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REPORT

on the new European security and defence architecture - priorities and
deficiencies
(2002/2165(INI))

Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence
Policy

Rapporteur: Philippe Morillon

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PROCEDURAL PAGE

At the sitting of 10 October 2002 the President of Parliament announced that the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy had been authorised to draw up an own-initiative report, pursuant to Rule 163 of the Rules of Procedure, on the new European security and defence architecture - priorities and deficiencies.

The Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy had appointed Philippe Morillon rapporteur at its meeting of 11 September 2002.

It considered the draft report at its meetings of 27 January, 18 February and 25 March 2003.

At the last meeting it adopted the motion for a resolution by 33 votes to 15, with 0 abstention.

The following were present for the vote: Elmar Brok, chairman; Geoffrey Van Orden and Christos Zacharakis, vice-chairmen; Philippe Morillon, rapporteur; Ole Andreasen, Per-Arne Arvidsson, Sir Robert Atkins (for Armin Laschet pursuant to Rule 153(2)), Alexandros Baltas, Bob van den Bos, André Brie, John Walls Cushnahan, Rijk van Dam (for Bastiaan Belder pursuant to Rule 153(2)), Rosa M. Díez González, Hélène Flautre (for Reinhold Messner), Gerardo Galeote Quecedo, Per Gahrton, Jas Gawronski, Fiorella Ghilardotti (for Magdalene Hoff pursuant to Rule 153(2)), Anne-Karin Glase (for Karl von Wogau pursuant to Rule 153(2)), Alfred Gomolka, Vasco Graça Moura (for José Pacheco Pereira), Efstratios Korakas, Joost Lagendijk, Catherine Lalumière, Cecilia Malmström, Pedro Marset Campos, Hugues Martin, Emilio Menéndez del Valle, Hans Modrow (for Sami Naïr), Pasqualina Napoletano, Raimon Obiols i Germà, Arie M. Oostlander, Reino Paasilinna (for Véronique De Keyser), Hans-Gert Poettering (for Jürgen Schröder), Jacques F. Poos, Jannis Sakellariou, Jacques Santer, Elisabeth Schroedter, Ioannis Souladakis, The Earl of Stockton (for Michael Gahler), Hannes Swoboda, David Sumberg, Ilkka Suominen, Charles Tannock, Maj Britt Theorin (for Klaus Hänsch), Paavo Väyrynen, Joan Vallvé, Jan Marinus Wiersma and Matti Wuori.

The report was tabled on 27 March 2003.

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

European Parliament resolution on the new European security and defence architecture - priorities and deficiencies (2002/2165(INI))

The European Parliament,

- having regard to its resolutions of 30 November 2000 on the establishment of a common European security and defence policy after Cologne and Helsinki¹,
 - having regard to its resolutions of 10 April 2002 on defence policy, including EU/NATO relations, and European defence-related industries²,
 - having regard to its resolution of 15 May 2002 on reinforcing the transatlantic relationship³,
 - having regard to its resolution of 26 September 2002 on the progress achieved in the implementation of the common foreign and security policy⁴,
 - having regard to its resolution of 5 September 2000 on a common Community diplomacy⁵,
 - having regard to the declaration of 21 November 2002 by the Heads of State of the Atlantic Alliance at the Prague Summit,
 - having regard to the final reports of working group VII (external action) and working group VIII (defence) of the European Convention of 16 December 2002 - CONV 459/02 and CONV 461/02,
 - having regard to Rule 163 of its Rules of Procedure,
 - having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy (A5-0111/2003),
- A. recalling that it is the objective of the European Union's foreign and security policy to safeguard the Union's common values, fundamental interests, independence, and identity, as well as to fulfil the need to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter,
- B. convinced that it is necessary to create the conditions conducive to the emergence of a common defence culture,
- C. whereas the definition of a common foreign policy is a precondition for the development of a European defence policy,

¹ OJ C 228/2001, 13.8.2001, p. 9

² P5_TA(2002)0171 and P5_TA(2002)0172.

³ P5_TA(2002)0243.

⁴ P5_TA(2002)0451.

