REPORT on the Communication from the Commission 'Agenda 2000 - for a stronger and wider Union' (COM(97)2000 -C4-0371/97 ) (Co-rapporteurs: Ms Magda AELVOET, Mr Jörn DONNER, Mr Otto von HABSBURG, Mr Ernesto CACCAVALE, Mr Frode KRISTOFFERSEN, Ms Magdalene HOFF, Mr Carlos CARNERO GONZALEZ, Mr Pierre BERNARD-RAYMOND, Mr Roberto SPECIALE, Mr Jan Marinus WIERSMA, Mr JanWillem BERTENS)

19 November 1997

Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy
Rapporteurs: Mr Arie OOSTLANDER/Mr Enrique BARON CRESPO

By letter of 6 July 1993 the Commission forwarded to Parliament its opinion on the application for accession to the Community of the Republic of Cyprus (COM(93)0313 - C4-0583/97). By letter of 16 July 1997 the Commission forwarded to Parliament its communication 'Agenda 2000 -for a stronger and wider Union' (COM(97)2000 - C40371/97) and its opinions on the applications for accession by Hungary (COM(97)2001 - C4-0373/97), Poland (COM(97)2002 - C40374/97), Romania ((COM(97)2003 - C4-0375/97), Slovakia (COM(97)2004 -C4-0376/97 ), Latvia (COM(97)2005 -C4-0377/97 ), Estonia (COM(97)2006 -C4-0378/97 ), Lithuania (COM(97)2007 - C40379/97), Bulgaria (COM(97)2008 - C4-0380/97), the Czech Republic (COM(97)2009 - C4-0381/97) and Slovenia (COM(97)2010 - C4-0382/97).

At the sittings of 18 July 1997 and 17 November 1997 the President of Parliament announced that he had forwarded the latter communication to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy as the committee responsible and to all the committees interested for their opinions.

At its meeting of 2 December 1994, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy had appointed Mr Jan-Willem Bertens rapporteur on Cyprus.

At its meeting of 23 June 1997 it appointed Mr Arie M. Oostlander rapporteur on 'A Strategy for Enlargement', Mr Enrique Bar?n Crespo rapporteur on 'The Impact on EU policies', Mr Otto von Habsburg rapporteur on Hungary, Ms Magdalene Hoff rapporteur on Poland, Mr Pierre Bernard Raymond rapporteur on Romania, Mr Jan Marinus Wiersma rapporteur on Slovakia, Mr Ernesto Caccavale rapporteur on Latvia, Mr Jörn Donner rapporteur on Estonia, Mr Frode Kristoffersen rapporteur on Lithuania, Ms Magda Aelvoet rapporteur on Bulgaria, Mr Carlos Carnero Gonzalez rapporteur on the Czech Republic and Mr Roberto Speciale rapporteur on Slovenia.

At its meetings of 16 July, 3 September, 16 September, 24 September, 1 October, 29 October and 17 November 1997 it considered the Commission communication and the draft report.

At the last meeting it adopted the motion for a resolution by 31 votes to 10, with 4 abstentions.

The following were present for the vote: Spencer, chairman; Cushnahan, 3rd vice-chairman; Barón Crespo and Oostlander, rapporteurs; Aelvoet, Bernard-Raymond, Bertens, Caccavale, Donner, Habsburg, Hoff, Kristoffersen, Speciale and Wiersma, co-rapporteurs; André-Léonard, Berès (for Fouque), Burenstam Linder, Cars, Daskalaki, Dupuis, Frischenschlager (for La Malfa), Gahrton, Hänsch, Imbeni (for Occhetto), Lambraki (for Avgerinos), Lenz, Linser, Mutin, Swoboda (for Newens), Pack (for Bianco), Piha, Poettering, Rothe (for Cotigny), Roubatis, Saint-Pierre (for Lalumière), Sakellariou, Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra, Spaak (for Väyrynen), Schroedter (for CohnBendit), Schwaiger (for Graziani), Stenzel, Terrón i Cusí (for Mendiluce Pereiro), Theorin, Tindemans, Titley and Truscott.

The explanatory statements, the opinions of the committees and the letters from the European Parliament delegations to the joint parliamentary committees will be published separately.

The report was tabled on 19 November 1997.

The deadline for tabling amendments will be indicated on the draft agenda for the relevant partsession.

A MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

Resolution on the Communication from the Commission 'Agenda 2000 - for a stronger and wider Union' (COM(97)2000 -C4-0371/97 )

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the Commission communication of 15 July 1997 Agenda 2000 - For a stronger and wider Union (COM(97)2000 - C4-0371/97)[1],

- having regard to the conclusions of the European Councils of Copenhagen (21-22 June 1993), Essen (9-10 December 1994) and Madrid (15-16 December 1995),

- having regard to the conclusions of the European Council of Florence in June 1996 that accession negotiations with Cyprus should start six months after the conclusion of the Intergovernmental Conference,

- having regard to the European Council of Amsterdam in June 1997 which concluded that with the successful conclusion of the Intergovernmental Conference the way is now open for the launching of the enlargement process in accordance with the conclusions of the Madrid European Council,

- having regard to its resolution of 20 January 1993 on the structure and strategy for the European Union with regard to its enlargement and the creation of a Europe-wide level [2],

- having regard to its resolution of 12 July 1995 on Cyprus's request for membership of the European Union[3],

- having regard to its resolution of 17 April 1996 on the White Paper on the preparation of the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe for integration into the internal market of the Union[4],

- having regard to its resolution of 19 November 1997 on the Treaty of Amsterdam

- having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy, and the opinions of Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, the Committee on Budgets, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy, the Committee on Research, Technological Development and Energy, the Committee on External Economic Relations, the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on Regional Policy, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection, the Committee on Culture, Youth, Education and the Media, the Committee on Development and Cooperation, the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs, the Committee on Institutional Affairs, the Committee on Budgetary Control, Committee on Fisheries and the Committee on Women's Rights (A4-0368/97).

A. whereas any country which is situated in Europe and which has democratic institutions can legitimately aspire to join the Union,

B.. whereas enlargement is a moral, political and economic challenge for the EU and presents an historic opportunity to shape the future of Europe,

C. whereas enlargement is a response to the changes that have taken place on the European continent since the largely peaceful liberation of Central and Eastern Europe between 1989 and 1991,

D. whereas enlargement is in the interest of both the EU and the applicant states, and is expected to lay the foundations for a broader Communitarian Europe based on the rule of law, democracy, peace, solidarity and human dignity,

E. whereas a well-functioning Union, reinforced by the enlargement rather than weakened, is in the interest of both the applicant countries and the current Member States,

F. taking into account the Commission"s assessment of the result of the Council of Amsterdam in 1997, bearing in mind the need to reform the institutions of the Union before enlargement takes place,

G. whereas, in any event, accession to the European Union is possible only after the institutional reform of the European Union,

H. convinced that the enlargement of the EU must be considered and handled as part of an overall design for the task of European integration,

I. whereas the European Council of Copenhagen in 1993 stipulated that applicant countries must have:

(1) stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;

(2) a functioning market economy;

(3) the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union;

(4) the ability to take on the obligations of membership, which are related to the acquis, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union,

J. whereas the Council at its Madrid summit in 1995 called on the Commission to submit, as soon as possible after the IGC, the opinions on the individual applications and to prepare a composite paper on enlargement,

K. noting that according to Agenda 2000 the process leading to accession will start simultaneously for all applicants within the framework of the Reinforced Accession Partnerships (RAP),

L. insisting that an inclusive enlargement strategy, implying the involvement of all applicants in the long-term accession process, is essential to avoid negative side-effects in certain applicant countries,

M. aware of the complexity of the accession process in which several types of negotiations will take place: bilateral negotiations about the way in which the criteria of membership can be met (RAP negotiations), leading to negotiations on the specific constitutional place of the country in the EU, as well as on transition measures and other similar issues, and multilateral talks on common interests in the sectors of the Second and Third Pillars,

N. taking account of the Commission's view that enlargement is an opportunity for the Union not only in terms of its security and economy but also in terms of its culture and that the multilateral talks should concern a common vision of the educational, cultural and information dimension of European integration,

O. noting that, according to the Opinion of the Commission, all CEECs, with the exception of

– for the time being - Slovakia, fulfil the political criteria of democracy to a sufficient degree,

P. noting that the Commission remarks that none of the applicant CEECs at present fulfils the economic criteria of "Copenhagen", thus acknowledging the logic of all applicant countries participating in the Reinforced Accession Partnership,

Q. aware of the process in the applicant countries in order to improve the capacity and quality of the administrative procedures in the public sector and stressing the need for a continued improvement which could be further advanced through an overall strategy in the applicant country as well as in the EU,

R. taking account of the Commission"s view that, given the highly developed and complex character of the internal market, accession must be based on principles like full respect of the acquis, no 'opt-outs' and no derogations, and the restriction of transition measures to duly justified cases for limited periods of time,

S. taking account of the Commission"s view that the decision to open negotiations with Cyprus should be seen as a positive development which could promote the search for a political settlement,

T. taking account of the opinion of the Commission that Turkey is of high importance to the EU and deserves special attention, but aware of the fact that the relationship with Turkey has particular characteristics which make it different in some ways from that with the CEECs,

U. aware of the gaps in the knowledge of the citizens of the CEECs concerning European integration and the operation of the European Union, and the similar lack of information in the European Union about the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the consequences of enlargement to the east,

V. conscious of the importance to involve all sectors of society in the European Union and the applicant countries, as much as possible, in the process of enlargement and integration,

W. convinced that reform of the common agricultural policy (specifically in those sectors that were excluded from the 1992 reform) and of the regional and cohesion policy is imperative, independently of the accession of one or more new member states,

X. stressing that enlargement to include the 11 applicant countries will bring about a considerable increase in the Union's agricultural potential and will extend the market in raw and processed produce to an additional 100 million consumers;

Y. whereas the devising and implementing of major projects on a European scale in the field of infrastructure, land, sea and air communication routes, regional development, environmental protection, etc., could be facilitated by the enlargement of the Union to include the applicant countries,

Z. convinced that European integration and the forthcoming enlargement will only succeed if the issue of reconciling respect for national interests with the need for solidarity amongst the Member States, whether old or new, is successfully resolved,

AA. whereas enlargement could constitute a major opportunity for the Union, in so far as it will enhance its political and economic potential, offer the 15 Member States the chance to secure new trade outlets, increase its weight in the field of foreign relations and in international institutions, strengthen its position on the international markets and extend its own internal market for trade in goods and investments, and encourage the creation of new jobs,

AB. whereas in view of the levels of democratic and economic development of the applicant countries and the economic, social, strategic and political challenges of enlargement, the forthcoming enlargement will be an event of historic scope which is not comparable with previous enlargements,

AC. believing that given the requisite political will, the end result of the process will be a stronger Union within a more stable Europe, better able to discharge its duties towards its citizens and take up its responsibilities in the international community,

AD. whereas the decision taken by the Commission to preselect the countries that in the medium run would be able to take on the obligations relating to their membership of the European Union is appropriate neither in political terms, since a further break is thus created between the applicant countries, nor in economic terms since it penalizes the central and eastern European countries" capacity for attracting direct foreign investment not taken into account, for economic reasons, when the accession negotiations began,

AE. whereas all the applicant countries have the right to participate in the enlargement process from the start, on the understanding that the duration of negotiations may vary subject to the ability of each country to accept the acquis communautaire and fully meet the criteria laid down at the Copenhagen European Council,

On the Strategy

1. Solemnly declares the European Union open to all European democracies that fulfill the criteria for membership, wishing to support its objectives as laid down in the Preamble to the 1957 Treaties of Rome, namely 'to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe and by thus pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty';

2. Considers the forthcoming enlargement of the European Union to be an entirely new stage in the process of the European integration requiring a thorough appraisal of all the institutional, political, economic and social implications for the Union and the applicant countries, and is convinced that this deepening can be enhanced by the full involvement of the national parliaments and the general public of all the countries concerned;

3. Believes that all the applicant countries in question have the right to open negotiations for accession to the Union at the same time, and that these negotiations should begin simultaneously for all these countries early in 1998, except the Slovak Republic, which does not at present meet the criterion of a stable democratic order, respect for human rights and the protection of minorities laid down at Copenhagen;

4. Stresses the importance it attaches to progress in particular in the following areas, while acknowledging that improved respect for human rights and democratic principles is a continuing challenge for both current and future EU Member States:

- the ratification and implementation of legal human rights standards,

- the legal accountability of police, military and secret services,

- respect for the rights of minorities,

- the right to free speech, and the freedom of the media,

- the abolition of capital punishment, where applicable,

- the acceptance of the principle of conscientious objection to military service, and

- the acceptance and encouragement of the non-profit-making sector as an important partner in the task of continually improving respect for human rights;

5. Believes, however, that the length of, and rate of progress in, negotiations could vary from country to country in terms of their ability to adopt the aquis communautaire, develop a market economy capable of facing the pressures of the single market, and equip themselves with stable institutions which respect the rule of law, democracy, human rights and the rights of minorities;

6. Furthermore, believes that the intensity of the negotiations and the timetable for their conclusion will depend upon the extent to which each applicant country fulfills the requirements for accession;

7. Therefore, shares the Commission"s view that intensive negotiations should begin with the countries which have made the most progress and - while noting some factual inaccuracies - supports the Commission"s evaluations of which these countries presently are;

8. Is convinced that regional cooperation among applicant countries should be encouraged and facilitated and that this should be seen as a positive step towards EU membership; is of the opinion that EU accession should not hinder existing processes of regional integration such as the one between the Baltic Republics;

9. Maintains its view that the Union should neither directly nor indirectly determine in advance the date of full membership, as this date depends on the efforts made by the applicant countries;

10. Considers that the enlargement strategy should conform to the following principles:

(1) the aim of the European Union in this process is to enable all the applicant countries to meet the Copenhagen criteria and accede to the Union in the shortest achievable timescale;

(2) it should therefore begin from an encouraging stance toward the applicants, acknowledging their moral right to enter the Union, yet continuing to insist on fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria and so feeding the dynamism of the accession process;

(3) the invitation to participate in the RAPs should provide the political commitment to the membership of those applicant countries which seek to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria, and should be considered as the common starting line of the accession process as proposed in Agenda 2000;

(4) the preparations for membership should include all CEECs on the basis of equal treatment, while acknowledging the vast differences in the state and speed of development which determine the type of topics to be handled;

(5) the annual assessments should underline the flexibility of the rank order of the applicant countries, which depends on the results attained and should not be considered as a static fact;

11. States that only a country which has abolished the death penalty can become a member of the European Union;

12. Believes that an efficient and trustworthy public administration is a vital element in preparations for EU membership to strengthen the rule of law and economic and social cohesion, and that measures to improve the quality of public administration in all applicant countries must figure largely in the pre-accession strategy;

13. Recalls that in the years to come the European Union has deadlines to meet, each one of which will constitute a challenge to European integration and will influence the others, namely the introduction of a single currency, the revision of the financial perspective and enlargement to include Cyprus and the countries of central and eastern Europe;

14. Considers the results that will be achieved during the accession process as building blocks in an organic process leading to Union membership, and expresses the wish that candidate countries will participate increasingly in the existing EU programmes;

15. Stresses the fact that culture and education will be vital to the pre-accession strategy and that the development of the cultural and educational programmes will have an equal value for the Member States and the applicants;

16. Stresses that cultural and educational activity - which has, through their financial means, an important multiplier effect - is an integral part of economic development, a direct and indirect source of job creation, and an essential factor in the quality of life and in strengthening European citizenship;

17. Believes that the institutional framework which has emerged from the Amsterdam Treaty does not meet the necessary conditions for achieving enlargement without endangering the operation of the Union and the effectiveness of its actions;

18. Confirms the view set out in its resolution of 19 November on the Amsterdam Treaty regarding the institutional reforms which must be achieved before any further enlargement and the methods to be adopted for such reform;

19. Warns against the suggestion implicit in the idea that institutional reform could be postponed until the number of Member States exceeds twenty, because this idea reinforces the fear that there will be a privileged group of candidates and one with an uncertain future as to its membership;

20. Regards the European Conference as an essential instrument for political cooperation in order to involve all European countries aspiring to membership and linked to the Union by association agreements in multilateral talks with the Union on issues regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), on the basis of a concrete agenda reflecting the needs and interests of the participants, to be held once a year at the level of Heads of State and Government, including the Presidents of the European Commission and the European Parliament;

21. Considers that participation in the European Conference does not imply automatic accession on any defined timetable to the European Union;

22. Draws attention, in the context of accession terms, to the fact that the applicant countries should not grant third country products or businesses more favourable trade or financial treatment than their European Union counterparts with the aim of attracting direct foreign investment;

23. Points out that at the end of the accession negotiations it will be asked to ratify any further enlargement of the Union and stresses therefore that it has an important role to play in the European Conference and that the Council should take the appropriate measures to guarantee its full participation in this new forum;

24. Supports with regard to the Reinforced Accession Partnerships the emphasis to be placed on education and training of civil servants and the accompanying financial facilities in order to increase the quality of government;

25. Suggests to the applicant countries that ensuring continuity with regard to their respective negotiating delegations is of great importance for the rapid progress of the accession process;

26. Expresses the wish that the creation of conditions for the abolition of any visa obligation will be of priority for the countries concerned, which will ease the traffic with, and the development of, the applicant countries involved;

27. Proposes that the Union engages in a more active policy towards Cyprus in order to contribute effectively to the restoration of its integrity and encourage efforts to seek a political solution;

28. Takes the view that the application for EU membership of Turkey needs a serious approach and underlines the necessity of a special relationship at high level between this country and the Union that goes beyond the existing Customs Union;

29. Stresses that the budgetary costs of enlargement are but a fraction of the economic peace dividend gained after the Cold War and that investing in enlargement sustains this peace dividend;

30. Considers it important that a special strategy be adopted to ensure that cooperation across the EU's external borders to reduce disparities in the standard of living and safeguard peace and stability can continue after enlargement;

31. Considers that the European Union must ensure that enlargement does not reduce the amount of appropriations allocated in aid to traditional developing countries;

32. Stresses that the EU's relationships with the developing countries, including development cooperation, must be regarded more clearly than in the past as a part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. In the context of enlargement the new Member States must also be integrated, to the extent their resources permit, into the EU's policy on developing countries and development aid;

33. Supports the view that the PHARE funds should be used in a more decentralized way, thus enabling local and regional authorities to play a more active role in the use and monitoring of those funds; also welcomes the Commission proposals to make the PHARE funds accession-driven instead of demand-driven;

34. Calls on the applicant countries to establish efficient local, regional and national administrative structures under their constitutional systems, to encourage non-state sector operators at these levels and to improve financial control systems so that they can as future members make effective use of the Structural Funds and thereby reduce the enormous regional disparities and development problems;

35. Calls on the Commission to intensify its information campaign to the CEECs about the background and goals of the Union, its federal perspective and its fundamental values, as well as the implications inherent in the adoption, by the applicant countries, of the acquis communautaire and the obligations deriving from accession to the European Union;

36. Wishes to see special attention paid to the programme on democracy and human rights within the PHARE programme;

37. Calls for the establishment of appropriate monitoring mechanisms by the EU institutions to keep under review the human rights situation in applicant countries, in cooperation with the Council of Europe and the OSCE;

38. Calls on the Commission, further, to provide European public opinion with ongoing, comprehensive information about the enlargement, thereby involving it in this process, the success of which depends largely on public support;

39. Urges the Commission to encourage a broader range of direct links between socioeconomic players in the Union Member States and their counterparts in the applicant countries, particularly in the so-called sensitive economic sectors (agriculture, iron and steel, textiles, fisheries, shipbuilding), in order to foster mutual understanding and a constructive approach to problems which might give rise to tension, or even disputes, at the accession negotiations;

On the Impact

40. Notes that the Commission"sview that 1.27% of GDP is enough to meet the challenges facing the EU over the period 2000-2006 depends on its assumptions about GDP growth, reform of Community policies and the outcome of the enlargement process, whereas a periodic re-assessment of such data is called for in order to make sure that the Commission"s estimates reflect the true implications of enlargement;

41. Firmly believes that the current system of own resources is likely to be a constraint on the funding of a successful enlargement and calls for this to be taken into account;

42. Gives special emphasis to measures for modernizing the administration of the prospective Member States (at national, regional and local levels), which will be called upon, depending on the circumstances, to manage Community and other funds, and for the adoption of specific organizational measures affecting the services of the institutions, and in particular the Commission;

43. Considers that, although the Commission's financial framework may appear too long for this kind of perspective, the very success of enlargement requires the budgetary stability provided by an interinstitutional agreement accompanied by the relevant financial perspective;

44. Considers that allowance must be made for the as yet unknown factors which will influence the overall cost of enlargement and the challenge represented by a successful conclusion of EMU, and hence considers that any financial perspective should include a review clause;

45. Asks the Commission, within the scope of its declared 'policy against corruption' to work with candidate countries to put in place policies and instruments which effectively dissuade, detect and punish corruption in public administration;

46. Believes that the existence of effective and credible public audit and financial control institutions, able to work closely with their EU equivalents, must be a pre-requisite for accession to the European Union;

47 Considers that, given the inevitable uncertainty of these assumptions, the new financial framework must provide for a revision clause dealing both with expenditure limits and policies in the event that the Commission"s assumptions prove not to be on target;

48. Recalls the overall positive outcome of preceding enlargements, which have improved the Union's position on international markets, increased trade between Member States and enhanced the Union's international dimension, and thereby increase, the total resources available for Member States and the Union;

49. Considers that enlargement will strengthen the weight and influence of the European Union in the international economic system, in international organizations and, more particularly, in the World Trade Organization; in this regard, wishes the European Union and the applicant countries to define forthwith a coordinated strategy for the commitments to be made in the World Trade Organization (the new Agenda themes) and the OECD and with regard to other economic and financial forums in which it is possible to engage in concerted action;

50. Considers it essential that the phased integration of the applicant countries into the internal market should go hand in hand with a more determined policy of harmonizing that market"s external aspects and coordinating the commercial policies of the applicant countries with the European Union"s commercial policy;

51. Calls for the applicant countries to be linked to the single market action plan in order to minimize the frictional losses which will arise as a result of joining the single market;

52. Calls in the framework of the approximation strategy and accession negotiations for greater encouragement for small and medium-sized businesses and the setting up of new businesses, including those in the area of trades and crafts, as this sector is underdeveloped in comparison with the existing Union of fifteen and needs a favourable social environment so that an SME culture can develop;

53. Considers the agreements on EMS II to be an extremely suitable framework in which to facilitate the entry of the Central and Eastern European countries into monetary union, and thinks it worth considering the idea of allowing those Central and Eastern European countries which are willing and able to do so to acquire associate member status in EMS II;

54. Believes that enlargement offers numerous advantages with regard to expanding the internal market and strengthening the Union on international markets, given the strengths of the applicant countries in terms of geographical position, natural resources and investment opportunities, and will in this way increase economic growth in Member States and thus expand the total income of the Union;

55. Recalls, however, that because the level of development of the applicant countries is lower than the Union average - the new members will all be net beneficiaries - enlargement will lead to a considerable drop in average per capita income in the enlarged Union, yet membership of the Union will in particular stimulate economic growth in the new Member States and will thus rapidly reduce this income gap;

56. Believes that it is imperative that the cohesion policy be reformed by readjusting its objectives and making available the funds required to ensure its smooth operation during the preaccession period and to enable it to cope with the pressures for sectoral and regional adjustment which will follow enlargement; notes furthermore that this imminent reform is not one that has been imposed as a result of enlargement but represents what is necessary in this area of policy in the light of past experience;

57. Believes that unless adequate financial resources are forthcoming there may depending upon what reforms there are in regional policies - irrespective of the enlargement process - be a considerable cut in the funding currently earmarked for the Union regions benefiting under the cohesion policy, and the imbalance between the rich and poor regions of the Union will increase;

58. Stresses that it is important that the financial repercussions of enlargement should not undermine the principles of solidarity and economic and social cohesion within the Community;

59. Underlines the importance of developing the participation of the population in the implementation of EU legislation as well as in carrying out structural interventions; calls therefore upon the Commission to support NGOs in the environmental, social and cultural fields, to promote the twinning of cities between East and West as well as to favour the access to information on EU policies particularly on consumer protection, environmental and social policy and public health;

60. Insists that the acquis communautaire be included de jure and de facto in all social control mechanisms when the applicant countries accede and also notes that it is absolutely essential for the acceding countries to adjust to the European social model if social peace is to be ensured; also takes the view that the basis for broad social acceptance in the question of enlargement is an institutionalized social dialogue between autonomous partners on the two sides of industry, who must be involved in all relevant government decisions and flows of information at the accession negotiations;

61. Notes critically that the social question is listed in Agenda 2000 only as an issue to be considered, but that unfortunately no more than secondary importance is attached to the treatment of the social dimension itself; calls, therefore, for a White Paper on the social situation and social policy in the applicant countries to be drawn up as part of the preaccession strategy, with

- account taken, as a matter of urgency, of a common employment strategy in view of the unemployment situation in the EU Member States and the problems of the border regions,

- particular attention paid to the importance of initial and continuing training for social integration and

- a broad approach to social concepts also adopted, and account taken of such aspects as the social implications of regional development tendencies, socio-cultural effects of migratory pressures and social consequences of transformation processes in agriculture;

62. Considers it essential for the applicant countries to be gradually but steadily brought into line with the Union"s environmental and social standards; calls on the countries likely to join the European Union to ratify ILO Conventions 138 and 29 on forced labour and the employment of children, and to do so before any accession;

63. Considers that the acquis communautaire on equal opportunities for men and women must be imposed on the applicant countries and that in the negotiations respect for the application of the Treaty"s provisions (in Article 119) and current directives on the equal treatment of women and men must be one of the criteria for assessing the Central and Eastern European countries" state of preparation for accession;

64. Is concerned at the trafficking in human beings, particularly women originating in the Central and Eastern European countries, for the purposes of sexual exploitation in the Member States of the Union and considers that urgent measures need to be taken by the relevant authorities of the Central and Eastern European countries and the Member States to stop this clandestine immigration from the central and eastern European countries for trade of this particular kind;

65. Insists that the political criteria for accession must explicitly include respect for the freedoms and fundamental rights of women; considers that there is a need to revise the Treaty of Amsterdam before enlargement to insert the fundamental right to equal treatment of men and women;

66. Recalls however, that the EU as a whole must be successfully overhauled and structural reforms, especially reform of the CAP, must be successfully concluded if the integration of the CEECs, which has been decided and makes sense, is to be a success for both sides;

67. Regrets that, in the section of Agenda 2000 which deals with agriculture, the Commission has put forward only piecemeal detailed proposals for individual production sectors instead of developing an overall approach which could have formed the basis for the orientation of all sectors of agricultural production;

68. Regrets that the Commission has not developed a specific policy framework for the rural community, as announced at the Cork Conference; fears that the effectiveness of using agricultural structural funds will be diminished because they are to be split between various objectives and support frameworks;

69. Points out that the economic situation is not identical in all applicant countries, especially in the farm sector, and that the specific situations in those countries must be taken into account when drawing up the measures and timetables for preparations for accession and the transitional measures and timetables that are to apply following integration;

70. Believes that, given the considerable difference in prices and the appropriateness of encouraging a rural development policy, the common agricultural policy in its current form should not be extended to the new members, and that perhaps it would be appropriate to consider whether to set long transitional periods for the application of the common agricultural policy to the new Member States;

71. Believes that, with regard to the Common Fisheries Policy, the Commission should assist the new fleets and processing sectors in reaching the safety and hygiene standards required and recommends that all possible Community financial assistance be extended to the fishing sectors of the applicant states so that they can be modernized as quickly as possible;

72. Considers that the Commission should defend strongly all newly acquired third country fishery agreements, and allocate on a just and fair basis TACs and quotas always taking account of relative stability and historic fisheries performance; believes, moreover, that the environmental issues of pollution have to be resolved in the Black Sea so that a viable fishing industry can be re-established;

73. Considers that there is an urgent need to include in the '1992 reform' all those market sectors which have so far been excluded from this reform (e.g. the sugar regime), as the 1992 reform is a prerequisite for extending the common agricultural policy to the accession countries;

74. Stresses the importance of mobility and of exchanging researchers and the establishment of more energy centres for protecting the environment and guaranteeing nuclear safety;

75. Draws attention to the established nuclear power activity in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and requires the Commission to prepare, prior to accession, an agreed programme to:

(a) bring existing nuclear power plants up to Western safety standards;

(b) ensure that operational safety is overseen by an independent authority recognized by the IAEA; and

(c) put in place safeguard procedures in line with the EURATOM Treaty to ensure the protection of highly radiated material;

76. Points out that coal is a significant component of primary energy sources in the applicant countries and calls on the Commission to prepare with the countries concerned an initiative supported by the PHARE programme to improve the productivity of coal mining as well as the introduction of clean coal burning technology;

77. Stresses that via the funds earmarked for the reinforced pre-accession strategy, more attention should be given to the establishment of Trans-European Networks in Central and Eastern Europe;

78. Considers respect for fundamental rights and the protection of minorities in the applicant countries to be a matter of crucial importance and calls on the Commission to give special urgency to solving the outstanding problems jointly with the countries concerned;

79. Calls on the Commission, the Council, the Member States and the applicant states to give priority to all measures, including financing, which will create the conditions for the full attainment of freedom of movement in order to avoid lengthy transitional periods and to achieve the dismantling of controls at internal frontiers;

80. Notes that the independence of the judiciary is one of the pillars upholding the rule of law and fundamental to the effective protection of the rights and civil liberties of all, including the citizens of the applicant countries and, in particular, those brought before the courts, and reaffirms its respect for defendants' rights, victims' rights and means of redress, and the protection of witnesses in connection with the fight against international organized crime;

81. Notes with great concern the Commission's findings regarding the applicant countries' administrative and judicial capacity to apply Community law and calls for greater efforts by the Union in terms of financial and human resources to retrain judges, lawyers and administrators; points to the need, therefore, to establish a programme to raise awareness within the professions involved in the administration of justice, organized along similar lines to the Robert Schuman Action Plan;

82. Points out that the activities of the Union's credit institutions in some applicant countries are still severely hampered by the fact that, as a means of securing loans, real estate is worthless not least because of legal uncertainty about the possibility of realizing it in the event of the debtor's financial failure; points out furthermore that priority must be given to developing efficient and reliable land and business registry systems;

83. Recalls the importance, fully respecting the principle of subsidiary, of further developing horizontal policies (social policy, environment, consumers, science, research and development and the information society) so as to take account of the specific features of the applicant countries and not weaken their impact on the populations of the Member States;

84. Believes that speedy and full accession of all candidate Member States will, in the long term, improve the environment throughout Europe, assuming a more intensive approach to important policy areas such as the environment, transport and energy, with special attention being paid to nature conservation in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in order to avoid loss of biodiversity;

85. Requests the Commission, in order to make the accession criteria realistic, to draw up a list of the most important elements of EU environmental legislation which candidate countries must satisfy at the time of accession, a list which should be established on the basis of objective criteria with the Council and Parliament; considers that, for the purpose of implementing the remaining legislation, contracts should be concluded during the negotiations, with clearly defined timetables and financing frameworks, transition periods of more than five years not being acceptable for the EU environmental acquis (if longer transition periods are proposed in the accession negotiations, the European Commission being requested to report this to the European Parliament in order to seek a solution);

86. Considers that in establishing transitional arrangements, particular attention should be paid to implementing provisions to improve air, water and soil quality and food safety and protection of health as a matter of priority, since in some instances very poor environmental conditions in the CEECs are already damaging the health and reducing the life expectancy of CEEC citizens;

87. Asks the Commission, in accordance with the commitment in the Treaty, to integrate environmental and consumer protection considerations in other policy areas when EU policy is reformed with the environmental and consumer affairs ministers of both the EU and the CEECs being explicitly involved in working out the details of the reforms;

88. Points out that the applicant states should protect the health of their citizens by taking public health considerations into account in other policy areas and considers that the EU and the applicant states should actively support the development of NGOs and voluntary organizations in the health sector;

89. Shares the Commission's view that enlargement will have no major implications for developing and implementing sectoral policies (transport, energy, industry, SMEs, telecommunications and the audiovisual sector), provided that the specific requirements of the applicant countries are taken into account, and the current effort being made at internal level is not affected;

90. Calls on the Member States of the Union and the Commission to make every effort to combat unemployment effectively and thereby create the preconditions for the free movement of workers in an enlarged Europe;

91. Considers that the European Union should ensure that enlargement does not reduce resources for aid to the traditional developing countries;

92. Considers it necessary for the accession process to cover all aspects of the common transport policy, with particular reference to environmental, social and safety considerations, and for the emphasis to be placed, wherever possible, on the use of modern technologies and intelligent systems, and that consideration must therefore be given to driving hours, engine emissions, vehicle standards, road-traffic regulations and all the legislation concerning the acquis communautaire;

93. Believes that the opening of negotiations and the prospect of the accession of new Member States should neither undermine (but serve to strengthen) the implementation of a more effective and consistent common foreign and security policy, nor impede, (but be used to promote), necessary developments in the field of justice and home affairs;

Opinions on the various countries

Bulgaria

94. Considers that Bulgaria has recently made substantial efforts towards transition to a market economy, although decisive measures still need to be taken in the spheres of the environment, transport, agriculture, energy and justice; a wide-ranging administrative reform at all levels is also needed if the acquis communautaire is to be applied properly;

95. Stresses its compliance with the main political criteria and in this sense is convinced that the opening of negotiations would promote and encourage continuation of the reforms undertaken and would prevent the Bulgarian people from feeling excluded, whilst reaffirming the Union's presence in a region of great political instability;

Estonia

96. Commends Estonia´s rapid establishment of a stable multiparty democracy, which must however be completed by fully extending citizenship to members of minority groups within a reasonable timeframe, and improving the quality of public administration, and, whilst appreciating the fact that Estonia has ratified the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights, looks forward to further progress on matters such as improving prison conditions and tackling corruption;

97. Notes that Estonia can be regarded as having a functioning open market economy, despite economic inequalities between Tallinn and the rest of the country and the alarming trade imbalance which has partly been offset by foreign direct investment and tourism;

Hungary

98. Welcomes Hungary's strong attachment to democracy and its exemplary minorities policy as well as the substantial progress made over a number of years in harmonizing its legislation to comply with the acquis, but states that further efforts are needed to meet the acquis in sectors such as environment, customs control and energy;

99. Assumes that the reinforced pre-accession strategy will help Hungary to prepare itself better to meet the obligations of membership and to overcome shortcomings with regard to modernizing its economy;

Latvia

100. Considers that Latvia, after having been for so long occupied as an integral part of the Soviet Union, has made substantial efforts towards the building of national institutions, although, if the acquis communautaire is to be applied properly, decisive measures still need to be taken in public administration and in the application and enforcement of a rule of law; considers also that the country has made successful reforms towards transition to a market economy, but that a process of privatization must be continued;

101. Notes the existence of a certain number of problems such as the status of the Russian minority, the as yet uncompleted privatization process and the need to effect a substantial reform of the legal and administrative systems;

Lithuania

102. Considers that Lithuania has made impressive political reforms and has a functioning market economy strong enough to meet many of the economic obligations of membership and has made progress in transposing the acquis communautaire; notes that important measures still need to be taken in public administration and in the application and enforcement of the rule of law;

103. Notes that the details of the Commission opinions on Lithuania show that the country has made very significant progress in its continued preparation for membership, appreciates the improvement of the economic situation and the lifting of restrictions on foreign exchange, prices and movements of goods and expects that the reinforced pre-accession strategy of the applicant state will further prepare the country for membership in those areas where continued progress is considered desirable such as enforcing legislation to tackle corruption and improving the system of rules covering the labour market;

Poland

104. Is conscious that Poland is by far the largest of the applicant countries, and that its accession would have a critical effect on existing EU policies, and takes note of the enormous progress towards reforms achieved since 1989, but states that further change and reform measures are required in areas such as the state-owned industries, agriculture, transport, the environment and border controls;

105. Assumes that the reinforced pre-accession strategy will help to overcome in the medium term Poland's economic and environmental structural problems as well as to improve its capacity to control effectively its external borders;

Czech Republic

106. Calls on the Czech authorities to improve substantially the operation of the legal system, especially in order to guarantee fair trials within acceptable periods of time, and to establish rapidly a global policy which aims to avoid any kind of discrimination or marginalization of the Roma minority, not least by ratifying without further delay the European Council's framework convention on national minorities;

107. Takes the view that the pre-accession strategy provides a good opportunity for the Czech Republic to carry out the necessary modernization of the state administration, reforming it on the basis of principles of quality and efficiency, and to carry out those economic reforms which are compatible with both the functioning of the internal market of the European Union (e.g. the national banking and financial structure) and with a European social model which allows for strong measures to combat unemployment and maintain a welfare state which meets the needs of the population;

Romania

108. Applauds the political and economic reforms implemented by Romania in preparation for its accession to the European Union, in particular those carried out since November 1996, and encourages Romania to continue its adjustment measures in line with the requirements of the acquis communautaire;

109. Notes the positive role played by Romania in maintaining the stability of the region, whether through the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty concluded with Hungary, the trilateral cooperation arrangements with neighbouring states or its participation in the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA) and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Area (BSECA);

110. Considers that the reinforced pre-accession strategy will allow Romania to tackle the economic and structural reforms needed to allow it to face the challenges of enlargement;

Slovenia

111. Recognizes Slovenia's economic dynamism, which has allowed the country to reach the highest level of per capita revenue among the applicant countries;

112. Notes the fact that this country meets the political criteria laid down in Copenhagen and the decision of the Slovenian Parliament to ratify the European agreement with the Union and to adopt the constitutional changes requested;

Slovakia

113. Stresses Slovakia's European aspirations and notes that it has achieved, under difficult circumstances, good economic results which would qualify it for accession to the European Union at the same time as the more advanced countries if its political life were not tainted by certain practices which are not consistent with accepted democratic standards in the Union Member States;

114. Requests, nevertheless, that Slovakia should, like the other applicant countries, benefit from the reinforced pre-accession strategy in order to continue to adapt its economy to the conditions of the single market and to ensure that it is not left behind when the political conditions for its accession are met; calls, in particular, for the accession partnership to be negotiated with this country to make provision for measures in the sphere of democracy - including minority rights - and for the democracy-related appropriations from the PHARE programme to be used to support the measures which will be determined by joint agreement in this sphere;

115. Notes that the Slovak authorities are starting to send the European Union signals regarding their determination to democratize political life in Slovakia and now looks to that country to take practical measures to implement the three recommendations issued by the Joint Parliamentary Committee;

Cyprus

116. Stresses that the European Parliament reasserts its position of 12 July 1995 and that the accession negotiations with Cyprus must begin six months after the end of the Intergovernmental Conference, as has already been confirmed on a number of occasions by the European Council;

117. Calls on the Council and the Commission to do everything in their power to promote a peaceful solution to the Cyprus question in accordance with the UN Resolutions, without the accession negotiations being linked to a solution to the dispute, and invites the Commission to persuade the two communities on the island of the advantages of EU membership and to involve both communities in the negotiations;

118. Calls on the Commission and Council to give proper acknowledgement to the Republic of Cyprus's excellent economic and financial position which would enable the island to meet the EMU criteria as of now, thus facilitating the accession negotiations which must not, under any circumstances, depend on the state of relations with Turkey and which must be concluded without delay;

119. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the applicant countries.

• [1] () C4-0373/97, C4-0374/97,C4-0375/97 , C4-0376/97, C4-0377/97,C4-0378/97 , C4-0379/97, C4-0380/97,C4-0381/97 , C4-0382/97,C4-0383/97 .
• [2] () OJ C 42, 15.2.1993, p. 124.
• [3] () OJ C 249, 25.9.1995, p- 74.
• [4] () OJ C 141, 13.5.1996, p. 135.

B EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS

1. A strategy for enlargement - Mr Arie Oostlander

I. INTRODUCTION

Under the Treaty of Rome, membership of the European Union is open to any democratic states respecting the rule of law. It is therefore arguable that countries which fulfil this criterion and whose accession would contribute to the smooth running of the Union have a right to such accession. The fact that the Council of Copenhagen in 1993 upheld the criteria thus places the right to accession in a clear light. However, the Union has never before been confronted with enlargement on such a scale as now, either in terms of the size of population or the social and economic context.

The associated countries and the present Member States want to be part of a strong Community. This means that no concessions can be made with regard to the acquis communautaire. If the EU is to preserve its internal cohesion and compete in an increasingly global market, it needs to ensure that new members are capable of fulfilling all the requirements of membership. For those which do not want to subscribe to the Community objectives in the prospect of a federal type of Community, alternatives in the form of a free trade area or customs union must be available from the outset.

At the end of the day the question is whether the Union wants to contribute to the essential political, social, economic and ecological reforms in Eastern Europe or whether it wants to import the consequences of political regression, economic crises and pollution. Today's European Union needs to lay the foundations to enable the next generation to live in the healthy legal climate of peace and solidarity in a Europe with a real sense of common purpose.

II. INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

Enlargement must be made possible by preliminary consolidation. The intergovernmental conference concluded in Amsterdam in 1997 did have some impact on democratizing the Union, but it did not sufficiently understand the pressure of the forthcoming enlargement. For this reason, as a preparation for enlargement the IGC was a failure. Institutional reform of the Union must be based on a clear concept of further integration. There is no consensus on such a concept, in view of the preference of some Member States for allowing national interests and perceptions to prevail in the area of the second and third pillars. The institutional barriers that still survive today are thus also much more substantial than any financial ones might be.

The Council's intention of holding a further IGC if the number of members goes beyond 20 does not do justice to the present urgent need for institutional reform and is setting up an unfortunate situation in which five countries must be selected to join before the next IGC, while the other applicant countries have to wait until the IGC does or does not reach a favourable verdict. For these countries it creates a measure of uncertainty over their future which in itself is no contribution to mutual peace and stability on the European continent. The Commission proposal of holding an IGC before any enlargement takes place therefore deserves every support, since it disposes of the need to divide the applicant states into two classes and such an IGC will be aware of a much heavier pressure from enlargement than the Council has so far understood.

At the next IGC three essential issues will have to be settled. First, the extension of majority voting with Parliamentary control, supervision by the Court of Auditors and appeals procedures through the Court of Justice. Second, the distribution of votes in the Council in the case of majority voting. And third, the composition of the Commission. Parliament's Committee on Institutional Affairs is best equipped to draw up a proposal in consultation with the Commission for an agenda for that 'enlargement IGC'.

III. ACCESSION CRITERIA

The Commission's opinions on the applications for membership take as their starting point the conditions for membership as laid down by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993. These are divided into four consistently distinct categories:

* Political criteria

Stable institutions, founded on democracy, respect for the principles of the constitutional state, human rights and protection of minorities. Gross divergence from the principle of the constitutional state is unacceptable;

*Economic criteria

A properly functioning, viable market economy, to withstand the pressure of competition and market forces within the Union. New Member States must not be allowed to drown in the rougher competitive waters of the EU;

* The acquis communautaire

Sufficient management and judicial capacity to accept the obligations of membership deriving from the acquis including pursuance of the aims of political, economic and monetary union. The applicant countries must demonstrate their steadfast loyalty to the fundamental principles of a Union moving in a federalist direction, and they must act in accordance with the required solidarity deriving from their involvement in the Euro-Atlantic organizations.

*The EU must be ready for enlargement

The EU institutions must be able to deal with enlargement, which implies the need for a new IGC.

