Report - A4-0488/1998Report
A4-0488/1998
European Parliament

REPORT on the institutional implications of the approval by the European Parliament of the President of the Commission and the independence of the members of the Commission

8 December 1998

Committee on Institutional Affairs
Rapporteur: Mr Elmar Brok

Following a request by the Conference of Committee Chairmen, DT(d month yyyy)@DATE@the President of Parliament announced at the sitting of 14 December 1998 that the Committee on Institutional Affairs had been authorised to draw up a report on the institutional implications of the approval by the European Parliament of the President of the Commission and the independence of the members of the Commission and that the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights and the Committee on the Rules of Procedure, the Verification of Credentials and Immunities had been asked for their opinions.

The Committee on Institutional Affairs had appointed Mr Giampaolo D'Andrea rapporteur at its meeting of 25 February 1998..

On 23 October 1998 the Italian Government appointed Mr D'Andrea State Secretary in the Ministry of Cultural Affairs and, owing to the incompatibility of the two posts, he was obliged to resign from the European Parliament.

The Committee on Institutional Affairs appointed Mr Brok rapporteur on 23 November 1998.

It considered the draft report at its meetings of 22 and 29 September, 28 October and 23 and 30 November 1998.

At the last meeting it adopted the motion for a resolution by 14 votes to 3.

The following were present for the vote: Bourlanges, first vice-chairman; Berthu, third vice-chairman; Brok, rapporteur; Barton, Bonde, Brinkhorst (for Frischenschlager), Delcroix, Dell'Alba (for SaintPierre), Gutiérrez Díaz (for Castellina), Hager (for Vanhecke), Lööw (for Barros Moura), Méndez de Vigo, Rack, Schäfer, Schlechter, Spaak and Tsatsos.

The opinions of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights and the Committee on the Rules of Procedure, the Verification of Credentials and Immunities are attached.

The report was tabled on 8 December 1998.

The deadline for tabling amendments will be indicated in the draft agenda for the relevant partsession.

A MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

Resolution on the institutional implications of the approval by the European Parliament of the President of the Commission and the independence of the members of the Commission

The European Parliament,

- having regard to Articles 213, 214, 216 and 219 (ex Articles 157, 158, 160 and 163), and Declaration No 32 annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam[1],

- having regard to Rules 32 and 33 of its Rules of Procedure,

- having regard to Rule 148 of its Rules of Procedure,

- having regard to its report of 21 April 1994 on the investiture of the Commission[2],

- having regard to its resolutions of 17 May 1995 on the functioning of the Treaty on European Union with a view to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference[3], 13 March 1996 on the convening of the Intergovernmental Conference and an evaluation of the work of the Reflection Group and the definition of the political priorities of the European Parliament with a view to the Intergovernmental Conference[4], 10 December 1996 on the constitutional status of the European political parties[5], 19 November 1997 on the Treaty of Amsterdam[6], 16 July 1998 on the new co-decision procedure after Amsterdam[7], and 16 September 1998 on the modification of the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission - 'commitology'[8],

- having regard to the report of the Committee on Institutional Affairs and the opinions of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights and the Committee on the Rules of Procedure, the Verification of Credentials and Immunities (A4-0488/98),

A. whereas the new provisions introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht concerning the appointment of the President and composition of the Commission and bringing the Commission's term of office in line with that of Parliament provided the starting point for the changes established by the Treaty of Amsterdam,

B. whereas, under the new provisions, 'the governments of the Member States shall nominate by common accord the person they intend to appoint as President', 'the nomination shall be approved by the European Parliament' and that person therefore acts in the capacity of the person jointly responsible for forming the Commission,

C. whereas 'the governments of the Member States shall, by common accord with the nominee for President, nominate the other persons whom they intend to appoint as Members of the Commission' and whereas the Members thus nominated and the person jointly responsible for forming the Commission 'shall be subject as a body to a vote of approval by the European Parliament',

D. whereas the EC Treaty, as amended successively by the provisions of the Treaty of Maastricht and the Treaty of Amsterdam, by giving the European Parliament the power to approve the nominations under an 'assent' procedure (compulsory and binding), has introduced an important element of democracy into the Community institutions and requires Parliament to display the necessary determination in exercising its new prerogatives, by conferring on the Commission a mandate of trust, which must as far as possible be given substance in terms of policies and programmes,

E. whereas the need for strict respect of the new Treaty provisions concerning the nomination of the President of the Commission should be stressed,

F whereas the Commission President has been given a shared role in nominating individual members of the Commission and, under Article 219 and Declaration No 32 annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam, is required to play the very important institutional role, among others, of drawing up a programme covering the whole parliamentary term of the European Parliament,

G. whereas Parliament has called for greater powers of leadership for the President and an internal restructuring of the Commission with a view to adapting its structure and composition to its new tasks and to the needs of enlargement so as to maintain its collegiate responsibility and effectiveness[9] and whereas this is in keeping with the letter of the Treaty of Amsterdam,

H. whereas the increased powers, also in the legislative field, deriving from the Treaty of Amsterdam confer upon the European Parliament a new dimension in the decision-making process which will inevitably strengthen the political dimension of its relations with the Commission,

I. whereas the gradual elimination of the continuing political imbalance between the level of integration already achieved and the participation of citizens and political forces in the European process requires the forging of a clear, strong and public link, in keeping with the spirit of the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, between the choices made by Europe's citizens in the European elections and the nomination of the Commission President, with a view also to preventing these elections from being seen as little more than a national electoral exercise,

J. whereas the terms of this link should be determined in advance, given the political, institutional and regulatory implications involved,

K. whereas the amendments to the Treaty concerning the nomination of the President of the Commission can become the catalyst for fundamental changes in Community interinstitutional relations,

L. whereas the election of the President of the Commission not only means that choices must be made as regards the persons nominated, but also the structure of the Commission, its institutional commitments and its programme for the parliamentary term, and whereas Parliament's final vote of collective approval must be a vote of confidence in the body as a whole, on the basis of a positive assessment of the method and substance of its proposed actions and the quality of its relations with the European Parliament,

M. whereas the Commission would be in danger of becoming a weak body with too many national interests at stake, incapable of taking initiatives and overseeing the application of Community law and whereas only a president with great authority will be able to ensure that one of the Union's key institutions continues to play the politically dynamising role conferred on it by the Treaty,

N. whereas prior to the 1996 IGC, Parliament had called for the Treaty to be amended to enable it, like the Council, to request compulsory retirement of members of the Commission pursuant to Articles 157 and 160 of the EC Treaty,

