and European security interests; notes with concern the dependency of the EU and its Member States on imports of rare earth elements and other critical raw materials from third countries, in particular China, which constitutes a growing security risk;

 

23. Emphasises that deepening cooperation between the EU and India in the areas of security and defence is in the mutual interest of both sides, but also requires that India take a clear stance in view of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; calls on India to take effective action to prevent the circumvention of EU sanctions, in particular through controls on the re-export of sanctioned goods, greater transparency on energy imports and the suspension of military cooperation with Russia;

24. Notes the growing importance of dual-use space-based activities for European strategic resilience and autonomy and the rising number of operators in space; stresses that space capabilities, in particular those with a dual use, are essential for security and defence, and for ensuring autonomous decision-making, protecting critical infrastructure and enabling effective defence operations in all theatres of operation; stresses that European space autonomy requires, above all, the effective protection of orbital assets and less dependence on foreign companies and service providers; calls for the accelerated establishment of a regular Earth observation service, a reinforced European navigation and positioning system, a European secure communication solution by 2028 and an early warning system against ballistic missiles; stresses the need for an improved regulatory and governance framework for space-based activities in general and for the military use of space and anti-satellite weapons in particular; calls for closer coordination between the Member States, the Commission, the European Space Agency and the EDA, also in support of CSDP missions and operations;

25. Underlines that space-based assets are increasingly critical enablers for military purposes as well as CSDP missions and operations, including secure communications, positioning, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and command support; underlines that the EU successfully operates the Copernicus, Galileo and EGNOS programmes, which provide dual-use services for the EU and its Member States; considers that this sets a precedent for the development of further European strategic enablers that fall outside the financial and technical ability of individual Member States, or where there is overriding European public interest in European solutions; calls for closer coordination between the Member States, the Commission, the European Space Agency and the EDA to prevent duplication of efforts, ensure interoperability and maximise industrial synergies across civil, commercial and defence applications; welcomes the planned IRIS2 secure satellite internet constellation and recommends that Taiwan and Ukraine be granted future access;

26. Notes the dichotomy between the very high levels of public support for a genuine European Defence Union and the varying support among the Member States for the implementation of the CSDP, despite the unprecedented threats and changing geopolitical circumstances;

27. Stresses the EU’s obligation and strategic long-term global interest in maintaining the rules and values-based international order, ensuring respect for international law and upholding multilateralism; notes that traditional peacebuilding, peace negotiation expertise, transitional justice and confidence-building measures remain critically important, despite current trends; calls for the EU to assume a leading role in shaping peace negotiations and peaceful transitions in the major conflicts affecting Europe and its immediate neighbourhood; underlines that the EU should ensure its relevance in this regard by exploiting the full potential of CSDP instruments in order to ensure that peace negotiations benefit from its expertise in securing sustainable and fair peace; urges the EU and its Member States to further deepen existing partnerships and seek new partnerships with countries that share the same belief in multilateralism and a rules-based international order; insists on the importance of a strong and close partnership with the UK on security and defence with specific conditions, and welcomes the EU-UK Security and Defence Partnership;

28. Regrets the weakening of non-proliferation and arms control regimes; calls for the redoubling of efforts to reverse this trend and demands that the EU play a much stronger role, in particular in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; points out that, while a nuclear deterrent is of crucial importance in protecting Europe as a continent, the UK and France are the only European countries that possess nuclear weapons; reaffirms its full support for the EU and its Member States’ commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime; stresses the need for an effective EU-level armaments policy to be developed and for greater transparency and convergence at national and EU level on arms exports, especially during a period of increased defence spending and EDTIB reinforcement; calls on the Member States to respect the EU Common Position on Arms Exports and acknowledges their competences in their defence acquisition policies; calls on the Member States to fully comply with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP[7] and to strictly implement Criterion Four on regional stability and halt arms export licensing if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient might use the arms aggressively against another country in general and the Member States in particular;

29. Expresses its dismay at the current ambiguity in the EU-US defence and security relationship; acknowledges NATO’s crucial role for Europe’s collective defence, but warns of the risks posed by the growing unpredictability, short-sighted isolationism and self-centredness in US foreign policy and its shifting relations with Russia and focus on Asia, which could be accompanied by a stark decrease in military posture and the rapid withdrawal of troops from Europe and be perceived as undermining its security commitments to Europe; calls, against this backdrop, for the development of contingency plans in case of rapid US troop withdrawal to ensure European deterrence and capacity for autonomous action against aggression;

30. Underlines that the US remains the EU’s most important strategic ally and is essential to NATO’s collective defence and European security, resilience and deterrence; highlights that US engagement and close EU-US cooperation should therefore be fostered; underlines the need for the EU and its Member States to increase defence spending in a coordinated manner and for the Member States to strengthen their own defence capabilities and readiness, with the aim of ensuring strategic autonomy and developing credible deterrence independent of the United States and within the framework of a renewed and balanced transatlantic partnership; underlines that a stronger and more capable EU in the field of security and defence would reinforce European interests, contribute to a stronger transatlantic partnership with the United States and achieve shared security objectives;

Addressing the deterrence gap and capability issues

31. Underlines that the EU has a deterrence gap; considers that the critical issues constituting this EU deterrence gap lie in: autonomy, military doctrine, political unity, regular common threat assessment, ISR, capability gaps, unified command and control (C2), industrial capacity and innovation, and interoperability; stresses – given the rapid deterioration of the geopolitical context – the need to replenish depleted stocks, close critical capability gaps and ensure the interoperability of armed forces, scale up industrial defence production, create a true European single market for defence products and services, improve interoperability by reducing the overlapping weapons systems in use, promote standardisation in line with NATO standards, and drastically ramp up investment in innovation; considers it critical to develop, in line with the recommendations of the white paper of 19 March 2025, air and missile defence, artillery systems, ammunition and missiles, drone and counter-drone systems, military mobility, artificial intelligence, quantum, cyberwarfare and electronic warfare, strategic enablers and critical infrastructure protection; calls for joint efforts by the EU and its Member States to address these gaps also through a set of EDPCIs; welcomes the establishment of the EDPCIs as a key instrument to strengthen cooperation, interoperability and industrial efficiency by fostering the joint development, production and procurement of key military capabilities, which are critical for the EU’s security and defence interests; calls, furthermore, on the industry to scale up its production and innovation as fast as possible in cooperation with, and supported by, the EU and its Member States;

