REPORT on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe

9.12.2004 - (2004/2129(INI))

Committee on Constitutional Affairs
Rapporteur: Richard Corbett and Íñigo Méndez de Vigo

Amendments

• 001-009 (PDF - 109 KB)
• 001-009 (DOC - 127 KB)
• 010-010 (PDF - 74 KB)
• 010-010 (DOC - 111 KB)
• 011-011 (PDF - 80 KB)
• 011-011 (DOC - 111 KB)
• 012-012 (PDF - 82 KB)
• 012-012 (DOC - 43 KB)
• 013-016 (PDF - 93 KB)
• 013-016 (DOC - 120 KB)
• 017-017 (PDF - 77 KB)
• 017-017 (DOC - 43 KB)
• 018-019 (PDF - 120 KB)
• 018-019 (DOC - 131 KB)
• 020-020 (PDF - 90 KB)
• 020-020 (DOC - 44 KB)
• 021-021 (PDF - 78 KB)
• 021-021 (DOC - 112 KB)

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe

(2004/2129(INI))

The European Parliament,

–   having regard to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (hereinafter 'the Constitution'),

–   having regard to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community as amended by the Single European Act and the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice,

–   having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union[1],

–   having regard to the European Council's Laeken Declaration[2],

–   having regard to its resolutions[3] paving the way towards a Constitution for Europe,

–   having regard to its resolutions[4] preparing past intergovernmental conferences and its resolutions[5] assessing their outcome,

–   having regard to the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe adopted by consensus by the European Convention on 13 June and 10 July 2003 as well as its resolutions[6] preparing and subsequently assessing the work of the Convention,

–   having regard to the opinions on the Constitution delivered by the Committee of the Regions[7] on 17 November 2004 and the European Economic and Social Committee[8] on 28 October 2004 at the request of the European Parliament[9],

–   having regard to the views expressed by the representatives of regional associations, social partners and platforms of civil society at a public hearing convened on 25 November 2004,

–   having regard to Rule 45 of its Rules of Procedure,

–   having regard to the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Development, the Committee on International Trade, the Committee on Budgets, the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, the Committee on Regional Development, the Committee on Agriculture, the Committee on Fisheries, the Committee on Legal Affairs, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and the Committee on Petitions (A6‑0070/2004),

Whereas:

A. the European Union has, in the course of its history, played a substantial role in creating a continuously expanding area of peace and prosperity, democracy and freedom, justice and security,

B.  the Constitution consolidates these achievements and brings about innovations which are essential to maintaining and to enhancing the capacity of the Union of twenty-five and potentially more Member States to act effectively internally and externally,

C. the efforts to achieve a Constitution deployed by the European Parliament since its first direct election, have been crowned by the success of the Convention, which prepared the draft using a democratic, representative and transparent method that has fully proved its effectiveness, and which took account of the contributions of the citizens of Europe, resulting in a consensus which was left essentially unchanged by the Intergovernmental Conference,

D. the Constitution, as a compromise that had to be acceptable to all Member States, inevitably left out some proposals, notably of the European Parliament or of the Convention, that would have, in the view of their authors, brought further improvements to the Union, many of which remain possible in the future,

E.  the agreement to the Constitution of every single national government in the European Union demonstrates that the elected governments of Member States all consider that this compromise is the basis on which they wish to work together in the future, and will require each of them to demonstrate maximum political commitment to ensuring ratification by 1 November 2006,

F.  the Constitution has been the object of some criticism voiced in public debate that does not reflect the real content and legal consequences of its provisions, insofar as the Constitution will not lead to the creation of a centralised superstate, will strengthen rather than weaken the Union's social dimension and does not ignore the historical and spiritual roots of Europe since it refers to its cultural, religious and humanist inheritance,

1.  Concludes that, taken as a whole, the Constitution is a good compromise and a vast improvement on the existing treaties, which will, once implemented, bring about visible benefits for citizens (and the European Parliament and the national parliaments as their democratic representation), the Member States (including their regions and local authorities) and the effective functioning of the European Union institutions, and thus for the Union as a whole;

Greater clarity as to the Union's nature and objectives     

2.  Welcomes the fact that the Constitution provides citizens with more clarity as to the Union's nature and objectives and as to the relations between the Union and the Member States, notably because:

(a)  the complex set of European treaties is replaced by a single more readable document spelling out the objectives of the Union, its powers and their limits, its policy instruments and its institutions;

(b)  the Union's dual legitimacy is reaffirmed, and it is clarified that it is a Union of States and citizens;

(c)  the canon of values common to all the Member States, on which the Union is founded and which creates a strong bond between the Union's citizens, is made explicit and widened;

(d)  the objectives of the Union as well as the principles governing its action and its relations with Member States are clarified and better defined;

(e)  economic, social and territorial cohesion is reaffirmed as an objective of the Union;

(f)   there are new provisions of general application concerning a high level of employment, the promotion of equality between women and men, the elimination of all kinds of discriminations, the fight against social exclusion and the promotion of social justice, social protection, a high level of education, training and health, the protection of the consumer, the promotion of sustainable development and the respect of services of general interest;

(g)  the confusion between the "European Community" and "European Union" will end as the European Union becomes one single legal entity and structure;

(h)  European legal acts are simplified and their terminology is clarified, using more understandable vocabulary: "European laws" and "European framework laws" replace the existing multiple types of act (regulations, directives, decisions, framework decisions, etc);

(i)   it provides guarantees that the Union will never be a centralised all-powerful "superstate":

-  the strong emphasis on decentralisation inherent in "united in diversity",

-  the obligation to "respect the national identities of Member States, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government",

-  the principles of conferred powers (whereby the Union's only competences are those conferred on it by the Member States), subsidiarity and proportionality,

-  the participation of the Member States themselves in the Union's decision-making system and in agreeing any changes to it;

(j)   the inclusion of the symbols of the Union in the Constitution will improve awareness of the Union's institutions and their action;

(k)  a solidarity clause between Member States provides citizens with an expectation of receiving support from all parts of the Union in case of a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster;

Greater effectiveness and a strengthened role in the world

3.  Welcomes the fact that, with the entry into force of the Constitution, the Union's institutions will be able to carry out their tasks more effectively notably because:

(a)  there is a significant increase in the areas in which the governments meeting in Council will decide by qualified majority voting rather than by unanimity, a vital factor if the Union of twenty-five Member States is to be able to function without being blocked by vetoes;

(b)  the European Council will have a two-and-a-half-year chair instead of a six-month rotating one;

(c)  there will, as of 2014, be a reduction in the number of members of the Commission based on an equal rotation between Member States;

(d)  there will be a significant enhancement of the Union's visibility and capacity as a global actor:

-  the European Union's Foreign policy High Representative and the Commissioner for External Relations - two posts causing duplication and confusion - will be merged into a single European "Foreign Minister", who will be a Vice President of the Commission and will chair the Foreign Affairs Council and be able to speak for the Union on those subjects where the latter has a common position,

-  there will be a single external action service under the responsibility of the Foreign Minister,

-  the conferral of legal personality, previously enjoyed by the European Community, on the Union will enhance its capacity to act in international relations and to be a party to international agreements,

-  the Union's capacity to develop common structures in the field of security and defence policy will be reinforced, while ensuring the necessary flexibility to cater for differing approaches of Member States to such matters;

(e)  the number of the Union's legislative instruments and the procedures for their adoption will be reduced; the distinction between legislative and executive instruments will be clarified;

(f)   action in the area of justice and home affairs will have more effective procedures, promising tangible progress with regard to justice, security and immigration issues;

(g)  for a number of other matters, it will become easier to apply the successful Community method as soon as there is the political will to do so;

(h)  there is more room for flexible arrangements when not all Member States are willing or able to go ahead with certain policies at the same time;

More democratic accountability

4.  Welcomes the fact that citizens will have greater control over the European Union's action by increased democratic accountability, notably due to the following improvements:

(a)  the adoption of all European Union legislation will be subject to the prior scrutiny of national parliaments and, with a few exceptions, the dual approval of both national governments (in the Council) and the directly elected European Parliament - a level of parliamentary scrutiny that exists in no other supranational or international structure;

(b)  national parliaments will receive all European Union proposals in good time to discuss them with their ministers before the Council adopts a position and will also gain the right to object to draft legislation if they feel it goes beyond the European Union's remit;

(c)  the European Parliament will as a rule decide on an equal footing with the Council on the Union's legislation;

(d)  the President of the Commission will be elected by the European Parliament, thereby establishing a link to the results of European elections;

(e)  the Foreign Minister, appointed by the European Council in agreement with the Commission's President, will be accountable both to the European Parliament and to the European Council;

(f)   a new budgetary procedure will require the approval of both the Council and the European Parliament for all European Union expenditure, without exception, thus bringing all expenditure under full democratic control;

(g)  the exercise of delegated legislative powers by the Commission will be brought under a new system of supervision by the European Parliament and the Council, enabling each of them to call back Commission decisions to which they object;

(h)  agencies, notably Europol, will be subject to greater parliamentary scrutiny;

(i)   the Council will meet in public when debating and adopting Union legislation;

(j)   the role of the Committee of the Regions is reinforced;

(k)  with regard to future revisions of the Constitution, the European Parliament too will have the power to submit proposals, and the scrutiny of any proposed revision must be carried out by a Convention unless Parliament agrees that this is not necessary;

More rights for citizens

5.  Welcomes the fact that the rights of citizens will be strengthened as a result of the following improvements:

(a)  the incorporation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in part II of the Constitution, which means that all provisions of European Union law and all action taken by the EU institutions or based on EU law will have to comply with those standards;

(b)  the Union is to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights, thereby making the Union subject to the same external review as its Member States;

(c)  new provisions will facilitate participation by citizens, the social partners, representative associations and civil society in the deliberations of the Union;

(d)  the introduction of a European citizens' initiative, which will enable citizens to submit proposals on matters where they consider that a legal act of the Union is required in order to implement the Constitution;

(e)  individuals will have greater access to justice in connection with European Union law;

Conclusions

6.  Endorses the Constitutional Treaty and wholeheartedly supports its ratification;

7.  Believes that this Constitution will provide a stable and lasting framework for the future development of the European Union that will allow for further enlargement while providing mechanisms for its revision when needed;

8.  Hopes that all Member States of the European Union will be in a position to achieve ratification by mid-2006;

9.  Reiterates its request that all possible efforts be deployed in order to inform European citizens clearly and objectively about the content of the Constitution; therefore invites the European institutions and the Member States, when distributing the text of the constitutional Treaty to citizens (in unabridged or summary versions), to make a clear distinction between the elements already in force in the existing treaties and new provisions introduced by the Constitution, with a view to educating the public and informing the debate;

10. Instructs its President to forward this resolution and the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs to the national parliaments of the Member States, the Council, the European Commission and the former Members of the Convention on the Future of Europe, and to ensure that Parliament's services, including its external offices, provide ample information about the Constitution and Parliament's position on it.

• [1]  OJ C 364, 18.12.2000, p.1.
• [2]  Laeken European Council, Laeken declaration on the future of the Union, SN 273/01, 15.12.2001.
• [3]  Resolution of 14.2.1984 on the draft Treaty establishing the European Union - OJ C 77, 19.3.1984, p. 5, rapporteur: Altiero Spinelli, 1-1200/1983.
  Resolution of 11.7.1990 on the European Parliament's guidelines for a draft constitution for the European Union - OJ C 231, 17.9.1990, p. 91, rapporteur: Emilio Colombo, A3-0165/1990.
  Resolution of 12.12.1990 on the constitutional basis of European Union - OJ C 19, 28.1.1991, p. 65, rapporteur: Emilio Colombo, A3-0301/1990.
  Resolution of 10.2.1994 on the Constitution of the European Union - OJ C 61, 28.2.1994, p. 155, rapporteur: Fernand Herman, A3-0064/1994.
  Resolution of 25.10.2000 on the constitutionalisation of the Treaties - OJ C 197, 12.7.2001, p. 186, rapporteur: Olivier Duhamel, A5-0289/2000.
• [4]  Resolution of 14.3.1990 on the Intergovernmental Conference in the context of Parliament's strategy for European Union - OJ C 96, 17.4.1990, p. 114, rapporteur: David Martin, A3-0047/1990.
  Resolution of 11.7.1990 on the Intergovernmental Conference in the context of Parliament's strategy for European Union - OJ C 231, 17.9.1990, p. 97, rapporteur: David Martin, A3-0166/1990.
  Resolution of 22.11.1990 on the Intergovernmental Conferences in the context of Parliament's strategy for European Union - OJ C 324, 24.12.1990, p. 219, rapporteur: David Martin, A3-0270/1990.
  Resolution of 22.11.1990 embodying Parliament's opinion on the convening of the Intergovernmental Conferences on Economic and Monetary Union and on Political Union - OJ C 324, 24.12.1990, p. 238, rapporteur: David Martin, A3-0281/1990.
  Resolution of 17.5.1995 on the functioning of the Treaty on European Union with a view to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference - Implementation and development of the Union - OJ C 151, 19.6.1995, p. 56. rapporteurs: Jean-Louis Bourlanges and David Martin, A4-0102/1995.
  Resolution of 133.1996 embodying (i) Parliament's opinion on the convening of the Intergovernmental Conference, and (ii) an evaluation of the work of the Reflection Group and a definition of the political priorities of the European Parliament with a view to the Intergovernmental Conference - OJ C 96, 1.4.1996, p. 77, rapporteurs : Raymonde Dury and Hanja Maij-Weggen, A4-0068/1996.
  Resolution of 18.11.1999 on the preparation of the reform of the Treaties and the next Intergovernmental Conference - OJ C 189, 7.7.2000, p. 222, rapporteurs: Giorgos Dimitrakopoulos and Jo Leinen, A5-0058/1999.
  Resolution of 3.2.2000 on the convening of the Intergovernmental Conference - OJ C 309, 27.10.2000, p. 85, rapporteurs: Giorgos Dimitrakopoulos and Jo Leinen, A5-0018/2000.
  Resolution of 16.3.2000 on the drafting of a European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights - OJ C 377, 29.12.2000, p. 329, rapporteurs: Andrew Duff and Johannes Voggenhuber, A5-0064/2000.
  Resolution of 13.4.2000 containing the European Parliament's proposals for the Intergovernmental Conference - OJ C 40, 7.2.2001, p. 409, rapporteurs: Giorgos Dimitrakopoulos and Jo Leinen, A5-0086/2000.
• [5]  Resolution of 16.1.1986 on the position of the European Parliament on the Single Act approved by the Intergovernmental Conference on 16 and 17 December 1985 - OJ C 36, 17.2.1986, p. 144, rapporteur: Altiero Spinelli, A2-0199/1985.
  Resolution of 11.12.1986 on the Single European Act - OJ C 07, 12.1.1987, p. 105, rapporteur: Luis Planas Puchades, A2-0169/1986.
  Resolution of 7.4.1992 on the results of the Intergovernmental Conferences - OJ C 125, 18.5.1992, p. 81, rapporteurs: David Martin and Fernand Herman, A3-0123/1992.
  Resolution of 19.11.1997 on the Amsterdam Treaty - OJ C 371, 8.12.1997, p. 99, rapporteurs: Iñigo Méndez de Vigo and Dimitris Tsatsos, A4-0347/1997.
  Resolution of 31.5.2001 on the Treaty of Nice and the future of the European Union - OJ C 47 E, 21.2.2002, p. 108, rapporteurs: Iñigo Méndez de Vigo and António José Seguro, A5-0168/2001.
• [6]  Resolution of 29.11.2001 on the constitutional process and the future of the Union - OJ C 153, 27.6.2002, p. 310, rapporteurs: Jo Leinen and Iñigo Méndez de Vigo, A5-0368/2001.
  Resolution of 24.9.2003 on the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and the European Parliament's opinion on the convening of the Intergovernmental Conference - OJ C 77 E, 26.3.2004, p. 255, rapporteurs: José María Gil-Robles Gil-Delgado and Dimitris Tsatsos, A5-0299/2003.
• [7]  CdR 354/2003 fin, not yet published in the Official Journal.
• [8]  CESE 1416/2004, not yet published in the Official Journal.
• [9]  P6_PV(2004)09-14.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

‘I am not an advocate of frequent changes in laws and constitutions, but laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths discovered, and manners and opinions change, with change of circumstances, institutions must advance also to keep pace with the times. We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilised society to remain ever under the regime of their ancestors.’

Thomas Jefferson

I.    Introduction

1.   More than half a century ago, the Schuman Declaration set in train an ambitious undertaking: that of uniting Europeans, who had been divided for centuries by fratricidal conflicts, around a common project.

Success was dependent on a resolution of the three crucial issues facing Europe at the end of the Second World War: how to overcome the internal demons which were the root cause of the most serious disasters to have affected our continent, how to regain a place at the forefront of world affairs, and how to develop economic conditions which would guarantee the survival of a stable democratic order.

The history of the last five decades is the chronicle of a success. Europe has managed to consolidate a political system based on the principles of freedom, pluralism and tolerance; has reconciled countries which had been enemies only just before, ushering in the longest period of peace in modern times; has secured for Europeans high levels of material well-being and social progress; has helped to bring about the dismantling of the Iron Curtain which divided the Europe of the free from the Europe of the oppressed. All these achievements of the European integration process should not lead us to forget its true objectives: making nationalist excesses, the real cancer affecting modern Europe, a thing of the past; defending democracy as a system which can channel divergent opinions in a pluralist society; and giving Europe a strong, influential voice to defend its ideas, its values and its interests.

However, Europe must not rest on its laurels: it must deal with the new challenges facing it at the start of the 21st century, i.e. the Union’s role in international politics, globalisation, enlargement, the euro, the internal and external security of our continent, terrorism, migratory flows, education, technological progress, racism, xenophobia or social exclusion.

Since the first European Community (Coal and Steel: Paris Treaty of 18 April 1951[1]), which brought together six Western European countries[2], was established, the European integration process has been extended to embrace 25 European States[3] and has seen its scope expand to cover new areas through the establishment of the Economic Community and the Atomic Energy (Euratom) Community (Treaties of Rome of 25 March 1957[4]) and, subsequently, the European Union (Maastricht Treaty of 7 February 1992).

2. Ever since the first European elections by universal suffrage in 1979, Parliament has consistently sought to democratise and make more effective and transparent the workings of what was to become the European Union. By adopting, on 14 February 1984, the first draft Treaty establishing the European Union (known as the ‘Spinelli’ draft, after its rapporteur), Parliament initiated a reform process which was to continue for the following 20 years and lead to the drafting of the Single European Act[5], the Maastricht Treaty[6], the Treaty of Amsterdam[7], the Treaty of Nice[8] and, now, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe[9].

At each stage, with the Committee on Institutional Affairs, which in 1999 became the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, providing the driving force, Parliament played an active part in the preparatory talks and assessed the outcome of the various Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs)[10].

Right from the start of this process, it advocated clarifying and enhancing the constitutional basis for the European Union, a need which became more and more acute under the pressure of successive enlargements, given their capacity to jeopardise the political dimension of the integration process.

Three distinct but related objectives have been pursued by Parliament to this end:

First, it has sought to clarify and where necessary strengthen the competences and responsibilities of the European Union itself. Parliament has consistently argued that powers should be attributed to, and exercised by, the Union on the basis of the ‘principle of subsidiarity’, i.e. it should exercise those responsibilities - but only those responsibilities - that can be carried out more effectively by common policies than by the Member States acting separately.

Second, it has argued that responsibilities exercised at European level should be carried out more effectively. Parliament was particularly critical of the practice of unanimity in the Council, arguing that, where it has been agreed to run a policy jointly, it makes no sense to give a blocking power to each of the component States of the Union. It has also pleaded for a stronger role to be given to the Commission in carrying out policies once they have been agreed, subject to proper scrutiny and control.

Third, it has made the case for better democratic control and accountability at European level. Those responsibilities which national parliaments, in ratifying the Treaties, have transferred to the Union should not be exercised by the Council (i.e. national ministers) alone. The loss of parliamentary powers at the national level should be offset by an increase in parliamentary power at European level.

In the light of the mixed and clearly inadequate results achieved by the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice, when set against the challenge posed by the doubling in the number of Member States, but also that of the further deepening of the Union, it became more and more apparent that the established method of revising the Treaties was no longer able to provide genuine responses to the issues raised by the development of Europe.

Parliament had already reached that conclusion, and outlined it clearly, in its resolution of 19 November 1997 (based on the report by Íñigo Méndez de Vigo and Dimitris Tsatsos, see footnote 10 above) which marked the real starting point of the political review process which was to culminate, in 1999, in the establishment, at the instigation of the German Council Presidency, of the Convention model, one first employed in connection with the drafting of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

The signatories to the Treaty of Nice, being aware of its imperfections, in fact annexed to it a Declaration No 23 'on the future of the Union'[11] which paved the way for further reform of the treaties, originally scheduled for 2004. This reform was to be prepared for by 'wide-ranging discussions with all interested parties: representatives of national parliaments and all those reflecting public opinion (...) representatives of civil society, etc.', which was to take place in 2001 with a view to the adoption of a declaration 'containing appropriate initiatives for the continuation of this process' at the European Council in Laeken.

3. Parliament, for its part, after having sought to work in partnership with the national parliaments, during the preparations for successive IGCs[12], was the first to propose[13], on the basis of the precedent set when the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union was drawn up[14], the convening of a Convention comprising representatives of the Heads of State and Government of the Member States, the national parliaments and the European Parliament and the Commission and with the involvement, as full members, of representatives of the governments and parliaments of the applicant States.

The Convention on the Charter of Fundamental Rights demonstrated that a body of this kind was able to prepare a draft text likely to secure the approval of the Heads of State or Government. The open and transparent nature of the Convention and the quality of its debates had also facilitated efforts to achieve a consensus by giving every representative the opportunity, first of all, to express his or her own views, and, subsequently, to understand those of the other representatives.

The Laeken European Council of 14 and 15 December 2001, by adopting the 'Laeken declaration on the future of European Union'[15] followed up this initiative by setting out the organisational arrangements for the work of the Convention and, above all, defining its terms of reference and the issues that it would be called upon to discuss. Thus, the Convention on the Future of Europe (chairman: Valéry Giscard d’Estaing; vice-chairmen: Giuliano Amato and Jean-Luc Dehaene) was given the task of drawing up a preliminary draft Constitution to serve as the basis for the work of the IGC which was to follow.

The outcome of the Convention confirmed that the choice of this method had been a wise one, since the latter succeeded in presenting, after 16 months’ work, a consensus-based text informed by intense debates which also drew on close dialogue with civil society.

For its part, Parliament, through the work of its Committee on Constitutional Affairs, exerted a major influence on the draft constitutional Treaty[16], only a very few provisions of which would be modified by the IGC. At that IGC, for the first time Parliament was fully involved in the proceedings, in the persons of its President, Pat Cox, and its two representatives, Íñigo Méndez de Vigo, subsequently replaced by Elmar Brok, and Klaus Hänsch.

II.       How does the Constitution represent a step forward by comparison with the Treaties in force and, hence, the existing acquis?

The new Constitution proposed for the European Union includes a high number of significant reforms and improvements to the current Constitution (i.e. the set of overlapping treaties that currently serve as the de facto constitution). It is, of course, a compromise that is cautious in a number of respects. But it is a compromise that takes Europe forward, that has been elaborated after lengthy, public and pluralistic debates in the European Convention and has been finalised and approved by the elected governments of all 25 Member States - each of which wants this to be the basis on which they will work together in Europe in the future.

1.   A constitutional Treaty for the Union

1.1.     The question is sometimes raised as to whether the new document is a Constitution or a Treaty. A sterile debate on an issue which is nothing more than a red herring must be avoided: there is no doubt that, in formal terms, the document is a treaty which will be adopted and ratified in accordance with the rules in force governing the revision of treaties. There is no other possible procedure. However, by virtue of its nature and substance, this Treaty establishes a genuine Constitution.

1.2.     The Constitutional Treaty defines the nature of the actions which the European Union (EU) may take and the values and principles which guide those actions; it describes the Union’s competences; it lays down what institutions the EU will have, outlines its decision-making procedures, stipulates what form its acts will take; it defines citizens’ rights vis-à-vis the EU; it lays down the rules governing its own revision, etc. This is the role of a constitution: laying down the conditions governing, and the limits to, the exercise of power in the context of a political entity and safeguarding citizens’ rights.

1.3.     To a substantial extent, the same is true of the existing Treaties: the Union already has its Constitution, deriving from the Treaties which brought it into being, just like any other political entity. By simplifying those Treaties, by giving them a more readily comprehensible structure, and by conferring on them a particularly formal status, a vital step has been taken towards clarifying the system with a view to making it more transparent and comprehensible for citizens.

1.4.     On that basis, and despite the fears voiced in some quarters, endowing the Union with a Constitution in no way signifies that a first step has been taken towards the creation of a centralised ‘superstate’ which would inevitably sound the death knell for national States and irrevocably change the nature of the European Union (there are many examples of international organisations whose constituent act is rightly termed a constitution, including the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the World Health Organisation (WHO), or, one which is less frequently cited, the Universal Postal Union (UPU). Indeed, the reverse is true: as it stands, the Constitution can even be said to offer the Member States and Union citizens formal safeguards against Community action going too far.

1.5.     It can legitimately be argued that Part III of the Constitutional Treaty should have been substantially revised and that many of its provisions are not truly constitutional in nature, are too detailed and complex and should have no place in a genuine Constitution. However, the remit conferred on the Convention did not cover such a task. Nevertheless, the degree of simplification is immediately evident: all the provisions have been brought together in a single coherent and structured document and a mere reading of Parts I and II, those which focus on the more specifically ‘constitutional’ aspects, is enough to provide members of the public with a clear and straightforward overview of the political reality of the Union and of their rights.

1.6.     The length of Part III has given rise to the criticism that the Constitution is far too detailed and complex when compared to, for example, the US Constitution. This is because Part III, like preceding treaties, spells out in detail, for each policy area, the objectives of EU action, thereby limiting it. There is no ‘blank cheque’ given to the EU institutions to act without restriction in any policy area.

2.        One single entity: the European Union

2.1.     A crucial step forward, in terms of transparency and understanding by citizens of the nature of the European project, has been taken by merging the various Treaties in a single document and by making a transition from a very complicated state of affairs, involving several overlapping entities (European Union, European Community), to a single entity, the European Union, endowed with a (single) legal personality at international level, which will increase the effectiveness and visibility of Union action at that level. At the same time, the three-pillar structure [common foreign and security policy (CFSP), justice and home affairs (JHA) and Community] has been done away with; all three have been merged into the single corpus of the Union, with a single institutional framework and the across-the-board application of the Community method, the sole exception being the common foreign and security policy (including defence), where specific decision-making procedures remain in force, as warranted by the specific nature of that policy area.

In short, therefore, the Constitution offers us a single Treaty, and a single entity: the European Union[17].

2.2.     The Constitution lays down, in a prominent position (Article I-8), the symbols of the Union, i.e. its flag (a circle of 12 gold stars on a blue background), its anthem (the Ode to Joy from Beethoven's Ninth Symphony), its motto (United in Diversity), its currency (the euro) and Europe Day (9 May). These symbols are designed to enable citizens to identify more closely with and strengthen their feeling of belonging to a Community with a shared destiny.

3.       A clear definition of the Union's values, principles and objectives

It is significant that the Constitution should open with articles defining the nature of the Union and the values and principles on which it is founded and the objectives which it is supposed to pursue by means of its action.

3.1.     The very first article of the Constitution (Article I-1) enshrines the dual legitimacy of the Union, reflecting the will of the citizens and States of Europe. The Constitution places the emphasis on the individual, that is to say men and women with rights and duties who are citizens of the Union, through being citizens of a Member State, and who, by virtue of that fact, enjoy the additional set of rights afforded them by European citizenship.

This article sets out the founding principles of the European integration process: the Member States confer on the Union competences to attain objectives they have in common. At European level, the Union coordinates the policies by which the Member States aim to achieve these objectives, and it is the Union's institutions which exercise the competences conferred on it. At the same time, the Union undertakes to respect the national identity of the Member States, that is to say essential elements of their internal political structure. In this way the Union demonstrates its respect for the decisions which each Member State may take in relation to the geographical distribution of power - from the fixing of its frontiers to regional or local autonomy - the maintenance of public order and the safeguarding of national security. Lastly, the Constitution lays down the principle of loyal cooperation between the Union and its Member States with a view to achieving their shared objectives.