IV. THE ACCESSION PROCESS

The eleven applicant countries all differ considerable from one another, particularly with regard to the convergence of their social, economic and political structures in relation to the EU Member States. The Commission survey that led to a ranking of applicant countries demonstrates this point convincingly, apart from one or two inaccuracies. The Commission proposal to update the assessment of ranking positions annually points out that the Commission itself does not regard the countries' ranking number as set in granite. A policy in which all the emphasis is placed on the applicant countries' efforts underlines once more that a rigid division into two categories is unrealistic and further serves to ensure that advanced countries feel less pressure to continue their efforts, while less advanced countries - even if they pursue an extremely tough policy - are likely to be discouraged.

However, Parliament has already pointed out that early accession with long transitional periods is undesirable, since it jeopardizes the smooth running of the European Union. The Commission is now rightly moving towards Reinforced Accession Partnerships with support from the Commission, in order to speed up the process leading to full acceptance of the acquis, by all applicant countries To emphasize that all applicant countries which fulfil the political criteria are welcome in the Union, the invitation to participate in the partnerships must be regarded as the political decision on membership which gives the required securities, since the accession negotiations in the stricter sense are obviously the final part of the process.

The Commission points out in Agenda 2000 that none of the applicant countries fulfils all of the economic criteria. In view of this fact all the countries are being required by the Commission to participate in the Accession Partnership. But at the same time the Commission is inviting about six more developed countries to the accession negotiations in the strict sense. It is obviously being assumed that discussion of the most recent issues on accession will run in parallel with the discussion of other major issues from the partnership dialogue. The Commission suggests that the accession negotiations with the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), in the strict sense, will last about twice as long as those with the United Kingdom, the Scandinavian countries and Austria (which took about 18 months). The Commission rightly suggests that it is pointless starting this kind of final paragraph negotiations too early, since the transitional periods must be short, must be confined to no more than a few points and must certainly not be allowed to boil down to postponement of application of the rules. Protracted final paragraph negotiations (accession negotiations in the strict sense) clearly imply that transitional periods should be allowed to be protracted and extended.

The invitation to participate in the Reinforced Accession Partnerships deserves to be given the utmost political importance, partly because by far the bulk of the whole accession process takes place within it. The Commission is rightly endeavouring to speed up implementation of the required activities by means of a very direct approach. Participation in the partnerships also means that the Union is financially committed to supporting the relevant activities as effectively as possible. The activities to be carried out within the accession partnership are indicated in the Commission White Paper on preparing the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe for integration into the Union's internal market. The objectives to be formulated for each applicant country within a specific deadline can in the first instance be deduced from the opinions published by the Commission and the replies of the relevant applicant states.

The progress of the activities will be assessed by the Commission annually. On the basis of this annual report - which should also be disclosed to Parliament - and detailed reactions to it by the applicant countries themselves, it will be possible to identify indications for further objectives. At a pace determined by the respective performance of the applicant countries the Commission will obviously continue to negotiate on further developments, without waiting for others who are only reluctantly beginning to implement the acquis communitaire.

The Commission considers that 30% of the supporting budgets provided for the accession process can be allocated to improving open government by training (or retraining) civil servants. Good governance is essential for economic growth and particularly lays the foundation for effective partnership with the EU. In this sense it is also very important for rapid progress in the accession process that the quality of the negotiating delegations of the applicant countries remains up to the mark and demonstrates continuity.

Growth after membership of the EU will primarily require real determination to participate in this association of democratic constitutional states, as underlined in the political criteria of Copenhagen - and confirmed once more in Article 6 of the Treaty of Amsterdam. For the accession process this will therefore have to be the first objective to be fulfilled. If an applicant country does not agree to give priority to this objective, there is no point in inviting that country to the subsequent accession process. Hence there must be evidence of an effective democracy, in which human rights and minorities are respected. In this sense, the political criteria of Copenhagen must be broadly interpreted.

However, the criterion of democracy applies not only to government, but also to the society itself. The development, operation and legal nature of social organizations in the CEECs needs to be more closely examined. trade unions and employers' organizations must be independent and able to operate in a balanced dialogue of partners with the government. Educational establishments, churches, the media, humanitarian organizations and universities in the Union can provide support for their partners in the CEECs as they develop. Clearly, the provision of assistance with accession is not a task just for government, but also forms part of the responsibilities of independent organisations that are active in the present EU Member States.

In relations between the EU Member States and some applicant countries attention needs to be drawn to certain barriers to successful development of the applicant countries concerned. An example here is the visa policy with regard to Rumania and Bulgaria. In such a case, the creation of conditions for removing the relevant barriers must be one of the first objectives of the accession process.

According to the Commission that process also comprises a multilateral section in so far as some types of negotiations will intersect. Clearly, this section too will only be accessible to those which comply with the Copenhagen political criteria and have received an invitation to the Reinforced Accession Partnership.

Cyprus

Cyprus, or at least the southern part of the island, fulfils the criteria for accession. With regard to the island's division, the opening of negotiations raises political hopes that they might work as a catalyst for a just and lasting settlement. The EU must conduct a vigorous Cyprus policy based on consensus which will contribute to solving the island's problems. Be that as it may, it is clear that Cyprus is quite a different case from the CEECs and that its problems lie mainly in the political domain.

Turkey

The fact that Turkey is also eligible for membership has been confirmed on more than one occasion. However, Turkey's situation differs radically from that of the CEECs. With regard to the political accession criteria, it cannot be said that Turkey is effectively pursuing integration. There are serious border problems, the position of minorities is unsatisfactory and democracy is unstable. The CEECs have in fact been making strenuous efforts to solve similar problems. Although it plays an exceptionally important role in relation to the EU, Turkey is in a totally different perspective on accession and should therefore receive special attention and special treatment, in particular further consolidation and reinforcement of the existing customs union within the framework of the EuroMediterranean partnership. It is of vital importance that this broadly-based rapprochement is further developed on the basis of constructive dialogue.

V. THE EUROPEAN CONFERENCE

The Commission proposes a multilateral forum in which second- and third-pillar issues can be discussed. In that forum participants will confer on an equal footing on Community policy, recommendations and possible action. This will result in mutual benefits from each contribution to the harmonization of policy on refugees and immigrants, a common approach to combatting international terrorism, and international organized crime including drug trafficking. The EU would also benefit from an understanding of issues in the field of international politics in the CEECs, and of their internal policy initiatives.

To the applicant countries, the European Conference may come to be seen as a political counterweight to the Accession Partnerships, in which the Union is rightly following a very direct approach. To safeguard the serious nature of the Conference's agenda, participation in it can only be permitted for democratic constitutional states which do not themselves form part of the international political problems but may be expected to have a substantial interest in their solution. The European Conference can thus be a prelude to future membership. It is a unique type of forum, as can be underlined by a substantial participating presence from the Commission and Parliament. This would prevent uncontrolled policy-making from being seen to be acceptable.

VI. THE ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS IN THE STRICT SENSE

Although they are final paragraph negotiations, the accession negotiations in the strict sense are the automatic fulfilment of the accession process and hence of the Reinforced Accession Partnership, for which no separate political decision is therefore needed. The definitive invitation is of course the invitation to the partnership. During the last round of enlargement these final paragraph negotiations lasted about 18 months. The long period of negotiations with Greece, Spain and Portugal was due partly to the fact that they were to a great extent pre-accession negotiations and the process also marked time for years.

The principle that everyone should begin with the reinforced accession procedure at the same time does not mean that the last chapters will come up for discussion for each country at the same moment. Not only would a consequence of such a strategy be likely to involve accessions with long transitional periods, it would also prevent optimum use of negotiating capacity. Moreover, a too early start to such negotiations on temporary transitional measures would lead to negotiating results that were prematurely obsolete. Thus in the long run there is little point in staking prestige on the simple fact of whether or not a given country is negotiating on the final paragraphs.

However flexibly the distinction between accession partnerships and accession negotiations in the strict sense is handled, a start cannot be made on the latter until the time is ripe: five to six years before enlargement is quite soon enough for this purpose. The question then arises as to how extensive and detailed the annual reports should be. Assessments for the respective countries should provide indications of the possible need for agreeing specific transitional measures, which means that the accession negotiations in the strict sense follow organically from the preceding accession process.

Contrary to the arguments put forward by the Commission, it is still too early to designate the countries for the first wave of accession. Moreover, a restriction to five potential accession countries is no longer relevant in the light of the Commission proposal to hold a new IGC before the first accession takes place. The important thing is that consolidation of the accession strategy and initial negotiations on transitional periods should follow on seamlessly from each other. The Commission should ensure that enlargement is given consistent shape within an overall scheme of things in which all the candidates are involved. The results obtained from the negotiating process must be regarded as building blocks in a developing process leading inevitably to EU membership.

None of the candidates must be excluded from the outset. The importance of the Reinforced Accession Partnership lies in the fact that the Luxembourg Summit must constitute the start of the accession process for all the CEEC applicants. The Commission should ensure that the CEECs receive the necessary support to bring the partnership dialogue to a satisfactory conclusion. The Commission's negotiating capacity must be optimized and geared to the requested faster pace of the accession process for all the applicant countries. The success of the whole accession operation depends on the candidate countries themselves, but they must in turn show clear signs of political determination.

VI. CONCLUSION

It must be stressed that a problem of costs must certainly not be allowed to take precedence over the political view of the significance of enlargement. That is the guarantee for a stable, just and peaceful legal order for future generations, based on mutual solidarity and an understanding of Europe's responsibility for its environment. Investment in enlargement of the EU has always, as history has shown, delivered significant political and economic advantages for the EU.

Citizens of the applicant countries and the Member States must be properly informed on the background and objectives of the Union, its federal perspective, and the values on which the Union is founded: a democratic legal order, solidarity and human dignity. They must also be informed of the great importance of EU enlargement to the European continent as a whole. The answer to the question whether the goal will be reached of a Union in which peace and solidarity are values that can be taken on trust will depend upon the readiness and courage of citizens to continue with the task of building Europe after the year 2000.

2. The Impact on EU policies - Mr Enrique Baron Crespo

Foreword

The debate on the internal and external impact of enlargement is taking place at an extremely delicate stage in the European integration process: despite a number of cosmetic changes, the Treaty signed on conclusion of the Intergovernmental Conference it cruelly reveals the lack of any overall goal or project for European integration. For enlargement to have any meaning, it must be made part of a broader strategic view of the nature of the European Union itself, and not looked at merely from an accountant's point of view.

The background to the present discussions on the accession of new Member States is radically different from that obtaining at the time of past enlargements: the geopolitical situation has changed and the major efforts required of the Union will substantially change the nature of European integration, altering its aims and purposes. Furthermore, there are obvious implications for European security.

Much thought has been given to the political and strategic reasons for enlargement. However, approval in principle of the entry of such a large number of new Member States raises a whole series of questions regarding the Union's real ability to carry through such an ambitious project, not only with regard to its existing policies (agricultural policy, economic and social cohesion), but also in terms of the financial efforts to be made and the institutional reforms required to ensure that a Union with more than 20 Member States is able to operate in a consistent and effective manner and to continue to meet its objectives. The debate on the impact of enlargement must be based on the acknowledgement that all the applicant countries have a right to negotiate the terms.

With regard to the number of countries with which to begin negotiations, the only criterion for selection is whether a country meets the political requirements for accession. In this connection, only the 'regatta' approach, would appear able to meet the legitimate expectations of the applicant countries. This means that negotiations should start at the same time with all the applicant countries, with the only exception, at present, of Slovakia, in respect of which the doubts expressed by the Commission appear justified.

The current enlargement process has the particularity of being both bilateral (between the Union and each country) and multilateral (within the proposed European Conference).

Both the Member States and the applicant countries have an interest in ensuring that the future enlarged Union retains the ability to act effectively at both internal and international levels, thus ensuring political stability and an economic climate conducive to growth and full employment.

The dynamics of enlargement

While it is difficult to assess the impact of enlargement on Union policies, which will depend on the number of new members, the timetable for accession and the transitional adjustments required, it is still more difficult to determine the dynamic effects of enlargement; in other words, to predict the shape and objectives of the Community policies which will be adopted by a Union with such a large number of very disparate Member States. The challenge will be how to reconcile the new national and Community interests with the need for solidarity. At the same time, enlargement could facilitate the reform of some Union policies, which can no longer be put off.

In any case, even without the accession of new Member States, major adjustments need to be made to Union policies. Strengthening the Union's ability to act is a priority for the Member States and, at the same time, for the applicant countries which, for the first time in their history, are free to decide their own destiny in Europe. On the other hand, enlargement has not always been painless, and on more than one occasion has made it more difficult to achieve the necessary cohesion. Nonetheless, the need for consolidation is a constant in the process of European integration.

The overall impact of the various enlargement processes has been positive. Furthermore, no enlargement can be neutral, i.e. its impact necessarily goes further than simply extending the scope of Union policies. The entry of a new Member State leads to a new way of looking at European policies, brings greater diversity, creates new areas of interest and entails a review of the form and substance of everything achieved to date. For this reason, the accession of new Member States is the object of negotiations and not simply a matter of accepting constitutional and secondary Community law and theacquis of the other intergovernmental policies. The end result is, of course, the extension of the Community heritage to the new member of the club however this process also involves adjustments, alterations and transitional periods.

It must also be said that European integration is a process of continual constitutional change, in which there is hardly time to digest territorial (enlargement) or institutional (revision of the Treaties) changes before a new process begins. This has been the case since the very start: the conclusion of the three Treaties - ECSC (1951), EEC and Euratom (1957) - was followed by the Merger Treaty establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission (1965), the first enlargement (1973), the entry of Greece (1981), the accession of Spain and Portugal (1986), the Single European Act (1987), the reunification of Germany (1990), the Treaty on European Union, better known as the Treaty of Maastricht (1993), the enlargement to take in Austria, Finland and Sweden (1995) and the recent drafting of the Treaty of Amsterdam. In addition to the revision of the Financial Perspective, the near future holds in store two major events which will affect both the Member States themselves and the whole of the continent and all international relations, namely enlargement and the introduction of the single currency.

These extremely important events come at a time of institutional and political change, which makes it more difficult to prepare for them and to understand their implications for the future. Although a decision in principle has been taken on enlargement, we must not, whatever happens, allow this to jeopardize internal cohesion and further development of European integration, which is based, inter alia, on a number of internal policies which form the foundations for the entire system and, are, in many respects, one of the reasons for the interest shown by the applicant countries in the entire process.

There can be no doubt that, alongside the major economic benefits to be gained, those countries' interest in accession to the Union stems inter alia from the stable relations which have developed between its Member States and the advantages to be gained from taking part in the formulation and management of ever more diversified common policies.

There can be no denying that the activities and development of the Union have had their difficult moments; however, there are still no valid alternatives to the principles and aims of European integration. The new Article F of the Amsterdam Treaty states that the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. Their Union intends to establish an area of stability and economic development within which to promote job opportunities; political, economic and monetary union will help to guarantee political and economic stability for the peoples of Europe, which is why it is the ambition of the vast majority of European countries to take a full part in the European project. Different views on various issues, do, however, exist particularly among the general public: some feel that involvement in the European project will mainly help to strengthen economic and social cohesion; others see it as providing support for given activities; still others as an opportunity to benefit from larger markets or an important contribution to the security of their own borders. Past economic and political experiences and demographic and geopolitical differences add to this disparity of views, which represents the real challenge of enlargement.

Alongside obvious advantages such as the opening up of a new market, every enlargement also represents a threat to the normal functioning of the existing mechanisms. Unless the necessary adjustments are made, the Union is in danger of falling victim to its own success, i.e. the interest which it generates in those countries which are not yet part of it. Meeting the challenge of enlargement will require successful mediation between the interests of the Member States and the applicant countries, so as to enable existing policies to work in a broader, more diverse context and ensure the adoption of the new strategies required by the Union of the next millennium, which will cover most of Europe from Linosa to the arctic regions and from Lisbon to Nicosia, thereby taking in areas lying to the east of St. Petersburg and the south of Tunis.

Enlargement: a few facts and figures

Enlargement represents a major commercial opportunity for the Union and its Member States: despite a relatively modest level of development, the markets of the Central and Eastern European countries have enormous potential. The extension of the internal market to the new Member States will make a major contribution towards boosting the economies of the Member States.

Unlike earlier enlargements, it is no longer a question of creating the conditions for the entry of developed countries with a well developed market economy, but of opening up the European Union to countries which are lagging behind in terms of development and which, despite having made important advances, are well below the Community average in terms of the main economic indicators and the legal and administrative structures required to be able to operate in a genuinely competitive environment and to face up to market forces.

The entry into the Union of 11 new Member States would bring the total number of consumers up to 500 million. According to the traditional analysis of the effects of setting up or extending a customs union, liberalization of trade would have a positive impact on trade and investment flows, enabling economies of scale to be made and manufacturing resources to be used more efficiently. The need for extensive modernization of the industrial base of the applicant countries, together with the service sector, would boost direct investment from the Member States, and thus make a major contribution towards economic recovery.

On the other hand, enlargement will make the Union more heterogenous: for example, it will give rise to a wider range of agricultural, regional and environmental problems. Major adjustments will therefore be required, together with in-depth reform of some Community policies. However, the negotiations and the transitional period may be relatively lengthy; furthermore, as things stand at the moment, the simultaneous accession of the 11 countries is not politically conceivable. Enlargement will take place gradually and in stages, which should, as long as the necessary courage and capacity to innovate is shown, allow the Union the time to formulate and carry through the reforms which must be made if it is to enter the next millennium in a position of strength on the international scene. To use an agricultural image, what is needed is slow and steady irrigation, not a flash-flood.

The first part of the Commission Communication Agenda 2000 is entitled 'For a stronger and wider Union'. A stronger Union will not be brought about automatically by enlargement but will depend on the effectiveness of the reforms needing to be made. However, it will definitely be a wider Union. The simultaneous accession of the 10 Central and Eastern European countries and Cyprus would produce the following result: the Union's territory would increase by 34% and its population by 29%, while its gross domestic product would rise by only 9%. As a result, per capita income would fall by 16%. The per capita income of a 26-Member State Union would stand at 75% of that of the original Community of six Member States. The main effect of this enlargement will therefore be a substantial reduction in per capita income. There are currently major disparities even among the applicant countries themselves, ranging from 18% to 59% of the Community average (Latvia and Slovenia). There are also major differences in the unemployment rate, which varies from 13.7% in Bulgaria to 3.4% in the Czech Republic, and are also substantial disparities in terms of regional development.

This economic situation would have the immediate impact of increasing the gap between rich and poor regions. For example, the Commission indicates that the percentage of potential beneficiaries of structural funds in a 26-Member State Union would rise from the current level of 49.8% to 60.9% (291 million inhabitants as against 185 million). Enlargement could of course also have a positive impact on those regions lagging behind in terms of development, but such effects are difficult to predict. In the short and medium-term, one can therefore expect an increase in disparities, which is why structural operations, which are the main instrument of solidarity within the Union, must remain one of its principle activities. The above forecasts are based on extrapolations which evidently cannot take account of the development of the economies of the individual applicant countries and of trade between those countries, and of the impact, inter alia, of the PHARE programme.

Enlargement will also have an impact on the agricultural sector. The Common Agricultural Policy was for a long time the driving force behind European integration and, even today, agricultural expenditure is the largest item in the Union's budget. Given the importance of the primary sector in the applicant countries, agriculture will need to retain a leading position among the policies of the enlarged Union. On average, in the 11 applicant countries, 22% of the working population is employed in the agricultural sector (9.5 million people), as against 5% in the 15-Member State Union (8.2 million). Agriculture accounts for 9% of the gross domestic product of those countries, as against 2.4% in the Union. While enlargement would increase the number of potential consumers by approximately 100 million, their purchasing power would be substantially lower than the average for the Union. With a few exceptions, prices in the applicant countries range between 40 and 80% of the Community level.

Enlargement should, however, improve the operation of the internal market, on condition that legislative and administrative transposition of the acquis, which has already begun under the Europe agreements, is completed. The extension of the four freedoms to the new members should therefore not cause any major problems. The same is also true of the provisions on competition, customs arrangements and indirect taxation.

As regards the horizontal policies, the social and environmental policies will be among those subjected to the greatest demands. Despite more advanced legislation in some sectors, tensions could arise in connection with unemployment, health, equal treatment of men and women, health care and safety at work and dialogue between both sides of industry. Given that living standards are appreciably lower than the average for the Union, and in view of the costs arising from the adoption of progressive social policies, there is every reason to expect both difficulties in the transposition of Union legislation and, once enlargement has been effected, delays in the adoption of new provisions and action programmes wherever unanimity proves necessary.

Particular attention needs to be paid to the issue of the environment. In general, the situation is more problematic in the applicant countries than in the Member States, particularly as regards atmospheric pollution and waste management. The main problems are linked to energy supplies and the use of nuclear power stations based on obsolete technology, which are extremely dangerous.

According to the Commission, the development of the Union's internal policies with a view to enlargement should be based on four objectives: stable growth and employment; the development of new technologies; the modernization of employment systems; and the improvement of living conditions. At the same time economic and social cohesion needs to be strengthened by enhancing the impact of financing, concentrating operations and achieving greater cost-effectiveness. The number of objectives will therefore be reduced from seven to three, although the Cohesion Fund will be retained in its current form. Furthermore, a number of reforms will be made to the Common Agricultural Policy, in respect of objectives (consumer protection and environmental considerations), procedures (direct aid instead of price support) and the management of the common organization of the market in some sectors. Major investments will also be necessary in the transport sector.

These types of reform, together with the pre-accession aid for the applicant countries, are set out in the new financial framework 2000-2006 which appears in Agenda 2000. On the basis of the assumption that the first group of applicant countries should accede to the Union midway through the above period, the Commission states that the new expenditure and priority measures can be paid for within the ceiling set at 1.27% of gross national product. This estimation takes account of a number of factors relating to the rate of growth in the Member States and the applicant countries.

The volume of expenditure which the Commission provides for in the financial framework covering the period 1999-2006 amounts to a total of ECU 74 800 million over the seven year period, which represents 0.00127% of Union GNP over that same period. The political importance of the matter therefore far outweighs the financial effort required.

Remarks

The above analysis is, of necessity, merely a brief outline, given the lack of information for an indepth analysis of the situation. Above all, we do not know how the accession negotiations will develop, how long they will take, which countries will be the first to join the Union and which will form part of the second group and, lastly, what changes the treaties of accession will make to primary and secondary Community law.

In view of its scale and the geopolitical, economic, social and cultural implications, enlargement to take in Cyprus and the Central and Eastern European countries is an event of unprecedented importance in the history of European integration. The author has attempted to highlight the specific factors which make enlargement towards the east and towards the Mediterranean a challenge which will change the very identity of the Union. However, enlargement must not remain a hostage to the necessary reforms, which must be carried out anyway if the Union's mechanisms are to function properly.

Firstly, the scale of the adjustments required to given policies (agriculture and social cohesion) is enormous and is difficult to reconcile with the optimistic forecasts supplied by the Commission in the new financial framework 2000-2006. This will be no easy task: owing to the continuing needs of the Union in its existing form, which are due to regional disparities which have yet to disappear, a substantially smaller amount of resources will be available for structural operations. The approach and problems which the new members will bring to the formulation and management of Union policies are as yet unknown. In all probability, the direct result will be the creation of new items of expenditure, to the detriment of sectors and policies which have traditionally received Community aid.

The above consideration brings us back to the original question: do the financial resources required for enlargement exist, or will the ceiling need to be revised? The probable reply is no: it would appear extremely difficult to cope successfully with the impact of the accession of 11 countries which have such widely varying levels of development and are lagging so far behind the current levels in the Member States, unless the appropriate financial efforts are made. Existing and new policies will require an ever greater volume of resources, without which they cannot possibly be effective. Whatever the case, there is good reason to anticipate that the ceiling will be revised when accession takes place. Enlargement must not be allowed to be used as a general alibi for all the EU's internal problems.

Despite its financial rigour, which is matched only by the lack of imagination which it showed when drawing up Agenda 2000, the Commission would appear to have adopted an approach of static optimism unlikely to stand the test of time.Agenda 2000 is an interesting, accurate document, but one which lacks the vision required to sketch out the Europe of the future, together with that form of dynamic vision required to understand how the Union and its policies will change once enlargement has taken place. Furthermore, it is unclear to what extent the completion of economic and monetary union and the introduction of the single currency will affect economic prospects and job opportunities in the participating Member States and those which will remain outside the system. Possible tensions on the foreign exchange markets could affect investment flows and trade and have repercussion on the labour market, making additional interventions at national and Community level necessary. The above is only an example, but it does serve to illustrate the difficulties of making forecasts in a changing uncertain situation.

Whatever the situation, once it has been decided that enlargement is necessary, the costs arising from that decision will have to be borne. It is illusory to claim that such a vast operation can be carried through without dipping into one's purse. In the interests of the Member States and the applicant countries it is vital for spending to be maintained at a level which enables Union policies to be pursued. The exacerbation of regional disparities, rising tension on the labour market and the worsening situation in some agricultural sectors are all threats to the stability of the Union in its existing form, and may grow worse following enlargement. At the same time, however, they can be controlled and properly channelled if a new political will is shown.

3. Bulgaria's application for accession to the European Union - Mrs Magda G. H. Aelvoet

1. When, in November 1989, the reform wing of the Bulgarian Communist Party removed the party leader Todor Zhivkov, who had ruled the country since 1954, the news was received as one more link in the chain of revolutions which western Europe was confronting with amazement. The same year saw, one event coming on the heels of another, the adoption of multi-party politics in Hungary at the beginning of the year, the agreement between Solidarity and the Polish Communist Party which led to semi-democratic elections in Poland in June, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the triumph of the 'velvet revolution' in Czechoslovakia, and the execution of Ceausescu in Romania.

The years that have followed have brought to the fore the determined intention - now all but beyond doubt - of all those countries and a number of others to become members of the European Union. Both sides have come to accept this as inevitable, both for reasons of historical justice and on geostrategic, economic, social, and, indeed, emotive grounds.

The EU has set out a pre-accession strategy and has launched certain funding programmes (PHARE and TACIS) which have proved reasonably effective. Association agreements (known as 'Europe Agreements') have been signed with all the applicant countries, setting under way the long process of economic, social and political metamorphosis.

Bulgaria swiftly rid itself of its decaying totalitarian regime in less than two years after the fall of Zhivkov. June 1990 saw parliamentary elections in which the former communists won a majority. A new constitution was adopted in July 1991; fresh elections in October of that year resulted in a victory for the centre-right. In January 1992 the former dissident Zhelyu Zhelev was elected President. In the parliamentary elections of 1994 the inheritors of the Communist Party returned to power, to remain until the elections of 19 April 1997. By then the political situation had worsened markedly, and the government had become incapable of surviving; the final blow came in November 1996 when the centrist presidential candidate, Peter Stoianov, defeated Ivan Mazarov of the Socialist Party.

The process of transition in Bulgaria, while peaceful, has been politically complex. The problems encountered have no doubt held back the process of economic reform (as the Commission points out in its opinion). One should also mention the adverse impact on the Bulgarian economy of the prolonged embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and of Greece's unilateral embargo on the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia.

It is, then, too early to know whether the new government's reform programme will have the desired positive effects. The government's new programme, adopted unanimously by the national parliament, includes a set of urgent social and economic measures, as well as promises to act against corruption and organized crime. The desire to join the European Union has been expressed by a unanimous vote of the newly elected parliament.

2. The journey towards integration into the EU began with the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1988. 1990 saw the signing of a trade and cooperation agreement and the extension of the PHARE programme to Bulgaria. On 8 March 1993 the 'Europe Agreement' with the EU was signed; this agreement received the assent of the European Parliament on 22 November of that year, and came into force on 1 February 1995. In the conclusion to the explanatory statement in its report, Parliament expressed its unreserved endorsement of the agreement and described Bulgaria as the most stable country in the Balkans. Bulgaria submitted its application for Community membership on 14 December 1995.

Unfortunately, as pointed out above, political developments since then have not made it possible for a transition to take place on lines similar to those followed by other applicant countries: the present economic situation and the slowness of the reforms are obstacles to national development.

The opinion on Bulgaria's application for membership adopted by the Commission, which was submitted to the European Parliament on 16 July 1997, recognizes this state of affairs with virtually no ambiguity. No doubts are expressed as to Bulgaria's right to become a member of the Union when the right conditions exist. The opinion points out a number of fundamental problems in relation to the establishment of a market economy, stressing that Bulgaria is in no position in the medium term to handle the pressure of competition; it also emphasizes the existence of major problems as regards harmonization with Community legislation and the assumption of the mid-term obligations entailed by accession. By contrast, the political criteria appear to be met, or to be in process of being met. The text concludes that the accession negotiations should begin once Bulgaria has made sufficient progress towards fulfilling all the Copenhagen criteria.

It is also stated that the pre-accession strategy will be suitably reinforced and that the Commission will submit a progress report no later than the end of 1998.

Nonetheless, in view of the applicant country's insistence, echoed by the other applicants excluded from the first round, that negotiations should get under way, it appears desirable to look into the arguments for and against.

3. In view of the above and in the light of the Commission's opinion, your rapporteur wishes to put forward, for this stage of the working document, a number of considerations for and against opening accession negotiations with Bulgaria.

The following arguments may be invoked in favour:

1) The Bulgarian government and people do not wish to be excluded at a moment when the country's economy and its economic and social transition appear to be well on the road to recovery. There is anxiety that Bulgaria may be relegated to the second division as far as foreign investors are concerned. This position was restated by Mr Kostov on his most recent visit to Brussels; he also recognized that accession remains a long-term strategy (no doubt corresponding, he said, to two legislative terms). It should also be stressed that, despite the serious economic and political problems of the transition, Bulgaria has exhibited signs of maturity and moderation.

2) The European Parliament has tended to support the view that all the negotiations should be opened at the same time. Thus, in its resolution of 17 April 1996, Parliament 'stresses the importance of beginning consultations simultaneously with all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe which have applied for membership, ... even though the membership negotiations might subsequently last for different lengths of time'. Nonetheless, in paragraph 18 of its resolution of 18 January 1996 Parliament had taken the view that negotiations should be opened six months after the end of the IGC 'with all the applicant states which fulfil the necessary conditions', even if it should not prove possible for all the applicants to join simultaneously.

3) The commencement of membership negotiations with Bulgaria could strengthen the Union's presence in the Balkans and contribute to the stabilization of the region. In addition, the existence of a Turkish minority which is reasonably well integrated into Bulgarian society could serve as a bridgehead for improving relations with Turkey.

4) It remains possible that negotiations could be opened with a country on which the Commission has expressed a negative opinion, should there be a majority in favour in the Council or in Parliament.

The following arguments may be marshalled against:

1) According to the Commission, which is, under the Treaties, responsible for delivering a reasoned opinion on the matter, Bulgaria does not meet all the necessary conditions for the opening of negotiations. The problems are mostly economic, but also institutional and social.

2) The enlargement negotiations would go on for years (eight years or more), creating considerable anxiety in the Bulgarian public. They would also suffer from the additional complexity of being conducted with a country which has not yet achieved a sufficient degree of approximation of its legislation and administration with the acquis communautaire.

4. Your rapporteur considers that the political criteria should have priority, A refusal to begin negotiations at a moment when Bulgaria is making an enormous political effort to get economic and institutional reform off the ground would be perceived as extremely harsh. For the Union itself, it appears important to strengthen the role of a Balkan nation which has managed to maintain peaceful relations with all its neighbours.

In view of these circumstances, the role of the Committee on Foreign Affairs should be to examine the above points and reach whatever position on the matter it concludes is in the best interests of both the Union and the Bulgarian people.

4. Estonia's Application for Membership of the European Union - Mr Jörn Donner

This working document seeks to raise questions rather than to answer them, and to open up subjects for discussion.

General

The Commission assesses Estonia's application for EU membership on the basis of the criteria for accession laid down at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993. These are, broadly, political, economic and 'the ability to take on the conditions of membership'. It is the first, which requires "that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities" (p1) which most closely concerns the Foreign Affairs Committee, but reference will be made to factors outside this.

It is true that in the short period after regaining independence Estonia has gone a long way towards the goals expressed in the Copenhagen declaration, but it has still a long way to go. This probably holds true for all applicant countries, but given the rather long time-span for the EEA and later EU accession negotiations for Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden it should be borne in mind that Estonia is willing to fulfil all the criteria for membership, and seems able to do so during the years to come.

Political considerations

The Europe Agreement

The Commission draws attention to the Europe Agreement signed in June 1995 and mentions that Estonia will become eligible to participate in Community programmes from the entry into force of that agreement. This would clearly be valuable preparation for EU membership, but ratification procedures have not been completed. Estonia has ratified it (in August 1995), as has the European Parliament. However, to date (3 November) France has still not ratified it, though all the other EU Member States have now done so.

Democracy and the Rule of Law

The Commission feels that the legislature, executive and judiciary function correctly (rather than 'satisfactorily' or 'smoothly' as in the Lithuaniaavis ), but mentions that "the major difficulties facing the justice system relate to uncertainly regarding the law applying in many areas of legislation and the inexperience of the magistracy" (p11) and that "the police's effectiveness has sometimes been called into question given the rise in organized crime and in (sic) the fight against corruption" (p10). Under 'Justice and home affairs' (p103) it states: "There is an overriding need for sufficient and properly trained staff with a high degree of integrity". What problems have there been? Corruption, by no means absent in existing EU members, negatively affects the rule of law, human rights and indeed the proper functioning of a market economy. We are pleased to read that there is an active parliamentary committee dealing with corruption (p9), but we are given no information as to the extent of that corruption.

We are told that Estonia has no Ombudsman (p11) but that "a government bill introducing one is currently being considered"; we look forward to learning its fate.

Human Rights and the Protection of Minorities

Conventions Estonia has ratified the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights, though with a reservation on the right to a public hearing at appellate court level, and also, according to the Commission, 'the Convention against the use of torture', presumably the Council of Europe one. It has also ratified the UN one (Latvia has not, Lithuania has), as well as the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Lithuania has not, Latvia has).

Death penalty The European Parliament has often called for the abolition of the death penalty. Not all Member States have removed it completely from their statute books, but it is effectively abolished. We should find it unacceptable that any state be admitted to the EU without its having abolished the death penalty, and indeed believe that such abolition should be made a criterion for even opening negotiations. Estonia has not abolished it, and indeed parliament rejected to proposal so to do, in December 1996. The Commission states that the last execution was carried out in September 1991 and that the Minister of Justice has undertaken to abolish the death penalty before February 1998. Amnesty International's Report 1997 says that in 1996 "at least four men were sentenced to death and at least nine other prisoners were believed to be on death row at the end of that year". So far no amnesty has been granted by President Lennart Meri.

Minorities "Around 35% of the population of Estonia consists of minorities, including non-citizens, made up of 28% Russians, 2.7% Ukrainians and 1.5% Belorussians" (p13). 23% of the population are not Estonian citizens, 13% being without any nationality. "A large percentage of Estonia's population will continue to remain foreign or stateless for a long time, estimates the Commission (p14). This is an extremely serious problem although, "on the whole, the rights of the Russianspeaking minority...are observed and safeguarded" (p15). Only Estonian citizens may belong to a political party, and non-Estonians have problems becoming civil servants.

Estonia has ratified the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, likely to come into force shortly, but with a declaration which apparently gravely restricts its applicability. The Commission's statement on this declaration is quite unclear, but it would seem that the idea of limiting the definition of "national minority" to those who "maintain longstanding, firm and lasting ties with Estonia" (amongst other criteria) is intended to exclude at least some (former) Russians from the scope of the Convention. It seems that Estonia regards only Estonian citizens of Russian or other mother-tongue to be parts of a minority. The stateless and bearers of foreign passports are regarded as aliens.

The Russian minority is often regarded in Estonia as a liability. It might be seen as an asset too: many European countries are bilingual or multilingual, Finland and Belgium officially so. On the other hand, given the facts of persecution, deportations and Russification in an earlier period, some Estonian reaction is understandable. Opening up accession negotiations might lead to an increased willingness by the stateless or foreign nationals to opt for Estonian citizenship, provided that the quality and extent of Estonian language courses is being improved.

Security and border questions

The Commission states that 'an important remaining issue between Estonia and Russia is the absence of a border agreement' (P.94). The Union needs to have secure external borders. A political agreement between Estonia and Russia is in danger of falling hostage to the Russian view that nonEstonian minorities are maltreated. Russia has strongly opposed NATO membership for Estonia, but the potential EU membership seems acceptable. Work is being undertaken to enhance Estonian border controls, partially by electronic means.

Estonian defence forces are tiny. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that conscription, as a legacy of the Soviet era, is quite unpopular (only about half of those called up actually serve). Conscription may even be an obstacle to stateless or Russian subjects wishing to take up Estonian citizenship.

In view of the Parliament's firm position in favour of totally banning anti-personnel mines, and its support for the Ottawa Process aimed at having a treaty on this signed in Ottawa at the end of 1997, we note that although the three Baltic States did attend the Brussels Conference in June 1997 (a stage in the Ottawa Process), they did so only as observers and did not sign the Brussels Declaration. This was, sadly, also the case for Finland and Greece though the latter seems to be changing its mind. All other EU Member States are fully participating in the Ottawa Process.

Economic and social considerations

Per capita income

We note that the GDP per capita, expressed in purchasing power parity, is in fact higher in Lithuania (4,100 ECU), which, according to the Commission, should wait for accession negotiations, than in Estonia (3,900 ECU), where they could begin. Estonia in fact ranks second lowest of the applicants; Latvia is at 3,100 ECU. The EU average is 17,300 ECU. Estonia's trade imbalance has been partly offset by foreign investment and tourism. Considerations for including Estonia ahead of Latvia and Lithuania apparently have been based on other than economic considerations.

Social and labour legislation

"Trade union freedoms are guaranteed without restriction in Estonia, where two national federations unite most union members. Almost 30% of workers are members of a trade union" (p13). This positive assessment is supported by the fact that the ICFTU's Annual Survey of violations of trade union rights contains no entry for Estonia.

The Baltic States : together or separately?

The Burenstam Linder Report (A4-1196/97) on the Baltic Sea Region Initiative, which went through plenary in June, shows the recent burgeoning of cooperation between the three Baltic States. Such cooperation has been strongly encouraged by the EU and it covers numerous fields, such as defence matters, including BALTBAT, and agriculture. There are different fora for cooperation, such as the Council of Baltic Sea States. Some of these involve other countries in the region. Cooperation between the three Baltic States themselves is of vital importance for their development, enabling them to tackle common problems together. The Commission's proposal that accession negotiationsbe opened in the first instance only with Estonia has the disadvantage that it could negatively affect such cooperation.

There is a strong case for treating all the Baltic States similarly and opening negotiations simultaneously with all three even if it must be clear that they will not all necessarily accede at the same moment. Indications of different treatment by the EU have already led to some friction - disagreement between Lithuania and Estonia surfaced at the Baltic premiers' meeting in June. Exacerbation of this could be avoided by opening negotiations simultaneously.

In view of the foregoing, it should be pointed out that Estonia, despite its shortcomings, is well equipped to start negotiations. The timeframe for accession must, by the nature of things, remain utterly flexible. It very much depends on Estonia itself how quickly accession will be possible.

5. Hungary's application for accession to the European Union - Mr Otto von Habsburg

For historical and political reasons, Hungary occupies a special position among the Central and Eastern European states which wish to accede to the European Union.

The first distinctive feature is the resilience of Hungarian society. Even under the communist regime, Hungary went its own way, which in the West was dubbed 'goulash communism'. Although the 1945 elections were held under Soviet occupation, even at that early date the result was a large absolute majority for non-socialist parties. Mainly because of the 1956 uprising, the communist regime was compelled, after a period of violent repression, to make certain concessions to the people. Consequently, in comparison with what happened in many other countries in the Danube region, the Hungarian economy developed in a different direction. The Hungarian communist leadership also adopted a reformist line at an early date. It is striking that, even under a still 100% communist regime, measures were taken to approximate Hungarian legislation to that of the European Union, albeit discreetly. Leading Hungarian communists, such as Deputy Prime Minister Imre Pozsgay and the current Prime Minister Gyula Horn, were among the democratizers and took part in the transition to democracy, especially the events of 19 August 1989.

Hungary's attachment to democracy is also reflected in the fact that the country's transition process has not been marked by the same political crises as elsewhere. As the majority has shifted from left to right and back again, normal civilized procedures have prevailed. It is significant that not a single representative of any party of the extreme right or left has been elected to the Hungarian Parliament. Hungary can accordingly be described as an established democracy.

Another aspect which is significant is Hungary's exemplary minorities policy. This too began under the communist regime. It is worth noting that the provisions concerning minorities relate not only to the rights of the individual but also to the collective rights of population groups. The 13 minorities scattered about the country enjoy democratic self-government, with free elections. Among neighbouring countries with their numerous Hungarian minorities, there are two unsatisfactory instances: Slovakia, where the Meciar government is pursuing a brutal assimilation policy, and rump Yugoslavia, where there is no agreement with the Belgrade government on the status of the 350 000 Hungarians in Vojvodina. Basic treaties now exist with all other neighbouring states, which not only guarantee their borders but also regulate minority rights; in particular, relations with Austria, Slovenia and Croatia can be described as perfectly satisfactory.

Substantial progress has also been made with the harmonization of legislation, the preparations for which, as already mentioned, began in the communist era. This should considerably ease the forthcoming negotiations, particularly as regards the 'acquis communautaire'.

The financial situation is difficult at present, although here too things have improved since the stabilization policy of 1995-96. The large volume of foreign investment in Hungary is a point to be noted here.

Some progress has been made in trade policy, but there is still work to be done. On the other hand, progress in agriculture has been remarkable: in terms of the economic significance of agriculture in relation to the economy as a whole and to the population Hungary is already close to the EU standard. Considerable efforts are still being made to diversify, which could assume importance particularly with regard to agricultural exports to non-EU countries. There are still major problems with social policy, and the current efforts of the Hungarian Government relate mainly to combatting unemployment and reforming family policy.

To sum up, it would be fair to say that, thanks to the early date at which reforms began, Hungary has made vigorous efforts to prepare itself for membership of the EU in recent years, both microeconomically and micro-socially. This particularly applies to harmonization of legislation and enhancing competitiveness in areas beyond the EU. Hungary has also done much to modernize its economy. At micro-level, Hungary's preparations are impressive, and are also promoting progress in production. This can particularly be observed in modern, advanced-technology sectors, while machinery and vehicles already account for more than 40% of Hungary's exports to EU Member States.

There is every reason to believe, therefore, that once Hungary becomes a full member, and perhaps even at the preceding stages, it will be able to use EU resources effectively - perhaps even more effectively than they are used under the EU's existing practice. Important factors here are the high average level of education of the population, their skills, the flexibility of society and existing microeconomic achievements. Hungary's geographical location also operates in its favour: investment in transport, which is very important, will have an impact which does not cease at the EU's borders, as is the case in many other countries: rather, Hungary will become a transit area for transport within the EU. Investment should therefore yield significantly better returns than investment which leads only to a terminus.

Seen in this light, Hungary could become a new European growth centre, not only accelerating growth in Europe as a whole but above all offering specialized products which will make the EU more competitive with non-European countries.

6. Latvia's accession to the Union - Mr Ernesto Caccavale

Introduction

In its opinion on Latvia's accession application, the Commission takes the view that the country does not yet meet the conditions required for negotiations to be opened. However, the call for negotiations to be opened with Estonia is certain to have far-reaching consequences in other respects for future relations between Latvia and the Union. The above recommendation marks a departure from the Union's invariable earlier practice of treating all three Baltic republics in the same way. The distinction stems primarily from economic considerations.

Economic situation

Latvia's economic performance in recent years has been fairly creditable. However, for all the signs of a manifest upswing, per capita income continues to be substantially lower than the Community average, and the agricultural sector is disproportionately large. In addition, although significant moves have been made to establish a market economy, the economic system is still having great trouble in withstanding the pressure of competition and market forces within the Community. The necessary steps to ensure compliance with internal market rules have not yet been taken, especially where intellectual property, contracts, and the rules of competition are concerned. Even more radical action appears to be needed with regard to customs and statistics.

