Report - A10-0005/2026Report
A10-0005/2026
European Parliament

REPORT on EU strategic defence and security partnerships

28.1.2026 - (2025/2119(INI))

Committee on Security and Defence
Rapporteur: Michał Szczerba


Procedure : 2025/2119(INI)
Document stages in plenary
Document selected :  
A10-0005/2026
Texts tabled :
A10-0005/2026
Debates :
Votes :
Texts adopted :

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on EU strategic defence and security partnerships

 

(2025/2119(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular the provisions on the common security and defence policy (CSDP),

– having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security, adopted by the Council on 21 March 2022,

– having regard to the Versailles Declaration adopted at the informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government on 10 and 11 March 2022,

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States[1],

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/890 of 18 March 2024 amending Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 establishing a European Peace Facility[2],

– having regard to the conclusions of the European Council, particularly those of 23 October 2025, 26 June 2025, 20 March 2025 and 6 March 2025,

– having regard to the security and defence partnerships signed on 21 May 2024 by the EU and Moldova, on 28 May 2024 by the EU and Norway, on 1 November 2024 by the EU and Japan, on 4 November 2024 by the EU and South Korea, on 19 November 2024 by the EU and North Macedonia, on 18 December 2024 by the EU and Albania, on 19 May 2025 by the EU and the United Kingdom (UK) and on 23 June 2025 by the EU and Canada,

– having regard to the joint security commitments between the EU and Ukraine signed on 27 June 2024;

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1092[3],

– having regard to the White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030 presented by the Presidency of the European Commission on 19 March 2025, and its five-pillar financing plan, ‘ReArm Europe’,

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 22 April 2025 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2021/694, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697, (EU) 2021/1153, (EU) 2023/1525 and 2024/795, as regards incentivising defence-related investments in the EU budget to implement the ReArm Europe Plan (COM(2025)0188),

– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 of 27 May 2025 establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the Reinforcement of the European Defence Industry Instrument[4],

– having regard to the Commission communication of 17 June 2025 on the Defence Readiness Omnibus  (COM(2025)0820), aimed at simplifying the relevant legal and administrative frameworks to strengthen the EU’s defence readiness,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 October 2025 entitled ‘Preserving Peace –Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0027),

– having regard to Mario Draghi’s report of 9 September 2024 on the future of European competitiveness,

– having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together: Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

– having regard to the three joint declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed by the Presidents of the European Council and the Commission and the NATO Secretary General on 10 January 2023, 5 December 2018 and 6 December 2016,

– having regard to the Strategic Concept adopted at the NATO Madrid Summit on 29 June 2022,

– having regard to the Hague Summit Declaration of 25 June 2025,

– having regard to its resolution of 2 April 2025 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2024[5],

– having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on the white paper on the future of European defence[6],

– having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2021 on EU-NATO cooperation in the context of transatlantic relations[7],

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘A new European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through a responsive and resilient European Defence Industry’ (JOIN(2024)0010),

– having regard to the political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029, entitled ‘Europe’s choice’, presented on 18 July 2025 by the candidate for the European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen,

– having regard to the Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management signed by the Secretary General of the United Nations and the President of the European Council on 24 September 2003,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 March 2023 entitled ‘European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defence’ (JOIN(2023)0009),

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Security and Defence (A10-0005/2026),

A. whereas the current geopolitical context, in particular the return of war to the European continent due to the Russian aggression against Ukraine and the consequent decision of the EU to take more responsibility for security and defence, including military support to Ukraine, requires the EU to forge stronger, sustainable and tailored partnerships to enhance cooperation with like-minded partners in a mutually beneficial way; whereas the shift in the military paradigm, combined with the rise in hybrid threats, makes no region of the EU immune to the risk of aggression or interference;

B. whereas the EU’s growing role in security and defence must remain consistent with the principles and objectives of the EU’s external action under Article 21 TEU, including respect for the UN Charter, international law, conflict prevention, sustainable development, democracy and human rights;

C. whereas the EU remains fully committed to promoting international cooperation and strengthening effective multilateralism at all levels;

D. whereas the EU-wide range of partnerships and dialogues on peace, security and defence are a key source of strength and resilience; whereas these partnerships should address the most urgent EU defence needs and challenges;

 