3.2.     The constitutional foundations of the European Union must be firmly anchored to the values which underpin and must guide every action taken by its institutions.

In accordance with Article 2 of the Constitution, the values on which the entire European integration process is founded are respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. Moreover, these values represent the reference criteria governing future accessions and may serve as the basis for imposing sanctions on any Member States which violate them on a serious, persistent basis.

This article also defines the principles which guide the Union's action: pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men.

Finally, the Union pursues political objectives, objectives which justify its existence and which can be summarised as follows: the promotion of peace, the Union's values and the well-being of its peoples. They are given practical form in Article 3 of the Constitution in terms of political, economic and social objectives, as pursued within the Union and in the sphere of external relations.

Accordingly, at an internal level the Union offers it citizens an area of freedom, security and justice and an internal market based on free and fair competition. It works for the sustainable development of Europe, on the basis of balanced economic growth and price stability; to develop a highly competitive social market economy aiming at full employment and social progress; and to secure a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. It promotes scientific and technological advance. Finally, it combats social exclusion and all forms of discrimination and promotes social justice and protection, equality between men and women, solidarity between generations and the protection of the rights of the child. It promotes economic, social and territorial cohesion and solidarity among the Member States. It respects its rich cultural and linguistic diversity and ensures that Europe's cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.

At an international level, the Union contributes to peace and security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, the eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, and to strict observance and the development of international law, in particular the United Nations Charter.

These objectives thus make up a basic political programme which was the well-spring for the establishment of the Union. It is incumbent on the Union to pursue these objectives by appropriate means, using the competences conferred on it in the Constitution.

The values and principles thus represent the ethical foundation of the Union, a foundation which is given practical form in the Charter of Fundamental Rights incorporated into Part II of the Constitution. The objectives assigned to it justify the existence of the Union and are the reason behind the Member States' decision to establish the Union. They govern its action in all areas. Although the values, principles and objectives defined in these articles are not entirely new, some of them had never previously been clearly stated and had never previously been codified and systematised. Codification of this kind is the hallmark of a Constitution and represents an important step towards providing citizens with a clear, highly symbolic insight into precisely what the Union signifies.

3.3.     In that connection, it should be emphasised that the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) essentially followed the text agreed on by the Convention, making only minor changes which Parliament can readily endorse: the addition to the list of values of the rights of persons belonging to minorities, the enshrinement of equality between women and men as a principle, the inclusion of 'price stability' among the Union's objectives, alongside that of the 'a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress'.

4.        Citizens at the heart of the European integration process: the incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into the Constitution

4.1.     The incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into Part II of the Constitution signifies full acknowledgement of the fact that citizens are at the heart of the European integration process. As a result of this incorporation, the Charter has acquired binding legal force: it is thus binding both on the European institutions, acting in the framework of their respective competences, and on the Member States, but only when they act as implementers of Community law. It thus offers citizens an additional safeguard vis‑à‑vis the Union.

           This in no way signifies that the protection of the fundamental rights guaranteed to citizens, vis-à-vis their States, by each national constitution is being called into question, or that competences are being surreptitiously conferred on the Union, despite the claims made by some critics that the Union could in this way impose economic and social policy guidelines on the Member States. The assertion in the Constitution that the Charter does not extend the field of application of Union law, does not establish any new power or task for the Union and does not modify the powers and tasks conferred on it in the Constitution (Article II-111) is particularly clear on this subject.

However, the fears held by some Member States regarding the implications of the social and economic rights recognised in the Charter prompted the Intergovernmental Conference to try to incorporate further safeguards[18] over and above those which the Convention had already laid down with a view to preventing any unwanted expansion in Union powers. The necessity of such a step, which seems to disregard well established doctrine in European constitutional law, is not clear; however, given that the legal effect of the Charter is not called into question, it can be accepted.

4.2.     The rights set out in the Charter correspond, in general terms, to the common set of fundamental rights which the Union already recognised and which resulted from the constitutional traditions of the Member States or the European Convention on Human Rights. The point is that these rights should be set out in detail, in a manner readily understandable to citizens, and that it should be clearly stated that the Union is required to respect them. This can only help to strengthen citizens' trust in their Union.

4.3.     The incorporation of the Charter into the Constitution is announced immediately in the opening pages of the Constitution, in a separate title (Title II of Part I) devoted to fundamental rights and Union citizenship. A further step towards the protection of fundamental rights at Union level is taken by means of the stipulation that the Union will seek accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (to which all the Member States are parties), as Parliament has long been proposing. This will entail an agreement with the Council of Europe. The decision to conclude that agreement will have to be adopted by a qualified majority, after approval by Parliament.

4.4.     Further aspects of the Constitution could be cited which strengthen citizens’ rights of participation in the European political process (such as the people’s legislative initiative, or citizens’ initiative: Article I-47, paragraph 4) or which help to enhance the legal protection of their rights, by facilitating access to the Court of Justice.

Parliament can only welcome these vital steps designed to transform the EU into a genuine union of States and citizens.

5.        A clear and readily understandable definition of the Union's competences:

5.1.     One of the most important questions to which the new constitutional text needed to provide an answer was that of 'who does what?' in Europe. A clarification of this kind is essential if citizens are to grasp properly the allocation of political responsibilities at European level. It will also offer an additional safeguard to all those who fear excessive intervention on the part of the Union.

5.2.     With a view to providing this clarification, the Constitution defines the Union's competences, dividing them into three categories, each with a different legal status and each implying a different degree of Union intervention: the Union's exclusive competences; the competences it shares with the Member States; and action to support or complement action by the Member States. By virtue of their specific nature, the common foreign and security policy and the coordination of economic and employment policies warrant specific provisions which fall outside the three categories (cf. Annex 1).

           This definition of the Union's competences is consistent with the basic principle governing the allocation of competences, i.e. that the Union enjoys only those competences which have been conferred on it by the Member States in the Constitution with a view to achieving the objectives laid down in that document. This principle is in itself sufficient to prevent the emergence of any kind of centralised superstate, since it implies that all competences rest with the States, except in those cases where they transfer them to the Union.

5.3.     The Constitution does not increase the Union's competences: the small number of 'new' competences laid down correspond essentially to areas in which the Union already took action, under Article 308 of the EC Treaty, and which have been more clearly defined in the Constitution. The changes made in Part III essentially reflect the need to bring its provisions into line with the new decision-making procedures and the new legal instruments established in Part I.

5.4.     In addition, the Constitution strengthens the requirement for the Union to comply with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality when exercising its competences; monitoring of that compliance is already a matter for the Member State governments, in the Council, and Parliament. Although the definition of these principles set out by the Constitution corresponds to that already employed in the Treaties in force, the protocol on the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality provides for new mechanisms to guarantee compliance with those principles, in particular by substantially strengthening the role of the national parliaments.

5.5.     Above all, the latter gain the right to be informed in good time of all Commission legislative proposals, which must be duly substantiated as regards compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. This provision will enable the national parliaments to exercise more effectively the rights they enjoy at national level and will, in particular, enhance their ability to influence the actions of their governments in the Council of Ministers. Moreover, as regards the subsidiarity principle in particular, the national parliaments may, within six weeks following the forwarding of the proposal, send directly to the Union institutions, which must take due account of them, opinions setting out the reasons why they take the view that a proposal is not consistent with the subsidiarity principle. An 'early warning' mechanism even requires the Commission to reconsider its proposal should one-third of the national parliaments consider that the proposal in question does not comply with the subsidiarity principle.

           Finally, that same protocol also offers the Member States the possibility, if the national legal system allows such provision, of bringing an action before the Court of Justice, on behalf of their national parliament or one of its chambers, against a legislative act on the grounds that it violates the subsidiarity principle. The Committee of the Regions also gains the right to bring such actions against legislative acts on which, under the Constitution, it must be consulted prior to their adoption.

           These mechanisms offer further safeguards against any potentially ill-considered exercise of Union competences and will clear the way for much deeper democratic scrutiny of Community legislation.

5.6.     It is true that in order to gain a full picture of the specific methods for implementing these powers the definition must be read in conjunction with the specific provisions set out in Part III of the Constitution. However, it is equally true that a simple reading of Part I will give European citizens a fairly clear insight into who does what in Europe. This represents a substantial improvement in terms of transparency.

5.7.     One of the further welcome features is that the Constitution provides the system with the requisite degree of flexibility by means of a clause similar to the current Article 308 TEC, which authorises the Council, should the need arise, to adopt measures in areas where the Union has no explicit competences. This flexibility clause offers the Member States full safeguards: decision-making by unanimity and clause to be used solely in order to achieve the objectives laid down in the Constitution; the procedure to put it into effect has become more democratic, in that it is subject to approval by Parliament and the national parliaments must be notified in good time before the decision is taken.

6.        A revamped institutional framework for a stronger, more democratic and more transparent Union

           One of the key questions which the Constitution was required to resolve was that of the changes to be made to the Union institutions in order to enable them to deal with the new situation resulting from the enlargement, particularly as the Union's institutional organisation has essentially been based on the same structures for almost 50 years, even though the Union’s range of tasks has expanded substantially and the number of Member States has increased from six to 25. Despite the work of a series of Intergovernmental Conferences, the key institutional issues had remained unresolved and the solutions agreed on at Nice were not satisfactory even to some of those who had negotiated them. For its part, Parliament has repeatedly drawn the attention of the public and the leaders of the Member States to the need for a radical institutional reform to endow the Union with effective, democratic and transparent institutions, whilst safeguarding the institutional balance and the Community method: the Commission which proposes legislation, Parliament and the Council which take the decisions, and the Court of Justice which guarantees the application of the texts adopted.

6.1.     European Parliament

1.        The Constitution substantially enhances the role of the European Parliament, the only European institution which directly represents citizens:

           -  its role as a colegislator is fully recognised, thanks to the general application of the existing codecision procedure, which is elevated to the rank of the ordinary legislative procedure, but also thanks to an increase in Parliament's participation in special legislative procedures. In future the public will have a clear perception that European law is adopted by the chamber which represents them and by the chamber which represents States; in parallel, in the field of international agreements its approval will also be required as a general rule;

           -  it acquires a concurrent right of initiative for revision of the Constitution and participates in the Convention procedure (its approval is required for the Council to decide not to convene the Convention);

           -  its budgetary powers, which it shares with the Council on an equal footing, now extend to all Union expenditure;

           -  its powers of political control are enhanced, particularly by means of the election of the President of the Commission;

           -  various decisions which are of great importance in the life of the Union and which hitherto have rested solely with the Council are now also subject to approval by Parliament: the decision to initiate enhanced cooperation; the use of the flexibility clause enabling the Union to take measures not provided for in the Constitution in order to attain ends for which it does provide; decisions on the use of the general ‘bridging clauses’ (‘passerelles’) substituting qualified majority voting for unanimous voting or replacing special legislative procedures with the ordinary legislative procedure; certain decisions making it possible to extend the scope of legal bases provided for in the Constitution, such as those concerning the European public prosecutor or judicial cooperation in criminal matters;

           -  even in the field of the common foreign and security policy, where it has no powers of decision, the European Parliament acquires a general right to be informed and consulted.

2.        In conclusion it may be said that, despite certain fields where it might have been possible to go further, the European Parliament acquires powers of codecision in virtually all areas of Union policy. Basically, this is a matter of putting into practice the fundamental idea of the twofold legitimacy of the EU as a union of States and of citizens. Thus the Constitution undeniably represents a significant enhancement of the democratic dimension of the EU.

3.        The number of Members of the European Parliament is limited to 750. The Constitution does not state how the seats are to be distributed among Member States, but instructs the European Council, on the initiative of the European Parliament and with its assent, to decide, before the 2009 elections, what its composition should be, on the basis of the principle of 'degressively proportional' representation, with a minimum of 6 and a maximum of 96 seats per Member State (the Convention proposed a minimum of 4 and no maximum). This solution will make it possible to respond more flexibly to the future development of the EU while preserving the interests of each Member State.

6.2.     European Council

The European Council is recognised as an autonomous institution whose role is to impart political impetus: the Constitution expressly states that it is not to perform any legislative functions[19]. A major innovation introduced by the Constitution is the abolition of the rotating Presidency and its replacement with a President elected by the members of the European Council for a term of two and a half years, which may be renewed once. The President's duties will be to prepare and direct the work of the European Council and represent the Union externally in order to raise the Union's profile and improve the continuity and consistency of its representation, both internal and external. Provisions are included to prevent the President from exercising executive powers and to avoid any conflicts with the President of the Commission or the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Only practice will show whether these provisions are adequate.

6.3. Council

1.        The key issue was that of the procedure for voting within the Council when it acts by a qualified majority. The failure of the Brussels summit in December 2003 was partly due to differences of opinion between Member States on this subject. In the view of one of the rapporteurs, the introduction of population as a criterion for both the distribution of seats in the European Parliament and votes in the Council did not guarantee a balanced system, and he expressed himself in favour of the weighted votes system for the Council. However, since the Dimitrakopoulos-Leinen report, the European Parliament had opted by a large majority for the double majority system. This is why, since the beginning of the Intergovernmental Conference, the European Parliament had insisted that a solution could only be acceptable to it if it adhered to the principle of a double majority (of Member States and the population), in order to draw attention to the twofold legitimacy underlying the development of the EU as a union of states and a union of citizens, and that the new procedure must make decision-making easier than the system provided for in the Nice Treaty.

2.        It was indeed the double majority system proposed by the Convention that was finally adopted instead of weighting of votes. It may reasonably be considered that, although the thresholds have been set higher than proposed by the Convention (the Constitution now requiring 55% of States rather than 50%, and 65% of the population rather than 60%), the new system will make decision-making easier, as, in many combinations, the weighting system required far higher population thresholds for the adoption of a decision, and because, in many cases, the fact that at least four Member States will be required to form a blocking minority will have the effect of considerably reducing the 65% population threshold[20].

3.        The progress made in terms of transparency and clarity of the system, on the other hand, leaves much to be desired. Certainly, the logic of the double majority is far easier to understand than any weighting of votes, but there is a risk that the public may regard the thresholds which have been adopted as rather arbitrary, and above all, the combination of different, complementary criteria greatly impairs the gains in terms of simplification and comprehension of the system[21].

4.        While regretting the abandonment of the compromise arrived at by the Convention, it should be borne in mind that the solution ultimately adopted was chosen after a hard-fought battle among the Member States, the purpose of which was not always entirely clear: the impact of a few percentage points more or less on the relative degree of influence of each Member State in the voting system obscured the fact that in reality, coalitions between Member States are subject to change and are quite contingent - how many times has a decision been marked by a division between all the 'large' Member States on the one hand and all the 'small' Member States on the other? Often, the same action was intended to pursue contradictory objectives simultaneously, such as preserving a State's own opportunities to block decisions while attempting to reduce the opportunities for others to do so. And above all, the whole of this debate was carried on without considering that ultimately the dynamics of Community negotiations are such that votes are very rarely taken. Political realities being what they are, however, Parliament can accept the agreement reached between the Heads of State and of Government, albeit without concealing its regrets.

5.        Whatever the method by which decisions are taken, it must be applicable. Hence the importance of the question of the field of application of qualified majority voting. The Constitution makes significant progress in this regard: there are approximately 45 new cases in which qualified majority is to apply in various fields (cf. Annex 2). On the other hand, unanimity is still required in 70 cases. While the general direction of the changes can only be regarded as very positive, it is regrettable that the opportunity was not taken to do more in certain cases, and there were instances where the IGC even retreated from proposals on which consensus had been reached after mature reflection in the Convention (the most flagrant example being that concerning the multiannual financial framework).

6.        Another major improvement made by the Constitution in terms of transparency is the requirement for meetings of the various configurations of the Council to be divided into two parts, depending on whether the Council is acting in a legislative capacity or in other ways, with the corollary that when it deliberates or votes on legislative acts, the Council meets in public. Although it can only be regretted that the Member States did not accept the Convention's proposal, which Parliament was strongly in favour of, that a genuinely separate Legislative Council should be created, it may be considered that the essential aspect of this proposal, which was that meetings should be held in public and that the Council's legislative work should be transparent, has been preserved.

7.        As regards the configurations and functioning of the Council, the main novelty is the creation of an autonomous Foreign Affairs Council, to be chaired by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. This and the General Affairs Council are the only two configurations of the Council whose existence is provided for by the Constitution, which leaves it to the European Council to decide by a qualified majority on the creation of other configurations. The efforts to modify the existing system of rotating Presidencies of the Council in order to raise the profile and increase the consistency and continuity of its work have had somewhat limited results. The Member States deviated from the Convention's proposal, ultimately adopting the principle of equal rotation within a system of team Presidencies determined by a decision of the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, and it is not possible to see in advance exactly what the real benefits of this will be.

6.4. Commission

1.        Another of the institutional questions which were at the centre of debate both at the Convention and at the Intergovernmental Conference was the composition of the Commission. The solution ultimately opted for, with its implementation deferred, deviated from the Convention's proposal, but it corresponds better with political reality and may be considered positive: it makes it possible to respect the new Member States' aspiration to be represented in the Commission during the first years after their accession, although in future, after a reasonable lapse of time (2014), the vital reduction in the number of Commissioners (to 2/3 of the number of Member States, which - even in a 27-member EU - would already mean that there were fewer Commissioners than at present). Based on a rotation system which preserves equality between Member States, this solution will thus make it possible to contain the size of the Commission within acceptable limits. The frequency of the period when any given Member State will not nominate a Commissioner will be once in every three terms.

2.        The Constitution makes important progress regarding the appointment of the President of the Commission, who is in future to be elected by the European Parliament on a proposal by the European Council, acting by a qualified majority. This is a further step in the process of imparting political legitimacy to the Commission, particularly as the European Council is required to take account of the elections to the European Parliament. Afterwards, the whole Commission, the President, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is appointed by means of a special procedure (see below), and the Commissioners, selected by the Council in agreement with the President-designate, will require a vote of approval en bloc by the European Parliament[22].

3.        The enhanced role of the President of the Commission should also be noted, particularly as regards the internal organisation of the Commission and the right to demand the resignation of a Commissioner, which should improve the efficiency of the Commission.

6.5. Minister for Foreign Affairs

1.        One of the main institutional novelties of the Constitution is the creation of the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union (merging in a single post the pre-existing posts of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Commissioner responsible for external relations), which will correspond to the objective of ensuring that all the external actions of the EU are consistent and have a high profile. Institutionally, the Minister will wear two 'hats': he will be responsible for conducting the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, for which purpose he will chair the Foreign Affairs Council, present proposals and implement Council decisions, while at the same time he will be a Vice-President of the Commission, taking on that institution's responsibilities in the field of external relations and coordinating all aspects of the EU's external action. He will be assisted by a European External Action Service composed of officials from the Commission, the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers and national diplomatic services, which is to be set up by decision of the Council after consulting the European Parliament and obtaining the approval of the Commission.

2.        Thus the Minister will be a member of the Commission, but he will have a special status, reflected in the procedures for his appointment and the possible ending of his tenure: he will be appointed by the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, with the agreement of the President of the Commission; he may be dismissed by the European Council using the same procedure, and must resign if the President of the Commission asks him to do so. As a member of the Commission, his appointment must also be approved by the European Parliament when it votes on the investiture of the Commission as a whole, and if the Commission resigns en bloc following a motion of censure by the European Parliament, this also applies to him.

3.        These provisions essentially correspond to what the European Parliament had long been calling for: the Minister will indeed be able to increase the consistency and efficiency of the Union's international action, promote the emergence of a genuine common foreign policy and raise the Union's international profile by giving it a 'face'. The threefold political responsibility of the Minister, to the European Parliament, the Council and the President of the Commission, is positive. But potential conflicts between the Minister and the President of the Commission or the President of the European Council remain possible, and his hybrid status may give rise to conflicts of loyalty to the Council and Commission.

6.6. The Court of Justice of the European Union

           The Constitution also enhances the role of the Union's judicial wing, which it calls the 'Court of Justice of the European Union', comprising the 'Court of Justice', the 'General Court' and possible 'specialised courts', which may be instituted by a European law[23]. Although there are no major changes in the composition and organisation of the Court of Justice and the General Court (Court of First Instance), a preliminary stage is introduced into the procedure for appointing judges and advocates-general: before being appointed by the Member States, the candidates nominated by the governments will be heard by a committee with a remit to assess the candidates' suitability to perform their duties.

           In future, acts of the European Council and of the agencies will be subject to judicial control to ensure their legality. The conditions for the admissibility of complaints by natural and legal persons about regulatory acts are eased. There will be no restrictions on the bringing of actions against acts adopted in the field of judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation, except as regards reviewing the validity and proportionality of police operations and the exercise by States of their responsibilities for maintaining public order and internal security. Finally, although the acts adopted in the field of the common foreign and security policy cannot in themselves be the subject of legal proceedings, the Court nonetheless has jurisdiction to consider the legality of European decisions providing for restrictive measures again legal and natural persons.

6.7. Other institutions and advisory bodies

1.        The provisions concerning the European Central Bank (elevated to the rank of an institution of the Union) and the Court of Auditors remain virtually unchanged. However, it may be noted that the members of the Bank's Executive Board are in future to be appointed by the Council acting by a qualified majority and no longer unanimously.

2.        As regards the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social Committee, there are virtually no changes. However, the Committee of the Regions acquires the right to bring an action on grounds of a violation of the principle of subsidiarity by a legislative act for the adoption of which the Constitution requires it to be consulted.

* * *

           It may thus be concluded that, despite certain aspects with regard to which it is not possible to judge in advance how effective the proposed changes will be, the Constitution succeeds in clarifying and enhancing the capacity of the institutions while preserving the 'Community method' and the institutional balance, which should enable the Union to respond to the new situation arising from enlargement and assert itself in the international context.

7.        Acts and procedures: a more coherent, precise and comprehensible system

7.1.     The Constitution brings about significant progress in terms of simplification and rationalisation of decision-making procedures and instruments for action. The gains as regards the efficiency of procedures, their democratic legitimacy and their transparency are obvious. Even the changes of terminology are important in order to allow citizens to understand more clearly who decides what in the Union and how.

7.2.     The typology of legal instruments is simplified and clarified: six types of legal instrument are provided for: laws, framework laws, regulations, decisions, recommendations and opinions. These terms are simple and clear, and the designation 'European' added to each of these categories will make it clear to the public what is meant, since they correspond to the terminology used in most Member States (a law is a set of rules emanating from Parliament, a regulation is a set of rules adopted by the executive), putting an end to the confusion and terminological imprecision which have prevailed until now.

7.3.     The Constitution also establishes a clear hierarchy of instruments. The supremacy of legislative acts over executive acts is clearly stipulated. The Commission is recognised as the European executive, which has the duty to take the necessary measures to implement legislative acts at European level, while the Council only exceptionally performs executive responsibilities, in the cases where the Constitution expressly so determines, or when legislative acts, stating due reasons, so specify.

7.4.     The creation of a category of delegated regulations, which involve power being delegated by the legislative authority (the European Parliament and the Council) to the Commission, will be able to render the Union's action more efficient, as there will be no need for the legislature to concern itself with technical details which can be dealt with more quickly and appropriately by the executive; delegation of powers is accompanied by the requisite guarantees of control by the legislative authority (by means of the 'call-back' procedure), and complete equality between the European Parliament and the Council is ensured[24].

7.5.     The new legislative procedures: the Constitution clearly places the emphasis on the ordinary legislative procedure (which corresponds to the existing codecision procedure); this is the legislative procedure par excellence, which the other types of procedure are conceived as exceptions, which must be explicitly provided for in the Constitution. The main features of the ordinary legislative procedure are as follows: the power of initiative rests with the Commission (except in the case of certain topics in the field of the area of freedom, security and justice, where the Commission shares it with at least 1/4 of the Member States), there is codecision by the European Parliament and the Council (some small changes which have been made to the old codecision procedure are intended precisely to stress the complete equality between the two institutions), and the Council adopts its decision by a qualified majority.

7.6.     The scope of the ordinary legislative procedure has been substantially expanded: some fifty new legal bases (bringing the total to 86), some of which are of enormous importance, such as those concerning the area of freedom, security and justice, policy on agriculture and fisheries, the European research area and the definition of implementing powers (hitherto governed by the framework decision on comitology) or the current Financial Regulation (cf. Annex 3). In all these fields, the Council can no longer decide by itself, but only in agreement with Parliament.

7.7.     Regrettably, there are still too many cases in which special legislative procedures apply, so that one institution adopts an act with the participation of the other institution - which may range from assent to mere consultation - and in some cases it is difficult to see the choice of this type of procedure as anything but the result of concessions made during the negotiations at the Intergovernmental Conference. There are three cases in which the European Parliament may enact laws with the assent of the Council[25]. In contrast, there are 28 cases in which provision is made for Council laws[26]. The law containing the annual budget is subject to a special procedure for joint decision-making by the European Parliament and the Council (cf. point 8 below).

7.8.     Despite these exceptions, the Constitution undeniably represents distinct progress in terms of the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of European law-making. This progress is accompanied by similar progress regarding the adoption of the international agreements concluded by the Union, thanks to the extension of the application of the qualified majority voting procedure in the Council and the requirement that the assent of the European Parliament be obtained (for example on agreements implementing the common commercial policy).

8.        The Union's finances

8.1.     One of the questions which gave rise to most debate, both at the Convention and at the Intergovernmental Conference, was reform of the Union's system of finance, particularly the budgetary procedure. It was a matter of institutionalising a system which in future would make it possible to finance the Union adequately, transparently and democratically, and particularly for the European Parliament to consolidate its powers as an arm of the budgetary authority by giving it a decisive say on the whole of the EU budget, including expenditure hitherto classified as 'compulsory', such as expenditure on the common agricultural policy and the common fisheries policy. The final result, although positive overall, to some extent represented a change of emphasis by the Intergovernmental Conference, which did not entirely accept the Convention's proposals.

8.2.     The Convention had proposed a three-stage model which was simple and balanced:

            -  the Council would continue to decide unanimously (with the subsequent approval of the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional rules) on the essential features and on the own-resources ceiling[27];

            -  the European Parliament and the Council would decide jointly on the Financial Perspective, which would be constitutionalised under the name 'multiannual financial framework' (the Council would decide by a qualified majority as from the first financial framework after the entry into force of the Constitution);

           -  the two institutions would decide jointly on the annual budget: after a first reading in each institution, which could lead to the convening of a conciliation committee, Parliament would have the last word in the event of disagreement, on condition that a very large majority was in favour; otherwise, the Council's position would prevail.

8.3.      This meant that the Member States would continue to hold the key to the determination of the amount and nature of the Union's revenue, that the two arms of the budgetary authority would have to agree on the programming of expenditure and that, in the event of disagreement on the annual budget, the European Parliament could have the last word on overall expenditure (the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure being dropped), albeit within the limits of the ceilings imposed by the financial framework. In practice, the two institutions would thus have been strongly encouraged to reconcile their views.

8.4.      A large number of the Member States were unhappy with this balanced system, and throughout the Intergovernmental Conference proposals were submitted which in some cases even represented a serious assault on the European Parliament's existing powers in this field and ran the risk of destroying the idea of financial democracy in the Union. Thanks particularly to the efforts of the representatives of the European Parliament and the Italian and Irish Presidencies, it proved possible to find a compromise which preserves the essential aspects of Parliament's rights in this field:

          -   the Convention's proposals on own resources were accepted;

         -    the financial framework must always be adopted by the two institutions, but the Council will decide unanimously until the European Council, also acting unanimously, decides that the Council may decide by a qualified majority;

        -     the annual budget is also adopted jointly by the European Parliament and the Council, but in the event of disagreement the procedure must begin again with the submission by the Commission of a new draft budget.

8.5.     As has already been said, this solution preserves the essential aspects of the European Parliament's budgetary powers: Parliament is given a decisive voice on the whole of budget, in view of the abolition of the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure. But the retention of the unanimity requirement for the adoption of the multiannual financial framework will seriously complicate future negotiations on the subject and provide less encouragement for the budgetary conciliation between the institutions which was the rationale underlying the Convention's proposal.