Privatization is proceeding very rapidly in all sectors of industry except postal services, railways and airports, and more slowly in the agricultural sector; the process should be completed by June 1998. After the crisis in the banking sector in 1995, the currency is now relatively stable; the unemployment rate is rising, while the inflation rate has fallen to 9%. The objective for 1998 is to reduce the inflation rate to 7% and bring the budget into balance.

Political situation

From the political point of view, institutional stability now appears to be an established fact. Last August there was a further change of government; as the latter is based on a coalition of several parties, no significant disruption of the political system in general ensued. Accession to the Council of Europe provides further evidence of the high democratic standards achieved. Certain important improvements still need to be made with regard to the protection of human rights and the rights of minorities and, more generally, in relation to the rule of law and the judicial system. The new government's main objectives include revising the law on criminal procedure. But the most significant problems arise in connection with civil law, due to the disastrous legacy of the Soviet system and the consequent difficulty of ensuring consistency in the interpretation of the law and in sentencing, greatly to the detriment of the principle of legal certainty and the protection of contracts and private property.

Beyond more intensive cooperation in the Baltic region, the Latvian authorities believe that membership of the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union will be the corner-stone of Latvia's political and economic stability and the key to secure borders. This legitimate aspiration, however, is at odds with Russia's oft repeated determination to oppose any enlargement of NATO to encompass the Baltic region. Membership of the European Union could offer some form of security guarantee by virtue of the institutional links with the Western European Union and the CFSP pillar.

One matter of continuing and especially pressing concern for Latvia is the high number of stateless persons who are consequently deprived of particular rights. The persons concerned, accounting for some 28% of the population, are mostly Russian-speakers who moved to Latvia at the time of the Soviet occupation, from 1940 on. Although Latvian law is relatively advanced as regards the treatment of minorities and there are no reports of tensions between the two ethnic groups, the small size of the country compared with the high percentage of 'immigrants' constitutes a potential destabilizing factor.[1]

A law on the acquisition of nationality, adopted in 1994, permits a different given category of persons every year to apply for naturalization under what is known as the 'windows' system. To date, however, the number of naturalizations has been modest, thus serving to demonstrate not only that the Russian-speaking minority is not over-anxious to obtain Latvian nationality, but also that the naturalization procedures and criteria are rather complicated. On the other hand, the prospect of accession to the Union is likely to induce more people to take Latvian nationality in order to qualify

for specific entitlements associated with membership (freedom of movement, for example).

Previous position of Parliament

The criteria for the accession of Central and Eastern European countries to the Union were laid down at the Copenhagen European Council. Any acceding State must accordingly have stable institutions to uphold democracy; it must recognize the primacy of the law, human rights, and respect for minorities; its economy must be run along operational market lines and able to withstand the pressures of competition and market forces within the Union; and, lastly, it must be in a position to endorse the objectives of political, economic, and monetary union.

In 1995 Parliament gave its assent to the Europe Agreement, which already contained an explicit reference to Latvia's accession to the Union. Furthermore, in April 1996 it called for negotiations with all the applicant countries to open at the same time, avoiding a two-tier arrangement, on the understanding that the duration of the negotiations would vary from one country to another. More recently, it has asserted that accession of the Baltic States to the Union will bring benefits in terms of greater political stability for the region and hence Europe as a whole.

Conclusions

Some of the economic criteria laid down in Copenhagen have not yet been fulfilled. Although progress has been made, much wide-ranging work is still required before Latvia can do business on the internal market. The country's authorities should be encouraged to continue with the necessary administrative and legislative reforms. Early entry into force of the Europe Agreement and a more resolute pre-accession strategy will be key means of achieving that aim.

In both geopolitical and economic terms, there appears to be no question that it would be difficult and largely counter-productive to treat Latvia differently from the other two Baltic republics. That would create barriers and divisions where previously none had existed, as happened in the weeks following the Commission's Recommendation concerning the suspension of negotiations on the establishment of a Customs union. While the principle that Latvia must continue the reform process with a view to ultimately assimilating the Community 'acquis' in its entirety must be firmly upheld, the country must be assured of the possibility of embarking on accession negotiations at the same time as Estonia and Lithuania. Any other decision would be a mistake, both in political and strategic terms.

7. Lithuania's Application for Membership of the European Union - Mr Frode Kristoffersen

Economic situation

Lithuania has made many efforts over the past years in order to improve its economic situation. In the first years after it regained independence the country's industrial output fell dramatically, but it has been improving every year since 1994. The country has also lifted most of the restrictions on the free movement of goods, and the same is the case regarding previous regulations on prices and foreign exchange.

The inflation rate which has dropped significantly in the last years. Compared with an EU average Lithuania still falls behind (in all areas), but this is a surprise to nobody. The country is improving its positions in almost every field and works together with the other two Baltic States to reach the European level as soon as possible. The transportation network agreement with Estonia and Latvia is a clear signal of the willingness to improve the economic infrastructure of the country and of the Baltic region.

Political situation

Lithuania's recent history is one of determination and willingness to fight for sovereignty at almost any cost and it was the leading Baltic State in the struggle for freedom and independence from the USSR. The country's political system is stable and reliable and changes of governments have taken place without any problems. The next presidential election is due in December 1997 and as in recent years the democratic process continues without any problems - also during the election campaign. Lithuania has been able during a short period of time to re-establish itself as a democratic state with all the basic rights that are related to a free and open political system.

Lithuania has shown its commitment to the European cause in all its efforts following the application for accession. The drafting of a new law on civil service will be finalized in 1997 - regulating the activities of all civil servants employed by the public sector. Adding to this the new anti-corruption laws that were approved in June and the specific EU-training strategy imposed in order to improve the qualifications of the civil servants shows that Lithuania generally aims to be ready as soon as possible for the future as a member of the European Union.

Conclusions

It seems obvious to treat Lithuania like the two other Baltic States when the EU considers when to open negotiations of accession with the country. The three Baltic States are not just three countries somewhere in Europe. They have shared the same destiny since they lost their independence and disappeared from the European map as countries. They truly - in a sad way - represent the climax of Europe's darkest hours and as a result of that they lived in the forgotten darkness as Soviet republics for half a century. They lost their country, their independence and their identity. They emerged together in the beginning of this decade as new democracies - hand in hand. The EU should not divide them. The political willingness and commitment are key elements when they prepare themselves for the future as full EU members. Given the size of their populations and the size of their problems it would constitute no real problem for the EU to announce that the European Union is ready to open the negotiations with Lithuania and the two other Baltic States at the same time. It would be of tremendous value for them all in their internal preparations for obtaining full membership

- even if Lithuania must realize that it does not necessarily mean that the country will become a full member at the same time as either of the other two Baltic States.

8. Poland's application for membership of the European Union - Mrs Magdalena Hoff

1. Poland regards its desire for membership of the European Union and its efforts to achieve it as a historical challenge. Over the centuries Poland's national integrity has again and again been shattered by its neighbours, whether by the various divisions after 1795 by Russia, Prussia and Austria, or by the division and annexation by Germany and the Soviet Union after 1939.

Now Poland is trying to give a firmer basis to its newly won national sovereignty through membership of western political and security structures, and EU membership is the most important strategic aim of Polish foreign policy. NATO's decision in Madrid to invite Poland to membership negotiations is another important indication of the role Poland can play in a united Europe. Another is Poland's commitment to regional cooperation with its neighbours - with the Baltic states, where it plays a bridging role, and with Germany, whose fateful relationship and subsequent reconciliation with its neighbour in this century are symbolic of the regrowth of a peaceful, united Europe.

The journey towards Europe's community of free and democratic nations first began for Poland, not in 1989 with the fall of the Iron Curtain, but ten years earlier than that with the Solidarity strike in Gdansk. In the 1980s the trade union opposition's struggle under Lech Walesa for political and economic change paved the way for democracy in the nineties and laid the foundations of the democratic Poland of today.

2. In its opinion of 5 April 1994 on Poland's membership application, the Commission recommended that accession negotiations should begin, for the following reasons:

- Poland has the characteristic features of a democracy with stable institutions,

- Poland can be regarded as a functioning market economy and should be able to keep pace with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union,

- Poland should be able to take part in the single market in the medium term if it continues its efforts to incorporate the acquis communautaire, particularly the parts relating to the single market, and steps up its efforts to implement it.

3. Despite the enormous progress towards reform since 1989, Poland, like all the other applicant countries from Central and Eastern Europe, does not at present fulfil the economic conditions for EU membership, although it should be ready for full accession within a medium-term timescale of about 5 years if its reform efforts continue.

It should not be forgotten, however, that Poland is by far the largest of the applicant countries, and its accession would have a critical effect on existing EU policies.

Negotiations with Poland therefore require particular care.

Geographically Poland is the ninth largest country in Europe, with 38.6 million inhabitants, the equivalent of almost 11% of the Union's population. Its economic power, on the other hand, is only 3% of that of the Union, with a per capita GNP equivalent to 31% of the EU average. The average monthly wage is ECU 250.

In 1996 Poland showed a positive economic growth of 6%, its budget deficit was reduced to 3% of GDP, and debt servicing is being steadily reduced (in the 1980s Poland was the world's fourth most indebted country). The inflation rate, although it has dropped steadily over the last few years, still stood at 19.9% in 1996.

Poland shares borders with seven countries: Slovakia, Russia, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, the Czech Republic and Germany. This means that Poland has a particular responsibility for controls and stability at its external borders.

With 70% of its export and 65% of its import trade in 1995 being with the European Union, Poland's economy is already more closely involved with that of the EU than that of certain Member States. 17% of Poland's export trade and 15% of its imports are with its Central European neighbours, 6% and 7% respectively with Russia.

4. Five areas need special attention, in the view of your rapporteur, and require further change and reform measures in the years leading up to accession and thereafter. They are:

* the state-owned industries

* agriculture

* transport

* the environment, and

* external frontiers.

Poland's economic dynamism is attributable mainly to the private sector, in which 65% of workers are employed, 95% of them in small businesses with up to five employees. Most of these are newly founded businesses rather than privatized state enterprises. More effort will be needed here.

27% of all employees work in agriculture - or depend upon it -, although this sector yields only 6.6% of GNP. This disparity must be eliminated in the next few years by means of modernization, restructuring and privatization. Of the state-owned farms which account for 20% of Poland's agricultural land, only 10% have so far been privatized.

Poland is now an important transit country between western Europe and the CIS countries, and is crossed by four trans-European corridors. Since 1990traffic levels have risen dramatically, mainly in the area of heavy road transport, whereas inland waterway traffic decreased by one third and rail freight traffic by half between 1990 and 1995. Considerable infrastructure efforts will be needed here in the future.

In the environmental area Poland faces very serious problems of air and water pollution. The main causes are coal mining and energy production using coal. Long-term improvements can be made if up to 40% of Poland's energy needs are covered in future by natural gas from Russia. Since all of Poland's rivers flow into the Baltic, Poland as the main polluter bears a special responsibility for keeping its water cleaner.

237 million crossings of Poland's external borders in 1995 brought a great many illegal immigrants from the CIS states and Asia into the European Union. Drug trafficking, crossborder crime and illegal immigration mean that special external border management measures must be taken.

5. Poland's particularly large size means that its economic and environmental structural problems must not be neglected; the same goes for the sensitive area of its complex external borders. Reinforced pre-accession strategies must take account of all this.

9. The Czech Republic's application for membership of the EU - Carlos Carnero González

The Czech Republic submitted its application for membership of the European Union on 17 January 1996. On 29 January 1996, pursuant to Article O of the Treaty, the Council of Ministers asked the Commission for its opinion on the application and this was submitted on 15 July 1997. This working document is merely intended as an initial, partial response to the Commission's opinion; your rapporteur will not attempt a comprehensive assessment of the Commission document until he has heard what the Czech Republic's authorities and representatives of its civil society have to say about it and until the matter has been discussed in detail by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy. This document in no way represents, therefore, the rapporteur's final opinion.

The Czech Republic's application for membership is part of a process in which the entire continent of Europe became involved following the fall of the Berlin Wall, an event which has still to be fully digested by European and pan-European political and military bodies and which should encourage them to respond in an innovative fashion to the challenge of integration, security and development posed by the events of 1989. It is an expression of the country's political determination to become an integral part of a European political area whose foundation stone is the European Union. This is a legitimate and understandable aspiration which your rapporteur can only welcome since its intended aim is to put an end to the pre-1989 division of Europe.

All the countries which have submitted an application for membership are an integral part of the European family and the European Union must quickly recognize this fact, which does not just concern the applicant countries but also constitutes a challenge to the Union itself. In the specific case of the Czech Republic, the bilateral contractual relations being developed during the period leading up to the county's accession are a tangible expression of its European identity. Together with Hungary and Poland, Czechoslovakia was a signatory, on 16 December 1991, to one of the first three European Association Agreements concluded by the Union with countries of the former Soviet bloc. As proof of its willingness to bring the country into the European family the European Parliament approved an 'Interim Agreement' on 17 January 1992 which enabled the trade and economic aspects of the association agreement to be brought into immediate effect. The association agreement obviously had to take into account the controversial, though consensual, separation between Slovakia and the Czech Republic which took effect on 1 January 1993 and which required the Commission to negotiate legally separate agreements with each of the two countries. A new European Agreement (more comprehensive than the previous one) was subsequently concluded on 4 October 1993 and it came into force, following ratification, on 1 February 1995. This agreement currently provides the legal basis for EU-Czech relations and the Association Committee and the Association Council are the institutional bodies responsible for monitoring the progress of bilateral relations and settling any disputes. The Czech Republic gave an even clear signal of its determination to join the European Union by setting up, in 1994, the Government Committee on European Integration which is chaired by the Prime Minister and includes a number of ministers.

Since 1990, the Czech Republic has gone through profound political, economic, social and institutional changes which stem from its desire for inclusion within European structures and its awareness that membership of the European Union represents a fundamental and irreversible strategic choice. The Czech authorities must be given credit for having pursued this policy with such conviction, striving for objectives such as guaranteed basic freedoms, the rule of law, human rights, economic development intended to combat unemployment, a multi-party political system, freedom of the press and freedom of political expression. Such an outcome could not be taken for granted and was not easy to achieve but was secured thanks to a genuine commitment to Europe which was supported by a significant majority by the Czech political class. This remarkable process of systemic change is obviously not yet complete and the Commission itself has identified certain problem areas which the Czech Government will have to deal with.

Your rapporteur notes with interest that the Commission is recommending that accession negotiations should be opened with the Czech Republic and it is clear that it intends to contribute to a political process which will result in mutually beneficial and effective accession in accordance with the country's wish to join the European Union as soon as possible. The negotiations will be lengthy, as has been admitted by the Commission President, who has mentioned the year 2002 as the key date for EU enlargement to include Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia and Cyprus. In the meantime the strengthened pre-accession strategy will help the Czech Republic to gear itself quickly to the requirements of membership and to address what the Commission describes as 'the weak points identified in the opinion', on which a report is due to be submitted by the end of 1998.

The Czech Republic does not have any structural problems as regards the three basic criteria defined at the June 1993 Copenhagen European Council, i.e. the existence of stable democratic institutions, the existence of a market economy and the ability to meet the obligations stemming from accession. There are, however, certain problem areas which will have to be tackled without delay and to which your rapporteur intends to draw attention.

From the political and human rights point of view it should be pointed that the Czech Republic has signed (but not yet ratified) the Council of Europe's Framework Convention on national minorities which would provide better means of protecting and promoting the situation of national minorities, especially the Roma (gypsies).

The Commission notes that accession also represents a challenge to the Czech justice system, which is particularly overburdened and is unable to ensure that cases are dealt with swiftly. This major problem is linked to a more general one of the lack of a civil service statute and a modern administration. The Commission devotes a fair amount of space to describing the Czech Republic's shortcomings as regards its administrative structures. This is understandable since, in the absence of an efficient, independent civil service, it would be impossible for the acquis communautaire to be properly applied. As the Commission points out, the absence of firm, well-thought-out plans for modernizing the civil service is a cause for concern in this key area.

Certain legislative changes would also be called for as regards the power to ban political demonstrations 'which would damage the country's prosperity, (a source of possible abuse) or greater guarantees for press freedom which is governed by a law dating back to 1966 which has not been adequately updated by the amendments made to it in 1990 and 1992.

Lastly, the most serious (although apparently short-term) bilateral dispute is a trade-related one concerning the decision taken by the government in April 1997 to set up an import deposit scheme in accordance with which importers are required to deposit in a bank account an amount equal to 20% of the value of the goods they wish to import. This appears to contravene the European Agreement currently in force and is damaging to bilateral trade relations and the development of the Czech economy, and your rapporteur hopes that it will be done away with. Although this problem is a minor one it does demonstrate a rather worrying attitude, as pointed out by the Commission in the introduction to its Opinion when it says that 'confident of its progress towards meeting the obligations of EU membership, the Czech Republic has at times shown signs of reluctance to acknowledge difficulties and seek a collaborative approach to resolving them'.

Drawing attention to these problem areas does not constitute an attack on the quality of bilateral relations, which is generally high. The Czech Republic is a highly suitable candidate for membership of the European Union and the enormous amount of work which the authorities in Prague have so far carried out speaks for itself. Precisely because Parliament firmly believes that the Czech Republic should be brought into the European Union by means of negotiations which produce a satisfactory outcome for both sides, a combined effort must be made to overcome the final obstacles which, in any event, must not be allowed to obscure the political significance of enlargement. Your rapporteur is willing to work with the authorities in Prague in order to ensure that the Czech Republic's requirements are given due consideration by the authorities in Brussels.

Finally, your rapporteur would like to draw attention to the challenge which enlargement per se represents for the European Union. The Union must carry out a thorough institutional reform before the countries applying for membership are actually accepted into the Union. The Union must not be allowed to become just a free-trade area; indeed your rapporteur hopes that it will undergo a political deepening and he therefore agrees with those who maintain that the Treaty should be revised once again with a view to establishing a more democratic, transparent, efficient and integrated Europe.

Furthermore, the process of extending the EU to include Cyprus and Eastern Europe should be carried out at a relaxed pace so as to avoid creating social costs which the current and future Member States cannot afford to pay and to ensure that the current common, structural, cohesion and solidarity policies are continued and further developed.

10. Romania's application for membership of the European Union - Mr Pierre BernardReymond

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Romania, a country of 237 500 km² and 22.6 m inhabitants, occupies an important position in geopolitical terms, located as it is between central Europe, the Balkans, the former USSR and the Black Sea. It is surrounded by the Slavic world but set apart by its Romance language - a distinctive feature arising from the Roman occupation following the defeat of the Dacians by the emperor Trajan. The territory of present-day Romania was subsequently dominated by a number of peoples, including the Hungarians, the Turks and the peoples of the Austro-Hungarian empire. The history of modern Romania began in 1859, with the union of Wallachia and Moldavia under a single prince, Alexander Cuza; the new state was recognized at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Romania's present frontiers are the result of the treaties that followed the first[2] and second[3] world wars. The country became communist in 1947, and suffered a particularly appalling dictatorship under the 'Conducator' Ceausescu, who was finally overthrown and executed in 1989. Since then, Romania has gradually returned to the ways of democracy, as demonstrated by the elections of 1990, 1992 and 1996.

In parallel to its return to democracy, Romania has entered a number of European structures. It became a member of the Council of Europe on 4 October 1993, and was the first former Warsaw Pact country to sign the Partnership for Peace, on 26 January 1994. Its desire to become a member of NATO was not, however, satisfied at the Madrid summit of the Atlantic Alliance (8-9 July 1997), but it may be invited to join the alliance in 1999[4]. On 1 February 1993, Romania signed a 'Europe agreement' with the European Union; this constitutes an essential stage on the road to the accession which Romania officially requested on 22 June 1995.

At the same time, Romania has normalized its relations with Hungary and Ukraine. The treaty concluded with Hungary following the final conference of the Stability Pact for Europe must be seen as being of particular importance, given the large Hungarian minority existing in Romania. In May 1997, a 'treaty of good neighbourliness' was signed with Ukraine.

In accordance with Article O of the Treaty on European Union, the Commission has prepared an opinion on Romania's application for EU membership, which it has submitted within the framework of 'Agenda 2000'.

II. THE COMMISSION'S OPINION

The Commission's opinion is based on the criteria adopted by the Copenhagen European Council. On this basis, the Commission considered that it should not propose the immediate opening of negotiations with Romania.

In the political sphere, the Commission stresses that 'Romania has democratic institutions whose stability now seems secure [but which[ still need to be consolidated by fuller respect in practice for the rule of law at all levels of the structures of government'. On the matter of respect for fundamental rights, the Commission notes that a number of gaps still remain, and that efforts are still needed 'in the fight against corruption, and in order to improve the operation of the judicial system and the protection of individual rights against the police and the secret services as well as during the operation of the penal system'. It adds that, while progress has been made as regards the situation of the Hungarian minority, improvements are required for the Roma (gypsies) and in the protection of children in orphanages. However, the Commission believes that the actions of the new authorities brought to power by the November 1996 elections make it possible to affirm that Romania is on the way to satisfying the Copenhagen criteria in these fields. The same is considered to apply to foreign policy: Romania is considered capable of meeting the obligations of the CFSP.

As far as the economy is concerned, Romania is considered to exhibit substantial quantitative and structural deficiencies. GDP per inhabitant stands at 24% of the EU average. The state sector still occupies approximately 50% of the economy, including large, energy- and subsidy-hungry conglomerates. The agricultural sector employs about one-third of the active population, and its productivity is low. Inflation was as high as 56.9% in 1996; the average wage is currently ECU 65. Nonetheless, the Romanian authorities have embarked on reforms to enable the market economy to develop, and considerable progress has ben made. In particular, the new government has shown great courage in introducing a programme of macroeconomic stabilization and structural reform, despite a difficult climate characterized by a slower rate of growth, accelerating inflation and worsening public and external deficits.

The Commission considers that at present Romania would face serious difficulties in coping with competitive pressure within the EU.

Essential elements of the acquis communautaire have still to be integrated: for instance, of the 899 directives of the White Paper, only 426 have been incorporated.

Nonetheless, as the Commission rightly stresses, Romania has made enormous progress since the beginning of the transition period: prices and capital markets have been liberalized, productivity is rising, the external debt is low, there have been substantial improvements in welfare provision and 750 000 undertakings have been created in five years. The programme announced by the new government can only have the effect of accelerating this positive trend: the extent of its impact will depend on the degree to which the administration is willing to modernize itself.

Following publication of the Commission's report, the Romanian government has set out its reactions and intentions in an official document, which the European Council will examine. It would be useful for the Commission to analyse the document and, if necessary, take it into account in its next report, due in December 1998.

III. CONCLUSIONS

Romania is European by culture, history and geography. Its return to democracy implies that the gates of the Union should be open for it; Romania's desire to join is as strong as our desire to welcome it. Its accession is therefore not a problem of principle but of how and when: we wish to see Romanian accession take place as soon as possible, and in the best possible conditions for the applicant country. If this is to happen, considerable further convergence is still needed, especially in the economic sphere; changes will be required which the Romanian people will have to be capable of accepting. It is for the country's authorities to determine the appropriate rhythm for its march towards the Union: this must reconcile the quite legitimate desire (as shared by EU-15) to move fast with a degree of effort which can be supported by Romanian society.

In the present transition phase, the European Parliament considers that Romania must be associated as closely as possible with the Union's political decisions, and should receive all necessary aid in human and financial terms to accompany its modernization. These two objectives may be achieved via the presence of the 'European Conference' and by benefiting from a reinforced pre-accession strategy. On the latter point, aid to Romania must be substantial, given that the least advanced countries must receive the greatest amount of aid in relative terms.

Although the vital date is that of accession rather than the start of negotiations, and although the former does not depend on the latter, it would be completely inappropriate and unwarranted for negotiations with Romania not to start at the same time as those with the other applicant countries, i.e. 1998. The Commission's technical opinions on the degree of democracy and economic criteria must in fact be supplemented and transcended by a political judgment and a long-term vision.

From this point of view, an immediate start to negotiations is justified.

Of all the former Soviet satellites, Romania is the country which had to suffer the harshest and most violent dictatorship. In 1989 its economy was completely drained, after dictator Ceausescu had suddenly decided to repay the entire external debt in three years. His fall was not followed by a process of rapid and fundamental redirection, and reforms were often slow and sometimes ambiguous. Within a few years, Romania had to reorient its entire external trade and contend with the embargo it was asked to observe with regard to former Yugoslavia. These factors go a long way towards explaining why the country is lagging behind.

The Romanians' widely shared desire to join the European Union must also be taken into consideration. With the exception of the nationalist fringe, both the government majority and the opposition are united in this. The new government is even more determined to achieve this goal and has had the courage to impose far-reaching reforms upon a population which, unfortunately, is accustomed to suffering. For the time being, the population has accepted change with stoicism and hope. But EU aid and encouragement will be essential in order to get through this transition period.

At geostrategic level, Romania's regional role must be taken into account. In the space of a few years the country has signed agreements with Hungary and Ukraine, and has also pursued trilateral cooperation in the form of joint declarations with Ukraine/Poland, Hungary/Austria, Moldavia/Ukraine and Turkey/Bulgaria[5]. Romania is part of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone and a signatory to the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA).

The country's stable situation in a region which history has never left in peace for long is of benefit to Europe as a whole.

It would also be inappropriate if the European Union were to give the impression that it is interested only in part of Europe, the heart of Mitteleuropa, which happens to be its richest part as well. Any barrier introduced between the CEECs in the form of a 'criteria curtain' can, in the end, only complicate the situation in Europe. Finally, at a time when the USA has chosen to distinguish between countries in the context of NATO enlargement, should Europe not offer the world a different image? An image of a generous continent which is pulling together?

The Romanians, who have suffered so much over the past 50 years and who consider themselves to be very much European, are fully aware that they still have a long way to go on the road to the Union. Nevertheless, they need confirmation that they are part of the European family, they need a sign of encouragement and a message of hope - and they need them now.

11. The Slovenian application for accession to the Union - Mr Roberto Speciale

Introductory note

On 10 June 1996, when the Europe Agreement was signed, the Slovenian Prime Minister, Janez Drnovšek, submitted Slovenia's application to join the Union. In its opinion on the application, delivered 13 months later pursuant to Article O of the Treaty on European Union, the Commission took the view that negotiations should be opened. Without passing a final judgment, this working document will make an initial attempt to assess the Slovenian application and the Commission's reading of the situation.

Economic situation

Slovenia is quite a small country in economic, geographical, and population terms, but its economic system is very buoyant. The most recent statistical indicators show that it is definitely one of the most advanced, if not the most advanced country to have applied for membership. Gross domestic product has been growing constantly since 1993; per capita income stands at 59% of the Community average and exceeds the average for the other applicant countries. Trade with the Union is likewise continuing to expand and now accounts for 65% of Slovenia's external trade.

Leaving aside the figures, significant though they are, the Slovenian economy is growing all the time, living standards are rising, and a rapid full-blown transformation is taking place to turn the country into a market economy.

Mention should also be made of Slovenia's strategic importance as regards the extension of the transEuropean networks.

Political situation

There is no need to repeat how the Slovenian State came into being after Yugoslavia disintegrated, although the fact that there have been no serious ethnic tensions has undoubtedly enabled a representative, democratic form of government to be consolidated more easily. Furthermore, when it joined the Council of Europe, Slovenia secured full recognition of its legitimacy and its commitment to uphold the rule of law and protect human rights and the rights of minorities.

Discussions among political forces, especially where relations with the Union are concerned, have not always moved in a clear-cut direction: one reason is that Slovenia has attained its independence too recently for all the walks of society to be able to embark with the necessary maturity on a debate on a matter such as accession, which in some respects will entail relinquishment of national sovereignty as well as obvious general advantages.

In May, however, the Državni Zbor (National Assembly) sent an extremely encouraging signal when it endorsed a number of resolutions instructing the Government to put in hand a global strategy aimed at integration into the Union, a programme to bring regulations and administrative provisions into line with those of the Union, a public information campaign, and, last but not least, the decision to make the necessary changes to the Constitution, thereby enabling the Europe Agreement to be ratified and the Slovenian market gradually opened up without jeopardizing national interests. The fact that all of the main parties represented in the Assembly voted in favour of the above decisions gives good reason to hope that the Union and Slovenia will cement their ties.

On the other hand, the debate on involvement in the Atlantic Alliance has further strengthened the notion that accession is a vitally important strategic objective. The decision taken at the Madrid Summit to exclude Slovenia from the first group of countries invited to join and postpone the question until 1999, even though many European members explicitly supported Slovenia's inclusion, has none the less brought recognition of the progress that Slovenia has made from the economic point of view and as regards the reliability of its democratic institutions. Settlement of the dispute with Italy has thus lent greater weight to the Slovenian application, which, at all events, will remain on the table and, according to the implicit promise, be reconsidered as a matter of priority in 1999.

Lastly, the recent decision by the Slovenian National Assembly to adopt the amendments to the Constitution and ratify the Europe Agreement does much to advance the pre-accession strategy and place the future negotiations on a solid footing. There is now every cause to expect that subsequent legislation and administrative provisions will afford the necessary consistency.

Previous position of Parliament

The criteria which Central and Eastern European countries must meet in order to join the Union were laid down at the Copenhagen European Council on 21 and 22 June 1993. The institutions that uphold democracy must accordingly be stable, the rule of law must prevail, human rights must be respected, minorities must be protected, and the economy of any new Member State must operate along genuine market lines and be able to withstand the pressure of competition and market forces within the Union. Accession implies, moreover, that a new Member State is in a position to accept the obligations and endorse the objectives of political, economic, and monetary union.

From the outset Parliament has encouraged the efforts of the Slovenian authorities to strengthen ties with and become a member of the Union. In its resolution of 30 November 1995 it pointed to the need to include Slovenia in the pre-accession strategy. In October of that year it sent a very clear signal by giving its assent to the Europe Agreement and, when doing so, also welcomed the fact that Slovenia had applied to join.

Conclusions

In its opinion on the Slovenian application for accession the Commission recommends that negotiations be opened; this attitude is entirely justified because Slovenia is recognized to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria. The country's institutions are stable and democratic, and its economic system is sufficiently open. Parliament consequently applauds the Commission decision, since it likewise believes that Slovenia satisfies the conditions required for negotiations to begin. The forthcoming entry into force of the Europe Agreement can only confirm the rightness of this approach.

12. The application of Slovakia for accession to the European Union - Mr Jan Marinus Wiersma

I. BACKGROUND

Slovakia, a country of 49 000 km² and a population of 5.3 million, is a new State on the map of Europe but its people has a long history of over a thousand years. Until independence, the history of Slovakia was bound up with Hungary, then the Austro-Hungarian Empire from which Slovakia freed itself after the First World War by uniting with Bohemia-Moravia to form the Republic of Czechoslovakia with the support of the Entente.

The new State was to have a tumultuous existence (Munich Accords: 1938; Prague Putsch: 1948; intervention of Warsaw Pact troops following the Prague Spring: 1968) until it emerged from Communism in 1989. However, the transformation of Czechoslovakia into a Federal Czech and Slovak Republic was not enough to maintain unity between the two nations. In October 1992, the parliaments of the two Republics adopted a joint resolution dissolving the Federation and setting up two independent States as of 1 January 1993.

Since independence, Slovakia has endeavoured to overcome the political, economic and administrative difficulties caused by partition and to develop its relations with neighbouring States, beginning with the Czech Republic and Hungary, particularly as there is a significant Hungarian minority (570 000 people) living in Slovakia. Slovakia and Hungary in fact concluded a treaty on good neighbourly relations and friendship and cooperation at the final conference on the Stability Pact in Europe (1995), a joint action by the European Union with the specific objective of facilitating the accession of the CECEs (countries of Eastern and Central Europe) by encouraging them to settle their frontier disputes and minority problems in advance. However, the two countries take a different interpretation of one of the provisions of the Treaty referring to Recommendation 1201 (1993) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the collective rights of minorities, creating a situation in which there is a temptation to play the nationalist card, particularly with the forthcoming elections to be held in both countries. On the question of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam, which the two countries had put before the International Court of Justice for arbitration, the Court delivered its judgment on 25 September 1997, finding in substance in favour of Slovakia.

Finally, it should be noted that Slovakia is a member of the Council of Europe (30 June 1993) and that the country participates in NATO's Partnership for Peace (9 February 1994). On 4 October 1993, Slovakia signed a Europe Agreement with the European Union to replace the Europe Agreement signed with Czechoslovakia on 16 December 1991, an essential step towards future membership. On 27 June 1995, Slovakia lodged its application for accession to the European Union. The Commission has drawn up an opinion on this application Pursuant to Article O of the Treaty on European Union

II. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION

In the Commission's view, Slovakia remains the only country in Central and Eastern Europe with which it cannot envisage opening accession negotiations for the moment on the basis of the political criteria drawn up in Copenhagen. The Commission considers that the Slovak institutions are not operating satisfactorily, that the government does not sufficiently respect the powers devolved by the Constitution to other authorities and too often ignores the rights of the opposition. It also indicates that the rights of the Hungarian minority are not sufficiently respected and that the situation of the Roma (gypsies) is not sufficiently taken into account by the authorities.

This negative assessment of the current political situation in Slovakia is tempered by the Commission's views on the economic situation in the country. It notes that Slovakia has introduced most of the reforms necessary for establishing a market economy such as price liberalization and privatization. Nevertheless, it recommends a measure of vigilance following the introduction of a restrictive law on prices in 1996 and a law on 'revitalization of enterprises' which might represent a retreat from market mechanisms. Overall, the Commission believes that Slovakia should be able to withstand competitive pressure and market forces from the Union in the medium term. Moreover, the Commission affirms that Slovakia is firmly committed to the 'acquis communautaire', particularly in regard to the single market.

In conclusion, the Commission regrets that the political situation in Slovakia does not enable it to recommend opening accession negotiations with that country and considers that negotiations 'should be opened ... once (Slovakia) has made the necessary progress to fulfil the conditions for accession drawn up by the European Council in Copenhagen'.

III. CONCLUSIONS

There is no doubt that Slovakia is ready and willing to become a member of the European Union and that the Slovak people share this aspiration. The European Parliament, therefore, profoundly regrets that the failings of democracy in Slovakia have led the Commission to put the country in the same category as those that are unable to join the Union immediately for economic reasons, whereas, at that level, Slovakia can be proud of its achievements, considering the difficult years following partition. It should be noted in fact that many of the country's problems are connected with the dissolution of Czechoslovakia.

The European Parliament shares the Commission's view that the political situation in Slovakia is not what should be expected from an applicant country. The European Parliament is particularly concerned that the process of government should not be marred by personal rivalries, that the rights of the opposition should be recognized in full and that fundamental rights and the rights of minorities should be duly safeguarded. The case of the MP, Gaulieder, who was relieved of his duties after leaving his parliamentary group, even though the Constitutional Court had upheld his appointment, is symptomatic indeed of a far from normal legal situation. It is inconceivable in a constitutional State that a parliament could overrule the decision of a Constitutional Court, to say nothing of dismissing one of its members in contradiction of a judgment of that Court. These concerns are also shared by the Council of Europe.

The European Parliament also stresses that the internal political situation is having a negative impact on economic developments, as demonstrated by the fact that the rate of foreign investment (0.8% of GDP) is very low. In other respects, some of the economic difficulties currently encountered by Slovakia are the result of shortcomings in its political system and, if nothing changes, it may well be that some of the present failings of the economic system highlighted by the Commission will become more significant in the future.

The European Parliament reaffirms that there can be no transitional period for democracy. This does not mean that Slovakia should be isolated because, at present, the country does not fully meet the Copenhagen political criteria - especially as that solution is not the most conducive to the change desired - but, on the contrary, it entails the Union encouraging the country to achieve what we are entitled to expect of an applicant for membership. Your rapporteur, therefore, recommends that Slovakia be included in the negotiating process, on the understanding that actual accession negotiations will not open until practices in that country are more in keeping with what the Member States of the European Union consider to be the normal functioning of the political system.

This means that Slovakia should immediately benefit from the strengthened pre-accession strategy in line with the other CECEs. First, an accession partnership will be concluded between the European Union and Slovakia with the emphasis on the political progress to be achieved by that country - funds from the PHARE programme for democracy might be released to support civil society, for example. Subsequently, Slovakia should be fully affiliated to the European Conference both because the country is European in its history and culture and because its people want to take part in the process of European integration and because it is in the interests of the country itself and of the European Union that it is not excluded from that process, if only because of the central position it occupies in Europe and the contribution it can make to the stability of the continent.

As regards actual accession negotiations, your rapporteur takes the view that they cannot begin until there are positive signals from the Slovak government, parliament and political forces with particular regard to the three recommendations adopted by the EU/Slovakia Joint Parliamentary Committee at its fourth meeting held on 16,17 and 18 June 1997 in Bratislava. Moreover, the case of the MP, Gaulieder, expelled from the Slovak National Council despite a decision to the contrary by the Constitutional Court must be settled in accordance with European democratic standards.

Your rapporteur is aware that the institutions and most of the Slovak political forces want Slovakia to become part of the European Union. The latter are finally sending the Union the first, longawaited, positive signals such as the proclamation of the Slovak National Council of 10 October 1997 on the integration of the Slovak Republic into the European Union, adopted by an overwhelming majority of its members, and the joint proclamation of the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister of 17 October 1997 which contains a commitment to meet the expectations of the European Union.

Pending Slovakia's practical implementation of these declarations of intent, it is important that the country continues to adjust to the acquis communautaire at the economic level with the aid of existing instruments (PHARE, Europe agreements, structured dialogue). The annual report to be drawn up by the Commission by December 1998 will enable us to take stock of the development of the situation in Slovakia and to recommend - let us hope at least - the opening of accession negotiations with that country in 1999. For its part, the European Parliament reserves the right to recommend the opening of negotiations earlier if it appears in the meantime that Slovakia has met the criteria to be expected of a country applying for membership of the European Union in line with Article Fa of the Amsterdam Treaty. At all events, that is the hope we might express for the Slovak people and for the European Union itself.

13. Cyprus' application for membership - Mr Jan Willem Bertens

Cyprus applied for membership of the European Union on 4 July 1990. This was the logical next step in the process of strengthening relations between the Union and Cyprus from 1962 onwards. An association agreement between the EU and Cyprus had already come into affect on 1 June 1973 and the agreement to establish a customs union entered into force on 1 January 1988.

On 30 June 1993 the European Commission issued its opinion on the Cypriot application (COM 93/313). The Commission recognized Cyprus" eligibility and its vocation to become a member of the Union. The Commission stated that Cypriot membership would not pose any economic problem in view of the progress already made in the customs union, and set 1 January 1995 for the reassessment of the situation pending the efforts of the Secretary-General for a political settlement on the island. The Council adopted the opinion on 17 October 1993.

The European Council meetings of Corfu (24 June 1994) and Essen (9 December 1994) confirmed that the next phase of enlargement would involve Cyprus.

On 26 January 1995 the European Commission presented its reexamination of the Cyprus application. It reconfirmed the Cypriot vocation to become part of the Union. The lack of progress in the intercommunal discussions between the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish- Cypriots towards a bi-zonal and bi-communal Cypriot Federation in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations, led the Commission to propose the confirmation and elucidation of the intentions of the Corfu European Council. Therefore, the Commission proposed to commit the Union to the start of the accession negotiations no later than six months after the Intergovernmental Conference, taking into account the results of the Conference.

The Council of Ministers concluded on 6 March 1995 to do just that. It also invited the Commission to submit proposals for a pre-accession strategy. The Fourth Protocol was signed and the substantive talks and structured dialogue with Cyprus duly commenced.

The European Parliament adopted a report on Cyprus" application for membership of the European Union on 12 July 1995 (A4-0156/95). It endorsed the Commission"s opinion and the Council"s conclusion. The European Parliament stated in that report and the numerous resolutions which it adopted since, that the accession of Cyprus is an autonomous process and that Cyprus should not be the hostage of relations between the Union and Turkey, as the Commission and the Council have confirmed in various statements. Instead, the European Parliament has long believed that not only the opening of negotiations on accession but also accession itself can help speed up the peaceful settlement in Cyprus and considered that membership should benefit both communities.

Conclusions:

1. Considering that the positive opinion of the Commission concerning the application of Cyprus is still valid, Parliament maintains the positions taken in its report ( of 12 July 1995) on Cyprus" application for membership of the European Union and since confirmed in its various resolutions;

2. The European Parliament urges the Council to mandate the Commission to start the accession negotiations with the Cypriot Government, representing the whole island, in accordance with the timetable set by the European Council in Madrid (December 1995), and confirmed in Florence (June 1996) and Dublin (December 1996), i.e. 6 months after the end of the IGC;

3. The Union should contribute to the involvement of the Turkish-Cypriot community in the accession process;

4. Both the start of the accession negotiations and accession itself, which should not be linked to either EU/Turkish relations or a peaceful settlement for the island, will contribute to achieving the latter and will benefit both communities on the island;

5. The Union should do its utmost to ensure that both communities in Cyprus on the one hand benefit from Union membership and on the other are themselves convinced of the benefits Union membership will bring them;

6. The European Parliament insists that prior to the accession itself a serious institutional reform of the Union should take place in order to guarantee the absorption capacity of the Union, maintaining the dynamism of the European integration process.

• [1] () There are about 700 000 non-Latvian nationals out of a population of approximately 2500000.
• [2] () The Treaties of Saint-Germain with Austria (1919), Neuilly with Bulgaria (1919) and Trianon with Hungary (1920)
• [3] () The Treaty of Paris (1947)
• [4] () See point 8 of the Declaration of Madrid (PE 223.501)
• [5] () A final declaration is currently being negotiated with Bulgaria and Greece.

OPINION

(Rule 147)

for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy

on the Commission comunication 'Agenda 2000' - For a Stronger and Wider Union (COM(97)2000 -C4-0371/97 )

Rapporteurs: Mr Oostlander and Mr Baron Crespo

Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development

Draftsman: Mr Edouard C.M.P. des Places

PROCEDURE

At its meeting of 8 July 1997 the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development appointed Mr Edouard des Places draftsman.

It considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 2/3 September, 23/24 September, 20 October and 28/29 October 1997.

At the last meeting it adopted the following conclusions unopposed, with 12 abstentions.

The following took part in the vote: Colino Salamanca, chairman; des Places, draftsman; Anttila, Arias Cañete, (for Fraga Estévez), Barthet-Mayer, Botz (for Watts), Cabezón Alonso (for Wilson), Campos, Campoy Zueco (for Redondo Jiménez), Fantuzzi, Farassino, Filippi, Funk, Garot, Goepel, Görlach, Hallam, Hardstaff, Iversen, Jové Peres, Keppelhoff-Wiechert, Kindermann, Kofoed, Lambraki, Philippe-Armand Martin, Mulder, Otila (for Mayer), Querbes, Rosado Fernandes, Schierhuber, Sonneveld, Sturdy, Thomas and Virgin (for Ebner).

BACKGROUND/GENERAL COMMENTS

This opinion of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the enlargement of the European Union in the context of the Commission Communication entitled Agenda 2000 supplements the opinion on the financing of enlargement (PE 223.646). It is restricted to an analysis of the consequences for agriculture and the rural community in the Member States of the European Union and the applicant countries. It is therefore left to the Committee on Foreign Affairs to take a decision on the European Commission's opinions on the accession applications proper and on progress on the basis of the criteria laid down in Copenhagen in June 1993 (political and economic functioning, ability to adopt the Community patrimony).

The Committee on Agriculture is not expressing an opinion on the Commission's proposal to enlarge the EU by an initial group of five countries (six with Cyprus) deemed capable of meeting these European criteria and suited to receiving an offer for the opening of negotiations in January 1998.