O. whereas, although Article 213 of the Treaty of Amsterdam (ex Article 157 of the EC Treaty) on the conditions guaranteeing the independence of the Commission has not been amended, it must be strictly applied in order to provide firmer and more effective guarantees for one of the cornerstones of the Community's institutional order,

P. whereas Parliament's Rules of Procedure must be amended to take account of the new Treaty provisions,

I. Method of nomination and vote of approval on the Commission President

Considers that:

1. the person nominated as Commission President by 'common accord' by the governments of the Member States - whose policies and complexions differ widely and whose electoral terms are out of step with that of Parliament - must possess the personal and political qualities that will enable him to secure the support of a newly elected European Parliament;

2. it would be an important step of the political integration process if, during the campaign for the European elections, European political movements each proposed the candidate they would like to see appointed President of the European Commission; in such a way, the campaign would be focused on those candidates, which in turn would increase the visibility of the European elections;

3. the governments of the Member States should take account of the outcome of the European elections and the preference indicated by European political parties when nominating the candidate for the Presidency of the European Commission by common accord;

4. at the end of a period of detailed negotiations between the European Parliament and the nominee for President, at its first sitting after the elections, as far as possible, Parliament should hold a vote on the approval of the President nominated by common accord by the governments of the Member States. This vote should take place on the basis of the undertakings given by the latter with regard to the political guidelines he intends to follow in office, the quality of interinstitutional relations, the criteria he will follow when cooperating with the governments over the nomination of members of the Commission, and the timetable and methods for introducing institutional reform prior to enlargement of the Union.

II. Composition and internal reorganisation of the Commission

Stresses that:

1. a relevant number of the members of the Commission should be chosen from among sitting Members of the European Parliament and all persons nominated should have significant political, institutional and parliamentary experience in European affairs, with due respect in all cases for the balance between men and women and between political tendencies, on the basis of the approved programme;

2. the internal organisation of the Commission and the distribution of portfolios should be done in such a way as to ensure the unity of the Commission, the coherence, the coordination and the efficiency of its activity, without the kind of duplication and overlapping which occurred during the vote of approval on the Commission in January 1995;

3. in determining the procedure for Parliament to consider the conditions required for its overall vote of approval, Parliament should again organise hearings with individual Commissioners, whilst taking account of the shortcomings and inconsistencies encountered under the procedure introduced in 1995;

4. the European Parliament should be informed of any reshuffling of Commissioner portfolios by the President of the Commission.

III. Independence of the Commission

Stresses that:

1. the need to safeguard the Commission's role as protector of the Community interest, guardian of the Treaties and the only body with the right of legislative initiative, means that the concept of independence and the instruments needed for parliamentary supervision of such independence should be strengthened, including the possibility that the Council complies with any request of the European Parliament to initiate the procedure of compulsory retirement of individual Commissioners in accordance with Articles 213 and 216 of the EC Treaty (ex Articles 157 and 160);

2. the European Parliament must take care to ensure that the process of presidentialisation of the Commission goes ahead and that arrangements are drawn up swiftly to improve its internal organisation, so as to fully guarantee its independence;

3. further measures should be adopted, in addition to those already provided for in Article 213 of the EC Treaty, to strengthen the guarantees designed to avoid conflicts of interest created by the increase in the Communities' powers and deriving from personal links Commissioners may have with a wide range of interests. These measures should include in particular:

- the need for a public declaration of interests and sources of external income;

- the obligation to refrain from taking part in discussions relating to interests that are incompatible with their office;

- the use of a 'blind trust', i.e. assigning to a trustee the management of activities relating to property or finance which may give rise to conflicts of interest;

4. the guarantee of independence must also be extended to cover Commissioners' private offices and their composition, in order to safeguard the European civil service, since any renationalisation of the Community administration would seriously damage not only the functioning of the institution but also its ability to achieve the objectives of the Union,

5. it must be possible to hold Commissioners politically responsible for serious misconduct committed by their subordinates;

IV. Programme and timetable

1. wishes to see the reformed procedures for the nomination, appointment and approval of the President and members of the Commission give rise to a process that will begin with the European elections next spring and end by December 1999, so that the new Commission can take up its duties in January 2000 once the final vote of overall approval has been held;

2. takes the view that the Member State governments should ensure that the figure proposed by them as Commission President is capable of securing a broad majority during the vote of investiture within Parliament and that that person will have the necessary authority to carry out the duties of political guidance incumbent on him under the Treaty of Amsterdam;

3. requests that the nominee for Commission President should make a statement of intent, if possible, at the July 1999 part-session, followed by a debate;

4. requests that the Commission President discharge his responsibility pursuant to Article 214(2) in selecting the members of the Commission, drawing thereby on the full weight of his democratic legitimacy;

5. considers that the nominations for Commissioner put forward by the governments, in agreement with the President of the Commission, should be submitted by 1 November 1999 so that hearings can be held in good time by the parliamentary committees to enable Parliament to hold its final vote on the Commission as a whole during the December 1999 part-session;

6. recalls the significance of the hearings of candidates nominated for the post of Commissioner before Parliament's committees and stresses the importance of ensuring proper publicity for these hearings, which provide the vote of investiture with its full dimension and strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the Commission;

7. recommends that preparations be made for the rule changes needed to ensure that the institutional order and effective balance of interinstitutional relations described in this resolution can be fully achieved;

8. instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the parliaments and governments of the Member States.

B EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

The draftsman would like to thank Mr Giampaolo D'Andrea, who has been appointed State Secretary in the Italian Ministry of Cultural Affairs, for the work he undertook on this report for which he provided the major elements.

A. FROM THE TREATY OF ROME TO THE TREATY OF MAASTRICHT

The Treaties of the 1950s, and in particular the ECSC Treaty, made the 'governmental' role of the Commission ('High Authority') quite explicit. The Commission was unique among international organisations, principally because of the independence of the Commissioners with respect to the Member States which lay at the heart of the way in which it operated. Given that the European project had only just begun, the Commission's powers were extraordinarily extensive. The Treaties make it clear that the Commission is intended to play a major role, in particular by emphasising the Commissioners' independence with respect to the Member States, which effectively makes them the main agents of a 'European government'. The Treaties of the 1950s stipulate only that the Commission of the European Communities is composed of members appointed by the governments of the Member States meeting in the Council. Originally, therefore, the Commission gained its legitimacy exclusively from its appointment by the Council, without the European Parliament being involved at all, although Parliament was given the power to censure the college of Commissioners.

The European Parliament immediately recognised that the system lacked legitimacy, and very early on began to work on gradually promoting the idea of 'dual legitimisation' for the Commission, by both the Council and the Parliament.

