REPORT on the Commission communication on humanitarian aid to the former Yugoslavia: prospects and guidelines (COM(95)0564 - C4-0535/95) of the

30 May 1996

Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy
Rapporteur: Mr Alexandros Alavanos

By letter of 20 November 1995, the Commission forwarded to Parliament a communication on humanitarian aid to the former Yugoslavia: prospects and guidelines.

At the sitting of 11 December 1995, the President of Parliament announced that he had forwarded this communication to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy as the committee responsible, and to the Committee on Budgets, the Committee on External Economic Relations and the Committee on Development and Cooperation for their opinions.

At its meeting of 20 December 1995, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy, appointed Mr Alavanos rapporteur.

At its meetings of 25 January 1996, 20 March 1996, 23 April 1996, 7 May 1996 and 29 May 1996, it considered the draft report.

At the last meeting, it adopted the motion for a resolution unanimously.

The following were present for the vote: Fernández-Albor, chairman); Malone, first vicechairman; Mendiluce Pereiro, third vice-chairman; Alavanos, rapporteur; Aelvoet, Barón Crespo, Bernard-Reymond, Bertens, van Bladel, Carnero González, Castagnetti, Daskalaki, De Melo, Dupuis, Fabra Vallés (for Burenstam Linder), Gahrton, Gomolka, Graziani, Habsburg, Iivari, Imbeni (for Avgerinos), Jung, König (for Casini), Lalumière, Lambrias, Laurila, Lenz, Lindholm (for Cohn-Bendit, pursuant to Rule 138(2)), MaijWeggen (for Kristoffersen), Occhetto, Oostlander, Pack (for Rinsche), Piquet, Poettering, Pomes-Ruiz (for Stevens, pursuant to Rule 138(2)), Rehn, Souchet, Tindemans, Viola (for Robles Piquer) and Titley.

The opinions of the Committee on Budgets, the Committee on External Economic Relations and the Committee on Development and Cooperation are attached.

The report was tabled on 30 May 1996.

The deadline for tabling amendments will appear on the draft agenda for the partsession at which the report is to be considered.

A MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

Resolution on the Commission communication on humanitarian aid to the former Yugoslavia: prospects and guidelines

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the Commission communication (COM(95)0564),

- having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy and the opinions of the Committee on Budgets, the Committee on External Economic Relations and the Committee on Development and Cooperation (A4-0174/96),

A. whereas the peace established by the agreement of 12 November 1995 on Eastern Slavonia and by the Dayton accords of 21 November 1995 on BosniaHerzegovina has not yet been achieved, and everything must be done to bring about a lasting peace between the parties to the conflict,

B. whereas the implementation of the Dayton accords themselves is giving rise to a new wave of refugees from areas which have changed hands in addition to the existing 3.6 million refugees and displaced persons within the former Yugoslavia as a result of the war,

C. having regard also to the 850 000 persons who have taken refuge in a number of European countries, whose return must also in the majority of cases must be provided for,

D. aware that not all these refugees and displaced persons are able or willing to return to their homes,

E. whereas humanitarian aid to the peoples who have suffered as a result of the war is essential and should continue until the latter can secure their own livelihood,

F. whereas the main humanitarian aid effort during the war came from the European Union and its Member States and whereas those states also provided the majority of the UNPROFOR contingents,

G. whereas a large amount of humanitarian aid was provided by many international NGOs often operating in difficult conditions and without any coordination,

H. whereas the continuation of humanitarian aid must be carried on in connection with the implementation of the Reconstruction Plan, the two actions being strictly linked to each other,

1. Notes that the European Union accounts, financially, for the bulk of humanitarian aid for the former Yugoslavia and therefore has the grave responsibility of ensuring the correct use of these resources;

2. Expects the High Representative to take particular care to prevent these conditions of the Dayton accords from being circumvented by any mixing of reconstruction investments and humanitarian aid measures;

3. Stresses that, in providing humanitarian aid, the emphasis should be on emergency aid, such as food and clothing aid, medical supplies and aid to trauma victims, emergency repairs to homes, hospitals and essential utilities such as water, gas, electricity, transport and communications; considers that urgently required mine clearance can also be defined as humanitarian aid;

4. Notes that humanitarian aid is of a different character from reconstruction aid, because under the terms of the Dayton accords reconstruction aid is subject to political conditions; stresses therefore that, although excessive rigidity must be avoided, care should be taken to ensure that humanitarian aid is not used for projects which fall within the definition of reconstruction aid;

5. Urges that humanitarian aid not serve as an alternative to a political commitment by the European Union to the former Yugoslavia and that the European Union continue to discharge the responsibilities it should always have had towards that country; considers it particularly important that the European Union make commitments going beyond the end of the I-FOR mandate to ensure the safety of minorities throughout the territories of former Yugoslavia, to guarantee the protection of refugees who wish to return and the to allow the development of civil society;

6. Calls on the European Union to use its influence with all the former warring parties to ensure that they grant refugee status to all those expelled from their homes by the war;

7. Asks that careful efforts be made to ensure that the humanitarian aid reaches the suffering population and does not fill the pockets of so-called local authorities;

8. Considers that good cooperation between the European Union, the international community and the former warring parties in implementing humanitarian aid would make it possible to create the conditions for a positive, forward-looking dialogue between the former warring parties;

9. Stresses that the objective of humanitarian aid must, in the short term, be to ensure the survival of the people concerned in conditions of safety and dignity and that, in the medium term, reconstruction aid must permit them to regain some degree of self-sufficiency, particularly by the supply of seed, fertilizer and machinery which would permit the resumption of farming, and by assisting small and medium-sized businesses, re-establishing schools and hospitals and restoring the infrastructure; believes that humanitarian aid can, in this connection, provide a large measure of help in reactivating the local authorities, mobilizing resources available at local level and promoting programmes specifically aimed at soldiers returning en masse from the front in a state of discouragement;

10. Stresses the urgency of disarming local militias and paramilitary groups and of a mine-clearing operation to permit the resumption of normal life in BosniaHerzegovina; welcomes the work already accomplished by UNPROFOR and by IFOR in this area; considers it acceptable that mine clearance which is urgently needed should be funded partly from humanitarian aid resources;