⁵ OJ C 135/2001, 7.5.2001, p 69

- D. starting from a broader security concept, which goes beyond purely military aspects and which covers not only the security of States but also the security of citizens,
- E. recalling that the ESDP was conceived at the Cologne and Helsinki Summits in 1999 to give the European Union a military capability to enhance the credibility of its foreign policy objectives and to create the ability to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises, and with special reference to the decision to build up a strategy for non-military conflict prevention which is seen as a cost-saving measure for crisis prevention and crisis management,
- F. stating that EU conflict management must be founded on multilateral solutions and respect for international law,
- G. convinced that despite the current mismatch between the laws of war and the new international situation in which civilians are the main victims of conflicts, the task of defining such international law should be entrusted to the United Nations whenever a multinational operation is envisaged, invites the European Union to support respective efforts of the United Nations,
- H. supporting the work being carried out, under the auspices of the UN's OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), on drawing up guidelines for making military capacity available in connection with humanitarian operations, in complex emergency situations,
- I. stating that crisis prevention must be the overall guiding principle of any EU foreign, security and defence policy, but recognising that the European Union must have available military means for crisis management and resolution,
- J. convinced that the European security and defence policy should concentrate primarily on tasks in the geographical environs of the European Union,
- K. recalling that the ESDP so far is limited to the Petersberg tasks, which include humanitarian, evacuation and logistical support operations, peacekeeping missions, and action by combat forces for crisis management purposes, including missions to restore peace, whereas NATO has an Article V component relating to collective defence which applies to a majority of the Member States,
- L. sharing the opinion that the events of 11 September have highlighted the need to extend peace and stability outside the Union and to ensure security within,
- M. emphasising that there must be no differing levels of security within the territory of the European Union,
- N. noting that the war in the Balkans and that in Afghanistan have revealed substantial military capability and technology gaps between Europe and the United States,
- O. reiterating that one of the principal obstacles to modernising and transforming European forces to cope effectively with the security challenges of the 21st century is not the level of defence expenditure but the lack of cooperation, the absence of a clear division of labour and specialisation, as well as duplication and fragmentation in arms production and

procurement, which increases the risk of lack of interoperability between armies,

- P. convinced that the launching of any military operation in the name of the European Union needs the highest degree of democratic legitimacy and public support, and must be based on observance of the constitutional arrangements of the Union and its Member States,
- Q. convinced that the new security and defence measures must not result in human rights in general, civil liberties and the rights of Union citizens laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights being weakened,

Objectives and principles

1. Recalls the importance of the principles which must underpin the European Union's European security and defence policy (ESDP), namely security which is common to Europe and the rest of the world; sustainable security based on equality, justice and reciprocity; and security based on respect for the rights of the individual, democratic control and international law;
2. Considers the development of a genuine European security and defence policy (ESDP) to be an integral part of the CFSP and an effective contribution to the European Union's international credibility which would enable it to uphold its objectives and values and contribute to freedom, peace and stability in the world in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and International law;
3. Deeply regrets the current split between Member States in relation to crucial foreign policy matters, which will have serious consequences for the common foreign and security policy; points out that only if the Union pursues a single line and speaks with one strong and clear voice will it be considered as a serious international actor;
4. Strongly believes that, without prejudice to the North Atlantic Treaty and complementary to it or to the specific character of the defence policy of certain Member States, the Union is committed to its collective security and, accordingly, should progressively frame a common defence policy;
5. Believes that only a Union which has available a whole range of crisis prevention and management tools and clearly defined foreign policy objectives and interests, including efficient, interoperable military capabilities, will be able to become an independent actor in world affairs and remain a reliable partner within the transatlantic relationship;
6. Believes that only if the Union's foreign and security policy is backed up by credible political, economic and military capabilities, supplied by Member States and NATO, will Europe be able to influence situations of tension or conflict in order to champion its values and assert its interests;

The new international security environment

7. Stresses that the security situation after 11 September 2001 is characterised by increasing insecurity, with new risks and threats which no country of the Union is capable of coping with alone;
8. Believes that regions such as the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus region, Central Asia and Africa will remain the potential areas of instability in the years to come; points out, however, that after 11 September terrorism has become an international security challenge, especially when non-State actors strive to produce or acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD);
9. Recognises that the fight against terrorism has not only made the notion of geographical limitations for military engagements obsolete, but has also blurred the traditional distinction between foreign and domestic security policy;
10. Realises that the new risks are perceived differently by the United States, which was shaken to the core by the terrorist attacks of September 2001 and which considers itself to be in a state of war, and by Europe, where neither the horrors in the Balkans nor the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, in Bali, Kenya and elsewhere have had the same effect on public opinion;
11. Considers it, therefore, the duty of European leaders to inform the public of ongoing conflicts and real threats, with gravity and clarity;
12. Notes that 71% of EU citizens declare themselves to be in favour of a common security and defence policy;
13. Stresses the importance of the new dimension of threats deriving from terrorism and from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, not least for the protection of the civilian population and democratic institutions within the European Union;
14. Hopes for a more active role by the enlarged European Union in connection with the OSCE's activities aimed at strengthening security in the wider Europe;