9.        Progress on sectoral policies

           Part III of the Constitution, concerning 'The policies and functioning of the Union', consists of 322 articles and is the largest part. It consists almost entirely of provisions which already exist in the treaties as they stand at present concerning the definition and implementation of sectoral policies, particularly the legal bases for the Union's action in each field. It may be considered that many of these provisions could have been simplified or adjusted in the light of the changes which have occurred since they were drafted. But the fact is that the mandate which the European Council conferred on the Convention did not empower it to revise these provisions in depth.

           Thus the changes made in Part III are essentially consequences of the choices made in Part I of the Constitutional Treaty regarding the abolition of the 'pillars', the powers of the Union, the institutions, decision-making procedures and legal instruments. That is why, apart from the area of freedom, security and justice (essentially the former third pillar) and external relations, particularly the common foreign and security policy, where the changes are most sensitive, in the other sectoral policies the changes mainly concern the procedures applicable and the breakdown of legal bases between legislative and non-legislative acts. This in itself may already constitute a guarantee of greater efficiency, democratic legitimacy and transparency of the Union's action in view of the positive character of the changes which we have analysed above. It may incidentally be noted that an initial chapter has been introduced which lists the horizontal or cross-cutting clauses which apply across the board to all policies. We shall review the main aspects of these changes, with the aim of determining whether they enable the Union to act more efficiently and democratically in the fields in question.

9.1. The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice

1.        In the internal policy sphere, the provisions dealing with the area of freedom, security and justice are those where the greatest changes are to be found, with, in particular, the pillar structure being discontinued and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation (which, up to now, have come under the third pillar) being brought under the 'Community' method through the extension of the ordinary legislative procedure and qualified majority voting[28]. Specific institutional arrangements nonetheless continue to apply: the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning are defined by the European Council (by consensus), without Parliament being involved in any way; legislative initiative in connection with judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation is shared between the Commission and one quarter of the Member States (rather than a single Member State as is currently the case); and the national parliaments are given a larger role, particularly as regards monitoring compliance with the subsidiarity principle (one quarter of national parliaments required to trigger the early warning procedure, rather than one third).

2.        The policy objectives in this area are clarified and defined more precisely. Union action is the area is explicitly made subject to compliance with fundamental rights. Access to justice is enshrined as a general objective. Mutual recognition of the various systems and the approximation of laws are recognised as two parallel means of implementing policies.

           Policies on border checks, asylum and immigration are recognised as common policies of the Union, governed by the principles of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility among Member States.

           The Constitution also marks a major step forward as regards judicial cooperation in both civil and criminal matters and of police cooperation, mainly through the application of the ordinary legislative procedure.

3.        Judicial cooperation in civil matters is extended to all matters having cross border implications and is based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and decisions in extrajudicial cases, with the ordinary legislative procedure applying to any measures for the approximation of laws, with the exception of measures concerning family law, in which case unanimity is the rule (Council law, with Parliament merely being consulted). However, the Council may itself decide unanimously to extend the ordinary legislative procedure to cover some aspects of family law with cross-border implications.

4.        The major innovation as regards judicial cooperation in criminal matters is that the ordinary legislative procedure (qualified majority) is to be used for the approximation of laws covering both procedural matters (minimum rules to facilitate mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions, etc.) and substantive criminal law, with minimum rules concerning the definition of some serious crimes with cross-border dimensions listed in the Constitution, and sanctions. The Constitution even provides that the Council may, acting unanimously, identify other aspects of criminal procedure and other areas of crime to which the ordinary legislative procedure may apply.

           Some Member States were strongly opposed to this, despite the guarantee that European legislation in this area must respect the fundamental aspects of the Member States' legal systems. Therefore, in order to secure agreement, the Intergovernmental Conference made provision for an 'emergency brake' mechanism which provided the Member States that were having problems in this area with all the guarantees they required, without completely ruling out any further progress. Under this arrangement, should a Member State consider that a legislative proposal jeopardises 'fundamental aspects' of its legal system, it can ask for the matter to be referred to the European Council. The European Council has four months in which to refer the matter back to the Council so as to enable the procedure to continue, or to request the Commission or the group of Member States that submitted the original text to submit a new legislative proposal. Should the European Council fail to take a decision within the four-month period, or should the new legislative procedure opened at its request not be completed within twelve months, enhanced cooperation shall be established in the matter automatically if one third of the Member States are in favour.

5.        Parliament can also welcome the fact that the Intergovernmental Conference adopted the Convention's proposal for the establishment of a European Public Prosecutor's Office which has responsibility for combating offences against the Union's financial interests and may prosecute the perpetrators of such offences, despite strong opposition from several delegations. However, the Constitution stipulates that the Council law establishing the office must be adopted unanimously once Parliament has given its consent. A 'bridging clause' ('passerelle') nonetheless provides for the possible extension of the office's responsibilities to cover action to combat serious crimes with a cross-border dimension, by means of a European decision adopted unanimously by the Council after Parliament has given its consent.

6.        Lastly, the ordinary legislative procedure has also been introduced for police cooperation, although unanimity continues to be rule for operational cooperation and intervention by the competent authorities of one Member State on the territory of another Member State.

9.2      Other internal policies

1.        Aside from the introduction of a few new legal bases for 'new' - or more clearly defined - competences in Part I, the changes which the Constitution makes to the other sectoral policies stem mainly from the establishment of codecision (and thus qualified majority voting) as the ordinary legislative procedure and the breakdown between legislative and non-legislative acts as now defined.

2.        Some of the most striking changes are to be found in the fields of agricultural policy and fisheries policy, where the ordinary legislative procedure will apply for the adoption of legislative acts laying down rules for the common organisation of agricultural markets and the other provisions required for the pursuit of the common agricultural and fisheries policies (under the current arrangements, Parliament is merely consulted). This means that the shaping of the main lines of the common agricultural and fisheries policies will become a matter to be decided by Parliament as well, and no longer just by agricultural ministers. However, the setting of prices, levies, aid and quantitative limitations and the allocation of fishing quotas are to be dealt with by means of non-legislative acts (European regulations or decisions) adopted by the Council.

3.        A new strand, space policy, has been added to research and technological development policy. The research framework programme will now be enacted by a European law adopted by a qualified majority. A European research area within which researchers, scientific knowledge and technologies may move freely will be established under laws adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure. A European space programme may be adopted by means of a law or framework law. It should be noted that Parliament's legislative rights in this area were seriously called into question by some of the proposals put forward during the IGC.

4.        The objectives set out in the new section on energy include ensuring the functioning of the energy market and security of energy supply and promoting energy efficiency and the development of renewable forms of energy. The IGC placed a limit on legislative action by the Union, which must not affect a Member State's right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply. Furthermore, although the ordinary legislative procedure and qualified majority voting are the rule in this area, the IGC stipulated that any measures primarily of a fiscal nature must be taken by means of a Council law adopted unanimously after Parliament has been consulted.

5.        In the public health field the IGC went a little further than the Convention by adding, 'early warning of and combating serious cross-border threats to health' to 'the fight against the major health scourges' among the support measures to be taken by the Union. The Union must also, among other things, lay down measures setting high standards of quality and safety for medical products and measures to protect public health regarding tobacco and alcohol abuse. It should be emphasised that the Constitution stipulates that Union action in this area shall respect the responsibilities of the Member States for the definition of their health policy, including the management of health services and medical care and the allocation of the resources assigned to them.

6.        One can regret that the text finally agreed does not contain more substantial changes in the social policy field, particularly as regards the extension of qualified majority voting (no change with respect to the present situation). It would, however, be wrong to say that the Constitution represents a step backwards in this area. On the contrary, various advances are made, namely:

           -  inclusion of 'full employment' and 'social progress' among the Union's objectives in the opening articles of the Constitution;

           -  introduction at the beginning of Part III of a general 'social clause' under which, in defining and implementing all policies, the Union must take into account 'requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education, training and protection of human health';

           -  the establishment of a legal basis enabling services of general economic interest to be recognised and safeguarded;

           -  explicit recognition in Part I of the role played by the 'social partners', particularly the Tripartite Social Summit for Growth and Employment, which is to contribute to social dialogue.

           Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that the incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into the Constitution means that the social rights enshrined in the charter will be fully recognised in Community law.

7.        Lastly, the ordinary legislative procedure will apply to social security measures covering employed and self-employed migrant workers' entitlement to benefits. This will be combined with another 'emergency brake' mechanism, to apply in cases where a Member State considers such measures 'would affect fundamental aspects of its social security system, including its scope, cost or financial structure, or would affect the financial balance of that system'. It may then request that the matter be referred to the European Council (thus automatically suspending the legislative procedure). The European Council must then within a period of four months either refer the matter back to the Council, thus enabling the procedure to continue, or ask the Commission to submit a new proposal. (The Constitution does not, however, state what would happen should the Council fail to act.)

8.        The Constitution does not make any changes to the situation as regards taxation, where unanimity remains the general rule. The IGC failed to agree even to the relatively limited number of cases in which the Convention proposed that the ordinary legislative procedure (i.e. qualified majority) should apply in connection with administrative cooperation measures and action to combat tax fraud and evasion (subject to the Council unanimously establishing that the proposed measures related to these issues).

9.        Another area that came in for much discussion but in which the changes are relatively minor is that of economic governance. However, the coordination of economic and employment policies has been confirmed as a Union competence (although the IGC amended the Convention text to place the emphasis on the fact that the Member States coordinate their policies according to arrangements determined within the Union) and the provisions specific to Member States whose currency is the euro have been fleshed out. For example, the Council decision on the adoption of the euro by new Member States (proposed by the Commission) must be preceded by a recommendation from a qualified majority of the Member States whose currency is already the euro.

           Furthermore, the operating procedures of the Euro Group are set out in a protocol attached to the Constitution. The IGC also adopted a Declaration on the Stability and Growth Pact. The pact was the subject of heated discussions among some delegations, resulting in the adoption of changes to the Convention text which, inter alia, have reduced the importance of the Commission's proposed role in the excessive deficits procedure (with the recommendations addressed by the Council to the Member State concerned being adopted on the basis of a Commission recommendation, as is currently the case, rather than a proposal, as the Convention was proposing).

9.3.     Common foreign and security policy

1.        Major changes have also been made in the external relations sphere, but more to institutional arrangements than to decision-making procedures. In keeping with the creation of the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs (see section 6.5 above), the holder of which will, in institutional terms, wear two 'hats' and will be responsible for conducting the common foreign and security policy and coordinating all aspects of the EU's external relations, the Constitution now brings all areas of EU external action together in a separate title (Title V of Part III).

           Unanimity will continue to be the rule in the common foreign and security policy sphere, which continues to come under essentially intergovernmental procedures and in which the European Council plays the dominant role. Qualified majority voting will apply only to the implementation of decisions taken by the European Council (or proposals submitted by the Minister at the European Council's request) or the Council. Provision has, however, been made for an 'emergency brake' in cases where a Member State opposes the adoption of a decision by a qualified majority for vital reasons of national policy. Neither the Convention's proposals (qualified majority for proposals submitted by the Minister and supported by the Commission) nor the Italian Presidency's proposals (qualified majority for all of the Minister's proposals) were adopted, owing to opposition from various Member States. Parliament has been given the general right to be informed, and in some cases consulted. The Court of Justice's jurisdiction over common foreign and security policy is limited. However, the Constitution does give the Court jurisdiction to review the legality of European decisions resulting in restrictive measures against individuals.

2.        The greatest advances brought by the Constitution are to be found in the specific area of common security policy, where the Intergovernmental Conference made major changes which went even further than those proposed by the Convention.

           As a result, a common defence, or at least the formulation of a common defence policy, the principles for which were already approved in the Maastricht Treaty - has become a more realistic prospect[29]. This common defence policy gives the Union an operational capacity based on civil and military assets. The main changes in this connection are:

           -  revision of the 'Petersberg' missions[30];

           -  establishment of a European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency[31];

           -  the option to establish, by means of a Council decision adopted by a qualified majority, permanent structured cooperation in the defence field among Member States which have the military capacity and political will to be involved (the conditions for implementing such structured cooperation are set out in a protocol annexed to the Constitution);

           -  a mutual aid and assistance obligation among Member States under which Member States must use all means in their power to assist a Member State that is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, in accordance with the United Nations Charter and in compliance with the NATO commitments of the Member States that are members of that organisation. The Constitution stipulates that this obligation shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States, which is an important guarantee for the Member States that have traditionally been 'neutral';

           -  with a view to protecting the values of the Union, the Council will be able to entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States;

           -  establishment of a start-up fund made up of contributions from the Member States, to cover military expenditure not charged to the Union budget,

           -  laying down of a procedure for rapid access to appropriations in the Union budget.

3.        The Constitution also contains a solidarity clause under which the Member States must provide assistance to any Member State that is the victim of terrorist attack or natural disaster, if it so requests. The arrangements for implementing this clause will be adopted by decision of the Council, on a joint proposal from the Commission and the Minister. The Council will decide unanimously if this decision has defence implications. Parliament will be informed.

4.        These advances are therefore significant and do not undermine the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States or the commitments of the Member States that belong to NATO. Furthermore, they are not likely to transform the Union into an aggressive military bloc, as some people seem to fear. Some people would certainly have liked to go further, particularly as far as qualified majority voting is concerned. However, in view of the fact that this in an eminently intergovernmental policy area and of the political climate in which the Intergovernmental Conference was held, the final outcome can be considered to be relatively positive.

9.4.     Other areas of external relations

1.        Positive changes have been made in the area of common commercial policy. Its scope has been extended as regards trade in services and intellectual property. Parliament's role is enhanced: the ordinary legislative procedure will be used to lay down measures implementing the common commercial policy; and Parliament will receive regular reports on negotiations on international agreements, which may not be concluded without its consent. The Constitution also endorsed what is referred to as the 'cultural exception'[32].

2.        Lastly, as regards humanitarian aid, Parliament can welcome the establishment of a specific legal basis coming under the ordinary legislative procedure and providing for the establishment of a voluntary humanitarian aid corps.

10.      A significant degree of flexibility

           Another question of fundamental importance is whether the new constitutional framework is sufficiently flexible to enable the Union to adjust to changing circumstances and meet new challenges that may arise in the future.

           To find an answer to this question we need to address two issues: firstly, that of revision of the Constitution and secondly that of whether the system can evolve within the confines of the constitutional framework, without the need for revision of the Constitution itself.

1.        The new treaty makes a number of clear improvements to the revision procedure, first and foremost among which is the granting of a right of initiative as regards revision to Parliament, on the same basis as the Member States and the Commission. It also places the Convention on an institutional footing as the body responsible for preparing revisions, in recognition of both the truly decisive role the Convention played in the drafting of the Constitution and the limitations of the intergovernmental method. Parliament, which was the first to propose that the Convention method be used, cannot but welcome this change, which will help to make the revision procedure more transparent and democratic at the same time as making it more effective.

           One particularly positive development is the fact that Parliament must give its approval should the Council decide not to convene a Convention on the grounds that the changes are not sufficiently major.

2.        Unfortunately, the Intergovernmental Conference did not live up to Parliament's expectations as regards simplifying the revision procedure. The text of Article IV-444 does contain a simplified procedure for revising the provisions of Title III of Part III on the internal policies of the Union (on condition that such revision does not increase the competences allocated to the Union), but this procedure merely allows the European Council to bypass the Convention method (without requiring Parliament's consent); furthermore, unanimity and ratification by all the Member States remain the rule.

3.        Revision of the Constitution will thus continue to require unanimity and ratification by all the Member States in all cases. Even though various proposals were put forward which enjoyed broad support in Parliament and among the national parliaments and would have made this requirement a little more flexible as regards the revision of the provisions of Part III (which are quite detailed and many of which are of questionable constitutional value) while complying with the fundamental principle that any further increase in the Union's competences would need to be unanimously approved by the Member States.

4.        Conversely, Parliament cannot but welcome the retention of the 'bridging clauses' ('passerelles') which the Convention proposed for changes from unanimous voting to qualified majority voting within the Council or from special legislative procedures to the ordinary legislative procedure. The fact that this decision can only be taken unanimously by the European Council with Parliament's consent - and then only if no national parliament expresses any objections within a six-month period - provides an adequate guarantee that due respect will be shown for the rights of each Member State and that the decision will be transparent and democratically valid.

5.        Another positive aspect of the new constitutional text is the improvements made in connection with enhanced cooperation, the importance of which may increase in future in view of the substantial increase in the number of Member States. While establishing the conditions required to ensure the overall cohesion and institutional unity of the Union, the Constitution extends the scope of enhanced cooperation (which can now apply to all areas not covered by the exclusive competences of the Union, while under the current arrangements defence policy is excluded) and facilitates their establishment. Enhanced cooperation must bring together at least one-third of the Member States, with the Council acting by a qualified majority except in common foreign and security policy matters, where unanimity will continue to be required. Furthermore, the requirement that Parliament's consent be sought (except in common foreign and security policy matters) will enhance the democratic legitimacy of the decision to establish such cooperation.

6.        Lastly, the fact that the Intergovernmental Conference managed to retain the 'bridging clause' ('passerelle') proposed by the Convention, allowing a switch to qualified majority voting or the ordinary legislative procedure within the enhanced cooperation mechanism, is also a satisfactory development.

7.        Voluntary withdrawal from the Union: for the first time in the treaties establishing the European Communities and then the Union, which - with the exception of the first treaty, which established the European Coal and Steel Community - were expressly concluded for an unlimited period but which made no provision for a collective or individual withdrawal procedure, the Constitution establishes a mechanism for 'voluntary withdrawal from the Union' (Article I-60). It must of course be acknowledged that, in the absence of any specific provisions, such a move was anyway already permissible under international treaty law. However, the fact that withdrawal is now explicitly provided for in the Constitution both lays down detailed arrangements for dealing with such a situation and sends out the clear message that no Member State is obliged to continue to be involved in the European project if its people no longer wish it to be involved. When taken together with the provisions on enhanced and structured cooperation, this clearly demonstrates that involvement in the Union and in the furtherance of its policies is something that must be chosen freely on the basis of a genuine political commitment.

11.      Entry into force of the Constitution

11.1.   The Intergovernmental Conference was convened on the basis of Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union, which stipulates that whatever the scope of the amendments it proposes be made to the existing treaties (including their repeal, as provided for in Article IV-437 of the draft Constitution), the amendments will not come into force until they have been ratified by all the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

11.2.   This means that the provisions set out in Article IV-447 of the Constitution will apply to future ratification processes only. Article IV-447 states that if, two years after the commencement of any procedure for the ratification of changes to the treaty establishing the Constitution, one-fifth of the Member States have yet to complete the procedure or have encountered difficulties in proceeding with ratification (which also covers the possibility of the text having been rejected by one or more of them), the matter will be referred to the European Council.

11.3.   With a view to the ratification of the original treaty establishing the Constitution, the IGC adopted a political declaration (No 30), the terms of which are similar to those of Article IV-447 referred to above, which was incorporated in the Final Act.

11.4.   In the past, in cases where problems have occurred in some Member States during the procedure for ratifying earlier treaties, the matter has of course been referred to the European Council. However, by including this provision in line with the Convention's proposals, the IGC wished to send out the political message that it would be difficult to accept that a small minority of Member States prevent the others from moving forward, particularly in view of that fact that the Constitution provides inter alia for the option of voluntary withdrawal from the Union and that of taking part in enhanced or structured cooperation, in which not all the Member States are required to be involved. Such a situation should give rise to negotiations aimed at finding a solution that takes account of not only the situation of the Member State that is unable to ratify the Constitution but also, and above all, that of the Member States that accept it.

III.      Overall assessment/recommendation to approve the Constitution

1.        Given the above, Parliament's overall opinion on the outcome of the IGC which concluded in June 2004 must be firmly in favour, given that it reflects a level of ambition that few people felt would be possible to attain in the geopolitical context in which the entire exercise has been conducted since the Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union in December 2001[33].

2.        The procedure under which the Constitutional Treaty was drafted by the Convention was unprecedented in terms of the level of participation and degree of transparency. Subsequently, the Heads of State or Government adopted the text that will be put up for ratification in all the Member States. The resulting document is the outcome of a compromise reached among various parties, namely the national governments and national parliaments, in which democratic legitimacy is vested at national level, the European Parliament and Commission, acting on behalf of the EU institutions, and citizens, both individually and through civil society organisations. However, 'compromise' does not mean an agreement on lowest common denominators. On the contrary, despite the shortcoming described above, its provisions are extremely ambitious, which is something that had appeared Utopian in the light of the political context in which the work was conducted since the Laeken Declaration set the process in motion in December 2001.

           The consolidation of the constitutional foundations of the Union and its institutional framework and the rationalisation and simplification of its instruments are capable of at last bringing stability following two decades of permanent reform.

           The stability and certainty that are a feature of all constitutional texts are complemented by provisions which both organise the development of the decision-making process and enable use to be made of enhanced and/or structured cooperation mechanisms providing the flexibility required to adjust the way in which the Union operates so as to enable it to tackle the challenges it will be facing in coming years.

           Above all, however, the Constitution enhances democracy within the European Union, fosters more effective decision-making, ensures greater clarity about who does what in the Union and the competences assigned on the one hand to the Union and on the other to the Member States. At the press conference that followed the closure of the Convention, the chairman, Mr Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, said that the European Parliament had emerged from the Convention as the winner. The rapporteurs consider the real winners to be the European public, because this Constitution represents the biggest step forward since the Treaties of Rome in 1957, because it consolidates our values and principles in a stimulating project for living together and because it provides the best means of jointly tackling today's challenges.

3.        Given the above, Parliament should take a leading role in promoting and defending the Constitution and should help to foster and consolidate the political will required for it to be fully implemented. This should start with an active involvement in the debates taking place in connection with the ratification process.

• [1]  Entry into force: 23 July 1951.
• [2]  Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
• [3]  The following countries have joined the first six: Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1973, Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986, Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995, and the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia in 2004.
• [4]  Entry into force: 1 January 1958.
• [5] Luxembourg Treaty of 17 February 1986, which came into force on 1 July 1987.
• [6]  Signed on 7 February 1992, came into force on 1 November 1993.
• [7]  Signed on 2 October 1997, came into force on 1 May 1999.
• [8]  Signed on 26 February 2001, came into force on 1 February 2003.
• [9]  Signed in Rome on 29 October 2004 and should enter into force on 1 November 2006 if allthe instruments of ratification have been deposited by that date.
• [10]  Resolutions on the preparations for the IGCs and assessing their outcomes:
  - Single European Act
  . resolution of 14 February 1984: Spinelli report and draft Treaty (OJ C 77, 19.3.1984, p. 33)
  . resolutions of 16 January 1986: Planas report (OJ C 36, 17.2.1986, p. 144)
               and 17 April 1986 (OJ C 120, 20.5.1986, p. 96)
  - Maastricht Treaty
  . resolutions on the report by D. Martin of
                 14 March 1990 (OJ C 96, 17.4.1990, p. 114),
                 11 July 1990 (OJ C 231, 17.9.1990, p. 97)
                 and 22 November 1990 (OJ C 324, 24.12.1990, p. 219)
  . resolution of 7 April 1992: D. Martin report (OJ C 125, 18.5.1992, p. 81)
  - Treaty of Amsterdam
  . resolutions of 17 May 1995: D. Martin/Bourlanges report (OJ C 151, 19.6.1995, p. 56)
                 and 13 March 1996: Dury/Maij-Weggen report (OJ C 96, 1.4.1996, p. 77)
  . resolution of 19 November 1997: Méndez de Vigo/Tsatsos report (OJ C 371, 8.12.1997, p. 99)
  - Treaty of Nice
  . resolutions on the Dimitrakopoulos/Leinen report of 18 November 1999 (OJ C 189, 7.7.2000, p. 222),
                 3 February 2000 (OJ C 309, 27.10.2000, p. 85)
                 and 13 April 2000 (OJ C 40, 7.2.2001, p. 409)
  . resolution of 31 May 2001: Méndez de Vigo/Seguro report (OJ C 47E, 21.2.2002, p. 108).
• [11]  OJ C 80, 10.3.2001, pp. 85 and 86.
• [12]  Mention need be made here only of the Rome ‘Assises’ involving the national parliaments (Conference of the Parliaments of the European Community, held from 27 to 30 November 1990), the interinstitutional conferences held in parallel with the IGCs on Economic and Monetary Union and Political Union, which culminated in the drafting of the Maastricht Treaty, the participation by Parliament representatives in the work of the Reflection Group prior to the Amsterdam IGC, followed by their involvement in the proceedings of the IGC itself, and, finally, their involvement as observers in the group set up to prepare the Nice IGC.
• [13]  Resolution of 25 October 2000 (report by Olivier Duhamel on the constitutionalisation of the Treaties), confirmed by the resolution of 31 May 2001 (Méndez de Vigo/Seguro report on the [assessment of the] Treaty of Nice and the future of the European Union).
• [14]  The idea of adopting such a Charter, which today forms Part II of the Constitution, was first put forward by the German Council Presidency, which secured its acceptance by the Cologne European Council of 3 and 4 June 1999. The method of drafting the Charter was also laid down at that European Council meeting, then clarified at the following meeting held in Tampere on 15 and 16 October 1999. It was decided to establish a ‘body’ - subsequently termed ‘Convention’ - bringing together the four component parts of the Convention on the Future of Europe, but without the involvement of the applicant States.
• [15]  SN 300/1/01 REV 1, Annex 1, p. 19.
• [16]  Resolution of 16 March 2000: Duff/Voggenhuber report on the drafting of a European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights (OJ C 377, 29.12.2000, p. 329)
  .       Decision of 14 November 2000: Duff/Voggenhuber report on approval of the draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ C 223, 8.8.2001, p. 74)
  .       Resolution of 23 October 2002: Duff report on the impact of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union and its future status (OJ C 300E, 11.12.2003, p. 432)
  . Resolution of 29 November 2001: Leinen/Méndez de Vigo report on the Laeken European Council and the future of the Union (OJ C 153, 27.6.2002, p. 310(E))
  . Resolution of 25 October 2001: Poos report on the reform of the Council (OJ C 112, 9.5.2002, p. 317(E))
  . Resolution of 14 March 2002: Carnero González report on the legal personality of the European Union (OJ C 47, 27.2.2003, p. 594(E))
  . Resolution of 7 February 2002: Napolitano report on relations between the European Parliament and the national parliaments in European integration (OJ C 284, 21.11.2002, p. 322(E))
  . Resolution of 16 May 2002: Lamassoure report on the division of competences between the European Union and the Member States (OJ C 180, 31.7.2003, p. 493(E))
  . Resolution of 17 December 2002: Bourlanges report on the typology of acts and the hierarchy of legislation in the European Union (OJ C 31, 5.2.2004, p. 126)
  . Resolution of 14 January 2003: Napolitano report on the role of regional and local authorities in European integration (OJ C 38E, 12.2.2004, p. 167)
  . Resolution of 24 September 2003 on the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and the European Parliament’s opinion on the convening of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) (OJ C 77E, 26.3.2004, p. 255).
• [17]  The Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC/Euratom) is not, however, affected by the Constitution and will therefore remain in force alongside it, although some of its provisions have been amended by the Protocol modifying the Euratom Treaty with a view to making them compatible with the constitutional text. However, Germany, Ireland and Austria have expressed the wish, in declaration No 44 annexed to the Final Act of the IGC, that an Intergovernmental Conference be convened as soon as possible to revise the Euratom Treaty.
  Besides, it has to be said that the constitutional treaty is completed by a confusing number of protocols, annexes and declarations: 36 protocols (most of which were annexed to the existing treaties and have simply been adapted to the constitutional text, for instance those on the Schengen acquis, the role of national parliaments, the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, transition provisions concerning the institutions, structured permanent cooperation in matters of defence, etc.), two annexes (already existing, concerning the list of agriculture products and the list of countries and overseas territories) and 46 declarations. As these protocols have the same legal force as the constitutional treaty, they must also be ratified by all Member States. This is not the case for declarations, which are not legally binding.
• [18]  Paragraph 7 of Article II-112, which refers to the explanations drawn up on the authority of the Praesidium of the Convention that drew up the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Declaration No 12 annexed to the Final Act of the IGC, which incorporates those explanations.
• [19]  Although the role assigned to the European Council in operating an 'emergency brake' in connection with certain decisions concerning social security and judicial cooperation in criminal matters may mean that, even if it does not directly perform legislative functions (it does not participate in the adoption of legally binding rules) it may at least interfere in a virtually decisive manner in a legislative procedure - cf. below, points 9.1.4 and 9.2.7.
• [20]  The fact that the IGC introduced the requirement that at least four Member States should vote against a proposal in order to form a blocking minority means that in some circumstances a decision could be adopted with the support of far less than 62% of the population, which is the threshold set for the population criterion in the Nice Treaty: thus a decision opposed, for example, by Germany, France and Italy would nonetheless be adopted, even though its proponents represented only about 55% of the population, as these three Member States cannot by themselves form a blocking minority even though between them they represent almost 45% of the population of the EU (in its current 25-member form). It is necessary to bear in mind that at present the vagaries of the various possible combinations whereby it is possible to attain the minimum number of weighted votes required for a qualified majority has the effect that in many cases the required percentage of the population is substantially greater.
  On the other hand, it may be hoped that raising the threshold for the number of Member States will not, in practice, have a very significant negative impact. 55% of Member States instead of half (50%) would mean that in the 25-member EU 14 Member States would be required to vote in favour instead of 13, without the additional requirement formulated by the IGC that the majority must include at least 15 Member States; the number of Member States required to prevent a decision from being adopted will now be 12 instead of 13. In practice, the possible increase in the risks of blockage due to this increase is certainly not very great. In reality, decisions are never taken with the Member States divided into two antagonistic blocs of virtually identical proportions. Moreover, the additional requirement of at least 15 Member States, referred to above, will no longer be of any independent significance once the EU has 27 or more Member States, as is likely to be the case from 2009, when the new system enters into force (in a Union with 27 members, 55% of States is in any case equivalent to 15 Member States).
• [21]  It should also be recalled that, besides the two corrective criteria mentioned in the text (the minimum number of States required for a blocking minority (4) and the minimum number of States required for the adoption of a decision (15)), the IGC also reached agreement on a kind of revised Ioannina compromise for a transitional period (Declaration No 5 to the Final Act of the IGC): if members of the Council representing at least 3/4 of the number of Member States or of the population required to block a decision indicated their opposition to the adoption of a Council act by a qualified majority, the Council would continue to debate the subject with a view to reaching wider agreement within a reasonable period. This agreement was formalised in a draft decision which the European Council approved. This decision will remain in force at least until 2014, when the Council could revoke it. It should also be recalled that the Constitution provides that when an initiative from the Commission is not required, or when a decision is not adopted at the initiative of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the required qualified majority is to be bigger: 72% of Member States (as against the 2/3 proposed by the Convention), representing 65% of the population (as against the 60% proposed by the Convention).
• [22]  It may be noted that the IGC did not accept the Convention's proposal that the government of each Member State should submit a list of three names from which the President would choose the Commissioner proposed by the Member State. Also, it is regrettable that the IGC did not accept the Commission's proposal that the investiture of the Commission should conclude with the vote by the European Parliament, which is politically highly symbolic, but added a stage to the procedure, which is now to conclude with the appointment of the Commission by the European Council, acting by a qualified majority.
• [23]  Adopted by Parliament and the Council by means of the ordinary legislative procedure, either on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Court of Justice, or at the request of the Court of Justice and after consulting the Commission.
• [24]  Each of the two arms of the legislative authority may revoke the delegation decision at any time; in addition, a delegated regulation proposed by the Commission can enter into force only if neither of the two institutions makes objections within the time limit provided for by the law or framework law delegating the power of regulation.
• [25]  The law laying down the Statute for Members of the European Parliament, the law determining the status of the European Ombudsman and the law determining the procedures for the exercise of the right of inquiry (which likewise requires the assent of the Commission) - cf. Annex 4.
• [26]  In 22 of these cases, the Council decides unanimously (in five cases with the assent of the European Parliament, in 17 after mere consultation); in six cases it decides by a qualified majority (in one case with the assent of the European Parliament, in five cases after mere consultation) - cf. Annex 4.
• [27]  The Constitution provides for a Council law, on which Parliament may only deliver an opinion. The Convention, on the other hand, proposed that the measures for the implementation of the own-resources system should be adopted by a Council law adopted by a qualified majority, with the approval of Parliament.
• [28]  The Constitution does not affect the special situation applying to the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark in connection with the area of freedom, security and justice, as set out in several existing protocols which have been adapted to the new constitutional text.
• [29]  The decision to establish, in time, a common defence will be taken by the European Council, acting unanimously, and will require the approval of all the Member States in accordance with their constitutional procedures.
• [30]  To add operations relating to disarmament, military advice, post-conflict stabilisation and the fight against terrorism, including in the territory of third countries, to the existing humanitarian and rescue tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.
• [31]  Whose main responsibility is to promote the rationalisation of the military capacities of the Member States, the coordination of defence technology research and more effective military spending.
• [32]  The Constitution states that the Council shall act unanimously for the negotiation and conclusion of agreements in the field of trade in cultural and audiovisual services, where these risk prejudicing the Union's cultural and linguistic diversity. The IGC extended this 'exception' to cover the trade in social, education and health services where such agreements risk seriously disturbing the national organisation of such services and prejudicing the responsibility of Member States to deliver them. The Council shall also act unanimously where agreements in the fields of trade in services in general and the commercial aspects of intellectual property include provisions for which unanimity is required for the adoption of internal rules.
• [33]  Presidency conclusions, European Council meeting in Laeken, 14 and 15 December 2001 (Council doc. SN 300/1/01 REV 1).