E. whereas the Strategic Compass called for extending and deepening partnerships with bilateral, regional and multilateral partners worldwide to ensure mutual benefit and enhanced collaboration, highlighting the need for interoperability, innovation and coherence between the EU and NATO frameworks, as well as for strengthened cooperation with Ukraine and the United States as key partners for European and transatlantic security;

F. whereas the surge in activity of human trafficking organisations and the instrumentalisation of migration constitute a key security risk for the EU;

G. whereas the new security and defence partnerships (SDPs) between the EU and partner countries should strive to secure and ensure the highest European security standards by acquiring and ensuring access to the most technologically advanced and effective self-defence systems;

European security environment

1. Underlines that SDPs are key for Europe to respond effectively to emerging threats and to support the EU’s ambition to strengthen its role as a global strategic actor; stresses that such partnerships – which are mutually beneficial, with a clear strategic focus and objectives – are essential for the EU to become more sovereign, more responsible for its own defence, and better equipped to act and deal autonomously and in a coordinated way with immediate and future challenges and threats, with a 360° approach; states that these partnerships are a necessity, not an option for the EU; stresses that they should enhance the EU’s strategic autonomy while remaining firmly committed to multilateral cooperation as well as fully complementary with NATO, and strengthen the EU’s capacity to act together with like-minded partners in the pursuit of peace, stability and collective security;

2. Notes that the EU is currently experiencing its most critical security situation since the Second World War, facing major challenges such as strengthening its military capabilities and cybersecurity infrastructure, combating hybrid threats, countering terrorism, and protecting its critical infrastructure; stresses that Russia’s neo-imperial aspirations and revisionist attitude constitute the most significant threat to EU security and underscores the urgency of reinforcing the EU’s defence and deterrence capabilities; recalls, in this context, the growing security implications of climate change and environmental degradation for critical infrastructure, energy systems and crisis preparedness;

3. Underlines that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has been a wake-up call for Europe to prioritise and invest more in security and defence; underlines that Russia continues its aggression on the European continent also with the support of its proxies, such as the regimes in Iran, North Korea and Belarus; notes the malicious activities of our strategic competitors and the ongoing hybrid warfare being waged by various state and non-state actors, which constitute threats to European security and the international rules-based order; emphasises the particular security concerns of EU Member States on its eastern flank, which face direct threats from Russian aggression and hybrid warfare; stresses that continued economic cooperation between the EU and China needs to be reassessed in the light of China’s support for Russia’s war economy, with a view to strengthening the EU’s economic resilience through de-risking, among other measures; underlines that the EU has to manage strategic competition from China, which is a critical enabler and supporter of Russia’s war of aggression, and spillover from conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, while addressing common global threats and challenges;

4. Underlines that through the EU Strategic Compass the EU commits to engaging more coherently, consistently and comprehensively with its partners and thus building mutually beneficial tailored partnerships based on shared values and interests; emphasises the importance of interoperability, joint training and defence industrial innovation within these partnerships, notably through initiatives such as the European Defence Industrial Programme and SAFE;

5. Underlines the fact that the EU and its Member States remain firmly committed to the rules-based international order, grounded in respect for international law, the principles of the UN Charter and the values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, as enshrined in the TEU; stresses that this commitment forms the foundation of the EU’s external action and its efforts to promote peace, stability, multilateralism and prosperity worldwide; emphasises that SDPs should integrate conflict prevention, climate security and sustainability as cross-cutting priorities;

6. Looks forward to the Strategic Compass being regularly updated, to ensure that the EU’s strategic vision and common objectives are always in step with recent geopolitical, social and technological developments; invites the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to integrate resilience planning into security initiatives, covering critical infrastructure, supply chains and energy independence;

Criticality of the EU-NATO strategic partnership

7. Highlights the reinforced strategic partnership with NATO, which includes structured dialogues and enhanced operational and sectoral cooperation particularly in areas such as military mobility, maritime security as well as defence industry and capability development, conducted notably through joint drills and staff-to-staff collaboration, thereby strengthening NATO’s European pillar; underlines that this cooperation must remain mutually reinforcing and be based on trust, transparency and respect for the decision-making autonomy of both organisations; stresses that democratic accountability and parliamentary oversight are essential to ensure that such cooperation strengthens European and transatlantic security; stresses that 23 of 27 EU Member States are NATO members, and believes that cooperation with non-EU European NATO members should be reaffirmed through exploring the possibilities for strengthening these partnerships;