11. Stresses that humanitarian aid must ease the transition from the emergency phase to the reconstruction phase and permit the re-establishment of networks (gas, electricity, drinking water, postal services, telephone), facilitate the resettlement and re-integration of those displaced and encourage the return of qualified people with a view to permitting the resumption of social and economic activity;

12. Considers that only if the Dayton accords are consistently implemented, i.e. if freedom of movement is established and refugees return to their homes within the region, will the rapid repatriation of refugees from western countries be possible;

13. Considers that the European Union's humanitarian aid should make a positive contribution to the return of refugees and displaced persons to their region of origin; notes however that many difficulties still remain to be overcome to enable refugees to return to areas where they constitute a cultural minority and that their return must be carried out in proper consultation with UNHCR, which means that it should not be overhasty; calls on the Union not to cooperate unnecessarily in any further ethnic segregation and above all to work to promote the security and protection of the multicultural communities;

14. Calls on the Member States of the European Union who have generously taken in refugees from the former Yugoslavia to implement a gradual plan for their return in such a way as to avoid forcing them back, and thereby aggravating the situation on the ground and most of all so as to take account of the wishes of the people concerned, often mixed couples who no longer wish to settle in states whose multi-ethnic character is much less marked than before;

15. Calls for humanitarian aid to be used to fund programmes in the fields of health, medicine and surgery and calls on medical staff to return and calls on international medical organizations to send assistance so as to permit the health services and hospitals disrupted by the war to resume working; stresses the need to set up programmes to aid those handicapped by war wounds and to provide them with prostheses to enable them to resume working life as far as possible;

16. Stresses the importance of immediate and coordinated actions relating to transparency and information concerning disappeared persons;

17. Notes that 27 000 people are registered as missing and that they must be found or their graves located; considers that the Union should assist in financing these investigations and the necessary identifications so that their families and close relatives can be certain as to their fate, partly because otherwise it will be almost impossible for them to make a fresh start;

18. Considers that war criminals who have committed murder, rape and other crimes must be traced and surrendered to the Tribunal in The Hague; stresses that it is impossible for people to live in an area where murderers and rapists are still at large and that it is not acceptable that refugees should be unable to return for this reason;

19. Stresses the need for psychological support and rehabilitation programmes for those who have been victims of ethnic cleansing and emphasizes that it is essential for all the peoples of the former Yugoslavia to engage in collective soulsearching, with a view to creating the conditions for a lasting peace in people's minds; stresses in this connection the expiatory role of the International Tribunal for War Crimes in the former Yugoslavia and the obligation for all the governments of the States that originated from former Yugoslavia to collaborate with it and seizing and delivering to it war criminals;

20. Considers that humanitarian aid should also take account of war orphans, singleparent families and women who have been victims of violence, in view of these people's need for social aid programmes and psychological support and education;

21. Calls for extra attention to be devoted to the approximately 300 000 military personnel who are to be demobilized, including many young people in the various republics of the former Yugoslavia, and stresses that young people in particular will require psychological rehabilitation and a good deal of education to prepare them to play a normal rôle in the multicultural society which needs to be established; calls for these young people to be involved in the process of building that society;

22. Stresses the vital role which the NGOs have played and are still playing in managing humanitarian aid, and calls for their action to be coordinated in order to maximise the effectiveness of humanitarian programmes; notes that many NGO workers are working very long hours under very difficult conditions, and calls on the Commission to make arrangements together with the NGOs for temporary replacement when it is necessary;

23. Calls on the Commission to support the establishment in Bosnia-Herzegovina of NGOs reflecting the existence of the three ethnic communities there, in order to permit the revival of a multi-ethnic society based on tolerance and European humanist values;

24. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and the parliaments of the states once part of former Yugoslavia and the UN High Representative.

B EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

1. The agreement of 12 November 1995 on Eastern Slavonia, and the agreements on peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, initialled at Dayton on 21 November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995, put an end to a murderous war which had lasted more than four years and had arisen from the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia.

The 'Dayton peace agreement', imposed by American diplomacy, fragile as it is, offers the peoples of the former Yugoslavia an opportunity to begin living together again within the borders of the successor States of the former Yugoslav Federation. The Dayton accords provide that the current ceasefire should be accompanied by political and military measures capable of creating the conditions for coexistence between the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the same time, the agreement on Eastern Slavonia offers the possibility for a peaceful solution to this thorny problem.

2. The Dayton/Paris accords in particular are intrinsically fragile. First of all the USA's involvement in the force implementing the agreements (I-FOR) is restricted to one year, in view of the American electoral timetable. Secondly the constitutional arrangements aimed at recreating a multi-ethnic state on the territory of BosniaHerzegovina contain the seeds of a split between the Serb Republic of BosniaHerzegovina on the one hand and the Croat-Muslim federation on the other. Recent developments, both in Sarajevo and in Mostar, show how difficult it is to re-create a multi-ethnic society. If the Croat-Muslim federation does not work, the Dayton accords as a whole, and thus the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state, are jeopardized.

3. In addition to their military and a constitutional components, the Dayton/Paris agreements contain a civilian element, overseen by Mr Carl Bildt, the UN High Representative responsible for the coordination of civilian affairs. It will be recalled that on 15 December 1995 the European Parliament approved a transfer of appropriations permitting the High Representative to establish the administrative services necessary for the completion of his task. That task will be onerous and difficult, since the Dayton accords provide in particular for the return of refugees and the holding of elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

4. On 4 December 1995 the Council of the European Union adopted conclusions on the role which the European Union proposes to play in the context of international efforts towards the reconstruction of the former Yugoslavia, beginning with BosniaHerzegovina. Since then a Conference has been held in London on 8 and 9 December 1995 for the implementation of the Dayton/Paris accords (at which Mr Carl Bildt was appointed UN High Representative of the UN responsible for the implementation of the civilian aspects of these accords) and another in Brussels on 20-21 December 1995 between the donor countries. At the latter of these meetings, organized jointly by the Commission and the World Bank, the donors undertook to provide US$ 669m to cover the most urgent needs for the first few months of 1996.

This meeting was followed by a meeting in Brussels on 12 and 13 April 1996, at which the donors undertook to agree to an additional US$1.23 billion, raising aid for reconstruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina to US$1.8 billion for 1996, on the understanding that an estimated US$5.1 billion will be needed over the next four years. Once again it was the European Union which agreed to make the greatest effort.