ANNEX 1: The competences of the Union The Constitution also refers to the common foreign and security policy and the coordination of economic and employment policies, which, because of their specific nature, do not come under any of the three categories in this table. The areas of competence underlined in each of the columns are areas for which there are currently no specific provisions in the Treaties but in which the Union has already taken action, in particular using the provisions relating to the internal market or Article 308 TEC.

Type of competence	Exclusive (full list)[2]	Shared (non-exhaustive list)[3]	Complementary (full list)
Definition	Only the Union can adopt legally binding acts; the Member States cannot intervene unless authorised to do so by the Union, or to implement measures taken by the latter.	The Union and the Member States can adopt legally binding acts, the Member States being able to do so insofar as the Union has not done so.	The Union can intervene only to support action by Member States (primarily through financial contributions); it may legislate but not harmonise national legislation and regulations.
Subjects	Customs Union   Establishing competition rules required for operation of the internal market   Monetary policy for Member States whose currency is the euro   Conservation of the biological resources of the sea under the fisheries policy   Common commercial policy	Internal market Social policy Economic, social and territorial cohesion Agriculture and fisheries (excluding conservation of the biological resources of the sea) Environment Consumer protection Transport TransEuropean networks Energy Area of freedom, security and justice Common safety concerns in the public health sphere Research and technological development Space policy Development cooperation	Protection and improvement of human health   Industry   Culture   Tourism   Education   Youth   Sport   Vocational training   Civil protection   Administrative cooperation

• [1]  The Constitution also refers to the common foreign and security policy and the coordination of economic and employment policies, which, because of their specific nature, do not come under any of the three categories in this table. The areas of competence underlined in each of the columns are areas for which there are currently no specific provisions in the Treaties but in which the Union has already taken action, in particular using the provisions relating to the internal market or Article 308 TEC.
• [2]  In addition to these competences, the Union also high as an exclusive competence for the conclusion of international agreements when this is provided for in a legislative act of the Union, when it is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence or when it is likely to affect common rules or adversely affect their scope.
• [3]  Although the Constitution deals with the policies indicated in italics in this column in Article (I-14), relating to shared competences, they are sectors in which Union action does not have the effect of preventing the exercise of national competences.

ANNEX 2: New cases of qualified majority voting

I -  Existing legal bases which move to qualified majority voting

(the current procedure is indicated in brackets in italics)

1.   Art. I-24, paragraph 7 : Order of Presidencies of the Council – decision of European Council, without a Commission proposal (Art. 203 TEC – Council decides unanimously)

2.   Art. I-37, paragraph 3 : mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission's exercise of implementing powers (current comitology decision) – ordinary legislative procedure (Art. 202 TEC – unanimous Council decision, after consulting EP)

3.   Art. III-136 : free movement of workers, social benefits – ordinary legislative procedure[1] (Art. 42 TEC : codecision – Council acting unanimously) 

4.   Art. III-141 : freedom of establishment, taking-up and pursuit of activities as self-employed persons  – ordinary legislative procedure when the implementation of the relevant directives involves a change in the legislative principles in a Member State (Art. 47, paragraph 2 TEC – codecision – Council acting unanimously)

5.   Art. III-187, paragraph 3 : amendment of certain provisions of the Statute of the ESCB – ordinary legislative procedure (Commission proposal with consultation of the ECB or ECB recommendation with consultation of the Commission) (Art. 107.5 TEC – in the case of the Commission proposal, the Council acts unanimously after consulting the ECB; in all cases the EP is required to give its assent; in the case of a recommendation from the ECB, the Council acts by qualified majority after consulting the Commission)

6.   Art. III-236, paragraph 2 : common transport policy (including cases covered by paragraph 3) – ordinary legislative procedure (Art. 71, paragraph 2 TEC – Council acts unanimously after consulting EP only in the case of the exceptions set out in paragraph 2)

7.   Art. III-263 : administrative cooperation in the area of freedom, security and justice – Council regulation, consultation of EP (Art. 66 TEC and Art. 34, paragraph 1 TEU : procedure laid down in Art. 67, paragraphs 1 and 2 TEC : unanimity in Council after consulting EP – Council may decide unanimously, after consulting EP, to move to a qualified majority ) 

8.   Art. III-265 : border checks – ordinary legislative procedure (Art. 62 TEC : procedure laid down in Art. 67 TEC : unanimity in Council after consulting EP – Council may decide unanimously, after consulting EP, to move to a qualified majority)

9.   Art. III-266 : asylum and protection of refugees and displaced persons – ordinary legislative procedure (Art. 63, paragraphs 1 and 2 TEC : procedure laid down in Art. 67, paragraph 5 TEC : unanimity and consultation of EP on certain aspects; Council may decide unanimously, after consulting EP, to move to a qualified majority)

10. Art. III-267 : immigration – ordinary legislative procedure (Art. 63, paragraphs 3 and 4 TEC : procedure laid down in Art. 67 TEC :unanimity in Council after consulting EP – Council may decide unanimously, after consulting EP, to move to a qualified majority)

11. Art. III-270, paragraphs 1 and 2 : judicial cooperation in criminal matters – ordinary legislative procedure[2] (Art. 31, paragraph 1, points (a), (b), (c), (d) TEU – unanimity in Council and simple consultation of EP) 

12. Art. III-271, paragraphs 1 and 2 : approximation of criminal laws, offences and sanctions[3] (Art. 31, paragraph 1, point e) TEU – unanimity in Council and simple consultation of EP)

13. Art. III-273 : Eurojust – ordinary legislative procedure (Art. 31, paragraph 2 TEU – unanimity in Council and simple consultation of EP)

14. Art. III-275, paragraph 2 : non-operational police cooperation – ordinary legislative procedure (Art. 30, paragraph 1 TEU – unanimity in Council and simple consultation of EP)

15. Art. III-276 : Europol – ordinary legislative procedure (Art. 30, paragraph 2 TEU – unanimity in Council and simple consultation of EP) 

16. Art. III-280, paragraph 5 : measures in the area of culture – ordinary legislative procedure (Council recommendations also by qualified majority) (Art.151, paragraph 5 TEC – codecision with unanimity in the Council; recommendations: Council acting unanimously on the basis of a Commission proposal)

17. Art. III-382, paragraph 2 : appointment of members of the Executive Board of the ECB – decision of European Council, on recommendation from Council, consultation of EP and of the Governing Council of the ECB (Art. 112 TEC – Heads of State or Government by common accord, remainder identical)

II - New legal bases subject to qualified majority voting

1.   Art. I-9 (together with Art. III-325, paragraphs 6 and 8) : accession to EHRC – Council decision on the basis of a proposal from the negotiator (in principle the Commission), after approval of EP

2.   Art. I-24, paragraph 4 : list of configurations of Council – European Council decision (without proposal from Commission)

3.   Art. I-32, paragraph 5 : review of rules governing the nature and composition of the CoR and ESC – Council decision

4.   Art. I-47, paragraph 4 : citizens' initiative for a European law – ordinary legislative procedure

5.   Art. I-54, paragraph 4 : measures implementing the own resources system – Council law after EP consent

6.   Art. I-60, paragraph 2 : agreement on withdrawal of a MS – Council decision on a proposal from the negotiator of the agreement (in principle the Commission), after consent of EP

7.   Art. III-122 : principles and conditions for the operation of services of general economic interest – ordinary legislative procedure

8.   Art. III-127 : measures to facilitate diplomatic and consular protection – Council law, consultation of EP

9.   Art. III-176, first paragraph: intellectual property – ordinary legislative procedure

10. Art. III-196, paragraphs 1 and 2 : Member States whose currency is the euro, common position and unified representation in international forums – Council decision, consultation of ECB

11. Art. III-254 : space policy – ordinary legislative procedure

12. Art. III-256, paragraph 2 : energy – ordinary legislative procedure[4]

13. Art. III-272 : measures to support crime prevention – ordinary legislative procedure

14. Article III-278, paragraph 4, points (c) and (d) : measures to tackle common safety concerns in the public health sphere[5]

15. Article III-278, paragraph 5 : incentive measures to protect human health and in particular to combat the major cross-border health scourges and tackle tobacco and alcohol abuse[6]

16. Art. III-281 : tourism – ordinary legislative procedure

17. Art. III-282 : sport – ordinary legislative procedure

18. Art. III-284 : civil protection[7]

19. Art. III-285 : administrative cooperation – ordinary legislative procedure

20. Art. III-300, paragraph 2(b) : initiatives by Union Minister for Foreign Affairs in CFSP at request of European Council – Council decision

21. Art. III-311, paragraph 2 : statute and seat of European Defence Agency – Council decision without Commission proposal

22. Art. III-312, paragraph 2 : establishing permanent structured cooperation in the area of defence – Council decision without Commission proposal, consultation of Minister for Foreign Affairs

23. Art. III-312, paragraph 3 : admission of a Member State to permanent structured cooperation in the area of defence – Council decision (only participating Member States may vote) without Commission proposal, consultation of Minister for Foreign Affairs

24. Art. III-312, paragraph 4 : suspension of a Member State from permanent structured cooperation in the area of defence – Council decision without Commission proposal (only participating Member States may vote)

25. Art. III-321, paragraphs 3 and 5 : humanitarian aid[8] and creation of European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps

26. Art. III-398 : European Union administration

• [1]  This procedure has an 'emergency brake' mechanism: where a Member State considers that the measures concerned 'would affect fundamental aspects of its social security system, including its scope, cost or financial structure, or would affect the financial balance of that system', it may request that the matter be referred to the European Council (thus automatically suspending the legislative procedure). The European Council must then within a period of four months either refer the matter back to the Council, thus enabling the procedure to continue, or ask the Commission to submit a new proposal. (The Constitution does not, however, state what would happen should the Council fail to act).
• [2]  This procedure has an 'emergency brake' mechanism: where a Member State considers that the measures concerned 'would affect fundamental aspects of its criminal justice system, it may request that
  the matter be referred to the European Council and the procedure suspended. The European Council must, within four months, either refer the matter back to the Council so that the procedure continues, or request the Commission or the group of Member States from which the initiative originates to submit a new proposal. If, within the four months, either no action has been taken by the European Council or if, within 12 months the new legislative procedure has not been completed, enhanced cooperation in the relevant area will automatically go ahead if at least one-third of the Member States are in favour.
• [3]  Ibidem.
• [4]  The Union already takes measures in the energy sphere now, either on the basis of provisions that already require qualified majority voting, or on the basis of Article 308 TEC.
• [5]  Measures covered by points (c) and (d) are new, whereas the measures covered by points (a) and (b) were already included in Article 152 TEC and came under the codecision procedure.
• [6]  The legal bases referred to in this paragraph are completely new, except for that covering incentive measures for the protection of human health, which were provided for in Article 152 TEC.
• [7]  Measures are already being taken in this sphere under Article 308 TEC.
• [8]  Measures are already being taken in this sphere under Article 179 (by qualified majority), or under Article 308 TEC (unanimity).

ANNEX 3: Legislative acts - ordinary legislative procedure

This Annex lists the legal bases to which the ordinary legislative procedure established by the Constitution will apply (this ordinary legislative procedure corresponds more or less to the procedure currently laid down in Art. 251 TEC, i.e. the codecision procedure).

The subject areas underlined are those for which the legal basis is completely new, or where there has been a change in procedure so that the relevant measures are now subject to the 'codecision'/ordinary legislative procedure.

The corresponding articles of the Treaty now in force are indicated in italics and, in cases where the Constitution modifies the procedure, an indication is also given of the procedure that currently applies.

1.   Arrangements for control of implementing powers (Article I-37, paragraph 3) (Article 202 TEC: unanimity in Council and simple consultation of Parliament)

2.   Citizens' initiative (Article I-47, paragraph 4)

3.   Procedures for the right of access to documents (Article I-50, paragraph 3) (Article 255, paragraph 2)

4.   Data protection (Article I-51, paragraph 2) (Article 286, paragraph 2)

5.   Services of general economic interest (Article III-122) (Article 16 TEC)

6.   Measures to combat discrimination on grounds of nationality (Article III-123) (Article 12 TEC)

7.   Basic principles for anti-discrimination incentive measures (Article III-124, paragraph 2) (Article 13.2 TEC)

8.   Measures to facilitate the exercise of the right of every citizen of the Union to move and reside freely in the territory of Member States (Article III-125) (Article 18, paragraph 2 TEC)

9.   Free movement of workers (Article III-134) (Article 40 TEC)

10. Internal market - social security measures for Community migrant workers[1] (Article III-136, paragraph 1) (Article 42 TEC: codecision - Council acting unanimously)

11. Right of establishment (Article III-138, paragraph 1) (Article 44 TEC)

12. Exclusion in a Member State of certain activities from the application of provisions on the right establishment (Article III-139, second paragraph) (Article 45, second paragraph TEC: qualified majority of the Council without participation of EP)

13. Coordination of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States providing for special treatment for foreign nationals with regard to the right of establishment (Article III-140, paragraph 2) (Article 46, paragraph 2 TEC)

14. Coordination of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the taking-up and pursuit of activities as self-employed persons and the mutual recognition of qualifications (Article III-141, paragraph 1) (Article 47 TEC: codecision - Council acting unanimously when this involves a change in Member State legislation)

15. Extending provisions on freedom to provide services to service providers who are nationals of a third State and who are established within the Union. (Article III-144, second paragraph) (Article 49, second paragraph TEC: qualified majority in the Council without participation of EP)

16. Liberalisation of services in specific sectors (Article III-147) (Article 52, paragraph 1 TEC: qualified majority in the Council and simple consultation of EP)

17. Services (Article III-150) (Article 55 TEC)

18. Customs cooperation (Article III-152) (Article 135 TEC)

19. Adoption of other measures on the movement of capital to and from third countries (Article III-157, paragraph 2) (Article 57, paragraph 2, first sentence TEC: qualified majority in the Council without participation of EP)

20. Administrative measures relating to capital movements in connection with preventing and combating crime and terrorism (Article III-160) (Article 60 TEC)

21. Measures for the approximation of national provisions which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market to promote the objectives of Article III-130 (Article III-172, paragraph 1) (Article 95, paragraph 1 TEC)

22. Measures to eliminate distortions in the internal market (Article III-174) (Article 96 TEC: qualified majority in the Council without participation of EP)

23. Intellectual property except language arrangements for the European intellectual property rights (Article III-176, first paragraph)[2]

24. Multilateral surveillance (Article III-179 paragraph 6) (Article 99, paragraph 5 TEC: cooperation procedure)

25. Modification of the Protocol on the statutes of the ESCB and ECB (Article III-187 paragraph 3) (Article 107, paragraph 5 TEC: unanimity in the Council or, depending on the case, qualified majority after assent of EP)

26. Measures necessary for the use of the euro (Article III-191) (Article 123, paragraph 4 TEC)

27. Incentive measures for employment (Article III-207) (Article 129 TEC)

28. Social policy (Article III-210, paragraphs 1, except points (c) (d) (f) and (g), 2 and paragraph 3[3], second subparagraph (Article 137, paragraphs 1 and 2 TEC)

29. Social policy (equal opportunities, equal treatment and equal pay) (Article III-214, paragraph 3) (Article 141, paragraph 3 TEC)

30. European Social Fund (Article III-219, paragraph 3) (Article 148 TEC)

31. Measures in the area of economic and social cohesion (Article III-221, third paragraph) (Article 159 TEC)

32. Structural Funds - as from 2007[4] - (Article III-223 paragraphs 1, first and third subparagraphs and paragraph 2) (Article 161 TEC: currently: unanimity in the Council and assent of EP; as from 2007: qualified majority in the Council and assent of EP)

33. Cohesion Fund - as from 2007⁴ - (Article III-223 paragraph 1, second and third subparagraphs and paragraph 2) (Article 161 TEC: currently: unanimity in the Council and assent of EP; as from 2007: qualified majority in the Council and assent of EP)

34. European Regional Development Fund (Article III-224) (Article 162 TEC)

35. Application of competition rules to the common agricultural policy (III-230 paragraph 1) (Article 36 TEC: qualified majority in the Council and simple consultation of EP)

36. Legislation on the common agricultural policy (Article III-231 paragraph 2) (Article 37, paragraph 2: qualified majority in the Council and simple consultation of EP)

37. Environment (Community measures to achieve environmental objectives except measures of a fiscal nature) (Article III-234 paragraph 1) (Article 175, paragraph 1 TEC)

38. Environment action programme (Article III-234 paragraph 3) (Article 175, paragraph 3 TEC)

39. Consumer protection (Article III-235, paragraph 3) (Article 153, paragraph 4 TEC)

40. Implementation of the common transport policy (Article III-236, paragraph 2) (Article 71 TEC)

41. Sea and air transport (Article III-245) (Article 80, paragraph 2 TEC)

42. Trans-European networks (Article III-247, paragraph 2) (Article 156 TEC)

43. Framework programme for research (Article III-251, paragraph 1) (Article 166, paragraph 1 TEC).

44. Implementation of the European research area (Article III-251, paragraph 4)

45. Implementation of the framework programme for research: rules for the participation of undertakings and dissemination of research results (Article III-252, paragraph 1) (Article 167 TEC)

46. Supplementary research programmes for some Member States (Article III-252, paragraph 2) (Article 168 TEC)

47. Participation in research programmes undertaken by several Member States (Article III-252, paragraph 3) (Article 169 TEC)

48. Space policy (Article III-254)

49. Energy, excluding measures of a fiscal nature (Article III-256, paragraph 2)[5]

50. Visas, border checks, free movement of nationals of non-member countries, management of external frontiers, absence of controls at internal frontiers (Article III-265, paragraph 2) (Article 62 TEC: procedure laid down in Article 67 TEC: unanimity in Council and simple consultation of EP with the possibility of moving to codecision following a unanimous Council decision after consulting Parliament)

51. Asylum, temporary protection or subsidiary protection for nationals of third countries (Article III-266, paragraph 2) (Article 63, paragraphs 1 and 2 and Article 64, paragraph 2 TEC: procedure laid down in Article 67 TEC: unanimity in Council and simple consultation of EP with the possibility of moving to codecision following a unanimous Council decision after consulting Parliament)

52. Immigration and combating trafficking in persons (Article III-267 paragraph 2) (Article 63, paragraphs 3 and 4 TEC: procedure laid down in Article 67 TEC: unanimity in Council and simple consultation of EP with the possibility of moving to codecision following a unanimous Council decision after consulting Parliament)

53. Incentive measures for the integration of nationals of third countries (Article III-267 paragraph 4)

54. Judicial cooperation in civil matters (excluding family law)[6] (Article III-269 paragraph 2) (Article 65 TEC: procedure laid down in Article 67 TEC: unanimity in Council and simple consultation of EP with the possibility of moving to codecision following a unanimous Council decision after consulting Parliament)

55. Judicial cooperation in criminal matters - procedures, cooperation, training, settlement of conflicts, minimum rules for recognition of judgments) (Article III-270 paragraphs 1 and 2)[7] (Article 31 TEU: unanimity in Council and simple consultation of EP)

56. Minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension (Article III-271 paragraphs 1 and possibly 2)⁷ (Article 31 TEU: procedure laid down in Articles 34, paragraph 2 and 39, paragraph 1 TEU: unanimity in Council and simple consultation of EP)

57. Measures to support crime prevention (Article III-272)

58. Eurojust (Article III-273 paragraph 1, second subparagraph) (Article 31 TEU: procedure laid down in Articles 34, paragraph 2 and 39, paragraph 1 TEU: unanimity in Council and simple consultation of EP)

59. Arrangements for involving the European Parliament and national parliaments in the evaluation of Eurojust's activities (Article III-273 paragraph 1, third subparagraph)

60  Police cooperation (certain aspects) (Article III-275, paragraph 2) (Article 30 TEU: procedure laid down in Articles 34, paragraph 2 and 39, paragraph 1 TEU: unanimity in Council and simple consultation of PE)

61. Europol (Article III-276 paragraph 2, first subparagraph) (Article 30 TEU: procedure laid down in Articles 34, paragraph 2 and 39, paragraph 1 TEU: unanimity in Council and simple consultation of PE)

62. Procedures for scrutiny of Europol's activities by EP and national parliaments (Article III-276 paragraph 2, second subparagraph)

63. Public health - measures to tackle common safety concerns in the health sphere[8] (Article III-278, paragraph 4) (Article 152, paragraph 4 TEC)

64. Public health - incentive measures to protect human health and in particular to combat the major cross-border health scourges, and measures to tackle tobacco and alcohol abuse (Article III-278, paragraph 5[9])

65. Industry (Article III-279, paragraph 3) (Article 157, paragraph 3 TEC)

66. Culture (except for recommendations) (Article III-280, paragraph 5(a)) (Article 151 TEC: codecision - Council acting unanimously)

67. Tourism - measures to complement the action of Member States in the tourism sector (Article III-281, paragraph 2)

68. Education (except for recommendations) (Article III-282, paragraphs 1, third subparagraph, points (a) to (f) and 3) (Article 149, paragraph 4 TEC)

69. Sport (Article III-282, paragraphs 1, third subparagraph, point (g) and 3)

70. Vocational training (Article III-283 paragraph 3) (Article 150, paragraph 4 TEC)

71. Civil protection against natural and man-made disasters (Article III-284, paragraph 2)[10]

72. Administrative cooperation in implementing Union law by Member States (Article III-285, paragraph 2)

73. Commercial policy - implementing measures (Article III-315, paragraph 2) (Article 133 TEC: qualified majority in Council without consultation of EP)

74. Development cooperation (Article III-317 paragraph 1) (Article 179 TEC).

75. Economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries (Article III-319, paragraph 2) (Article 181A TEC: qualified majority in Council and simple consultation of EP)

76. General framework for humanitarian aid operations (Article III-321, paragraph 3)

77. European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps (Article III-321, paragraph 5)

78. Regulations governing political parties at European level and their funding (Article III-331) (Article 191 TEC)

79. Creation of specialised courts (Article III-359) (Article 225A TEC: unanimity in Council and simple consultation of EP)

80. Jurisdiction of Court in matters relating to intellectual property rights (Article III-364) (Article 229A TEC: unanimity in Council and simple consultation of EP, plus national ratification)

81. Modification of Statute of Court of Justice, except Title I and Article 64 (Article III-381) (Article 245 TEC: unanimity in Council and simple consultation of EP)

82. European administration (Article III-398 paragraph 2)

83. Adoption of financial rules [unanimity being maintained in Council until the end of 2006] (Article III-412 paragraph 1) (Article 279, paragraph 1 TEC: unanimity in Council after consulting EP, then, as from 2007, qualified majority in Council)

84. Fight against fraud affecting the Union's financial interests (Article III-415 paragraph 4) (Article 280, paragraph 4 TEC)

85. Staff Regulations of officials and Conditions of employment of other servants of the Union (Article III-427) (Article 283 TEC: qualified majority in Council and simple consultation of EP)

86. Statistics (Article III-429, paragraph 1) (Article 285, paragraph 1 TEC)

ANNEX 4: Legislative acts - special legislative procedures

This annex lists the legal bases for special procedures, namely ad hoc procedures, European Parliament laws and Council laws. Where there are corresponding articles in the current treaties, these are indicated in italics and in cases where there has been a change in procedure, the procedure currently in force also appears in italics.