Over the years, many resolutions have been adopted calling for the European Parliament to be given the power to hold a vote of confidence in the Commission, especially following the increase in the scope of the Commission's powers arising from the development of Community legislation and the resulting need for democratic scrutiny[1].

Following the Single European Act, the Commission experienced a major 'growth crisis', as a result of its powers being extended under the single market provisions. After the Treaty of Maastricht had been drawn up, the Commission therefore found itself at the centre of a great deal of controversy and was threatened with having its powers curbed and the role of the Commissioners brought back into the national domain. Despite many calls from the European Parliament, not even the Single European Act succeeded in formally setting out in the Treaties the Commission's accountability to the European Parliament, and the Commission continued to gain its legitimacy from being exclusively appointed on the basis of 'common accord' between the governments of the Member States.

At this point, pressure from the European Parliament for a reordering of interinstitutional relations once again became strong: in particular, the resolution on the constitutional foundations of the European Union, of 12 December 1990[2], although in many ways ahead of its time given the general direction that the process of integration was taking, put forward some interesting and thoughtprovoking ideas on the reform the Community. In order to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the Union, the resolution proposes, in paragraph 38, that: 'The President of the Commission shall be elected by the European Parliament on a proposal from the European Council; the members of the Commission shall be appointed by the President of the Commission; the Commission must obtain Parliament's vote of confidence; a new Commission shall be appointed at the beginning of each parliamentary term.'

Although, as has been said above, it represents a fairly radical option, the resolution quoted above underscores the importance of confidence in relations between the Commission and the Parliament, and it is one of the positive features of the Treaty of Maastricht that it gave substance to this relationship based on confidence: Article 158 of the EC Treaty, as amended by the Treaty on European Union, introduced five substantial innovations:

- The Commission's term of office to last for a period of five years to run in parallel with the European Parliament's term of office;

- Prior consultation of the European Parliament on the nomination of the President of the Commission by common accord of the governments of the Member States;

- The choosing of the other members of the Commission by the governments, in consultation with the nominee for President;

- Vote of approval of the President and the other members of the Commission, as a body, by the European Parliament;

- After approval by the European Parliament, the President and the other members of the Commission are appointed by common accord of the governments of the Member States.

In view of the new institutional arrangements introduced by the TEU, the European Parliament felt it necessary to carry out an assessment, which took the form of the Froment-Meurice report[3], of the innovations concerning the appointment of the Commission in order to define the stages, procedures and conditions under which the European Parliament would be able to exercise its powers most effectively. The Rules of Procedure were amended to reflect this (Rules 32 and 33).

Subsequently, the European Parliament's position on the reorganisation of the Commission and the appointment of its President was set out during the IGC in various resolutions which simply reiterated its position that 'at the present stage the number of members of the Commission must be at least equal to the number of Member States; notes that there is a consensus on strengthening the powers of the President of the Commission; insists that the role and independence of the Commission, and its right of initiative, must be maintained'[4].

Institutional reform (already made necessary by the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden) was postponed by the Maastricht Treaty until the IGC in 1996. The Reflection Group, which was given the task of preparing the negotiations at the Intergovernmental Conference, began its work in the expectation of being able, finally, to achieve the elusive goal of institutional reform. In order to achieve this aim, the European Parliament adopted the report on the functioning of the Treaty on European Union with a view to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference[5]. The achievements of Amsterdam, which were assessed by the European Parliament in its resolution on the Treaty of Amsterdam[6] represent a considerable success in the area being considered by this report.

B. THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM

The Treaty of Amsterdam amends the first and second paragraphs of Article 214 (ex Article 158) of the EC Treaty: thePresident, who previously was nominated by the governments after consultation of the European Parliament, is now nominated by the governments of the Member States by common accord, however the nomination must now be approved by the European Parliament; the Commissioners, who previously were nominated by the Member States in consultation with the nominee for President, are now nominated by common accord by the governments and the nominee for President. The provisions of the third paragraph of Article 214 (ex Article 158) of the EC Treaty remain unchanged. The President will therefore be subject to two votes of approval by the European Parliament: first, a vote to approve his or her nomination, and then a vote to approve the President and the other members of the Commission as a body. Although the Treaty of Amsterdam introduces the approval by the European Parliament of the appointment of the President, it does not give it the right to elect the President directly[7].

The Treaty of Amsterdam also adds, in the first paragraph of Article 219 (ex Article 163), that the 'Commission shall work under the political guidance of its President'. This change increases the importance of the President's role. It might be said that the Commission has been 'presidentialised'. The changes introduced by Amsterdam give the European Parliament a more active role since it is now called upon to vote to approve the nominated President, who in turn also acquires a more active role since he jointly decides on the nomination of individual Commissioners.

The first question to be asked here is whether or not this has created a relationship between the Parliament and the Commission that can be likened to the traditional government-parliament model, where the vote of approval by parliament is an opportunity to record a parliamentary majority which, as well as marking the investiture of the executive, involves a commitment to support its actions throughout its term of office. Even now, despite the changes, the relationship is still not a straightforward parliament-government one, since the authority that nominates the President of the Commission (the governments of the Member States) is independent of both institutions and is entirely free to take no account of the make-up of the European Parliament.

The aim of this report is to deal not only with the institutional consequences of what is new in the Treaty of Amsterdam, but also with the political choices the European Parliament must make in three essential areas:

- the election of the President;

- the composition, structure and independence of the Commission;

- the programme and the timetable for the appointment of the Commission.

I. Election of the President of the Commission

The European Parliament's new power to "approve", which is equivalent to assent (obligatory and binding), represents an important step towards making the process of integration more democratic. As a result of this power, the European Parliament is in a position to determine the thrust and maximise the content, in terms of policies and programmes, of the mandate given to the President of the Commission.

The President of the Commission:

- acquires a more active role and jointly decides on the nomination of individual Commissioners;

- takes on a major political role since the Commission is to work under the political guidance of its President;

- in accordance with Declaration No 32 of the Treaty of Amsterdam the President must enjoy broad discretion in the allocation of tasks within the college, as well as in any reshuffling of those tasks during a Commission's term of office; this reflects the frequently expressed wishes of the European Parliament.

The election by the European Parliament of the President nominated by common accord by the governments of the Member States, will be won or lost on the basis of the commitments the President makes in relation to the 'political guidelines' that will characterise his or her term of office, the quality of interinstitutional relations, and the criteria adopted in jointly deciding with the governments on the nomination of those to be appointed as members of the Commission. It follows, therefore, that in the event of any reshuffling of portfolios by the President (as provided for in Declaration No 32), the European Parliament will have to be kept informed.