32. Recognises the significant efforts to advance European defence through proposals for regulations and initiatives such as EDIP, the ReArm Europe Agenda, SAFE, the defence mini-omnibus, the defence omnibus, as well as the Military Mobility package, BraveTech EU and the Defence Readiness 2030 Roadmap; urges the swift completion and implementation of the Defence Readiness Omnibus; welcomes the proposals offering Member States greater budgetary flexibility, in particular the EUR 150 billion loan facility under the SAFE instrument; considers, however, that these measures are insufficient and that massive additional budgetary investment will be necessary; welcomes the fact that the SAFE loans have been fully subscribed, while reiterating its regret over the use of Article 122 TFEU, especially as Parliament has proven its ability to act swiftly when required; welcomes the announced intention for Member States to increase joint procurement by 40 % by the end of 2027 and to increase procurement with European preference by 55 % by the end of 2028 and by 60 % by the end of 2030; regrets the lack of incremental increases in joint procurement and notes that Member States have, to date, failed to implement joint procurement targets set in 2007; welcomes the adoption of EDIP Regulation (EU) XXX/2025, the first comprehensive industrial programme at EU level, which incentivises cooperation among Member States through the creation of the Structure for European Armament Programme (SEAP), the EU Military Sales Mechanism, and the EDPCIs; recalls the need for EU defence industrial funding to closely align with CSDP capability needs; calls for the creation of a dedicated EDIP-European Defence Fund (EDF) coordination mechanism to prioritise projects that enhance interoperability and operational resilience, while promoting innovation, supply-chain security and European industrial sovereignty;

33. Acknowledges the increasingly prominent role of drones in modern warfare and underscores the urgent need to counter, in particular, the evolving military and hybrid drone threats; underlines the need to strengthen drone and counter-drone systems to protect all European flanks, from east to west and from north to south; calls for enhanced coordination, unity and solidarity among the Member States, relevant EU institutions and NATO on monitoring, intercepting and neutralising hostile drones, as well as developing and deploying an integrated air and missile defence system to ensure collective protection against drone and ballistic missile threats; encourages the Commission, the EDA and the Member States to jointly prioritise the development of advanced electronic warfare systems and directed-energy weapon systems aimed at countering potential hybrid threats and drone attacks targeting the EU; calls for a clear strategy to facilitate the most effective and cost-efficient pathways towards those capabilities; stresses the need for joint training in and integration of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities into conventional air defence forces, ensuring interoperability with NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defence; urges the Member States and the Commission to urgently work on such projects, such as the Drone Coalition, in close and mutually beneficial cooperation with Ukraine; stresses the need to increase cooperation in the drone domain in terms of training facilities, certification procedures, assembly lines, battlefield coordination, real-time targeting, and resilient C2; calls for the avoidance of disproportionate dependence on non-EU countries, in particular China, for the production of drone systems; recognises the challenge posed by the high cost of intercepting drones and calls for joint programmes to promote the development of cost-effective counter-UAV capabilities; highlights the fact that directed-energy weapons, which include high-energy lasers and high-power microwave systems, would allow the countering of airborne threats such as drones, rockets or loitering munitions at a fraction of the cost of the current missile-based interceptors; stresses the need to better equip and authorise police forces and civil authorities with the means to detect and defend against drones, in close cooperation with armed forces; calls for concrete measures to enhance civil preparedness and whole-of-society approaches in response to hybrid attacks using drones;

34. Highlights the need to accelerate efforts aimed at protecting the entire eastern flank, from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea; stresses the urgent need for enhanced maritime surveillance in the Baltic Sea, North Sea and Black Sea regions; considers that the new operational dimension of hybrid warfare requires the integration of maritime security and counter-UAV strategies;

35. Calls on the Member States to make full use of the SEAPs under the EDIP Regulation to improve the integration and management of defence capabilities; calls on the Commission and the (VP/HR to make better use of PESCO projects and propose new ways for the EU and its Member States to acquire joint assets to support military use, such as strategic enablers, including in space, to be deployed by Member States on the understanding that ‘military or defence implications’(Article 41 TEU) arise out of the use of assets for military purposes, not their mere ownership or maintenance; welcomes the operationalisation of the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity in 2025 as a significant step forward in strengthening the EU’s ability to respond autonomously to external conflicts and security crises; proposes that the Rapid Deployment Capacity become a multinational force which could, in line with long-standing Helsinki headline goals, be expanded into a larger force of over 60 000 to meet part of the NATO Force Model target;

36. Welcomes the Eastern Flank Watch and the European Drone Defence Initiative as flagship projects essential for regions at highest risk of conventional warfare and hybrid attacks; notes that frontline Member States are advancing comprehensive ‘Eastern Shield’ programmes which are complementary to these flagship projects; welcomes the Commission proposal that Member States’ capability coalitions may use available tools such as EDIP, PESCO and EDPCIs, with clearly identified, tangible deliverables to trigger targeted EU support for flagship projects;

37. Calls for the EU and NATO to streamline, as appropriate, their capability development and planning processes, and C2 capacities, while ensuring their consistency and efficiency; urges the EU to align with NATO’s standards to bolster interoperability and NATO-EU complementarity to avoid the duplication of efforts; calls for enhanced joint planning and exercises;

38. Stresses that the absence of fully-fledged and robust European C2 capabilities remains one of the most critical gaps in the CSDP as well as the operationalisation of Article 42(7) TEU; underlines that credible EU action requires a permanent C2 headquarters capable of planning, commanding and conducting missions and operations at the strategic, operational and tactical levels; reiterates its calls for progress towards a European command-and-control structure by enabling the EU Military Staff, if needed, to plan and coordinate autonomous European military operations with the armed forces of Member States; underscores that this strengthens the European pillar of NATO; stresses the need to avoid unnecessary duplication with the structures and processes of NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe; underlines that such fully-fledged C2 headquarters requires reinforced staffing, secure infrastructure and an integrated civilian-military interface; emphasises the need for interoperable, secure and sovereign C2 systems resilient to spoofing, supported by EU-developed software, data networks and communication standards; urges the Member States, the VP/HR, the Commission and the EDA to initiate, within the framework of PESCO, a project for a C2 capability as a prerequisite for credible autonomous EU action;

39. Stresses the urgent need for decisive actions to strengthen the EDTIB; calls for enhancing cooperation and coordination among Member States’ defence industries; calls for the completion of a genuine single market for defence, noting the persistent fragmentation of both the demand and the supply side; is concerned that EU Member States’ national procurement practices continue to give preference to national industries; recalls that fragmentation undermines competitiveness, resulting in duplication and diminished interoperability; calls for the removal of unnecessary political, economic and regulatory barriers and practices in Member States that undermine the efficiency and competitiveness of the single market for defence, including through the frequent use of the national security interest exemption provided in Article 346 TFEU; calls on the Commission to issue a recommendation for an interpretation of Article 346 TFEU in order to facilitate a harmonised and uniform approach throughout the EU, addressing the need to strictly protect the essential security interests of the Member States and emphasising that the exemptions provided in Article 346 TFEU are to be used exceptionally; considers that the Commission should be enabled to assess the overall implementation of Article 346 TFEU to remedy any potential structural misuse; calls, as a prerequisite for the creation of a real internal market for defence, for the swift implementation of Commission proposals to further harmonise and streamline the rules for cross-border contracting and intra-EU transfers of defence products to facilitate cooperation, common standards on certification and market access across the EU, including for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and innovative operators, and the circulation of defence products within the EU;