8. Underlines that NATO is the most successful military and political alliance in modern history, having ensured collective defence, stability and security for its members for over seven decades; underlines that together, the EU and NATO represent more than one billion citizens and encompass some of the world’s largest economies, forming a community united by shared democratic values and security interests; underlines the importance of institutionalising this dialogue through regular EU-NATO ministerial consultations, joint strategic foresight exercises, and coordinated crisis response planning, ensuring that political coordination keeps pace with operational cooperation;

9. Underlines that the EU relationship with NATO is a priority and needs to continue to develop, especially through increased information and intelligence sharing; stresses that EU-NATO cooperation is key for deterrence, protection of critical infrastructure, military mobility, energy grids, digital communications, cyber, space and defence ecosystems, and societal and democratic resilience; calls for the full implementation of the EU-NATO joint declarations; calls, furthermore, on the Member States that are also members of NATO to step up their commitment to NATO;

10. Stresses that NATO remains the key collective transatlantic defence alliance, with the EU and NATO playing complementary, coherent and mutually reinforcing roles to ensure security in Europe and enhance international security, and encourages close collaboration and a mutually beneficial partnership with the United States in this area; underlines that a stronger and more capable EU in the field of security and defence will contribute positively to both global and transatlantic security; underscores the need for a strong EU defence pillar within NATO, capable of acting autonomously while complementing NATO, thereby strengthening the transatlantic partnership and providing necessary security guarantees for the EU, its Member States and the international rules-based order; points out, at the same time, that European defence must stand on its own two feet and have a sufficiently strong deterrent capability; warns of the risks posed by the shifting focus of US foreign policy, which could translate into a decrease in its security commitments to Europe; emphasises, therefore, the need for the EU to develop its own planning and operational capacity;

11. Emphasises that strengthening security hinges on the ability of the Member States to equip themselves with interoperable military instruments, developed jointly through the European defence industry, in order to ensure a rapid and effective response to any threat to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the EU Member States; emphasises, in this context, that military capabilities must be identified in synergy with the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) and in line with the ‘one single set of forces’ principle; notes that the EU plays a key role in the regulatory field and in investments aimed at supporting industrial competitiveness, technological development and European defence logistics; stresses that standardisation remains a crucial pillar of EU-NATO cooperation to guarantee interoperability, complementarity of efforts, and the efficient use of resources, while avoiding unnecessary duplication; calls on the Commission and the Member States to simplify and harmonise the rules on the production, certification, transfer, military mobility and maintenance of defence materials and systems, in order to build a competitive, resilient and integrated European industrial supply chain able to ensure greater operational preparedness and full and effective interoperability between the EU and NATO;

12. Highlights NATO’s role as a global actor and reliable partner in the efforts towards the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, and in the fight against global terrorism;

Necessity of EU SDPs

13. Welcomes the fact that the EU is positioning itself as a reliable global security partner by strengthening its CSDP, including through mutually beneficial SDPs and deeper bilateral and multilateral dialogues; notes that SDPs are in place with eight countries so far and more are in the pipeline, including with Iceland; calls for these partnerships to include structured industrial cooperation aimed at scaling up EU-based production capacities for core defence production assets within the context of strengthening the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB);

14. Believes that the SDP framework is giving new impetus to ongoing security and defence dialogues and practical cooperation; underlines the importance of having tangible deliverables and milestones with agreed target dates; stresses the need for results monitoring, bilateral reviews and dialogue on multi-domain threat perceptions and mutual interests, which are crucial to the implementation of the partnerships; stresses the importance of securing, through strategic SDPs, a reliable supply of critical raw materials that are vital for European defence; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) to provide Parliament with a regular assessment of the implementation status of SDPs;

15. Underlines that SDPs include cooperation with CSDP missions, as they are intended to create synergies, enhance interoperability and coordination, and strengthen the EU’s overall security and defence capabilities;