The debate on the appointment of the future President of the Commission should enable the two institutions to reach agreement on what should be a programme focusing, in particular, on institutional reform and the timetable and the methods to be used to ensure that reform is introduced prior to enlargement.

II. Composition, structure and independence of the Commission

The Treaty of Amsterdam does not amend Article 213 of the EC Treaty (ex Article 157). It does not alter the composition of the Commission, and the protocol 'on the institutions with the prospect of enlargement of the European Union' postpones the settlement of this issue until the next round of institutional reforms. Nor does it say anything about the criteria of 'general competence' and 'independence', which it is essential for Parliament to be able to interpret, despite the fact that the amendments made to Article 214 (ex Article 158) of the EC Treaty and to Article 219 (ex Article 163) further increase the need to ensure that these conditions are met. In January 1995, the entire procedure of approving the Commission was carried out in a somewhat experimental fashion. A number of weaknesses and a degree of overlapping have emerged in the organisational structure that has been proposed for the new Commission, particularly in the areas of equal opportunities, human rights, development policy and foreign affairs. It is for this reason that it will be important to be able to influence the internal organisation of the Commission and the allocation of portfolios, by using, among other things, Declaration No 32 annexed to the Treaty. The provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam suggest that there are grounds for concluding that we may be moving:

(i) Towards an improved internal organisation of the Commission

In other words, although the President's freedom to allocate portfolios as he sees fit must be fully respected, as must the Commission's freedom to make decisions on its internal organisation, the European Parliament should nevertheless ensure that the allocation of portfolios makes political and administrative sense. One further issue, which is linked to the question of organisation but which also arises from the need to safeguard independence, is the importance of the Commissioners' private offices and their composition and the Commissioner's relationship to his services. Renationalising the Community's civil service would seriously undermine not just the workings of the institution but also the Union's ability to achieve its goals. The Member States should keep their involvement in the Commission's personnel policy to a minimum. The back-door recruitment of officials from national civil services must be cut back and, above all, there is a need to reduce the number of officials from outside the Commission given posts in individual private offices who are often of the same nationality as the Commissioner.

(ii) Towards a genuine guarantee of independence for the Commission

There is no doubt that the independence of the Commission and its members constitutes an essential component of the institutional balance of the Union. The purpose of the 'guarantee of independence' is to ensure that a Commissioner's duties are performed in the general interest of the Community. The whole question of the independence of the Commission is governed by Article 213(2) (ex Article 157) of the EC Treaty. In order to safeguard the Commission as the motor that promotes the Community interest, the guardian of the Treaties, and the exclusive holder of the right of legislative initiative, all characteristics which strengthen its position and give it wide-ranging autonomy, the concept of independence needs to be strengthened and the European Parliament must possess the means to monitor the Commission's actions. Article 216 (ex Article 160) of the EC Treaty states that a member of the college can be declared to have been guilty of serious misconduct only on application by the Council or the Commission (in its resolution of 17 May 1995 the European Parliament called for it to 'be able, like the Council, to request compulsory retirement of individual Commissioners'). The European Parliament will therefore play a fundamental role in ensuring respect for the conditions it deems appropriate to guarantee the independence of individual Commissioners. The need for such independence is ever greater as the Union's field of influence grows in a wide range of sectors. The potential for conflicts of interest, which were thought previously to be confined to relationships with national governments, has now spilled over into other areas and derives from the personal links Commissioners may have with a wide range of interests over which they are able to exert a vast influence in the performance of their duties. Although the EC Treaty states in Article 213 (ex Article 157) that each Member State undertakes to respect the principle of independence and not to seek to influence the members of the Commission in the performance of their tasks, the increase in the scope of the Community's powers means that the guarantee of the Commission's independence must cover not only relations with governments but also any possible conflicts of interest.

The law deals with conflicts of interest in different ways in various European and non-European legislations. Broadly speaking, the United States can be said to be the country where the debate on conflicts of interest is most extensive and far-reaching, where there is public concern about the ethical dimension of government. The cornerstone of the American system is the 1978 Ethics in Government Act which sets out rules that apply, subject to the necessary distinctions, to representatives and officials of the legislature. These rules can be summarised under the following headings:

- requirement to publicly declare assets, interests and outside income;

- requirement to refrain from taking part in discussions that involve matters in which the individual has an overriding personal interest;

- large number of bodies whose task it is to monitor and to prevent situations occurring in which conflicts of interest may arise;

- rules restricting the right to take up jobs and positions in the period after a particular public office has been held;

- use of 'blind trusts'[8].

The constitutions of a number of European Union countries include, normally in the section on government, provisions stipulating that the holding of government offices is incompatible with other offices, mainly at constitutional level. Others include provisions to the effect that government office is incompatible with more general public or private activities. Such rules can avert possible conflicts of interest, but essentially reflect requirements of an institutional nature, such as the need:

- to ensure professionalism and commitment to the work of government;

- to prevent concentrations of institutional and economic power;

- to stress the universal nature of the task of political leadership.

The European Parliament must therefore work to improve the internal organisation of the Commission and to ensure that there is a genuine guarantee of independence for the Commission by defining what is meant by conflicts of interest, which were previously confined to relations with national governments. As a result of the widening of the scope of the Community's powers, conflicts of interest may arise in other contexts and derive from the personal links Commissioners may have with a wide range of interests over which they are able to exert a vast influence in the performance of their duties. It follows from this that there should be:

- the need for a public declaration of interests and sources of external income;

- the obligation to refrain from taking part in discussions relating to interests that are incompatible with their office;

- the use of a 'blind trust', i.e. assigning to a trustee the management of activities relating to property or finance which may give rise to conflicts of interest.

III. Work programme

The problem of how to influence the interpretation of the Commission's institutional role also arises in connection with the new scope for initiative given to the European Parliament with regard to such matters as the process of treaty revision, institutional reform, enlargement, the implementation of new legislative procedures, interinstitutional agreements and so on. These issues are likely to be dealt with when the Commission submits its work programme, over which the European Parliament can exert some influence by using the vote of approval. This work programme must involve an evaluation of the Commission's programme of action for the five years of its term of office. The European Parliament has two opportunities to exert its influence:

- the election of the President

- the vote of approval of the college.

A further possibility that might be considered would be to introduce a procedure for the approval of individual Commissioners, prior to the vote of approval of the college, that might involve arrangements that would eliminate the risk of the misuse of procedure (tacit assent, on the basis of a qualified or super-qualified majority etc.). In any event, in order for the European Parliament's appointment procedure not to be reduced simply to a parade of potential candidates and to ensure that it focuses on policy rather than on personalities, the Commission must draw up its draft programme before, and not after, the hearings. The final vote of approval by the European Parliament should express confidence both in the college as a whole and in a clearly defined programme.