40. In order to strengthen intra-European industrial cooperation and achieve strategic autonomy, welcomes initiatives to strengthen the European preference in defence procurement, as defined in the EDIP Regulation, and encourages the Member States to prioritise European companies in their procurement while at the same time preserving our security cooperation with like-minded partners, without jeopardising the immediate replenishment of stocks and arsenals; underscores that EU public funds should primarily support the EDTIB; calls for coordinated efforts to ramp up production capacity, enhance interoperability and accelerate technological innovation while ensuring fair opportunities for companies from all Member States; notes that the ReArm Europe plan lacks a strong European preference clause; urges the Commission to both deepen and widen its omnibus approach towards the sector to go beyond a topical evaluation towards a structural reform of the regulatory framework; welcomes efforts to speed-up EDF decision-making processes, particularly in relation to disruptive technologies; encourages further coherence and synergies between EDF funding and PESCO projects; encourages EDF actions to further support the integration of the Ukrainian defence industry into the EDTIB;

41. Calls for appropriate measures to be taken to facilitate and incentivise the EDTIB, including through public-private cooperation models, mobilising private investment and savings, and the more active involvement of the European Investment Bank (EIB); calls for the EU and the Member States to urgently create a durable, robust and predictable funding mechanism, including by exploring the possibility of establishing a multilateral financing instrument or an EU defence, security and resilience fund, which can be used to support the expansion of the production-capacity stabilisation of supply chains and the technological independence of critical sectors, including through private investment; calls for the optimisation and better coordination of national and EU funding instruments to ensure joint capability development and the procurement of assets to ensure our collective defence; welcomes the fact that the EIB has significantly increased its investments in European security and defence, having allocated 3.5 % of its total financing to these projects in 2025; stresses, however, that the EUR 175 million budget of the Defence Equity Facility for the period 2024-2027 is clearly insufficient for meeting the financing requirements of the EDTIB and its value chain; calls, therefore, on the EIB to substantially increase the budget to better address the equity needs of the sector and support strategic European defence capabilities;

42. Stresses the importance of stimulating innovation and research, including the participation of universities and technology centres in defence projects; supports the creation of a European Defence Innovation Network, under the auspices of the EDA, to connect research institutions, SMEs, innovative operators, dual-use providers and military end-users across the Member States; supports the development of regional innovation hubs and testing facilities in less industrialised or peripheral Member States to ensure that the defence ramp-up benefits the EU as a whole; calls for the EU and its Member States to urgently devise mechanisms to use windfall profits and clawback funds, especially during the current periods of ramp-up, to address supply shortages and demand peaks, to drive EU-level defence and dual-use innovation and competitiveness, including through the establishment of a ‘European DARPA’ (akin to the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) with sufficient funding;

43. Underlines that the participation of SMEs across all Member States should be facilitated and promoted, and their fair and equitable access to EU-funded projects ensured; encourages sustained investment and support for SMEs; calls for simplified access to EU funding and for coordination between defence and civilian research programmes; stresses that all EU defence industry initiatives and financial instruments must ensure a level playing field for all defence industry actors across the EU, and promote cooperation between bigger and smaller companies from all 27 Member States;

44. Urges the EU, in coordination with NATO, to support the strengthening of Ukraine’s defence capabilities; underlines that this includes developing a strengthened industrial partnership enabling transfers of technology and know-how, and the integration of the Ukrainian defence technological and industrial base into the EDTIB, while supporting EDTIB activities in Ukraine, including through the SAFE fund; in that respect, urges the Member States and their defence industries to make additional investments, set up joint ventures and develop partnerships with Ukraine for the joint development of defence products in the EU, particularly in the field of drone and counter-drone technology; welcomes the Commission’s initiatives in this regard; urges Member States’ armed forces and the EDTIB to learn critical lessons from Ukraine’s capability development and battlefield innovations, especially as regards unmanned and autonomous systems, and the techniques, tactics and procedures used in combat; commends the Danish model of support for Ukraine, and calls for greater incentives for closer cooperation between and integration of the EDTIB and Ukraine’s defence industrial base; highlights the benefit of allowing Ukraine’s defence industrial base to produce outside of Ukraine;

45. Highlights the need to develop proper civil protection infrastructure and emergency planning; urges to strengthen crisis-resilient and civil defence infrastructure; underlines that defence and security policies must be based on social cohesion and democratic mechanisms; calls for the integration of social dialogue, regional development and workforce upskilling into the Union’s defence planning; stresses that dual-use investments should contribute to civilian resilience and job creation in vulnerable regions, therefore contributing to a ‘whole-of-society’ approach to crisis preparedness;

46. Stresses the strategic importance of military mobility as a cornerstone of European strategic autonomy and EU-NATO cooperation; urges the extension of the EU military mobility corridors to the eastern flank, including to Ukraine, by providing necessary funding, including from the Connecting Europe Facility, for dual-use infrastructure, and for these corridors to be equipped with the necessary capabilities, such as transport equipment, logistics hubs, fuel supply chains and secure digital systems; reiterates the importance of swift movement of equipment or troops from the west and of drawing lessons from the experience of the Ukrainian armed forces; calls for the mainstreaming of counter-mobility in the design of military corridors;

47. Considers it critical to rapidly address financial, regulatory and physical barriers to military mobility, with a focus on the four priority military mobility corridors, as well the streamlining of administrative procedures; underlines that military corridors are also crucial for civilian evacuation and the supply of humanitarian aid; urges concrete preparedness on military mobility by moving towards a comprehensive approach to ‘military logistics’, including security of critical infrastructure, transport hubs, maintenance, storage, refuelling and repair; emphasises the strategic importance of developing existing networks and investing in new dual-use corridors, via enhanced coordination between the EU and NATO, to ensure interoperability and cost-effectiveness; calls for EU support for projects such as the NATO fuel pipeline to Poland, Rail Baltica and the Black Sea Highway; underlines the growing strategic importance of the Atlantic and Mediterranean maritime corridors for the EU’s security and supply-chain resilience;

 