On the political principle, the draftsman can only be in favour of the widest possible enlargement, taking in all the applicant countries. The objective of this opinion is therefore of a different nature, namely to assess the difficulties which our farmers, and those in the future Member States, will have to face.

In its Agenda 2000, the Commission presents a reform of the agricultural and structural policies. The Agriculture Committee's opinion is deliberately not an opinion on the reform of the common agricultural policy. Enlargement of the European Union is a sufficiently important subject for it not to be an excuse for a reform of the underlying CAP. The task of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development is therefore to express its ideas, the result of in-depth thought, setting out an agricultural model for Europe based on the development of the CAP.

I - AGENDA 2000 ONE OF THE GREATEST CHALLENGES IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNION

What will it cost?

The enlargement of the European Union was agreed in Copenhagen in June 1993 and confirmed at the European summits in Essen in December 1994, Cannes in June 1995 and Madrid in December 1995. The arguments in favour of enlargement are political, geostrategic, economic and social with a view to strengthening peace and security, consolidating democracy and promoting the development of a part of Europe which is having to tackle the burden of its past and the problems of transition to a market economy. The agriculture sector and the rural community in Europe as a whole will have to prepare for this prospect.

Consequently, it is important to assess the problems and risks likely to be faced not only by farmers, businesses upstream and downstream of agriculture, the rural community, consumers, the environment and food safety in the current Member States of the European Union but also by their counterparts in applicant countries who want to join the Union in the more or less distant future. If the European Union is to take full advantage of the exceptional challenge of enlargement, it will be crucial to define a European model of agricultural development which is consistent with traditions of farming and rural life that go back almost 2500 years.

The opinion of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (PE 223.646) concerning the financing of EU enlargement demonstrates the three presentation 'errors' in the Commission's Agenda 2000 document: maintaining the assessment basis of the agricultural guideline, not taking account of monetary erosion with regard to the agricultural sector, and underestimating the requirements of the first new Member States joining the Community vis-à-vis the CAP.

II - AGENDA 2000 AND ENLARGEMENT

The document entitled 'Agenda 2000 for a stronger and wider Union' is the European Commission's response to the instructions given to it by the European Council (particularly in Madrid in December 1995) with a view to enlargement of the European Union to include the CEECs.

Although the report is not totally consistent with the views of some Member States of the European Union, it is justified by the timetable for the opening of accession negotiations(January 1998). It covers much more than just enlargement, since it puts forward proposals for the development of Union policies and the future financial framework for the period 2000-2006. These issues arise now and will have to be tackled even without the question of enlargement.

It is only the second part of the report, 'The challenge of enlargement', which deals specifically with the accession issue; enlargement is mentioned only in passing in the first part 'The policies of the Union', which discusses the CAP among other things, and in the third part entitled 'The new financial framework 2000-2006'.

On 16 July the Commission also submitted two communications on enlargement, 'Strengthening the pre-accession strategy'and 'The effects of enlargement to include the CEECs on Union policies' along with ten detailed opinions on the applicant countries from Central and Eastern Europe.

III - ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE CAP

(a) In discussing the main developments and future of the CAP (Part One, Section III - CAP), the Commission makes virtually no mention of enlargement to include the CEECs. Aside from the timetable, therefore, the Commission sees no causal link between its proposals for the CAP and the prospect of enlargement to include the CEECs.

(b) The section on the Commission's opinions on the applicant states totally fails to mention conditions in the agricultural sector in the countries concerned. Although the criteria established at Copenhagen are much broader, it would not have been irrelevant to say whether adopting the existing body of Community legislation on agricultural markets could cause major problems for a particular country.

In 1995 the Commission drew up a series of communications on each of the applicant countries. The opinions submitted on 16 July 1997 reproduce to a large extent the 1995 communication, and it is unfortunate that the position has not been updated or discussed in greater detail. It is obviously not easy to make predictions for agricultural production in the year 2005, but the 1996 harvest and the forecast for 1997 show that the Commission's proposals were optimistic.

An assessment of each of the applicant countries shows that the situation in the agricultural sector varies widely. In Poland the basic problem is of a structural nature, and any radical and rapid change in agricultural structures would undoubtedly lead to an increase in unemployment in the rural community. Some experts estimate short-term job losses in farming and the rural economy at one million (what about their future?).

The agricultural sector in Hungary seems to be the one which will have the least difficulty in adapting to the CAP. Hungary is the only applicant country which still has a net surplus in agricultural products. However, under the COM rules, the Hungarian agricultural sector would find that its export subsidies were too high.

In Slovenia farming is subsidized, and the prices of agricultural products are closest to current levels in the European Union. The situation in the Czech Republic is completely different, and the level of protection enjoyed by the agricultural sector is significantly lower than in the European Union. Farming in the Czech Republic has developed in a very free market system which does not mirror the importance of the CAP in the European Union. In the marketplace the problems faced by Czech products, given identical prices, relate mainly to quality.

These very wide differences emerge to only a limited extent from the Commission's opinions.

(c) The link between CAP matters and enlargement is covered by the impact study (Part Two, Section II - The principal questions on the way to enlargement) from the point of view of how the CAP would apply to the CEECs, and in the estimates given within the financial framework.

The Commission starts from the assumption that the gap between prices in the CEECs and the Union, which is wider for the main arable crops than for the livestock sector, will continue to narrow. These price differentials might have disappeared for cereals and beef and veal by the time of accession. Disparities of between 20 and 30% would remain for milk, sugar and fruit and vegetables. Implicit in this assumption is that the proposed CAP reform will go ahead.

The Commission is generally optimistic, taking the view that 'candidate countries would face relatively few problems in integrating into the CAP market and price policy', particularly in the arable crops sector, whereas in the livestock sector such integration would take longer.

The Commission proposes transitional periods, the length of which is not specified and which would vary from country to country, to cushion the effects of price alignment and the opening up of markets. There would be no need during this period to provide direct income support. On the other hand, the applicant countries should be able to receive aid for developing their agricultural and processing structures. In the case of milk and sugar, the Commission is opposed to the idea of an overnight alignment of prices and the immediate introduction of quotas.

It is also essential not to underestimate the fact that farming in the present 15 Member States will develop very rapidly (cultivation methods, genetic engineering, etc.) and that the gap could well widen.

IV - FARMING IN THE NEXT MILLENNIUM

Given the deadline imposed for the drawing up of this opinion, the draftsman would like to make it clear that the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development has not had time to give in-depth consideration to the future of Europe's rural community in the context of the common agricultural policy and rural policy. It therefore proposes to set out a number of trains of thought which could serve as a basis for the preparation of a European Parliament own-initiative report.

The European agricultural sector comes under two types of competing pressure:

- firstly from US agricultural policy and the CAIRNS Group which would like to see a total liberalization of agriculture based on the RICARDO principle of comparative advantage;

- secondly, as demonstrated by the European Parliament's recent adoption of a resolution against the use of hormones in beef production, there is a counter pressure based on environmental, economic, social and cultural considerations which would like to reverse this trend.

A response must be found to these two pressure groups by creating without delay a European agricultural model based, of course, on agricultural production which takes account of the requirements of productivity, but is weighted by social factors such as regional planning, the environment and food safety.

The European model must not be a defensive one designed to ward off international pressure. It must be based on the principle of developing a society that respects a farming tradition which goes back more than 2500 years.

European agriculture must be able to play a multifunctional role, which means producing the agricultural products required for food or non-food uses both on its internal market and for export, and contributing to town and country planning.

The specific character of European farming will not survive unless incomes remain at an adequate level for the farming sector as a whole; at the end of the 1950s farming in the six founding members of the Union accounted for some 30% of employment (a figure which is virtually identical to that in Poland today). The agricultural sector now accounts for only 5% of those in active employment.

Although, it may be the driving force, enlargement to include the CEECs cannot be assessed only in budgetary terms. It has to be remembered that the potential new Member States together have twice the number of farmers as the European Union of the 15. For instance, in Poland there are 7.5 million farmers with average holdings of between 6 and 7 hectares. On the other hand, applying organizational techniques to the whole of the European agricultural sector should allow a major improvement in agricultural productivity in the future Member States.

The Santer package (Agenda 2000) should be a historic chance to achieve a 'Greater Europe'. However, the prospects for a new agricultural policy which would enable a European agricultural model to be developed are too limited. In the vast majority of states, development has been based upon a system allowing the raising of capital (banking sector), mutual insurance of risks (agricultural insurance schemes) and enhancing the value of agricultural products (agricultural cooperation).

The approach to CAP reform as proposed in Agenda 2000 - lower prices, partially offset by subsidies

- remains unrealistic. New instruments requiring few financial resources are needed to allow farmers to protect themselves against price and production fluctuations (resulting from alignment to world prices and the uncertainties of the weather respectively). Instruments of this type, designed to secure farmers' incomes, have recently been introduced in a number of countries, including the USA and Canada.

V - AGENDA 2000 AND RURAL POLICY (Annexes 1 and 2)

The Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development's second working document (PE 223.641) presents the European agricultural economy under 12 points. It must be remembered that over 70% of holdings in the EU are smaller in size than the Community average (7.4 ha in the EU-12 in 1993), that family members account for nearly 94% of the agricultural workforce in the EU, and that 80% of the EU's territory is countryside.

A genuine rural policy must cover all the players in the rural economy (services, rural craft trades, farmers and cooperatives). The population involved in rural areas is substantial (some 30% of the European population), providing a sound basis for harmonious rural planning.

In order to achieve this objective of rural planning, it is necessary to create a specific sub-objective under Objective 2, as proposed by the Commission, entitled 'rural areas'. In this case, in view of the constraints presented by Mr Santer, it will be necessary to consider the population actually concerned by the new Objective.

Consequently, the draftsman proposes the creation of three specific and independent sub-objectives under Objective 2, covering 'rural areas', 'urban areas' and 'maritime and coastal areas' respectively.

Annex 1 shows that, according to the Agenda 2000 proposals for structural policy reform, nearly 79 million citizens of EU-15 Member States currently covered by Objectives 1, 2, 5b and 6 will no longer come under the new Objectives 1 and 2. In his presentation, Mr Santer says that a maximum of 40% of the population of the EU-21 Member States will be eligible under the new Objectives 1 and 2.

For example, more than 32 million persons are directly eligible under the present Objective 5b. It is therefore necessary to create a specific sub-objective 'rural areas' in order to allow all European country-dwellers currently eligible under Objectives 1, 2 and 5b to benefit from a genuine structural policy which preserves the integrity of the rural community. This proposal is consistent with the Cork conclusions (1996).

VI - CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSALS

In the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development's first working document (PE 223.637), the draftsman asks a number of questions on the practical aspects of enlargement (problems linked to reference levels, administrative organization, transitional periods, integration of the Community patrimony, etc.).

It is not possible to cover all these trains of thought in an opinion. It will therefore be necessary in the near future, and in step with the enlargement process, for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development to consider the problems associated with enlargement.

For example, as regards transitional periods, it will be essential to examine the consequences of a disparity in the prices for agricultural raw materials between the new Member States and EU-15 and of a structural cohesion policy subsidizing industrial infrastructure on the possible relocation of processing facilities in the agri-food sector (slaughterhouses, etc.). The price disparity resulting from subsidies and differences in wage costs could in fact cause undertakings to close some of their less profitable production units in order to invest in a new Member State, once there is a single market in processed food products.

With reference to the common agricultural policy, the Commission's proposals are very precise, perhaps even too precise. A valid question is whether the Commission might be taking advantage of Agenda 2000 to push through a new reform of the CAP by avoiding the legitimate debate with farmers, their professional organizations and elected politicians. It must be borne in mind that Agenda 2000 as a whole will have to be adopted at the next European summit in Luxembourg, in only two months' time.

In its proposals for a new CAP, the Commission defines six commendable objectives: the improvement of agricultural production, the improvement of food safety and food quality, the stabilization of farm incomes, the integration of environmental goals, the creation of income and employment opportunities complementary to agriculture, and the improvement of economic cohesion.

However, an analysis of the means proposed by the Commission, whether for arable crops, the dairy sector or beef and veal, shows that these means are not consistent with its own objectives for a new CAP.

We can only express surprise that the Commission does not, for example, include proposals on double quotas for the dairy sector, as proposed by a number of European professional organizations.

As regards the 'environment' objective, we have found several contradictions. For example, in the beef and veal sector, the Commission is proposing almost a tripling of premiums for young male bovine animals thus favouring intensive stock farming, which - apart from the fact that it does not consume grass - will increase meat production although, according to the Commission, this is already too high.

Whilst the aims of a new CAP are to be welcomed, it is clear that the means proposed by the Commission are contradictory.

Finally, as regards agriculture, the Commission's proposals are not acceptable in their present form. The Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development will have to give specific consideration to the subject of the future of agriculture and the rural community, adhering of course to a certain financial framework, in order to develop a European model for agricultural development even before considering the three new proposals for common market organization presented in Agenda 2000 (arable crops, beef and veal and milk). It would be appropriate for the agriculture section of Agenda 2000 to be a reference document for both the Commission and the Council, even before the start of negotiations within the WTO.

VII - CONCLUSIONS

The Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development requests the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy to take account of the following points. It:

1. Notes that any proposal for reform of the Common Agricultural Policy is obliged to respect the aims set out in Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome;

2. Recognizes the considerable political importance of enlargement for stability and peace on the European continent; welcomes in this context the decisions taken by the Copenhagen, Essen, Cannes and Madrid and Amsterdam European Councils and points out that the current Member States and the applicant countries alike may benefit, inter alia in economic terms, from an enlarged Union;

3. Recalls however, that the EU as a whole must be radically overhauled and structural reforms, especially reform of the CAP, must be successfully concluded if the integration of the CEECs, which has been decided and makes sense, is to be a success for both sides;

4. Notes the European Union's budgetary constraints, but regrets that in its communication 'Agenda 2000' the Commission does not focus, in the common interest of the enlarged EU, all its financial resources exclusively on the Community's integrated and cohesion policies;

5. Assumes that the Commission, as announced, will introduce or maintain an appropriate level of safeguards against imports as the agricultural reforms take shape and in WTO negotiations;

6. Regrets that, in the section of Agenda 2000 which deals with agriculture, the Commission has put forward only piecemeal detailed proposals for individual production sectors, instead of developing an overall approach which could have formed the basis for the orientation of all sectors of agricultural production;

7. Regrets that the Commission has not developed a specific policy framework for the rural community, as announced at the Cork Conference; fears that the effectiveness of using agricultural structural funds will be diminished because they are to be split between various objectives and support frameworks;

8. Proposes the creation of an independent and specific Sub-objective 2 entitled 'Rural areas', involving all the economic players in rural society;

9. Regrets that the Commission proposals do not establish a policy for developing new outlets for agricultural products and for promoting the production of non-food and in particular energy crops, thus precluding the harmonization of Community policies on agriculture, energy, and protection of the rural environment and the framing of a European policy on the quality of agricultural products;

10. Regrets that the Commission underestimates and fails to make clearer the difficulties for the new Member States inherent in the adoption of the Community patrimony;

11. Points out that the economic situation is not identical in all applicant countries, especially in the farm sector, and that the specific situations in those countries must be taken into account when drawing up the measures and timetables for preparations for accession and the transitional measures and timetables that are to apply following integration;

12. Regrets that the Commission does not emphasize more strongly the need for improvement in the veterinary, phytosanitary and environmental sectors of applicant countries' agriculture;

13. Refuses at this juncture to deliver a detailed opinion on the proposed reforms of the individual production sectors, as the incomplete data provided is neither sufficient to enable an assessment to be made of the financial impact on the farmers affected nor a suitable basis for future trade talks within the WTO;

14. Points to the fundamental contradiction inherent in the proposals between the desire to make agriculture more competitive and the call for ceilings to be introduced on aid to individual holdings.

.Annex 1

Breakdown by Objective of the population of each Member State

(1994 - 1000 persons)

Country	Objective1	Objective2	Objective 5b	Objective 6	TOTAL /country
B	1 288	1 429	453		3 170
DK		441	353		794
D	16 608	7 095	7 820		31 523
GR	10 349				10 349
E	23 356	7 981	1 721		33 058
F	2 532	14 446	9 612		26 590
IRL	3 564				3 564
I	20 899	6 264	4 726		31 889
L		137	31		168
NL	229	2 652	823		3 704
P	9 859				9 859
UK	3 419	17 906	2 840		24 165
O	293	593	2 271		3 157
SF		794	1 092	844	2 730
S		999	799	460	2 258
TOTAL /Objective	92 396	60 737	32 541	1 304	186 978

.Annex 2

Consequences of structural policy reform in the context of Agenda 2000 on the populations currently in areas covered by Objectives 1, 2, 5b and 6

EU-15 (population 1994)	364 179
Poland	38 581
Slovenia	1 989
Estonia	1 491
Czech Republic	10 333
Hungary	10 246
TOTAL population of the first group of CEECs joining the EU (future Objective 1 area) (b)	62 640
EU-21*	426 819
40% of EU-21*(Mr Santer's maximum)(a)	170 728
Remaining population after integration of CEECs into the Objective 1 area (a) - (b) = (c)	108 088
Population currently covered by Objective 1	92 396
Population currently covered by Objective 2	60 737
Population currently covered by Objective 5b	32 541
Population currently covered by Objective 6	1 305
Total population (Objectives 1,2, 5b and 6)(d)	196 979
Population no longer covered by the Objectives(c) - (d)	-78 890

* excluding Cyprus

** figures in 1000s

OPINION

(Rule 147)

for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy

on the Commission comunication 'Agenda 2000' - For a Stronger and Wider Union (COM(97)2000 -C4-0371/97 )

Rapporteurs: Mr Oostlander and Mr Baron Crespo

Committee on Budgets

Draftsman: Mr E. Christodoulou

PROCEDURE

At its meeting of 23 July 1997 the Committee on Budgets appointed Mr Christodoulou draftsman.

It considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 3, 23 and 30 September and 20 October 1997.

At the last meeting it adopted the following conclusions by 22 votes to one with four abstentions.

The following took part in the vote: : Samland, chairman; Tillich, vice-chairman; Adam (for Ghilardotti), Böge, Bösch, Brinkhorst, Christodoulou (draftsman, for Bardong), Colom i Naval, Dankert, Dell'Alba, Dührkop Dührkop, Elles, Fabra Vallés, Fabre-Auprespy, Galeote Quecedo (for Bourlanges), Garriga Polledo, Haug, Krehl, Kuckelkorn (for Laignel), McCartin, Müller, Piha (for Imaz San Miguel) Pimenta, Theato, Tomlinson, Watson (for Virrankoski) and Wynn.

BACKGROUND

1. Article O in the final provisions of the EU Treaty provides that any European State may apply to become a member of the Union. With this provision in mind, the Copenhagen European Council of 21 and 22 June 1993 examined the prospects for cooperation with the countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CCEEs) and agreed that the associated countries which so desired should become members of the EU. With this in view, the European Council set out the conditions which will have to be met for enlargement to take place, in particular:

- as regards the CCEEs, it set out the general guidelines for cooperation with those countries, emphasizing the strengthening of multilateral dialogue and the speedier opening up of Community markets. I had stated that accession would take place as soon as the applicant associated country was able to satisfy the economic and political conditions required. The economic conditions comprised on the one hand the existence of a functioning market economy and adaptation to competitive conditions within the Union and, on the other, the ability of the new Member States to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of Economic and Monetary Union and its political implications.

The obligations of full membership as also described in Agenda 2000 of course involve the adoption of the 'acquis communautaire' and the avoidance of lengthy post- accession transitional periods. The latter would not only directly hold up the operation of the single internal market but would indirectly obstruct effective decision-making.

- As regards the Union itself, it emphasized the need to ensure its ability to absorb new countries without interrupting European integration.

This means that enlargement may not occur at the expense of the deepening of European Union (the Commission refers to this topic in passing) and the concept of promoting and strengthening economic and social cohesion which are the basic aims of the Treaty (Articles 130a-e)[1] may not be watered down. It also involves the execution of the necessary institutional changes which would allow efficient decision-making and hence the smooth operation of an enlarged Union.

2. In its communication of 15 July 1997[2] the Commission affirms the political will to enlarge the Union to include the CCEEs and Cyprus[3]. This is to be achieved at the least possible institutional and financial cost. It has opted for a strategy to ensure that the new Member States will from their accession accept the fundamental obligations stemming from their membership of the Union and ruling out any accession as second class Member States or exemption clauses. It thus recognizes that we cannot have prolonged postaccession transitional periods which would jeopardize the acquis communautaire. It also accepts that the pre-accession strategy will both concern general principles and take account of the individual circumstances of the applicant countries. On these matters it adopts the views of the European Parliament as expressed in its resolution of 12 December 1996 on the financial aspects of enlargement.

3. The Commission recognizes that reforms (which it does not specify) will be required in the management and control of the use of Community funds in a larger Community. In this respect it mentions the national authorities (at local, regional and national levels) but says nothing about the role which those authorities will have to perform. It should be remembered that we already have experience of the management of the structural funds, the PHARE programme and, as regards Community administration, the SEM 2000 proposals.

4. The Commission's proposed strategy for enlargement does not include the simultaneous commencement of negotiations with all candidate countries, which to them would be a clear and consistent signal as regards the certainty of their accession. The selection of the countries with which it is proposed that accession negotiations should begin is based on the Copenhagen European Council accession criteria. It will however be noted that despite the existence of certain dissimilarities of an economic nature, this does not in itself justify any differential treatment of candidate countries. Only the failure to meet the political criteria justifies the exclusion of a country from the simultaneous opening of negotiations which will certainly lead to accession.

5. After the application of the political criteria by the Commission, it was concluded that Slovakia did not meet the requirements established by the Copenhagen European Council.[4].

6. As regards the economic criteria, the Commission recognizes that, apart from Cyprus, none of the applicant countries meets them in full. In particular, as regards the existence of a viable market economy it would appear that all the countries have made substantial progress and will be in a position to meet the economic criterion on time (some in the next few years and in any case all at the beginning of the next century). On the matter of coping with competitive pressure and market forces, progress by the individual countries has not been absolutely established with certainty. Here practically all the countries will meet this criterion in the medium-term provided they make a real effort.

7. If there are any real differences they are definitely to be found in the area of the adoption of the acquis communautaire and its administration. This is the point to which particular attention must be paid throughout the pre-accession period. Economic disparities detected do not justify a decision not to start negotiations at the same time.

8. Negotiations could therefore begin simultaneously, but with the final date for accession of each country depending on its overall success in satisfying the accession terms.

9. The Commission to some extent shares this view. The principle of starting negotiations at the same time while allowing for different completion dates is mentioned for a group of countries (Cyprus, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia).

10. On particular aspects of the accession strategy it is fair to ask whether monitoring systems such as TAIEX are in a position to give a full picture good enough for timely and effective parliamentary control.

11. It would appear that the failure to resolve the institutional problems and the absence of any real debate on the financial framework for the Union have led to the postponement or curtailment of its ambitions regarding enlargement.

12. While a new Intergovernmental Conference has been proposed for directly after the year 2000 to deal with the institutional problems basically before any accession takes place, the same does not seem to apply to the new financial framework. The Commission believes that for the 2000-2006 Financial Perspective the twin aims of deepening and widening the Union and the resulting expenditure can be covered from the revenue side by the existing system of own-resources which provides for a ceiling of 1.27% of GDP.

13. Agenda 2000 does not offer any great detail of the cost of enlargement. Moreover, there is some vagueness as regards the application of certain policies and any evaluation of their implications for the economic sectors and regions of the Community. It acknowledges that the enlarged Union will be heterogeneous, that there will be political, economic and social tensions, but offers no ready-made solutions. How to meet the challenge of a broader and more disparate European Union is left to 'strengthened cooperation'.

14. It is to be feared that efforts are being made to deal with the accession of the new countries in stages so as not to affect the revenue side of the Financial Perspective. Bookkeeping solutions are being proposed for the apportionment of expenditure especially as regards the structural policies. The Commission is focusing its attention on the existence of unused appropriations. It fails however to ask itself whether this result is not linked to the suitability of the programmes it has itself proposed.

15. As regards the structural programmes, financial solidarity is not properly backed up by the amounts proposed. The rate of 0.46% of GDP decided at Edinburgh for the purpose of the current Financial Perspective and proposed again by the Commission would result in an increase of structural appropriations for the current Member States if there is no enlargement.

16. In practice, even though there will be a constant increase in overall structural expenditure (25% higher in 2006 than in 1999) there will be a progressive reduction in such expenditure for the current Member States (apart from 2001 over 2000) and in 2006 they will be lower than the 1999 level. In real terms there will be a reduction of about 13% in the Structural Funds (12% if account is taken of Cohesion Fund expenditure). The increase in structural fund appropriations is slowing down and the principle of solidarity towards the recipients of structural support among the present Member States is being undermined. Agenda 2000 is proposing at the expense of these Member States to finance a major part of enlargement from the structural sector (about 33% in 2006).

17. Having said that, it must be pointed out that progress towards EMU requires the introduction of tight financial policy which must not however hamper the effort to support Member States which initially at least are not taking part. It is vital to preserve a balance which must not be destroyed with the prospect of enlargement, the success of which must moreover be to the benefit of all. The decisions of the Union must be governed by consistency and continuity.

18. The Commission supplements its approach with the strengthening of the pre-accession strategy which will affect all applicant countries and on the one hand will involve concentrating all forms of assistance provided by the Union within a single framework (partnership for accession) and on the other the familiarization of the applicant countries with Union policies and procedures by participation in Community programmes.

It insinuates, without adducing any cogent reasoning, that this strengthened pre-accession strategy will be able:

- to constitute the appropriate framework within which the links with these countries will be maintained, and

- to provide some form of certainty of future accession, depending in each case on progress made.

This progress will be substantiated in the annual reports which the Commission will be submitting to the Council alone, from the end of 1998.

19. Careful study of this strategy shows that in fact it involves a quantitative increase in the aid supplied of about ECU 1.5 bn a year, starting in 2000 (ECU 500 m for agriculture and ECU 1 bn in structural fund aid). A quantitative increase of this kind could in extremis be covered by the PHARE programme, the proper financial instrument for funding enlargement. A revised form of this programme would be politically acceptable provided that it contained appropriate arrangements for the participation of the various sources of funding to which the Commission refers (Member States, EIB loans, EBRD and World Bank, etc.).

20. This working hypothesis would ensure authorization for European Community budget intervention, entrench the European Parliament's position on any realignment of the PHARE programme priorities and of course create the conditions for centralizing resources for the funding of infrastructure projects and structural and administrative reform. A review of this nature will require the Community institutions to ensure the existence in good time of an appropriate legal basis.

21. As regards participation in Community programmes, this will involve an extension of their current scope[5]. However, this participation will need to be transparently and clearly expressed in the nomenclature of the Community budget. This approach was adopted at first reading of the 1998 Budget in an amendment introducing a table showing all the necessary information.

22. In respect of the institutional timetable:

- The December 1997 European Council in Luxembourg should lay down the framework to consider what degree of institutional change is required for enlargement to be successful, and the financial implications thereof;

- the Commission should then, by 31 May 2000, submit a report indicating how far the applicant countries are ready for membership, recommending the institutional change required for any enlargement and showing its financial implications;

- on the basis of that report the European Council, after consulting the European Parliament, would in December 2000 decide whether an overall package should be submitted to each Member State for ratification.

23. However, the Commission offers no specific proposals on the terms for participation by representatives of the applicant countries on the various management committees (comitology) which give their expert opinion on the execution of the various Community programmes. Emphasis is laid on this aspect because of the link between these Community programmes and the pre-accession stage.

CONCLUSIONS

24. The Committee on Budgets calls on the Committee on Foreign Affairs to incorporate the following points in its resolution:

1. Believes that accession negotiations should begin with all applicant countries apart from those which do not meet the political criteria; the conclusion of these negotiations with each country should be linked to the overall success of the efforts required to meet the accession terms;

2. Notes that, at the same time, a political dialogue should be conducted with the countries which do not yet meet the political criteria;

3. Will not give its assent to any accession agreements which are concluded unless the Financial Perspective is revised and there is institutional reform;

4. Considers that most of the work that still needs to be done to adapt the economies of the applicant countries and adopt the acquis communautaire should be concentrated in a sufficiently long pre-accession period tailored to the individual circumstances of each country, and that the post-accession transitional periods should be kept as short as possible as they would otherwise hamper the efficient operation of the Union;

5. Firmly believes that the current system of own resources is likely to be a constraint on the funding of a successful enlargement and calls for this to be taken into account;

6. Stresses that Agenda 2000 does not propose changing the Community's system of funding, remains silent on the need for the financial independence of the Union and does not create any financial link between the taxpayer and the European Institutions;

7. Urges at the same time the need for deepening which must be accompanied by an adequate system for the funding of Community policies; voices concern at the risk inherent in a heterogeneous enlarged Union and calls for specific proposals to avoid the creation of political, economic or social tensions on sensitive issues;

8. Also stresses that EMU should not result in any additional cost to the Community budget; on the contrary, once the common currency is introduced, there will no longer be any reason to give some of the present Member States advantages over future Member States by means of the Cohesion Fund;

9. Believes there should be a system for monitoring the progress achieved and funding granted of which the Council and the European Parliament would be kept regularly informed; considers that such information should include a separate chapter on the adequacy of anti-fraud measures;

10. Gives special emphasis to measures for modernizing the administration of the prospective Member States (at national, regional and local levels), which will be called upon, depending on the circumstances, to manage Community and other funds, and for the adoption of specific organizational measures affecting the services of the institutions, and in particular the Commission;

11. Considers that, although the Commission's financial framework may appear too long for this kind of perspective, the very success of enlargement requires the budgetary stability provided by an interinstitutional agreement accompanied by the relevant financial perspective;

12. Considers that allowance must be made for the as yet unknown factors which will influence the overall cost of enlargement and the challenge represented by a successful conclusion of EMU, and hence considers that any Financial Perspective should include a review clause;

13. Insists that the new Financial Perspective (revenue and expenditure) should be revised automatically, firstly once one or more applicant countries sign accession treaties to the Union, secondly, if the reforms of the agricultural and structural policies are not realized and thirdly if the calculated rates of growth are not attained;

14. Further considers it essential that the necessary institutional changes and financial implications should be part of the ratification process for enlargement to include new Member States, whether individually or in groups;

15. Notes that in Agenda 2000 the Commission proposes to extend the existing system of languages without alteration to applicant countries despite the additional costs and considerable operational difficulties this would involve; requests the Commission to produce a report by 31 January 1998 setting out the options open to the European Union to ensure that a cost-effective system for interpretation and translation can be maintained;

• [1] () It will be recalled that the draft Amsterdam Treaty strengthens the element of solidarity (see in particular the new version of Article 130a, second paragraph).
• [2] () COM(97)2000 - 2010 final, 15.7.1997.
• [3] () As regards Cyprus the Commission recalls that in July 1993 it delivered a favourable opinion on Cyprus's application for membership and that the European Council had subsequently reaffirmed on several occasions that accession negotiations with Cyprus should start six months after the completion of the Intergovernmental Conference. The draftsman is satisfied that the Commission shares the view of the UN Secretary-General that a decision to commence negotiations should be regarded as a positive factor in the search for political agreement on a solution to the Cyprus problem.
• [4] () The same is true of Turkey.
• [5] () See the draftsman's working document PE 221.996/Ann.: the consequences of enlargement: the current situation, Part C, 1997 general budget, calculations and amendment No 689 to the 1998 Budget.

OPINION

(Rule 147)

for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy

on the Commission comunication 'Agenda 2000' - For a Stronger and Wider Union (COM(97)2000 -C4-0371/97 )

Rapporteurs: Mr Oostlander and Mr Baron Crespo

Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy

Draftsman: Mr Bernhard Rapkay

PROCEDURE

At its meeting of 14 July 1997 the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy appointed Mr Bernhard Rapkay draftsman.

It considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 25 September, 8 October and 29 October 1997.

At the last meeting it adopted the following conclusions unanimously with two abstentions.

The following were present for the vote: von Wogau, chairman; Secchi, vice-chairman; Rapkay, draftsman; Arroni, Barton (for Donnelly), Billingham, de Brémond d'Ars, Camisón Asensio (for Areitio Toledo), Carlsson, Cassidy (for Konrad), Caudron, Christodoulou, Ewing, Falconer (for Hendrick), Friedrich, Gallagher, García-Margallo Y Marfil, Gasoliba I Böhm, Giansily (for Garosci), Glante, Hallam (for Fayot), Harrison, Hautala, Herman, Hoppenstedt, Ilaskivi, Imbeni, Kestelijn-Sierens, Kuckelkorn, Langen, Lienemann (for Berès), Lindqvist (for Larive), de Lassus (for Castagnède), Metten, Mezzaroma, Miller, Murphy, Paasilinna, Pérez Royo, Peter (for García Arias), Porto (for Lulling), Randzio-Plath, Read, Riis-Jrgensen, de Rose, Rübig, Ruffolo (for Katiforis), Skinner (for Wibe), Svensson, Theonas (for Ribeiro), Thyssen and Torres Marques, W.G. van Velzen (for Peijs).

I. BACKGROUND

On 16 July 1997 the Commission presented its Communication 'Agenda 2000' together with its opinions on the applications for membership, thus complying with the instructions of the Madrid European Council of December 1995. 'Agenda 2000' consists, apart from the individual opinions, of three parts: the first gives a comprehensive assessment of achievements to date and an overview of the prospects and future development of the European Union, while the second looks at 'the challenge of enlargement'. In this section the assessment criteria for accession, a transitional strategy and an impact analysis are set out. The third part presents the financial framework for the years 2000 to 2006.

Your rapporteur will concentrate here on the second part, the challenge of enlargement. Where policy development is concerned, the action plan adopted in Amsterdam is of crucial importance, for the single market in particular. A separate report is already being prepared on this subject, and it will not therefore be examined in detail here.

II. The challenge of enlargement

Assessment

The addition to the European Union of the ten Central and Eastern European countries and Cyprus will (according to 1995 figures, i.e. EUR12) bring a 34% enlargement of its territory and a 29% increase in population, but a rise in GDP of only 9%. The ten Central and Eastern European countries have a per capita GDP equivalent to only 32% of the Community average. This means that we are indeed talking about a formidable challenge.

The assessment of the applicant countries was carried out in accordance with the economic and political criteria laid down by the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993. They were concerned essentially with their degree of political maturity, progress in reforms leading to a market economy and willingness to take over the acquis communautaire. While there is at present no country which could be described as ready for EU accession by these standards, the Commission is nevertheless expecting marked progress in the medium term in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia, and therefore proposes that membership negotiations be started with these countries and with Cyprus. In the view of your draftsman, this approach is more useful than the 'starting line model' whereby negotiations would begin simultaneously with all the applicants, since there are significant differences in the level of development of the different countries. This approach must not, however, be allowed to lead to the development of a two-tier society. Your draftsman refers in this connection to the European Parliament resolution of 17 April 1996 on the Commission White Paper on 'Preparation of the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into the Internal Market of the Union', which warns against dividing these countries up into an A class and a B class.

Effects

Regardless of when which countries join the EU, it must be borne in mind that enlargement involves enormous challenges. The Commission is expecting significant gains in the economic area, since an enlarged single market will offer substantial new production and employment opportunities. The increased competition in the production-factor and commodities market will - according to the Commission - lead to a curbing of price rises and thus facilitate a stabilityorientated monetary policy with relatively low interest rates. The resulting growth will then leave room for a further improvement in the employment situation. The Commission does stress, however, that enlargement also involves problems and risks, since the process of enlargement will bring considerable pressure for sectoral and regional adjustment.

The objective of a large economic area with up to 500 million consumers, liberalized productionfactor and commodities markets, common rules and, ultimately, a single currency, is an attractive one, certainly, but one which is still a long way off. Despite the advantages which can certainly be expected in the long term, in the short and medium term great strains can be expected both on the existing Member States and the applicant countries. The Central and Eastern European countries have made significant progress in the years since the collapse of the Communist bloc, but they still face an immense struggle to overcome the legacy of the old system. This represents a major difference and element of difficulty in comparison with earlier enlargements, so that the drawing of straightforward parallels with these, as often attempted by the Commission, is not always possible.

Although, by and large, the Commission lists all the additional burdens of the process of adjustment for the Member States and the applicant countries, it seems a little over-optimistic as far as their effects and strategies to overcome them are concerned. In the view of your draftsman, an important role will be played by competition policy. The pressure to adjust will almost certainly lead to greater protectionist tendencies in both the European Union and the applicant countries. These dangers must be met by enforcing the Treaty rules on competition. It does, however, seem legitimate and necessary for the Central and Eastern European countries to take transitional protective measures to restrict market access, given the enormous differences in their levels of competitiveness.

Small and medium-sized businesses have a very important function in the process of economic recovery. Whereas in the Member States of the European Union they form the backbone of the economy and are the primary source of innovation and job creation, in the Central and Eastern European countries, where the former system means that large businesses are predominant, SMEs are very underdeveloped. Their promotion and development must therefore lie at the heart of economic policy, not least because of their as yet low international competitiveness.

One essential aspect of the process of recovery in the Central and Eastern European countries is that of intangible investment, i.e. investment in education, research and development. This is indispensable if competitiveness is to be improved. Hand in hand with this must go a change of attitude on the part of the whole of society, both in business and in the public sector; this is the only way that the transition to a social market economy can be successfully made. Adequate support must be provided for this process.

In its opinion on the abovementioned White Paper, the Economic Affairs Committee has already pointed out that a stream of goods and services from the Central and Eastern European countries without any guarantee of quality by EU standards would undermine the confidence of consumers and producers in all products and services circulating in the single market, regardless of their origin, undermining the single market itself in the process. At the same time an influx of unsafe, environmentally unfriendly products and products manufactured under less acceptable social conditions will distort competition and do damage to the single market as a level playing field. Participation in the European standardization process by the Central and Eastern European countries thus takes on great importance, and the development and implementation of the current programmes of technical support for these countries must be more energetically pursued.

Further important aspects which have still to be presented in more detail are the protection of external borders, in connection inter alia with the programme to combat fraud ('Customs 2000' programme), protection of intellectual property, participation by the applicant countries in the transitional VAT system, and infrastructure development and liberalization in the areas of telecommunications, energy and transport.

Ultimately, the crucial question is this: how quickly can the standard of living and degree of integration of the single market be achieved by the applicant countries? Which measures have priority, what is less urgent? The Commission speaks of this only in vague terms, saying that any transitional arrangements must be limited as regards both time and content. What exactly does this mean? Greater precision is needed here; the short paragraph devoted by the Commission to the subject of the length of transitional periods is not enough.

The labour market

In view of wage differentials, an influx of potential employees onto the labour market can be expected. The Commission dismisses such fears as unfounded on the strength of experience with earlier enlargements, but your draftsman considers this view to be over-optimistic. Relocations to the East by businesses are also to be expected, which will also put a strain on the labour market in the present European Union.

Economic and monetary union

With their applications for membership the applicant countries committed themselves to the aim of economic and monetary union. Although the applicant countries are unlikely to enter economic and monetary union on accession, they must nevertheless introduce the acquis communautaire relating to EMU. This may lead to difficulties, primarily in relation to exchange rates, since, as the Commission notes, the loss of the exchange rate as a financial instrument will represent a significant restriction for some countries. However, the heads of the central banks of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, for example, made it clear at the Eastern European summit in Salzburg in July that in the light of the progress which could be expected in stabilization in the case of future accessions the fluctuation spreads of EMS II applicable to the 'outs' should be quite adequate. This is, however, only true in the medium term, since the process of recovery may lead in the initial phase to stronger inflationary pressure which will make monetary and exchange rate policy more difficult and can be expected to bring sharp swings in nominal exchange rates.

The liberalization of movement of capital is also a problem for some applicant countries. It will be made dependent on the achievement of general macroeconomic stability in order to avoid the risk of disproportionate flights of capital and balance of payments difficulties. The applicant countries must be considered separately here, however; the Czech Republic, for example, had to contend with an excessive influx of capital before the most recent currency crisis, whereas Hungary is already very advanced in this respect.

Financial framework

The funding of enlargement and the new financial framework (2000-2006) form the third main point of Agenda 2000. One of the aspects that seem overoptimistic is the Commission's estimated annual growth rate of 2.5%, with which enlargement is to be funded. The idea of raising the ownresources ceiling (1.27% of GNP) is rejected by the Commission, as is Parliament's proposal of a European Union tax.

III. Conclusions

The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy

1. Takes the view that dialogue on accession should be opened with all the applicant countries in the framework of the European Conference, a process in which the European Parliament should take a full part.

.2. Takes the view that accession negotiations should initially be opened only with those countries which, on the basis of their economic and economic progress, are in the best position to implement theacquis communautaire without too long a transitional period after the start of membership;

3. Notes that trade and direct investment are market-oriented mechanisms which are in keeping with the logic of the single market and will lead to greater integration of the European net product chains, and that the relevant potential must therefore be exploited and the framework conditions improved;

4. Points out that, in order to strengthen their position in intra-industrial trade and in so doing become integrated in European industrial structures, the applicant countries must first and foremost continue their efforts to make good their deficit in the area of capital goods and to close the technological gap; notes that they are therefore still under great pressure to adjust and must accept trade deficits in this area, just as the current Union will continue, conversely, to be under a certain pressure in the labour-intensive industries;

5. Considers it necessary for the services sector, in relation inter alia to the information and communications society, to take on greater significance in the Central and Eastern European countries; considers the financial sector in particular to be underdeveloped and unprepared for competition in the enlarged single market, and calls for greater efforts by the Central and Eastern European countries and generous transitional arrangements on the part of the EU countries in order to ensure that the competitive pressure can be withstood;

6. Calls for the applicant countries to be linked to the single market action plan in order to minimize the frictional losses which will arise as a result of joining the single market;

7. Notes that the competitive weaknesses of the Central and Eastern European countries still lie mainly in the industries based more strongly on know-how, and that the Union's fields of action in the area of industrial policy - promotion of intangible investment, development of industrial cooperation, achievement of fair competition and modernization of the public sector - are therefore just as essential for the applicant countries, even in the preparatory phase;

8. Calls for the appropriations from the EU budget provided for in the preparatory phase to be used as a priority to improve industrial competitiveness;

9. Calls in the framework of the approximation strategy and accession negotiations for greater encouragement for small and medium-sized businesses and the setting up of new businesses; including those in the area of trades and crafts, as this sector is underdeveloped in comparison with the existing Union of fifteen and needs a favourable social environment so that an SME culture can develop;

10. Calls for participation by the Central and Eastern European countries in the European standardization process to be more energetically pursued so that an adequate level of quality can be achieved for goods and services;

11. Points out that the Treaty rules on competition must be enforced as a matter of principle from the start of membership and that possible transitional arrangements must be precisely defined as to their content and duration;

12. Considers the agreements on EMS II to be an extremely suitable framework in which to facilitate the entry of the Central and Eastern European countries into monetary union, and thinks it worth considering the idea of allowing those Central and Eastern European countries which are willing and able to do so to acquire associate member status in EMS II.

OPINION

(Rule 147)

for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy

on the Commission comunication 'Agenda 2000' - For a Stronger and Wider Union (COM(97)2000 -C4-0371/97 )

Rapporteurs: Mr Oostlander and Mr Baron Crespo

Committee on Research, Technological Development and Energy

Draftsman: Mr W.G. van Velzen

Procedure

At its meeting of 27 May 1997 the Committee on Research, Technological Development and Energy appointed Mr van Velzen draftsman.

It considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 7 October 1997, 28 October 1997 and 29 October 1997 .

At the last meeting the committee approved the conclusions unanimously with 2 abstentions.

The following were present for the vote: Scapagnini, chairman;Quisthoudt-Rowohl, Adam and Lange, vice-chairmen; W.G. van Velzen,draftsman; Ahern, Argyros, Chichester, de Gaulle, Desama, Estevan Bolea, Graenitz (for Denys), Holm (for Bloch von Blottnitz), Izquierdo Collado (for Rothe), Linkohr, McNally, Malerba, Marset Campos, Matikainen-Kallström, Mombaur, Plooij-van Gorsel and Tannert.