5. It is in this general context that the Commission communications on the reconstruction of the former Yugoslavia must be seen. There are four of these:

- reconstruction in the former Yugoslavia (SEC(95)1597)

- humanitarian aid to the former Yugoslavia: prospects and guidelines COM(95)564)

- the European Union's financial contribution to reconstruction in former Yugoslavia (COM(95)581)

- reconstruction in former Yugoslavia: EU aid administration and international aid coordination (COM(95)582).

This report will concentrate on humanitarian assistance to the former Yugoslavia, on which the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy has been asked to draw up a report.

6. In its communication COM(95)564, the Commission stresses that the European Union is the principal financial backer of humanitarian aid to the peoples of the former Yugoslavia. EU aid, including existing bilateral aid, amounted to ECU 1800 million, with the ECHO programme contributing ECU 1180 million. Humanitarian aid provided by the European Union represented 65% of the total aid provided by the international Community since the beginning of the conflict. It should also be noted that the countries of the European Union supplied a majority of the UN troops, many of whom gave their lives. Unfortunately, the European Union, in the absence of a genuine common foreign policy, has not been able to take advantage of this exceptional situation to help the warring parties find a just and lasting peace together.

There are currently 3 600 000 people needing aid in the successor states to the former Yugoslavia, and to this already considerable number must also be added 850 000 refugees who have been taken in by other European countries. This shows the scale of the task facing the international community and its representative Mr Carl BILDT.

7. The number of persons in the former Yugoslavia depending on humanitarian aid breaks down as follows, according to the Commission communication:

- Bosnia-Herzegovina: 2 774 908

- Croatia: 434 423

- Serbia-Montenegro: 371 087.

These figures conceal many human tragedies, since a number of these refugees and displaced persons have either been made unwelcome in the countries to which they have fled, been forced to resettle in territories conquered by force or had to give up all hope of returning home, fearing to live among an ethnic group with whom the coexistence of the pre-war period seems no longer to be possible. It will take a considerable time to heal the wounds caused by the war and enable confidence to be restored between the former warring parties.

One particular problem concerns the Muslim refugees who fled from the enclave of Bihac into Croatia at the time of the joint offensive by Croatia and the Croat-Muslim federation against the fighters supporting Fikret Abdic in August 1995. The Croatian authorities do not recognize the refugee status of these 22 000 persons and are seeking to have them deported to Bosnia-Herzegovina, with all the inconveniences and risks this involves for those who fought against the Sarajevo authorities.

Nor should it be forgotten that the implementation of the Dayton accords themselves is creating waves of refugees, in the Serb suburbs of Sarajevo for example, who will have to be brought back under the authority of the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. These departures, which are not in the spirit of the Dayton accords, are primarily motivated, rightly or wrongly, by fear. After all the years of war, these people are thinking in terms of survival, not in abstract terms.

8. In its communication, the Commission distinguishes between several forms of humanitarian aid:

(a) in the short term it is necessary to ensure that the peoples affected can survive the 1995-96 winter. This involves continuing to provide food aid, pursuing essential programmes in the health and medical fields and psycho-social programmes to help those traumatized by the war (particularly women who have suffered violence), as well as specific winter clothing programmes, fuel provision programmes, the provision of the logistics needed to implement these programmes, and continued support for minimum emergency rehabilitation activities and the implementation of specific shelter programmes for new refugees and displaced persons;

Humanitarian aid should take into account the many orphans who lost their parents during the war, and of the families which have become single-parent families for the same reasons. These people have a need for social assistance and appropriate psychological aid.

(b) in the medium term, we need to reduce people's dependence on humanitarian aid by means of measures to make them self-sufficient while increasing the responsibility of the authorities. This is particularly important in BosniaHerzegovina where the war was waged more fiercely than elsewhere and where a number of infrastructures have been destroyed, including water distribution networks, electricity supplies and medical infrastructures, not to mention housing. Over the four years of the war, humanitarian aid prevented the human disaster from being even greater, but at the same time it served as an alternative to any serious policy of trying to put an end to the conflict;

Particular attention should be given to the rehabilitation of farming so as to permit those affected to regain a degree of self-sufficiency. For the same reasons, health infrastructures should be reestablished, hospitals rebuilt and medical staff who escaped or went into exile encouraged to return.

We should also mention the need to rid the country of the millions of mines laid by the warring parties throughout the war, and should stress the achievements of UNPROFOR, and more recently of I-FOR, in mine disposal operations. It is now the responsibility of each State to continue these operations, with the aid of specialist bodies where appropriate and the financial support of the international community. The refugees have the right to return to areas which offer them sufficient levels of safety.

(c) finally, humanitarian aid must be gradually redirected to make it possible to move from the emergency phase to the reconstruction phase. At that point it will be necessary to restore networks, ease the resettlement and reintegration of displaced persons and encourage the return of qualified people in order to permit the resumption of social and economic activities.

9. The most sensitive problem both in humanitarian and in political terms is undoubtedly that of the return of refugees and displaced persons, including those who have remained within the former Yugoslavia as well as those abroad, a total of some 4.5 million people. Their return needs to be organized in an ordered fashion, guaranteeing their safety and dignity.

There are several aspects to the problem of returning refugees:

(a) how can displaced persons be enabled to return to areas where housing has been systematically destroyed?

(b) how can people be enabled to return to areas where the ethnic make-up of the population has been changed by the war and which harbour people who have themselves been expelled from other regions of the former Yugoslavia?

(c) what can be done for people living in areas which have come under the authority of the Croat-Muslim Federation or of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina following the Dayton Accords? Will humanitarian aid end up aiding and abetting the process of ethnic cleansing, or is it merely a matter of common sense that populations should be transferred in a way which helps consolidate peace?

(d) finally, how can the circa 300 000 soldiers demobilized in the wake of the Dayton accords be returned to full-time employment?

The success of return programmes for refugees and displaced persons depends on the existence of a favourable political environment: an amnesty law, respect for human rights and the rights of minorities, recognition of citizen status without improper discrimination. Refugees returning to their area of origin must enjoy the same level of protection from the authorities of the country concerned as all other citizens. In this context the irreplaceable role played by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and by the NGOs can hardly be stressed too much. With regard to the demobilized soldiers, we need to recreate the conditions required for the resumption of economic activity so that the former soldiers can find jobs.