48. Underlines that forward-looking defence innovation is critical for tactical purposes, including the development of clean technology with defence applications, such as advanced materials, green energy, fuels and batteries;

Financing defence

49. Welcomes the recent substantial defence expenditure increases; notes the focus on national defence spending, including in the Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030, which leaves critical issues around fragmentation, potential budgetary and operational synergies, and interoperability unresolved; notes that making joint procurement the rule of the EDTIB could save billions of euro in defence spending; stresses the need to ensure that EU funds are channelled into collaborative projects, with clear European added value, that reduce our dependencies on non-EU countries; is of the view that, without structural European reform and collaboration, increased national spending may lead to continued duplication of efforts and inefficiencies; emphasises that the development of an internal market for defence also requires a lasting and coordinated financial framework that enables long-term investment planning; calls for the pooling of parts of national defence budgets at EU level, in order to generate economies of scale and invest in capabilities used for the collective defence of the EU; stresses that defence investment must be supported by coordinated multiannual planning between the EU and the Member States, in line with the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence and NATO Capability Development Plan documents; calls on the Commission to further explore targeted EU grant funding options to complement funding from SAFE loans, EU programmes and national budgets;

50. Calls for the new multiannual financial framework (MFF) to provide sufficient and flexible funding to address both the ‘security’ and ‘defence’ aspects comprehensively, thereby strengthening the EU’s capacity to safeguard its citizens and to ensure their protection both within its borders and beyond, and also to promote stability in its neighbourhood; welcomes the Commission’s proposals to simplify, facilitate and accelerate defence procurement; calls on the Commission to consolidate and clarify the defence envelope provided for in the draft 2028-2034 MFF, exploring all options to support the Member States’ defence investments; recalls the specific nature of the defence sector and considers that the future European Competitiveness Fund, provided for in the Commission’s draft MFF, should retain all the criteria and modalities of the European defence industry financing instruments, in particular the criteria relating to the EDF and EDIP, while welcoming the Commission and the EIB’s initiative to establish the Defence Equity Facility with a budget of EUR 175 million; calls on the EIB to substantially increase this budget to better support strategic European defence capabilities;

51. Calls for a European financial architecture for defence based on European solidarity, cohesion, competitiveness and efficiency; urges the Commission and the Member States to position the 2028-2034 MFF so as to enable a genuine European Defence Union, including the necessary support and incentives for the EDTIB, and the delivery of the Defence Readiness 2030 commitments;

52. Underlines that reinforcing the EDTIB and Europe’s defence capabilities are alone insufficient for strengthening European defence and deterrence; stresses that Europe’s fundamental challenges to effective deterrence lie in political unity and posture, military doctrine, and the ability to exercise effective C2 outside of NATO structures when necessary; underlines that strengthening our capabilities, without forcefully reacting to Russia’s tests of EU military preparedness, undermines our deterrence; stresses, in this regard, the need to revise the EU’s Strategic Compass with a comprehensive approach that strengthens civil and military preparedness;

53. Underlines the need to integrate the concept of civil-military preparedness into European defence policy, including through joint exercises, strategic education and the strengthening of civilian crisis-response capabilities; emphasises, furthermore, that European defence readiness must be embedded in a comprehensive approach to societal resilience, including the protection of critical infrastructure, the establishment of robust cybersecurity and counter-hybrid capacities, tools to proactively identify, deter and counter disinformation campaigns and propaganda narratives, the safeguarding of our democratic institutions and the security of critical supply chains, in particular those related to rare earth minerals and other strategic resources; calls for annual whole-of-society defence exercises in every Member State, coordinated at EU level; stresses the need for EU co-funding of multi-country scenarios and an annual scoreboard of lessons learned, in line with best-practice recommendations on whole-of-society preparedness; stresses the need to pay adequate attention and grant sufficient funding to the development of those dual-use technologies that are instrumental to guaranteeing EU security and defence; stresses that dual-use investments should contribute to civilian resilience and job creation in vulnerable regions, thereby contributing to a ‘whole-of-society’ approach to crisis preparedness;

54. Recalls that the EU’s outermost regions are essential to the EU’s global security posture; stresses that their geographic position provides critical reach for maritime awareness, crisis management and the protection of sea lines of communication;

55. Urges the EU to invest significantly in its intelligence and information security, including through improved vetting procedures, better implementation of security classification schemes, and secure systems for sharing and accessing intelligence; urges the Member States to intensify intelligence-sharing with the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre and the EU Military Staff Intelligence Directorate; calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to explore vesting EU intelligence bodies with powers to gather, collect, process and disseminate open source intelligence products to the Member States and intelligence agencies; calls on the VP/HR to explore the creation of a fusion centre or data clearing house, in close cooperation with the Member States; underscores the need for EU institutions to make greater use of intelligence and commends the efforts of the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre to reach out to key decision-makers, in this regard;

Reinforcing CSDP missions and operations

56. Calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to reinforce civilian and military CSDP missions and operations with robust, flexible, scalable and modular mandates, adapted to security contexts and host country needs; stresses the need for adequate and efficient resources and funding, as well as streamlined support structures and reinforced political-strategic planning; calls for the strengthening of staffing and the better allocation of seconded staff; urges the standardisation of the duration of personnel deployments to CSDP missions; encourages the Member States to each deploy personnel to CSDP missions in Eastern Partnership countries, to ensure that all Member States are represented in missions throughout the region; underlines the need to strengthen the evaluation of the results and impact of CSDP missions and operations, ensuring transparency in their execution and coordination with NATO, the UN and regional organisations; urges the Member States to match their ambitions by fulfilling their pledges and commitments made in Council decisions; notes persistent obstacles, including resource gaps, vacancies, high turnover, national caveats, risk aversion, the need to improve poor coordination with EU programmes and partners, and weak strategic communication; calls for the strategic communication of CSDP missions and operations around the world, especially in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood and candidate countries, such as BiH and Ukraine; calls for enhancing the visibility and strategic communication of the benefits, presence and role of the CSDP missions and operations; underlines that the CSDP missions and operations offer the most tangible external projection of the EU’s force, and as such are a critical component of the EU’s strategic tools;