Missions and operations

15. Considers that Petersberg tasks should be revised and expanded to include other tasks involving the use of military resources, such as conflict prevention, joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance, post-conflict stabilisation and combating terrorism, which should lead the European Union to make provision for various types of intervention of varying degrees of intensity;
16. Considers that civilian crisis management should be placed on equal footing with the military aspects of the Petersberg tasks and recognised as a core part of the common security and defence policy; points out that the Union should be able to meet civilian crisis management needs by coherent and concerted deployment of Member States' capabilities and Community instruments, for the purpose of conflict prevention and

preservation of peace and stability through police missions as well as through measures aiming at strengthening democracy, public administration and the rule of law;

17. Underlines the crisis-prevention character of many of the Petersberg missions and welcomes the EU police mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina as an important step; deplores, however, the fact that Parliament has not been consulted formally on this joint action although it has agreed to its financing;
18. Supports the European Union's decision to take over NATO's 'Allied Harmony' operation in FYROM and also its intention to take on the SFOR command in Bosnia-Herzegovina; in view of the future role of Parliament in monitoring and controlling such kinds of action, invites the Presidency and the High Representative to fully inform Parliament's competent bodies, confidentially if appropriate, about these missions, after each General Affairs Council meeting, especially with regard to the mandate, the capabilities needed (including possible access to NATO structures), and the financial implications;
19. Notes with interest the possibilities for transforming the ISAF mission in Afghanistan into a NATO operation under European command, which would be an important precedent for a mutually reinforcing NATO-EU operation, as the European Union is one of the largest donors for the reconstruction of this country, and most of the ISAF forces deployed there are European;
20. Is convinced that in the long run the Atlantic Alliance will only be maintained through the introduction of a genuine European defence identity;
21. Stresses the need to enhance the Mediterranean dimension of the ESDP, and cooperation and dialogue between the ESDP and Mediterranean States, in accordance with the guidelines which emerged from the informal meeting of Ministers of Defence in Rethimnon (Greece) in October 2002;

Capabilities and armaments

22. Is of the opinion that the development of the ESDP will not be possible without strengthening the military capabilities available to the Union; this will require the development of a European security culture as well as improved allocation of resources and adequate financing;
23. Considers that the implementation of the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) adopted by the Laeken Summit in December 2001 is a short-term priority to overcome immediate deficits in order to make the Rapid Reaction Force deployable and operational as soon as possible;
24. Advocates close coordination between the EU's Capabilities Action Plan and NATO's Capabilities Initiative in order to avoid needless overlapping and to tackle the challenges ahead: strategic airlift, air tankers, ground surveillance, precision-guided munitions, protection against weapons of mass destruction, support for current operations, etc., as European Member States invariably have only one set of forces available to be deployed under either the ESDP or NATO;

25. Recalls that a rapid reaction capability will only be effective if it is based on advance planning; therefore encourages the European Union's Military Committee to plan force packages, their command arrangements, transport, logistics and communications, and to train them;
26. To that end wishes the Union to have, with effect from 2004, a 5000-strong military force kept in a state of permanent readiness for humanitarian operations and for those to rescue populations under threat;
27. Encourages those Member States which wish to undertake enhanced cooperation commitments with a view to harmonising their military needs to share their capabilities and resources and to ensure a degree of specialisation within their defence efforts;
28. Regards it as desirable that a well-reasoned survey be drawn up of the military needs of the EU as such, which can also serve as a frame of reference for a common procurement and production policy;
29. Pleads for a mechanism to evaluate and improve Member States' commitments by evaluating the proportion of their defence budgets in relation to GDP, and in particular the proportion of equipment and research expenditure in the defence budget, as well as force preparedness, including force deployment capabilities and their interoperability; this task could be entrusted to a future Armaments and Research Agency;
30. Calls for that Agency to have its own budget, initially restricted to research and development relating to new technologies where the spin-offs for civilian industry are known;
31. Envisages that this Agency would also be responsible for encouraging the Member States to adopt a harmonised purchasing policy and to run pilot projects for cooperation among themselves;
32. Calls for the practical arrangements for the Agency's operation to be drawn up in consultation with the European Parliament, or even by codecision;
33. Recalls its position calling for the revision of Article 296 of the EC Treaty with the aim of gradually creating a European armaments market; appeals to Member States as well as to candidate countries to apply the principle of 'Community preferences' so as to ensure security of supply;
34. Calls for thought to be given to the possibility of the ESA (European Space Agency) becoming the space agency of the European Union, which would represent a major step towards establishing the security and defence policy;