C. AFTER AMSTERDAM: BUILDING A EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY

I. The European Parliament's position on the nomination of the President of the Commission and the European elections

The changes made by the Treaty of Amsterdam may prove to have a considerable impact on making the European Union a concrete reality for citizens and considerably reduce the 'democratic deficit' which continues to exist alongside the gradual advances in the process of integration. From next spring a new phase will begin in European democratic life, with the attempt to give the European Union itself a democratic dimension at least equivalent to that provided by the various national systems in the areas of Community competence that are subject to a gradual transfer of sovereignty. One of the major changes introduced by Amsterdam is the more active role given to the European Parliament, which is now called on to take a dual vote of approval, and to the nominee for President, who acquires a role in deciding on the nomination of individual Commissioners. The debate that has taken place over recent months has brought into focus how useful it might be to link the new arrangements for appointing the President of the Commission more closely with the European elections, not simply in order to arouse public interest and to encourage citizens, who often regard the European Parliament elections, at best, simply as a national election, to take part in the elections, but also because there is a widely felt need to counterbalance the powerful role the European Central Bank will have in monetary union by politicising the relationship between the European Parliament and the European Commission.

Of the various proposals that have been put forward the most innovative one has come from the European committee of the 'Our Europe' foundation, coordinated by Jacques Delors, which has suggested that each European political party should say, during the European Parliament election campaign, which candidate for President of the Commission it supports and undertake to support the candidate through their respective political groups. The basic idea behind the proposal is that if the names of the candidates were already known in advance the choice of President of the Commission would become a European election campaign issue, which would make the elections politically more interesting and end the public's indifference, caused by the fact that the European elections have not until now had anything to do with choosing a government for Europe, as is the case in national election campaigns more or less everywhere. The re-evaluation of the role of the President of the Commission effected by the Treaty of Amsterdam, would take the form of a even wider democratic legitimisation, giving citizens the opportunity to take part in choosing the future President: the current procedure would basically be replaced by a 'trial', during which candidates would be judged on the basis of their ability to form a parliamentary majority. Even though the final choice of President would, in any case, depend on the 'common accord' of the governments of the Member States, the governments would not dare to refuse to appoint a candidate who, after running a convincing election campaign, was capable of attracting the support of a majority of the European Parliament.

Following the hearing held by the Committee on Institutional Affairs on 29 September 1998[9] and the debate within the 'SOS Europe' Intergroup, the rapporteur notes that there is broad agreement on the need to link the European elections closely to the appointment of the President of the Commission. However, there is also a concern to take account of the special nature of the European Union, which is at once a Union of peoples and a Union of states, with an institutional architecture that reflects this fact. The rapporteur therefore supports the idea of leaving it up to governments to propose, by common accord, the candidate, or preferably, the candidates, for the presidency. It would be an important step of the political integration process if the European political parties were to spell out their own position on the candidates proposed and state the conditions under which they are supporting a particular candidate.

These arrangements would force governments to bring forward the implementation of their strategies relating to the future Commission by several months, which would help to make the composition and the presidency of the Commission a public and concrete election campaign issue. It would bestow a clear political legitimacy on the President and the entire Commission that would be relatively uniform across the Union.

It is also proposed that a relevant number of the members of the Commission be chosen from within the ranks of the newly elected European parliamentarians who have experience of office in the area of European affairs, and that there should be an equal balance between men and women and between the democratic political tendencies.

D. TIMETABLE

The rapporteur proposes the following timetable for 1999:

July: declaration of intent by the candidate for the presidency followed by discussion and, if possible, vote

November: hearing of candidates for Commissioner by parliamentary committees

December: final vote by European Parliament on entire college

E. CONCLUSIONS

The European Parliament has on several occasions expressed its disappointment at the limited scope of the progress made on institutional reform at Amsterdam. It had hoped for a bolder initiative, at least equal to the expectations created by a number of views expressed in the debate leading up to the IGC. The European Parliament concurred with the formal reservations expressed by the governments of Belgium, France and Italy at the Amsterdam European Council, and pointed to the need to go beyond the intergovernmental method and to move towards the Community method, which it regarded as the decisive step to be taken to ensure that future Treaty revisions, which must precede any enlargement of the Union, will be more effective. However, the changes that have been introduced have now opened up important avenues which must be fully explored. The aim should be to involve 'European citizens', as provided for by citizenship provisions of the EC Treaty, as directly as possible in the process of integration in order to further the goal of a united federal Europe. This goal, which lay at the heart of the far-sighted and courageous decisions made by the founding fathers, must remain our cause and that of future generations of Europeans.

  • [1] () See the two working documents by Mr D'Andrea: PE 226.877, of 14 May 1998, on the institutional implications of the approval by the European Parliament of the President of the Commission and the independence of the members of the Commission, and PE 211.534, of 12 January 1995, on the composition and structure of the Commission.
  • [2] () Resolution A3-301/90, OJ C 19, 28.1.1991
  • [3] () Resolution A3-0240/94, of 21 April 1994, OJ C 128, 9.5.1994, p. 358-360.
  • [4] () B4-0040/97, of 16 January 1997, OJ C 33, 3.2.1997, p. 63-73, paragraphs 42-43.
  • [5] () Resolution A4-0102/95, of 17 May 1995, OJ C 151, 19.5.1995.
  • [6] () Resolution A4-0347/97, of 19 November 1997, OJ C 371, 8.12.1997.
  • [7] () A4-0102/95/Part III, (PE 212.450/fin./Part III, p. 112-115.)
  • [8] () This is a legal arrangement under which an individual's property and financial assets are managed by a trustee in order to avoid conflicts of interest. Although it is not a legal requirement, this arrangement has been used by all the presidents of the United States since Carter.
  • [9] () The following took part: Carlo Trojan, Secretary-General of the European Commission, David Williamson, former Secretary-General of the European Commission, and Peter Sutherland, former Commissioner.

MINORITY OPINION

(Rule 136(10))

by Mr Georges Berthu (I-EDN)

vice-chairman of the Committee on Institutional Affairs

The majority of the committee members wish to make the new provisions set out in the Amsterdam Treaty (which has not yet been ratified by all the Member States) 'the catalyst for fundamental changes in Community interinstitutional relations'. In particular, basing their arguments on the amendments to Articles 158(2) (appointment of the President and Members of the Commission) and 163 (political guidelines laid down by the Commission), they twist the Treaty into appearing to uphold a change which, quite plainly, has not been clearly endorsed by anyone. This involves the gradual transformation of the Commission into a sort of government of the Union, invested by Parliament on the basis of a programme of 'political guidelines' which reflects the results of the last European elections.