10. It is clear that the reconstruction of a multi-ethnic society will take time, as we are seeing in Mostar in spite of the efforts by the successive EU administrators - Mr Koschnik and Mr Perez Casado - and their teams. People must be given time to grieve.

The European Union's humanitarian assistance should be guided by two principles:

- in accordance with the principles of independence, impartiality and neutrality laid down by international law, humanitarian aid should not be subjected to political conditions, unlike reconstruction aid;

- the Union must demand that all parties grant freedom of access to humanitarian aid.

11. Humanitarian assistance to the former Yugoslavia cannot be regarded in isolation. It is the prelude to the reconstruction of the regions devastated by the war and must continue until normal conditions have been restored. However, humanitarian aid and the deployment of UN troops were used during the war as an alternative to a dynamic and impartial European policy towards the warring parties, and must not now be used in such a way, compounded possibly by the slow pace of reconstruction, as to keep the former Yugoslavia in a position of dependence, thus postponing the question which will have to be asked one day about the need to guide the region of the former Yugoslavia, and the Balkans as a whole, towards adopting European structures.

12. The European Union must therefore be firm with all the new successor states of the former Yugoslavia to ensure that they respect the European criteria on human rights and the rights of minorities. This presupposes, for example, that the PHARE programme, which is to be extended to cover all these new states, may be suspended in the event of a serious breach of these principles. In the same way, the European Union should not a priori exclude any of these new states from the successive agreements from which the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have benefitted. Slovenia, which was fortunate enough to get out of the war very early, shows the way the others can take, since it is already negotiating a European Association Agreement with the EU.

13. However, this piecemeal approach to the former Yugoslavia is not satisfactory. Everyone agrees that the way in which the recognition of the states of the former Yugoslavia took place, in spite of the criteria laid down in 1991 and the opinions of the Badinter Committee, was not satisfactory. Rather than encouraging the fragmentation of the former Yugoslavia, the European Union should aim in the long term, once the prospects for peace have been firmly established, to reconstitute a Yugoslav Economic Area which might form part of a Balkan-wide economic and security area. The European Union should then help by means of negotiation to reintegrate this region into Europe as a whole: it has after all sufficient financial and other instruments at its disposal to make such a policy attractive.

14. Having set out these broad objectives, we must now, while remaining within the framework of this report, look to see how humanitarian aid can be used to help achieve them stage by stage:

(a) firstly, humanitarian aid has an important role to play through its psycho-social programmes. The war in the former Yugoslavia demonstrated strikingly how repressed experiences can return in force. It is as if history had stopped in 1945 with Tito and had resumed in 1991, since any debate on the Second World War had been impossible during the Tito period. Any future psycho-social programmes should aim to revive dialogue among the southern Slav peoples by overcoming prejudices, fears and repressed experiences. Public education should have the same goal;

(b) next, measures should be taken to help restore confidence among the southern Slav peoples. The joint administration of EU humanitarian aid by representatives of the Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims should make it possible to restore the dialogue between the three communities and to lay the foundations for future cooperation within a Bosnia-Herzegovina founded upon tolerance and European humanist values.

The European Union should therefore encourage the formation of genuinely triethnic local NGOs with a view to allowing a new civil society to emerge in BosniaHerzegovina. The Commission should coordinate the activities of all nongovernmental and other organizations involved in humanitarian aid with a view to maximizing their impact.

15. Beyond this, the EU ought to become the guarantor, in the context of the CFSP, of respect for the rights of minorities and should, in some cases, be made responsible for protecting these rights, particularly when the I-FOR mandate has expired. This would be a concrete and useful example of preventive diplomacy and would at the same time permit the European Union to assert itself and resume the responsibilities which it abdicated when it called on the UN.

16. The Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy therefore supports the implementation of a humanitarian assistance programme to the former Yugoslavia, starting with Bosnia-Herzegovina, without any special conditions attached except that the aid should be able to reach all those in need without let or hindrance.

Humanitarian aid should form part of the programmes for the reconstruction of the zones devastated by the war and should therefore create the conditions to make reconstruction possible. It is not merely a matter of physically rebuilding infrastructures destroyed in the war but also of reconstructing minds so that forgiveness (not to be confused with forgetfulness) can take the place of the warlike attitudes which have prevailed hitherto.

17. The efforts which the EU and the international community proposing to make to help the former Yugoslavia will have a greater chance of success if the various successor states of the federation are offered the prospect of integration into the structures of democratic Europe, always on the understanding that they too satisfy the conditions for such a rapprochement.

This will take time but it is clear that the integration into the EU of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe cannot take place without at least envisaging a similar integration for the Balkans. The stability and security of Europe as a whole presupposes the stabilization of the Balkan region. The EU cannot evade its responsibilities any longer and must do everything it can to reintegrate the Balkan states into the democratic and security structures of Europe.

O P I N I O N

(Rule 147 of the Rules of Procedure)

of the Committee on Budgets

for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy

Draftsman: Mr Jean-Antoine Giansily

At its meeting of 24 January 1996 the Committee on Budgets appointed Mr Giansily draftsman.

At its meeting of 22 May 1996 it considered the draft opinion and adopted the conclusions as a whole unanimously.

The following took part in the vote: Samland, chairman; Tillich, first vice-chairman; Porto, second vice-chairman; Willockx, third vice-chairman; Giansily, draftsman; Bösch, Brinkhorst, Colom i Naval, Desama (for Dankert), Di Prima, Dührkop Dührkop, Elles, Fabra Vallés, Fabre-Aubrespy, Haug, König, McCartin, Miranda, Müller, Tappin, Trautmann, von Habsburg (for Theato), Waidelich and Wynn.

This opinion relates to one of the three communications from the Commission to the Council between September and November 1995, concerning the aid hitherto supplied to the former Yugoslavia or the arrangements for future aid. Although all three communications relate essentially to the same complex of topics, they each have their own separate priorities:

- reconstruction in the former Yugoslavia;

- prospects and priorities for humanitarian aid;

- EU aid administration and international aid coordination.

These communications describe and analyze in detail the situation in the former Yugoslavia and the needs for extensive international aid measures.