16. Underlines the strategic importance and need for prioritisation of the SDPs signed with Norway, the UK and Canada, which are NATO allies and the EU’s crucial defence partners; encourages the deepening of these partnerships, including in the area of the defence industry, cyberthreats and hybrid threats and maritime security and in building joint military capabilities and encouraging closer collaboration; emphasises that industrial cooperation should prioritise projects contributing to strategic autonomy and resilience, ensuring balanced geographical distribution of investments across the Member States, with particular attention to the eastern flank; encourages the EU to also sign similar agreements with like-minded partners, including those that are not NATO members;

17. Underlines that the EU-US relationship remains a cornerstone of European security and defence; stresses the importance of exploring a formalised SDP with the United States that would align with EU interests and values and promote a rules-based international order; points out the need for constant dialogue and cooperation on threat perceptions; reiterates that our partnership with the United States is of strategic importance and calls for a deepening of our cooperation in a mutually beneficial way, and exploring the possibilities for optimum collaboration between defence industries;

18. Stresses that there can be no European security without Ukrainian security; stresses the importance of exploring a formalised SDP with Ukraine; affirms that Ukraine is a strategic priority partner for the EU as it prepares to take its place as a member of the Union; reiterates that the EU will provide continued, sustainable support with everything that it takes to secure Ukraine’s victory as soon as possible; insists that the EU must contribute to robust legally-backed security guarantees for Ukraine in order to deter further Russian aggression; stresses that closer cooperation between the EU and the Ukrainian defence industrial sector is a priority, including alignment with European standards and transparency; underlines the importance of EU partnerships and of the nine-point joint security commitments between the EU and Ukraine in coordinating assistance to Ukraine; reiterates its call for the urgent use of frozen Russian assets in supporting Ukraine, while respecting international law; underlines the importance of systematically drawing on the lessons learnt from Ukraine’s operational experience, notably in the area of drones/unmanned aircraft systems and electronic warfare;

19. Calls on the Member States to actively cooperate and establish synergies with Ukraine, particularly in the fields of air and missile defence and drone and counter-drone warfare, acknowledging its groundbreaking operational expertise and advanced capabilities, thus strengthening both EU and Ukrainian defence capabilities;

20. Commends the conclusion on 21 May 2024 of the EU-Moldova SDP with a focus on combating hybrid threats;

21. Underlines the strategic importance of EU partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific, such as Japan and the Republic of Korea, which have already signed SDPs, and encourages the rapid conclusion of negotiations with Australia and the exploration of further partnerships with other countries in the region, notably New Zealand; emphasises that Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security challenges are closely intertwined; emphasises that deepening cooperation with India could be mutually beneficial; underlines the need to deepen cooperation on security and defence with Taiwan;

22. Underlines the need to explore enhanced cooperation at different levels and in various formats on energy security, connectivity and critical infrastructure protection with countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia; notes the strategic importance of these regions for diversifying energy supplies, developing secure transport corridors and strengthening Europe’s overall resilience;

23. Stresses the strategic importance of the Black Sea region for European security; calls for enhanced security and defence cooperation with like-minded partners in the Black Sea region and for the development of a comprehensive EU Black Sea security strategy; supports increased EU investment in Black Sea naval capabilities, coastal defence, and maritime area awareness;

24. Calls on the Member States and the EEAS to explore the setting up of additional SDPs, on the basis of clear, mutually beneficial engagements, with other like-minded partners that share our values and are committed to upholding a rules-based international order;

25. Stresses the importance of establishing structured SDPs with Western Balkan countries, notably Bosnia and Herzegovina, to enhance regional stability, counter hybrid threats and strengthen the European security architecture in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood; emphasises that such partnerships should build on the existing CSDP engagement in the region, including the EUFOR Althea operation, political and security dialogues, and joint participation in EU missions, while providing a more strategic and long-term framework for cooperation in areas such as cyber resilience, countering disinformation, and defence capacity building;

Developing UN and other multilateral partnerships

26. Stresses the importance of the EU-UN strategic partnership on peace operations and crisis management; welcomes the new priorities of the EU-UN Strategic Partnership for 2025-2028 and stresses the need for increased coherence between, and effectiveness of, EU and UN missions and operations, including through joint planning and lessons-learnt processes; calls for the full implementation and the systematic integration of the Women, Peace and Security agenda, in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1325, in particular regarding the protection of civilians, full, equal and meaningful participation of women in peace processes, and the prevention of conflict-related sexual violence; calls for the functioning of the UN to be reformed to ensure that missions and operations are effective and have the desired effect;