We believe that this interpretation ignores the real nature of the Union and goes beyond the terms of the Amsterdam Treaty, which, despite its ambiguities, leaves the Council the right of initiative in choosing the nominees for the Commissioners' posts and the power to finally appoint the new Commission (Article 214 of the new EC Treaty). These provisions should also be viewed in the light of the Treaty as a whole, which leaves the Member States the most important role, both under Article D (Article 4 of the new EC Treaty), which entrusts the European Council with responsibility for providing the Union with the necessary impetus and defining the general political guidelines thereof, and Article 145 (Article 202 of the new EC Treaty), which gives the Council the power to take decisions, coordinate economic policies, and confer implementing powers on the Commission.

Therefore, notwithstanding the federalists' eagerness to exploit the new Amsterdam provisions to their own ends (which was only to be expected), we are firmly convinced that the Council should retain its pivotal role in accordance with the general thrust of the Treaty and the Union's status as an association of States. In fact, we should like to consolidate this role by making the Commission itself accountable to the Council.

Lastly, the idea of the 'Commission's independence', on which the report lays great emphasis, is, in our view, extremely ambiguous. Although we agree that the Commission's independence vis-à-vis pressure groups should be enhanced (and, indeed, have tabled amendments seeking to ensure this), we do not believe it to be of the least use vis-à-vis the democratically elected governments meeting within the Council. We would therefore like to see the Commission's existing privileges (monopoly on initiative, discretionary powers, etc.) actually reduced, since we feel them to be excessive.

27 October 1998

OPINION

(Rule 147)

for the Committee on Institutional Affairs

on the institutional implications of the approval by the European Parliament of the President of the Commission and the independence of the members of the Commission (report by Mr Brok)

Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights

Draftsman: Mr Georgios Anastassopoulos

PROCEDURE

At its meeting of 17 March 1998 the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights appointed Mr Anastassopoulos draftsman.

It considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 13 October 1998 and 27 October 1998.

At the last meeting it adopted the following conclusions by 17 votes to 0, with 1 abstention.

The following were present for the vote: De Clercq, chairman; Palacio Vallelersundi, vice-chairman; Anastassopoulos, draftsman; Añoveros Trias de Bes (for Casini C.), Berger, Buffetaut, Falconer (for Martin D.), Florio, Habsburg-Lothringen (for Cassidy), Janssen van Raay, Medina Ortega, MosiekUrbahn, Nassauer (for Lehne), Sierra González, Thors, Ullmann and Verde i Aldea.

1. INTRODUCTION

The Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights has been asked for its opinion on the report of the Committee on Institutional Affairs on the institutional implications of the approval by the European Parliament of the President of the Commission and the independence of the members of the Commission. The issue arises following the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam and, in particular, changes to Articles 158 and 163 of the EC Treaty (respectively Articles 214 and 219 of the consolidated Treaty on European Union).

It should be pointed out that, at the same time, the Committee on the Rules of Procedure, the Verification of Credentials and Immunities has been instructed to draw up proposed amendments to Parliament's Rules of Procedure[1]. This work is now underway and, in principle, the corresponding amendments will be adopted at the January part-session and will come into force at the same time as the Treaty of Amsterdam.

The changes made in the Treaty of Amsterdam supplement those introduced by the Maastricht Treaty: the five-year Commission mandate being brought into line with Parliament's term of office; prior consultation of Parliament on the nomination of the President of the Commission; selection of the other members of the Commission in consultation with the nominee for President; overall vote by Parliament approving the President and other members of the Commission; subsequent appointment of the President and the Commission by common accord of the governments of the Member States. Furthermore, through its Rules of Procedure Parliament has introduced a procedure for hearing Commission nominees whereby they appear before parliamentary committees according to their prospective field of responsibility (Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure). Initial experience with these hearings at the beginning of the present electoral period proved highly positive and enabled Parliament to strengthen its prerogatives; it is important to ensure that hearings proceed smoothly and receive appropriate publicity.

2. INSTITUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW TREATY PROVISIONS

While strictly respecting the provisions of the Treaty, a review should be made of their implementation and of the questions which might arise. Your draftsman takes the view that the Treaty of Amsterdam entails two significant adjustments to the institutional balance:

- Strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the Commission. The legitimacy of the Commission has been strengthened under the new rules laid down in the Treaty. This is a dual legitimacy: it emanates from the Member States which intervene on two occasions, in the appointment of the Commission President and in the appointment of the college itself; it also emanates from the peoples of Europe represented within Parliament, which also intervenes on two occasions to approve the person chosen as prospective president and to issue a vote of confidence in the Commission as a college.

One innovation is a strengthening of the role of the president-designate of the Commission - who is no longer merely 'consulted' on the nomination of the other members of the college by the Member State governments, but who participates in the nomination of the other members of the college 'by common accord' with the Member States.

- The 'presidentialisation' of the Commission. The status of the Commission President has been strengthened not only in terms of the procedure for appointing the Commission but also in its functioning. The new provisions of Article 163 of the EC Treaty (Article 219 of the consolidated Treaty) strengthen the role of the Commission President by entrusting him with the task of political guidance[2]. Declaration No. 32 annexed to the Final Act of the Treaty of Amsterdam states that 'the President of the Commission must enjoy broad discretion in the allocation of tasks within the college, as well as in any reshuffling of those tasks during a Commission's term of office'. Through these new provisions, the President will become a genuine head of the executive with distinct prerogatives[3]. Nevertheless, the Commission President has not been granted the power to dismiss a Commissioner.

However, there are a number of points where the new Treaty has made no fundamental changes and the principles which currently apply are upheld. These are:

- The collegiate nature of the Commission. The special function of the President, who provides guidance within the college, has implications for the principle of Commission collegiality, but otherwise the principle is upheld. The vote of investiture is an overall vote and a motion of censure entails the collective dismissal of the Commission[4]. The college of Commissioners represents the formal nomination of an institution[5]. Parliament has called for it to be made possible to censure an individual Commissioner, in particular in its resolution concluding the work of the Committee of Inquiry into BSE. The Commission has consistently opposed such a possibility, invoking the principle of collegiality[6]. Parliament's proposal for individual censure of Commissioners by Parliament had also been put forward by some members of the Reflection Group on reform of the Treaty[7] but was not taken on board by the Intergovernmental Conference.