Introduction

Securing a Union which acts in an effective and decisive manner in view of enlarging the Union with countries of Central and Eastern Europe is at present the Union's main challenge. With Agenda 2000 the Commission has given a further impetus to answering the questions we are currently facing. The Committee on Research, Technological Development and Energy asserts its responsibility by helping to find a solution to this challenge. In fact, energy, RTD and the information society play a key role in the process of enlarging and strengthening the Union. As such, both the EU and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will mutually benefit from closer co-operation and integration in these sectors. The reinforced pre-accession strategy plays a crucial role in this “win-win” situation as it strives for institution-building and implementation of the acquis. This opinion will provide the main elements for this strategy in the realm of energy, RTD and information society.

Energy

The current situation in the energy market in the CEECs is that a careful and efficient usage and management of energy is still lagging behind the situation in the EU. Compared to EU-standards, production, distribution and consumption are environmentally unfriendly and nuclear safety remains a source of concern. Currently there already exists co-operation between the EU and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe which is mutually beneficial. The EU secures energy supplies and the countries of CEE acquire technologies which enable them to increase efficiency and reduce environmental damage. In order to integrate the energy sector more fully in theacquis , it is important that in the reinforced pre-accession strategy this co-operation and integration is further strengthened. It is necessary that an integrated approach be pursued so that the various elements will complement and strengthen each other.

In the first place, it is desirable to come to an agreement on more concrete and binding provisions in the Energy Charter Treaty on the issue of trade in nuclear fuels and in setting environmental protection targets. For protecting the environment and guaranteeing nuclear safety an exchange of researchers and the establishment of more energy centres is desirable. In these institutions, which must be established in every applicant country, one could jointly strive for the development of renewable sources of energy, e.g. the coal-gasification process. Such a technique could in Poland, for example, lead to efficiency and environmental gains. Such centres could instigate research and issue support (as well as public-awareness programmes) on a country-specific and tailor-made basis.

With a view to enlargement, it is of paramount importance that all applicant countries are able to participate fully in the EU energy programmes (e.g. SAVE, THERMIE, ALTENER). This would give intrinsic benefits and familiarise the countries of CEE with EU policies and procedures.

The Committee on Research, Technological Development and Energy is of the opinion that attention should be given to the establishments of Trans European Networks in Central and Eastern Europe via the funds earmarked for the reinforced pre-accession strategy. For all applicant countries, it is important to gain easy access to the electricity and gas markets of Western Europe in order to make them less dependent on Russian gas. Moreover, for Western Europe this might help in further securing its energy supplies. The Committee welcomes therefore the importance the Commission is giving to TEN´s in Agenda 2000.

These are the most important elements for closer co-operation in the field of energy within the reinforced pre-accession strategy and it is evident that both the EU and Central and Eastern Europe will benefit from such an approach.

Research and Development

After 1989, RTD - which was primarily geared towards military uses - became less important for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In the CEEs, the undermining of the technological base of the economy, which has become evident through brain-drain and neglecting research institutes, poses serious dangers for the competitiveness of the society and this might also undermine the reform process and would not contribute to improving the quality of life and the solving of social problems. It is therefore of major importance that RTD figures prominently in the reinforced pre-accession strategy. Increases in scale, prevention of overlaps and duplications, strengthening the economic dynamism and preventing brain-drain are the key-elements in this respect. Therefore, an integrated approach which ensures a country-specific, tailor-made approach with all applicant countries is desirable here.

Complete incorporation of all applicant countries in the Fifth Framework Programme should be first and foremost in the new strategy. The Framework Programme offers a good opportunity to get acquainted with EU policies and processes and it allows for programmes which can be of special relevance to the CEEC, e.g., energy research.

In addition, the exchange of researchers should be geared towards maintaining the technological capabilities of the CEEC. The network of universities and technological centres should be expanded and support should also be given towards the further development of universities and research institutes in the individual countries. We need to make maximum use of the chapter in the Fifth Framework Programme on international co-operation for the CEE participation. After all, RTD is not only being dealt with by the European Union but Member States, too, play an important role in this respect.

A valuable initiative could be the foundation of a common research institute. This institute should focus on pan-European projects and should be open for researchers of all applicant countries.

The Information Society

The current society is characterized by global communication. The ramifications for society and economy of this development are enormous. The Information Society has become essential for nations´ competitiveness, employment and living standards. In addition, the development of this market will result in an increase of employment. The Committee on Research, Technological Development and Energy welcomes the fact that the Commission has given recognition to the Information Society in Agenda 2000. It is our common task to develop means of co-operation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to fully reap the benefits global communication offers. Diverging legal frameworks and standards as well as non-equal accessibility to information technology hamper the economic development and reduce the quality of living. Therefore, the reinforced pre-accession strategy should strive for a European infrastructure, convergence on standards and legal frameworks. The Europa Conference can be a suitable means for discussing these issues as all candidate countries are involved in the Conference. Disseminating technology, especially software, to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe via the Fifth Framework Programme is important for establishing a sound scientific and technological base in information and communication technologies. Moreover, the development of a European infrastructure is of importance and can be established not only by, e.g. the liberalisation of the telecommunications markets but also via ESPRIT projects such as WEBCORE and IMPRIMATUR for developing an infrastructure for electronic commerce. It goes without saying that all countries of Central and Eastern Europe should fully participate in the development towards creating a proper-functioning infrastructure.

Standardisation is the key word in disseminating information and all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe should be incorporated in the Euro-ISDN network. Needless to say, global communication is only truly global when everybody has access to the information offered. Therefore, the European information infrastructure needs to be extended to all applicant countries. Open access by all groups in society to information is essential. However, this poses difficult questions as the states adopt different legal frameworks for what is acceptable and what is not. The Europa Conference is a useful forum for addressing these contentious issues in an open manner and with all the applicant countries.

Conclusions

The Committee on Research, Technological Development and Energy calls on the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy to incorporate the following conclusions in its resolution:

A whereas an effective and decisive enlargement of the European Union with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is one of the main challenges for the Union,

B whereas though strengthening and enlarging the European Union is often presented as a contradiction, both challenges can be simultaneously met for the energy, RTD and Information Society sectors,

C whereas closer co-operation between the EU and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in these sectors is mutually beneficial,

D whereas by incorporating all the applicants fully in various programmes and other schemes of co-operation, we will reach a gradual convergence towards the EU standards and the acquis, and an uplifting of the economies of Central and Eastern Europe reduces the necessity for a transfer of large sums from the EU budget to these economies,

E whereas the reinforced pre-accession strategy plays a crucial role in this “win-win” situation as it strives for institution-building and implementation of the acquis, and in order to integrate the energy sector more fully in the acquis, it is important that this cooperation and integration is further strengthened,

F whereas the weakening of the technological base of an economy, due to brain-drain and neglecting research institutes, poses serious dangers for the competitiveness of a society and especially in the CEECs, this might undermine the reform process and will not contribute to improving the quality of life and the solving of social problems,

1. Stresses the desirability to come to an agreement on more concrete and binding provisions in the Energy Charter Treaty on the issue of trade in nuclear fuels and in setting environmental protection targets;

2. Stresses the importance of mobility and of exchanging researchers and the establishment of more energy centres for protecting the environment and guaranteeing nuclear safety;

3. Draws attention to the established nuclear power activity in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and requires the Commission to prepare, prior to accession, an agreed programme to:

a) bring existing nuclear power plant up to Western safety standards;

b) ensure that operational safety is overseen by an independent authority recognised by the IAEA; and

c) put in place safeguard procedures in line with the EURATOM treaty to ensure the protection of highly radiated material;

4. Emphasizes that, with a view to enlargement, it is of paramount importance that all applicant countries are able to participate fully in the EU energy programmes (e.g., SAVE, THERMIE, ALTENER);

5. Points out that coal is a significant component of primary energy sources in the applicant countries and calls on the Commission to prepare with the countries concerned an initiative supported by the PHARE programme to improve the productivity of coal mining as well as the introduction of clean coal burning technology:

6. Stresses that via the funds earmarked for the reinforced pre-accession strategy, more attention should be given to the establishment of Trans European Networks in Central and Eastern Europe;

7. Stresses that RTD should figure prominently in the reinforced pre-accession strategy and that increases in scale, prevention of overlaps and duplications, strengthening the economic dynamism and preventing brain-drain are the key-elements in this respect and an integrated approach which ensures a country-specific, tailor-made approach with all applicant countries is desirable;

8. Stresses that in the new strategy all applicant countries should be fully incorporated in the Fifth Framework Programme and funds should be made available for that while further negotiations are being held on the financial contribution of the applicant countries to the Fifth Framework Programme;

9. Regards the COPERNICUS programme as an acceptable alternative for applicant countries which cannot or do not wish to take part in the Fifth Framework Programme;

10. Welcomes the attention the Commission is giving to the Information Society and the major ramifications this entails for economy and society in both Western and Central and Eastern Europe; stresses that the reinforced pre-accession strategy should strive for a European infrastructure, convergence on standards and legal frameworks; points out that the Europa Conference could be a suitable means for discussing these issues as all applicant countries are involved in the Conference;

11. Stresses that all countries of Central and Eastern Europe should fully participate in the developments towards creating a proper functioning communications infrastructure, in which context it is extremely important for businesses to be encouraged to develop clear standards for the dissemination of information and all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe should be incorporated in the Euro-ISDN network;

12. Stresses that open access by all groups in society to information is essential and that the Europa Conference serves as a useful forum for addressing the contentious issues relating to energy, RTD and the Information Society with all applicant countries.

13. Emphasizes that the new style (reinforced pre-accession strategy) Phare/Tacis programme should include a subprogramme designed to encourage combined heat and power projects in Central and Eastern Europe and to provide the public with information and education on efficient and sustainable energy use.

OPINION

(Rule 147)

for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy

on the Commission comunication 'Agenda 2000' - For a Stronger and Wider Union (COM(97)2000 -C4-0371/97 )

Rapporteurs: Mr Oostlander and Mr Baron Crespo

Committee on External Economic Relations

Draftsman: Mr Fernando Moniz

PROCEDURE

At its meeting of 26 May 1997 the Committee on External Economic Relations appointed Mr Fernando Moniz draftsman.

It considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 23 July 1997, 3 September, 24 September and 24 October 1997.

At the last meeting it adopted the following conclusions unanimously.

The following took part in the vote: Moniz, acting chairman and draftsman; Sainjon, vicechairman; Elchlepp, Falconer, Habsburg-Lothringen, Hindley, Karamanou (for Papakyriazis); Kreissl-Dörfler, Erika Mann, Valdivielso de Cué and Van Dam (for Souchet).

I. AGENDA 2000: A COHERENT ANALYSIS OF THE CHALLENGES FACING THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE RUN-UP TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

1. Agenda 2000 is a discussion paper in which the Commission gives a coherent analysis of the challenges posed to the European Union by not only the globalization of trade and competition but also enlargement to include the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) and Cyprus and the effects this will have on Community policies and on the applicant countries. The Commission document has a strongly political focus in that it sees the deepening of the Union through transition to the third phase of EMU and the creation of a single currency (which will not only mark the completion of the large single market which began in 1993 but will also give the Union a genuine external identity) and the forthcoming enlargements to include the countries from eastern and southern Europe as interdependent historical processes which must be mutually strengthened. However, for this compromise between deepening and widening to be successful, the EU must be endowed with the institutional and financial resources which ensure that the two processes will be compatible. On the institutional front, there is not the slightest doubt that reform of the institutions and of the decision-making procedures must be completedbefore the first enlargement .

Achieving sustainable growth, capable of generating the degree of employment which European society requires, based on knowledge and capable of bringing about a society based more on solidarity, which accommodates the general interest and respects the environment is a fitting objective for Europe in the year 2000. In order for these ambitions to stand a realistic chance of success, the Union's internal policies must be further developed and adapted, from technological R&D policy and vocational training to the modernization of employment policy, the CAP and economic and social cohesion. It is only by modernizing the tools available to it that the EU will be able to tackle the challenges of globalization with any hope of success, alleviating the downside of this process and taking advantage of the opportunities it offers. Bearing this in mind, the EU cannot put off much longer the formulation and implementation of a system of financing the Community budget which is both adequate, flexible and fair in distributing the burden amongst the Member States and which is capable of financing future budgetary requirements in the context of a full economic and monetary union. The Community budget is therefore another crucial factor in achieving the Union's ambitions as regards both internal policies and the financing of enlargement and cooperation and development aid policies in respect of third countries.

II. ENLARGEMENT STRATEGY

Pre-selection: a justifiable but inopportune decision

2. As regards the method that has been chosen for guiding the process of enlargement, your draftsman considers that there is some doubt as to whether the Commission's decision to preselect or choose countries which it believes would be in a position to assume in the medium term the obligations of EU membership is politically appropriate, given that it has generated new tensions between the applicant countries.

Moreover, the timing has been particularly inopportune, given that some countries, such as Romania, for example, whose overall progress has been impressive in the last few months under the new government, have seen their attempts to join NATO and the EU each rejected in the short space of ten days.

It would have been more appropriate to maintain the approach adopted by the Madrid European Council in December 1995 whereby all countries started the negotiations at the same time, even though the point at which they would achieve membership would depend on the relative merits of each one. The order drawn up by the Commission appears to be aimed more at providing an incentive for those countries which are at the forefront of the process of reform and of bringing themselves into line with the EU than at defining a proper balanced strategy for enlargement to the east. The impression that there has been discriminatory treatment in the opening of negotiations is heightened given that the Commission itself acknowledges that the current picture (of the political and economic situation) shows that no applicant country is at present in a position to join the EU. The chosen method of selection may prove to be a disincentive rather than an incentive for those CEECs which, for economic reasons, have seen the start of negotiations delayed, in that it will affect both the internal and external credibility of their governments and the capacity of those countries to attract direct foreign investment.

3. From a geopolitical point of view, the Commission's decision appears to be doubly inopportune. Not only will it accentuate the feeling of marginalization and rejection of certain applicant countries but it will also give rise to the idea that membership of NATO and the EU are parallel processes and that it is the United States which is leading the process of shaping the new European architecture. The world public is being given the impression that the United States is making the first selection for NATO on the basis of its strategic requirements and that Baltic countries such as Estonia, whose prospects for membership of NATO are remote, are being compensated economically and indirectly by the prospect of future membership of the EU. From playing the role of 'leader' in the shaping of Europe in the twenty-first century, the European Union has come to play the role of 'follower'. This is perhaps the price to be paid for the lack of political will on the part of the Europeans to take on more of the burden of financing their own defence.

4. Although the Commission's pre-selection of countries appears to be an inopportune decision, the process of assessing the extent to which each of the applicants is ready to fulfil the accession criteria, as laid down in the European Council held in Copenhagen in June 1993, has been carried out objectively. It is my view, however, that when assessing each country's capacity to meet its obligations as a future Member State, special attention should have been paid to the extent to which they have fulfilled the obligations deriving from the European Association Agreements (EAAs) rather than the extent to which they have transposed the Community acquis, which has inevitably been only limited in all the countries. The EAAs were the cornerstone of the initial phase of the pre-accession process. They were legally binding on all the applicant countries and the commercial provisions have been in force since 1992 and 1993 for the majority of the applicant countries. In other words, when carrying out the assessment, the experience of four or five years of implementing of the agreements must be taken into account. However, the White Paper published in 1995 is a 'voluntary' document which pinpoints the requirements for the harmonization of laws allowing those countries to be integrated into the EU's internal market. In this context, it is surprising that some of the pre-selected countries have experienced problems in implementing moves towards trade liberalization while others, which the Commission has passed over for pre-selection, have fulfilled their commitments in this area properly and punctually and indeed have implemented them ahead of the scheduled timetable.

5. As far as the principles of the accession negotiations and, above all, the new 'reinforced pre-accession strategy' are concerned, your draftsman is in broad agreement with the method, legal instruments and financial resources proposed by the Commission. On the basis of the three-part structure established at the Essen European Council held in December 1994 (the EEAs, structured dialogue and the PHARE programme focusing on technical assistance for the process of transition towards a market economy), Agenda 2000 proposes a new pre-accession methodology consisting of four components:

. Association ('Partnership') for accession. This legal administrative instrument highlights the bilateral approach to relations which consists in the Commission and each applicant country jointly drawing up a 'programme' preparing for accession which not only sets out the priority activities for overcoming the specific problems identified in the 'opinions' but also lays down a timetable for the implementation of those measures. The main change compared with the previous complex and technocratic system consists of the establishment of an 'accession conditionality clause'. What this means in reality is that the logic of the 'programme contracts' is applied to bilateral pre-accession relations with all the applicant countries. The granting of pre-accession aid will be made conditional each year on the extent to which the objectives or commitments entered into have been fulfilled and the progress made in implementing the national accession programme. The Commission will submit periodic reports assessing the progress achieved by both the pre-selected applicant countries and the others. The commitments to be met by those countries will include democracy, compliance with the provisions laid down in the EEA, macroeconomic stability, the national programme for transposing the Community acquis, progress in implementing the PHARE programme and progress in the sensitive areas identified in the opinions.

The Commission's reasoning is that these reports would serve as a basis for recommending the opening of negotiations with those countries which were initially rejected. It is clear in this context that the timetable for accession for each applicant country will depend on the progress it makes in transposing and actually implementing the Community acquis as required by accession. The process of adapting to the Community acquis and the negotiations will have to be undertaken in a coordinated manner.

. The Europe (Association) Agreements, which contribute decisively to commercial integration into the Union, the implementation of competition policy and the approximation of the laws. Moreover, the bodies set up by the EEAs (the Association Council, the Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC), the Association Committee and the working parties) provide a framework for ongoing bilateral dialogue under the pre-accession strategy.

. The Annual European Conference which is open to all European countries with aspirations to join the Union and which have association agreements with it. The Conference will replace the'structured dialogue' as the mechanism for multilateral dialogue within a pan-European context . It should provide a forum for consultations, cooperation and possible joint actions both the CFSP and police cooperation and cooperation in the fields of justice and other home affairs. Your draftsman believes that it is essential to specify the composition and working methods of the 'European Conference' to avoid any repetition of the shortcomings of the 'structured dialogue': formal meetings limited to the presentation of the respective standpoints, overcrowded agendas, limited time for debate and the lack of preparatory meetings. If this new formula is to be more effective and profitable than the 'structured dialogue', it will be necessary for the annual conferences to include preparatory meetings at the level of experts and/or ministers and mechanisms to follow up decisions adopted at the highest level.

. The renewed PHARE programme, as a financial instrument for accession preparations and a catalyst for all aid arrangements, will continue to play a vital role. The Commission has reformulated PHARE's priority objectives, procedures and administrative methods in order to strengthen its effectiveness. The training of administrators ('institution-building') and the financing of investment will count for 30% and 70% respectively of the funds allocated. Furthermore, the Commission proposes an integrated synergy-based approach to all pre-accession aid (PHARE, aid for the modernization of agriculture, structural assistance at regional level in the spheres of infrastructure and the environment, progressive participation in Community programmes and EIB loans under the new 'preaccession facility') which will ensure that Community aid has a greater impact.

6. As far as the REX Committee is concerned, it is vital that in future the Union should ensure that 'accession conditionality' is closely linked to strict respect for the letter and the spirit of the EEAs and, in particular, the provisions on trade, competition policy and state aids. Since the agreements entered into force, the EU's trade relations with some of the applicant countries have been disrupted all too frequently by the unilateral adoption of various restrictive trade measures with no real justification or prior consultation, such as the imposition of a deposit prior to importation, export restrictions, discriminatory fiscal measures, the introduction of new certification systems and various protectionist expedients. Although in the majority of cases a satisfactory solution has been found to such trade disputes, the unilateral nature of these measures, without prior consultation, has soured the climate of cooperation and, if it persists, this could hamper further liberalization of trade in accordance with the objectives and timetables laid down in the EEAs. In this context of pre-accession conditionality, it would be unacceptable for the applicant countries to make out more favourable trade or financial treatment to products or companies from third countries than to their Union counterparts with the aim of attracting direct foreign investment.

7. For the first time in its history, the EU has put in place a pre-accession strategy whose financial package is the Union's way of compensating the adaptation efforts required of the applicant countries. From the year 2000, the Commission is proposing a large amount of financial aid worth ECU21 billion to ensure the success of the pre-accession strategy during the seven years in which the next multiannual financial framework will be in force (2000-2006). The cost to the Community of this first pre-accession/accession stage would total ECU 75 billion if the ECU 54 billion which will probably be needed if the first applicant countries are to be integrated into Community policies around the year 2002 (technical hypothesis) are added to the pre-accession spending.

According to the figures given in Agenda 2000, a substantial share (approximately one third) of the budgetary cost of enlargement will be accounted for by a freeze in real terms (and a decrease with effect from the year 2002 given that the funding would be decreased from ECU 34.2 bn in 2002 to ECU 30.2 bn in 2006) in the internal solidarity policies existing in the Union of 15. The rest of the cost of enlargement (two thirds) would be financed by the forecast economic growth, as funding for thereformed CAP would increase from ECU 41.7 bn in 1999 to ECU 47.9 bn in the year 2006. Your draftsman believes that it is clear that the amount of pre-accession aid would undergo a substantial increase although it is perhaps exaggerated to compare it to a real Marshall Plan given the huge capital requirements involved in the historic process of bringing the level of economic prosperity and social welfare in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe into line with that in Western Europe. However, it should be pointed out that, in the context of Heading 4 of the Community budget, the amount of pre-accession aid will undergoa substantial increase which will put a strain on the financial resources available for supporting the Union's cooperation and development policies with other regions . Pre-accession aid under Heading 4 will be increased by around 15.4% in real terms between 1999 and the year 2000, while the total appropriations under that heading will remain frozen in real terms at a level of ECU 6 600 m.

8. In short, everything would appear to indicate that in Agenda 2000 the Commission has opted for an enlargement strategy consisting in stepping up efforts during the preparatory phase of integration so as to ensure that the forthcoming and subsequent accessions do not result in excessively long transition periods which could jeopardize the uniformity of the single market and the cohesion of the European project as a whole. The Commission therefore assumes optimistic working hypotheses as regards the prospects for growth and reform of the CAP (the need to reduce support prices and to continue the process of changing the current arrangements into a system involving minimal aid, moving definitively away from a policy of price support to one of income support, which would help ensure the gradual harmonization of the EU's prices with those of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe) and the structural funds policy (a ceiling of 4% of GNP on the level of aid and progressive integration) which will limit the cost to the budget of enlargement ... at least during the first few years of the twenty-first century - in other words, the period during which the next multiannual financial framework will be in force. However, we would point out that there are considerable discrepancies between the cost of this first wave of enlargement, according to the Commission proposals, and the estimates drawn up hitherto in various academic and political circles (Wieczorek-Zeul, Baldwin, Ersboll) or in studies carried out for the Commission (the Mahé, Tangermann, Tarditi and Buckwell team). While there is no doubt that these estimates are seriously flawed in that they are based on the hypothesis of 'ceteris paribus' ('all things being equal'), in other words, on extrapolation from the current agreements as far as the CAP and the structural funds policy are concerned, they all agree on the need to raise the ceiling of own resources (1.27% of GDP in 1999) by between 0.69% and 1.05% of Community GDP in order to finance the costs of enlargement. In Agenda 2000, the Commission states that the CAP and cohesion policy must be partially revised so that enlargement can be financed using the current ceiling of own resources. It is not going too far, perhaps, to say that although the initial estimates over-valued the budgetary cost of enlargement, the Commission is tending to undervalue it for tactical reasons.

In conclusion, your draftsman considers that the possible adverse effects of enlargement in terms of regional or sectoral adjustment problems and the cost to the budget should not be used as a pretext for endlessly delaying the integration of all the applicant countries into a more stable, democratic and prosperous Europe. This major political objective should not be put in jeopardy.

III. THE LIKELY IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT ON COMMUNITY POLICIES

9. As President Santer himself pointed out when presenting Agenda 2000 to the plenary sitting of the European Parliament, we are talking about a system of interdependent equations. All the factors are inter-related: enlargement, reform of the CAP and of the Structural Funds policy, external relations and the impact on the Union's budgetary framework.

(A) The impact on Community policies: the CAP, cohesion policy and the Union's financial system.

As far as the impact of enlargement on Community policies is concerned, Agenda 2000 outlines the qualitative effects rather than attempting to quantify them.

The Commission outlines a package of proposals for partial reforms of the CAP and cohesion policy which would enable the Community budget to bear the cost of enlargement without any increase in its current form. The CAP, which continues to account for almost half of the Community budget, is a powerful redistribution mechanism with considerable regional impact. Your draftsman welcomes the shift of the reform, which favours support for farmers' incomes rather than price support. However, although the proposals set out in Agenda 2000 are fairly detailed as far as mainland products are concerned (cereals, oilseeds, beef and veal and dairy products), the proposals concerning Mediterranean products are vague and shrouded in uncertainty. Moreover, if the aim is to ensure that people can continue living in a renewed rural environment capable of taking on new ecological and recreational functions, the new CAP should establish a maximum limit on the size of undertakings which qualify for aid and, without jeopardizing the overall competitiveness of European agriculture, should adjust the amount of aid inversely to the size of undertakings, with incentives depending on the number of people employed on those undertakings. Your draftsman believes that the success of future enlargements to include the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will be largely dependent on the degree of technical preparation of and thought given to the agricultural question. Enlargement will not only consolidate the European Union's position as a large world exporter of agricultural products, in that the amount of land given over to agriculture will increase by around 55%, but will also mean that the number of people employed in this sector will largely double. Moreover, the applicant countries face objective difficulties (inter alia, a lack of housing) when trying to halt in the medium term a possible move away from the countryside and a shift from jobs in agriculture to jobs in other production sectors. The applicant countries will also have to invest heavily in modernizing agriculture, which they are not in a position to do without aid or foreign investment.

As far ascohesion policy is concerned, your draftsman welcomes the fact that the Commission has taken a political decision to maintain the level of economic and social cohesion overall in order to encourage general harmonious development within the Union and the fact that it has assumed that the forthcoming enlargements will require stronger cohesion between the Union's current and future partners, in view of the level of development of the applicant countries. The proposals for changing the current cohesion agreements include such positive aspects as maintaining in relative terms the financing of structural policies aimed at territorial cohesion (0.46% of the EU's GDP) and, therefore, the approval of a clear financial framework of reference which makes it possible to apply modernization and genuine convergence strategies to the less developed regions of the Community. Simplification of the decision-making process and thematic and geographical concentration of aid will make it easier to achieve rational and effective use of the funds. However, given that two thirds of the Structural Funds is given over to the Objective 1 regions (where per capita GDP is less than 75% of the Community average), the Commission will have to act with the utmost caution in 'phasing out' those regions which have slightly exceeded this limit so as to avoid any adverse consequences. A developed region in a country with per capita income of less than 75% is not the same thing as a backward region in a country that is wealthier than the Community average. In the first case, the more advanced regions act as a starter motor for other regions and if their rate of growth slows down it can have a highly adverse effect on the more backward regions. Similarly, special attention must continue to be paid to the northern regions of the Union which have small populations and specific agricultural and regional planning characteristics.

In any case, the main limitations of the Commission's proposals lie in the lack of ambition in the financial framework proposed by the Commission. The basic hypothesis on which the Commission's calculations are based is that of continuity. It is claimed that enlargement will be financed within the current budgetary ceiling on the assumption that there will be sustained economic growth of 2.5% annually during the period 2000 to 2006, which will help finance much of the cost of enlargement. The question is, is this hypothesis plausible? What would happen ifaverage economic growth did not achieve the required level? Has the Commission given any thought to the budgetary consequences of less optimistic economic growth scenarios? Will all the Member States agree to maintain the current system of financing the Community budget up until the year 2006, as the Commission is proposing, or, in view of the delicate balancing-act which enlargement entails, will it be necessary to modify this system to take account of the changes in the relative prosperity of the Member States?

One has the impression that it is financing difficulties which will determine expenditure rather than financing being geared to the requirements to be met. Unlike the Delors I and II packages, in which the Commission acted as the driving force behind Community ambitions, this time the Commission has tailored its ambitions to the budget stringency required by transition to the third phase of EMU. In this context, it would be a real 'budget miracle' if the Union could guarantee that the cost of enlargement, the new technological and training requirements entailed by globalization and the Union's evergreater external responsibilities in the sphere of development aid and the growing demand by third countries for cooperation activities could be financed within the limit of 1.27% of the Member States' GDP.

(B) Sectoral and regional impact

Agenda 2000 does not clarify the uncertainties surrounding the sectoral or regional impact of the increasing competition from industrial - and, in future, agricultural - products from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and confines itself to outlining the possible effects. As far as integrating the industry of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe into the EU is concerned, 'at least during an initial period, a crucial issue will be the use of acceding countries as low-cost production sites for industrial activities ... In this process, due account would have to be taken of sectoral and regional adjustment strains in both present and acceding members, as well as of the imperative need for gradual but steady alignment of acceding countries to EU environmental and social norms' (pages 47 and 48 of Volume 2 of Agenda 2000).

Has the Commission drawn up forecasts or studies on the sectoral and regional impact of future enlargement in terms of its effects on production and employment?

Analyses of this kind are of great political importance for the forthcoming negotiations, particularly bearing in mind - as the Commission itself admits (on page 38 of Volume 2) - that 'enlargement carried a risk that support for a broad social policy would become weaker in the Union as a whole, especially if adaptation of acceding countries to the acquis were inadequate.' Nor does the Commission rule out future political tensions as a result of the exchange rate policies of the applicant countries and their possible impact on the smooth functioning of the internal market and the price competitiveness of products from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe compared with Community products - in other words, possible shifts in the relative share of the internal market, despite the limited economic weight of the applicant countries, which will only contribute a 5% increase in the GDP of the EU of 15. The status of the applicant countries' currencies in relation to the euro and to those countries which might remain outside the euro area is yet another of the unknown factors which will determine the impact of enlargement.

(C) The impact of enlargement on the Union's external relations

As far as our foreign relations are concerned, the system is also interdependent and there are many uncertainties surrounding the impact of the forthcoming enlargements to Eastern Europe and Cyprus. The following are examples of some of these areas of uncertainty:

. Turkey,a country which is eligible for future long-term accession , but which is not included in the pre-accession strategy. It is not clear in the Commission proposals whether or not Turkey would take part in the 'Annual European Conferences' despite being the only country with which the European Union has a customs union and a US$ 10 000 annual trade surplus in 1996. Although the EP firmly believes that it is imperative that the human rights situation in Turkey should improve, are the new Commission proposals sufficient to make up for thefundamental uncertainty underlying our relations with Turkey?

. Russia: when visiting the European Commission on 18 July 1997, the Russian Prime Minister, Mr Chernomyrdin, declared that his country's aim was to join the EU and that all the reforms were geared to that end. Although many Europeans rule out the possibility of membership for Russia in the long term as this would cause imbalances in the Union, the case of both Turkey and Russia highlight the vagueness and uncertainty surrounding the final shape of the European project. However, the EU should not turn a deaf ear to the statements by the Russian Prime Minister. In addition to the current rhetoric consisting of questions such as 'Are the association or 'partnership' agreements sufficient?', it must also be asked: What kind of 'special relationship' should the EU have with Russia?

. Relations with the countries of the Mediterranean Basin. In the Cannes European Council held in June 1995, the EU established the principle that Europe's political stability depended on both the success of the reforms in Eastern Europe and the prosperity of the southern flank of the Mediterranean, and adopted a financial package for the period 1995-1999 under which this region of strategic importance for Europe's security would receive 70% of the aid earmarked for Eastern Europe. Although from the point of view of trade the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are now 'displacing' the Mediterranean countries in certain sectors of the European markets (such as the textile sector), is there not a risk that the additional cost to the budget of facilitating the integration of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will result in a decrease in the aid intended to ensure that this plan for a large Euro-Mediterranean economic area is viable?

Are there not similar risks for the Union's development aid policy (for the ACP countries) or its cooperation policy with the new emerging regions of Asia and Latin America, particularly bearing in mind that the appropriations under Heading 4 will increase less than the EU's average GNP? In this connection it would be very helpful if the Commission could provide a statistical framework for the period 2000-2006 with a breakdown of the allocation of appropriations under Heading 4 (external action) by region (the Mediterranean, Asia, Latin America and southern Africa). Will budget stringency not result in the amount of aid under the EDF earmarked for the ACP countries being limited when the IVth Lomé Convention is renewed?

(D) The impact of enlargement on the Union's external economic relations

Enlargement will increase the EU's weight and influence in the international economic system, international bodies and, especially, in the WTO. Moreover, given the likely boost to the economy from the integration of countries with a strong growth rate and growth potential, enlargement is very likely to have a 'trade-creating' effect for the rest of the world. The increased dynamism of the enlarged single European market and the implementation by the new Member States of preferential agreements with third countries is likely to create new trade opportunities for those countries and offset to a certain extent the inevitable 'trade diversion' effects of enlargement and erosion of the preferential margins enjoyed by developing countries and some of the emerging economies of the Mediterranean Basin and Latin America on the EU market.

Where the future Member States maintain preferential agreements or special trade provisions with certain third countries (such as Russia, Ukraine, other CIS states and other third countries), the Union will have to ensure that its interests are properly safeguarded when renegotiating those agreements.

The Union's substantial shift towards Eastern Europe and towards the Asian continent will be one of the most far-reaching geopolitical consequences of the forthcoming enlargement. Your draftsman believes that it is vital that the gradual integration of the applicant countries into the single market should be accompanied by a more determined policy of harmonizing the external aspects of that market and coordinating the trade policies of the applicant countries with those of the EU. As the ultimate objective of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is rapid integration into the EU and hence the establishment of a customs union, the 'reinforced pre-accession strategy' should ensure that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe can gradually bring their provisions into line with the EU's common commercial policy, which will be fully applicable from the start of membership. In this context, the EU and the applicant countries should as of now define a coordinated strategy on the commitments to be undertaken within the framework of the WTO (the issues on the new agenda) and the OECD, and in respect of other multilateral economic and financial forums where concerted action is possible. Such a strategy, together with the progressive adaptation of the applicant countries to bring them in line with the Community acquis in the sphere of the common commercial policy, should make it possible to avoid the disagreements which have often plagued the Union's relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in a multilateral context.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions of the Committee on External Economic Relations will be submitted in the form of amendments to the two reports by the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

OPINION

(Rule 147 of the Rules of Procedure)

for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy

on the Commission comunication 'Agenda 2000' - For a Stronger and Wider Union (COM(97)2000 -C4-0371/97 )

Rapporteurs: Mr Oostlander and Mr Baron Crespo

Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights

Draftsman: Mrs Astrid Thors

At its meeting of 8 July 1997 the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights appointed Mrs. Thors draftsman.

It considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 24 September and 14 October 1997.

At the latter meeting it adopted the following conclusions unanimously[1] which it asks the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy to incorporate into its report:

The European Parliament

1. Appreciates and welcomes the work so far accomplished by the Commission in preparing further enlargements;

2. Notes that, according to the Commission's findings, only one applicant State does not currently satisfy the political conditions laid down by the European Council in Copenhagen, including stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; notes, however, that the Commission also observes that not all applicant countries have made the same progress and every one of them has flaws in the rule of law, which need to be put right, and that there is a lack of suitably qualified judges and of guarantees of their independence;

3. Agrees with the finding that, if unresolved, minority problems - a feature common to the applicant countries - may affect democratic stability or lead to disputes with neighbouring countries, and invites all applicant countries, as a first step, to ratify the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, which has been drawn up by the Council of Europe; without prejudice to this, the current Member States of the Union should for their part sign and ratify this convention;

4. Without prejudice to the foregoing, considers that negotiations with the applicant countries should all begin at the same time, on the understanding that, because of the persistent delay by some countries in meeting certain accession requirements, the negotiations with those countries might have to proceed more slowly in the areas affected by the delay;

5. Recalls that the approximation of the laws of the applicant countries to those of the Community and the progressive liberalization of the movement of workers, of the establishment of Community companies and individuals, of the provision of services and of the movement of capital are essential elements of the existing Europe (Association) Agreements;

6. Notes that the actual application of internal-market legislation in some applicant countries is unsatisfactory and that Community companies often complain about unfair treatment with regard to public procurement, state aid and environmental law, for example;

7. Notes with great concern the Commission's findings regarding the applicant countries' administrative and judicial capacity to apply Community law and calls for greater efforts by the Union in terms of financial and human resources to retrain judges, lawyers and administrators; points to the need, therefore, to establish a programme to raise awareness within the professions involved in the administration of justice, organized along similar lines to the Robert Schuman Action Plan;

8. The funds earmarked for measures to familiarize the authorities and other judicial officers of the applicant countries with the Community institutions, for example under the Odysseus and Phare programmes, should be increased significantly and the Union should forgo financial contributions from the applicant countries;

9. Points out that the activities of the Union's credit institutions in some applicant countries are still severely hampered by the fact that, as a means of securing loans, real estate is worthless not least because of legal uncertainty about the possibility of realizing it in the event of the debtor's financial failure; points out furthermore that priority must be given to developing efficient and reliable land and business registry systems;

10. Recalls its position that the abolition of the death penalty is an indispensable condition for states to become members of the Union.

• [1] () The following took part in the vote: De Clercq, chairman; Palacio Vallelersundi, vice-chairman; Rothley, vice-chairman, Thors, draftsman; Anoveros Trias de Bes, Barzanti, Berger, C. Casini, Ferri, Habsburg-Lothringen, Malangre, McIntosh, Parigi, Scarbonchi and Verde I Aldea.

OPINION

(Rule 147)

for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy

on the Commission comunication 'Agenda 2000' - For a Stronger and Wider Union (COM(97)2000 -C4-0371/97 )

Rapporteurs: Mr Oostlander and Mr Baron Crespo

Committee on Employment and Social Affairs

Draftsman: Mr Harald Ettl

PROCEDURE

At its meeting of 2 July 1997 the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs appointed Mr Harald Ettl draftsman.

It considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 24 September, 7 October and 21 October 1997.

At the last meeting it adopted the following conclusions by 32 votes in favour to 1 against.

The following were present for the vote: Hughes, chairman; Menrad and Ojala, vice-chairmen; Ettl, draftsman; Andersson, Bennasar Tous (for Castagnetti), Boogerd-Quaak, Cabezón Alonso, Carniti, Correia, Crowley, Eriksson, Ghilardotti (for Blak), Glase, González Álvarez (for Sornosa), Hernandez Mollar, Jensen, Jöns, Lindqvist, Mann, Mendonça, Morris, Oddy (for Malone), Pirker (for Chanterie), Pronk, Schiedermeier, Schörling, Theonas, Van Lancker, van Velzen, Waddington, Weiler and Wolf.

I. Introduction

1. General: The collapse of the iron curtain has led in Europe to fundamental political and economic changes. The historic opportunity that this creates for Europe is essentially a matter of consensus among EU Member States.

The primary driving force for EU enlargement to the East is at all events the opportunities it holds out for the economy, with its growth effects in both applicant countries and Member States. The decisive questions of how to ensure security and stability in bringing about enlargement to the East are hardly discussed or even totally suppressed. The same its true of the inadequate treatment of social policy in Agenda 2000. Even the cultural dimension of social questions, representing as it does the intellectual breeding-ground for Europe's intellectual and economic competitiveness, is too little recognized, in terms both of the opportunities it affords and the obstacles it creates to development potential.

For all that the EU policy of enlargement to the East and the necessity to pursue it must be fully recognized, absolute priority must still be given to the public fears within the Member States of being socially and economically overwhelmed. What must also be taken into account is that, on the one hand, the further development of the integration process and the introduction of the common currency, together with the restructuring of Community assistance policy, will require the full power of political argument for the implementation of its objectives; and on the other, that it is precisely the pace at which enlargement to the East is being pursued that might well elicit the strongest popular resistance. An in part adverse underlying feeling in the EU Member States against EU policy of enlargement to the East can only be countered by going on the offensive on social questions.

2. Unemployment in the EU and the pressures from east Europeans seeking to emigrate: Since hopes for rapid change in existing disparate levels of development will not rapidly be fulfilled, - as shown by all extrapolations that include per capita GNP in their calculations - it can be assumed that emigration pressures will intensify. Not least because the ten Central and East European countries as a whole continue to lag well behind the four structurally weakest countries of the EU of 15. The different levels of development in the applicant countries are not remotely comparable with the situations obtaining in Greece, Spain or Portugal at the time of accession, so that the adverse repercussions of any precipitate accession by the reforming countries could well lead to serious problems and significantly disrupt the operation of the internal market and horizontal EU policies. At social level, this might well unleash extra pressures for deregulation in the EU and elicit an increased inflow of immigrants. If it is assumed that, as recent counts indicate, more than 700 000 persons in the Visegrad states are already making plans to remove to the West, to the EU, that is reason enough to pay closer attention to the social aspects of EU enlargement to the East. The main targets of an East to West migration will be the border countries, with Germany and Austria in the front line. And there at all events it can be assumed that, even with long-term transition rules on personal freedom of movement, migration pressure, together with that of commuter workers in border regions, will increase. In the EU Member States themselves, we shall once again have to confront a propensity of the black market in labour to expand. That problem is still far from a solution not only on account of the fiscal and social questions evidently arising in this connection, but also of the impossibility of imposing full controls. The EU Member States bordering on the reforming countries in particular will have to contend with growth in the black market in labour as a direct consequence of immigration pressures..

3. Division of labour in the EU and possible impact of EU enlargement to the East on the situation hitherto: Studies of the long-term impact of growth in trade point to a not inconsiderable increase in potential. They also show, however, that it is the northern EU states that derive the greatest advantages, while the southern ones are unevenly exposed to stronger competition. The reason is that the states of Central and Eastern Europe tend more strongly towards productive activities that lie in the area of less innovative mass production, so that a cheaper reserve workforce and lower social and environmental standards play a fundamental part.

4. The Agenda 2000 pre-accession strategy: The Commission's Agenda 2000 document constitutes a global response by the Commission to the requirements of the December 1995 Madrid European Council. The Commission brings within a single framework the overall prospects for the development of the Union and its policies on the eve of the millennium, embracing horizontal questions relating to enlargement as well as the future financial framework beyond the year 2000 in the context of an enlarged Union. After analysing each of the applicant countries, the Commission recommends opening negotiations with five of them (Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Czech Republic, and Slovenia) and strengthening the pre-accession strategy for all these applicants. The Commission assumes that a first wave of accessions could take place between 2000 and 2006. The pre-accession strategy mechanisms would be, on the one hand, the so-called 'accession partnerships' (bilateral programming mechanism for coordinating the various forms of European-Union aid to each applicant country), and on the other the option of progressively taking part in Community programmes. The Commission proposes financing this strategy through 'pre-accession aid' based on three components:

- the PHARE programme, as now reformed in terms of administrative procedures and priority objectives (ECU 1.5bn per annum);

- agricultural development aid (ECU 500m per annum);

- aid drawing on the Structural Funds, implemented under arrangements applicable to Community Structural Fund activities (ECU 1bn .per annum).

Whereas the Commission, in its impact study, repeatedly stresses the importance of the social consequences of enlargement, it nonetheless fails to draw the necessary conclusions from the choice of financing priorities. Indeed, the priority objectives for that assistance continue to be expenditure on infrastructural investment (70% of PHARE funds and a declared Structural Fund priority). Aid intended for establishing indispensable social structures is therefore to be sought in what the Commission describes as 'institution-building' - strengthening the applicant countries' institutional capacity, albeit without the terms 'education' or 'training' ever appearing in the priorities listed.