27. Notes that the EU and the African Union maintain a strategic partnership, particularly in peace and security; stresses the need to deepen strategic partnerships with other regional organisations, including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the League of Arab States, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Organization of American States, in areas of mutual interests through joint initiatives, dialogue and increased diplomatic activity; highlights the importance of cooperation with Latin American partners in addressing international organised crime, transnational trafficking, hybrid threats and maritime security, and in promoting democratic resilience and regional stability;

28. Calls for strengthening the operational dimension of EU security and defence cooperation with like-minded and other partners in the Southern Neighbourhood, particularly in the Mediterranean, with a focus on maritime security, counter-terrorism, border management and the protection of critical infrastructure, and building on the commitments set out in the Pact for the Mediterranean to deepen security cooperation with Mediterranean partners; underlines that instability in the region has a direct impact on the EU’s internal security and therefore requires a more strategic and coordinated response;

Boosting broad and tailor-made ways of cooperation

29. Stresses that the EU’s integrated approach to CSDP includes the legal frameworks for the participation of third countries and regional organisations in CSDP missions and operations; stresses that these partners need to uphold our values and share our interests; encourages the Commission and the EEAS to further streamline administrative procedures to ensure faster and more flexible participation of like-minded partners, particularly in training, capacity building and crisis response missions;

30. Underlines the strategic role of the European Peace Facility (EPF) as a key instrument in strengthening military and defence capacities, supporting military aspects of peace operations and providing equipment to the armed forces of EU partners; calls for full transparency and democratic scrutiny of this instrument;

31. Deplores the Hungarian Government’s ongoing obstruction of the use of this instrument to assist Ukraine, including through legal action before the General Court, and its continued blocking of EPF support to Armenia; urges the Member States to actively put pressure on the Hungarian Government to end its irresponsible blockade of the EPF; calls on the VP/HR to find alternative solutions to overcome this situation;

32. Welcomes the strengthening of the EEAS network of military advisers in EU Delegations, which strengthen relations with partners’ military and civilian institutions; calls for the establishment of regular coordination meetings among these advisers to share best practice, improve situational awareness and foster coherence in EU external action;

33. Insists that the EU’s defence readiness 2030 requires partnerships and EU involvement with like-minded partners; stresses that achieving the EU’s proclaimed goals requires securing supply chains, including of raw materials and critical components, reinforcing and strengthening the EDTIB and reducing the EU’s strategic dependencies, without creating new ones; highlights, by way of example, the EU’s dependence on China for critical raw materials, which represents a significant geopolitical and economic vulnerability; calls for democratic oversight and transparency in defence industry partnerships, among other things to ensure compliance with labour and environmental standards; acknowledges that the realisation of a genuine single market for defence is of decisive importance and will strengthen both the EU’s military capabilities and its strategic autonomy;

34. Welcomes the fact that privileged access to the SAFE instrument could be granted, further to specific bilateral agreements, to those countries with which there is an SDP; notes that the negotiations of the SAFE-compliant agreement with Canada have been concluded; regrets that the agreement with the UK has not yet been finalised; stresses that the inclusion of the two countries in EU defence initiatives would be mutually beneficial and would leverage the added value of each industry; underlines the importance of Ukraine’s participation in SAFE;

35. Notes that the European Defence Agency also cooperates with third countries, organisations and entities in the framework of tailor-made administrative arrangements; stresses the need to ensure that these arrangements contribute to the consolidation of the EDTIB and to the protection of disruptive technologies; calls for a reassessment of the administrative arrangements and their effectiveness;

36. Calls for the EEAS to have the necessary human and financial resources to implement existing SDPs, ensuring that they deliver tangible results;

Strengthening key areas of collaboration within SDPs

37. Underlines SDPs’ role in integrated border management with a number of partners, which is especially important given recent provocations and violations of NATO airspace by the Russian and Belarusian regimes, particularly affecting the eastern flank states, and external aspects of irregular migration; recalls that external aspects of irregular migration also affect Member States of the southern flank; calls for increased EU financial and operational support for the border management capabilities of front-line states;

38. Encourages the European Council to consider the participation of countries that have signed SDPs, particularly Norway, the UK and Canada, in EU flagship projects such as the Eastern Flank Watch, the European Drone Defence Initiative, the European Air Shield and the European Space Shield;