Decision-making and institutional improvements

35. Underlines the fact that any crisis management operation requires efficiency and coherence, therefore supports an enhanced role for the High Representative, who should have the right of initiative in crisis management matters and should guarantee coherence between the civilian and military aspects of the operation, without prejudice to the Political and Security Committee's political control and strategic direction of all EU-led crisis management operations;
36. Therefore supports new institutional arrangements which would combine the functions of High Representative and Commissioner for External Affairs in a 'European External Representative', a Member of the Commission, supported by a single Commission administration, the staff of which might partly be recruited from existing resources within the WEU;
37. Considers the coordination of military and civilian aspects on the ground to be vital; this should be attributed to special representatives acting under the responsibility of the European External Representative, while observing the integrity of the military command;
38. Believes that the future institutional treaty should set up specific cooperation on defence and supports the concept of a degree of flexibility in launching and conducting crisis management operations, in particular on the basis of applying the principle of 'constructive abstention', which will facilitate flexibility in decision-making and action and which will also make possible such enhanced cooperation within the institutional structure of the European Union; however, the goal must be to secure the broadest possible consent within the European Union for all crisis management operations;
39. Agrees that the launching of operations, both civilian and military, would require swift access to Community financing; on the basis of the positive experiences with the rapid reaction mechanism for civil operations, supports the idea of a start-up fund for military crisis management operations within the CFSP budget;
40. Confirms its position that common costs of military operations within the ESDP framework should be covered through the Community budget (CFSP) and in this connection calls for Article 28 of the TEU to be modified;
41. Suggests the establishment of a joint military college and proposes enhanced cooperation on training, which could take the form of a European Institute of Advanced Defence Studies, to ensure better interoperability and to sow the requisite seeds within both the armed forces and the civilian population to ensure the emergence of a common defence culture;
42. Recalls its earlier request for the addition to the Treaty, in a protocol, of a *collective defence clause* for those Member States wishing to share between themselves the obligations laid down in Article V of the Brussels Treaty and thus bring to an end the Western European Union;

43. Shares the opinion that, in view of new challenges such as terrorist threats to the civilian population and democratic institutions, a '*solidarity clause*' should be introduced into the Treaty to enable Member States to mobilise all the necessary military and civilian instruments within the Union to prevent terrorist threats;
44. Supports, to that end, the creation of a pool of specialised civilian and military civil protection units which should undertake joint training and be available in the event of natural or environmental disasters, or those associated with industrial risks, within the Union;
45. Proposes the setting-up, alongside national forces, of a common EU police force and coastguard corps to protect the European Union's external borders against terrorism and organised crime, illegal immigration, and the smuggling of arms, drugs and human beings and to combat maritime crime; considers that such a common force would be a useful supplementary instrument for certain external ESDP missions;
46. Reiterates its call for the establishment of a European Civilian Peace Corps;
47. Recalls its support for the creation of a Council of Defence Ministers which would be responsible for capability and armaments questions, whereas the Foreign Affairs Council would remain competent for situation analysis and the handling of crisis operations;

EU-NATO relations

48. Considers the European Union and NATO to be mutually reinforcing and urges close cooperation between them;
49. Considers that for collective defence, NATO remains the indispensable bond that links the USA to European security interests; continues to attach great importance to the maintenance of good transatlantic relations;
50. Welcomes, therefore, the strategic partnership agreement of 16 December 2002 between the European Union and NATO on guaranteed access for the European Union to NATO's resources and structures, thus enabling the European Union to use NATO's operational military planning capabilities as well as its command structures when conducting EU-led operations;
51. Welcomes the arrangements adopted at the Brussels European Council of 24-25 October 2002 for the involvement of non-EU European allies in EU-led operations when using NATO assets and capabilities; welcomes the confirmation that no action will be undertaken that would violate the principles of the United Nations Charter;
52. Notes NATO's decision at its Prague Summit to set up a multinational Rapid Response Force of 21 000 men, rapidly deployable at very short notice for high-intensity conflicts, which would be complementary to the European Union's Rapid Reaction Force, but considers that this decision still needs a clear definition as regards relations between these two forces;