5. Concluding remarks: On account of the framework conditions that apply to EU enlargement to the East in the current perspective, particular attention must be paid to the social framework, and also, to a not inconsiderable degree, to the time factor for enlargement. At the centre of all efforts there must be a policy for enlargement to the East that pays particular attention to the social questions and more or less probable conflicts. Especially important will be a wide-ranging debate with public participation at all levels of society. Nor must any form of window-dressing be resorted to, with attention being drawn only to the long-term advantages; rather, it must also be acknowledged that, great as the need for enlargement to the East undoubtedly is, we shall, at least in the medium term, have to face up to powerful restrictions on further growth in our living standards and the EU itself will become significantly less cohesive.

II. Conclusions

The Committee on Employment and Social Affairs calls on the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy, as the committee responsible, to include the following in its final resolution:

1. Notes critically that although the chapter on social policy in Agenda 2000, with its assessment of the status quo and the problems that derive from it, is fundamentally to be welcomed, it is deeply regrettable that the question of the social dimension generally is accorded only an altogether subordinate importance;

2. Takes the view that EU enlargement can and must contribute to maintaining and further developing the social dimension in Europe; points out, however, that to maintain and secure social stability and social peace in Europe it will be absolutely essential for the acceding countries to adapt themselves to the European social model. The European social model consists however not simply in the formal exercise of democracy and a viable market economy, but also strives for high social acceptability and an institutionalized social dialogue between autonomous partners on the two sides of industry and government departments, while ensuing social integrity by protecting the weakest elements;

3. Calls on the Commission to conduct research into and submit proposals concerning the possibility of drawing up social and employment standards for assessing the ripeness of applicant states for accession; since there is no comprehensive EU social legislation, but only ad hoc measures, the Commission should draw up, as a basis for the enlargement debate, a White paper on the social situation and social policy in the applicant countries;

4. Considers it urgently necessary for a coordinated social policy based on joint qualitative criteria and relative protection levels finally to be developed within the EU, so as to enable a transitional run-up strategy to be conceived and developed for the accession countries as a means of raising them, within a foreseeable period, to a common level defined thereby;

5. Considers that precautions should be taken to prevent enlargement from being used as a pretext for stepping up internal pressure on the European social model;

6. Takes the view that the European Commission's recommendation to applicant countries that they should at once rapidly and decisively amend their social security schemes, which are currently bearing the costs of transition, gravely jeopardizes social cohesion in those countries;

7. Regrets that employment policy as a fundamental precondition for the further development of the social dimension plays only a subordinate part in Agenda 2000; affirms that employment problems to be expected in the short term in the EU of 15 and in the applicant countries call, in the strategy for the run-up to accession, for applicant countries to be involved in drawing up a joint employment strategy in border regions

8. Insists that acquired EU social rights must be implemented de jure and de facto at the time of accession during a transition period appropriate to the respective situations of each acceding country, albeit subject to core areas of European employment and social legislation, since only thus can social cushioning of structural economic change be guaranteed (especially true of the directives on transfers of undertakings, mass redundancies, employee protection in the event of employer insolvency and the European Works Council);

9. Points out that it will be absolutely essential, having regard to EU enlargement to the East, for loopholes in European employment law to be closed so as to guarantee a system of minimum employment-law standards (in particular atypical working conditions, employee provisions internal to the undertaking, right of termination, etc);

10. Regards it as necessary that, in addition to the economic prerequisites for enlargement to the East, an operational social-security system must be acondition for acceptance into the EU, and therefore suggests that this should be made apparent to the applicant countries by anchoring social security in the Community Treaties;

11. Is concerned that women have hitherto been the big losers in the restructuring processes in the applicant countries, and calls for special efforts to be made to offer them de jure and de facto equality and enable them to secure forms of social integration worthy of human dignity;

12. Points out moreover that in the run-up stage efforts must be made by the EU to ensure that the applicant countries involve the two sides of industry in their policies;

13. Takes the view that the creation of competent, legally secure representatives of interests within undertakings must be improved, and that labour relations in which the social dialogue between labour and capital is dominated by government representatives must be rejected;

14. Considers that the PHARE programme must continue as the essential mechanism of the preaccession strategy, but that its methods must be reformed (increasing the size and duration of projects), as must the concentration of its resources, which should reflect the priority assigned to the introduction of structures, institutions and networks capable of supporting a high standard of social policy in the applicant countries;

15. Takes the view that the PHARE programme must be mobilized as a mechanism for the leadup strategy for the first wave of accession countries, as well as for subsequent ones, and therefore welcomes the restructuring of the PHARE programme so as to provide it with a strengthened lead-up strategy, and calls for investment financing to benefit primarily SMEs, the introduction of environmentally and socially acceptable production methods, the implementation of sustainable approaches to energy using renewable resources and the retraining and education of employees of both sexes; calls, moreover for regional and local authorities together with both sides of industry also to be involved in programming on the basis of decentralized administration;

16. Calls, in the context of the PHARE programme and the planned financing of structural measures in the accession countries, for EU assistance to be granted to undertakings registered in the EU only subject to the condition that when conducing operations in the accession countries and in their subsidiaries located there, they maintain the same environmental standards and the same employment-protection and health-protection provisions as are enshrined in the EU's acquis communautaire;

17. Considers that reform of the Structural Funds and in particular of the European Social Fund must be pursued while taking into account the fact that structural operations in an enlarged Union will be more closely geared to employment and workforce adaptation, and urges that arrangements be made for an efficient coordination system or adequately endowed special funds to be set up in the preparatory period;

18. Points out that education and training represent the foundations of social integration, lasting regional development and a successful process of economic transformation; that they are an important vehicle of cross-cultural contacts and that the importance of training for employee representatives in preparation for social dialogue, specifically the European training Foundation, must also be appropriately acknowledged in this connection;

19. Points out that an essential factor in Europe's long-term global competitiveness is maintainingcultural diversity , neglect of which leads to social tensions. Such cultural diversity is, moreover, an essential contribution to positive regional and social development. In that connection, the special socio-cultural situation of minorities and smaller ethnic groups must be taken into account, since they are particularly exposed to economic and migratory pressures;

20. Notes that although land ownership is of course a subjective motivating factor for development, land reforms have nevertheless brought about an important and lasting impetus to development favourable to democratic policy, together with social stability, so that the near-exclusive emphasis on internal-market aspects in Agenda 2000 without acknowledgement of social and historical developments is to be regretted;

21. Notes that structural reforms in the agricultural sector have led to differentiations in types of farms, with private (family) farms and big cooperatives, and that approaches to employment problems in the agricultural sector will have to take account of the existence of the two types of farm;

22. Regrets that thesocial dimension of the processes of transformation and integration in agriculture in the applicant countries is scarcely mentioned in Agenda 2000, since it is precisely a too rapid restructuring that could well cause social structures to break down irrevocably, without at the same time providing alternatives, which could lead to migratory pressures destabilizing to integration, and to mass impoverishment;

23. Points out that special attention must be paid to the problem of surplus labour in the agricultural sector, in particular in Poland, and the creation of other job-opportunities in rural areas;

24. Notes that in the first stage of enlargement the free movement of labour will have to be excluded on account of the unemployment situation in the Member States and the problems already emerging in EU border regions (in particular those of commuter workers); recommends consequently, with all possible emphasis, that the progressive and flexible granting of free movement at a stage to be laid down should be made subject to compliance with established criteria (e.g. GDP comparisons, purchasing-power parities, unemployment);

25. Considers, given that too slow an adjustment of social standards in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe would tend to compromise the European social model in Union countries, while a too rapid adjustment would tend to reduce competitiveness and with it employment in the applicant countries, that a balance must be struck in the timetable for enlargement to ensure that it is sufficiently progressive;

26. Notes in conclusion that living standards in the applicant states have been rising significantly more slowly than expected and that the first candidates for accession cannot be expected to create conditions enabling full integration to take place as rapidly as anticipated.

27. Considers that fundamental adjustments will have to be made to European Union Institutions (membership, powers) and decision-making (qualified majority in the Council, codecision with the European Parliament) as a necessary condition for enlargement; submits that this must be seen, not as a pretext for opposing enlargement but as a recognition of the need to combine it with fundamental changes; warns that enlargement without such fundamental changes cannot but be disastrous both for the European Union generally and for the social dimension in particular;

The Committee on Employment and Social Affairs consequently requests the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy to incorporate the following conclusions into its motion for a resolution:

A. Insists that the acquis communautaire be included de jure and de facto in all social control mechanisms when the applicant countries accede and also notes that it is absolutely essential for the acceding countries to adjust to the European social model if social peace is to be ensured; also takes the view that the basis for broad social acceptance in the question of enlargement is an institutionalized social dialogue between autonomous partners on the two sides of industry, who must be involved in all relevant government decisions and flows of information at the accession negotiations;

B. Calls, with regard to the free movement of workers, especially in view of the phenomenon of commuting, for appropriate, flexibly applied transitional periods based on assessment standards to be agreed, in order

- to ensure an urgently needed, socially compatible integration process,

- to reduce the pressure on the European social model and

- to ensure continuous economic, social and regional upward development in the application countries;

C. Notes critically that the social question is listed in Agenda 2000 only as an issue to be considered, but that unfortunately no more than secondary importance is attached to the treatment of the social dimension itself; calls, therefore, for a White Paper on the social situation and social policy in the applicant countries to be drawn up as part of the preaccession strategy, with

- account taken, as a matter of urgency, of a common employment strategy in view of the unemployment situation in the EU Member States and the problems of the border regions,

- particular attention paid to the importance of initial and continuing training for social integration and

- a broad approach to social concepts also adopted and account taken of such aspects as the social implications of regional development tendencies, socio-cultural effects of migratory pressures and social consequences of transformation processes in agriculture;

OPINION

(Rule 147)

for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy

on the Commission comunication 'Agenda 2000' - For a Stronger and Wider Union (COM(97)2000 -C4-0371/97 )

Rapporteurs: Mr Oostlander and Mr Baron Crespo

Committee on Regional Policy

Draftsman: Mr Jürgen Schröder

PROCEDURE

At its meeting of 14 June 1997 the Committee on Regional Policy appointed Mr Schröder draftsman.

It considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 22-23 September, 8-9 October and 20 October 1997.

.

At the last meeting it adopted the following conclusions by 24 votes to 6, with 1 abstention.

The following took part in the vote: Arias Cañete, chairman; Howitt and Napoletano, vicechairmen; Schröder, draftsman; Ahern (for Lindholm), Azzolini, Berend, Botz, Chichester (for Kellett-Bowman), Costa Neves, Crampton, David (for Hume), De Lassus, Hyland (for Collins, pursuant to Rule 138(2)), Ephremidis, Frutos Gama, Hatzidakis, Imaz San Miguel (for Viola), Izquierdo Collado, Karamanou, Klaß, Klironomos (for Lage), McCarthy, Myller, Novo, Novo Belenguer, Ojala (for Gutiérrez Díaz), Otila, Pinel, Schroedter, Vallvé, Varela Suanzes-Carpegna and Walter.

GENERAL COMMENTS

With the presentation of Agenda 2000 on 16 July 1997 the Commission published probably the most important document of Jacques Santer's Presidency. The Agenda contains the guidelines for the forthcoming enlargements, a new financial framework for the period from 2000 to 2006 and initial steps towards the further development of some Community policies, in particular the common agricultural policy and the attainment of economic and social cohesion within the Union. These two policies account for around 80% of the Union's outgoings and this justifies their more detailed examination in the Agenda particularly in the light of the Commission's proposal to retain the existing ceiling on own resources of 1.27% of the Union's overall GNP. However, there is less justification for the fact that, despite these priorities in the Agenda, neither Parliament's Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development nor its Committee on Regional Policy will have an opportunity to state their positions on this document in a more detailed fashion than is possible in an opinion. The reality is that the Agenda is basically speaking, in the light of the proposed financial framework and of the recommendations for enlargement, already laying the foundations for a reform of the structural funds over the next programming period (2000 to 2006).

THE CHALLENGE OF ENLARGEMENT IN TERMS OF REGIONAL POLICY

After careful scrutiny of the applicants in the light of the three criteria adopted by the European Council in Copenhagen (capacity to meet the obligations arising from membership; political and economic criteria), the Commission proposes opening negotiations with five applicants for the time being, viz.Estonia, Poland, Slovenia, Czech Republic and Hungary. To these should be added Cyprus as the sixth country in respect of which the opening of negotiations six months after the conclusion of the IGC has already been reaffirmed on several occasions irrespective of the longstanding political conflict which still awaits a solution.

The 5+1 approach proposed by the Commission indicates that the enlargement is to take place in stages and cautiously. An enlargement to include only some of the CEECs is already a major challenge from the regional policy angle.

The average per capita GDP of the 10 CEECs at purchasing power standards (PPS) amounts to approximately 32% of the EU15 average according to EUROSTAT figures. While there are considerable fluctuations, all CEEC regions would nevertheless qualify at the present time as Objective 1 areas so that the accession of all applicant countries would double the Objective 1 population overnight to some 200 million and the accession of the proposed 5+1 would increase it to an estimated 150 million. Alongside the challenge of bringing the Central and Eastern European countries and Cyprus closer to the average level of the Community, it is also essential to work towards reducing the current widening regional and social disparities within these countries.

Regional disparities in the countries proposed by the Commission for the first round of negotiations

Country	Population in millions	GDP per capita in PPS 1993 (EU15=100)	Maximum	Minimum
Poland	38.6	27.3	46.2 (Warsaw City)	20.0(Warsaw region)
Czech Republic	10.3	49.2	74.8 (Prague)	42.8 (Central Bohemia)
Hungary	10.2	34.8	62.0 (Budapest)	23.8 (North-East)
Slovenia	2.0	53.8	not available	n.a.
Estonia	1.5	22.2	n. a.	n.a.
Cyprus	0.7	53.7 (GDP per capita)	n.a.	n.a.

Source: 'The impact on cohesion of EU enlargement', study for the European Commission (DG XVI), p.284.

The development problems and considerable disparities both within the CEECs and when compared with the existing EU require of the Community a cautious enlargement strategy, preaccession assistance for the applicant countries and adjustments to a number of Community policies. In terms of regional policy this means that huge efforts will need to be made to uphold the existing solidarity with the Union's disadvantaged regions at a level acceptable to all, while at the same time displaying solidarity with the applicant countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean.

THE COMMISSION'S STRATEGY

In its document the Commission has devised a strategy for the process of enlargement which will be briefly summed up below and commented on from the regional policy angle.

Common regional and structural policy

The Commission proposes a comprehensive reorganization of regional policy for the next programming period: reduction to 3 objectives (2 regional, 1 horizontal) and 3 Community initiatives, maintenance of the Cohesion Fund, strict application of the criteria, simplified administration and proportionality. This assumes that economic and social cohesion will retain political priority and includes the proposal to cap of own resources at 1.27% of overall GNP and set the ceiling for structural policy at 0.46% of GNP. These reform proposals will be the subject of the debate on the proposed regulations for the structural funds next year. The Committee on Regional Policy has stated clearly that enlargement must be accompanied by a qualitative and quantitative reform of the Union's budget, but the new financial framework does not match this requirement. The rapporteur recognizes the budgetary constraints and the related difficulties in increasing own resources but advocates raising the limit of 0.46% of GNP for structural policy measures under the fixed ceiling of 1.27% of own resources.

Pre-accession strategy

The existing pre-accession aid based on three pillars (Europe agreements, structured dialogue and PHARE) is to be improved and stepped up in order to provide a coherent programme for preparing the CEECs for accession to the EU. This new and expanded pre-accession strategy will in principle be aimed at all applicant countries. It contains two new features: a uniform overall approach embodied by accession partnerships and the involvement of applicant countries in Community programmes and mechanisms for applying the acquis.

In financial terms, the Commission is accordingly proposing a change in the emphasis of the PHARE programme as well as new pre-accession aid under headings 1 (agriculture) and 2 (structural policy). Both are planned to take effect from 2000, the former at a constant rate of ECU 500 m per year and the latter with a sum of ECU 1000 m. The rapporteur explicitly welcomes the objectives that are to be attained with this pre-accession aid, particularly in the area of structural measures at regional level. It is of immense importance that the applicant countries should be familiarized with objectives, procedures and financial management rules and that support for infrastructure projects in the areas of transport and the environment similar to that from the Cohesion Fund should be provided even before accession. These very two areas were often mentioned as backward sectors in need of major investment according to the findings of the opinions on the applicant countries. While the Commission's proposal does for the first time depart from the principle of financing external measures not from the appropriate heading 4 (external action) of the Financial Perspective, the balanced allocation of pre-accession aid by the Commission does justify such an approach and reflects the solidarity of European regional policy with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean.

Enlargement

The Commission proposes that the EU structural support system should in principle be taken over in full on accession. A successful pre-accession strategy should make it possible for the new members to adopt fully the rules and procedures of the structural funds, i.e. the relevantacquis in this area. It has to be said at present that none of the applicant countries pursues an integrated regional development policy that even approaches comparison with the Community's regional policy, with the sole exception of Hungary. The main reasons for this are demarcation disputes between ministries, the need for reform of territorial administrative structures and the lack of financial resources. As for the volume of aid to be provided, only gradual integration will therefore be possible since the provision of joint financing depends on absorptive capacity and the size of the individual country's contribution. The rapporteur welcomes in this connection the ceiling of 4% of national GDP on the amount of aid but sees this figure as an absolute upper limit which may not be exceeded but which may be undercut. The effectiveness of the arrangements for administering structural aid must ultimately be the decisive criterion.

CONCLUSIONS

The Committee on Regional Policy calls on the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following conclusions in its report:

1. Recognizes the considerable political importance of enlargement and approves the Council's initiative at the European Summits in Copenhagen, Essen, Cannes and Madrid;

2. Is convinced that the issue of enlargement does not have an exclusively economic and financial dimension but is principally a political decision that will establish the basic pillar of a new political order in Europe after the end of the Cold War, and emphasizes the need for an enlargement including the CCEEs and Cyprus, which should, however, be properly prepared and preceded by a new revision of the treaties;

3. Is convinced that, on account of the unique nature of this challenge and of the huge implications for the existing Union and for the applicant countries, only a cautious step-bystep approach can guarantee the stability of the Union and the optimum integration of these countries, and accordingly supports the Commission in the basic strategy which it has proposed;

4. Calls therefore on the applicant countries to establish efficient local, regional and national administrative structures under their constitutional systems, to encourage non-state sector operators at these levels and to improve financial control systems so that they can as future members make effective use of the Structural Funds and thereby reduce the enormous regional disparities and development problems;

Common regional and structural policy

5. Notes that the Commission, in its Agenda 2000, is already sketching the broad outline of a proposed reform of regional and structural policy for the forthcoming programming period, which meets the needs for efficiency, concentration and administrative simplification but that the new instruments are inadequately geared to the new universal criterion laid down by the Amsterdam Treaty - sustainable development; notes furthermore that this imminent reform is not only one that has been imposed as a result of enlargement but represents what is necessary in this area of policy in the light of past experience; its overall approach still needs to be the subject of detailed debate and negotiation in another context;

6. Stresses its agreement with the Commission's communication Agenda 2000 that the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund should assist the development of all countries joining the Union, particularly in the sphere of infrastructure, environment, manufacturing and human resources;

Pre-accession strategy

7. Considers the improved pre-accession strategy proposed by the Commission overall to be an appropriate way of supporting the structural adjustment of the applicant countries;

8. Emphasizes the need to familiarize the applicant countries with the principles and procedures of structural policy; considers, however, that the aid pledged by the Commission is inadequate to overcome the enormous disparities within a reasonable period and urges that such aid should achieve concrete results that can actually be evaluated and that allow direct incorporation of the acquis in the field of regional policy;

9. Calls also on all the applicant countries to take account at this stage in their national policies of the four priority objectives to be achieved specifically via cohesion policies: job creation, competitiveness, environmental protection and equal opportunities between the sexes;

Enlargement

10. Believes that if budgetary contributions are not agreed beyond the 1.27% GNP ceiling, the financial perspective of the Union should be reviewed before the next enlargement;

11. Notes that, under the rules currently in force, all applicant countries will qualify as Objective 1 areas; considers the Commission's proposed ceiling on structural aid of 4% of national GDP to be an absolute limit; notes further that adopting a ceiling of 4% of GDP will mean that those countries with the highest revenue will receive the most aid;

12. Considers it important that a special strategy be adopted in connection with enlargement to ensure that cooperation across the EU's external borders to reduce disparities in the standard of living and safeguard peace and stability can continue.

OPINION

(Rule 147)

for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy

on the Commission comunication 'Agenda 2000' - For a Stronger and Wider Union (COM(97)2000 -C4-0371/97 )

Rapporteurs: Mr Oostlander and Mr Baron Crespo

Committee on Transport and Tourism

Draftsman: Mr Niels Sindal

PROCEDURE

At its meeting of 14 July 1997 the Committee on Transport and Tourism appointed Mr Niels Sindal draftsman.

It considered the draft opinion at its meeting of 23 September 1997.

At the meeting of 29 October 1997 it adopted the following conclusions with one abstention.

The following took part in the vote: Bazin, chairman; Lüttge, vice-chairman; Sisó Cruellas, vicechairman; Sindal, draftsman; Aparicio Sánchez, Baldarelli, Bennasar Tous (for Ferri), Díez de Rivera Icaza (for Klironomos), Donnay, Ferber (for Jarzembowski), Langenhagen, McIntosh, Megahy, Moreau, Novo Belenguer (for Dary), Schlechter, Simpson Brian, Stenmarck and Van Dam.

I.INTRODUCTION

With a view to understanding the impact which the accession of an as yet unknown number of countries will have on the future of the European Union, it is essential to take two general considerations into account:

(1) the degree of commercial, and, indeed, other forms of integration, between the Union and the applicant countries will depend to a large extent on the support provided for that process by the various national transport systems, which, in general, are currently below standard, particularly as far as interconnection with the European transport network is concerned;

(2) for the transport systems and, above all, the infrastructure networks in the applicant countries to meet the requirements for accession, the European Union will need to make a significant financial and organizational contribution.

Any debate on enlargement, however thorough, which does not take these two considerations as a starting point, cannot but fail to achieve a fundamental objective, namely that of identifying as clearly as possible exactly what must be done to make enlargement easy to assimilate, thereby ensuring its success.

II. THE TRANSPORT SITUATION AS OUTLINED IN AGENDA 2000

The situation in the applicant countries is sketched out by the Commission in Agenda 2000 as follows:

Bulgaria has made some progress in meeting the transport 'acquis', but serious recent difficulties have held this process back. It must accelerate its efforts in particular in the maritime, air and road freight sectors. Bulgaria must also provide the investment necessary for extending the European transport network , which is an essential element for the effective operation of the single market.

In addition, considerable efforts will be needed in the areas of environment, transport, energy, justice and home affairs as well as agriculture.

Estonia has made progress in taking on the 'acquis' in the transport sector, but needs to make improvements in the road freight and maritime sectors, and pay particular attention to safety issues. Provided this is achieved, accession in the medium term should not pose major problems. But investment will be needed to extend the European transport network so as to ensure the single market functions well.

Hungary has already made considerable progress in taking on the transport 'acquis'. If it continues its efforts on road transport and technical controls this sector should not pose significant difficulties. Hungary will need to provide the investment necessary to extend the European transport network in order to ensure effective operation of the single market.

Latvia has made real progress in the field of transport, especially air transport.

Provided efforts are made in road transport, rail and sea transport, no major problems are to be expected in applying the 'acquis' relating to the single market. But investment will be needed to extend the European transport network so as to ensure that the single market functions well.

Lithuania should not have major problems in applying the transport 'acquis', provided that attention is paid to maritime safety and environmental standards. Investment will be needed to extend the European transport network so as to ensure that the single market functions well.

With regard to transport,Poland has made notable progress in taking on the 'acquis', but considerable effort and investment will be needed in road transport. Provided that these efforts are made, the transport sector should not pose major problems in the medium term. But investment will be needed to extend the European transport network so as to ensure that the single market functions well.

With regard to transport, the Czech government has already made notable progress towards meeting the 'acquis'. Efforts need to be pursued in respect of road freight transport. But meeting the 'acquis' relating to the single market should not pose real problems. Investment will be needed to extend the European transport network so as to ensure that the single market functions well.

Romania has made some progress in taking on the 'acquis' for transport. It needs to increase its efforts, notably in respect of road freight transport and in the maritime and rail sectors. Romania will also need to provide the investment necessary to complete the European transport network, which is an essential element of the effective operation of the single market.

Slovenia has already made satisfactory progress in the transport field. If it continues its efforts in road freight transport and the railway sector, transport should not pose difficulties for accession. Slovenia has undertaken to make the investments necessary to establish TENs in order to ensure effective functioning of the single market.

Slovakia has made efforts towards applying the 'acquis' in the field of transport. But further progress is needed on road freight transport and the railway sector, without which it would be hard for Slovakia to meet the obligations of accession. Only if the situation improves is the transport sector unlikely to pose major problems. Slovakia needs to make the necessary effort, in collaboration with the international financial institutions, to integrate itself into the European transport network and to achieve establishment of the TENs which are important elements in the effective functioning of the single market.

III. REMARKS

As is apparent even from the very broad outlines given by the Commission, infrastructure in the applicant countries is, in general, substandard. Furthermore, there are a number of problems regarding the organization of the transport system in many of those countries. This applies in particular to the railway sector, which is why the Committee on Transport has forcefully maintained on numerous occasions that more attention should be paid to investment in this sector, so as to prevent road transport from gaining too much of a dominant position in those countries.

As far as infrastructure is concerned, the financial difficulties arising in connection with implementation of the trans-European network priority projects are common knowledge. The modest amounts allocated under the Community budget play an important and far-reaching role in mobilizing additional funding for the projects to be carried out.

Nonetheless, problems of profitability and the difficulties experienced in involving a sufficiently large number of operators in public-private partnerships are already proving a major obstacle to rapid progress on the projects located in the Community's territory; one therefore cannot expect the situation to be any better, in this respect, with regard to projects involving one or more applicant states. The problems will, in fact, be even greater, starting with those involved in determining the size of the budgetary appropriation which the European Union will be able to allocate to extension of the trans-European networks to neighbouring countries. However, such difficulties do not exempt the European Union from providing the necessary impetus in this area. The documents produced recently by the Commission set out initiatives worthy of consideration (and already warmly endorsed by Parliament on several occasions) which must be taken into account above all (but not exclusively) during the preparations for forthcoming budgets. One initiative of particular note is the refocusing of the Phare programme on investments geared to the preparations for accession and implementation of the 'acquis', not least in the field of transport infrastructure.

The Helsinki Conference, which was the third of its kind within the framework of the panEuropean transport policy promoted by Parliament and the Commission, gave a clear signal that Parliament does not intend to stop making good use of its influence and its powers to enable the European transport system of the future to ensure greater economic competitiveness, the development of trade relations and the achievement of significant objectives in terms of sustainable mobility.

This means that the approach to be followed must be based on a set of instruments clearly set out in the Helsinki Final Declaration: legislative approximation; progressive liberalization of transport markets; the development of intermodality and infrastructure with a view to sustainable mobility; the promotion of public and collective passenger transport; and support for intelligent transport systems and research and development. Equally important in this context is the set of measures designed to facilitate as of now and in the future the crossing of the European Union's internal and external borders. This will require a major commitment from all the parties involved in the accession process; a commitment which must cover organizational and negotiating aspects as well as financing.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

The Committee on Transport and Tourism calls on the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following conclusions in its report:

The Committee on Transport and Tourism

1. Considers it extremely important for the future of the European Union that the accession negotiations be placed on a sound footing with a view to ensuring, not least by means of balanced and sustainable development of transport systems, that enlargement is effected in line with those objectives recently reaffirmed in the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Helsinki Final Declaration which have been endorsed by the European Parliament;

2. To that end, considers it necessary for the accession process to cover all aspects of the common transport policy, with particular reference to environmental, social and safety considerations, and for the emphasis to be placed, whereever possible, on the use of modern technologies and intelligent systems; consideration must therefore be given to driving hours, engine emissions, vehicle standards, road-traffic regulations and all the legislation concerning the acquis communautaire;

3. Calls on the Commission to ensure that due account is taken of social and environmental considerations in the infrastructure field as well, and that the relevant principles be applied in such a way as to ensure that the projects carried out are mature from an economic and technical point of view and, at the same time, are as environment-friendly as possible and have a greater impact on the employment situation; furthermore, consideration should also be given to establishing a suitable balance between railways and motorways;

4. Calls on the Commission to ensure that decisions regarding the projects to be carried out under the PHARE programme and the connections with the trans-European networks take due account of options which will facilitate intermodal transport flows, including sea and inland waterway routes and port infrastructure;

5. Given the current transport situation, calls on the Commission to make available, with a view to the accession negotiations, all the financial and staff resources required to make that process as balanced as possible (not least vis-à-vis the countries which will not join in the first wave) and, at the same time, as to make it as easy as possible for the various regions of the European Union to assimilate in terms of transit (with attention being paid to the issue of fraud), sustainable mobility, the impact on the employment situation, and the development of outlying areas.

OPINION

(Rule 147)

for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy

on the Commission comunication 'Agenda 2000' - For a Stronger and Wider Union (COM(97)2000 -C4-0371/97 )

Rapporteurs: Mr Oostlander and Mr Baron Crespo

Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection

Draftsman: Mr Doeke Eisma

PROCEDURE

At its meeting of 19 June 1997 the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection appointed Mr Doeke Eisma draftsman.

It considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 7 October and 20 October 1997.

At the latter meeting it adopted the following conclusions by 27 votes to 2.

The following took part in the vote: Ken Collins, chairman; Poggiolini, Dybkjær and Lannoye, vice-chairmen; Eisma, draftsman; Blokland, Bowe, Breyer, Correia (for Apolinario), Florenz, Gonzalez Alvarez, Graenitz, Grossetête, Kirsten Jensen, Kokkola, Kronberger, Leopardi, Liese (for Flemming), McKenna, Needle, Pimenta, van Putten, Riis-Jørgensen (for Olsson), RothBehrendt, Schnellhardt, Sjöstedt (for Bertinotti), Tamino, Trakatellis, White.

I. INTRODUCTION

On 16 July 1997 the Commission presented Agenda 2000 with its views on the enlargement of the European Union to include the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC). Given that Agenda 2000 is concerned principally with the strategy that needs to be pursued in the enlargement process, your draftsman believes that this should be the framework for looking at what is best for the environment and efforts towards sustainable development in both the EU and in the CEEC.

Numerous studies show that EU environmental legislation is one of the major stumbling blocks to enlargement. The Commission makes this plain in Agenda 2000:

'Environment is a major challenge for enlargement; while the adoption of the Union's environmental rules and standards is essential, none of the candidate countries can be expected to comply fully with theacquis in the near future, given their present environmental problems and the need for massive investments.' (Agenda 2000, 1: For a stronger and wider Union, p. 56)

In formal terms, full compliance with the acquis is still the condition for accession, but given that under this condition no new Member State would be able to accede for about 20 years, this is not a desirable position to adopt politically speaking. Or in terms of the environment: the environment will benefit from speedy accession. Given the long period of time needed to satisfy the environmental criteria, there will therefore have to be transitional stages. Realistic demands will have to be made, provided that this does not lead to environmental legislation having a lower priority than, for example, internal market legislation.

The accession of the CEEC could be of great advantage to the environment. On the one hand it will lead to a great cleaning-up operation in Central and Eastern Europe and, on the other hand, it will tackle cross-border pollution affecting the EU. However, nature with its great wealth of biodiversity is vulnerable, and it is important to prevent damage being done to it.

Furthermore, future enlargement must not hold up developments in environmental legislation in the EU.

II. IDENTIFYING THE MAIN PROBLEMS

Adapting EU legislation involves more than simply transposing European legislation in national legislation. EU legislation also needs to be implemented and monitored. A high priority must therefore be given to reforming and expanding civil service and administrative capacity. Implementing bodies need extra manpower and more money: at the national level and also, and more importantly, at regional and local levels. This will require a lot of support, particularity during the period prior to accession.

One problem in a lot of CEEC is that ordinary citizens do not have easy access to government information. This is not only regrettable from the democratic point of view; it means that popular involvement also suffers. This is a harmful state of affairs for environmental policy, in particular, because broad popular support is needed to put environmental policy at the top of the political agenda and to keep it there. Furthermore, greater involvement of NGOs can ensure better policy. For these reasons your draftsman calls for priority to be given to legislation on access to information, public participation and access to the courts. This is something which needs to be improved, in fact, with the EU of the 15

Although in some sectors the CEEC are almost as advanced as the EU, or in fact more so (for example, nature conservation), in general they are lagging well behind. Caution is needed to avoid opting for short-term, cheaper, 'end-of-the-pipe' solutions. That is an outmoded approach. Efforts must be made to ensure that future Member States are made aware of the thinking underlying present policy which is principally geared towards prevention.

Considerable efforts are needed with regard toair quality . Emissions from energy power stations and from central heating plant which are still often coal-fired need to be reduced as soon as possible.

The prevention and processing of waste is still in its infancy in most of the candidate countries. Dangerous waste is a particular problem. In many CEEC there is no overall waste strategy.

Complying with water legislation is likely to be one of the most expensive forms of transposition, especially with regard to the directive on drinking water and urban waste water.

Industrial pollution has been the cause of the most serious environmental problems in the past. Most of the CEEC have industrial 'hot spot' areas which are seriously polluted because of obsolete production methods and the lack of waste management (for example, the 'Black Triangle'). Cleaning up these areas will be a very costly process. As far as modernization of industry is concerned, priority should be given to the IPPC directive which provides a new framework for controlling pollution and the Seveso directive to present serious accidents.

One serious and dangerous problem that requires a dynamic approach is that ofnuclear safety . A number of countries still operate old-fashioned nuclear power station powered by Soviet technology which cannot possibly comply with Western safety standards, even in the future. Enlargement of the EU must be used as a means of shutting down these highly dangerous plants as soon as possible. However, this will only be possible if alternative electricity or other energy sources can be made available. It is also important to stress greater energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy.

III. COSTS

Although different studies produce different figures for the environmental costs of enlargement, the general conclusion is the same: the costs will be enormous and even in the medium term they cannot be borne by the CEEC and the EU. In its latest documents the Commission reckons on a total of ECU 120 billion for all ten candidate countries together. These include costs which would have to be incurred even without accession to the EU. It is just that the time constraints are now much greater.

In Agenda 2000 the Commission stresses that the lion's share of the investment will have to come from the CEEC themselves and that the EU can make only a small contribution. It says that the largest contribution must come from the private sector. The key question, however, is whether the private sector is prepared to make such a commitment. This would only be possible if the environmental acquis were to be given high priority on accession. Industry, after all, has an interest in rapid accession, not least so that it can take part in the internal market. Given the high costs it is important to set realistic objectives. If the financial pressure on the economy is too great, this will act as a major brake on economic and social developments and will remove public support for environmental policy.

Efforts must be made to induce the international monetary bodies to give priority to environmental investments in the CEEC, and there needs to be a sound degree of coordination between such bodies. Within the EU's financial instruments, greater priority must be given to the environment. Some of the funds can be used for specific purposes by earmarking them in advance. The Commission should also transform PHARE as soon as possible from a programme driven by demand from the recipient countries into a programme which uses money for those products which are needed for accession ('accession driven' programme). Combined with earmarking, this should lead to a greater share within PHARE of investments in the environment and sustainable development.

To prevent the CEEC trailing even further, the Commission rightly states in Agenda 2000 that new investments in the CEEC must comply with existing EU legislation. This applies both to national and to international investments. However, a legal basis will need to be found for this.

IV. INTEGRATION

In both the EU and the CEEC integration of environmental considerations in the other sectors is one of the principal objectives of environmental policy. However, for a variety of reasons the candidate countries are in a unique position. They still have large untouched areas of nature with an enormous biodiversity, largely thanks to the lack of a sophisticated transport infrastructure. Because it is less well developed, the extensive agricultural sector comes across as more environmentally friendly than in the EU. Major reforms, both economic and social in nature, are waiting around the corner. Taken together, these factors afford the possibility of large-scale integration of environmental considerations at an earlier stage than in the EU. In fact, the CEEC could even forge ahead through the introduction, for example, of taxes on environmental pollution instead of on labour. In all sectors new policy needs to be subject to strategic environmental impact assessments. In this way integration can be guaranteed at a very early stage. Within the EU, the Council and the European Parliament still need to adopt the Commission proposal on this. The Amsterdam Treaty has explicitly included the condition of sustainable development in its preamble and has made it one of the main objective of the Union. The candidate Member States should therefore apply this principle directly.

Agriculture. The CEEC must be prevented from gearing agriculture solely towards increasing production, as is the case in the EU, where we now know that this approach is disastrous, both for agriculture itself and for the environment. There is evidence that consumers are attaching increasing importance to quality products. The emphasis should therefore be on quality rather than quantity. Policy should be aimed, for example, at avoiding pesticides, intensification and increases in scale.

Transport. The transport sector is one of the major polluters in the EU. The CEEC are, with good reason, afraid of being flooded with lorries and cars. The transport infrastructure does need to be improved, but priority should be given to those investments which are needed in the CEEC themselves. Motorways are mainly of benefit to international transit traffic, and less so to the countries themselves. The TENs in the CEEC should therefore be looked at again. Another useful starting point would be the density of the public transport network. To prevent a loss of capital and damage to the environment public transport will have to be modernized.

Energy. In general the level of energy efficiency in the candidate countries is low. In addition, energy is in some cases still being generated in an environmentally unfriendly way (e.g. coal-fired power stations and obsolete nuclear power stations). From both an economic and an environmental point of view priority should be given to building up sustainable energy sources and increasing energy efficiency.

Structural policy. History shows that money from the Structural Funds is used to finance a lot of projects in the EU which have proved harmful to nature and the environment. This mistake must not be repeated in the CEEC. More effective environmental impact assessments are needed.

It is regrettable that the Commission has placed too little emphasis in Agenda 2000 on integrating environmental considerations. Despite the new integration provisions in the Treaty the Commission has passed up an opportunity, particularly with regard to the Common Agricultural Policy and the Structural Policy. The environment ministers of both the EU and the CEEC will have to be explicitly involved in working out the details of the forthcoming reforms of current EU policy.

V. ENLARGEMENT STRATEGY

The Commission contradicts itself in Agenda 2000: it assumes compliance with the full acquis communautaire at the time of actual accession. At the same time it indicates that none of the candidate countries will be able to comply with the environmental acquis in the near future. The two positions are incompatible. In the CEEC itself it is rumoured that no-one seriously thinks that EU membership will be refused on environmental grounds. In other words: there is a feeling that the environmental acquis is not one of the unconditional criteria for accession. To a certain extent this is true: if the EU were to stick to its conditions, no candidate country would be able to join for several decades. which would be politically undesirable. The great danger in all this is that the environment is not given the same priority as economic criteria and the functioning of the internal market. Not only is this detrimental to environmental policy in the CEEC, but it will also put a brake on the further development of EU environmental policy. To resolve this dilemma, it would be appropriate to request the Commission to draw up a list of elements of EU environmental legislation which the candidate countries must comply with in order to be able to accede. This list must, as a matter of principle. be the same for all would-be members. The Council must consult Parliament as closely as possible on the list which, it goes without saying, should be based on objective environmental criteria. As far as other EU legislation is concerned, at the time of the accession negotiations contracts will have to be concluded with fixed timetables and financial frameworks.

Broadly speaking the Commission itself opts for this approach,. which it describes as follows:

'In partnership with the Union, realistic national long-term strategies for gradual effective alignment should be drawn up and start being implemented in all applicant countries before accession... These strategies should identify key priority areas and objectives to be fulfilled by the dates of accession as well as timetables for further full compliance; ensuing obligations should be incorporated in the accession treaties.' (Agenda 2000: I, p. 56)

The Commission also proposes commencing negotiations with five CEEC. Your rapporteur believes that dividing the CEEC into two groups could have an adverse effect on the environment. The countries making up the 'chosen few' would have the feeling of almost having arrived, and they would slacken their efforts - particularly with regard to matters such as the environment. The countries in the second group would have lost any immediate prosect of accession, with all the psychological consequence that this entails. They would also have seen that the Commission had selected the 'chosen few' mainly on the basis of political and economic criteria. Accordingly, they would focus their efforts on those sectors and give less priority to the environment.

For these reasons it would be advisable not to engage in any selection process, but to apply the same pre-accession strategy to all ten candidate countries. Once it can be assumed that a candidate country can satisfy the accession criteria within the space of one or two years, negotiations can start with that country.

VI. CONSUMERS AND PUBLIC HEALTH

Although public health is principally the responsibility of the Member States, the Union still has a role to play in protecting its citizens. EU citizens have the right to travel freely and to live and work in other Member States. In general public health standards are lower in the CEEC than in the EU, largely because of a poor lifestyle, environmental pollution, lower standards of health care, poor working conditions and relative poverty. It is disappointing that Agenda 2000 pays such little attention to public health policy. Accession of the CEEC to the EU could substantially improve public health conditions in those countries, provided there is adequate funding available. Review of the action programmes in this area must concentrate on the problems in the CEEC.

Both with regard to consumers and public health little progress has been made in developing voluntary organizations. Developing organizations in defence of consumer interests should be encouraged. Popular involvement must be encouraged through greater openness in the decisionmaking process.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

The Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection calls on the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following amendments in its report:

1. Speedy and full accession of all candidate Member States will, in the long term, improve the environment throughout Europe. This assumes a more intensive approach to important policy areas such as the environment, transport and energy. However, special attention should be paid to nature conservation in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in order to avoid loss of biodiversity.

2. On no account should the future enlargement slow down the development of environmental legislation in the Union.

3. The environment would suffer if a distinction were to be made between Central and Eastern Europe, between countries which could join at an early stage and those which could join later. It must therefore be assumed that there will be a long pre-accession period with all candidate countries. If a candidate can be expected to satisfy the criteria which have been laid down within two years, negotiations will be started with that country. The expectation then is that all countries will have made the best possible efforts with regard to the environment.

4. To make the accession criteria realistic, the Commission is requested to draw up a list of the most important elements of EU environmental legislation which candidate countries must satisfy at the time of accession. This list should be established on the basis of objective criteria with the Council and Parliament. For the purpose of implementing the remaining legislation contracts should be concluded during the negotiations, with clearly defined timetables and financing frameworks.

Transition periods of more than 5 years are not acceptable for the EU-environmental aquis. If longer transition periods are proposed in the accession negotiations, the European Commission is requested to report this to the European Parliament in order to seek a solution.

5. In establishing transitional arrangements, particular attention should be paid to implementing provisions to improve air, water and soil quality and food safety and protection of health as a matter of priority, since in some instances very poor environmental conditions in the CEECs are already damaging the health and reducing the life expectancy of CEEC citizens.

6. In order to cover the very high costs of cleaning up the environment in the CEEC and implementing EU legislation, the proportion of EU funds for the environment should be increased. At the same time, financial aid needs to be earmarked for various environmental objectives. Parliament welcomes changing PHARE from a demand-driven to an accessiondriven programme, and calls on the Commission to implement this as soon as possible. Finally, efforts are needed on the part of both the EU and the CEEC to obtain more funds from international monetary bodies for improving the environment in the CEEC.

7. Is aware that small and medium-sized businesses and local and regional authorities have difficulty obtaining loans for environmental investments; therefore calls on the EBRD and EIB to examine the possibility of setting up guarantee funds to make it easier for banks in Central and Eastern Europe to grant loans for environmental investments.

8. All new investments in the CEEC, both national and foreign, must comply with current EU legislation with immediate effect.

9. High priority in aid to the candidate countries should be given to reform and expansion of the administrative apparatus in order to guarantee sound implementation and enforcement of the legislation.

10. One of the most important factors in the implementation of EU legislation is involvement of ordinary citizens. This will increase support for policy and improve its quality. Priority should therefore be given to implementing legislation concerning access to information, public participation and access to the courts. There is still room for improvement in this respect within the EU, too.