39. Stresses that EU funding priorities should reflect the need for balanced geographical distribution of industrial capacities, with particular attention to strengthening defence production on the eastern flank of the EU to address proximity to high-risk areas;

40. Calls for more joint maritime security exercises with relevant allied partners to promote interoperability and operational readiness in strategically important waterways and choke points around the world, especially in areas where the EU’s vital interests are under threat; insists on the importance of the surveillance and protection of critical maritime infrastructure, including undersea cables and pipelines to prevent increasingly frequent hybrid attacks;

41. Underlines the importance of SDPs for CSDP missions and operations, as they remain the cornerstone of EU external security engagement, and are a key pillar of the EU’s work on conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict stabilisation;

42. Stresses that cybersecurity attacks, disinformation and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), the activities of transnational criminal organisations involved in drug smuggling and human trafficking, and the instrumentalisation of migration by belligerent third countries are a growing security threat for the EU; calls for further cooperation with the EU’s partners to strengthen its resilience, protect its critical infrastructure and exchange best practice on tackling FIMI; underlines the importance of SDPs for building societal and democratic resilience; encourages the creation of joint cyber-response exercises and the development of secure information-sharing channels between the EU and its partners to counter hybrid threats;

43. Points out that the EU’s approach to the protection of critical underwater infrastructure also reflects growing awareness of non-traditional security challenges;

44. Emphasises the importance of counterterrorism and the prevention of violent extremism, addressing both state and non-state threats through integrated security frameworks; emphasises that extensive intergovernmental cooperation and information sharing, both within the EU and with third countries, are needed to effectively combat and prevent terrorism and violent extremism;

45. Underlines that partnerships are essential to promote peaceful and responsible behaviours in outer space, respond to space threats and support the use of space services for security and defence purposes; stresses, in particular, that the emerging ‘new space’ sector and its innovative potential regarding dual-use technologies should also be fully exploited for defence and civilian developments;

46. Insists that the SDPs contain an effective review clause that allows for adjustments related to implementation and to respond to new security developments; emphasises that these partnerships, if well implemented, will deliver concrete results that contribute to the European security order;

Developing Parliament’s role in fostering defence cooperation

47. Recalls that Parliament has repeatedly highlighted the significance of the partnerships on security and defence; believes that parliamentary diplomacy complements and supports these partnerships; underlines the key roles played by the Committee on Security and Defence and the Delegation for Relations with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly; requests that the EEAS provide regular reports to Parliament on the implementation of SDPs and the status of ongoing or planned negotiations;

48. Commits to pursuing regular joint committee meetings with the Committee on National Security, Defence and Intelligence of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to foster dialogue at parliamentary level;

49. Welcomes the organisation of the first interparliamentary meeting of the defence committees of the EU Members States in the European Parliament and the further deepening of the partnership with staff of national parliaments, including through the European Security and Defence College;

50. Welcomes the holding of the 107th Rose-Roth Seminar of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, entitled ‘EU-NATO Cooperation: Essential Partnership and Democratic Resilience’, on Parliament’s premises; stresses that this underscored Parliament’s new and active role in view of its enhanced partnership status in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly;

51. Underlines the success of the first ever Parliament and NATO Parliamentary Assembly pilot project for parliamentary capacity-building in the security and defence sector for staff of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine; calls for this pilot project to be extended to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the enlargement area parliaments and all SDPs;

52. Believes that the Schuman Security and Defence Forum, organised by the EEAS and co-hosted by Parliament, is an opportunity to provide a regular, high-level platform for dialogue with partners; calls for Parliament to take an active role in shaping its agenda and follow-up, ensuring that the outcomes feed into legislative work on EU security and defence policy;

53. Encourages the building of closer ties with societies in partner countries, and the strengthening of the EU’s strategic communication; calls for campaigns involving Parliament, other EU institutions, bodies and agencies, the Member States and partner countries, as well as non-governmental organisations, academia and the media, to be launched to promote existing SDPs and encourage new partnerships, thereby strengthening the EU’s image and position among SDP countries; emphasises the need to counter disinformation and foreign manipulation narratives through coordinated communication strategies and public diplomacy initiatives involving EU Delegations and Member States;

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54. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.


EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

We are at a crucial moment, when Europe faces unprecedented challenges, with the war of aggression at our doorstep. We can see this today more clearly than ever – Russia’s escalation has resulted in violation of EU’s and NATO’s airspace in several countries. The broader geopolitical landscape is undergoing profound changes and shifts. This volatile international environment means major challenges, the security of Europe is at serious risk.

Escalation in the Middle East has led to significant and varied risks for European and global security, and in the long-term, China’s rise as a global power may introduce new strategic complexities.

It is therefore paramount that we maintain strong and unified transatlantic relations within NATO and with partners in the Indo-Pacific, such as Japan and the Republic of Korea. Europeans must take more responsibility for their security and do more to deter Russia.

Addressing this risk, clearly requires new forms of cooperation and targeted partnerships that deliver concrete results and build real capabilities. This is where the EU and its security and defence partners play a key role. If challenges and threats know no borders, then we need friends to tackle them. The European Union cannot do it alone.

The evolving geopolitical landscape, marked by Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, the shifting role of NATO, and increasing tensions in the Indo-Pacific has intensified the need for a robust and cohesive European security and defence partnerships.

The report places EU Security and Defence Partnerships in the context of EU Common Security and Defence Policy. Overall, the Strategic Compass of the EU commits to engage more with its bilateral partners and thus build tailored partnerships based on shared values and interests.

Cooperation with strategic partners such as the UK, Canada, Norway, South Korea, Japan, Moldova, Albania, North Macedonia, as well as the US and Ukraine, with which the EU does not yet have formal partnerships, is a key element of the Common Security and Defence Policy.

Today, the EU is on a path of an overhaul of its defence policy, which is critical for Europe’s ability to defend itself and advance its interests globally. This overhaul must also extend to security and defence partnerships.

The EU has always sought partners to uphold the rules-based multilateral order – today more than ever the outreach needs to reflect defence and security interests of EU countries. Current volatile international environment poses increased threats and challenges to our common security – which requires more efforts, new forms of cooperation and targeted partnerships that deliver concrete results and build real capabilities.

Promoting partnerships on security and defence is also essential for our capability development, innovation and defence industrial readiness as well as to diversify supplies of raw material or critical components.

In line with the White Paper, the EU has taken concrete steps to advance its partnership agenda in the field of security and defence with allies and like-minded partners, notably NATO, with which the EDA will pursue a technical arrangement for the exchange of classified information.

Partnerships are crucial to help enhance interoperability and reinforce industrial cooperation, as well as diversify supplies of raw material or critical components. This model is pioneered with the UK and Canada, with which bilateral agreements are being negotiated to allow their respective defence industries and products to benefit from joint procurement under the SAFE instrument. Defence industrial cooperations is also at the centre of Defence Industrial Dialogues with Japan and, potentially in the future, with India. The EU should also deepen its security and defence partnership with Moldova.

The report aims to take stock of the current and develop proposals for future defence partnerships – providing concrete policy suggestions and actions for adaptation. It explores alignments with some of the broader objectives of building a strong defence policy of the EU, including relations with NATO, and alignment with its capabilities, ensuring innovation and rapid advancement of defence industries.

As the EU seeks to bolster its Common Security and Defence Policy strengthened partnerships with NATO and regional partners are becoming increasingly vital. The relation with NATO is a priority one, and needs to keep improving, including through increased intelligence and information sharing. The EU-NATO cooperation will also be important in addressing critical, and transport infrastructure, energy grids, digital communications and civilian satellites.

There is consensus among EU Member States on the importance of EU Partnerships. The conclusions state that “The European Council underlines the importance of working together with like-minded partners, who share our foreign and security policy goals. It welcomes in that regard the EU’s recent Security and Defence Partnerships with the UK and Canada”. This forms a clear direction from Member States to move forward robustly on implementing the partnerships. The EU Council conclusions also set out the priorities for security and defence. They state that “Europe must become more sovereign, more responsible for its own defence and better equipped to act and deal autonomously and in a coordinated way with immediate and future challenges and threats, with a 360° approach”.

The report calls for alignments with some of the broader objectives of building a strong European Defence Union, including improving relations with NATO, and consistent with its capabilities.

The partnerships vary in their scope, as highlighted in the report, but they are critical for depending on the assessed mutual interests of the EU and each partner. However, several areas can be outlined as thematic components.