However the state of implementation of concrete aid measures has now fundamentally changed, since many of the proposed measures have already been initiated, implemented and/or concluded, e.g.:

- conclusion of the Paris peace agreement;

- London conference of 8-9 December 1995;

- appointment of the High Representative Carl Bildt and his administration;

- first donor conference in Brussels on 20-21 December 1995;

- second donor conference in Brussels on 12-13 April 1996.

On these occasions the framework conditions for reconstruction, the funding by international donors, humanitarian aid and coordination were worked out and jointly adopted.

The Commission communications define two main priorities: the guaranteeing of emergency humanitarian aid to relieve immediate distress, and the transition from emergency aid to sustainable reconstruction measures. The reconstruction programme comprises the following individual objectives:

- establishment and reinforcement of democratic institutions;

- protection of human rights, the rule of law and fundamental freedoms;

- strengthening civil society;

- construction and stabilization of a market economy;

- development of the private sector by encouraging investment to small and medium-sized undertakings;

- restoration of normal economic links between the States of former Yugoslavia;

- reconstruction and modernization of electricity, water, transport and telecommunication networks;

- participation of these countries in the international economy;

- development of cooperation with the European Union.

These objectives can now be counted among the international aid measures which have been initiated.

The Committee on Budgets has supported these objectives since the beginning of negotiations on aid activities in former Yugoslavia and has encouraged the financial participation of the European Union.

However, the financial aspects of the aid measures raise a number of problems both in the context of the international donor community and as regards the amount to be paid from the European Union budget, with the result that the finance the World Bank has estimated as necessary for these objectives over the next four years until 1999 does not appear to be guaranteed. The Committee on Budgets has discussed aspects of the provision of adequate finance in its own report on this subject (cf. Giansily report on the Commission Communication on the European Union's financial contribution to reconstruction in the former Yugoslavia, PE 216.935).

Without wishing to go into the financial aspects again in detail, the Committee on Budgets recalls that the funding and implementation of the aid measures referred to in the Commission's communications are generally dependent on a number of conditions, the fulfilment of which appears essential in order both to achieve the objectives and to enable a credible case to be put within the Union for the commitment of appropriations. With regard to the humanitarian aid, however, it should be added that Parliament advocates that such aid should be granted unconditionally.

O P I N I O N

(Rule 147 of the Rules of Procedure)

of the Committee on External Economic Relations

for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy

Draftsman: Mrs Concepció Ferrer

At its meeting of 19 December 1995 the Committee on External Economic Relations appointed Mrs Concepció Ferrer draftsman.

At its meetings of 20 March 1996, 22 April 1996 and 29 May 1996, it examined the draft opinions.

At the last meeting, the conclusions were adopted unanimously.

The following took part in the vote: De Clercq (chairman), Hindley (vice-chairman), Ferrer (draftsman), Elchlepp, Kreissl-Dörfler, Malerba, Miranda de Lage, Novo, Nußbaumer, Sturdy (for Verwaerde), Titley (for Moniz), Wiersma (for Smith) and Valdivielso de Cué.

I. INTRODUCTION

Following the end of a four-year war and the beginning of the peace process in the former Yugoslavia, a major effort now has to be made by the European Union and the international community to help reconstruct a region which has been torn apart by war and create the conditions for the gradual consolidation of peace.

In such circumstances, humanitarian aid takes on particular importance in view of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The statistics speak for themselves: 80% of the population (i.e. approximately 4.3 million people) are directly affected by the consequences of the conflict, 2.5 million people have moved to other regions and over 500 000 people have sought refuge in approximately 30 different countries. In addition to the problems stemming from this mass exodus, which was provoked by fear of ethnic cleansing and the brutality of the aggressors, there is the difficulty of overcoming hatred and healing the wounds suffered by the civilian population.

In view of the scale of the challenge posed by these difficulties, action by the European Union cannot be restricted merely to ensuring that the Dayton agreements are complied with or to promoting the material reconstruction of the countries of the former Yugoslavia; it must also involve the repatriation of refugees, the return of displaced persons, the establishment of a just order based on dialogue and the kind of conciliation which will make it possible for peace to be established and a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society to be recreated in the region. This is precisely the intention behind the Commission's Communication on humanitarian aid to the former Yugoslavia, which forms the subject of this opinion.

In addition to providing an exhaustive analysis of the situation and the most urgent needs of refugees and displaced persons and to describing the main features of the programmes which the European Union - the main donor of humanitarian aid to the people of the former Yugoslavia - has implemented since the start of the conflict, the Commission Communication proposes that the provision of humanitarian aid should be adapted to the changes associated with the Dayton peace agreements in order to meet current requirements.

However, in laying down guidelines for short- and medium-term humanitarian aid the Commission allows for a continuum between a state of emergency and rehabilitation comprising accompanying measures to facilitate social reintegration, urgent rehabilitation (in particular water and electricity) and primary healthcare assistance but does not, in the draftsman's view, take into account the moral requirements which must be met as a prerequisite for peace. Humanitarian action by the European Union should also be directed towards creating the conditions which will make it possible to break down the barriers created by the war and to ensure that, from the ashes of hatred and violence, there emerges a reconciled society which is able to progress in a unified fashion towards a shared future.

The task is enormous - hence the need not just to secure a substantial increase in the financial resources allocated for 1996 but also to ensure complementarity amongst all the funds from other sources which are intended for humanitarian aid in the former Yugoslavia - aid which the Commission should undertake to channel in order to increase the effectiveness thereof. There should also be greater coordination amongst the various instruments available to the Commission for the carrying out of humanitarian aid initiatives and, in particular, activities of bodies working for the establishment of peace and reconciliation should be strengthened.