11. Priority should be given to support for NGOs working in the areas of environment, public health and consumer protection so that the involvement of ordinary citizens can be better developed.

12. The fundamental economic and social reforms in the candidate Member States provide the momentum for creating a sustainable economic system. The candidate countries can forge ahead by, for example, introducing environmental taxes and strategic environmental impact assessments.

13. The Commission is requested, in accordance with the commitment in the Treaty, to integrate environmental and consumer protection considerations in other policy areas when EU policy is reformed. The environmental and consumer affairs ministers of both the EU and the CEEC should be explicitly involved in working out the details of the reforms.

14. Enlargement of the EU must be used to shut down, as soon as possible, the dangerous nuclear power stations built with Soviet technology and the associated radioactive waste disposal facilities. There is also a need for a special programme on energy savings for contractors. Prefinancing of energy efficiency measures and stimulating renewable energies are essential.

In any event, alternative solutions should not be nuclear but should give preference to the cleanest technologies available and renewable energy sources.

15. Points out that the applicant states should protect the health of their citizens by taking public health considerations into account in other policy areas and considers that the EU and the applicant states should actively support the development of NGOs and voluntary organizations in the health sector.

OPINION

(Rule 147)

for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy

on the Commission comunication 'Agenda 2000' - For a Stronger and Wider Union (COM(97)2000 -C4-0371/97 )

Rapporteurs: Mr Oostlander and Mr Baron Crespo

Committee on Culture, Youth, Education and the Media

Draftsman: Mrs Hilde HAWLICEK

PROCEDURE

At its meeting of 2 September 1997 the Committee on Culture, Youth, Education and the Media appointed Mrs Hawlicek draftsman.

It considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 25 September 1997, 13 October 1997 and 20 October 1997.

At the last meeting it adopted the following conclusions unanimously.

The following took part in the vote: Baldi, acting chairman; Augias, Daskalaki (for Boniperti), De Coene, Evans, Guinebertière, Günther (for Mouskouri), Heinisch, Kerr, Kuhne, Leperre-Verrier, Matikainen- Kallström (for Pack), Perry, Poisson, Ryynänen,Vaz da Silva.

INTRODUCTION

1. The negotiations on enlargement will start in January 1998. The Commission has drawn up a communication entitled "AGENDA 2000" (COM(97)2000 - 2010), to which the opinions on the various applications for membership are annexed. The document of the Commission describes the prospects for the development of the Union and its policies beyond the turn of the century, the horizontal issues related to enlargement and the future financial framework beyond 2000 in the light of the prospect of an enlarged Europe.

2. The European Parliament will adopt its opinion on this document in November-II (3 December) in Brussels. The Budget Committee will adopt its report in the meeting of 27 and 28 October (deadline for the amendments: 20 October) and the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy will adopt its report in the meeting of 3 and 4 November (deadline for the amendments: 21 October). The drafts of the resolutions will be available beginning of October. Taking into account this agenda, our Committee will examine the amendments tabled by its rapporteur in the meeting of 13 and 14 October (14 October) and vote on these amendments and on the amendments tabled by the members of our Committee (deadline: 14 October at 6 p.m.) in an extraordinary meeting in Strasbourg, the 20 October.

3. The document of the Commission points out that enlargement to include the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Cyprus is a historic challenge for the Union, but it is also an opportunity in terms of its security, its economy, its culture and its place in the world. Europe's cultural diversity will be a source of creativity and wealth and the accession of new Member States will enhance the Union's weight and influence internationally.

4. The Commission stresses that in order to derive maximum benefit in terms of growth, competitiveness and employment, special attention must be paid to the development, dissemination and use of immaterial goods as research, innovation, education and training. Education and training represent, in this framework, essential immaterial investments.

5. The document of the Commission considers that priority should be given to access to employment, the development of the life-long term learning and the promotion of local employment initiatives, including territorial employments pacts. A new objective 3 will be introduced for regions not covered by objectives 1 and 2 helping the Member States to adapt and modernise their systems of education, training and employment.

6. The Commission proposes that the development of internal policies over the period covered by the next financial perspective (2000-2006) will have to satisfy two considerations: the resources available for internal policies will have to be targeted so that they are not wasted on measures that are unlikely to have a significant impact and, at the same time, allocations may be increased faster than GNP growth for certain programmes, which have been given priority because of the value-added they derive from Community-level action.

7. The Commission stresses the fact that the enlargement will enrich the cultural diversity and the cultural heritage of the European Union: the participation of the new countries in the educational and cultural activities of the Community will strengther the links between the Member States and the candidates, to the benefit of all the countries..

CONCLUSIONS

8. The Committee on Culture, Youth, Education and the Media could place special emphasis on these 7 points:

a) the Union should treat enlargement and cohesion as complementary rather than conflicting goals. The institutions will have to bear that point in mind when drawing up the financial perspective, since the Union will not be able to move forward unless both areas develop smoothly;

b) the view is sometimes expressed that enlargement of the Union will benefit some countries and work to the disadvantage of others. It is necessary to combat this narrow interpretation of the issue and encourage Union citizens to adopt an overall perspective enabling them to understand that enlargement is in the common interest of all the members of the Union;

c) culture and education will be priority areas in the pre-accession period, and the annual expansion of the budget headings concerned will need to reflect that fact. The involvement of applicant countries in cultural programmes (as is already happening under the Ariane, Kaleidoscope, and Raphael programmes) and educational and youth programmes (Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Romania are already taking part in Socrates, Leonardo, and Youth for Europe, and the necessary approval for Poland and Slovakia to do so is due to be given shortly) will prepare the ground more effectively, enabling Union policies gradually to be implemented in those countries;

d) the revision of the Structural Funds after 1999 will provide an opportunity that should not be missed to incorporate the cultural dimension into Union policies as a whole, especially with regard to employment, cohesion, regional development, and urban renewal, which are posing growing problems in the applicant countries;

e) when the PHARE programme is revised to become an 'induction aid programme' for the Central and Eastern European countries, which are planning to channel the bulk of the funding into a few large-scale projects, it must be ensured that cultural and education policy measures are not relegated into the background;

f) cultural activity is an integral part of economic and political development. Economically it is a direct and an indirect source of job-creation. Politically it is an essential factor in widening the shared European identity among citizens of diverse ethnic and cultural background which is vital for the success of the enlargement process;

g) a framework programme for culture, grouping together all the Community's activities in the cultural sphere could have the useful effect of extending and improving the Union's cultural action, providing the necessary boost for and complementing the decentralized role of the Structural Funds. A particular attention must be paid to the cultural management and to the role of the national States;

h) the support for cultural networks is essential, because they are vital to achieve involvement of all cultural organizations of the creative community in the formulation and implementation of EU cultural policies and they play key part in achieving real European citizenship. European cooperation by establishing a constructive dialogue and a system of cooperation between European cultural foundations must be encouraged together with the importance of the role of the academies and the Universities in achieving a European cultural dimension (for example in the field of literature, to ensure a knowledge of less known national cultures and to establish cultural exchanges not only between the Member States and the candidates, but also between the Central and Eastern countries). The Committee on Culture, Youth, Education and the Media could examine the possibility to re-open the debate on the creation of a Cultural Foundation of European Union;

i) an ever-closer relations up with the Council of Europe, UNESCO and specialized NGOs in the cultural sphere - while respecting the identity and autonomy of each of those organizations - is necessary;

j) the role of civil society to develop a Europe's cultural dimension and to strengthen democracy and protection of minorities in the Central and Eastern Countries is very important and it will be useful to establish with these organization a genuine and constructive cultural dialogue. In this framework, the Committee on Culture, Youth, Education and Media could endorse the conclusions of the working document made by Mr. Oostlander, when they affirm that the presence, nature and functioning of non-state institutions in the CEECs need to be closely examined" and that assistance for accession is not only a governmental task but also a responsibility for NGOs in the societies of the EU Member States. The Committee on Culture, Youth, Education and Media could propose that the Permanent European Conference will be open to other dimension than the governmental cooperation, i.e. the interparliametarian dialogue and the participation of the citizens throught the NGOs representing the civil society, the Trade Unions and the employers' organisations;

k) a coherent information policy is essential. While statistics show that there are more supporters than opponents in each applicant country, this support is far from unreserved and is based on a scarcity of information. The European Commission, as the institution responsible, must provide the European Parliament with a clear outline of its future information strategy to the CEECs, which has so far lacked coherence and coordination;

l) the Committee on Culture, Youth, Education and the Media would draw the attention of the Central and Eastern European countries to the Commission's comments about the weakness of certain laws governing access to information and freedom of the Press. It recommends that the CEECs swiftly adopt appropriate legislation and calls on them to make the changes required to comply with the principles set out in the 'television without frontiers' Directive.

OPINION

(Rule 147)

for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy

on the Commission comunication 'Agenda 2000' - For a Stronger and Wider Union (COM(97)2000 -C4-0371/97 )

Rapporteurs: Mr Oostlander and Mr Baron Crespo

Committee on Development and Cooperation

Draftsman: Mr Paasio

PROCEDURE

At its meeting of 22 May 1997 the Committee on Development and Cooperation appointed Mr Paasio draftsman.

It considered the draft opinion at its meeting of 23 September 1997.

At its meeting of 8 October 1997 it adopted the following conclusions unanimously.

The following took part in the vote: Wurtz, vice chairman and acting chairman; Fassa, vice chairman; Paasio, draftsman; Aldo, Cunningham, Fernandez Martin, Glase (for Liese), Günther, Howitt (for David), Junker, Kinnock, Lööw, Martens, McGowan, Pomes Ruiz, Pons Grau, Salafranca (for Verwaerde), Sandbaek, Sauquillo Perez Del Arco, Vecchi.

BACKGROUND/GENERAL COMMENTS

The enlargement negotiations mark the beginning of two significant periods in terms of the effects of enlargement on the EU's policy towards developing countries. If the negotiations lead to a successful conclusion, the first new Member States may be expected to join the EU no sooner than 2002 but no later than 2005. The enlargement process will, however, in all probability be taken further, which means that by the end of the first decade of the next century the EU may have as many as 25 Member States.

At the same time as the negotiations on accession, negotiations are to be held between the EU and the ACP countries on the organization of their relations after 2000 when the Fourth Lomé Convention expires. There is thus clearly the prospect of a period when the Fifth Lomé Convention is in force and the European Union is growing significantly. The new Member States will be at the bottom end of the EU's national income statistics, and they have no development cooperation tradition of their own at all. The situation is distinctly new for both sides.

THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' POSITION AT THE TIME OF ENLARGEMENT

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the political upheavals in its allied countries there was a perceptible atmosphere of competition in many market economy countries in the allocation of economic aid. In many cases, partly because of the pressure of public opinion, supporting those European states aspiring to democracy and a market economy was regarded as closer to home and more important than supporting the more distant, 'traditional' developing countries. As a result, in many cases the appropriations earmarked for development cooperation were reduced, particularly for the poorest countries. This did not however happen in all countries, which reflects inter alia the different ways in which the EU countries adopted and adapted their traditions of development cooperation.

The Committee on Development and Cooperation considers it very important that, both at the time of the enlargement negotiations and later in the enlarged EU, care should be taken not to let the increased budgetary pressure involved in supporting the candidate and new Member states reduce the resources available for necessary cooperation with the developing countries proper, including ACP countries. If this situation did arise, it would in fact mean that aid for poor European countries would be financed by even poorer developing countries. This would lead to a serious crisis of credibility in the relations of the EU and its Member States with the developing countries and with the UN development organizations.

Some of the countries applying for membership of the EU are in the middle-income bracket in terms of national income, while some are almost on a par with the low-income developing countries. They cannot, however, be regarded as genuine developing countries in view of their education, health care and transport systems, even though these are mostly in a comparatively poor state.

TOTAL AMOUNT OF DEVELOPMENT AID MUST BE INCREASED

These problems cannot be solved solely by EU decisions. It is essential that each Member State should also take them into account in its own development cooperation policy.

The EU should appeal to all its Member States to comply with the UN's recommendation that they allocate at least 0.7% of GNP to development cooperation. The development cooperation policy of the EU and its Member States should be regarded more emphatically as a single unit than has been the case in the past.

ESSENTIAL ROLE OF RELATIONS WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CFSP

The total amount of development aid in the world over the past 10 years has remained at the same level: approximately US $ 55-60 billion. There is no prospect of any major changes to this unless political attitudes change significantly, for example in the EU.

It must be stressed that relations with the developing countries form an inseparable part of the EU's common foreign and security policy. The objectives of development cooperation must accordingly be approached with this more clearly in mind than in the past. This means, inter alia, that it should be possible for the EU's relations with developing countries, and the development cooperation policy pursued in the framework of those relations, to be dealt with in the same forums as other common foreign policies.

NEW MEMBER STATES MUST BE INTEGRATED INTO THE EU'S POLICY TOWARDS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Under the conditions created by enlargement a solution also needs to be found to the problem of how and at what stage the new Member States will be integrated into the EU's development cooperation policy and systems. Although their own contribution, in terms both of building up national development cooperation and of participation in the EU's basic funding and programmes, will for understandable reasons be quite small for some time to come, they should be involved in such work if only for reasons of principle. The worldwide responsibility for sustainable development is an essential part of European integration, and this requires all the Member States to act together.

None of the applicant states have any significant development cooperation tradition of their own. However, at least some of them have some experience of relations with developing countries in the context of the former social system, for example through the study and training opportunities offered to young people from developing countries. The objectives of such activities, although in some places they attained significant dimensions, were different from those which may be attributed to EU development cooperation. As a result of such activities, however, there may be in the new Member States a significant amount of knowledge about conditions in developing countries.

A number of applicant states have participated to some extent in the donation of humanitarian aid, mainly to regions in the CIS countries.

In Estonia, for example, these countries have been the subject of development aid plans, even for the near future. Bosnia and Albania are also mentioned as possible recipient countries. The reasons given for this aid include a wish to sell their own products and a wish to aid Estonians living abroad.

No mention is made in the short term of plans to help the developing countries proper. Participation in development cooperation is however referred to as an objective, partly because the country in question would then be showing itself to belong in a European context.

Participation in development cooperation policy and its implementation in practice must be discussed in connection with the forthcoming enlargement negotiations, to enable the new Member States to adopt this as an essential part of the EU's common foreign and security policy from the outset.

One factor which may influence the new Member States' integration and readiness to participate in EU development cooperation is that they themselves have been and still are recipients of significant quantities of aid. In addition to the EU their aid donors have been individual states and, for example, the World Bank and other international development organizations. For this reason, too, it is useful for the new Member States to participate from the outset in development work, the aim of which is to allocate aid to even poorer countries.

In the long term it may be expected that the new Member States, as they gradually grow more prosperous themselves, will increase the EU's development cooperation resources.

As early as the enlargement negotiations it may be necessary to consider, for example, the equal treatment, on the EU market of some developing countries' most important agricultural products, such as sugar. If the developing countries remain in a worse position than the Member States, this will make their economic development considerably more difficult.

The fact that many future Member States have experience of being recipients in their own right of aid and the adaptation programmes associated with it may be of significant use in the planning and implementation of the EU's development cooperation.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The European Union must ensure that enlargement does not reduce the amount of appropriations allocated in aid to traditional developing countries;

2. The European Union must appeal to the Member States to supplement their own development aid to the level of 0.7% of GDP recommended by the UN;

3. The EU's relationships with the developing countries, including development cooperation, must be regarded more clearly than in the past as a part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. In the context of enlargement the new Member States must also be integrated, to the extent their resources permit, into the EU's policy on developing countries and development aid.

OPINION

(Rule 147)

for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy

on the Commission comunication 'Agenda 2000' - For a Stronger and Wider Union (COM(97)2000 -C4-0371/97 )

Rapporteurs: Mr Oostlander and Mr Baron Crespo

Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs

Draftsman: Mrs Maria Berger

PROCEDURE

At its meeting of 8 July 1997 the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs appointed Mrs Maria Berger draftsman of the opinion.

The committee considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 23-24 September and 8 October 1997.

At the latter meeting it adopted the following conclusions unanimously.

The following took part in the vote: Ancona, chairman; Reding and Vinci, vice-chairmen; Berger, draftsman; Bontempi, Cederschiöld, Colombo Svevo, De Esteban Martin, De Luca, Deprez, Elliott, Lambrias (for Pirker), Lindeperg, Matikainen (for Posselt), McKenna (for Roth), Oostlander (for Stewart-Clark), Nassauer, Gerhard Schmid, Terron I Cusi, Van Lancker (for Schulz) and Zimmerman.

1. The Commission opinion

1.1. Overall strategy

On 16 July 1997 the Commission presented its Agenda 2000 together with its opinions on the applications for accession. In drawing up these assessments, the Commission had adhered strictly to the three conditions for accession laid down by the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993:

- Institutional stability guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities;

- the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;

- the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.

It also proceeded from the assumption that all the states would fully adopt the acquis communautaire and, save in specific cases in which transitional periods could be arranged, that they would implement it immediately after accession.

The results of this analysis are well known. The Commission recommends that accession negotiations should begin with 6 countries: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia and Cyprus. It notes, however, that even in these countries a great deal still remains to be done before accession can be possible but that it is attainable, at least in the medium term.

The other five Central and Eastern European applicant countries, Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia and Slovakia, will, in the view of the Commission, need longer before they can accede to the European Union. In the case of Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania and Latvia the reasons are economic and institutional. The political criteria are met, despite one or two critical points, by all of the countries except Slovakia, where the exact opposite is the case. While the Commission views as positive that country's medium-term prospects for meeting the economic criteria and adopting the acquis communautaire, it considers the instability of its institutions, which are not sufficiently rooted in political life, and the violations against democratic principles to be too serious for it to recommend the opening of accession negotiations at the present time.

The Commission also proposes a reinforcement of the pre-accession strategy, which should apply to all countries applying for accession. The key feature of the pre-accession strategy is the 'accession partnerships'. In this framework the Commission and the relevant applicant country will establish priority aims and a timetable for attaining them. Financial support from the Community for the national programmes to prepare for membership of the Union is to be mobilized and the granting of financial assistance will be dependent on progress in implementing these programmes. The Commission will report at regular intervals to the European Council on the progress achieved, and for the first time at the end of 1998. As soon as one or more applicant countries have achieved sufficient progress to meet the conditions for accession, the Commission intends to recommend to the Council that it open accession negotiations with those countries.

The Commission also proposes the setting up of a European Conference to be held annually at the level of the Heads of State and Government and possibly at ministerial level. All of the Member States of the Union would take part in this conference as well as all European countries which qualify for accession and have an association agreement with the EU. This European Conference would become a forum for debate on matters in areas such as the common foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs.

1.2. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms

Although the Commission gave all applicant countries except Slovakia a satisfactory report with regard to democracy and respect for fundamental rights, in most countries there are still shortcomings which urgently need to be put right. A case in point is the death penalty which, though it is no longer carried out in any of the applicant countries, has still not been abolished in several of them.

In a few countries protection of privacy or freedom of opinion and press freedom are not fully guaranteed, and minorities such as the Roma and the Sinti are discriminated against. In some countries the question of compensation for the victims of expropriation is also under discussion.

1.3. Freedom of movement

The implementation of freedom of movement in an enlarged Union would entail massive problems both for the acceding countries and for the present Member States. As the Commission repeatedly emphasizes, in spite of all the pre-accession aid, notably in the economic and social spheres, the migratory pressure from the acceding countries will be very high, particularly on the Member States which share a border with them. If full freedom of movement is attained prematurely, problems could arise in the present Member States, on the labour market, in the social sphere and in the field of internal security. The applicant countries would be faced with a risk of emigration, particularly of skilled labour needed for economic reconstruction. The adoption of the acquis enlarged by the Schengen Agreement in the field of freedom of movement, and in particular the obligations relating to the checks on the EU's external frontiers and the fight against organized crime, would, even in the medium term, place an enormous strain on the applicant countries.

In its opinions, the Commission takes the view that only Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia, assuming they made corresponding efforts, would be in a position in the medium term to create the conditions for abolishing checks at the future internal borders. It takes a sceptical view of the medium term capacity of the other applicant countries to achieve this, especially in the case of Estonia for which the opening of accession negotiations has been proposed.

1.4. Justice and home affairs

In assessing the ability of the applicant countries to adopt the acquis communautaire in the fields of justice and home affairs, the Commission encountered a number of difficulties. One of these is that in the sphere of justice and home affairs theacquis is still being developed, and the state of progress likely to be achieved at the time of the accessions is not yet foreseeable. After entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, it is to be expected that the acquis will expand at an accelerated rate. Furthermore, the relevant agreements were partly drawn up outside the EU framework. Yet another difficulty is posed by the institutions in the sphere of justice and home affairs in the applicant countries, whose experience, efficiency and constitutionality in the field of justice and internal security, which is particularly dependent on good administrative cooperation, are crucial. Their integration in existing activities, programmes and institutions is described as a lengthy and difficult process. The relevant institutions in the applicant countries are currently being reformed and still need to earn the trust of their partners in the EU if there is to be far-reaching cooperation.

The Commission focuses on the following points:

Asylum and refugee issues: The applicant countries are countries of transit, and increasingly countries of destination, but sometimes still countries of origin of asylum seekers. The adoption of the acquis (the Geneva Convention, the Convention of Dublin, and related measures on the approximation of asylum procedures) would have advantages for the existing Member States, but would also entail higher costs for the acceding countries.

Organized crime and other serious crime: All the applicant countries are countries of transit for the international drugs trade, some of them are even drugs-producing countries (synthetic drugs in Poland, amphetamines in Estonia). All of the countries are major fields of operation of organized crime and efficient structures to combat it are still lacking. Crime could have a destabilizing effect, and after enlargement this could have serious political consequences for the wider Union. On the other hand, the Commission points out that as yet there is no evidence of terrorist activities inside these states.

Judicial cooperation: In this area enlargement would offer advantages to the existing Member States since the extension of existing and planned measures such as the Extradition Convention will allow more effective transnational action by investigative and prosecution authorities. In the civil field there will also be benefits for matters such as the effective operation of contracts. However, some of the applicant states will encounter difficulties in ratifying certain international conventions and their judiciaries will lack experience in implementing them.

The Commission makes the point several times that problems with nuclear safety give rise to serious concern in certain applicant countries.

Overall, the Commission's assessments as regards the adoption of the acquis communautaire in the sphere of justice and home affairs in the next few years are optimistic with regard to the Czech Republic and Hungary and cautiously optimistic for Poland and Slovenia. In the case of Estonia, however, it notes a considerable backlog and the corresponding need for a major effort.

In the countries which have not been proposed for the first round of accession negotiations the deficits in the sphere of justice and home affairs are even more serious. The problems are similar to those encountered in the countries receiving a more positive assessment, in particular as regards the transit of drugs, drugs production, the presence of organized crime and the lack of adequate frontier controls. The problems are compounded by the fact that the relevant institutions (police, judiciary and frontier administration) are not yet endowed with the necessary efficiency. The Commission believes that it would therefore be very difficult for Romania and Bulgaria to meet the requirements of the acquis communautaire in the medium-term. As far as Lithuania and Latvia are concerned, its assessment seems somewhat more optimistic but even in these two cases the Commission believes that adoption of the acquis would be possible in the medium term only if a major, sustained effort was undertaken. Slovakia constitutes a special case in the area of justice and home affairs in that while the Commission believes in its administrative capacity to adopt the acquis communautaire in the medium-term, it is not convinced of Slovakia's willingness to implement the necessary reforms for this purpose.

2. Assessment

2.1. Respect for fundamental rights

It is essential that all future member countries of the Union should attain a high standard of respect for fundamental rights and the rights of minorities.

As part of the pre-accession strategy the applicant countries should therefore receive particular support in setting up effective protection of fundamental rights and of minorities and solutions must be found for the victims of expropriation. The death penalty should be abolished before accession to the Union.

2.2. Freedom of movement

Freedom of movement will probably not be fully introduced until after fairly long transitional periods when it is felt that the risks for the applicant countries and for the existing Member States are not insurmountable. However, under the pre-accession strategy priority should be given even during the transitional periods to all measures which help to create the conditions for the full implementation of freedom of movement. In order not to completely rule out freedom of movement at the beginning of membership, quotas might be introduced for employed and selfemployed workers. In view of the enormous challenges and expenditures which will face the new Member States in safeguarding their section of the EU's external frontiers, renewed consideration should also be given to a Community approach to performing these tasks, or at least to the provision of assistance from other Member States.

2.3. Justice and home affairs

Although the next European Union's enlargement will present it with major tasks in the field of justice and home affairs, it also represents a special opportunity to use wider cooperation to deal more effectively with the international problems of organized crime, drugs trafficking, money laundering and illegal immigration.

In the sphere of justice and home affairs it is particularly evident that preparation for enlargement involves not only the adoption of laws which are in conformity with EU legislation, but the ability to actually enforce such laws. That means, above all, that major efforts must be made to create an operational and independent judicial system. An absolutely essential requirement is also the setting up of an efficient police force capable of taking effective action against organized crime, committed to democratic principles and respectful of human rights. Setting up efficient institutions also means in particular that energetic action needs to be taken to combat corruption, which is still clearly widespread, and one way of achieving this is to improve the remuneration of government members.

The Commission has acknowledged this problem and taken it into account by according priority to the setting-up of efficient institutions and in particular the development of human resources as part of the pre-accession strategy. This prioritization must also be reflected in financial assistance (e.g. in the PHARE programme and new pre-accession aids). These programmes should also introduce more practical arrangements and, for example, enable officials from the applicant countries to take part in training courses and study trips to the existing Member States.

The Commission has not, however, taken up the demand of the European Council that preaccession agreements should be concluded as part of the action plan on the fight against organized crime and that the applicant states should ratify the relevant international agreements, notably within the framework of the Council of Europe.

In the area of asylum, steps must be taken to ensure that all the future member countries of the Union unconditionally ratify the 1951 Geneva Convention on refugees and the 1967 protocol. This demand is addressed particularly to Hungary, which has lodged a reservation in this regard. The implementation of asylum procedures must be in line with theacquis and EU standards.

The pre-accession strategy should be made more specific by drawing up a compulsory timetable for the adoption, ratification and actual implementation of all parts of the acquis and the relevant conventions.

Justice and home affairs issues should occupy a central place in the proposed European Conference and not be dealt with merely in the form of non-binding dialogue. Ministerial cooperation as part of the European Conference in the sphere of justice and home affairs should be conducted within suitable bodies at the level of the K4 committee and there should be regular coordination meetings of the Council's working parties with representatives of the participants at the Conference. In this context concrete forms of cooperation should be worked out and the applicant countries should be kept informed and take an active part in the development of the acquis. The issues of nuclear safety should also be included in all joint strategies aimed at the creation of greater security.

3. Conclusions

The Committee of Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs therefore requests the Committee on Foreign Affairs to incorporate the following points in its resolution:

1. Restates the position it adopted in April 1996 in favour of opening negotiations simultaneously with all the applicant countries in order to avoid dividing the latter into two categories;

2. Considers it to be an essential aim of the negotiations that all the acceding states should adopt the entireacquis and also be capable of implementing it so that after the expiry of any transitional periods an enlarged area of freedom, security and justice will actually come into being;

3. Points out that all the applicant countries are faced with an enormous - although not insurmountable - task in adopting the acquis in the areas of freedom of movement and justice and internal security and that the necessary support from the existing Member States will require an exceptional joint effort;

4. Considers respect for fundamental rights and the protection of minorities in the applicant countries to be a matter of crucial importance and calls on the Commission to give special urgency to solving the outstanding problems jointly with the countries concerned;

5. Calls on the applicant states which have not yet done so to abolish capital punishment;

6. Calls on the Commission, the Council, the Member States and the applicant states to give priority to all measures, including financing, which will create the conditions for the full attainment of freedom of movement in order to avoid lengthy transitional periods and to achieve the dismantling of controls at internal frontiers;

7. Considers free movement can only be limited for the briefest transitional period; any attempt to have a long transitional period would indicate that swift accession was not considered possible;

8. Emphasises, as did the Commission, that all the applicant countries are faced, to varying degrees, with the task of combating organized crime in all its forms, terrorism, trafficking in women, drug-trafficking and, of course, trafficking in children, and considers that an accession strategy must be established in the areas of freedom, security and justice to enable common problems in those fields to be tackled more effectively;

9. Shares the Commission's view that the setting-up of efficient institutions is a matter of particular priority in the sphere of justice and home affairs, and therefore calls for special programmes for all applicant countries, in particular for the purposes of human resources development and for training courses in the existing Member States;

10. Considers the setting-up of an efficient police force which is capable of taking effective action against organized crime while being committed to democratic principles is a priority task of the pre-accession strategy for all applicant countries;

11. Notes that the independence of the judiciary is one of the pillars upholding the rule of law and fundamental to the effective protection of the rights and civil liberties of all, including the citizens of the applicant countries and, in particular, those brought before the courts, and reaffirms its respect for defendants' rights, victims' rights and means of redress, and the protection of witnesses in connection with the fight against international organized crime;

12. Recalls that the European Council, as part of the action plan on the fight against organized crime, has issued a call for pre-accession agreements and for the ratification of all relevant international conventions;

13. Considers it urgent that all applicant countries should unconditionally ratify the Geneva Convention and set up asylum procedures which are in line with the acquis and EU standards;

14. Points out that nuclear safety is an important aspect of internal security and that measures must be taken immediately, including, where necessary, the decommissioning of power stations;

15. Calls for a specific, binding pre-accession strategy for all relevant parts of the acquis and of international law;

16. Emphasises that adopting and implementing the acquis on accession will represent an immense challenge for the applicant countries and, in particular, their administrative and judicial systems, and endorses the Commission's call for each applicant country to be required to submit a timetable for action to strengthen the institutions and the administrative and judicial systems which will be responsible for implementing the acquis in the context of the pre-accession strategy, with assistance from the PHARE programme;

17. Supports the proposal for the convening of a European Conference, which should serve, amongst other things, as a forum for dialogue on justice and home affairs issues, and proposes that at this Conference concrete arrangements for cooperation could be agreed and that the applicant countries should, through this forum, be actively involved in the further development and implementation of the acquis in the sphere of justice and home affairs;

18. Considers the amendments agreed in the Amsterdam Treaty on the establishment of an area of freedom, security and justice to be insufficient to meet the requirements of an enlarged Union in terms of efficiency, democracy and constitutionality and calls for a new revision of the Treaty in this area before new Member States actually accede to the Union.

O P I N I O N

(Rule 147)

for the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security

on the Commission comunication 'Agenda 2000' - For a Stronger and Wider Union (COM(97)2000 - C4-0371/97)

Rapporteurs: Mr Oostlander and Mr Baron Crespo

Committee on Budgetary Control

Draftsman : Mrs Eva Kjer Hansen

PROCEDURE

At its meeting of 16 June 1997 the Committee on Budgetary Control appointed Mrs Kjer Hansen draftsman.

At its meetings of 24 September and 21 October 1997 the committee considered the draft opinion and adopted unanimously its conclusions.

The following were present for the vote : Theato, chairman, Blak, Tomlinson, vice-chairmen, Mulder acting draftsman, Bösch, Bourlanges (for Bardong), Colom I Naval, Fabra-Valles (for Kellett-Bowman), Garriga Polledo, Giansily, Müller (for Holm), Redondo Jimenez, Waidelich, Wemheuer.

Terms of reference

Enlargement must be achieved while ensuring the maximum quality of expenditure from the budget throughout. This issue breaks down into a number of component parts:

- effective expenditure in preparation of new Member States for accession,

- effective expenditure in pursuit of EU policies following the accession of new Member States,

- legal, efficient and transparent management of EC funds before and after accession of new Member States,

- the protection of the financial interests of the Community against fraud and irregularity.This opinion is thus sets out the key points which, from the Committee's point of view, should condition the Union's attitude to the accession of new Member States.

It looks first at the requisite conditions in candidate countries, then at the measures to be taken by the Union to ensure they exist.

2. Candidate countries - requirements

Economic environment

The existence of what the Commission terms a "functioning market economy" in candidate countries is not simply a political and economic precondition for accession, but also a prerequisite of effective and transparent public expenditure from the EC budget. On the one hand, the question is one of ensuring a level playing field throughout the EU, with equivalent standards of free competition, "clean" business practices, etc., while on the other it is one of achieving equivalent effects with public expenditure in policy terms.

Legislation/"acquis"

In "Agenda 2000", the Commission puts due emphasis on the integration of Community laws into national legal systems. From the point of view of budgetary control, the importance of adequate and harmonised legislation, rules and procedures in fields such as competition, public procurement, customs, accounting and public audit and control is self explanatory. It is clear from the Commission's document that much progress remains to be made in all applicant countries before national legislation can be deemed sufficient.

Financial management - quality of administration

The Commission is to be congratulated for the emphasis it places (at least in theory) on the practical ability of candidate countries to apply legislation and administer procedures, rather than on the mere existence of such legislation and procedures. Experience shows that matching theory with practice is a bad enough problem in current EU Member States, let alone candidate countries.

The public administrations of central and eastern European candidate countries are, by broad consent, not yet in a position to manage Phare appropriations. Still less therefore can they yet contemplate taking over the range of administrative responsibilities involved in managing major EU programmes, such as the EAGGF or structural funds. Rightly therefore, the Commission lays great stress on ensuring that public administration is up to speed before accession takes place. This point cannot be overemphasised, as the damage to the credibility of the Union and its policies, not to mention the loss to taxpayers, potentially caused by ill-prepared and inefficient public services is incalculable.

Furthermore, as the Commission puts it elsewhere, "certain candidate countries ... face problems with corruption during the transition to full market economies"[1]. Indeed, given the extremely low pay rates in the public sector in most candidate countries (certainly as compared to potential earnings elsewhere), it is not surprising that corruption is a problem. Notwithstanding this, or indeed the fact that existing EU Member States hardly have clean consciences in this area, the EU must be certain that adequate instruments exist in applicant countries to dissuade, detect and sanction corruption and that the phenomenon itself is under control.

Public auditing and control

Effective auditing and control of public finances is a basic element in any democratic system and a practical prerequisite of sound expenditure, including that made by or on behalf of the Community. No mention is made of an effective public finance control function in "Agenda 2000". Though the notion is arguably implicit in the broad requirement that a democratic system be firmly established in countries acceding to the Union, this criterion must be made explicit and the effectiveness of public auditing and control be assessed before candidatures are finally approved.

Law enforcement and judicial systems

The Commission underlines the importance of the rule of law and the capacity of Member States to enforce it. However, as the recent Committee of Inquiry into the Community Transit System made clear, it is not only the existence of competent and well-equipped law enforcement services at a national level which ensures effective protection of Community financial interests, but their ability to work together with the authorities of other Member States and the relevant Community authorities. This applies to investigative authorities such as the police and the customs, where cooperation can be slow and ineffective, but also to the judicial authorities, where it is often close to non-existent.

Any assessment of a candidate country's law enforcement capacity should therefore not be carried out in isolation but within the context of a nascent European legal space. Moreover, close attention should be paid to the record of candidate countries in the repression of the activities of organised crime affecting Community interests on their territory.

3. Pre-accession measures

Phare

In financial terms, Phare is the Community's prime instrument for the preparation of candidate countries for accession. In its reorientated pre-accession form, Phare will be dedicated to public administration development and investment in the ratio of about 30/70%. Parliament should welcome both the priorities and the greater focus they should give to the Programme, not only because readiness for accession is of paramount importance, but because the fragmentation of Phare intervention over an array of unconnected actions has been one of its prime weaknesses.

As important has what Phare is spent on is how it is spent. Progressively, responsibility (including financial responsibility) for implementing Phare must be transferred to applicant countries as a prelude to managing Community funds in general. As this subject is covered in detail in a recent report from the Committee on Budgetary Control[2], there is no need to go into detail, other than to say that, in transferring financial responsibility, the Commission must also be prepared to impose conditions, enforce strict ex-post financial control and be prepared, if appropriate, to reallocate funding as necessary in accordance with candidate countries' ability to employ it effectively.

Other financial support

Agenda 2000 mentions two other forms of pre-accession support, in the EAGGF and structural funds. Here similar comments apply. When these instruments become available, they must be managed exactly as they are within the Community in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity.

Care should also be taken to coordinate the instruments. It remains unclear as to what the relationship will be between structural fund funding and investment under the Phare Programme. This is not an urgent question, but should be resolved before structural funds come on-stream.

Non-financial pre-accession support and cooperation measures

The importance of ensuring that the law enforcement agencies and judiciaries of candidate countries are able to operate within a European legal space makes immediate measures to enhance cooperation essential. UCLAF is already engaged in a range of contacts with the authorities of candidate countries, and is therefore in a strong position both to build up the necessary mechanisms for cooperation and to assess the state of development of the services in question.

Cooperation arrangements in the fields of law enforcement and justice pre-accession phase should be as strong as possible. The idea mooted by a High Level Group of Council for a "pre-accession pact on cooperation against crime"[3] should therefore be given concrete form as soon as possible. In a similar vein, cooperation between customs services, in particular the full integration of candidate countries into the forthcoming computerised transit system, must be enhanced.

4. Conclusions

In several areas, specific recommendations are unnecessary (democracy, market economy, the "acquis", public administration development) as the interests of budgetary control are by and large implicit in the wider pre-accession process. Moreover, detailed recommendations relating to the financial management of the Phare Programme are dealt with in detail in the recent report mentioned above. The following paragraphs thus relate to remaining areas specific to budgetary control only.

The Committee on Budgetary Control asks the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security to include the following paragraphs in its motion for a resolution:

a) Asks the Commission, within the scope of its declared "policy against corruption" to work with candidate countries to put in place policies and instruments which effectively dissuade, detect and punish corruption in public administration;

b) Calls on the Commission, particularly though its UCLAF unit, further to encourage and develop contact and cooperation between law enforcement agencies of candidate countries on those of current EU Member States and the Commission itself and to improve and simplify mechanisms for judicial cooperation; considers that the ability of candidate countries to offer full international cooperation in these areas should be an essential criterion for the assessment of their administrative and judicial capacity in the protection of Community financial interests;

c) Stresses that the ability of the customs services of new Member States fully to participate in the new computerised system for the management of the Community transit system is a precondition of accession;

d) Believes that the existence of effective and credible public audit and financial control institutions, able to work closely with their EU equivalents, must be a pre-requisite of accession to the European Union;

e) Draws the Commission's attention to its recent recommendations on the financial management of the Phare Programme, in particular the need for greater devolvement of financial responsibilities for the management of the Phare Programme to beneficiary countries in the pre-accession phase;

f) Emphasises that investment provided under the Phare Programme must be effectively coordinated with future assistance financed by the structural funds.

• [1] () "Communication on a Union Policy against Corruption" - COM(97)192
• [2] () Report on the Court of Auditors' Special Report 3/97 (PE 222.179)
• [3] () "Action Plan to combat organised crime" - Detailed action plan, recommendation 3 (C4-0199/97)

OPINION

(Rule 147)

for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy

on the Commission comunication 'Agenda 2000' - For a Stronger and Wider Union (COM(97)2000 -C4-0371/97 )

Rapporteurs: Mr Oostlander and Mr Baron Crespo

Committee on Institutional Affairs

Draftsman: Mrs Antoinette Spaak

PROCEDURE

At its meeting of 2 July 1997 the Committee on Institutional Affairs appointed Mrs Spaak draftsman.

It considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 22 July, 3, 22 and 29 September and 6 and 20 October 1997.

At the last meeting it adopted the following conclusions by 21 votes to 2, with 1 abstention.

The following were present for the vote: De Giovanni, chairman; Lucas Pires, Corbett and Berthu, vice-chairmen; Spaak, draftsman; Aglietta, Barton, Bourlanges (for Herman), Brinkhorst (for Haarder), Brok, Cohn-Bendit (for Ullmann pursuant to Rule 138(2)), Duhamel, Dury, Hager (for Vanhecke), Herzog, Lenz (for Capucho), Maij-Weggen, Manzella, Méndez de Vigo, Morán López, Neyts, Paasilinna (for Barros Moura), Rack, Saint-Pierre, Salafranca, Schäfer, Tsatsos and Voggenhuber.

INTRODUCTION

A. OBLIGATIONS AND RIGHTS OF THE APPLICANT COUNTRIES

The countries applying for membership have an obligation to comply with the conditions laid down by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 by accepting the acquis communautairein its entirety. They have the right to stability and peace in a stronger, wider Europe.

1. The challenge of enlargement

The inherent difference between the enlargement of the Union to embrace the new democracies of Eastern Europe and previous enlargements, particularly the most recent (Austria, Finland and Sweden) is obvious, bearing in mind the large number of applicants and, above all, the relatively recent establishment of a free market economy in those countries and the Union's more advanced state of integration when they join. Both the EU and the applicant countries are thus in a more complex situation. The negotiations on enlargement will start in January 1998, even though the Union has been strengthened only inadequately. This repeats the mistake made by the Lisbon European Council in June 1992, which decided that the accession of the EFTA countries could be achieved within the structures of the Union of Twelve. This decision was opposed by a majority of the European Parliament at the time.

As the report of the Reflection Group states, 'That enlargement is not an easy exercise. Its impact upon the development of the Union's policies will have to be assessed. It will require efforts both by applicants and present Union members that will have to be equitably shared. ... We must do it, but we have to do it well. The Union cannot tackle all the steps in that European strategy at once, but it does not have any time to waste. The Heads of State or Government have personally taken responsibility for agreeing on a European agenda for carrying out this plan, which will only become a reality if it finds democratic backing from Europe's citizens.'

In December 1995 in Madrid, the European Council decided that negotiations with those countries which had applied for membership would begin six months after the conclusion of the IGC introducing the institutional reforms which were necessary for enlargement to succeed.

The IGC was concluded in Amsterdam without replying to the challenge spelled out by the Reflection Group, namely to define the improvements which were needed to adapt the Union to reality and prepare it for the next enlargement.

At the Council's request, the Commission has drawn up a communication entitled 'Agenda 2000', to which the opinions on the various applications for membership are annexed. The document describes the prospects for the development of the Union and its policies beyond the turn of the century, the horizontal issues related to enlargement and the future financial framework beyond 2000 in the light of the prospect of an enlarged Europe.

2. Assessment on the basis of the accession criteria: who will join the Union?

It is obvious that all European countries who wish to join the Union, and who satisfy the criteria laid down by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, are cut out to do so. Each case will have to be examined on its merits during the negotiations. The Copenhagen European Council laid down three assessment criteria as necessary conditions for the opening of negotiations:

- democratic qualifications (respect for the rule of law, democracy and the rights of minorities),

- economic capacity (existence of a market economy able to cope with the forces of the Union's internal market), and

- the capacity to adopt theacquis communautaire (capacity to take on the obligations and to subscribe to the objectives of the Union).

The Maastricht Treaty added other conditions, such as the CFSP, EMU, the field of JHA and respect for fundamental rights which now forms part of the Treaty of Amsterdam (Article F). The application of the last criterion cannot be subject to any negotiation, since the Treaty of Amsterdam amends Article O to make compliance with Article F an explicit condition of accession. Where the economic aspects are concerned, none of the applicant States meets the conditions at present, but the judgment is that they will be able to in the medium term; this is an assessment of the future. With regard to the political criteria, the assessment is made on the basis of the existing situation and cannot be negotiated.

Six countries have been accepted by the Commission for the start of negotiations on the basis of an assessment of the above criteria: Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Cyprus, in the order in which their applications for membership have been submitted.

B. OBLIGATIONS AND RIGHTS OF THE UNION

The Fifteen have an obligation to ensure the effectiveness and credibility of a model, namely integration, with an institutionally 'strong' Union, and to meet the challenge, and the right to see that certain preconditions for accession are fulfilled.