I -  Ad hoc procedures

1.   Annual budget - joint decision of EP and Council (Article III-404) (Article 272 TEC: ad hoc procedure)

II - European Parliament laws

2.   Statute for Members of the European Parliament (Article III-330, paragraph 2) : adoption by EP, on its own initiative, after obtaining consent of Council (unanimously as regards taxation regime) and after consulting Commission (Article 190, paragraph 5 TEC)

3.   Provisions governing the exercise of the right of inquiry (Article III-333, third subparagraph) : adoption by EP, on its own initiative, after obtaining consent of Council and Commission (Article 193 TEC: common accord)

4.   Statute of European Ombudsman (Article III-335 paragraph 4) : adoption by EP, on its own initiative, after obtaining consent of Council and Commission (Article 195, paragraph 4 TEC)

III -     Council laws

A.  Unanimity and consent of European Parliament

5.   Measures to combat discrimination (Article III-124, paragraph 1) (Article 13, paragraph 1 TEC: simple consultation of PE)

6.   Extension of citizenship-related rights (Article III-129) - national ratification required (Article 22 TEC)

7.   Multiannual financial framework (Article I-55, paragraph 2) Not mentioned in the treaties. Currently governed by an Interinstitutional Agreement

8.   European Public Prosecutor's Office (Article III-274, paragraph 1)

9.   Uniform electoral procedure (Article III-330, paragraph 1): on initiative from and after consent of EP - national ratification required (Article 190, paragraph 4 TEC)

B.  Unanimity and consultation of European Parliament

10. Union's own resources - ceiling and establishment of new resources (Article I-54, paragraph 3) - National ratification required (Article 269 TEC)

11. Measures concerning passports, identity cards, residence permits (Article III-125) (Article 18, paragraph 3 TEC)

12. Citizenship: right to vote and stand for election in Member State of residence in municipal and European elections (Article III-126) (Article 19 TEC)

13. Adoption of measures which constitute a step backwards in Union law as regards the liberalisation of the movement of capital to or from third countries (Article III-157, paragraph 3) (Article 57, paragraph 2 in fine TEC: Unanimity in Council without consulting EP)

14. Harmonisation of indirect taxation (Article III-171) (Article 93 TEC)

15. Approximation of laws (Article III-173) (Article 94 TEC)

16. Language arrangements for European intellectual property rights (Article III-176, second paragraph)

17. Replacing the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure (Article III-184, paragraph 13) (Article104, paragraph 14 TEC)

18. Specific tasks of European Central Bank concerning prudential supervision (Article III-185, paragraph 6) (Article 105, paragraph 6 TEC: Unanimity in Council after consultation of ECB and assent of EP)

19. Social policy: social security and social protection of workers, protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated, representation and collective defence, conditions of employment for third-country nationals[11] (Article III-210, paragraph 1, points (c), (d), (f) and (g) and 3, first subparagraph) (Article 137, paragraphs 1, points (c), (d), (f) and (g) and 2 point (b), second subparagraph TEC)

20. Environment: provisions of a fiscal nature, town and country planning, management of water resources, land use and the supply and diversification of energy resources (Article III-234, paragraph 2) (Article 175, paragraph 2 TEC)

21. Energy: fiscal measures (Article III-256, paragraph 3)

22. Judicial cooperation in civil matters concerning family law with cross-border implications[12] (Article III-269, paragraph 3) (Article 67, paragraph 5, second indent TEC)

23. Operational police cooperation (Article III-275, paragraph 3) (Article 30, paragraph 1, point (a): procedure laid down in Articles 34, paragraph 2 and 39, paragraph 1 TEU)

24. Operations by the authorities of one Member State in the territory of another Member State (Article III-277) (Article 32 TEU: procedure laid down in Articles 34, paragraph 2 and 39, paragraph 1 TEU)

25. Association of overseas countries and territories with the Union - rules and procedure (Article III-291) (Article 187 TEC - without consultation of EP)

26. Modification of Protocol on the Statute of the European Investment Bank (Article III-393, fourth paragraph) (Article 266, third paragraph TEC)

C.  Qualified majority and consent of EP

27. Implementing measures of the Union's own resources system (Article I-54, paragraph 4)

D.  Qualified majority and consultation of EP

28. Measures to facilitate diplomatic protection (Article III-127, third paragraph) (Article 20 TEC - agreement between the Member States: intergovernmental cooperation)

29. Research: specific programmes implementing framework programme (Article III-251, paragraph 3) (Article 166, paragraph 4 TEC)

30. Outermost regions (Article III-424, first paragraph) (Article 299, paragraph 2, second subparagraph TEC)

• [1]  With an 'emergency brake' mechanism: where a Member State considers that the measures concerned 'would affect fundamental aspects of its social security system, including its scope, cost or financial structure, or would affect the financial balance of that system', it may request that the matter be referred to the European Council (thus automatically suspending the legislative procedure). The European Council must then within a period of four months either refer the matter back to the Council, thus enabling the procedure to continue, or ask the Commission to submit a new proposal. (The Constitution does not, however, state what would happen should the Council fail to act).
• [2]  In the absence of a specific legal basis, the Union has hitherto taken action in this area on the basis of Article 308 TEC: Unanimity in Council and simple consultation of EP.
• [3]  In the areas covered by these points, the law is adopted by the Council unanimously, after consulting the EP. However, the second subparagraph of paragraph 3 contains a bridging clause whereby the Council may decide, unanimously, that the ordinary legislative procedure will be applied to points (d), (f) and (g) of paragraph 1.
• [4]  Paragraph 2 of Article III-223 establishes that the first provisions on the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund to be adopted following those in force on the date on which the Constitution is signed will be established by a European law of the Council, acting unanimously after obtaining
  the consent of the European Parliament. The year indicated here (2007) is obviously conditional on the Constitution first having entered into force.
• [5]  In the absence of a specific legal basis, the Union has hitherto taken action in this area on the basis of Article 308 TEC: Unanimity in the Council and simple consultation of EP.
• [6]  Points (e), (g) and (h) of paragraph 2 of this article contain new legal bases; the other points were already covered by Article 65 TEC. Paragraph 3 of Article III-269 also allows the Council to adopt a decision determining those aspects of family law with cross-border implications which may be the subject of acts adopted by the ordinary legislative procedure.
• [7]  An 'emergency brake' mechanism is provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of these articles whereby if a Member State considers that the measures concerned 'would affect fundamental aspects of its criminal justice system, it may request that the matter be referred to the European Council and the procedure suspended. The European Council must, within four months, either refer the matter back to the Council so that the procedure continues, or request the Commission or the group of Member States from which the initiative originates to submit a new proposal. If, within the four months, either no action has been taken by the European Council or if, within 12 months the new legislative procedure has not been completed, enhanced cooperation in the relevant area will automatically go ahead if at least one-third of the Member States are in favour.
• [8]  The measures provided for in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 4 of this article were already provided for in Article 152 TEC. The measures provided for in points (c) and (d) are new.
• [9]  All the legal bases provided for in this paragraph are new, with the exception of that for incentive measures for the protection of human health, which was already covered by Article 152 TEC.
• [10]  In the absence of a specific legal basis, the Union has hitherto taken action in this area on the basis of Article 308 TEC: Unanimity in the Council and simple consultation of EP.
• [11]  The Council may decide unanimously, after consulting EP, to make the ordinary legislative procedure applicable for points (d), (f) and (g) (second subparagraph of paragraph 3 of Article III-210).
• [12]  The Council may decide unanimously, after consulting EP, to make the ordinary legislative procedure applicable (second subparagraph of paragraph 3 of Article III-263).

MINORITY OPINION

pursuant to Rule 48 (3) of the Rules of Procedure

Jens-Peter Bonde, Wojciech Wierzejski, James Hugh Allister and Mogens N.J. Camre

Europe Deserves Better

MORE DEMOCRACY

Within all EU member states, laws are passed by elected representatives and consequently all laws can be democratically changed. These representatives are held responsible by the voters and they can be replaced in an election. This is the essence of representative democracy.

All EU Member States are democracies. At the heart of democracy lies the voter’s right to choose his rulers.

The proposed EU constitution threatens the very idea of democracy. Certainly, we would still be able to vote, but in many areas, a majority vote in the EU would take precedence over our own national laws.

The EU Commission, where members are appointed rather than elected, has the sole and exclusive right to initiate legislation over which bureaucrats and the Council of Ministers, not the elected Parliament, have the final say.

Why should we therefore vote “Yes” to an erosion of democracy?

Europe deserves better than the current draft proposal for a European constitution. Therefore we reject the constitution as it stands.

We instead propose greater democracy in Europe:

· Every country should appoint a commissioner over whom it has powers of scrutiny.

· Every country should have one vote in the Council of Ministers which is controlled by the national parliament.

· A 75% majority should be required to pass a bill within the EU representing at least 50% of the population.

· All EU laws must also be approved by national parliaments.

· Every national parliament should have the right of veto in vital areas.

· The European Parliament must have the right of veto in all questions. If a bill is blocked, full decision-makings powers should revert to national parliaments.

· All legislation should be public and possible to follow on the Internet. All preparation meetings and documents should be open - unless 75% have voted in favour of a derogation closing a meeting or a document which can be controlled by the Ombudsman and the court.

LESS CENTRALISATION

The European Constitution introduces many new areas in which the EU can legislate in place of national parliaments. No vital area would be immune from EU interference.

Majority voting is introduced in many new areas where the national parliaments would therefore be overruled.

Furthermore, heads of government would be able to advance still further and change areas that today require unanimity, so that in the future such decisions would require only majority votes, where other countries could be overruled.

Heads of government could also extend the power of the EU into new matters without referring it back to voters.

The EU must be much closer to its citizens. The European Constitution does the opposite - it centralises even more power in Brussels.

This is why we recommend the rejection of the constitution.

We propose more liberty in the member states, not more centralisation:

· All laws should carry an integrated expiry date after which they would no longer apply unless specifically readopted.

· The 100,000 pages of existing EU legislation should be re-examined so that EU jurisdiction is confined to cross-border issues.

· A real principle of subsidiarity should be introduced. The national parliaments should adopt the annual catalogue of laws and thereafter give the Commission the right to propose a bill.

· All EU Decisions should be rationalised into two different types: laws and recommendations. Laws should apply only in cross-border areas where the member states cannot legislate effectively by themselves; recommendations could apply to matters of national interest.

· The European Court of Justice should be confined to arbitrating cross-border disputes; it should be prevented from legislating beyond the text of the treaties.

NO NEW SUPER POWER

The European Constitution gives the EU a "legal personality" to represent member states in relations with the rest of the world, and in doing so takes over the function of statehood under international law.

Any decision taken by the EU has priority over the democratically decided laws of member states. Even our national constitutions are ignored if they are in conflict with a decision coming from Brussels.

This principle of federal state centralisation is now articulated in Article 6 of the new constitution and furthermore it is the duty of member states to present any matter of dispute to the European Court of Justice.

The EU will get its own Ministry for Foreign Affairs and a joint military force. A President and a joint minister for Foreign Affairs will, together with a joint prime minister - the president of the Commission, represent EU in relations with other countries in the world.

The twenty-five member states will become constituent states akin to the US model, but with less freedom to legislate independently than American states enjoy. Therefore we recommend a rejection of the constitution.

Instead, we propose co-operation between free and independent nations. The world does not need a new superpower.

· EU cooperation should not be based on a constitution but on an agreement between independent countries; a treaty that could be rescinded with two years notification.

· The European Court of Justice and the EU authorities must respect the constitutions of the member states according to the way those constitutions are interpreted by their respective national Supreme Courts or Constitutional Courts.

· A common European foreign policy must not prevent member states from acting independently at international level.

· The military must be kept apart from civilian co-operation in the EU.

· The President of the EU must be abolished in favour of a practical presidency where the duty is undertaken in rotation.

THE EU MUST BE CLEANED UP

We still have a budget where as much as 10 % of the money paid to Brussels is lost or stolen.

We still have an EU where, the Court of Auditors and the EU Parliamentary Committee on Budgetary Control are unable to effectively control the use of EU funds. The Ombudsman does not have access to all documents.

We have an EU fisheries policy which harms the interests of fishermen and an agricultural policy that is expensive for consumers and taxpayers alike that penalises farmers, harms the environment and impoverishes the Third World.

Money is frittered away in the structural and cohesion funds and in badly-run overseas aid projects.

For these reasons, too we recommend a rejection of the constitution.

We would concentrate on improving the EU’s performance in exercising the powers it currently exercises, before bestowing any new ones on it.

FAIR REFERENDUM

· Referenda concerning the draft proposal for the European Constitution must be held, where possible in all countries on the same day, so that European citizens get the final say in deciding the rules that govern our co-operation.

· The referenda must be fair and free with equal resources allocated to both sides in all countries.

· If a country rejects the constitution, a new and more representative convention must be appointed. This convention would prepare proposals for more democratic rules which can unite us instead of dividing Europeans as the current proposal does.

RESPECTING THE RESULT

If all 25 member states ratify the constitution according to their own democratic procedures, we will respect the people’s verdict. But we are concerned that the other side displays no similar intention:

· Several incoming Commissioners have indicated that they will implement parts of this Constitution with or without formal ratification.

· MEPs have expressly demanded that they do so as a condition of their appointment.

· Already, work has begun on establishing an EU foreign ministry and diplomatic service.

· Even before the Constitution had been agreed, let alone ratified, the EU court had indicated that it would rule on the basis of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

The Referendum Group calls on national governments to accept the verdict of their peoples. If one or more member states vote ‘no’, the Constitution should be scrapped, and work should begin on a new intergovernmental treaty that would regulate a European Commonwealth of national democracies.

OPINION of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (24.11.2004)

for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs

on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
(2004/2129(INI))Draftsman: Elmar Brok

SUGGESTIONS

The Committee on Foreign Affairs calls on the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:

1.  Welcomes the improvements in the new Constitutional Treaty in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the following:

(a) definitions of the principles and objectives of the Union's external action (Articles I-3 and III-292), especially those concerning compliance by the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy with international law and observance of the principles of the United Nations Charter;

(b) grouping of the relevant articles of the current treaties covering the various aspects of the Union's external action within the new single Title V of Part III (The policies and functioning of the Union);

(c) attribution of legal personality to the Union (Article I-7);

(d) above all, the creation of the new post of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs accountable both to the European Parliament and the European Council (Article I-28). The European Parliament will be informed on a par with the Council of any future proposal presented by the Vice-President of the Commission/Union Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding the preparation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy;

(e) the creation of the European External Action Service (Article III-296(3)). It is expected however that this Service will remain a cornerstone in the external action field, assisting the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, but under the aegis of the Commission (as has been the case with the EC Delegations). In any event, therefore, the pre–eminence of the integrated common elements of the new Service as well as its democratic accountability to the European Parliament should be underlined;

2.  Welcomes the fact that in the field of the Common Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the Constitutional Treaty includes major improvements, including the following:

     (a) updating of the Petersberg tasks (Articles I-41(1) and III-309);

     (b) multinational forces set up by Member States available to the ESDP (Article I-41(3));

     (c) compromise to progressively improving military capabilities and setting up a European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency (Articles I-41(3), second subparagraph and III-311);

     (d) European decisions as a new instrument for the implementation of the CFSP/ESDP (Articles I-40(3), I-41, III-293 and III-297);

     (e) execution of ESDP tasks, within the Union framework, by a group of Member States (Articles I-41(5) and III-310);

     (f)  permanent structured cooperation between Member States which fulfil higher military capabilities criteria within the Union framework for the most demanding tasks (Articles I-41(6), III-312 and the specific Protocol);

     (g) mutual solidarity clause establishing an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means within the power of each Member State towards any other Member State that is a victim of armed aggression on its territory (without prejudice to the security and defence policy of certain Member States or the role played by NATO for certain other Member States) (Article I-41(7));

     (h) solidarity clause for mutual assistance to prevent terrorist threats or terrorist attacks or in the event of a disaster (Articles I-43 and III-329);

3.  Calls for the role of the civilian dimension of the ESDP to be strengthened by the provision of all necessary means, and reiterates the need to set up the European Civil Peace Corps in accordance with the resolutions adopted by the European Parliament on several previous occasions;

4.  Considers it necessary that the Commissioner for External Relations and the High Representative for CFSP should already apply new standards by fully informing and consulting the European Parliament on all questions of CFSP and ESDP;

5.  Asks the main Committee to make clear references within its Explanatory Statement to the following shortcomings, which will continue to exist even after the coming into force of the Constitutional Treaty in the CFSP field and should therefore be remedied at the earliest opportunity:

     (a) failure to fully extend the Community procedures and to improve the role of the institutions in this field (see Article I-41);

     (b) confirmation of the rule of unanimity plus constructive abstention instead of qualified majority vote (QMV) as the general rule for CFSP (Articles I-41(4) and III-300);

     (c) joint costs for military operations within the framework of ESDP should be funded from the Community budget (this already occurs in the civil sphere in the case of police operations) and not from a subsidiary budget or a start-up fund of the Member States, as provided for at present (see Article III-313);

6.  Agrees with the main Committee's positive recommendation to the Council and the Member States to ratify the new Constitutional Treaty as speedily as possible, and in the meantime expresses the wish that the spirit (and substance) of the provisions of the new Treaty already be applied, as has already been the case with the creation of the European Defence Agency which should be operational by the end of 2004, the "Battle Group" concept, the setting up of the Union's Neighbourhood Policy (Article I-57) and the application of the Solidarity Clause to prevent terrorist threats or attacks decided in the aftermath of the Madrid 11 March 2004 terrorist attacks;

7.  Stresses the need to ensure the democratic accountability and transparency of all activities undertaken by the European Defence Agency.

PROCEDURE

Title	Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
Procedure number	2004/2129(INI)
Committee responsible	AFCO
Enhanced cooperation
Draftsman   Date appointed	Elmar Brok 13.9.2004
Discussed in committee	22.9.2004	11.10.2004		22.11.2004
Date suggestions adopted	23.11.2004
Result of final vote	for: against: abstentions:		27 9 1
Members present for the final vote	Elmar Brok (P), Geoffrey Van Orden (2nd VP), Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne (3rd VP), Angelika Beer, Bastiaan Belder, Monika Beňová, Simon Coveney, Giorgos Dimitrakopoulos, Anna Elzbieta Fotyga, Maciej Marian Giertych, Klaus Hänsch, Georgios Karatzaferis, Ioannis Kasoulides, Helmut Kuhne, Francisco José Millán Mon, Pierre Moscovici, Alojz Peterle, Tobias Pflüger, João de Deus Pinheiro, Mirosław Mariusz Piotrowski, Paweł Bartłomiej Piskorski, Raül Romeva i Rueda, Libor Rouček, José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra, István Szent-Iványi, Konrad Szymański, Inese Vaidere, Luis Yañez-Barnuevo García, Josef Zieleniec
Substitutes present for the final vote	Giovanni Claudio Fava, Hélène Flautre, Milan Horáček, Doris Pack, Athanasios Pafilis, Miguel Portas, Aloyzas Sakalas, Inger Segelström
Substitutes under Rule 178(2) present for the final vote

OPINION of the Committee on Development (18.11.2004)

for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs

on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
(2004/2129(INI))

Draftsman: Miguel Angel Martínez Martínez

SUGGESTIONS

The Committee on Development calls on the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:

1.  Welcomes the adoption, by the Brussels European Council of June 2004, of the final text of the Constitutional Treaty resulting from the difficult and complex work carried out by the European Convention on the Future of Europe and the Intergovernmental Conference;

2.  Considers the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty a historical step forward in the process of European integration, as it recognises, for the first time, development and humanitarian aid as a principle and a responsibility identifying the nature and the actions of the European Union; considers it an important step forwards that development-policy objectives must now be taken into account in all EU policy areas;

3.  Notes that the Commission's role in negotiations concerning trade agreements has been strengthened and that the European Parliament has a right, albeit limited, to information; regards this as a step in the direction of greater effectiveness and increased transparency;

4.  Welcomes the fact that, on adoption of the Constitutional Treaty, the European Union will gain long-awaited legal personality, which will give it a stronger voice on the international stage, in particular in relations with the United Nations and its various agencies; emphasises that the EU will therefore enjoy greater representation, responsibility, and effectiveness, as well as greater potential in its relations with developing countries; stresses, further, that the legal personality of the European Union will improve the status of the current Commission delegations around the world, especially those that operate in African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and, more generally, throughout the developing world;

5.  Points out that, thanks to the Constitutional Treaty, the principle of solidarity with the developing world has become one of the fundamental values of the European Union, which define its identity and direct its actions;

6.  Recalls that, from the beginning of the process of European integration, intra-European solidarity - one of the fundamental values - has proved to be a guarantee of stability and peace in Europe; stresses, further, that against that background of European solidarity, the EU has now made a significant step forward in recognising in its Constitutional Treaty that solidarity cannot be confined to its own territories and peoples, but should also be projected beyond its borders;

7.  Welcomes the recognition of global solidarity as a guiding principle for the various EU policies, and also welcomes the fact that, with the adoption of the Constitutional Treaty, global solidarity will inspire EU action in the field of development and humanitarian aid; believes that placing solidarity on a global level will contribute to ensuring world-wide peace and stability;

8.  Observes that its previous opinion was based on the basic text drafted by the European Convention on the Future of Europe and is gratified that the final text of the Constitution retains most of its achievements in the areas of development policy, international cooperation and humanitarian aid; Reiterates, therefore, what was stated in its previous opinion, presented by Anders Wijkman[1], and the conclusions thereof, adopted by the committee in July 2003;

9.  Greatly approves the fact, which it considers of the highest importance, that the eradication of poverty has been included in the Constitutional Treaty as a primary objective of EU development policy; considers the mainstreaming of the Millennium Development Goals in all of the EU's external operations to be of particular importance;

10. Expresses satisfaction that many of its recommendations have been incorporated in the final text of the Constitution, in particular those relating to the field of humanitarian aid, where the principle of neutrality has become one of the Constitution's basic guidelines;

11. Regrets nevertheless that the Intergovernmental Conference has not taken up other suggestions that are important for development policy, such as the inclusion of a specific title 'Common Development Cooperation Policy', or explicit reference to some fundamental principles of EU development cooperation policy, namely equality between partners, ownership of development strategies by the countries and populations concerned, and involvement of all sections of society, including civil society;

12. Welcomes the fact that 'good governance' has been recognised as one of the common objectives of EU external actions in the general provisions relating to the Union's external actions; regrets, however, that the 'provision of global public goods' has not been included among those objectives;

13. Emphasises the importance of development policy continuing to be an area of competence shared between the EU and the Member States and notes that this means that the development policies of the EU and the Member States must complement and reinforce each other and that implementation procedures must be harmonised with regard to specific countries or regions; welcomes the fact that the Constitutional Treaty promotes the principle of complementarity; stresses that EU programmes and resource allocation should be designed and managed according to a long-term, strategic approach based on development objectives;

14. Strongly supports the commitment in the Constitution to ensuring consistency between the different areas of the EU's external action and between these and other policy areas; believes that coherence across policy areas is vital to meeting the objective of poverty eradication and reiterates the Parliament's commitment to monitoring coherence;

15. Observes that the Constitutional Treaty has given a clear signal in favour of including the European Development Fund in the EU general budget, a long-standing demand of the European Parliament; welcomes the Commission's intention to effect this change and stresses the importance, in this regard, of guaranteeing that current EDF funds will not be diverted to other regions or purposes;

16. Notes the provision, included in the Constitutional Treaty, to set up a European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps, which is a clear signal of interest on the part of the European Union in the field of development; emphasises, nevertheless, the challenge facing the EU, which must pay special care and attention to establishing the way the corps will operate, allowing only experienced volunteers to participate in it; states its opinion that this initiative should strengthen the process of improving the quality and professionalism of the human resources deployed in humanitarian crises, by complementing already available training programmes, working closely with NGOs, establishing a register of available resources and disseminating pre-identified good operational practices; invites the Commission to undertake feasibility studies for the future development of this provision; underlines the need to recognise the difference between civilian and military environments within joint actions in the area of disarmament, humanitarian missions, conflict prevention and maintaining and re-establishing peace, as set out in Article III-309(1);

17. Recalls its special concern regarding the situation of children in developing countries, as young people are the first victims of disease, illiteracy, hunger, trafficking and sexual exploitation and are even forced to become soldiers in a number of armed conflicts;

18. Welcomes, therefore, the fact that the Constitutional Treaty gives high priority to children's rights, recognising that EU policies and actions in this area will be guided by the principles of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child;

19. Reiterates also its great concern regarding the situation of women in developing countries and its interest in their decisive role in the development process; welcomes therefore all the clauses in the Constitutional text aimed at promoting women's rights and gender equality, which will be of particular relevance for the advancement of the developing

world in general, as envisaged in the Beijing Platform for Action[2] and the Cairo Action Plan; notes with satisfaction that the gender mainstreaming applicable to all policy areas covered by the earlier EC Treaty now applies - thanks to the merger of the two treaties - to all EU external action;

20. Considers that, from the perspective of development policy and humanitarian responsibilities, the letter and spirit of the Constitutional Treaty may be viewed very positively;

21. Expresses its determination to support the Constitutional Treaty and commit itself fully to whatever steps it can take to support its approval and ratification by all Member States and its entry into force in the shortest time possible.

PROCEDURE

Title	Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
Procedure number	2004/2129(INI)
Committee responsible	AFCO
Enhanced cooperation	No
Draftsman   Date appointed	Miguel Angel Martínez Martínez 6.10.2004
Discussed in committee	6.10.2004
Date suggestions adopted	17.11.2004
Result of final vote	for: against: abstentions:		29 0 1
Members present for the final vote	Alessandro Battilocchio, Margrietus van den Berg, Danutė Budreikaitė, Marie-Arlette Carlotti, Thierry Cornillet, Fernando Fernández Martín, Michael Gahler, Jana Hybášková, Filip Andrzej Kaczmarek, Wolfgang Kreissl-Dörfler, Maria Martens, Miguel Angel Martínez Martínez, Gay Mitchell, Toomas Savi, Pierre Schapira, Frithjof Schmidt, Jürgen Schröder, Feleknas Uca, María Elena Valenciano Martínez-Orozco
Substitutes present for the final vote	John Bowis, Giovanni Claudio Fava, Ana Maria Gomes, Fiona Hall, Raymond Langendries, Linda McAvan, Manolis Mavrommatis, Karin Scheele, Anders Wijkman, Zbigniew Zaleski, Gabriele Zimmer
Substitutes under Rule 178(2) present for the final vote

• [1]  Opinion of the Committee on Development and Cooperation for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs on the 'Draft Treaty on the European Constitution and European Parliament opinion on the convocation of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC)', adopted on 10 July 2003. (2003/0902(CNS)) - PE 326.747
• [2]  United Nations Report on the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action - Beijing, 4-15 September 1995. (A/CONF.177/20).
  http://www.un.org/esa/gopher-data/conf/fwcw/off/a--20.en

OPINION of the Committee on International Trade (16.11.2004)

for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs

on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
(2004/2129(INI))

Draftsman: Jorgo Chatzimarkakis

SUGGESTIONS

The Committee on International Trade calls on the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:

1. Notes positively the agreement on the Constitution and stresses that the new Treaty is an important step in the move towards an integrated Europe, particularly in the area of external trade; stresses that external trade represents the 'outward face' of the internal market.

2. Expresses satisfaction with a number of significant improvements in the provisions related to the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) and, in particular, the following:

a) the recognition of the CCP as an exclusive competence of the Union, which implies full and comparable participation of all institutions of the Union in CCP decision-making ;

b) the extension of the scope of the CCP to all trade-related areas, including foreign direct investment;

c) the application of the ordinary legislative procedure (i.e. qualified majority voting and co-decision with the European Parliament) to legislative acts relating to the CCP;

d)  the fact that, since the ordinary legislative procedure applies the European Parliament's consent is now mandatory as a general rule for all agreements pursuant to the CCP whether implementing measures are required or not.