57. Reiterates its call for support for CSDP missions and operations, with mandates to enhance resilience to hybrid warfare, including cyberthreats and FIMI, in particular in the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership countries; highlights the importance of strengthening cooperation with NATO, its Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence and the European cybersecurity network to combat disinformation and cyberattacks; strongly encourages the use of similar rapid-response operational capabilities for other cross-cutting issues, as appropriate; welcomes the Commission’s initiative to establish the European Democracy Shield (EUDS); considers that the experience and expertise required to counter FIMI in like-minded countries, in particular candidate and accession countries, can be synergetic with the EUDS; calls for greater coherence among the existing and upcoming EU regulations and efforts aimed at countering FIMI, including the EUDS, and for clear collaboration between all these components to be ensured; highlights the need for rapid, robust and collective responses to FIMI operations, alongside efforts to raise the costs for the perpetrators of these actions; encourages the closest possible cooperation, and rapid feedback and experience exchange, between the EUDS, CSDP missions and operations, as well as the intelligence and decision-making structures of Member States and candidate countries on their experience countering FIMI; stresses that the Russian Orthodox Church has been increasingly instrumentalised by the Russian Government as part of its FIMI efforts to undermine European democracies, social cohesion, pro-European orientations and religious tolerance; calls for the structured monitoring across all EU delegations, CSDP missions and operations, and EU Special Representatives, of Russian malign influence, including via the Russian Orthodox Church;

58. Commends the achievements of EUMAM Ukraine in bolstering the capacity of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to defend Ukraine, and of the EU Advisory Mission Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) in implementing, on the ground, under difficult conditions, its mandate to foster an efficient, resilient and accountable civilian security sector; considers EUMAM Ukraine to be the most significant CSDP mission currently ongoing; highlights that addressing EUMAM Ukraine’s urgent need for additional instructors, equipment, ammunition and dedicated training facilities to support its operational modules must be prioritised in CSDP mission planning and resourcing; welcomes the ongoing strategic review of EUAM Ukraine and underscores that countering hybrid threats, ensuring cybersecurity, and the integration of veterans are key challenges where the CSDP mission could provide critical assistance; underlines that EUAM Ukraine’s mandate should continuously evolve to meet Ukraine’s needs, including in the aftermath of Russia’s war of aggression; calls for the transformation of EUMAM Ukraine into a long-term EU military training and advisory mission, with a broadened mandate to include air defence operations, combined-arms tactics, logistics and officer leadership training, and with the aim of ensuring interoperability between EU and Ukrainian forces, in preparation for Ukraine’s future EU membership;

59. Recalls the importance, the achievements and the renewal of the mandate, until May 2027, of the EU Partnership Mission in the Republic of Moldova (EUPM Moldova), highlighting its effective contribution to strengthening the Republic of Moldova’s security and enhancing its resilience towards and ability to counter hybrid threats, including cybersecurity threats and FIMI, in the context of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; further recognises that EUPM Moldova has deepened EU-Republic of Moldova cooperation, enhanced crisis management capabilities and contributed to the overall stability of the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood; to this end, reiterates its calls on the European External Action Service to assess the adequacy of this partnership mission’s means, methods and resources, in relation to the mission’s objectives, especially as regards staff expertise for the needs of the mission, and to adapt them in the light of the evaluation’s conclusions; calls for continued and enhanced support to the Republic of Moldova through the EPF;

60. Welcomes the role of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) and the EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA) in building confidence and reducing the levels of risk for the local population; urges the EU to remain actively engaged, in order to ensure that Russia fulfils its obligations under the EU-mediated ceasefire agreement of 2008 which includes, among others, full and unimpeded access of EU monitors to Georgia’s territories of the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia and Abkhazia; supports the extension of the EUMM’s mandate and the reinforcement of its capacities so that it can effectively monitor and implement the ceasefire agreement; applauds the impartial observation role played by EUMA at Armenia’s border with Azerbaijan, contributing to the stabilisation of the situation; strongly urges the Azerbaijani authorities to engage in more constructive cooperation with relevant CSDP missions and operations; supports the recent renewal of the EUMA’s mandate until 2027, as Armenia is currently at a critical juncture; calls for further civilian CSDP involvement in the region to reinforce peacebuilding initiatives, including by focusing on transitional justice, in particular following the August 2025 US-brokered Agreement on Establishment of Peace and Inter-State Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan; calls for enhanced assistance for Armenia in the fight against increasingly aggressive Russian malign interference, ahead of Armenia’s 2026 national elections;

61. Recommends that the out-of-country reserve forces of the EUFOR Operation Althea be fully manned, sustained and maintained at all times, given their importance for the operation’s deterrent and reassurance effect in BiH; highlights, in the light of the prolonged attacks on BiH’s constitutional order and the potential security implications, that EUFOR’s role includes ensuring that the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of BiH are upheld, and that local stakeholders act consistently with these fundamental principles; strongly supports an active deterrent role for EUFOR and welcomes the extension of its executive mandate by the UN Security Council, reflecting the united commitment across the political spectrum in BiH to uphold peace and security, in cooperation with the EU as well as NATO contingency planning;

62. Acknowledges the renewal of the mandate of the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) until June 2027, reaffirming the EU’s long-term commitment to supporting the rule of law, justice and institutional resilience in Kosovo and to strengthening security and stability in the region; notes EULEX Kosovo’s contribution to strengthening judicial independence, enhancing law enforcement capacities, and promoting institutional accountability and good governance while mentoring, monitoring and advising Kosovo’s institutions; calls for a thorough assessment of EULEX Kosovo’s achievements and the lessons learned; recalls that the experiences and lessons learned from all missions and operations add substantial value to all current and future CSDP missions and operations;

63. Stresses the importance of the EUPOL COPPS and the EUBAM Rafah following the recent ceasefire and in the context of the implementation of the 20-point peace plan, as endorsed by the UN Security Council and leading towards the two-state solution; stresses, in particular, the importance of the reactivation of EUBAM Rafah, allowing it to act as a neutral third party at the Rafah crossing point, in coordination with the PA as well as the Israeli and Egyptian authorities; calls for the EU and its Member States to urgently adapt staffing to EUBAM Rafah’s growing needs; considers that EUPOL COPPS can play a significant role in supporting the necessary political transition in Gaza through the deployment of law enforcement personnel to promote stability, the rule of law, the principle of peaceful coexistence and the protection of fundamental human rights for populations in both Gaza and the West Bank; considers that they should assume a broader operational role in supporting the PA’s state-building and capacity-building efforts; calls on Israel and the PA to maintain full cooperation with both missions; encourages Israel and the PA to continue to cooperate fully, to ensure the demilitarisation of Hamas and the maintenance of a lasting peace;

64. Notes the renewal of the mandate, until March 2027, of Operation EUNAVFOR MED IRINI, recognising its vital contribution to enforcing the UN arms embargo on Libya and promoting peace and stability in the south-central Mediterranean; further commends the operation’s success in monitoring and preventing illicit arms and oil trafficking, contributing to the disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks, enhancing maritime security, and supporting the implementation of international law; requests a review of the results achieved by EUNAVFOR MED IRINI;