II. CONCLUSIONS

The REX Committee calls on the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy to include the following paragraphs in the motion for a resolution when adopting its report:

1. Considers that the reconstruction of the former Yugoslavia is a huge medium- and long-term task which is not restricted to easing the consequences of the war by securing acceptable living conditions for the victims thereof but also requires the countries of the former Yugoslavia to undertake a difficult transition towards fully democratic and pluralist political systems and towards a market economy;

2. Stresses that the establishment of peace in the former Yugoslavia provides the opportunity for creating a legal and institutional framework for the countries of the former Yugoslavia with a view to organizing the functioning of the new democratic institutions, ensuring respect for human rights and the rights of minorities and drawing up legislation to facilitate the free movement of goods, services and persons in the region;

3. Considers that attempts to consolidate peace must include overcoming the implicit contradiction between the IFOR mission mandate, which is being rapidly carried out and should be completed by the end of 1996, and the actual state of affairs in the region, which is acting as a brake on the process of reconciliation between the various parties which, to a large extent, will depend on the intensification of reconstruction efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina;

4. Considers that the reconstruction of the former Yugoslavia should above all include a social dimension to ensure that the financial resources allocated are assigned directly to projects which assist the local population, rather than to vast economic projects;

5. Points out that the return of refugees to their places of origin is an essential aspect of reconstruction and reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia and that, to ensure successful reintegration, economic recovery must be boosted, otherwise the mass repatriation of refugees and the return of displaced persons could destabilize the political situation in the region and provoke social conflicts which may jeopardize the peace agreements;

6. Calls on the Member States to devise a coordinated strategy to ensure that the voluntary repatriation of refugees resident in their respective territories takes place in accordance with minimum standards of safety and human dignity, and then to assess what can actually be done by way of rehabilitation;

7. Stresses the need for the donor countries to coordinate their humanitarian aid efforts on the basis of the plan drawn up by the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), whose guiding role it supports;

8. Also considers it essential that the unity of action guaranteed by the joint UNHCR plan should not diminish the visibility of the major financial effort being made by the European Union as the principal humanitarian aid donor and, accordingly, calls on the Commission to put this principle into practice so as to ensure that the Union's efforts acquire the visibility they deserve;

9.Calls on the Commission, through the local presence of ECHO, to follow, monitor and assess humanitarian aid programmes and to ensure that humanitarian aid is appropriately combined with other forms of medium-term aid such as technical assistance under the Phare programme and forthcoming programmes to assist the reconstruction and development of the former Yugoslavia;

10.Considers it essential to provide greater support for local humanitarian aid structures in the region which are associated with EU non-governmental organizations;

11.Considers that humanitarian aid should be gradually redirected away from emergency measures towards initiatives concerned with medium-term development and, accordingly, takes the view that priority should be given to the reconstruction of basic infrastructures and services managed at local level with the full involvement of the local people and authorities;

12.Considers that emergency humanitarian aid should be targeted at the most vulnerable sections of the population, particularly children; in this respect, considers that priority should be given to the health and education of children by means of preventive measures (vaccination campaigns) and programmes to help them catch up on the schooling which they have missed because of the war;

13.Considers that EU humanitarian aid should be used to launch information campaigns in schools aimed at preventing the danger which anti-personnel mines represent to children;

14.Points out that one-and-a-half million children have been physically and psychologically traumatised by the war in the former Yugoslavia and therefore considers it essential to train teachers to help children get over the long-term consequences of the war;

15.Stresses the need for EU humanitarian aid to be used to finance peace education programmes aimed particularly at children and designed to encourage tolerance amongst the peoples of the region.

OPINION

(Rule 147 of the Rules of Procedure)

of the Committee on Development and Cooperation

for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy

Draftsman: Hanja R.H. Maij-Weggen

At its meeting of 20 December 1995, the Committee on Development and Cooperation appointed Mrs Maij-Weggen draftsman.

At its meeting of 28 May 1996, it considered the draft opinion.

At that meeting, it adopted the conclusions as a whole unanimously.

The following took part in the vote: Kouchner, chairman; Wurtz, vice-chairman; MaijWeggen, draftsman; Aelvoet (for Telkämper), Aldo, Andersson (for Junker), AndréLéonard (for Goerens), Andrews, Fernández-Martin, Günther, Martens, Needle, Paakkinen, Pettinari and Sauquillo Pérez Del Arco.

1. Comments on the Commission document on humanitarian aid to the former Yugoslavia (COM(95)0564 final)

1.1 Financing of humanitarian aid

The Commission document indicates that since 1991 the European Union has been the largest donor of humanitarian aid to the former Yugoslavia. Since the beginning of the war in the former Yugoslavia, the EU has contributed ECU 1.6 billion for this purpose, thus providing 60% of all humanitarian aid to the area during the period concerned. Nearly ECU 1.1 billion came from ECHO. The remainder came, inter alia, from budget heading B7-214 (humanitarian aid to countries in Central and Eastern Europe) and from the emergency aid reserves.

ECHO is not only the biggest donor of humanitarian aid to the former Yugoslavia: since ECHO became operational in 1991, the European Union has been the biggest donor of humanitarian aid in the world. In the past five years, such aid has been provided to more than 60 countries worldwide. It mainly comprises food aid (40%), clothing, medical supplies and emergency restoration of essential services such as water, electricity, gas, transport and communications.

Over the first five years, ECHO's budget has more than trebled, from ECU 195 320 000 in 1991 to ECU 692 092 512 in 1996. The former Yugoslavia is the largest recipient of aid from ECHO's budget. In 1994 and 1995 35.3% (ECU 269 m) and 33.9% (ECU 234 m) respectively went to the former Yugoslavia, around 50% of it to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In addition to humanitarian aid, reconstruction aid is now being provided. At the first donor conference in Brussels on 20 and 21 December 1995, US$ 669 m was pledged, of which $ 306 m via the EU ($ 114 m from the EU budget and $ 192 m via the EU Member States). At a second donor conference in Brussels on 14 April, $ 1.2 billion was pledged, including $ 268 m via the EU budget and $ 156 m via the various EU Member States.

The difference between humanitarian aid and reconstruction aid is that humanitarian aid is intended mainly as emergency aid/aid to enable people to survive in acute emergencies. This means that humanitarian aid is of an apolitical character, i.e. no political conditions are attached to it. On the other hand, political conditions are attached to reconstruction aid; these are laid down in the Dayton accords.

In view of the essential difference between apolitical humanitarian emergency aid and conditional reconstruction aid, it is particularly important to avoid any unnecessary mingling of the two aid flows, despite the difficult situation throughout the area. The pressure to draw on humanitarian aid in cases where the conditions for reconstruction aid are not met but certain projects nonetheless need to be carried out is already too great, and could become ever greater. Yet the Union too must be called upon to yield to it as little as possible. It will not be good for development in the area itself, and the ECHO budget, which is intended not only for the former Yugoslavia but also for emergencies in other parts of the world, is already permanently too small.