Legitimacy and democratic control

53. Recognises the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security and considers an effective European security and defence architecture to be a major contribution to strengthening a multilateral security policy within the United Nations framework;
54. Proposes that within the framework of a future reform of the United Nations the European Union should be allocated a permanent seat in the UN Security Council;
55. Demands that any crisis management operation of the Union in the context of the Petersberg tasks should be decided by the Council only after consultation of the European Parliament as the only directly elected democratic institution at European level; such approval would require an absolute majority;
56. Points to the risk of the financing of the European security and defence policy leading to the emergence of shadow budgets which are closed to democratic scrutiny; calls, therefore, for the financing of the planned Armaments, Research and Development Agency to come within the European Union's budgetary procedure, so as to ensure the requisite parliamentary scrutiny;
57. Recognises the competence of national parliaments as regards military expenditure, military procurement and the deployment of national armed forces, whereas the European Parliament should be responsible for approving the mandate and objectives of any crisis management operation under the ESDP and would be responsible for the costs incurred by EU joint actions;
58. Proposes that bi-annual regular meetings be held at the invitation of the European Parliament between the competent committee of the European Parliament and representatives of the respective committees of national parliaments in order to develop a common perspective with regard to the definition of a common strategy for the ESDP; such meetings could be the basis for future arrangements between the European Parliament and national parliaments;
59. Considers that such cooperation should be extended to cover certain military aspects such as the development of joint command structures and joint European arms procurement projects; such a joint meeting should also be convened whenever a major EU crisis operation was envisaged by the Council at short notice;
60. Considers such joint meetings as the appropriate forum to which the 'European External Representative', as well as the commanders of crisis management operations, should report;
61. Requests that Article 21 of the TEU not be limited to foreign and security policy but also include defence policy, which in practice already happens when the Defence Minister of the Presidency reports to the European Parliament;
62. Further requests that information on the progress and decisions taken under the ESDP given by the Presidency of the Council and the 'European External Representative' be

complemented by the obligation to present written reports to Parliament in cases where this is explicitly demanded;

63. Welcomes the work of its delegation for relations with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly as an important contribution to strengthening EU-NATO relations; encourages members of the delegation also to involve themselves actively in the committee work of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and supports the idea of parallel co-rapporteurships on ESDP topics within the two institutions;
64. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission as well as to the Secretary General of NATO and the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

Where foreign and security policy is concerned, the citizens of the European Union wish to see an active Europe promoting peace, stability and security in a responsible manner on the international scene. Opinion polls confirm this assertion: 71% of Europe's citizens are in favour of a common security and defence policy, while only 16% are against.

Since the decisions taken in Helsinki in 1999 the European Union has stepped up its efforts to complement its diplomatic and foreign policy instruments with military capabilities.

The 'headline goal' in 1999, namely that of having, by 2003, a force of 60 000 capable of being deployed in crisis management operations, was based on the experience acquired during the Balkans war and, in particular, the war in Kosovo.

Following 11 September 2001, and in a completely new security situation, it has to be asked how, and with what means, Europe will react to the new threats to global peace. For its own public opinion, the European Union must find precise answers to the question of how it plans to guarantee the safety of its territory and population, and contribute to the stability of its strategic environment.

The war in Afghanistan revealed the new doctrine of the United States: its ability and decision to conduct wars alone, and to seek its coalition partners in the light of the mission to be carried out ('the mission determines the coalition').

It once again revealed the substantial technological gaps between American and European military capabilities, which could be a serious obstacle to force interoperability.

Finally, it showed that Europe is ready politically (Petersberg Conference), economically (aid for reconstruction) and militarily (ISAF) to take on responsibility for international peace missions.

The new strategic environment with regard to security is characterised, on the one hand, by the various faces of international terrorism, proliferating conflicts in the Middle East and Central Asia, the erosion of existing arms control regimes and the risks of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and, on the other hand, by change in America, whose strategic interests now lie more in Asia than in Europe, and which is limiting its forces at NATO's disposal to 8%.

All this requires increased military efforts by the Europeans if the European Union wants to become a credible actor on the international scene, a free partner of the United States, within an Atlantic Alliance whose leadership Europeans will one day have to assume, agreeing to share with the Americans the burden of defending their common values: in a nutshell, allied and non-aligned.

If this will were lacking, if the governments of the Member States were to continue leaving it to the Americans to conduct any potential wars, contenting themselves with shouldering affairs of peace, the Union would have to resign itself to playing the part of the Athenians in Ancient Rome: acceptance of being subject, in the last resort, to the will of a new empire.

We know that the vast majority of our fellow-citizens reject this.