3.  Stresses that the new Constitution states that the European Parliament must give its consent to the Council prior to the ratification of agreements dealing predominantly with external trade and regrets that this has not always been the case so far.

4. Regrets that the Constitution does not expressly grant the European Parliament the right to approve the mandate of the European Commission to negotiate a trade agreement.

5. Notes with concern the continuing restrictions on the application of qualified majority voting and stresses, in particular:

a) the fact that the IGC has added agreements in the field of foreign direct investment to the cases where Council may decide by unanimity (Article III- 315 (4) - CIG 87/04);

b) the fact that the IGC has extended the cases where Council may decide by unanimity to all agreements in the field of services and not just to those services involving the movement of persons (Article III- 315 (4) - CIG 87/04);

c) the fact that the IGC has added a ‘social exception’ to the cases where Council may decide by unanimity (Article III- 315 (4) b - CIG 87/04).

6.  Welcomes the fact that, with regard to the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements under the CCP, the Constitution provides that the Commission is now under a legal obligation to inform the European Parliament on the progress of negotiations on a par with the special committee of the Council.

7.  Notes, however, that in order to comply with the spirit of the Constitution and fully develop its provisions, certain aspects require further institutional implementation and accordingly calls on the Council and the Commission to consider the negotiation of an Inter-Institutional Agreement that, in keeping with the spirit and provisions of the Constitution, provides the European Parliament with a substantive definition of, inter alia, its competences and involvement in every stage leading to the conclusion of an agreement.

8.  Calls on the Commission, in keeping with the spirit of the Constitution, to provide Parliament with all information relating to the Common Commercial Policy and the negotiation of commercial agreements or the negotiation of the commercial components of any agreement, including all proposals and draft proposals for negotiating mandates and/or directives, in sufficient time for Parliament to be able to express its views and for the Commission to be able to take due account of those views.

9. Calls on the Commission, with regard to the transparency of operations of the Article 133 Committee, to make available all documents to the Committee on International Trade of the European Parliament.

PROCEDURE

Title	Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
Procedure number	2004/2129(INI))
Committee responsible	AFCO
Enhanced cooperation	–
Draftsman:	Jorgo Chatzimarkakis
Date appointed	28.7.2004
Discussed in committee	22.10.2004
Date suggestions adopted	16.11.2004
Result of final vote	for:		23
	against:		4
	abstentions:		1
Members present for the final vote	Enrique Barón Crespo, Peter Šťastný, Jean Daniel Varela Suanzes-Carpegna, Daniel Caspary, Jan Christian Ehler, Georgios Papastamkos; Godelieve Quisthoudt-Rowohl, Tokia Saïfi, Robert William Sturdy, Zbigniew Franciszek Zaleski, Françoise Castex, Glyn Ford; Erika Mann, David W. Martin, Javier Moreno Sánchez, Pasqualina Napoletano; Giulietto Chiesa; Sajjad Haider Karim, Johan Van Hecke, Alain Lipietz; Caroline Lucas, Jacky Henin; Helmuth Markov
Substitutes present for the final vote	Margrietus van den Berg, Jorgo Chatzimarkakis, Filip Andrzej Kaczmarek, Jörg Leichtfried, Maria Martens
Substitutes under Rule 178(2) present for the final vote

OPINION of the Committee on Budgets (25.11.2004)

for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs

on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
(2004/2129(INI))

Draftsman: Kyösti Tapio Virrankoski

SUGGESTIONS

The Committee on Budgets calls on the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:

1. Welcomes the formalisation of the multiannual financial framework in the Treaty which, if aligned with the parliamentary mandate from 2013, would improve the stability of budgetary planning and the accountability of the EU budget; notes, moreover, that not only does the Council still need Parliament's consent, but the Constitution includes a provision for a mechanism guaranteeing that negotiations between Parliament and Council take place;

2. Considers that the modifications to the articles concerning the budgetary provisions confirm the essential role of the European Parliament in determining the multiannual financial framework as well as in the annual budgetary procedure;

3. Underlines the importance of retaining the flexibility mechanism as a corollary to budgetary discipline in accommodating unforeseen needs in the future;

4. Welcomes the simplification of the budgetary procedure; considers that the elimination of the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure is long overdue and that finally Parliament must be recognised as an equal arm of the budgetary authority;

5. Regrets that no progress was achieved in increasing Parliament's role in determining the system of Own Resources but considers that the right of consent over the implementing measures is a first step toward more transparency and democracy in the revenue side of the budget;

6. Welcomes the fact that, after the entry into force of the Constitution, any change to the Financial Regulations, which underlie all Community expenditure, will be subject to the ordinary legislative procedure, thus according Parliament the power of codecision.

PROCEDURE

Title	Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
Procedure number	2004/2129(INI)
Committee responsible	AFCO
Enhanced cooperation	No
Drafts(wo)man   Date appointed	Kyösti Tapio Virrankoski 21.9.2004
Discussed in committee	12.10.2004	26.10.2004
Date suggestions adopted	24.11.2004
Result of final vote	for: against: abstentions:		21 3 1
Members present for the final vote	Simon Busuttil, Gérard Deprez, Brigitte Douay, Den Dover, Hynek Fajmon, Markus Ferber, Salvador Garriga Polledo, Neena Gill, Louis Grech, Nathalie Griesbeck, Anne Elisabet Jensen, Alain Lamassoure, Janusz Lewandowski, Vladimír Maňka, Jan Mulder, Gérard Onesta, Antonis Samaras, Esko Seppänen, László Surján, Helga Trüpel, Ralf Walter, Marilisa Xenogiannakopoulou
Substitutes present for the final vote	Mairead McGuinness, José Albino Silva Peneda, Margarita Starkevičiūtė
Substitutes under Rule 178(2) present for the final vote

OPINION of the Committee on Budgetary Control (25.11.2004)

for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs

on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
(2004/2129(INI))

Draftsman: José Javier Pomés Ruiz

SUGGESTIONS

The Committee on Budgetary Control calls on the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:

1.   Recital I - add new points (da) and (dbf)

      (da) the inclusion in Title VII of part 1 on the Union's finances of a reference to Parliament's discharge powers in respect of the implementation of the budget, since the approval of the accounts via the discharge procedure is at the same level in political terms as the authorisation of expenditure via the approval of the budget and the recent history of interinstitutional relations has shown the vital importance of the discharge procedure,

     (db) a set number of Members of the Court of Auditors and the abolition of the principle that each Member State shall be entitled to nominate its own Member of the Court,

2.  Paragraph 4 - add new point (fa)

      (fa) provision is made in the Treaty (Article III - 274) for the establishment of a European Public Prosecutor's Office; however, it expresses concern that this may not be possible in practice because establishment of such an office requires unanimity in the Council, and it will in any event be necessary to clarify the vague stipulation that the Public Prosecutor's Office is to be established from Eurojust;

PROCEDURE

Title	Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
Procedure number	2004/2129(INI)
Committee responsible	AFCO
Enhanced cooperation	No
Draftsman   Date appointed	José Javier Pomés Ruiz 22.9.2004
Discussed in committee	25.10.2004	23.11.2004
Date suggestions adopted	23.11.2004
Result of final vote	for: against: abstentions:		12 1 0
Members present for the final vote	Herbert Bösch, Paulo Casaca, Szabolcs Fazakas, Dan Jørgensen, Véronique Mathieu, Jan Mulder, István Pálfi, José Javier Pomés Ruiz, Alexander Stubb, Terence Wynn
Substitutes present for the final vote	Jens-Peter Bonde, Simon Busuttil, Ashley Mote
Substitutes under Rule 178(2) present for the final vote

OPINION of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (23.11.2004)

for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs

on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
(2004/2129(INI))

Draftsman: Jan Andersson

SUGGESTIONS

The Committee on Employment and Social Affairs calls on the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:

1.   Considers that, whilst it had envisaged further progress on certain issues, the Constitution (Constitutional Treaty) is still a clear improvement on the present Treaties, and welcomes its innovations pertaining to a Social Europe;

2.   Regrets that it has proved impossible, in the area of social policy, to agree on a general method for voting by qualified majority in the Council of Ministers and for an orderly legislative procedure;

3.   Underlines the importance of a Constitution that facilitates a balance between social rights and the functioning of the internal market, while laying the foundations for progressive development of the European Social Model; underlines in that connection the importance of the new horizontal clause in the third part of the Constitution, under which the Union is required to comply in all its areas of competence with the most important social objectives and to strive to secure their implementation;

4.   Expresses its satisfaction that the values, principles and objectives of the Constitution provide a solid basis underpinning a Social Europe by including in particular, on the basis of a social market economy with full employment, the promotion of social justice and protection, equality between women and men and the combating of social exclusion, poverty and discrimination;

5.   Points out, however, that the social cohesion striven for in part I is not matched in part III by the necessary expansion of European options for acting to secure its implementation; is disappointed that employee pay, the right of association and the right to take strike and lockout action continue not to be subject to Community law;

6.   Welcomes the integration into the Constitution of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the very clear signal that that sends to citizens, especially as regards the worker's right to information and consultation and to take collective action, notably to strike;

7.   Regrets that, despite the strengthening of the vital role of the social partners by the recognition of the social dialogue and the Tripartite Social Summit, the social dialogue has not been further developed;

8.   Welcomes the introduction of the instrument of the 'European Citizen's Initiative', under which an issue can be placed on the agenda of the Commission on submission of one million signatures;

9.   Emphasises that social policy is expressly recognised as a shared competence and points to the introduction of a Union obligation to take into account the promotion of a high level of employment, adequate social protection and the fight against social exclusion and discrimination, in accordance with Article 13 of the EC Treaty, when defining and implementing its policies;

10. Expresses its satisfaction that a legal basis is provided for services of general economic interest;

11. Welcomes the new and even balance struck in the coordination of employment and macroeconomic policies; is, moreover, satisfied with the acceptance of the procedure under the open-coordination method for social policy whereby the coordination of economic and employment policies will take greater account of the commitment to social inclusion, sustainable pension schemes and high-quality care systems;

12. Expresses its satisfaction with the extension, albeit limited, of qualified majority voting in the field of social policy, in relation in particular to services of general economic interest and social security for migrant workers; regrets the right of Member States to request that the matter be referred to the European Council;

13. Regrets that there has been no agreement on introducing trans-national rights for workers and trade unions and that the paramount objective of full employment is not consistently pursued throughout the Constitution;

14. Emphasises the fact that Union action in the social policy field does not restrict Member States in their efforts to maintain and further their own, more ambitious social and welfare models;

15. Expresses its satisfaction that the Constitution (Constitutional Treaty) sets out specific measures to be taken by European Union bodies and Member States in the field of employment.

PROCEDURE

Title	Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
Procedure number	2004/2129(INI)
Committee responsible	AFCO
Enhanced cooperation	-
Draftsman   Date appointed	Jan Andersson 20.9.2004
Discussed in committee	20.9.2004	6.10.2004		23.11.2004
Date suggestions adopted	23.11.2004
Result of the final vote	for: against: abstentions:		36 8 0
Members present for the final vote	Jan Andersson, Roselyne Bachelot-Narquin, Jean-Luc Bennahmias, Emine Bozkurt, Philip Bushill-Matthews, Milan Cabrnoch, Alejandro Cercas, Ole Christensen, Derek Roland Clark, Luigi Cocilovo, Fausto Correia, Jean Louis Cottigny, Ottaviano Del Turco, Harald Ettl, Richard Falbr, Ilda Figueiredo, Stephen Hughes, Ona Juknevičienė, Sepp Kusstatscher, Jean Denise Lambert, Raymond Langendries, Bernard Lehideux, Elizabeth Lynne, Thomas Mann, Mario Mantovani, Jan Tadeusz Masiel, Jiří Maštálka, Ria Oomen-Ruijten, Csaba Őry, Marie Panayotopoulos-Cassiotou, Jacek Protasiewicz, José Albino Silva Peneda, Jean Spautz, Anne Van Lancker, Gabriele Zimmer
Substitutes present for the final vote	Richard James Ashworth, Edit Bauer, Mihael Brejc, Marian Harkin, Magda Kósáné Kovács, Jamila Madeira, Marianne Mikko, Elisabeth Schroedter, Eva-Britt Svensson, Marc Tarabella, Patrizia Toia, Georgios Toussas, Anja Weisgerber, Tadeusz Zwiefka
Substitutes under Rule 178(2) present for the final vote	Carlos José Iturgaiz Angulo

OPINION of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (24.11.2004)

for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs

on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
(2004/2129(INI))

Draftsman: Vasco Graça Moura

SUGGESTIONS

The Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety calls on the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:

1.  Welcomes the fact that implementation of the three pillars of sustainable development has been included among the objectives of the European Union and that the integration of environmental protection requirements into the definition and implementation of Union policies and a high level of protection of human health are recognised by the draft Constitution as principles applicable to all Union policies;

2.  Regrets the fact that Part III of the draft Constitution, which deals with the policies and functioning of the Union, has not been updated and brought into line with the principle of sustainable development, in particular in the areas of agricultural, cohesion, transport and trade policy; likewise regrets the fact that some environmental measures, in particular those of a fiscal nature and those concerning town and country planning, the quantitative management of water resources and land use, are not covered by the ordinary legislative procedure, but are to be adopted by the Council acting unanimously;

3.  Notes that the adoption of measures seeking to establish high standards regarding the quality and safety of medicinal products and medical equipment and of measures dealing with the monitoring, early warning and combating of serious transfrontier threats to health has been included among the European Union's shared competences and made subject to the ordinary legislative procedure; regrets, however, the fact that, with regard to health, the draft Constitution neither establishes high-level convergence objectives for the Union nor equips it with the tools and resources required to ensure a better level of health for all European citizens and better and equal access to health care for everyone;

4.  Welcomes the incorporation into the draft Constitution of a chapter devoted to the democratic life of the Union and the principle that decisions must be taken in the most transparent manner possible and at a level as close as possible to citizens; emphasises the significance of the responsibility borne by the Community institutions vis-à-vis citizens and the need for citizens and their organisations to have access to justice, in particular in the area of the environment, in accordance with the UN ECE’s Aarhus Convention.

PROCEDURE

Title	Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
Procedure number	2004/2129(INI)
Committee responsible	AFCO
Enhanced cooperation
Draftsman   Date appointed	Vasco Graça Moura 20.9.2004
Discussed in committee	25.10.2004
Date suggestions adopted	24.11.2004
Result of final vote	for: against: abstentions:		53 5 2
Members present for the final vote	Adamos Adamou, Georgs Andrejevs, Irena Belohorská, Johannes (Hans) Blokland, John Bowis, Frederika Brepoels, Hiltrud Breyer, Dorette Corbey, Chris Davies, Avril Doyle, Mojca Drčar Murko, Edite Estrela, Jillian Evans, Anne Ferreira, Alessandro Foglietta, Norbert Glante, Françoise Grossetête, Satu Hassi, Gyula Hegyi, Mary Honeyball, Caroline F. Jackson, Dan Jørgensen, Christa Klaß, Holger Krahmer, Urszula Krupa, Peter Liese, Jules Maaten, Linda McAvan, Marios Matsakis, Roberto Musacchio, Riitta Myller, Péter Olajos, Dimitrios Papadimoulis, Adriana Poli Bortone, Vittorio Prodi, Frédérique Ries, Dagmar Roth-Behrendt, Guido Sacconi, Karin Scheele, Richard Seeber, Jonas Sjöstedt, María Sornosa Martínez, Thomas Ulmer, Marcello Vernola, Anja Weisgerber, Åsa Westlund
Substitutes present for the final vote	Margrete Auken, María del Pilar Ayuso González, Giovanni Berlinguer, David Casa, Milan Gaľa, Vasco Graça Moura, Erna Hennicot-Schoepges, Karsten Friedrich Hoppenstedt, Miroslav Mikolášik, Matteo Salvini, Pál Schmitt, Bart Staes, Andres Tarand
Substitutes under Rule 178(2) present for the final vote	Nikolaos Vakalis

OPINION of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (23.11.2004)

for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs

on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
(2004/2129(INI))

Draftsman: Johannes (Hannes) Swoboda

SUGGESTIONS

The Committee on Industry, Research and Energy calls on the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:

TENs, Industry, Space and Energy

1.  Welcomes the improvement brought about in terms of clarification of objectives and simplification of procedure concerning the fields of Trans-European Networks (TENs) and the industry;

2.  Welcomes also the fact that a European Space Policy can now be established falling within the remit of Research and Technological Development, hence a shared competence, having as objectives the promotion of scientific and technical progress, industrial competitiveness and the implementation of the Union's policies; calls upon the Commission to prepare the legislative measures necessary for the creation of a European space programme;

3.  Notes with satisfaction that the Constitutional Treaty provides for a Union policy on energy, having a legal base of its own that lays down the procedure, i.e. co-decision and qualified majority voting, and falling within the shared competence area, while aiming at ensuring the efficient functioning of the energy market and security of energy supply and promoting energy efficiency and renewable energy;

4.  Supports, as an interim measure and with a view to the expiry of the Euratom Treaty, the separation of the Euratom Treaty from the Constitutional Treaty and the separation of the Euratom Community's legal personality from the European Union's new legal personality;

5.  Reiterates its view that the Euratom Treaty:

a) being intergovernmental in nature may not conform to the Constitutional Treaty's logic,

b) setting up its own common customs tariff may not be compatible with the Union's exclusive competence in this area,

c) implementing its own external relations is not consistent with the Union's external action,

d) retaining its own institutional provisions and separate actions and policies over research, investment and co-operation may not be compatible with the logic of the Constitutional Treaty,

e) negotiating and concluding its own international agreements may not be consistent with the procedure laid down for international agreements (Art. III-325);

6.  Insists on the need to transfer the research aspects of the Euratom Treaty to the appropriate section of the Constitutional Treaty;

Research and technological development

7.  Is of the view that the Constitutional Treaty has missed a window of opportunity to amend the relevant articles of the current Treaties and render this section more effective, reflecting the logic of shared competence, in that:

a) basic research is not included as a priority,

b) the Protocol on the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) annexed to the Treaty of Nice has not linked the newly created 'Research Fund for Coal and Steel' to the framework programme under the legislative procedure (i.e. co-decision and qualified majority voting),

c) although the framework programme falls under co-decision, the specific programmes do not;

8.  Regrets the lack of reference to general consultation of the Committee of the Regions in matters of innovation and research; calls for the regional aspect of innovation and research to be mentioned explicitly.

PROCEDURE

Title	Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
Procedure number	2004/2129(INI)
Committee responsible	AFCO
Enhanced cooperation
Draftsman:	Johannes (Hannes) Swoboda
Date appointed	13.9.2004
Discussed in committee	7.10.2004	22.11.2004
Date suggestions adopted	23.11.2004
Result of final vote	for:		33
	against:		5
	abstentions:		3
Members present for the final vote	Richard James Ashworth, Ivo Belet, Šarūnas Birutis, Jan Březina, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jorgo Chatzimarkakis, Giles Chichester, Garrelt Duin, Lena Ek, Nicole Fontaine, Adam Gierek, Umberto Guidoni, András Gyürk, Fiona Hall, David Hammerstein Mintz, Rebecca Harms, Romana Jordan Cizelj, Werner Langen, Pia Elda Locatelli, Eluned Morgan, Angelika Niebler, Reino Paasilinna, Pier Antonio Panzeri, Umberto Pirilli, Miloslav Ransdorf, Vladimír Remek, Herbert Reul, Teresa Riera Madurell, Mechtild Rothe, Paul Rübig, Andres Tarand, Britta Thomsen, Patrizia Toia, Claude Turmes, Nikolaos Vakalis, Alejo Vidal-Quadras Roca, Dominique Vlasto
Substitutes present for the final vote	María del Pilar Ayuso González, Etelka Barsi Pataky, Zdzisław Kazimierz Chmielewski, Dorette Corbey, Avril Doyle, Françoise Grossetête, Malcolm Harbour, Satu Hassi, Erika Mann, Giovanni Pittella
Substitutes under Rule 178(2) present for the final vote

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT (26.11.2004)

for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs

on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
(2004/2129(INI))

Rapporteur pour avis: Carlos José Iturgaiz Angulo

SUGGESTIONS

The Committee on Regional Development calls on the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:

-    having regard to the territorial organisation of each Member State provided for in their respective constitutions,

A. whereas the Preamble to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, incorporated in Title II of the draft Constitution, recognises the "national identities of the Member States and the organisation of their public authorities at national, regional and local levels",

B.  whereas the European Union is based on the dual legitimacy of the State and of the citizen as established in Article I-1 of the draft Constitution,

C. recalling the role of the regional and local authorities in the European project; whereas Article 1-5 of the draft Constitution explicitly refers to regional and local self-government as an integral part of the identity of the Member States,

D. whereas the Committee of the Regions is called upon to play a significant role, together with the European Parliament, in involving local and regional governments in the work of the Union,

E.  whereas the principle of subsidiarity is one of the cornerstones of the European project, whereas it has been appropriately reinforced under the Draft Constitution,

F.  reaffirming that the economic, social and territorial cohesion policy constitutes one of the cornerstones of the European project and the clearest expression of the principle of solidarity; whereas it is vital that both the old and the new Member States of the Union continue to benefit from this policy in order to promote thus a sound development of their economies and societies,

1.  Is gratified to see that the draft Constitution recognises and guarantees the national identity of the Member States, in accordance with international law;

2.  Welcomes the fact that the draft Constitution establishes the involvement of national parliaments in monitoring the application the principle of subsidiarity;

3.  Is gratified to see that the draft Constitution provides for an early consultation procedure prior to the drafting of European legislative acts, taking account, where applicable, of the regional and local dimension of the proposed action;

4.  Supports the strengthening of the Committee of the Regions by granting it the right to appeal in relation to legal acts requiring its prior consultation for their adoption and in defence of its prerogatives; welcomes, moreover, the new role assigned to the Committee of the Regions as one of the guardians of the principle of subsidiarity;

5.  Is gratified to see that territorial cohesion and not just economic and social cohesion has been recognised as an objective and as a shared competence of the Union; regrets, however, the fact that the financial dimension of cohesion is not explicitly recognised;

6.  Welcomes the fact that the draft Constitution recognises and respects access to services of general economic interest in order to promote the social and territorial cohesion of the Union;

7.  Regrets that the draft Constitution does not provide for the application of the ordinary legislative procedure (codecision), or qualified majority voting in the Council, for the adoption of laws establishing general provisions on the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Funds as of 2007 as provided for in the European Convention's text;

8.  Is gratified to see that the draft Constitution makes explicit mention of less-favoured regions (islands, mountain regions, border regions and areas with low population density) in relation to the vital objectives of cohesion policy;

9.  Welcomes the fact that a specific reference to the Union's outermost regions was added to the provision on the compatibility of regional aid; hopes that the new specific status conceived in the draft Constitution for the outermost regions be applied automatically to all such regions since they face structural, economic and social problems which need to be counteracted.

10. Regrets that section III of chapter III of Title III of the draft Constitutional Treaty relating to economic, social and territorial cohesion does not expressly include cities and urban areas facing major economic and social difficulties among the primary beneficiaries of the social, economic and territorial cohesion policy.

PROCEDURE

Title	Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
Procedure number	(2004/2129(INI))
Committee responsible	AFCO
Enhanced cooperation	No
Drafts(wo)man   Date appointed	Carlos José Iturgaiz Angulo 31/8/2004
Discussed in committee	28/9/04
Date suggestions adopted	25/11/2004
Result of final vote	for: against: abstentions:		34 4 8
Members present for the final vote	Alfonso Andria, Stavros Arnaoutakis, Jean Marie Beaupuy, Adam Jerzy Bielan, Jana Bobošíková, Graham Booth, Bairbre de Brún, Giovanni Claudio Fava, Gerardo Galeote Quecedo, Iratxe García Pérez, Eugenijus Gentvilas, Lidia Joanna Geringer de Oedenberg, Zita Gurmai, Marian Harkin, Konstantinos Hatzidakis, Jim Higgins, Alain Hutchinson, Carlos José Iturgaiz Angulo, Mieczysław Edmund Janowski, Gisela Kallenbach, Tunne Kelam, Miloš Koterec, Constanze Angela Krehl, Jamila Madeira, Sérgio Marques, Ioannis Matsis, Miroslav Mikolášik, Francesco Musotto, James Nicholson, Lambert van Nistelrooij, István Pálfi, Francisca Pleguezuelos Aguilar, Elisabeth Schroedter, Alyn Smith, Grażyna Staniszewska, Catherine Stihler, Margie Sudre, Salvatore Tatarella, Kyriacos Triantaphyllides
Substitutes present for the final vote	Philip Bradbourn, Jan Březina, Ole Christensen, Mojca Drčar Murko, Richard Falbr, Richard Seeber, Thomas Ulmer, Daniel Varela Suanzes-Carpegna
Substitutes under Rule 178(2) present for the final vote

OPINION of the Committee on Agriculture (23.11.2004)

for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs

on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
(2004/2129(INI))

Draftsman: Friedrich-Wilhelm Graefe zu Baringdorf

SHORT JUSTIFICATION

The European Parliament has had to battle long and hard for codecision in the area of agriculture. Since the launch of the common agricultural policy almost half a century ago, the European Parliament and its Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development have played only an advisory role. Even today the Council of Agriculture Ministers may choose to ignore the opinion of the European Parliament and take charge of just under half of the Union's budget without any democratic scrutiny.

This democratic deficit has made necessary reforms impossible for decades and provoked major crises in public health, the environment and animal welfare. The BSE crisis would not have reached such catastrophic proportions if Parliament had been involved in the decisions on precautionary and control measures.

The European Parliament, and particularly the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, has never been able to accept this democratic deficit. Unofficially, it has often imposed a form of codecision with the Council by withholding its opinions and suspending dealings with the Commission. It is to be welcomed that, since the Amsterdam Treaty, the codecision procedure has at least been applied in the areas of environment, food safety and consumer protection. However, the common agricultural policy with its powerful instruments of the common organisation of the markets and investment and income subsidies is still not under the supervision of the only European institution to be directly elected and therefore democratically legitimate.

It is only with the European Convention's draft Constitution that greater democratic legitimacy has become a real prospect. This is in spite of strong opposition from some Member States fearing a reduction in national revenue from the EU budget. From now on, all basic decisions on agricultural policy will be subject to codecision by the European Parliament. However, in certain areas, in particular the setting of quotas, prices and quantitative restrictions, the draft Constitution proposes a worsening of the current situation: the Council is to decide on these matters without the involvement of the European Parliament. The compromise reached at the Intergovernmental Conference in Brussels is clearly a step in the right direction but does not provide for full codecision.

A significant shortcoming in the compromise reached in Brussels is that the objectives of the common agricultural policy decided upon half a century ago have been incorporated under Part III, Article III-123 of the draft Treaty completely unchanged. Today they are no longer compatible with the since much-reformed agricultural policy and provide no new impetus for the urgently needed support for the rural economy and the inclusion of environmental policy and animal welfare. Nor is there any sense in dealing with agricultural policy separately from rural development and relations with developing countries and other trade partners.

The compromise reached with regard to the draft Constitution represents progress with gaps that will have to be addressed in the future. However, these gaps do not call into question the success of European integration through a common Constitution. Parliament should do all it can during the forthcoming ratification process to make citizens aware of the advances the adoption of the Constitution will mean for them specifically. The common agricultural policy was and is a cornerstone of European integration and will remain so as long as it advocates fair international trade relations with regard to food and raw materials abroad and takes up the new challenges of rural development and environmentally, economically and socially sustainable agriculture at home. This means making sure in particular that our resources are used in an environmentally friendly way, our farms remain economically viable, agricultural products are available to consumers at a reasonable price and that agricultural policy is acceptable both to farmers and to the whole of society.