65. Notes with concern that the Sahel region has become a ‘blind spot’ in the CSDP, with missions reduced or wound down, limited impact on stabilisation and a reduction in the EU’s security footprint in that important African region; expresses profound concern about the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation across the Sahel region, in particular Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso; underlines that the Sahel remains a hotbed for jihadist activities, posing significant spillover risks to neighbouring regions and threatening European security, making sustained and coherent EU engagement in the region strategically essential; recalls that the mandates of the EU Training Mission in Mali, the EU Military Partnership Mission in Niger and of the ground mission of personnel from the EU civilian capacity-building mission in Sahel Niger ended in 2024; regrets that these missions have not been able to achieve their goal of stabilising the region and its fragile democracies, or of ensuring peace in the region, due to the rejection of democratic governments by national military juntas which seized power following a succession of coups in their presence; notes, moreover, that the reliance by military juntas in the Sahel on Russian paramilitary militias and political support has undermined regional security and stability and has, in practice, led to terrorist groups regaining ground;

66. Calls for an evidence-based, in-depth assessment of the EU’s mandates, roles and policies and for a profoundly revised, integrated CSDP strategy for the Sahel region; underlines the role of the EU Capacity Building Mission in Somalia in reinforcing Somali police, maritime security and rule-of-law capacities; urges, with a focus on mutually beneficial CSDP missions, a renewed EU-Africa partnership, based on security, development and governance; calls for the strengthening of cooperation with African regional organisations, in the light of our common security challenges; stresses the importance of coordinating CSDP actions with other international partners that share the same objectives;

67. Stresses the positive contribution of the EU Military Assistance Mission in Mozambique in strengthening the operational capacities of the Mozambican armed forces to address the jihadist insurgency in Cabo Delgado, carried out by the local branch of Daesh; calls for the integration of human rights and governance safeguards to ensure lasting stabilisation and prevent regional spillover;

68. Emphasises the major role played by Operation EUNAVFOR ASPIDES since February 2024 in preventing further Houthi attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea, helping to protect merchant ships from attacks, accompanying them and enhancing the security of the maritime situation in the region; calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to consider merging this with Operation EUNAVFOR ATALANTA, as originally envisaged, for the improved efficiency of both operations, and to ensure the adequate capabilities of Operation ASPIDES;

69. Calls for the VP/HR to put forward proposals to develop European defence education, joint operational training and exercises, and leadership programmes for the armed forces and political leadership, complementary to national and NATO equivalents, learning from CSDP missions and operations, in order to strengthen the CSDP and support the precise operationalisation and implementation of Article 42(7) TEU; calls for EU-funded programmes to train civilian and military leaders in hybrid threat response, strategic planning and EU-NATO coordination; recalls the importance of organising joint training and exercises between European armed forces, thereby promoting interoperability, with a view to maximising mission preparedness and addressing a broad range of threats, both conventional and non-conventional; reiterates, in that respect, its support for the European Initiative for the Exchange of Military Young Officers (Military Erasmus), operated by the European Security and Defence College, which aims to enable the national military education and training institutions to explore possibilities for the quantitative and qualitative exchange of knowledge and know-how, as well as developing a common security and defence culture, and therefore render the armed forces more interoperable;

70. Encourages the Member States to make greater and more strategic use of the EPF for the purpose of training and equipping the security and defence services of Eastern Partner countries; further encourages the Member States to ensure that all equipment support provided via the EPF is fully aligned with the specific needs of the recipient countries, and is coordinated with NATO as necessary, in order to ensure complementarity and avoid the unnecessary duplication of efforts; underlines that one of the key priorities of the CSDP in relation to the Eastern Partner countries must be the firm support for their sovereignty and territorial integrity within internationally recognised borders;

71. Recalls that mainstreaming and operationalising gender perspectives in external relations and implementing the ‘Women, Peace and Security’ agenda in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions are long-standing priorities for the EU; recalls, in this regard, the importance of strengthening women’s participation in conflict prevention and resolution, peace negotiations, peacebuilding and peacekeeping, humanitarian action and post-conflict reconstruction; stresses that the integration of a gender perspective into all external and internal CSDP activities helps to improve the CSDP’s operational effectiveness, and is a driver of the EU’s credibility as a proponent of gender equality worldwide; calls for measures to ensure gender equality and the full and meaningful participation of women in CSDP missions and operations;

72. Acknowledges the valuable contribution of religious actors, faith communities, intercultural and interfaith dialogue, and the preservation of cultural heritage in conflict resolution, peacebuilding, reconciliation and fostering community cohesion and calls for appropriate systemic attention to these aspects in CSDP missions and operations;

Engaging in partnerships including cooperation with NATO

73. Welcomes the signing of EU security and defence partnerships (SDPs) with eight countries so far; calls for a swift and comprehensive implementation of the SDP provisions; calls for further security and defence cooperation with like-minded partners, and for exploring ways of deepening engagement with the most constructive among them, including but not limited to Canada, Japan, Norway, South Korea, the United Kingdom and Ukraine; stresses that, in order for an SDP to be effective, it must be complemented by economic diplomacy that strengthens resilience and reduces dependencies; calls for targeted cooperation with like-minded partners, including in Latin America and Africa, to diversify supply chains and ensure access to critical raw materials for the EDTIB;

74. Stresses that NATO remains a crucial component of collective transatlantic territorial defence, and that the EU and NATO play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in enhancing international security; underlines the need for further progress in EU-NATO cooperation, including through increased intelligence- and information-sharing, and cooperation on C2 systems; calls, furthermore, on European allies in NATO to take swift and concrete actions in order to build a strong and credible European pillar of the alliance; considers, however, that the term ‘European pillar of NATO’ lacks definition and masks the failure of EU Member States to properly implement the CSDP, in particular Article 42(2) and Article 42(7) TEU; stresses that the term ‘NATO’s European pillar’ can be understood as a responsible and complementary contribution by the EU to allied collective security, based on effective cooperation, interoperability and the equitable sharing of burdens within the alliance; stresses that any strengthening of the CSDP must be carried out in full consistency with NATO commitments; considers, further, that the EU and its Member States must be ready to act autonomously on the basis of Article 42(2) and Article 42(7) TEU, in particular in the unlikely event of paralysis of NATO decision-making;