- The Commission is not a government with the task of implementing the policy of a parliamentary majority. Under the present Treaty, the Commission differs from a national government in that, inter alia, it is not backed by a majority parliamentary group or a majority coalition. The major European political families - corresponding to the main political groups in the European Parliament - are represented within it. The members of the Commission are invested by the European Parliament but proposed by the national governments in line with the political forces of that moment in the Member States. It should not be assumed that the new procedure for appointing the Commission President provided for by the Treaty of Amsterdam will make any fundamental change to this situation, even though the President's participation in the nomination of the college may strengthen the team's cohesion. For their part, the governments of the Member States must ensure that the figure proposed by them as Commission president enjoys a high degree of credibility within the European Parliament, transcending the political divides.

- The independence of members of the college. Article 157(1) of the EC Treaty (Article 213 of the consolidated Treaty) provides that Commissioners shall be chosen 'on the grounds of their general competence and whose independence is beyond doubt'. This provision is unchanged, as is paragraph 2, which stipulates that 'the Members of the Commission shall, in the general interest of the Community, be completely independent in the performance of their duties' and defines that independence and the ensuing incompatibilities. When taking up their duties, the members of the Commission give a solemn undertaking before the Court of Justice of the European Communities that they will respect those obligations. The draftsman notes the suggestions put forward by the rapporteur for the Committee on Institutional Affairs in paragraph III 3 of the motion for a resolution, but stresses that it is for the Commission itself, through its internal rules of procedure, or, possibly, for the negotiators of the forthcoming Treaty to make any changes to the current rules.

Without prejudice to the powers and responsibilities of the Committee on the Rules of Procedure, consideration should be given to the arrangements for implementing the new procedure. There are a number of points which are not covered by the Treaty.

Given that there are no specific provisions governing the vote on the approval of the Commission President, a simple majority must apply. Bearing in mind the political significance of the vote, consideration might be given to the question of whether a reform might be undertaken in the future so that the vote would require a majority of the component Members of Parliament. The President proposed by the Member State governments should make a statement before Parliament setting out his programme and possibly the composition of the future college. That statement would be followed by a debate with Members. The vote should take place during the same part-session.

The Treaty makes no mention of the possibility of rejection by Parliament. In the event that the proposed President was rejected, the Member State governments would have to nominate a fresh candidate. However, such a situation could block the institutions. Article 158 of the EC Treaty (Article 214 of the consolidated Treaty) lays down a precise term of office for the outgoing Commission. What would happen if, at the end of five years, the new Commission had not yet been appointed? This loop-hole in the Treaty needs to be closed in order to ensure that Parliament's prerogatives in the investiture procedure take their full effect and Parliament cannot be held responsible for a block in the event that it votes to reject the nominee for President. A parallel might be drawn with Article 144 of the EC Treaty concerning the motion of censure. Mutatis mutandis, the provisions stipulating that members of the Commission censured 'continue to deal with current business' could apply in this case too.

With regard to the timetable, the June European Council which is to take place straight after the European elections should nominate the President so that Parliament's vote on the nominee can take place at the constituent part-session in July and the procedure for approving the college can be completed at the December part-session, thus enabling the new Commission to take up its duties in January of the following year.

3. CONCLUSIONS

Consequently, the following conclusions should be drawn:

The Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights calls on the Committee on Institutional Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following conclusions in its report:

A. Stresses the need for the new Treaty provisions concerning the nomination of the President of the Commission to be respected strictly;

B. Takes the view that the Member State governments should ensure that the figure proposed by them as Commission President is capable of securing a broad majority during the vote of investiture within Parliament and that that person will have the necessary authority to carry out the duties of political guidance incumbent on him under the Treaty of Amsterdam;

C. Considers that the procedure laid down in the Treaty of Amsterdam for the appointment of the Commission President is in line with the constitutional provisions of the Member States concerning the appointment of the presidents of national governments. Accordingly, the President of the Council should be assigned the task of negotiating with the various political groups making up the European Parliament to secure the support of a sufficient majority of members, so as to avoid the interinstitutional stalemate which might occur if Parliament rejected the Council's proposals;

D. Points out that the Treaty does not include any provisions in the event that the nominee for President is rejected by Parliament and stresses the danger of institutional blocking which might result; calls on the Committee on Institutional Affairs to consider this issue with a view to a forthcoming revision of the Treaty;

E. Considers it appropriate to hold the hearing of the nominee for President and the vote of approval during the constituent part-session in July;

F. Recalls the significance of the hearings of candidates nominated for the post of Commissioner before Parliament's committees and stresses the importance of ensuring proper publicity for these hearings, which provide the vote of investiture with its full dimension and strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the Commission.

23 September 1998

  • [1] () Rapporteurs: Mr Corbett, Mr Gutiérrez Díaz and Mrs Palacio Vallelersundi.
  • [2] () This formula reflects similar provisions in national constitutions, e.g.: 'the Premier shall direct the operation of the Government' (Article 21 of the Constitution of the French Republic); 'the Federal Chancellor shall determine, and be responsible for, the general policy guidelines' (Article 65 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany); 'the Prime Minister shall safeguard the unity of the Government and he shall direct the actions of the Government...' (Article 82 (2) of the Constitution of the Hellenic Republic).
  • [3] () Parliament had called on many occasions for the role of the Commission President to be strengthened, e.g. resolution of 16 January 1997, OJ C 33, 3.2.1997, pp. 63-73.
  • [4] () It might nevertheless be noted that the procedures are not entirely parallel. The vote on the Commission's appointment is a simple-majority vote, while a dual majority is required for a motion of censure: two-thirds of the votes cast and a majority of MEPs (Article 144 of the EC Treaty).
  • [5] () Court of Justice, 15.6.1994, Commission v BASF, C-137/92 P, ECR Part I, p. 2555.
  • [6] () See for example the replies by Mrs Bonino to the temporary committee instructed to monitor the action taken concerning BSE.
  • [7] () Paragraph 119 of the report of the Reflection Group, Brussels, 5 December 1995.

OPINION

(Rule 147)

for the Committee on Institutional Affairs

on the institutional implications of the approval by the European Parliament of the President of the Commission and the independence of the members of the Commission (report by Mr Brok)

Committee on the Rules of Procedure, the Verification of Credentials and Immunities

Draftsman: Mr Antoni Gutiérrez Díaz

I. PROCEDURE

At its meeting of 29-30 June 1998 the Committee on the Rules of Procedure, the Verification of Credentials and Immunities appointed Mr Gutiérrez Díaz draftsman.

It considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 7-8 September 1998 and 21-22 September 1998.