SUGGESTIONS

The Committee on Agriculture calls on the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:

1.  Welcomes the extension of codecision by the European Parliament to the common organisation of agricultural markets and the other provisions necessary for the objectives of the common agricultural policy to be realised; calls however for the gaps remaining in terms of codecision on agricultural policy, in particular in Articles III-230(2) and III-231(3), to be filled in the course of a future revision of the draft Constitution;

2.  Regrets greatly in this regard that, under Article III-231(3), the matters previously subject to consultation, particularly the setting of quotas, prices and quantitative restrictions, are now to be decided by the Council alone, without Parliament's involvement; considers this to be counterproductive in view of the draft Constitution's otherwise visible tendency towards reducing the democratic deficit; reminds the Council that it will make use of its legislative powers to determine as far as possible the content of the conditions for regulating the matters referred to under Article III-231(3); repeats its demand that matters that have hitherto been subject to the consultation procedure and are considered under the section of the draft Constitution on agriculture, in particular Article III-231(3), to require a Council regulation or decision should in future only fall within the implementing power of the Commission if this is conferred upon it beforehand by Parliament and the Council by means of an act adopted under the codecision procedure;

3.  Points out that the objectives of the common agricultural policy set out in Article III-227 are incompatible with the European Union's objectives as defined under Article I-3; considers it to be essential, therefore, for the objectives of the CAP to be brought up to date in order to take into account the latest developments in this policy and, in particular, its multifunctional role with regard to farmers themselves, rural development, the environment and consumers;

4.  Considers the following to be appropriate as regards the objectives of the common agricultural policy:

The objectives of the common agricultural policy shall be:

(a)  to support a multifunctional agriculture in the European Union compatible with the environment and landscape that promotes biological diversity;

(b)  to increase agricultural productivity through the promotion and responsible use of technical progress, the rational development of agricultural production and the optimum use of production factors, especially labour;

(c)  to guarantee the farming and rural population a comparable standard of living and income, in particular by continuing with the rural development policy and increasing the individual earnings of people employed in agriculture;

(d)  to stabilise markets;

(e)  to assure the availability of supplies;

(f)   to ensure that supplies reach consumers at fair prices;

(g)  to promote the quality and safety of agricultural products and food;

5.  Welcomes the removal of the distinction hitherto made in the budget between compulsory expenditure, which mainly concerned agriculture, and non-compulsory expenditure; considers that this represents a substantial widening of the European Parliament's budgetary powers.

PROCEDURE

Title	Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
Procedure number	2004/2129(INI)
Committee responsible	AFCO
Enhanced cooperation	–
Draftsman:	Friedrich-Wilhelm Graefe zu Baringdorf
Date appointed	26.7.2004
Discussed in committee	2.9.2004
Date suggestions adopted	23.11.2004
Result of final vote	for:		28
	against:		--
	abstentions:		1
Members present for the final vote	Joseph Daul (Chairman), Jean-Claude Fruteau (Vice-Chairman), Friedrich-Wilhelm Graefe zu Baringdorf (Vice-Chairman), Peter Baco, Katerina Batzeli, Niels Busk, Albert Deß, Gintaras Didžiokas, Michl Ebner, Ioannis Gklavakis, Lutz Goepel, María Esther Herranz García, Heinz Kindermann, Albert Jan Maat, Mairead McGuinness, Rosa Miguélez Ramos, Neil Parish, Agnes Schierhuber, Czesław Adam Siekierski, Csaba Sándor Tabajdi, Marc Tarabella, Kyösti Tapio Virrankoski
Substitutes present for the final vote	Ilda Figueiredo, Gábor Harangozó, Wolfgang Kreissl-Dörfler, Antonio Masip Hidalgo, James Nicholson, Markus Pieper, Karin Resetarits
Substitutes under Rule 178(2) present for the final vote	--

OPINION of the Committee on Fisheries (24.11.2004)

for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs

on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
(2004/2129(INI))

Draftsman: Ian Stewart Hudghton

SUGGESTIONS

The Committee on Fisheries calls on the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:

1.  Welcomes the recognition given in the draft Constitution to the principle of subsidiarity and notes that, in the field of fisheries, the imminent establishment of Regional Advisory Councils may be regarded as being in keeping with this important constitutional principle, as well as being an important step towards the return of fisheries management to more localised decision-making;

2.  Regrets that the draft Constitution deals with fisheries largely as ancillary to agriculture and that no acknowledgement is given of the special characteristics of fisheries which, by their inherent nature, are primarily of importance to communities and economies of coastal regions and Member States;

3.  Further regrets the fact that this failure to recognise the special characteristics of fisheries gives non-fisheries dependent regions and Member States a disproportionate influence in fisheries management matters;

4. Considers that nothing in the draft Constitution should prevent Member States from taking further measures to conserve fish stocks, provided that such measures apply only to vessels flying their flag and are compatible with, and no less stringent than, the provisions of the Common Fisheries Policy;

5.  Regrets the fact that, whereas the European Union's exclusive competence over marine biological resources had previously been a matter of secondary Community law as established in the Kramer case of 1976, the draft Constitution envisages this exclusive competence becoming a matter of primary Constitutional law;

6.  Considers that, within the context of the other exclusive competences of the EU which are detailed in the draft Constitution, the inclusion of the conservation of marine biological resources is anomalous and unjustified;

7.  Welcomes the fact that, following approval of the Constitution for Europe, the co-decision procedure will apply to fisheries legislation.

PROCEDURE

Title	Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
Procedure number	2004/2129(INI)
Committee responsible	AFCO
Enhanced cooperation	no
Drafts(wo)man   Date appointed	Ian Stewart Hudghton 22.9.2004
Discussed in committee	4.10.2004	24.11.2004
Date suggestions adopted	24.11.2004
Result of final vote	for: against: abstentions:		23 0 4
Members present for the final vote	Stavros Arnaoutakis, Elspeth Attwooll, Luis Manuel Capoulas Santos, Giorgio Carollo, David Casa, Paulo Casaca, Zdzisław Kazimierz Chmielewski, Antonio De Poli, Carmen Fraga Estévez, Ioannis Gklavakis, Ian Stewart Hudghton, Heinz Kindermann, Rosa Miguélez Ramos, Philippe Morillon, Seán Ó Neachtain, Neil Parish, Sérgio Ribeiro, Struan Stevenson, Catherine Stihler, Margie Sudre, Daniel Varela Suanzes-Carpegna
Substitutes present for the final vote	Simon Coveney, Duarte Freitas, Henrik Dam Kristensen
Substitutes under Rule 178(2) present for the final vote	Ilda Figueiredo, Satu Hassi, Manuel Medina Ortega

OPINION of the Committee on Legal Affairs (25.11.2004)

for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs

on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
(2004/2129(INI))

Draftswoman: Maria Berger

SUGGESTIONS

The Committee on Legal Affairs calls on the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:

Amendment 1 Recital I, point (d a) (new)

(da)     the removal of contradictions between the goals and principles laid down in Part I of the Constitution and the provisions of Part III, which as a consequence of the partial withdrawal of the mandate of the Convention at the Thessaloniki European Council had to be adopted in the version of the Presidium draft, although a massive majority in the Convention had called for far-reaching changes

Amendment 2

Paragraph 2, point (e)

(e)      Union legal acts will be simplified, their number reduced, and their names changed so as to be more consistent with the legal traditions of the Member States and to denote more accurately the nature of an act and those who have produced it: legislative acts, which originate invariably from the Community legislator - Parliament and the Council - are accordingly termed laws and framework laws, whereas non-legislative acts are called regulations and decisions;

Amendment 3

Paragraph 3, point (g)

(g)      there will be a more limited set of European Union legislative instruments and a more limited number of procedures for their adoption; a hierarchy of acts will be established; exercising the power delegated to it under the direct supervision of the legislator, the Commission will be able to expand or supplement legislative acts, thus helping to improve the quality of European legislation and making it simpler and more adaptable; furthermore, the general arrangements applicable to implementing acts (‘comitology’) will be laid down by means of codecision;

Amendment 4

Paragraph 3, point (j a) (new)

(ja)      the changes to the running and the powers of the Court of Justice will enable it to operate more efficiently;

Amendment 5

Paragraph 4, point (b a) (new)

(ba)     Union acts may be subjected to genuine prior scrutiny according to the yardstick of subsidiarity, a process in which the national and even regional parliaments will be able to play their part, and to subsequent judicial review on the initiative of the parliaments or of the Committee of the Regions;

Amendment 6 Paragraph 4, point (g)

(g) although the powers of the European Parliament concerning better regulation and control of the exercise of implementing powers by the Commission are not laid down expressly in the Constitution, the exercise of delegated legislative powers and implementing powers by the Commission will be brought by European laws within a new system of joint supervision by the European Parliament and the Council, which should enable each of them to revoke Commission decisions to which they object;

Amendment 7 Paragraph 5, point (a)

(a) all provisions of European Union law and all action taken by European Union institutions or based on European Union law will have to meet the standards of fundamental rights laid down in the draft Constitution, especially in Part II thereof incorporating the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is therefore legally binding, although the declaration concerning the explanations given in relation to the Charter of Fundamental Rights as updated under the responsibility of the Presidium of the Convention aims at ring-fencing the interpretation thereof by the courts of the Union and of the Member States;

Amendment 8 Paragraph 5, point (c)

(c) through the introduction of a European citizens’ initiative a direct democratic instrument is enshrined in the Constitution, allowing citizens to submit proposals on matters where they consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Constitution;

Amendment 9

Paragraph 8 a (new)

8a.      Calls on the institutions to use the ratification stage to prepare for entry into force of the Constitution so as to enable it to take effect as fully and as quickly as possible;

PROCEDURE

Title	Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
Procedure number	2004/2129(INI)
Committee responsible	AFCO
Enhanced cooperation
Drafts(wo)man   Date appointed	Diana Wallis 14.9.2004
Discussed in committee	21.9.2004	7.10.2004		26.10.2004
Date suggestions adopted	24.11.2004
Result of final vote	for: against: abstentions:		17 0 0
Members present for the final vote	Maria Berger, Marek Aleksander Czarnecki, Monica Frassoni, Piia-Noora Kauppi, Klaus-Heiner Lehne, Katalin Lévai, Antonio Masip Hidalgo, Aloyzas Sakalas, Daniel Stroz, Andrzej Jan Szejna, Diana Wallis, Rainer Wieland, Jaroslav Zvěřina
Substitutes present for the final vote	Evelin Lichtenberger, Manuel Medina Ortega, Ingo Schmitt, József Szájer
Substitutes under Rule 178(2) present for the final vote

OPINION of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (26.10.2004)

for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs

on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
(2004/2129(INI))

Draftsman: Stefano Zappalà

SUGGESTIONS

The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs calls on the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:

The European Parliament

1.   Commends the draft treaty establishing the first constitution for Europe and considers that the progress made with regard to the area of freedom, security and justice would by itself justify ratification by the Member States of the draft Treaty;

2.   Considers that the Constitutional Treaty meets in full the expectations expressed by the European Parliament with regard to the creation of a genuine common area of freedom, security and justice;

3.   Welcomes the fact that:

·   the Constitutional Treaty makes good the democratic deficit that characterises the decision-making process in matters of judicial and police cooperation in criminal matters, and that the merger of the Community into the Union, the extension of the legislative procedure to former third-pillar areas and the introduction of qualified majority voting mean that a genuine 'Union of the rule of law' can at last be achieved;

·   the Charter of Fundamental Rights is to be incorporated into the Constitutional Treaty, which will guarantee the effective protection of those rights in the European Union, this being a prerequisite for the completion of the area of freedom, security and justice;

·  the Treaty provides that the European Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

·  thanks to the abolition of the pillar structure, it will at last be possible to have a common legal basis for data protection, which will allow the necessary harmonisation of existing provisions, particularly in the field of criminal and police cooperation;

·  the right of legislative initiative for a quarter of the Member States has been recognised in the area of judicial cooperation on criminal matters and police cooperation; Member States may thus participate actively in the creation of the area of freedom, security and justice, proposing to the Union solutions to matters that transcend national boundaries;

·  immigration policy is to become a fully-fledged European Union policy, transcending the concept of the straightforward protection of internal security and promoting solidarity and the equal distribution of responsibilities among the Member States in this domain, and that a specific legal basis is to be introduced for the integration of third-country nationals residing legally in the Union;

·  considerable progress has been made in the context of the completion of a European area of freedom, security and justice and of the promotion of the quality of justice at European level;

·  the Constitutional Treaty defines the outlines of European law and order as safeguarding the security not only of Member States but also of the European Union, both internally and externally, and that the role of the Commission, as well as agencies such as Eurojust and Europol, is to be enhanced to this end;

·  Europol will no longer have to have an intergovernmental agreement as its basis, but rather an ordinary European law, and will conduct its activities under the supervision of the European Parliament, national parliaments and the Court of Justice;

·  the Treaty confers a suitable legal basis on the Council for deepening the area of freedom, security and justice, notably by extending the scope for harmonisation of substantive criminal law or the competences of the European Public Prosecutor's office;

·  in particular, the role of the national parliaments is strengthened, especially as regards monitoring of respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, participation in the Eurojust evaluation processes and implementation by the Member States of the policies relating to the area of freedom, security and justice;

·  the Union's fight against trafficking in people and sexual exploitation of women and children will be facilitated by the Constitutional Treaty (particularly by means of Article II-65(3), which prohibits trafficking in human beings, and Article III-271(1), which provides for the possibility of establishing minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of particularly serious crime, such as trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of women and children);

4.  Notes that in certain areas moves could have been made towards further integration, and in particular questions:

·  the limitations imposed by the introduction of the clause (Article III-267(5)) granting Member States alone the power to determine the volumes of admission to their territory of third-country nationals, which effectively precludes the possibility of establishing a genuine European policy for the management of legal admissions to the European Union;

·  the appropriateness of incorporating the 'emergency brake' clause (Article III-270(3)) for judicial cooperation in criminal matters;

·  the appropriateness of some Member States being able to enjoy special arrangements for derogation from the Constitution;

·  the European Parliament's limited role in the area of judicial cooperation in civil matters as regards family law;

·  the fact that the clauses relating to the freezing of funds, financial assets and economic gains needed to achieve the objectives of the area of freedom, security and justice are limited, contrary to what was proposed in the Convention text, to the area of the prevention and combating of terrorism, and exclude the prevention and combating of organised crime and of trafficking in human beings;

·  the proposed limitations on the powers of the European Public Prosecutor's office; believes that its powers should possibly be extended beyond the sole area of the protection of the Union's financial interests (Article III-274);

5.      Recommends that the Commission on Constitutional Affairs call on the Member States to ratify the Constitutional Treaty at the earliest opportunity.

PROCEDURE

Title	Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
Procedure number	2004/2129(INI)
Committee responsible	AFCO
Enhanced cooperation	-
Draftsman   Date appointed	Stefano Zappalà 13.9.2004
Discussed in committee	22.9.2004	5.10.2004		25.10.2004
Date suggestions adopted	25.10.2004
Result of the final vote	for: against: abstentions:		36 3 0
Members present for the final vote	Alexander Nuno Alvaro, Roberta Angelilli, Edit Bauer, Kathalijne Maria Buitenweg, Giusto Catania, Charlotte Cederschiöld, Carlos Coelho, António Costa, Agustín Díaz De Mera García Consuegra, Antoine Duquesne, Kinga Gál, Timothy Kirkhope, Ewa Klamt, Wolfgang Kreissl-Dörfler, Barbara Kudrycka, Stavros Lambrinidis, Henrik Lax, Sarah Ludford, Edith Mastenbroek, Jaime Mayor Oreja, Claude Moraes, Hartmut Nassauer, Athanasios Pafilis, Martine Roure, Michele Santoro, Luciana Sbarbati, Inger Segelström, Ioannis Varvitsiotis, Manfred Weber, Stefano Zappalà, Tatjana Ždanoka
Substitutes present for the final vote	Gérard Deprez, Luis Francisco Herrero-Tejedor, Sophia Helena In 't Veld, Jean Denise Lambert, Marco Pannella, Vincent Peillon, Agnes Schierhuber, Antonio Tajani
Substitutes under Rule 178(2) present for the final vote

OPINION of the Committee on Petitions (29.11.2004)

for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs

on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
(2004/2129(INI))

Draftsman: Marcin Libicki

SUGGESTIONS

The Committee on Petitions calls on the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:

Introduction:

The Convention on the Future of Europe was asked to make proposals on three subjects, according to the preface of the new Draft Constitution, at the Laeken Summit in December 2001. The first of these questions was "how to bring citizens closer to the European design and European Institutions".

The Committee on Petitions is best placed within the European Parliament to respond because it is uniquely placed within Parliament's committee structure and has regular and daily contact with citizens from every Member State of the Union. More than any other committee, or organ of the Union, it is made constantly aware by European citizens themselves of their individual concerns and reactions to European issues. It is therefore able to judge what is working and what is not in the everyday life of the Union.

Yet, the Petitions Committee is only a small tip of a very large European iceberg. While it may claim proximity to the citizen, it is evident that the methods and working practices of the non-parliamentary institutions of the Union remain distant and unknown, or at best misunderstood, and rarely trusted. It probably requires more than a Constitution to resolve that problem.

The Draft Constitution contains proposals which will allow the European citizen to better understand the framework within which the EU and the Member States conduct their business.

Rights.

The question of fundamental rights and citizenship is immediately addressed in the Draft Constitution, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights is fully incorporated into the text in Part II.

In addition the Union commits itself to accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, to which currently only Member States can accede in the framework of the Council of Europe.

For the average petitioner at the moment there is a high degree of incomprehension regarding precisely which rights they enjoy under which agreement. It is particularly hard for them to grasp why the Union now has a Fundamental Charter, yet has no practical means to ensure its enforcement or real implementation. To be told that their concerns are a matter for the European Court of Human Rights and they have to pursue legal paths in their Member States hardly responds to the problems which they have addressed to the European Parliament's Petitions Committee.

Every national of a Member State will be a citizen of the Union. There is no EU nationality. Amongst their enshrined rights is the right to petition the European Parliament, which they have enjoyed under the Treaty since Maastricht.

Efforts undertaken by the Petitions Committee and the European Parliament to obtain redress for citizens are often successful, particularly when the solution is found in cooperation with Member States' authorities (national, regional or local) or when there is a clear violation of EU law and the Commission can exert pressure under threat of infringement. However the infringement procedure merely ensures, if successful, the compliance of the Member State with a given directive. It rarely does anything for the individual petitioner directly.

Therefore, what is required under the terms of the Constitution, in its implementing provisions, or in the context of an interinstitutional agreement are clearly defined procedures which provide for a non-judicial means of redress which would give practical effect to the provisions contained in Title II.

Participatory Democracy.

Title VI provides for and confirms the participation of the citizen in the democratic life of the Union as well as specifying the responsibilities of the European Ombudsman who deals with "maladministration within the Union Institutions bodies or agencies", the importance of personal data protection and the status of churches and non-confessional organisations. Improved rules of transparency are defined.

Such provisions are important for the citizen and therefore for the Petitions Committee, which, it is recalled, supervises the activity and organises the election of the Ombudsman.

Article 46 goes further and gives "citizens and representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union action", which they have been doing for some time under the petitions process.

However, Paragraph 4 of Article 46 creates a completely new opportunity for the citizen - or to be more precise, for one million citizens. That is, provision is made for citizens to initiate a legal act of the Union. This represents an incredible opportunity for the Union itself to be seen to respond in legislative form to the direct concerns of people. It should not however become a means to bypass the Parliament which is the democratic emanation of all the citizens of the EU. It should in other words, be seen as complementary to Parliament's action, not as a substitute for it. It should therefore be channelled through Parliament, before the Commission is invited to officially submit a proposal.

That paragraph specifies that a European Law shall determine the provisions for the specific procedures and conditions required for such a citizens' initiative. It is imperative that such procedures are simple, clear and transparent and provide citizens with the effective right of initiative and continued involvement in the process leading to the formulation of a legislative proposal.

Such a measure should therefore be considered as an extension, and a very practical one, to the citizen's right of petition in a positive sense. Indeed, it is the essence of the right of petition, taken to its logical consequence.

Quite clearly, when the moment arises, the Petitions Committee would like to be directly associated as the committee responsible, perhaps with the other competent committees of Parliament depending on the issue involved, in the preparation of the European Law concerned. It claims the right and the responsibility to be an integral part of the process which links the citizen directly to the creation of a European law, as a matter of coherence and principle as well as for practical reasons.

Final remarks:

The Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe contains many specific provisions on individual rights and policy areas which are regularly discussed in Committee because of the petitions related to them. It should be recalled in this context quite simply that the petitions process is a cooperative one, which enhances the Parliament's ability to exercise the supervision and control of Union activity on behalf of the citizen. If a more adequate means of non-judicial remedy were to be provided for, it would become an even more efficient process for the enforcement of EU law, agreed by Parliament and each Member State through the Council.

Similarly, the Petitions Committee constitutes the appropriate parliamentary framework for the promotion of citizens' legislative initiatives and, if necessary, their refinement with the direct and public involvement of the initiators, before accessing the Commission. In the coming period more discussions must take place on this latter issue in order to work out the procedures in more detail.

PROCEDURE

Title	Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
Procedure number	2004/2129(INI)
Committee responsible	AFCO
Enhanced cooperation
Drafts(wo)man   Date appointed	Marcin Libicki 29.09.2004
Discussed in committee	29.9.2004	7.10.2004		22.11.2004
Date suggestions adopted	23.11.2004
Result of final vote	for: against: abstentions:		11 0 0
Members present for the final vote	Marcin Libicki, Michael Cashman, Marie Panayotopoulos-Cassiotou, Maria Matsouka, Manolis Mavrommatis, Robert Atkins, Proinsias De Rossa, Rainer Wieland, Mario Borghezio, Carlos José Iturgaiz Angulo, David Hammerstein Mintz, Alexandra Dobolyi
Substitutes present for the final vote
Substitutes under Rule 178(2) present for the final vote

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE

Brussels, 28 October 2004

OPINION of the European Economic and Social Committee

on the

Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe

____________

                      On 29 September 2004, the European Parliament decided to consult the European Economic and Social Committee, under Article 262 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, on the

Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.

                      In view of the urgent nature of the work, the EESC decided, at its 411^th plenary session held on 15 and 16 September 2004, to appoint Mr Malosse as rapporteur-general. At its 412^th plenary session on 27 and 28 October 2004 (meeting of 28 October 2004), the EESC adopted the following opinion by 166 votes to 4, with 6 abstentions:

1.        Introduction

1.1                 The EESC expressed its support for the draft Constitutional Treaty in its opinion of 24 September 2003[1]. In this opinion, the EESC pointed out that once agreement had, hopefully, been reached between the Member States, the key task would be to secure the support of the people and civil society bodies in the EU Member States.

1.2                 We have now reached this stage as the debate on the ratification of the Treaty has been set in train in each of the EU Member States, irrespective of the method of ratification which has been selected (ratification by Parliament or through a referendum).

1.3                 At this crucial time for the future of the European venture, everyone must be encouraged to look beyond their own interests, be they personal, sectorial, professional, local or national interests. The draft Treaty has to be scrutinised from the standpoint of its overall political importance in the context of the process launched over 50 years ago by the founding fathers of the European Communities.

1.4                 Against this background, the EESC welcomes the action taken by the European Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs in asking the EESC for an opinion on the Constitutional Treaty. The EESC intends to avail itself to the full of this opportunity to set out:

·     clear messages addressed to civil society organisations in the EU on the content and scope of the Constitutional Treaty and

·     recommendations on the communication strategy to be adopted with a view to rallying civil society behind the Constitutional Treaty.

2.        Clear messages

2.1      Use of the instrument of the “Convention”: a step forward in the process of democratising the European venture

2.1.1              The Constitutional Treaty was drafted by a Convention, most of whose members were national MPs or MEPs. This method of drawing up the Constitutional Treaty does, in itself, represent a step forward which deserves to be drawn to public attention. The efforts to involve civil society organisations, by means of hearings and consultations and through the participation of observers selected by the social partners and the EESC, marked a real step forward, also vis-à-vis the constitutional practices pursued in the majority of the Member States. In its abovementioned opinion of 24 September 2003^[2]2, the EESC also put forward proposals for strengthening the process of involving civil society in the future.

2.1.2              Although there was a number of setbacks, the IGC did not substantially change the text proposed by the Convention. The Constitutional Treaty is based on a consensus between all the political groupings and is the fruit of a genuine democratic debate.

2.1.3              Even though the Convention was not given constituent power, in view of the dual nature of the EU, as a union of states and peoples, the establishment of the Convention represented a genuine break with earlier practices, which completely disregarded the representation of parliaments and civil society.

2.1.4              Abandonment of the Constitutional Treaty would constitute a defeat for the method of drafting which was adopted. It is therefore essential to plead the cause of using this method on a permanent basis (as stipulated in the Constitutional Treaty itself).

2.1.5              For this reason, the EESC, which participated in the work of the Convention, endorses the legitimacy of the Treaty and calls upon all the members of the Convention and observers who signed the draft Treaty to follow its example.

2.2      The establishment of a Constitution, a “revolutionary” step in the history of the European venture

2.2.1              The Constitution provides a new framework of operation for the Union. The Constitution comprises three main parts, the first two of which represent complete innovations. Part I defines the principles and values underlying the Union; Part II sets out the fundamental rights of the citizens of the Union; and Part III defines and updates the Community policies set out in the earlier treaties.

2.2.2              The Constitution provides a means of replacing the existing treaties by a single, comprehensive document, thereby making the way in which the EU operates more readily understandable and more accessible to all.

2.2.3              The Constitution does not replace national constitutions but coexists alongside these constitutions. It will apply to all of the territory of the European Union.

2.2.4              Although the substance of the Constitution is not, strictly speaking, “revolutionary”, the fact that the new Treaty takes the form of a constitution is bound to mark a new chapter in the collective awareness of the people of the European Union by focusing on a joint ambition and a common destiny. The EESC is duty bound to promote public awareness of this step forward in the building of Europe.

2.3      A more democratic Union which recognises that the interests of the people are paramount in the building of Europe (Part I of the Treaty)

2.3.1              The objective of the Constitutional Treaty is abundantly clear: to establish a political union on behalf of the citizens and States of Europe.

2.3.2              The Union’s ambitions focus on the principal aspirations of the citizens of the Union. The Constitutional Treaty explicitly mentions “full employment, a highly competitive social market economy and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment", when listing the aims of the Union. The Union also seeks to promote “economic, social and territorial cohesion and solidarity among Member States” and to provide “an area of freedom, security and justice” for its citizens.

2.3.3              There has been a distinct improvement in the democratic legitimacy of the decision-making process:

2.3.3.1            The powers of the European Parliament, as the joint legislative body, have been increased. This development could help to strengthen public perception of the importance of the European Parliament.

2.3.3.2            The new role assigned to the national parliaments safeguards against any over-regulation at EU level. The Commission is obliged to inform national parliaments of any new initiatives and the “early warning mechanism” enables them to monitor compliance with the principle of subsidiarity.

2.3.4              In future, citizens can be informed of the positions adopted by their respective governments at the Council, since the latter body will be bound to act in a transparent way in its capacity as a legislative body.

2.3.5              For the first time, participatory democracy has been recognised as a principle underlying the operation of the Union and providing a vital counterpart to representative democracy.

2.3.5.1            By maintaining an open and regular dialogue with representative civil society associations, EU Institutions should act in a more coherent and transparent way. By consulting the parties concerned, it should be possible, for example, to avoid nitpicking rules and rules which cannot be applied in practice. Under the Constitutional Treaty the Commission would also be obliged to carry out a more effective assessment of the economic and social impact of its proposals, including the impact at regional and local level.

2.3.5.2            One of the major innovations of the Constitutional Treaty is the establishment of a right of popular initiative. Provided that each request is supported by at least one million citizens coming from a significant number of Member States, EU citizens may in future invite the European Commission to submit proposals for legislation which meet their aspirations.

2.3.6              The Constitutional Treaty confirms the role played by the social partners as a key component of democratic life in the Union, whilst respecting the autonomy of the social dialogue.

2.3.7              The introduction of this new part (Part I) of the proposed Constitution for Europe should make it possible to reduce the democratic deficit in an expanding Union.

2.4      A Union which affords better protection of the fundamental rights of European citizens (Part II of the Treaty)

2.4.1              The Charter of Fundamental Rights was drawn up by a Convention whose democratic legitimacy was widely recognised. Contributions from civil society organisations played an important role in the drafting of the Charter.