The general picture with regard to aid

Despite the Dayton accords, the political context in which the Union and the NGOs with which it is cooperating are providing humanitarian aid is still very delicate, very threatening and also very unpredictable. There is enormous pressure on the people and aid workers, because the aim of the original aggression - ethnic cleansing - has largely been achieved and in fact seems to be continuing. This is happening despite the fact that the fighting has practically been halted and the military forces under IFOR have succeeded reasonably well in establishing their temporary authority in the area. One of the speakers at the European Parliament's hearing on 23 April 1996 described the situation as follows: the war has been halted, but peace is still far from having been achieved.

A war in which human rights were violated in such an inconceivable manner, in which more than 100 000 people were killed and more than 10 000 are still missing, in which tens of thousands of people were disabled for the rest of their lives, in which tens of thousands of women, including many children, were systematically sexually assaulted and raped, and in which a large part of the population was seriously traumatized, cannot be ended by an imposed peace accord. Such a war will have well nigh intolerable repercussions for a long time to come, and hostilities could resume again and again; aid will remain indispensable for a long while.

In addition to the personal, human dramas, there is also huge dislocation of social structures. Whole communities, villages and towns have been dispersed by ethnic cleansing, which occurred on a large scale. Under the Dayton accords the multicultural society must be restored, but the dilemmas are enormous. Many people have left their home areas because of the aggression and are refugees, either in another part of the country or elsewhere in Europe. Can one compel people to return to an area where their families were cruelly murdered, where their rapists remain at liberty, where the administration is in the hands of the former aggressors and where they will regard themselves permanently as a threatened minority? According to the speakers at the hearing on 23 April, this will be possible only once those who committed murder or rape are being punished and once the long-term safety of returnees is guaranteed.

In addition to these personal and social/cultural upheavals, there has been enormous destruction of the physical infrastructure, which makes it even more difficult or in many cases impossible to live and work. 60% of the houses in Bosnia have been seriously damaged, and 15% completely destroyed. This figure is an average. In some areas, the destruction is almost total. In addition, schools, hospitals, business premises, drinking water supplies, electricity and telephone networks and roads, railways, bridges etc. have been seriously damaged.

Humanitarian aid, which is designed mainly to help people survive, must primarily concern itself with people's immediate needs: food and clothing, the basic necessities to enable them to live, medical care and above all psychological counselling for trauma victims. First steps must also be taken towards a possible restoration of the multicultural society. Emergency provision of water, gas, electricity, transport and communications must also be financed from humanitarian aid funds. However, civil reconstruction and the restoration of the infrastructure must be paid for using reconstruction aid funds. The dividing line must not be drawn too rigidly in financing them, but the differing characters of the two aid flows must be respected in so far as possible.

At present some 2.7 million people in Bosnia-Herzegovina are dependent on humanitarian aid, in Croatia 405 000, and in Serbia-Montenegro around 354 000. Altogether, nearly 4 million people are dependent on it in the area as a whole.

1.3 The return of refugees

The ethnic violence of recent years has sparked off large refugee movements in the former Yugoslavia, and especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There are some 3.6 million refugees within the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and a further approximately 850 000 in other European countries or elsewhere.

UNHCR is responsible for organizing and assisting the return of refugees; it has more experience in this field than any other body in the world. UNHCR has agreed with the countries which are hosting refugees that their return should take place in stages: first displaced persons within Bosnia-Herzegovina, then refugees and displaced persons in other republics of the former Yugoslavia, and finally refugees and displaced persons from third countries. UNHCR receives much of its funding for this work from the European Union.

In view of the ethnic dimension of the refugee issue, which is directly linked to the cause of the war, it is important to be very careful when returning people. The countries where the refugees are living must be urged to support the policy of UNHCR and help to avoid too rapid and forced a return with insufficient preparation.

The European Union can play a positive role in a well-organized return programme by means of satisfactory agreements with UNHCR and the Member States. The EU mainly supports UNHCR through ECHO. This assistance will have to be continued for a number of years. The same applies to aid to NGOs receiving the people at local level. This form of assistance too will have to be of a multi-year character. Formally, the aim is to return refugees within two years. However, NGOs have said that in order for the process to be carried out with care it will have to take between three and five years.

1.4 Ascertaining the fate of missing persons and prisoners

Another major problem is the large number of missing persons. The International Red Cross (ICRC) is mainly dealing with this issue. It too receives most of its funding for this work from the EU. Formally, 12 000 people have been registered missing with the ICRC. It is not clear whether they are dead or are living elsewhere as refugees. In Srebrenica alone, between 3000 and 8000 people are missing. It is extremely important for their families and relatives to know whether they are still alive. Otherwise it will hardly be possible for them to start a new life. Help in seeking missing persons and locating mass graves and assistance with identification are therefore essential. ECHO is now contributing generously to the budget of the ICRC. This funding will continue to be needed for a long time, until the fate of most of the missing persons is known.

In this connection, the search for war criminals must also be actively pursued. So far, 52 people have been charged at the Tribunal in The Hague. It is extremely important, partly to promote the return of refugees and the restoration of peace and order, that murderers and rapists should be punished. The EU has decided not to provide any economic aid - i.e. reconstruction aid - to parties which refuse to cooperate with the Tribunal in The Hague. It is particularly important to ensure that humanitarian aid, which is always provided, does not take the place of the denied reconstruction aid in such cases.

1.5 Mine clearance

More than five million landmines are believed to have been laid in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Mines thus outnumber the entire population of the area. Areas in other republics have also been mined. They have already killed many people and caused irremediable injury to both adults and children, and it is very important that they should be cleared as quickly as possible: otherwise the suffering of the war will be perpetuated, with casualties continuing.

Under the terms of the Dayton accords, all parties are obliged to inform IFOR of the location of landmines so that the areas concerned can be marked and cleared. This process is proceeding very slowly. If it is necessary to be able to clear the mines more quickly in the interests of the humanitarian work of UNHCR, the ICRC and NGOs, your draftsman considers that it would be perfectly proper to use ECHO funding for this purpose.