At the last of these meetings it adopted the conclusions hereunder unanimously.

The following were present for the vote: Fayot, chairman; Filippi, vice-chairman; Gutiérrez Díaz, draftsman; Donnelly, Manzella, Vecchi, Wibe and Wijsenbeek.

II. BACKGROUND

1. This opinion is intended for the Committee on Institutional Affairs in connection with the drawing up of its report on the institutional implications of the approval by the European Parliament of the President of the Commission and the independence of the members of the Commission. It is in fact an attempt to identify the - direct or potential - effects of the changes brought about by the Amsterdam Treaty, particularly to Articles 158 and 163 of the EC Treaty (respectively Articles 214 and 219 of the new consolidated version) in terms of interinstitutional relations as well as the new overall shape of the European Union that will emerge.

2. We would point out at this juncture that, in connection with the modifications to the Rules of Procedure in the light of the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty, we have been appointed rapporteur for, among other things, the changes that need to be made to Rules 32 and 33 relating precisely to the nomination of the President of the Commission and the approval of the Commission. The draft report (PE 226.933) had already been the subject, at the time of drawing up the present text, of an initial exchange of views at the meeting of 29 and 30 June 1998 and of more detailed consideration at the meeting of 20 and 21 July 1998. The report in question and that of the Committee on Institutional Affairs deal therefore with the same issue and hence it would give considerable cause for concern if:

- through their work, the two committees were to encroach on each other's terms of reference;

- at the same time, it were to transpire in the course of their proceedings that the general approaches of the two committees ultimately diverged.

3. The working document by Mr D'ANDREA (PE 226.877) reflects - if only indirectly - this concern. The passage following the introduction is indeed sufficiently eloquent about the risks of confusion involved, by definition, by this parallel activity. It states:

'Particular focus is needed on assessing the institutional effects the new provisions will have. Clearly, the strictly procedural aspects concerning the rules governing the exercise by Parliament of its prerogatives falls within the terms of reference of the Committee on the Rules of Procedure. The two questions undoubtedly need to be considered in parallel and the more points of convergence that can be found between these two procedures, the easier it will be for the European Parliament to secure the desired result.'

4. An appraisal carried out by the Committee on Institutional Affairs may have its usefulness in evaluating the new interinstitutional balance that will result from the way in which the President of the Commission is nominated. However, this exercise easily encounters its limitations in what the working document itself describes as 'strictly procedural aspects' which are a matter for the Committee on the Rules of Procedure. The emphasis should in fact be placed on two important factors:

(a) Alongside the changes made to Article 158 of the EC Treaty (new Article 214 in the consolidated version) - which lay down the basic rule and the principle of the Commission President being approved by Parliament - the internal rules of our institution will need to spell out the substance of this basic rule in such a way as to safeguard in the best way possible Parliament's prerogatives as already set out in the draft report which we have submitted to the committee[1]. This is all the more necessary in that the Treaty provisions - even amended - contain shortcomings that risk creating real legal vacuums should circumstances so conspire: problems could arise in particular from the point of view of the timetable in view of the fact that the new Parliament will have only a relatively short period (from July to December) to complete the entire procedure referred to in Article 158(2) of the EC Treaty (Article 214(2) of the consolidated version)[2]. Closely linked to this problem, the risk of 'institutional deadlock' - following on Parliament's prolonged refusal to approve the person or persons nominated as candidates for the Presidency of the Commission - scarcely features as an eventuality in the Treaty[3]. These problems are only examples justifying a pragmatic and consistent approach by our institution to this subject. The new powers at Parliament's disposal for nominating the Commission President can become the catalyst for fundamental changes in the interinstitutional balance of power. Unless they are to be relegated to the level of simple 'formalities', these procedures should be designed to reflect - where possible at all stages - the presence and active involvement of Parliament. An involvement which should even extend to Parliament claiming the right to elect the President of the Commission.

(b) Secondly, it should be remembered that Parliament's Rules of Procedure are based on the Treaty itself, Article 142 of which states that 'the European Parliament shall adopt its Rules of Procedure, acting by a majority of its Members.' This constraint is in fact an essential factor in safeguarding democratic principles in our institution. In particular, it represents a fundamental guarantee for the minorities represented there. This guarantee matters all the more because political parties that play a major role in some Member States, having no counterpart in the large groups in Parliament, find themselves as it were in a purely artificial minority position there.

It is therefore absolutely essential that the procedural provisions adopted by absolute majority in accordance with the Treaty should prevail in all circumstances and not risk being contradicted or undermined by considerations of a general nature, however interesting and useful they might be, submitted to Parliament for adoption by simple majority.

5. These considerations strengthen the idea of a consistent approach to which the working document of the Committee on Institutional Affairs indeed refers. It is satisfactory to note that this document, which is devoted above all to a general appraisal of the matter, covers all the problems which are resolved in the wording proposed by the Committee on the Rules of Procedure. It must however be ensured that the speculative aspects inherent in such a document do not disrupt the interpretation or even the implementation of the procedural provisions.

III. CONCLUSIONS

In the light of the foregoing, logic demands that the Committee on Institutional Affairs and the Committee on the Rules of Procedure should work in close cooperation on this subject but that the report of the Committee on Institutional Affairs should be adopted after the changes made to the Rules of Procedure in order to provide the most constructive and most consistent possible framework for reference.

The Committee on the Rules of Procedure, the Verification of Credentials and Immunities calls on the Committee on Institutional Affairs, which is the committee responsible, to take account of this opinion and incorporate in its report the following conclusions:

A. The amendments to the Treaty concerning the nomination of the President of the Commission can become the catalyst for fundamental changes in Community interinstitutional relations;

B. It is therefore essential to safeguard Parliament's prerogatives as well as possible in these circumstances, which can be done only by establishing procedures capable, on the one hand, of complementing the Treaty provisions in appropriate fashion and, on the other, of allowing Parliament to have its say in a consistent and credible fashion throughout those procedures; these procedures should ultimately result in Parliament actually electing the President of the Commission;

C. In the very interests of the institution and of the consistency of its work, it should therefore be made perfectly clear that its Rules of Procedure are the sole point of reference to be taken into account when the procedures are implemented in the institution.

  • [1] () See PE 226.933 dated 2 July 1998.
  • [2] () As is clear from paragraph 3 of Article 158 of the EC Treaty which will be deleted on the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty.
  • [3] () However, Parliament has anticipated this question since its Rules of Procedure already specify - in Rule 32(4) - the procedure to be followed in the event of a 'negative opinion' on the proposed nomination for President of the Commission.
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