Common areas of focus for the partnerships will be the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations – as they remain the cornerstone of its external security engagement. These missions, both civilian and military, are also linked EU’s work on conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict stabilisation, areas which will also be evaluated in the report.

Closely aligned with these are efforts in integrated border management and maritime security. In these domains, and other ones, operational presence, intelligence sharing, and strategic foresight are increasingly vital – and should be shared among partners.

As indicated in the report – sustained long-term support for Ukraine is vital for EU defence and security. This also goes for building a direct partnership with Ukraine defence industry – where a lot of lessons can be learned from each other, especially on usage of drones and new technique on the battlefield.

The partnerships should have an important component of responding to emerging threats and resilience building. The EU’s approach to hybrid threats and cybersecurity reflects a growing recognition of non-traditional security challenges. Coordination and cooperation on (cyber) capacity building, particularly for partners, demonstrates the EU’s dual focus on internal resilience and external projection.

This also includes efforts to bolster the resilience of critical infrastructure and improve strategic communication (STRATCOM) and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) responses.

In the partnerships, the EU should continue to emphasise counterterrorism and the prevention of violent extremism, reflecting the need to address both state and non-state threats through integrated security frameworks – developed with partners. Preventing human trafficking and small arms proliferation are also important areas.

Partnerships should also be strengthened through structured consultations on relevant defence initiatives, tools, and instruments. These should include cooperation of defence industries (including financing).

Training, education, and capacity building – whether cyber-specific or more broadly defence-related – are key levers for deepening cooperation with partner states and organisations. These initiatives aim to elevate shared standards, interoperability, and strategic alignment.

It will be important to implement a well-coordinated engagement in international forums to promote the partnerships and reflect a multilateral approach to global security governance.

An important component will be ensuring that partnerships can support innovation and rapid advancement of defence industries and working towards industry effectiveness and economic efficiency.

A multi-stakeholder process is needed, involving the European Parliament, Council and Commission, along with Member States and should launch a process of broader consultations and engagement on EU Security and Defence Partnerships – which will also have the aim to monitor existing and encouraging new partnerships.

In summary – the report shows where progress needs to be consistent in order to build up EU Security and Defence Partnerships – and importantly, that these align with the defence priorities and political goals of the EU’s external engagement. This is key for its priorities and its responses to the evolving global landscape.


ANNEX: DECLARATION OF INPUT

DECLARATION OF INPUT FROM MICHAŁ SZCZERBA

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that he included in his report input on matters pertaining to the subject of the file that he received, in the preparation of the report, prior to the adoption thereof in committee, from the following interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register[8], or from the following representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies:

1. Interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register

Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych (The Polish Institute of International Affairs);

Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia (Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW));

Fundacja Res Publica im. Henryka Krzeczkowskiego (Henryk Krzeczkowski Res Publica Foundation);

Marcin BUZANSKI, Senior Advisor at the Warsaw Security Forum and Pulaski Foundation, Director of the Center for Diplomacy and Negotiation at Collegium Civitas;

European External Action Service (EEAS);

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland.

2. Representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies

 

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that he has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament's Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

 

 


INFORMATION ON ADOPTION IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

Date adopted

15.1.2026

 

 

 

Result of final vote

+:

–:

0:

25

6

1

 


FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

25

+

ECR

Alberico Gambino, Reinis Pozņaks

PPE

Wouter Beke, Christophe Gomart, Miriam Lexmann, Angelika Niebler, Andrey Novakov, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Michał Szczerba, Riho Terras, Matej Tonin, Pekka Toveri

PfE

Pierre-Romain Thionnet

Renew

Petras Auštrevičius, Marjan Šarec, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann

S&D

José Cepeda, Vasile Dîncu, Sven Mikser, Thijs Reuten, André Rodrigues, Mihai Tudose

Verts/ALE

Terry Reintke, Villy Søvndal, Reinier Van Lanschot

 

6

-

ESN

Hans Neuhoff

NI

Kostas Papadakis

PfE

Rachel Blom, Kinga Gál, Roberto Vannacci

The Left

Marc Botenga

 

1

0

PPE

Vangelis Meimarakis

 

Key to symbols:

+ : in favour

- : against

0 : abstention

 

 


 

Last updated: 28 January 2026
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