1.6 Notes on the practical aid and basic facilities

In 1995 the humanitarian aid provided by the European Union was used as follows:

Republic Type of aid

Bosnia-Herzegovina 52.4% Food aid 32.4%

Croatia (+UNPAS) 21.4% Sanitation 8.6%

Serbia/Montenegro 18.0% Medical aid 16.3%

Slovenia 0.7% Logistics 8.4%

FYROM (Macedonia) 4.2% Psychological/social aid 3.3%

All republics 3.1% Emergency facilities 17.6%

Turkey/Hungary 0.2% Other 13.3%

At the hearing of 23 April, the NGOs added the following comments:

* The aid provided by the EU is very substantial; without it far more people would have died last winter and it would have been impossible for the NGOs to provide the aid they did. However, the aid must continue for several years yet.

* In addition to food aid, it is very important to provide emergency facilities for housing, clean water, gas, electricity, transport and communications, particularly when refugees return.

* Too little psychological and social counselling is available for trauma victims. In particular, relatives of missing persons, women and children who have been victims of rape, the disabled, and people, including children, who have witnessed many acts of cruelty, are in urgent need of assistance. There is too little specialist assistance for women.

* Sociocultural and mental assistance is urgently needed to help set up multicultural organizations. At present there is a danger that schools, hospitals and social institutions may become permanently segregated.

* More than 300 000 military personnel are being demobilized. Proper arrangements must be made for receiving these people, and they must be put to work as quickly as possible. There is a tendency for young ex-soldiers to form gangs, making them a fresh danger to public safety.

* Large numbers of people must not be allowed to remain dependent on humanitarian aid for too long. It is important that education, agriculture, trade and industry should become operational quickly. The local people and returning refugees must be actively involved in reconstruction, as must demobilized soldiers.

1.7 The NGOs

The way in which NGOs are working throughout the former war zones, often with ECHO funding, deserves nothing but praise. It is very important that they should not only carry out their operational work but should also be involved in policy-making and decisions on how to tackle the problems. They are very well informed about what is most needed and what effect aid has in practice.

At the same time it should be mentioned that staff of NGOs, including those who belong to the local population, often work very long days and have to work in very difficult conditions. Temporary replacement is sometimes necessary to enable people to continue with this difficult work over a long period. Arrangements - and funding - are needed for this purpose.

Conclusions

In view of the above, the following amendments should be made to the resolution in the Alavanos report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy.

Amendment 1

Paragraph -1 (new)

-1. Notes that the European Union is the largest donor of humanitarian aid to the former Yugoslavia and that the Union thus bears an extra responsibility with regard to the use to which the aid is put;

Amendment 2

Paragraph 1 (formerly paragraph 4)

1. Considers it important that humanitarian aid be allocated to all the peoples of the area without political conditions in accordance with the principles of independence, impartiality and neutrality laid down in international law, and that the former warring parties undertake to guarantee freedom of access to such aid;

Amendment 3

Paragraphs 1a and 1b (new)

1a. Stresses that, in providing humanitarian aid, the emphasis should be on emergency aid, such as food and clothing aid, medical supplies and aid to trauma victims, emergency repairs to homes, hospitals and essential utilities such as water, gas, electricity, transport and communications; considers that urgently required mine clearance can also be defined as humanitarian aid;

1b. Notes that humanitarian aid is of a different character from reconstruction aid, because under the terms of the Dayton accords reconstruction aid is subject to political conditions; stresses therefore that, although excessive rigidity must be avoided, humanitarian aid cannot be used for projects which fall within the definition of reconstruction aid;

Amendment 4

Paragraph 3

3. Calls on the European Union to use its influence with all the former warring parties to ensure that they grant refugee status to all those expelled from their homes by the war (twenty-five words deleted);

Amendment 5

Paragraph 5

5. Considers that good cooperation between the European Union, the international community and the former warring parties in implementing humanitarian aid would make it possible to create the conditions for a positive, forward-looking dialogue between the former warring parties;

Amendment 6

Paragraph 6

6. Stresses that the objective of humanitarian aid must, in the short term, be to ensure the survival of the people concerned in conditions of safety and dignity and that, in the medium term, reconstruction aid must permit them to regain some degree of self-sufficiency, particularly (two words deleted) by the supply of seed, fertilizer and machinery which would permit the resumption of farming, and by assisting small and medium-sized businesses, re-establishing schools and hospitals and restoring the infrastructure;

Amendment 7

Paragraph 7

7. Stresses the urgency of a mine-clearing operation to permit the resumption of normal life in Bosnia-Herzegovina and welcomes the work already accomplished by UNPROFOR and later by I-FOR in this area, while recognizing that this operation will require years of effort to clear the country of the millions of mines laid there, and considers it acceptable that mine clearance which is urgently needed should be funded partly from humanitarian aid resources;

Amendment 8

Paragraph 8

8. Stresses that (four words deleted) humanitarian aid must ease the transition from the emergency phase to the reconstruction phase and permit the re-establishment of networks (gas, electricity, drinking water, postal services, telephone), facilitate the re-settlement and re-integration of those displaced and encourage the return of qualified people with a view to permitting the resumption of social and economic activity;

Amendment 9

Paragraph 9 (replaces Paragraphs 9 and 10)

9. Considers that the European Union's humanitarian aid should make a positive contribution to the return of refugees and displaced persons to their region of origin; notes however that many difficulties still remain to be overcome to enable refugees to return to areas where they constitute a cultural minority and that their return must be carried out in proper consultation with UNHCR, which means that it should not be overhasty; calls on the Union not to cooperate unnecessarily in any further ethnic segregation and above all to work to promote the security and protection of the multicultural communities;

Amendment 10

Paragraph 12a (new)

12a. Notes that 12 000 people are registered as missing and that they must be found or their graves located; considers that the Union should assist in financing these investigations and necessary identifications so that close relatives can know their fate for sure, partly because otherwise it will be almost impossible for them to make a fresh start;

Amendment 11

Paragraph 12b (new)

12b. Considers that war criminals who have committed murder, rape and other crimes must be traced and surrendered to the Tribunal in The Hague; stresses that it is impossible for people to live in an area where murderers and rapists are still at large and that it is not acceptable that refugees should be unable to return for this reason;

Amendment 12

Paragraph 14a (new)

14a. Calls for extra attention to be devoted to the approximately 300 000 military personnel who are to be demobilized, including many young people in the various republics of the former Yugoslavia, and stresses that young people in particular will require mental retraining and a good deal of education to prepare them to perform a normal function in the multicultural society which needs to be established; calls for these young people to be involved in the process of building it;