The wider the Union, the more difficult decision-making will be. While the Union remains a model without precedent, the need to take institutional reform further has to be accepted in order to retain its means of action. The outcome of the Treaty of Amsterdam must also be evaluated, by attempting to see how far the factor of enlargement has been - or has not been - taken into account by the IGC. The Commission proposes fixing a date, and considers that a new IGC should be held as early as possible in 2000 so as to effect the reform concerning the reduction of the number of Commissioners to one per Member States before the first enlargement.

The speed of the process will essentially depend on the applicant countries. Their accession cannot be jeopardized by the Union's lack of political will to reform its institutions. The risks of this major reconciliation between East and West must be run, and the difficulties must be accepted and overcome.

3.The Treaty of Amsterdam and enlargement: only a commitment of principles

Your rapporteur is convinced that the Union's legitimacy is based on the effectiveness of its institutions. What legitimizes the EU is, above all, the practical impact that its rules have on people's daily lives. The Amsterdam European Council demonstrated clearly that institutional reform was no longer a priority. Other considerations preoccupying the governments prevailed over one of the priority aspects of the IGC. The Treaty of Amsterdam has thus postponed institutional reforms with a view to enlargement of the Union, particularly those concerning the composition of the Commission and voting arrangements within the Council.

The provisions which your draftsman considers to be of major importance for enlargement, from the institutional point of view, are:

- Article F: general principles underlying the Union - respect for fundamental rights as a sine qua non for any accession;

- theinstitutional protocol : number of Commissioners, weighting of votes in the Council, convening of a new IGC; your draftsman stresses the need to extend majority voting, which should become the general procedure used in an enlarged Community; this should only be approved if democratic legitimacy is strengthened by a reweighting of votes to achieve a better balance between large and small States.

4. What guarantees for institutional reform and what means of revision should be adopted, and what role should be envisaged for the European Parliament?

The protocol annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam states: 'At the date of entry into force of the first enlargement of the Union, notwithstanding Article 157(1) of the TEC, the Commission shall comprise one national of each of the Member States, provided that, by that date, the weighting of the votes in the Council has been modified, whether by reweighting of the votes or by dual majority, in a manner acceptable to all Member States, taking into account all relevant elements, notably compensating those Member States which give up the possibility of nominating a second member of the Commission.' Article 2 states: 'At least one year before the membership of the European Union exceeds twenty, a conference of representatives of the governments of Member States shall be convened in order to carry out a comprehensive review of the provisions of the Treaties on the composition and functioning of the institutions.' The question is whether it will be possible to keep to the postponed undertakings. The European Parliament has emerged as a beneficiary of the Treaty of Amsterdam by becoming a genuine co-legislator with the Council, but it failed to secure the right of assent to reform of the Treaties. The EP's role is to be the instigator of a new revision process, in which it would be directly involved and in which the Commission would have a right of initiative, with the aim of clarifying the choices to be made by European citizens, both in the West (initially) and subsequently in the East.

CONCLUSIONS

In the light of this approach, the Committee on Institutional Affairs calls on the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy to incorporate the following conclusions into its resolution:

1. Enlargement is vital for the stability of Europe, both politically and in terms of security; however, it will only be able to contribute to the political stability of Europe on condition that it is preceded by a fundamental institutional reform.

2. Points out that in its resolution of 26 June 1997 on the Amsterdam European Council the European Parliament expressed its disappointment 'that the institutional reforms, in particular the extension of qualified majority voting, are not sufficient for a future enlargement' and formally requested 'that a further reform of the treaties be adopted before any enlargement, in accordance with a more democratic and transparent procedure'.

3. The institutional challenges posed by the future enlargement of a changing European Union, following the end of communism and the start of the single currency, go well beyond the institutional issues referred to in the protocol annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam.

4. The Treaty of Amsterdam has not yet adequately settled the issue of institutional reform. A commitment in principle establishes a link between that reform and enlargement. A protocol annexed to the Treaty uses the so-called 'timetable' method to postpone the necessary changes to two subsequent dates.

5. The European Parliament supports the call made by some Member States for a further institutional reform before the next enlargement and invites the others to associate themselves with this move. In particular, it supports the declaration by the Belgian, Italian and French Governments linking enlargement to institutional changes, and declares its intention of considering its position on enlargement in the light of the progress achieved on the institutional front.

6. Bearing in mind the number of up to 11 new Member States, most of which are fairly small States, it is a matter of urgency to settle the extension of qualified majority voting, the weighting of votes and the composition and organization of the Commission, since these three issues are closely connected.

7. The new dimension that the Treaty of Amsterdam grants to respect for fundamental rights and the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice implies that the criteria for assessing the institutional situation of the applicant countries should include respect for the principle of citizenship of the Union taken in its widest sense, incorporating all the subjective legal positions recognized by the Treaties.

8. The question of the distribution among the Member States, in an enlarged Europe, of seats in the European Parliament, the number of which is limited to 700, must be tackled, using the system adopted by the European Parliament in its resolution of 16 June 1992.

9. The function and own resources of the European Union budget, and the way in which it is drawn up, must also be tackled.

10. The process of ratifying the Maastricht Treaty showed that citizens were not involved in that institutional acceleration. A public debate must therefore be launched, pointing out that enlargement, which is vital for the stability of Europe, necessitates institutional reforms, as well as financial resources targeted at raising public awareness, as part of the 'Building Europe together' campaign.

11. The present procedure for revising the Treaty has shown its limitations through its inability to link the process of enlargement to the requisite reform of the Union's decision-making capacity. Consequently, the European Parliament must initiate a political debate and give thought to the new European architecture that the forthcoming enlargements require, and to the most appropriate means of attaining that objective.

12. The method used for the next reform of the Treaty must be based on an initiative by the Commission and on the European Parliament being associated on an equal footing.

13. The European Parliament should work towards ensuring that the negotiations on enlargement quickly progress so far that the requisite institutional reforms to implement Protocol No 2 to the Treaty of Amsterdam have to be concluded as soon as possible.

14. The European Parliament should give its assent to any enlargement only after it has established that the institutional reforms undertaken satisfy the requirements of efficiency and democracy.

OPINION

(Rule 147)

for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy

on the Commission comunication 'Agenda 2000' - For a Stronger and Wider Union (COM(97)2000 -C4-0371/97 )

Rapporteurs: Mr Oostlander and Mr Baron Crespo

Committee on Fisheries

Draftsman: Mr James Provan

PROCEDURE

At its meeting of 21 and 22 May 1997, the Committee on Fisheries appointed Mr Provan draftsman.

It considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 23 and 24 June, 21 and 22 July, 3 and 4 September, 29 and 30 September and 7 and 8 October 1997.

At the last meeting it adopted the following conclusions unanimously.

The following took part in the vote: Fraga Estévez, chairman; Kindermann, Macartney and Souchet, vice-chairmen; Baldarelli, Burtone, Kofoed, Langenhagen, Teverson and Varela Suanzes-Carpegna.

INTRODUCTION

Seven of the ten Central and Eastern European candidate countries, as well as Cyprus, have a coastline with access to the Adriatic, Baltic, Black and Mediterranean seas. Their fishing fleets, although varied, are characterised by a similar structural dilemma to that pertaining in the present Union, in terms of over capacity. However, they also face additional problems with regard to the age of their vessels and in some cases, their legal and administrative arrangements. Nevertheless, your draftsman would share the view of the Commission that fisheries will not present an obstacle to enlargement. It should also be noted, that the Community maintains a positive trade balance in fisheries products with all the countries seeking accession.

CANDIDATE STATES WITH A SEACOAST

Without reference to the Commission's overall political and economic assessment of the suitability of their candidacies, the key features relating to the fisheries sectors of these countries are as follows:

- Bulgaria: Fishing effort is now limited to the Black Sea with 16 vessels, 5 of which are in private ownership, catching 2 500t in 1995. The six existing distant water freezer trawlers are currently laid up and may well be disposed of in the longer term. Aquaculture production from 20 state farms was 4 000t of mainly carp and trout in 1994. There appears to be no privately owned fish processing capacity. Bulgaria represents 0.08% of total imports into the Union and accounts for 0.34% of EU total exports of fisheries products. A complete overhaul of the fisheries administration is required in order to implement the acquis.

- Cyprus: The Cypriot fishing fleet is composed of 20 trawlers, about 40 swordfish vessels and approximately 500 in-shore fishing boats. In addition, aquaculture produces 500t mostly for local consumption. Fisheries structures and management are well adapted to those of the Union.

-Estonia : The fleet, which has been completely privatised, was comprised in 1996 of 31 distant water vessels accounting for 70 000t of mainly horse mackerel, redfish and blue whiting all of which is exported, 161 Baltic Sea vessels and 500 coastal boats under 12 metres. The total Baltic catch in 1995 was 60 000t, principally of herring, sprat and cod. Over half the fleet is over 20 years old. Aquaculture production of mainly carp and trout is 317t. Processing employed 8 000 people in 1994 with 120 private enterprises producing 102 000t. Estonia represents 0.15% of total imports into the Union and accounts for 0.13% of total EU exports. Capacity reduction and the establishment of a modern fisheries administration are necessary.

-Latvia : The current high seas fleet is 15 vessels, 13 of which are state owned, catching 70 000t of mostly sardines and horse mackerel in 1996, principally in Mauritanian waters. The Baltic and coastal fleet consists of 186 privately owned vessels, accounting for 72 000t of cod herring and sprat, which is under quota. The average age of the fleet is about 20 years. Aquaculture is dominated by 8 state owned concerns, presently engaged in restocking with a small but growing number of private farmers. There is also a significant inland fishery producing 500-600t per year. Processing is carried out by 34 private enterprises employing over 6 000 people and producing 54 000t of canned and 59 000t of other processed fish products. Latvia represents 0.06% of imports into the Union and accounts for 0.16% of EU exports. Modernisation of infrastructure and fisheries administration are the main requirements of the sector.

- Lithuania: The fleet, about half of which is over 20 years old, has been greatly reduced and now consists of 20 distant water vessels catching 30 000t and 64 Baltic vessels and accounting for 20 000t. All are privately owned. The processing industry, which is comprised of 54 companies, employs some 2000 people and produces 55 000t for exports. It is however, heavily dependent on imported raw materials. Lithuania represents 0.09% of imports into the Union and accounts for 0.34% of EU exports. Priorities for the sector include the modernisation of vessels and infrastructure, the improvement of management, quality and hygiene and the harmonisation of legal requirements.

- Poland: The applicant state with the largest fisheries sector, Poland's high seas fleet is composed of 31 modern large trawlers and 6 cold-storage vessels catching some 450 000t of mostly Alaskan pollack and trading mainly with the US and Japan. The fleet, which belongs to three state dominated companies, is heavily dependent on fishing rights agreed with Russia in the Bering Sea. The privately owned Baltic and coastal fleet consists of 403 vessels and 870 smaller boats, the majority of which are over 15 years old and underpowered. The fleet takes its full Baltic Commission entitlement to cod, but under-utilises its quotas for sprat and herring. Inland fishery production is around 36 000t of mainly carp and trout. The processing industry, which employs 12 000 people is made up of 500 generally small companies, only 50 of which meet EU sanitary and hygiene standards. Poland represents 1.75% of imports into the Union and accounts for 3.72% of EU exports. Some harmonisation with EU regulations has already taken place in the sector. However, restructuring of the fleet and the processing industry will be inevitable, while further modernisation of the fisheries administration is required.

- Romania: In 1995, the fleet consisted of 19 high seas vessels and 15 Black Sea coastal boats catching a total of 39 000t. Aquaculture production was 28 000t mostly of carp. The processing industry, which employed 1 700 people in 14 enterprises, produced 69 000t of which 30% came from the private sector. The Romanian fisheries sector is, however, undergoing a period of rapid change. Thus, the present size and ownership structure of the fleet and processing industry is unclear. Romania represents 0.02% of imports into the Union and accounts for 0.39% of EU exports. A complete overhaul of the fisheries administration will be necessary in order to implement the acquis.

- Slovenia: With its small Adriatic coastline, fisheries is of minor importance to the national economy. There are 10 vessels (6 large and 4 small) catching some 2 000t of mainly pilchard, anchovy and sprat. A total of 500 people are employed in the sector. Slovenia, which imports 15 times more than it exports, represents 0.05% of imports into the Union and accounts for 0.52% of EU exports. Modernisation of the fisheries administration will be necessary.

CANDIDATE STATES WITHOUT A SEACOAST

-Czech Republic : In 1994, production from inland fisheries was 22 600t mainly of carp. The Czech Republic represents 0.17% of imports into the Union and accounts for 1.31% of EU exports. It will be necessary to adapt to EU health, hygiene and environmental standards.

- Hungary: Total production from inland water fisheries in 1995 was 22 866t, mostly of carp. Hungary represents 0.1% of imports into the Union and accounts for 1.05% of EU exports. It will be necessary to adapt to EU health, hygiene and environmental standards.

- Slovakia: In 1995, inland production was 6 015t. Slovakia represents 0.01% of imports into the Union and accounts for 0.32% of EU exports. It will be necessary to adapt to EU health, hygiene and environmental standards.

COMMENTS

It will be clear from the above that almost in every case, the main priority in the pre-accession period will be the development and modernisation of applicant countries' administrative structures in the fisheries and aquaculture sectors. Such change is vital if they are to cope with the complex regulatory requirements of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). It will be to the mutual benefit of both the current EU members and the candidate countries if technical and financial assistance is provided to enable this task to be completed as rapidly as possible.

It is certain moreover that for most of the Central and East European states, fleet and infrastructural modernisation is also necessary. In some instances, this process has already progressed some distance as part of a transition to privatisation, in others considerable investment remains necessary. As we have witnessed the conversion from a centrally planned economy to one based on the market has often been a slow and painful experience. It is nevertheless an essential transformation which ought to be encouraged and which should be complete before accession. The Commission must give priority, therefore, not only to assist in restructuring measures aimed at reducing or rationalising capacity, but also to making the sector a more attractive proposition for private capital, not least through retraining.

At the same time, consideration has to be given to other means of alleviating the hardship of too rapid a change. Without obviating the need to scrap over capacity in the high seas fleets, the role of Third Country agreements will be crucial, particularly in securing new fishing opportunities, so as to provide a medium term breathing space to allow an equilibrium to be established at a human pace. The Commission must accept the responsibility for maintaining and improving the opportunities in this regard.

The eventual accession of Romania and Bulgaria into the Union would, for the first time, give the EU direct responsibility for the management to the Black Sea. This new responsibility would add a further dimension to the already deepening relations the EU has not only with Turkey, but with its rapidly developing relationship with Russian Federation and Ukraine. Not only would this network of connections make the EU a significant actor in the Black Sea, it could also involve the EU in future conflicts over fisheries and the worsening environment of the waters in which the fish live.

The Black Sea has long suffered appallingly from pollution, as it receives the drainage from almost half the land area of continental Europe through the Danube, Dnepr, Dnestr and Don, just to name the main rivers. As a result, in the last thirty years, the number of species supporting a commercial fishery has declined from 23 to just 5, despite the fact that the Black Sea is five times as fertile per square kilometre as the Mediterranean prior to the pollution.

Clearly the EU, given this new responsibility, would not be able to tolerate such a situation, whether out of concern for fisheries or the environment, both because the EU would be a contributor to the pollution (notably down the Danube) and would have to bear the costs of clearing it up. The Commission should therefore seek, at an early stage, EU involvement in the Bucharest Convention and in the Odessa Declaration process.

With regard to the Baltic, where enlargement will have the largest impact, the transition will be eased by the experience gained through working together in the Baltic Commission. The European Commission will take on the responsibility of negotiating on behalf of new Member States, just as it has more recently for Finland and Sweden. Provided that it carries out this task so as to provide for a fair and equal distribution of quotas based on historic rights, no major problems should be foreseen.

The processing industry, on the other hand, will present real if not insurmountable difficulties. Firstly, for many candidate countries the adaption process is likely to be as painful as that experienced by the fleet, in terms of social disruption. Secondly, for the existing Community, it is unthinkable that inferior health and environmental standards could be acceptable for any product free to circulate on the internal market. The frank admission by the Polish authorities that only 50 out of 500 processing enterprises in that country are currently in a position to comply with EU hygiene regulations, is an indication of the scale of the problem.

The Commission should envisage, therefore, a transition period for the processing sector whereby only EU approved processors could trade throughout the Community, with the list of licensed enterprises being progressively expanded as health and hygiene requirements were met.

Finally in respect of the tasks ahead, the Commission should not only understand when to take responsibility, but should know when not to take it. While providing every encouragement to the accession states to develop their fisheries, aquaculture and processing, it must also stress that small inshore fleets will be allowed to evolve under local management and with a minimum of outside interference.

CONCLUSIONS

The Committee on Fisheries calls on the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following amendments in its report:

1. Welcomes the Commission's contribution on enlargement of the European Union to include new Member States, including the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

2. Regrets that the Commission has made no practical proposal that would give the different sectors of the European fishing industry any hope for the future.

3. Regrets that the Commission has not evaluated the budgetary cost of measures to adjust the fishing industries of applicant states with a view to bringing them into line with the 'acquis communautaire', and has thereby undermined any hope of achieving a harmonious enlargement in the common interest of the countries concerned.

4. Welcomes the fact that the Commission has proposed a financial plan covering the period 1999-2006.

5. Calls for a specific sub-objective to be created within Objective 2 for maritime and coastal areas so that the common fisheries policy may preserve its financial instruments.

6. Recognises the urgent problems being faced by the applicant countries in achieving coordination with the CFP and calls on the Commission to stress these aspects in the accession negotiations.

7. Calls on the Commission to assist the new fleets and processing sectors in reaching the safety and hygiene standards required.

8. Recommends that all possible Community financial assistance be extended to the fishing sectors of the candidate states so that they can be modernised as quickly as possible.

9. Regrets the lack of complete and accurate statistical information.

10. Believes the environmental issues of pollution have to be resolved in the Black Sea so that a viable fishing industry can be reestablished.

11. Calls on the Commission to defend strongly all newly acquired third country agreements, to allocate on a just and fair basis TACs and quotas always regarding relative stability and historic fisheries performance.

OPINION

(Rule 147)

for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy

on the Commission comunication 'Agenda 2000' - For a Stronger and Wider Union (COM(97)2000 -C4-0371/97 )

Rapporteurs: Mr Oostlander and Mr Baron Crespo

Committee on Women's Rights

Draftsperson: Mrs Birgitta Ahlqvist

PROCEDURE

At its meeting of 22 May 1997, the Committee on Women's Rights appointed Mrs Ahlqvist draftsperson.

It considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 23 July 1997, 23 September 1997 and 20 October 1997.

At the last meeting it adopted the following conclusions by 13 votes to 3, with 1 abstention.

The following took part in the vote: van Dijk, chaiperson; Fouque, 1st vice-chairperson; Bennasar Tous, 2nd vice-chairperson; Torres Marques, 3rd vice-chairperson; Ahlqvist, draftsperson; Colombo Svevo; Garcia Arias (for Frutos Gama); Ghilardotti; Glase (for T. Mann); Gröner; Hautala; Larive; Lulling; Marinucci; McNally; Seillier; Sornosa Martinez.

I. EQUAL TREATMENT OF WOMEN AND MEN

AND ENLARGEMENT

This opinion shall exclusively concentrate on the broad goal of future enlargement and the objective of equal treatment of women and men, which must and shall take its proper place in the considerations on whether or not applicant countries fulfill the criteria for membership. There are perhaps more problems in this field than a first glance of "Agenda 2000" lets the reader assume.

The Committee on Women's Rights wishes to make it clear that it fully supports enlargement, in whatever form and at the speed the contracting partners will find it feasable to achieve. We can only support the political and economic criteria for accession laid down at the Copenhagen European Council, which should guarantee that the applicant countries are ready for membership. These would mean that the countries should have achieved such institutional stability that democracy is assured and that there is a guarantee of the rule of law and human rights. It is also important of course that applicant countries must, as a prerequisite, adhere to the acquis communautaire or, in a transitional period, be assisted to enable them to do so.

Due to the political systems under which all applicant countries were ruled until recently, the constitutions all recognised full human rights and equal individual rights both in the letter and also often in practice, even if citizens of the the Union's Member States did perhaps not always judge positively the level of equality enjoyed by men and women alike. It has been interesting to see that as most applicant countries have undergone the transition to market economies, horizontal and vertical segregation of labour markets and traditional signs of inequality have been quick to surface along patterns already known in the West: in particular women are hit faster and more severely by unemployment than men and, as far as can be judged, do not enjoy equal access to employment compared to men.

The Commission has worded this phenomen in a slightly different way, namely that though the CEEC's have highly developed policies in this area, the transition process has seen a serious deterioration, and policies in general are not adapted either to the conditions of a market economy or to comply with the the Union's social aqcquis and the social model of the Union. It would be fair to mention here that the social model of the Union has been strengthened considerably in the draft Treaty of Amsterdam. This agreement as well as the further transitional measures the CEEC's have to undergo, will put severe strains on the social cohesion of an enlarged Union. This committee fears that equal treatment policies will be one of the first policy areas to suffer if the utmost care is not taken early on in negotioations leading up to the various stages of full membership. History tells us that equal treatment, in all its aspects, is to be fought for most fiercely when economic difficulties hit the professional lives of men and women. This might be accentuated by the fact that the CEEC's have a far less organised and less fully-fledged social dialogue than that found in the Union, where many equal treatment issues are communicated, debated and decided. Further, this committee is extremely concerned that the CEEC's do not have sufficiently advanced legal systems to solve disputes should these arise, mainly because in many cases this will constitute completely new areas of dispute covering new practices.

II. CONCLUSIONS

The Committee on Women's Rights, while reserving its position on detailed questions and specific countries, therefore asks the Committee responsible to include the following considerations in its resolution on the general objective of enlargement:

1. Considers, in view of the fact that equal treatment of men and women was highly developed in the law of the central and eastern European countries until introduction of the market economy and still is to some extent, that it is essential for the accession negotiations to start from the premise that, as regards current European law on equal treatment for women and men, the applicant countries must have implemented this in full by the time of accession.

2. Is concerned that most CEEC's have quickly seen traditional signs of horizontal and vertical segregation on the labour market as well as a traditional division of female and male roles which run counter to equal treatment and equal opportunities; up to now, women have been hit harder by the processes of economic and social restructuring, and there is therefore a need to invest in adequate training that will enable women to be reintegrated in production processes that are more competitive technologically.

3. Considers that the acquis communautaire on equal opportunities for men and women must be imposed on the applicant countries and that in the negotiations respect for the application of the Treaty"s provisions (in Article 119) and current directives on the equal treatment of women and men must be one of the criteria for assessing the central and eastern European countries" state of preparation for accession.

4. Underlines further that integrating this policy (mainstreaming) must be an indispensable part of the assessment of the CEECs' readiness for adhesion and urges that this be built in where it is missing; urges, further, that no chapter of Agenda 2000 should be closed if any of the others remain open.

5. Proposes that considerable technical, legal and financial support be set aside for information campaigns, for setting up and supporting women's organizations, for including information on the rights women derive from theacquis communautaire, and for formulating, enhancing and setting up enforcement measures in the field of equal opportunities and equal treatment; in most cases these policies and how they are or can be carried out will break new ground in the CEEC's now producing and living in a market economy;

6. Underlines the importance of supporting and closely involving women's organisations and NGO's from the central and eastern European countries in designing appropriate communications and information campaigns on issues of equal treatment and equal opportunities, in particular areas where social partner structures do not exist or where these lack experience in settling agreements, in particular concerning equal pay arrangements.

7. Is concerned at the trafficking in human beings, particularly women originating in the central and eastern European countries, for the purposes of sexual exploitation in the Member States of the Union and considers that urgent measures need to be taken by the relevant authorities of the central and eastern European countries and the Member States, to stop this clandestine immigration from the central and eastern European countries for trade of this particular kind.

8. Insists that the political criteria for accession must explicitly include respect for the freedoms and fundamental rights of women; considers that there is a need to revise the Treaty of Amsterdam before enlargement to insert the fundamental right to equal treatment of men and women.

Delegation to the EU-Bulgaria Joint Parliamentary Committee

- the Chairman -

Dear Mr Spencer,

On behalf of the European Parliament delegation to the EU-Bulgaria Joint Parliamentary Committee, I would like to convey to you the position of the delegation concerning the Commission's opinion on Bulgaria.

As you are well aware, the beginning of 1997 was a very difficult time for the people of Bulgaria. There was a deep economic and social crisis and a brief period of political uncertainty, which ended with the holding of a general election in April. The outgoing Government was criticised both inside Bulgaria and, to some extent, by the European Union itself, for its apparent reluctance to deal with the immediate monetary crisis and to initiate substantial economic reform. The Government, elected in April, is pursuing the process of reform but, of course, these reforms are likely to pose further difficulties for the people of Bulgaria.

In spite of the political divisions in Bulgaria, there is a profound national consensus in favour of seeking accession to the European Union. This consensus has been clear at all the meetings of our Joint Parliamentary Committee, in spite of the changing majority in the Bulgarian National Assembly. The Government broadly accepts the Commission's opinion with regard to the need to continue with domestic reform, but is concerned that a decision to exclude Bulgaria from the beginning of accession negotiations, as proposed by the Commission, will send the wrong political signal to the country. I would also add that Bulgaria plays an important geo-political role in the region and has been an active participant in cooperation in the Balkan and Black Sea regions.

I would like to recall that already at its third meeting in Sofia on 24-26 July 1996 the EU-Bulgaria Joint Parliamentary Committee adopted the following in its Declaration and Recommendations:

"...the Joint Parliamentary Committee recommends to the European Parliament and to the Bulgarian National Assembly, to the Association Council, to the institutions of the EU and the Bulgarian Government to ...begin negotiations on the full membership of Bulgaria and all other applicant countries simultaneously, after the conclusion of the Intergovernmental Conference, in line with the principle of equal treatment, thus seizing the momentous opportunity for the European Union to contribute to peace, security and prosperity throughout Europe and to make the enlargement a reality." (Para. 10)

At its recent meeting in Sofia on 23-25 July 1997 this view was reiterated (Para. A and B) in the enclosed Declaration and Recommendations which were adopted unanimously.

The EP Delegation to the EU-Bulgaria Joint Parliamentary Committee, our colleagues in the Bulgarian National Assembly and the Bulgarian Government are well aware of the need to continue with the long and difficult reforms which Bulgaria has to undertake in order to be ready to assume the responsibilities of EU membership. This process has been initiated and enjoys the widespread support of the Bulgarian people.

The delegation to the EU-Bulgaria Joint Parliamentary Committee therefore strongly recommends that negotiations are opened simultaneously with all candidate countries. In the case of Bulgaria, this would send a clear message to the Bulgarian Government and its citizens that the country is now on the right road, and that membership is open to her as soon as the reform process has been sufficiently advanced.

Yours sincerely,

Nikolaos

PAPAKYRIAZIS

Delegation to the EU-Estonia Joint Parliamentary Committee

- the Chairman -

Dear Mr Spencer

I am writing to you on behalf of the Delegation for Relations with Estonia in order to communicate to you the views of the Delegation concerning the Commission Opinion on Estonia.

The Delegation fully supports the recommendation of the Commission to open negotiations with Estonia at the beginning of 1998. The Delegation considers this to be of utmost political importance, not just for Estonia, but also for all the candidate countries from the Baltic.

The Estonian economy is, as pointed out by the Commission, indeed strong and should be able to cope in due course with competition within the European Union. It is worth noting that Estonia is, at the moment, in per capita terms the second highest recipient of foreign direct investments amongst the candidate countries.

As you may be aware, the Constituent meeting of the EU-Estonia Joint Parliamentary Committee took place in Tallinn on 27-29 October 1997 and at that meeting we discussed with our Estonian colleagues all matters of mutual concern. We had an open discussion on relations with Russia. The European Parliament Delegation would therefore like to underline its view that Estonia has gone to great lengths in order to establish a border agreement with Russia. Our delegation strongly feels that Estonia's progress towards membership of the EU should not be held up by any unwillingness on the part of Russia to finalize the border agreement and that it would be quite inappropriate to accept any linkage between the issue of the border agreement and the situation of Russian speakers living in the country.

I enclose the declaration adopted at the end of the meeting in Tallin and would be very happy to discuss the outcome of the meeting in Estonia at one of the forthcoming meetings of the Committee Affairs Committee.

Yours sincerely,

Kirsi PIHA

Delegation to the EU-Hungary Joint Parliamentary Committee

- the Chairman -

Dear Mr Spencer,

I would like to convey to you my delegation's position on the Commission's opinion on Hungary's application for membership of the European Union.

The EU-Hungary Joint Parliamentary Committee, of which I am co-chairman, met in Brussels on 24-25 September 1997. During this meeting, the eighth of its kind, the Commission's opinion was of course the subject of extensive discussion and was well received by all the members, whether part of the European Parliament delegation or the delegation from the Hungarian national assembly. For your information I attach the recommendations adopted at this meeting.

The delegation of which I am chairman has always considered that Hungary is one of the most developed countries of Central and Eastern Europe, in particular with regard to political stability and the functioning of parliamentary democracy. As is shown in the Commission's opinion, it is also true that, after many years of far-reaching economic and social reforms, Hungary will soon be in a position to meet the two other conditions set by the European Council in Copenhagen.

Our delegation also agrees with the observations made in the Commission's opinion on the areas where progress still needs to be made, in particular the transposition of the acquis and environmental policy. We also consider that Hungary should continue its efforts to reduce inflation and the national debt. However, we do not hesitate to support the opinion of the Commission with regard to the opening of negotiations on membership.

Hungary should also continue its efforts to improve relations with its neighbours. This question is raised regularly during the meetings of our Joint Parliamentary Committee and we remain convinced that, whatever decision is taken on the opening of negotiations, the Union should continue to give encouragement to all efforts geared towards greater economic and political cooperation in this part of Europe.

The Committee on Foreign Affairs will certainly be interested to know that the government and parliament of Hungary are favourable to the Commission's proposal for the opening of negotiations with a limited number of countries. Our Joint Parliamentary Committee has not, however, made any specific recommendation on this subject as we consider that it is for the European Parliament as a whole to give its opinion on this fundamental question.

I remain entirely at the disposal of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to provide any other information which you consider necessary.

Yours sincerely,

Claude DESAMA

- Delegation to the EU-Latvia Joint Parliamentary Committee-

- the Chairman -

Dear Mr Spencer

I would like to, on behalf of the Delegation for Relations with Latvia of which I am the Chairman, inform you about the opinion of the Delegation as regards the European Commission Opinion on Latvia.

As you might be aware, the Constituent meeting of the EU-Latvia Joint Parliamentary Committee took place on 3-4 November 1997. The fact that the Delegation decided to hold the meeting before the ratification process is fully completed is a clear signal that we believe that Latvia deserves to be treated in the same way as the other associated states. The Delegation for Relations with Latvia recommends that the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy in its report urges the European Council to open negotiations simultaneously with the three Baltic States at the beginning of 1998. The Joint Parliamentary Committee felt that the simultaneous opening of negotiations would grant Latvia recognition for its achievements, as well as incentives to continue the reform process.

The Delegation is well aware of the reforms that still have to take place in Latvia, and the EU should support the Latvian Government and Saeima (Parliament) in this effort. Although reforms need to continue in several areas the Delegation considers that Latvia has made great progress in the last two years, and that Latvia is going in the right direction in this reform process. The administrative and judiciary systems need to be strengthened substantially, both through training and further resources and it is still unclear how sustainable the developments in the banking and financial systems are. The PHARE programme, as well as bilateral programmes on both state and regional levels should continue to support Latvia in her preparations for accession.

I would, once again, like to underline the importance of opening negotiations with Latvia at an early stage, and the fact that the European Parliament, as well as the European Commission, have always encouraged Baltic cooperation as part of the process of preparing for enlargement. Dividing the three countries into different groups at the opening of negotiations would be contradictory to thespirit of the Visby Declaration and the necessity to continue with regional cooperation in all possible ways.

I remain at the disposal of our committee for any further information you may require.

Yours sincerely,

Alfred GOMOLKA

Delegation to the EU-Lithuania Joint Parliamentary Committee

- the Chairman -

Dear Mr Chairman,

I am writing to you on behalf of the European Parliament's delegation for relations with Lithuania, which has recently participated in the constituent meeting of the EU-Lithuania Joint Parliamentary Committee. This meeting took place in Vilnius on 6-7 October and on this occasion members of the European Parliament and members of the Seimas of Lithuania had the opportunity to discuss with the political leaders of Lithuania, as well as with Mr Lamoureux, the Director-General of DG1A, the prospects for Lithuania's participation in EU accession negotiations.

The unanimous conclusion of our meeting was that Lithuania should be invited to participate in the accession negotiations, along with the other countries, at the beginning of 1998.

As the declaration which we adopted on this occasion points out, we fully realise that each set of negotiations will proceed at its own pace, and on the basis of the readiness of each applicant country to fulfil all the Copenhagen criteria for accession to the European Union. In the case of Lithuania, the criteria where further progress still has to be made are clearly in the economic rather than the political field. In spite of the fact that Lithuania still has a lot of ground to make up, we do feel that the wrong political signal would be given by introducing any differentiation at such an early stage of the enlargement process. Moreover, the idea of different starting points for the accession negotiations with different Baltic countries, seems to run counter to a whole series of declarations and EU initiatives in favour of regional cooperation in the Baltics. For your information I attach the declaration adopted at our meeting in Vilnius, and I remain at your disposal for any further information you may require.

I very much hope you will take our concerns into account when the Foreign Affairs Committee adopts its report on the Commission's "Agenda 2000".

Yours sincerely,

Niels SINDAL

Delegation to the EU-Poland Joint Parliamentary Committee

- the Chairman -

Dear Mr Chairman,

On behalf of the delegation of the European Parliament to the EU-Poland Joint Parliamentary Committee, I would like to express our delegation's support for the Commission's proposal to open accession negotiations with Poland at the beginning of 1998.

As you know, Poland has undertaken a series of substantial economic reforms, and whilst this process must be continued, there is no doubt that when the time comes Poland will be able to meet the criteria for full membership of the European Union. The very fact that there have been frequent changes of government in Poland in recent years is itself a confirmation that parliamentary democracy is fully established in that country, and I have no doubt that the new government to be formed following the elections in Poland on 21 September will continue with the economic reforms.

Our meetings in Poland have, however, identified a number of substantial problems, in particular with regard to the financing of social security, agriculture and environment policy, and our committee will continue to study these problems extremely carefully, and to press the authorities in Poland to carry out the necessary reforms in good time.

Due to the holding of elections in Poland in September, it will not be possible for the Joint Parliamentary Committee to express an opinion on the Commission's text before the Foreign Affairs Committee has to make its decision. It is, however, quite clear that our delegation fully supports the proposal made by the Commission with regard to Poland.

I remain at the disposal of your committee and will, of course, report to you after the next meeting of the EU-Poland Joint Parliamentary Committee, which we hope to organise in Brussels at the end of November.

Yours sincerely,

Ursula STENZEL

Delegation to the EU-Czech Joint Parliamentary Committee

- the Chairman -

Dear Mr Chairman,

I am writing on behalf of the European Parliament delegation to the EU-Czech Republic Joint Parliamentary Committee.

Our Joint Parliamentary Committee held its 6th meeting in Brussels on 7-8 October 1997, and it was unanimously agreed to support the Commission's proposal for the opening of accession negotiations with the Czech Republic at the beginning of 1998.

In the meetings of the Joint Parliamentary Committee, we have adopted a critical attitude with regard to the need for the continuation of economic reform in the Czech Republic and, in particular, earlier this year we did not hesitate to criticise the temporary action taken by the Czech authorities with regard to the establishment of an import surcharge. It is, however, quite clear that economic reform in the Czech Republic has made sufficient progress for us to agree with the Commission's conclusion that when the times comes the Czech Republic will be able to meet all the Copenhagen criteria for membership of the European Union.

Moreover, it goes without saying that the Czech Republic has achieved a remarkable democratic transformation of society, which will make the country not only a creditable member state of the Union, but a factor for peace and economic progress throughout the whole of Europe.

I enclose a copy of the recommendations adopted by the Joint Parliamentary Committee at its meeting in Brussels, and I remain at the disposal of your committee for any further information which you may require.

Yours sincerely,

Karl-Erik OLSSON

Delegation to the EU-Romania Joint Parliamentary Committee

- the Chairman -

Dear Mr Chairman,

I am writing to you to express the opinion of the delegation of the European Parliament to the EURomania Joint Parliamentary Committee, with regard to the Commission's 'avis' and to "Agenda 2000" in general.

As you know, we have an extremely active Joint Parliamentary Committee which has met five times with our colleagues from the Romanian Parliament, most recently in Bucharest on 24-26 September 1997. In spite of the major political changes which took place in Romania last year, what has been most remarkable from all these meetings has been the degree of continuity which characterises the overwhelming national consensus in Romania in favour of the objective of integration into the European Union. I very much feel that whatever action the European Union takes in the coming months must strengthen this European orientation, and not provide any discouragement.

It is clearly the case that Romania still has a long road to travel in terms of its preparations for EU membership. This fact also is widely recognised in Romania itself.

As you will see from the recommendations adopted at the 5th meeting of the Joint Parliamentary Committee, a number of specific areas will have to be looked at, in particular in the context of the pre-accession partnerships which have been proposed by the European Commission. These areas are the modernisation of the economy, the strengthening of public administration, the training of experts in Romania in European affairs and the strengthening of cooperation in the field of justice and internal affairs.

In order for progress to be achieved in such fields, Romania needs to be assured that the objective of eventual membership of the European Union is a realistic one. In this context, our delegation therefore strongly believes that Romania should be invited to participate in accession negotiations, along with all the other Associated countries, when negotiations begin early in 1998. Whilst the accession negotiations are bound to last for a longer period with Romania than with some of the other countries concerned, the introduction of any premature differentiation in the EU's approach would be extremely unfortunate and profoundly discouraging to all those striving to achieve modernisation and reform in Romania.

I would be grateful if you would take these concerns into account when the Foreign Affairs Committee finally adopts its report on the Commission's "Agenda 2000".

Yours sincerely,

Antonios TRAKATELLIS

DELEGATION FOR RELATIONS WITH SLOVENIA

- The Chairman -

Dear Mr Chairman,

I am writing on behalf of the European Parliament's delegation for relations with Slovenia which will become the EP delegation to the EU-Slovenia Joint Parliamentary Committee as soon as the ratification of the Europe Agreement will have been concluded in the national parliaments of the Member States.

The EP's delegation and a delegation from the Parliament of the Republic of Slovenia held their 5th meeting in Ljubljana today, and both delegations were unanimous in supporting the Commission's opinion to open accession negotiations with Slovenia at the beginning of 1998.

Our delegation takes the view that Slovenia is a well-established democracy with stable political institutions, rule of law and that the basic human rights are well respected. Furthermore, one can consider Slovenia a functioning market economy with a number of competitive sectors with considerable steps taken forward during last few years.

Our delegation, however, took a critical position with regard to the speed of reforms in the economic field such as privatisation, economic decision-making, denationalisation process and foreign direct investment. The state administration of Slovenia is also in need of reform and in order to be able to implement the acquis in a proper way.

The delegation supports warmly the Commission's recommendation to open accession negotiations with Slovenia whose EU strategy is widely accepted and supported by all main political parties in the country.

I remain at the disposal of the Foreign Affairs Committee for any further information which you may require.

Yours sincerely,

Michl EBNER

Delegation to the EU-Slovak Joint Parliamentary Committee

- the Chairman -

Dear Mr Chairman,

I am writing on behalf of the delegation of the European Parliament to the EU-Slovak Republic Joint Parliamentary Committee.

The next meeting of our Joint Parliamentary Committee will be taking place at the end of November. When the date of this meeting was fixed, we were well aware that it would be very close indeed to the time at which the European Parliament will pronounce on the Commission's opinion with regard to Slovakia, and on the general question of the opening of accession negotiations. We did, however, fix this date in order to give the maximum possible time to the Government and Parliament of Slovakia to respond positively to the concerns which have been widely expressed within the European Parliament and, indeed, throughout the European Union, with regard to the development of parliamentary democracy in Slovakia.

At the last meeting of the EU-Slovakia Joint Parliamentary Committee, which took place in Bratislava on 16-18 June 1997, it was possible, in spite of the difficult political situation in Slovakia, to agree unanimously on a set of recommendations. These recommendations (PE 223.036) are attached. In this text we attempted to establish a minimum set of conditions, whereby it might still be possible for the European Parliament to recommend Slovakia's participation in accession negotiations at the beginning of 1998. These recommendations concern the need for dialogue between the governing coalition and the opposition representatives, the role of parliamentary committees, in particular the need for opposition involvement in the special oversight committees which concern the secret services, and, finally, we recommended to the Government of Slovakia to bring forward legislation, in order to fulfil a commitment frequently stated in the past, in favour of a minority language law. At the time of the writing of this letter, I cannot inform you of any progress on these matters. However, it is not impossible that even at this late stage, some movement will take place in Slovakia in the coming months.

It is, however, unfortunately necessary to recall the European Parliament's resolution of 12 December 1996 concerning the suspension of a member of parliament, Mr Frantisek Gaulieder. The European Parliament protested at the manner in which Mr Gaulieder was suspended and, indeed, the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic supported his challenge to the ruling by the President of the Slovak National Council concerning his suspension. The National Council has still not reinstated Mr Gaulieder. This led to the cancellation of a meeting scheduled to take place in Bratislava between the President of the European Parliament and the Presidents of the Parliaments of the Associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe. A further urgent resolution was adopted by the European Parliament on 23 October.

From all this it is all too clear that the concerns expressed in the Commission's opinion with regard to the ability of Slovakia to fulfil the first, and most important, of the Copenhagen criteria are quite justified. It is, however, the profound concern of our delegation that Slovakia should not be indefinitely excluded from the process of enlargement, precisely because, as the Commission also points out, good progress is being made in Slovakia towards the fulfilment of the other criteria established by the European Council in Copenhagen. It is therefore our view that if the Foreign Affairs Committee and the European Parliament do decide to recommend a common starting point for negotiations with all candidate countries, it would not be appropriate to exclude Slovakia from the negotiations at this stage. Indeed, it is quite possible that the exclusion of Slovakia from these negotiations would actually exacerbate nationalist tensions inside Slovakia and further undermine political stability. It should, however, be quite clear to the authorities in Slovakia that there is absolutely no question of Slovakia being able to join the European Union with the ratification of its accession treaty by the European Parliament, and all the parliaments of the member states, unless substantial progress is achieved, and a fully functioning parliamentary democracy is established. Given the length of time that accession negotiations are likely to take, I have no doubt that when the time comes Slovakia will be able to meet all the criteria for membership of the European Union.

Yours sincerely,

Herbert BÖSCH

Delegation to the EU-Cyprus Joint Parliamentary Committee

- Chairman -

Dear Mr SPENCER,

The 12th meeting of the EU-Cyprus Joint Parliamentary Committee took place in Brussels on 6-7 October 1997. I enclose the recommendation adopted unanimously by the committee at this meeting.

It was a meeting of utmost importance as the committee was discussing the political situation in Cyprus and the current state of relations between the EU and Cyprus with Ambassador MISCHO, representing the Presidency-in-Office, Commissioner van den BROEK and the Foreign Minister of Cyprus, Mr KASOULIDES.

Another topic on our agenda was the discussion with Mr BERTENS, rapporteur of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy, on the application of Cyprus to join the EU and the European Commission's Agenda 2000.

It was the opinion of the committee that accession negotiations with the Government of the Republic of Cyprus should start as soon as possible and that the accession negotiations as well as the accession of Cyprus to the EU should not, under any circumstances, be linked to the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem. However, the commencement of accession negotiations in early 1998 and the accession itself will be beneficial for both communities of the island and will help to speed up a peaceful solution in Cyprus.

Yours sincerely,

Philippe MONFILS