75. Calls for stronger military-security cooperation with EU candidate countries whose alignment with, and implementation of, the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) is above 80 %, especially those that are the most militarily exposed, including through their inclusion and participation in EU defence initiatives, such as PESCO projects; underscores the opportunities for defence industrial cooperation with these candidate countries; underscores the need to deepen cooperation and expand EU assistance to defend against FIMI, in order to counter the malign influence of non-EU countries, including through critical infrastructure resilience and strengthening cybersecurity; proposes the introduction of stronger benchmarks on security and defence in the Commission’s assessments, and of bilateral defence cooperation roadmaps between EU Member States and these candidate countries; underlines that enhanced cooperation and interoperability with these partners would strengthen European resilience and reinforce the stability of the region; emphasises that this approach is necessary to counter the influence of Russia, China and other third countries, and to reinforce the fight against arms trafficking;

76. Notes Taiwan’s leading role in high-tech development, and its extensive experience in defending itself against China’s hybrid attacks and FIMI, which should be a foremost consideration when assessing the possibilities of strengthening multilateral exchanges and cooperation; calls for regular exchanges between the EU and its Taiwanese counterparts on relevant security issues, and for stronger cooperation on countering FIMI and the sabotage of undersea cables; encourages discussions on potential third-party cooperation on defence and security with like-minded partners, including Taiwan; calls on the Commission and the Member States to closely coordinate on security policy with Taiwan and partners in the South China Sea, including a regular naval presence and joint exercises; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to fulfil its commitment to Parliament to work towards effective deterrence against a possible invasion of Taiwan; reiterates its call for the EU to further engage with emerging strategic partners in the region, such as Indonesia and Viet Nam;

Future European security architecture: a genuine CSDP – if not now, then when?

77. Expresses deep concern that Russia’s repeated acts of aggression have eroded Europe’s security architecture, undermining the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and exposing the failure of related institutional and political processes; stresses that only cooperation between all states, based on jointly agreed rules, can safeguard against war and provide common security; highlights the importance of building a renewed European security architecture that strengthens the transatlantic link in line with the EU’s strategic interests, enhances cooperation with NATO and promotes stability in the EU’s Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods; calls for progress on the strategic thinking needed for that renewed European security architecture, including strengthening the Euro-Atlantic partnership; welcomes the positive steps taken so far, in the light of the aim, set out in the Commission President’s December 2024 mission letter to Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius, to create a true European Defence Union, and calls for the formulation of a clear vision and a strategic roadmap of the remaining steps, to ensure consistency across all required financial, institutional and operational aspects; calls for the Member States’ political engagement and commitment towards achieving the EDU;

78. Stresses that unprecedented threats and shifting geopolitics profoundly affect the EU’s strategic interests; underlines the need for a common threat perception and public awareness; underscores that these challenges and opportunities make it urgent to implement the CSDP as the basis for a genuine EDU and, ideally, to seize this pivotal moment to strengthen the effectiveness of existing instruments and, where appropriate, to advance cooperation between the Member States within the current framework of the Treaties;

79. Considers that strengthening the European pillar of NATO should go hand in hand with operationalising Article 42(7) TEU to ensure synergies and complementarity; urges the EU and its Member States to define operational procedures and mechanisms in the event of a Member State triggering Article 42(7) TEU, and to ensure coherence between Article 42(7) TEU and NATO equivalents, so that the mutual defence clause can provide a credible and robust layer of European security and defence, while ensuring full coherence with NATO, complementing national efforts, and preventing any competition with, and avoiding any unnecessary duplication of, the alliance’s defence mechanisms; calls, in this regard, for routine exercises to be carried out for scenarios under Article 42(7) TEU;

80. Reaffirms its call to create a permanent format for the Council of Defence Ministers as a forum for political and strategic coordination, as well as for a move from unanimity to qualified majority voting under Article 31 TEU, except for executive military mandates; recommends exploring flexible and pragmatic cooperation formulas that improve the effectiveness of decisions without altering the established institutional balance, and to strengthen political and strategic coordination within the EU;

81. Stresses the need to strengthen EU structures, decision-making and operational autonomy; reiterates its call for greater coherence in CSDP governance linking the Member States, the VP/HR and the Commissioners; welcomes the role and initiatives of the Commissioner for Defence and Space in relation to the CSDP, in line with Article 42(3) TEU; urges better coordination among the competent bodies within the EU to facilitate the swift and effective implementation of the decisions made; stresses the work of the EDA in enhancing European defence cooperation between the Member States, which is essential for a genuine EDU; notes the organisational disconnect between the EDA and the Commission’s Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space – with both bodies implementing CSDP mandates, yet one reporting to the VP/HR, and the other reporting to the Commissioner for Defence and Space – and highlights possible synergies through institutional reform, while acknowledging that current cooperation is satisfactory; reiterates that any evolution in European defence governance must preserve the balance between national sovereignty and European coordination, avoiding the duplication of structures and ensuring democratic accountability;

82. Calls for the involvement of regional and local authorities in planning for and building defence resilience, especially in areas near borders and coasts; stresses the need for democratic oversight, transparency and public participation in shaping the future of European defence;

83. Notes the importance and effectiveness of the Coalition of the Willing as a result of the current Treaty framework and disunity among the Member States, particularly in responding to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; notes, however, that its use moves the EU further away from the practical implementation of Article 42(2) and Article 42(7) TEU; considers that such coalitions, when inclusive and coordinated, can serve as a legitimate instrument of flexible cooperation within the framework of the CSDP; notes that Article 42(6) TEU, on permanent structured cooperation, has been interpreted in a limited fashion to mean cooperation on the development of capabilities, without covering cooperation on executive and operational aspects; proposes, therefore, that operational PESCO projects under Article 42(6) TEU be explored, including on secure military communications, C2, and ISR capabilities through European space-based systems, always in coordination with NATO and respecting the principle of voluntariness;

Enhancing parliamentary control of the CSDP

84. Calls for Parliament’s oversight and scrutiny role to be strengthened, in line with the expansion of the EU’s role in defence and the increase in spending on EU defence policies and programmes, in particular as regards the implementation of defence industrial regulations; considers that Parliament’s Committee on Security and Defence should play a leading role in this process; reiterates, in this regard, the need for Parliament’s scrutiny, legislative and budgetary role over a growing range of defence initiatives across the EU institutions, and in particular the work carried out under the CSDP, to be reinforced, including by strengthening regular dialogue, the provision and exchange of information and maintaining permanent channels of communication with the VP/HR, the Commissioner for Defence and Space, the European Court of Auditors and the competent Parliament bodies; recommends the inclusion of regular intelligence updates to relevant parliamentary committees, where necessary and subject to appropriate vetting and clearance procedures; highlights the establishment of its own Special Committee on the EUDS, presenting Parliament’s vision for strengthening the EU’s capacity to detect, deter and counter FIMI and other hybrid threats and attacks;

85. Calls for the European Parliament and national parliaments to develop a structured dialogue on the implementation of the CSDP and the oversight of European defence spending, with the aim of improving transparency, accountability and public trust in the CSDP; notes that it is necessary to expand cooperation between Parliament’s Committee on Security and Defence and the security and defence committees of the national parliaments of EU Member States, in order to achieve a common understanding of threats, and cooperation on legislative work, to enable the rapid scaling up of the EU’s defence capabilities; stresses that similar parliamentary committees in the candidate countries should also be involved, where possible;

°

° °

86. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, and to the European Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President of the Commission and competent Commissioners, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the President of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Parliamentary Assembly, the EU security and defence agencies, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and the governments and parliaments of partner countries.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

The threat landscape for the Union has worsened in the last year. Russia has intensified its war of aggression against Ukraine with additional support from its allies including North Korea, Iran, Belarus and China. Russia predictably shows no interest in peace. Equally, Russia continued, and even intensified its hybrid war against Europe, including in Moldova, Georgia and the Western Balkans. At the same time, the increasing isolationism of the Trump administration and its wavering attitude towards NATO, Europe, multilateralism and the rules-based order means that Europe is increasingly isolated. The highly volatile Middle East and North Africa region cause further risks for European security and European responses to the various conflicts have diminished our posture and ability to protect our strategic interests.

In spite of unprecedented spending increases, assurances of NATO’s capacity and European industrial ramp-up, we remain insufficiently prepared for what might come and our deterrence is insufficient to ward off Russia’s tests of our military preparedness, or worse.

Europe continues to face multiple challenges: assuming the responsibility for support to Ukraine as a moral obligation and a long-term investment in our own security while ramping up production, learning new battlefield tactics, replenishing our own stocks, building societal resilience and pushing forward deep structural reforms to increase the long-term autonomy, competitiveness, integration and pace of innovation of the EDTIB.

The Union’s leadership in the area of strengthening the EDTIB is highly needed and welcome, but the report outlines that current solutions – while ambitious – do not resolve long-standing structural issues that prevent full implementation of the CSDP, including in relation to military doctrine, fragmentation, political unity and the lack of a common threat perception. The draft report reviews the current ‘CSDP missions and operations’ but urges to give more practical effect to the other aspects of CSDP in relation to collective defence and working towards a genuine European Defence Union. It highlights the need for a functioning pan-european internal defence market and adequate and societally acceptable European funding solutions.

The report flags that the lack of unity among Member States has necessitated Coalitions of the Willing but that such initiatives should ideally be placed within EU structures through an operational form of permanent structured cooperation. The report argues the current context should imply an architectural moment for the CSDP, or at minimum to give full practice effect to the full scope of the current CSDP. It makes a number of practical recommendations in this regard.

This is the first CSDP report under the authorship of the SEDE Committee since it was granted the status of a full-fledged committee. The Rapporteur has spoken with a wide range of interlocutors. They have universally flagged the importance of the Parliament’s forward thinking on the CSDP, while many acknowledged to have little knowledge of the annual CSDP report itself. This has informed the shape of the report.

The report recognises that the credibility of Europe’s deterrence and defence lies not only in material capabilities but also in its political unity and the courage and resolve to act. The deteriorating global security landscape leaves no room for inaction towards a genuine European common security and defence policy: if not now, when.

 

ANNEX: DECLARATION OF INPUT

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that he included in his report input on matters pertaining to the subject of the file that he received, in the preparation of the draft report, from the following interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register[1], or from the following representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies:

1. Interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register

NATO.

EEAS (Service for Foreign Policy Instruments).

European Policy Centre.

EEAS (Peace, Security and Defence).

DG DEFIS.

Centre for European Policy Studies.

EEAS (Civilian Operations Headquarters).

EEAS (EU Intelligence and Situation Centre).

European Commissioner for Defence and Space.

 

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteurs declare that they have submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

INFORMATION ON ADOPTION IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

Date adopted	3.12.2025
Result of final vote	+: –: 0:	23 9 3
Members present for the final vote	Petras Auštrevičius, Marc Botenga, Tobias Cremer, Elena Donazzan, Alberico Gambino, Raphaël Glucksmann, Christophe Gomart, György Hölvényi, Merja Kyllönen, Vangelis Meimarakis, Ana Catarina Mendes, Sven Mikser, Hannah Neumann, Andrey Novakov, Reinis Pozņaks, Marjan Šarec, Mārtiņš Staķis, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Riho Terras, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Reinier Van Lanschot, Roberto Vannacci, Alexandr Vondra
Substitutes present for the final vote	Vasile Dîncu, Engin Eroglu, Michael Gahler, Marina Mesure, Thijs Reuten, Cristian Terheş, Marta Wcisło, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez
Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote	Klara Dostalova, Verena Mertens, Volker Schnurrbusch

 

 

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

23	+
ECR	Reinis Pozņaks, Cristian Terheş
PPE	Michael Gahler, Vangelis Meimarakis, Verena Mertens, Andrey Novakov, Marta Wcisło, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez
Renew	Petras Auštrevičius, Engin Eroglu, Marjan Šarec, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
S&D	Tobias Cremer, Vasile Dîncu, Raphaël Glucksmann, Ana Catarina Mendes, Sven Mikser, Thijs Reuten
The Left	Merja Kyllönen
Verts/ALE	Hannah Neumann, Mārtiņš Staķis, Reinier Van Lanschot

 

9	-
ESN	Volker Schnurrbusch
PPE	Christophe Gomart, Riho Terras
PfE	Klara Dostalova, György Hölvényi, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Roberto Vannacci
The Left	Marc Botenga, Marina Mesure

 

3	0
ECR	Elena Donazzan, Alberico Gambino, Alexandr Vondra

 

Key to symbols:

+ : in favour

- : against

0 : abstention

 

 

• [1] OJ L 331, 14.12.2017, p. 57, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2017/2315/oj.
• [2] OJ L, 2024/890, 19.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/890/oj.
• [3] OJ L 170, 12.5.2021, p. 149, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj.
• [1] Texts adopted, P10_TA(2025)0230.
• [2] OJ C, C/2025/4389, 9.9.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/4389/oj.
• [3] OJ C, C/2025/3151, 20.6.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/3151/oj.
• [4] OJ C, C/2025/3150, 20.6.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/3150/oj.
• [5] OJ C, C/2025/487, 29.1.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/487/oj.
• [6] OJ C 167, 11.5.2023, p. 105.
• [7] Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment, (OJ L 335, 13.12.2008, p. 99, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/compos/2008/944/oj).
• [1] Interinstitutional Agreement of May 2021 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on a mandatory transparency register (OJ L 207, 11.6.2021, p. 1, ELI:http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_interinstit/2021/611/oj).