2.4.2              The Charter of Fundamental Rights is seen as marking a step forward as it incorporates, without breaking them down into separate categories, all types of individual and collective rights (civil and political rights and social and economic rights). It also adopts an innovatory approach by recognising more “contemporary” civil rights (linked to sustainable development, consumer protection, gender equality, bioethics, the protection of personal data, etc.).

2.4.3              The fundamental rights of Union citizens form an integral part of the Constitutional Treaty, rather than taking the form of a preamble.

2.4.4              The incorporation of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights into the Treaty, as demanded by a large number of European civil society organisations, is of significant importance as these rights will henceforth be legally binding.

2.4.5              This progressive measure will, in practice, mean that citizens will benefit from better legal protection. They will, in future, be able to invoke the provisions of the Charter in any national courts when challenging decisions taken by the European Institutions and by Member States in implementing Community law.

2.4.6              The EESC, which was involved in the drawing-up of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, takes the view that its incorporation into the Treaty represents a significant step forward in the protection of the rights of natural and legal persons.

2.5      A Union which is capable of meeting the aspirations of its citizens by virtue of the Community method and Community policies (Part III of the Treaty)

2.5.1              The existing Treaties and, in particular, the Community method, have demonstrated their effectiveness to a considerable degree. Part III of the Constitutional Treaty therefore sets out the main provisions of the existing treaties with regard to the EU’s common policies, whilst extending qualified majority voting to approximately 20 areas hitherto subject to unanimous voting. Furthermore, it gives official recognition to the co-decision procedure as “ordinary legislative procedure”, thereby strengthening the powers of the European Parliament. Most of the decisions taken by the Union relating to the common policies can therefore be adopted more effectively and more democratically.

2.5.2              Part III of the draft Constitution sets out the general principles underlying the fields in which the EU Member States have decided either to pool their resources or to cooperate. The content of the policies in these areas is not, however, cast in stone; it depends on the decisions taken by EU governments and by majority votes in the European Parliament and therefore reflects the will of these bodies.

2.5.3              One example of this is social policy, with the insertion of a general provision ('social clause') stipulating that the Union must take into account, when defining and implementing its policies, 'the requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education, training and protection of human health'. Further examples include combating all forms of discrimination and exclusion and the recognition of the role of services of general interest in the promotion of the social and territorial cohesion of the Union or, as already enshrined in the Treaty, catering for the environmental dimension and the requirements of consumer protection.  

2.5.4              The difficulty encountered in securing popular involvement in the draft Constitutional Treaty may be attributed to the very fact that, whilst the public is used to being consulted on specific actions or proposed policies, it is not used to being consulted on operating frameworks. In order to mobilise public opinion, we have to launch a debate on what course of action the public and the Member States wish to pursue, now that the principles, values, objectives and operating rules have been clearly set out in the draft Constitution.

2.5.5              For this reason, the EESC would, at this stage, like to establish a link between the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Strategy, which will shortly be the subject of a mid-term review. The subject of the Lisbon Strategy should be introduced into the debate since it maps out a vision of the future for all citizens of the EU marked by: competitiveness, full employment; shared knowledge; investment in human resources; and growth, whilst preserving the living environment and the quality of life through sustainable development. This strategy has now broken down as the implementing instruments are not up to the task and there is a chronic lack of public involvement and involvement of civil society. At this stage, there is therefore a vital need for a fresh impulse and new Community initiatives in order to make the Union's economic and social project credible.

2.5.6              In the opinion which it submitted to the European Council^[3]3, the EESC called for the mid-term review to place responsibility for implementing the Lisbon Strategy in the hands of public and civil society players. The forthcoming mid-term review must be seen as providing an opportunity, which cannot be missed, to pass on to the public and civil society a clear political message spelling out the content of the EU's project.

2.5.7              EU citizens need to be made aware of the fact that the democratic progress achieved by the draft Constitution offers them the wherewithal to decide themselves on the content of the policies and actions to be pursued in practice by the Union in order to meet their aspirations. Rejection of the Constitutional Treaty would therefore be tantamount to freezing the Treaties in their present form.

2.6      Rallying European civil society behind the achievements of the Constitutional Treaty in order to overcome its shortcomings

2.6.1              This does not mean that we should keep quiet about the shortcomings of the Constitutional Treaty in its current form. A large number of the demands of civil society could not be taken into account by the Convention and still fewer by the IGC. In its opinion of 24 September 2003^[4]4, the EESC noted a wholes series of weaknesses in the Constitutional Treaty, including the following:

2.6.1.1            The lack of adequate operational provisions for implementing the principle of participatory democracy. As a result, the role of the EESC was not strengthened to the extent necessary to ensure effective civil dialogue.

2.6.1.2            The absence of provisions acknowledging the role played by organised civil society in implementing the subsidiarity principle (including functional subsidiarity) in the protocol on the application of this principle.

2.6.1.3            The weakness of EU governance as regards economic and employment policy and the absence of rules providing for consultation of the European Parliament and the EESC in these areas, which concern civil society players most of all.

2.6.1.4            The lack of any requirement for mandatory consultation of the EESC on application of the non-discrimination principle, the common asylum and immigration policy or culture, despite the Committee's expertise in these fields.

2.6.2              Does this mean then that the Treaty should be rejected? The EESC believes that this would only make things worse and send a negative signal regarding the European venture, both within the Union and outside, where hostile or competing forces would certainly take delight in such a setback. On the contrary, the Committee feels that it is possible to build on the proposed institutional framework and improve it through operational measures:

2.6.2.1            The provisions on participatory democracy should be made the subject of a series of communications defining the consultation procedures and the role of the EESC.

2.6.2.2            Civil society should be consulted on the content of the European law defining the procedures for implementing the right of citizens' initiative. The EESC could be asked to deliver an exploratory opinion on this subject. It could also lend its support to civil society initiatives.

2.6.2.3            The principle of participatory democracy should be applied to the EU's key strategies for promoting growth, employment and sustainable development.

2.6.3              Moreover, and still within the framework of the Constitutional Treaty as it has been adopted, it is also important to inform the public about how flexibility could be introduced and progress could be achieved without the need to revise the Treaty:

2.6.3.1            Member States wishing to advance further down the road of European integration will find it easier to establish enhanced cooperation between themselves.

2.6.3.2            If all the Member States express the political will to do so, it will be possible to deepen integration in sensitive areas where unanimity is still required, such as taxation or social policy, for example. A "bridging clause" allows qualified majority voting to be extended to these areas.

2.6.4              By opting for a committed, critical and constructive approach, organised civil society will help to ensure that citizens are well informed and will keep up the pressure on governments. The worst thing would be if politicians were to be confirmed in the - unfortunately widely held - view that citizens are not interested in the European venture. This view is totally false because people actually expect much from Europe, in particular that it will bring improvements in their everyday life by providing a vision of their future.

2.6.5              The EESC believes that the adoption of the Constitutional Treaty is not an end in itself. Rather, it opens the way towards a strengthening of participatory democracy. To reject the Treaty would be to give up the progress achieved through the Convention method.

3.        Effective communication

                      The EESC believes that the quality of the communication strategy will be a determining factor for the adoption of the Constitutional Treaty by the people of Europe. A pragmatic and professional approach is therefore needed to ensure that the strategy is effective. The EESC recommends that the communication strategy be built around action in the following four areas:

3.1      Provision of resources: information tools and funding

3.1.1              The complexity of the Constitutional Treaty calls for the development of information tools that could be used, upstream of the communication process, to launch campaigns or organise debates.

3.1.2              It would be up to the Member States, with the support of the information offices of the European Parliament and the Commission representations in the Member States, to devise information tools and make them accessible.

3.1.3              These tools could take the form of interpretive guides to the Constitutional Treaty, geared to the concerns of different population groups in each Member State. The more customised these tools are, the easier it would be for them to be used effectively by the media, civil society organisations, political groups and local and regional authorities in disseminating information and rallying public support.

3.1.4              The provision of adequate financial resources is necessary for the implementation of a communication strategy that meets citizens' expectations.

3.2      Launching of public communication campaigns using the media and grassroots communication channels

3.2.1              Once the requisite resources have been placed at their disposal, the media, local and regional authorities, political groups and civil society organisations will have the means to act as a conduit for information. They will be able to convey clear messages on the implications of the Constitutional Treaty that are attuned to the concerns of their local audience.

3.2.2              Initially, it would be useful to find out, in each Member State, how the Constitutional Treaty is perceived by different population groups in order to reflect on the content of the messages to be conveyed. Drawing on the conclusions reached, the aim of the messages would be to overcome people's fears and respond to their expectations.

3.2.3              In addition, the message-bearers and communication media will have to be chosen carefully. The involvement of a wide variety of players is essential to guarantee the pluralist nature of the campaign. Moreover, their closeness to citizens will be a key factor enhancing the credibility and acceptance of the messages conveyed, hence the importance of action taken at local and regional level.

3.2.4              The EESC recommends to the European Parliament that working parties be set up with institutional communication professionals in each Member State with a view to making practical proposals to governments regarding the measures and resources necessary to embark upon an effective communication campaign in the Member States. The EESC is prepared to make available its expertise in this field and to offer the support of its contacts in the Member States, national ESCs and similar institutions.

3.3      Organising debates that are open to all members of the public with a view to fostering the exchange of ideas and convincing people

3.3.1              The communication campaigns should lead to the opening of genuine dialogue with the public. It is essential that people be offered the opportunity to ask questions and hear different arguments so that they can make and express their own judgements.

3.3.2              Such dialogue will only be possible in the context of decentralised debates. The closer the interface with citizens, the better the information provided will be able to respond to their expectations, answer their questions and guarantee the democratic character of the debates.

3.3.3              National and European institutions must provide logistical support for these initiatives. National economic and social councils and similar institutions could coordinate the debates at national level by establishing a calendar of events and liaising with the EESC, which could provide them with documentation and put them in touch with speakers.

3.3.4              In order to ensure a degree of consistency between the initiatives, the EESC requests the European Parliament and the European Commission to ensure that initiatives by representatives of organised civil society enjoy the same support as those by elected and other representatives of European, national, regional and local bodies under the 1000 debates on Europe initiative. Civil society cannot be kept on the sidelines.

3.3.5              The EESC requests the European Parliament to allocate a significant proportion of the EU communication budget to the debates on the Constitutional Treaty to complement the resources of national and local public authorities and the resources at the disposal of civil society organisations.

3.4      Giving the debates and ratification a European dimension

3.4.1              It is essential to make sure that the adoption of the Constitutional Treaty by the people of Europe is not determined solely by domestic policy issues.

3.4.2              Therefore the EESC recommends that the debates and the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty be given a truly transnational dimension:

3.4.2.1            On the one hand, the European Institutions should help to coordinate the communication activities of political groups, local and regional authorities and civil society organisations by encouraging the exchange of good practice in this field and the pooling of efforts. For example, the EESC could promote the exchange of good practice (and know-how) at European level between civil society organisations involved in communication activities. It could also establish feedback arrangements for evaluating, at European level, proposals, criticisms and recommendations put forward by members of the public during debates organised by civil society. Finally, the EESC stands ready to support cross-border or multi-national initiatives.

3.4.2.2            Furthermore, the EESC endorses the proposal by the European Parliament's Committee on Constitutional Affairs to hold the ratifications on or around a symbolic date (such as 8 or 9 May), insofar as is possible.

3.4.3              Therefore the EESC calls for active involvement by the European Institutions in the drawing up and implementation of the communication strategy on the Constitutional Treaty. It is important to work alongside the Member States and to send out a strong and positive signal to citizens about Europe.

3.4.4              For its part, the EESC undertakes to convey clear messages to European civil society about the democratic achievements of the Constitutional Treaty, in terms of, inter alia, citizenship and participation.

                      Brussels, 28 October 2004.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee         Anne-Marie Sigmund	The Secretary-General of the European Economic and Social Committee         Patrick Venturini

________________

• [1]               Cf. Official Journal No. C10 of 14.1.2004, page 43.
• [2] ²              Cf. footnote 1
• [3] ³              Opinion submitted by the European Economic and Social Committee to the European Council on the mid-term review of the Lisbon Strategy (1438/2004).
• [4] ⁴              Cf. footnote 1

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS

	CONST-019

	Brussels 22 November 2004

OPINION

of the Committee of the Regions

of 17 November 2004

on the

Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe

____________

THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS,

Having regard to the draft report of the European Parliament's Committee on Constitutional Affairs on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (PE 347.119),

Having regard to the decision of the European Parliament of 14 September 2004 to consult it on this matter, under the fourth paragraph of Article 265 of the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe signed by heads of State or government on 29 October 2004 (CIG 87/2/04 rev 2, CIG 87/04 Add. 1 rev 1 and Add. 2 rev 2),

Having regard to the Presidency Conclusions of the Laeken European Council of 14 and 15 December 2001, and in particular the Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union,

Having regard to the Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council of 17 and 18 June 2004,

Having regard to its opinion on the CoR proposals for the Intergovernmental Conference (CdR 169/2003 fin[1]), its resolution on the Recommendations of the European Convention (CdR 198/2003 fin[2]), its resolution on the Outcome of the IGC (CdR 22/2004 fin[3]), and its declaration on the Constitutional process of the Union (CdR 77/2004),

Having regard to its opinion on The participation of regional government representatives in the work of the Council of the European Union, and of the CoR in informal Council meetings (CdR 431/2000 fin[4]),

Having regard to its draft opinion (CdR 354/2003 rev. 1) adopted on 21 September 2004 by the Commission for Constitutional Affairs and European Governance (rapporteurs: Mr Franz Schausberger, Representative of Land Salzburg in the Committee of the Regions (AT-EPP) and Cllr Lord Tope, Greater London Authority (UK/ELDR).

1)         Whereas the spirit of the Laeken Declaration and the commitments made by heads of state or government was to give the Union a constitutional basis, guaranteeing greater democracy, legitimacy, transparency and efficiency in order to face up to the democratic challenge of an enlarged Europe,

2)         Whereas the European Commission's White Paper on European Governance acknowledges that the EU has moved into a system of multi-level governance and that consequently there must be an enhanced role for and greater respect towards the powers of the local and regional spheres of government,

3)         Whereas the Constitutional Treaty provides a constitutional basis for applying and guaranteeing the subsidiarity principle, while protecting the prerogatives of Member States, regions and local authorities and taking account of the administrative and financial impact of Union legislation on regional and local authorities,

4)         Whereas the creation of a new ex ante policy monitoring mechanism, which for the first time in the history of European integration associates national parliaments - and where appropriate, regional parliaments with legislative powers - with the European legislative process, and the involvement of the Committee of the Regions in the process of ex-post monitoring, are the key innovation of the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality,

5)         Whereas it is important to strike a balance between compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and the need for efficient action by the Union,

6)        Whereas referral from the European Parliament recognises the contribution made by the CoR to the constitutional process, in particular in its capacity as representative of local and regional authorities in the European Convention.

adopted the following opinion at its 57^th plenary session of 17 and 18 November 2004 (meeting of 17 November:

1.        The Committee of the Regions' views

The Committee of the Regions

(a)       Constitutional process

1.1.     congratulates the Irish Presidency for its achievement in successfully chairing and concluding the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) within its term of office;

1.2.     recalls its contributions to the constitutional process as presented by the delegation of CoR observers to the European Convention and the joint actions and initiatives with European associations of regions and local authorities focussing primarily on the subsidiarity mechanism and the regional and local dimension in the Constitution; welcomes that the Intergovernmental Conference adopted the respective proposals presented by the European Convention;

1.3.     reiterates its support for the constitutional process, particularly of its Convention phase which was open, participatory and inclusive; considers that the Convention recognised but underestimated the role and place of local and regional authorities in the process of European integration as shown in particular through the organisation of a half-day session on this subject; regrets that the Convention was not given more time to discuss in depth the provisions for the policies of part III of the Constitution leading to the fact that part III does not always follow the system of competences laid out in part I;

1.4.     welcomes the support from the European Parliament, in the preparation of the Constitutional Treaty, for a fuller recognition of the institutional and political role of local and regional authorities in the Community decision-making process (cf. report Mr Napolitano on "The role of the regional and local authorities in building Europe" and the report of Mr Lamassoure on "Division of competences between the EU and the Member States");

(b)       The Treaty

1.5      considers that the Treaty represents a positive step forward for the European Union and puts in place many necessary arrangements for the effective governance of the Union;

1.6.     considers that both the establishment of an explicit link between the coordination of economic and employment policies [Article I-14 and I-15] as well as the introduction of a horizontal social clause, according to which the Union must take into account, when defining and implementing its policies, requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education, training and protection of human health [Article III-117], will provide an appropriate legal basis for pursuing the European social model and sustainability as laid down in the preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union and the objectives of the European Union [Article I-3(3)];

1.7.     welcomes the inclusion of the text of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into the Treaty, which will give citizens greater clarity and certainty as to their rights arising from citizenship of the Union, and will provide for a more just and social Europe;

1.8      regrets the entrenchment of the national veto in a number of areas, and considers that this will act as an unnecessary impediment to efficient decision-taking;

1.9      however welcomes the provision for unanimous action by the Council in concluding international agreements on trade in culture, audiovisual, social, education and health services [Article III-315];

1.10    welcomes the provisions for applying the normal legislative procedures for part III of the Constitution [Article IV-445];

1.11    considers that the Treaty provides a clearer definition and distribution of powers within the Union, a simplification of its instruments and a strengthening of the democratic legitimacy, transparency of the decision-making process and efficiency of its institutions, and provides the Union with the necessary flexibility to develop in new directions.

(c)       Subsidiarity and the role of sub-Member State government

1.12    welcomes the new definition of the principle of subsidiarity and the involvement of the Committee of the Regions in the process of ex-post monitoring of the application of the principle of subsidiarity; [Subsid-Article 8]; welcomes also that it will receive the report of the Commission on the application of Article I-11 of the Constitution (subsidiarity and proportionality) alongside the other institutions and the national Parliaments of the Member States [Subsid-Article 9]; regrets however that the provisions governing the principle of proportionality are less comprehensive than the ones concerning subsidiarity;

1.13    welcomes the reference to local and regional self-government [Article I-5 & Part II-preamble], the acknowledgement of the importance of grassroots democracy in the Union [Article I-46.(3)], and the role of representative associations in the democratic life of the Union [Article I-47 (2)]; regrets however that the CoR was not referred to in Title VI (“democratic life of the union”) [Article I-46] concerning the principle of representative democracy, given that its members represent the democratic principle of proximity at the heart of the Union;

1.14    considers that the fuller recognition of the local and regional dimension within the new architecture of the Union will both improve its effectiveness and its linkages with citizens: European integration should entail political decision-making where account is taken of the views of local and regional authorities, as it is these spheres of governance that are responsible for the transposition and implementation of a large proportion of EU legislation and policy, and are closest to the citizen so can therefore contribute substantially to the quality of Union legislation; [Article I-5] however states that consultation cannot substitute responsibility and accountability of regions and local authorities within their respective spheres of competence which have to be respected; they must be given the chance to prove that they can, according to the internal provisions of the respective Member State, sufficiently achieve the objectives of the intended action;

1.15    welcomes the provision that the Union shall respect Member States’ national identities and their fundamental structures, including the right to regional and local self-government, and their essential State functions [Article I-5] especially those designed to guarantee territorial integrity, maintain public order and safeguard national security, as this can be the key for maintaining responsibility and accountability of democratically legitimised local and regional authorities;

1.16    welcomes that the Treaty safeguards the right of regional ministers to take part in Council meetings on behalf of their Member State, as it confirms the text of Article 203 of the EC Treaty in Article I-23 (2); calls on Member States to provide internally structures and mechanisms to involve regions and local authorities in shaping Member States’ European policies and to safeguard regional participation also in the new regime of Council formations, on issues that fall within their competence;

1.17    welcomes the requirement of fuller consultation in the pre-legislative phase - for local and regional authorities to participate fully in the European decision-making process for which they have responsibility for transposition and/or implementation, they need to be well informed of current developments and adequate prior consultation is essential; this is a two-way process in which consultation may enable the Commission itself to be better informed about the local and regional dimension and thereby lead to more better lawmaking. [Subsid-Article 2];

1.18    calls for a real dialogue to be established and extended into key thematic areas early in the new Commission’s term of office;

1.19    urges improved direct consultation at national level between national parliaments and local and regional authorities responsible for transposition and/or implementation of Union legislation;

1.20    welcomes the Treaty requirement for prior account to be taken by the European Commission of the financial and administrative consequences of its legislative proposals, and considers that this must include an evaluation of the impact on local and regional authorities, given that they are often the sphere of governance ultimately responsible for delivery and implementation of new EU initiatives; invites the European Parliament to give similar consideration to the impact of its legislative amendments [Subsid-Article 4];

1.21    acknowledges the broad and valuable debate held at the CoR Berlin conference on Subsidiarity on 27 May 2004; understands that a fuller consideration of the application and assessment of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality will be undertaken in a forthcoming CoR opinion.

(d)       Policies

1.22    welcomes the inclusion of territorial cohesion among the objectives of the Union and the inclusion of regions facing various types of difficulty amongst those to receive particular attention; regrets however that the Treaty does not make reference to cross-border, transnational and inter-regional cooperation, nor does it provide a clear legal instrument nor a framework for financial support to town-twinning or other such cooperation [Article III-220-224] - there is a long tradition of trans-border, transnational and inter-regional cooperation in Europe which is one of the socio-cultural foundations of European integration and gains even greater significance in the context of the new neighbourhood policy. A legal base is therefore indispensable in order to give the Union the means to enable such cooperation;

1.23    welcomes that the Treaty provides for Member States – and their constituent spheres of governance – to provide, to commission and to fund services of general economic interest;

1.24    welcomes the recognition given to cultural and linguistic diversity, as this will help preserve and promote local and regional heritage and identity, and combat the homogenisation of European culture; [Articles I-3 and III-280];

1.25    takes note of the inclusion of supporting, coordinating or complementary action at Union level in the areas of sport [Article III-282], tourism [Article III-281] and civil protection [Article III-284], where local and regional authorities have important roles and calls on the Commission to generally make use of European framework laws;

1.26    considers the conferral of competences to the European Union in the trade in culture, education, health and social services needs close monitoring of compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and recommends that the Commission generally makes use of European framework laws leaving national, regional and local authorities the choice of form and methods in achieving the desired results.

(e)       Committee of the Regions

1.27    regrets that the IGC did not strengthen the institutional status of the Committee of the Regions in order to firmly establish its areas of mandatory consultation within the constitutional architecture and strengthen its consultative role, for example: in areas of shared competence, for measures to coordinate economic and employment policies, and in areas of supporting, coordinating or complementary action;

1.28    welcomes the granting to the Committee of the Regions of the right to institute proceedings before the Court of Justice to defend its prerogatives and for infringement of the subsidiarity principle; [Article III-365]; regrets, however, that the IGC did not give the regions with legislative powers the option to institute proceedings before the Court of Justice in order to defend their legislative powers;

1.29    welcomes confirmation that the term of office will be extended to five years, which in due course may be co-terminus with that of the Parliament and Commission [Article III-386].

2.        Recommendations of the Committee of the Regions

The Committee of the Regions

(a)       Ratification of the Treaty

2.1.     calls upon the European Parliament to give its assent to the Constitutional Treaty and welcomes the initiative of the EP committee on constitutional affairs to consult the CoR on its opinion on the draft constitutional Treaty;

2.2.     shares the European Parliament’s assessment of the undeniable democratic advances made by the Constitutional Treaty;

2.3.     calls upon Member States' national and regional parliaments, as appropriate, to ratify the Constitutional Treaty;

2.4.     supports the European Parliament’s political efforts to consolidate the constitutional process by stressing the merits of this Constitution and in particular the suggestions of the Committee on Regional Development;

2.5.     requests that an interinstitutional agreement be concluded in order to draw up a common communication strategy to publicise and explain the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe to the general public, especially given the Treaty’s imminent ratification;

2.6.     undertakes to participate in this strategy and to promote understanding and acceptance of the Treaty by the ordinary citizen and to urge the same of its members and their authorities and representative bodies;

2.7.     welcomes the initiative “1000 discussions for Europe” and confirms its willingness to take actively part in the campaign of sensibilisation of the European citizens through its network of local and regional authorities and calls on the members of the European Parliament and local and regional elected representatives to join forces in promoting the future European Constitution and to contribute jointly to the political and democratic debate which will accompany the ratification process;

(b)       Implementation of the Treaty

2.8.     expects real added value in the Union’s democratic life and work to result from the enactment of the Constitutional Treaty;

2.9.     undertakes to evaluate the new rights and obligations falling upon the Committee itself and to make the necessary preparations and internal re-organisation to respond to its enhanced responsibilities effectively and efficiently;

2.10    draws the attention of the European Parliament to several effects of the Constitutional Treaty, and calls on the Parliament to support the CoR in particular vis-à-vis:

- the qualitative involvement of the CoR in the political life of the Union and the Community decision-making process;

- the effective and successful application of the provisions of the Protocol on the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in terms of both the ex-ante political consultation process and ex-post legal monitoring;

- respect for the competences of local and regional authorities in accordance with the new definition of the principle of subsidiarity and the new distribution of competences within the European Union;

- recognition of territorial cohesion as a new objective of the Union and respect for the commitments given in the new protocol on economic, social and territorial cohesion;

- promotion of cross-border and inter-regional cooperation as an integrating factor in the European Union despite the lack of a legal basis, particularly with regard to the Union’s ambitions vis-à-vis the neighbourhood policy;

- respect for cultural and linguistic diversity enshrined as a new Community objective.

2.11    encourages the European Parliament to take further advantage of the possibility of consulting the CoR as enshrined in the Constitutional Treaty [Article III-388] in order to heighten understanding of the local and regional dimension;

2.12    requests that in cases where the Committee must be consulted under the Constitutional Treaty, the institution that has consulted the Committee should give its reasons in the event that it does not implement the Committee's recommendations;

2.13    requests to be involved in the defence of the principle of subsidiarity alongside national parliaments in the six-week early warning period and to have the right to produce a reasoned opinion if the proposal does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity and for this to be taken into account [Subsid-Article 6];

2.14    calls on national parliaments to establish a regular and effective dialogue with representatives of the local and regional level, who are familiar with the diversity of the issues at hand and responsible for the consequences as far as monitoring application of the subsidiarity principle is concerned;

2.15    calls on national governments and parliaments to carry through the spirit and philosophy of the EU "systematic dialogue" into their domestic governance arrangements, where they do not already exist, by involving regional and local government representatives in the scrutiny of legislative proposals;

2.16    calls on the European Commission to report to the Committee of the Regions on the application of Article I-10 (Citizenship), particularly as this governs the right to stand and vote in municipal elections [Article III-129];

2.17    considering that the proposal to strengthen the current consultative role of the CoR by means of a horizontal clause stipulating that the CoR shall be consulted in areas of shared competence, for measures to coordinate economic and employment policies, and in areas of supporting, coordinating or complementary action was not accepted, the CoR calls on the European Commission to consult in all initiatives in areas of manifest local or regional dimension or competence where no mandatory consultation is provided for in the Treaty. These areas include inter alia legislation on the definition of the principles and conditions, in particular economic and financial, which enable services of general economic interest to fulfil their missions [Article III-122], the liberalisation of services [Article III-147]; Harmonisation of legislation on indirect taxation [Article III-171]); Approximation of legislation in the area of the internal market [Articles III-172, III-173]; State aids [Articles III-167, III-168, III-169; Agriculture, rural development and fisheries policies [Article III-231]; Research and technological development [Articles III-251, III-252 and III-253], tourism [Article III-281] and civil protection [Article III-284];

2.18    calls on the European Commission to consult the Committee of the Regions on any future changes to its composition when preparing a proposal for a Council decision [Article I-32 and Article III-386].

(c)       Review of the Treaty and its provisions

2.19    believes that it is necessary for the further development of the EU to maintain a process of review to decide which tasks can be performed jointly by a considerably enlarged Union;

2.20    confirms its will to participate actively and fully in future revisions of the Constitution and proposes that Member States include representatives of regions and local authorities in their delegations to intergovernmental conferences [CdR 198/2003; 3.7.] dealing with treaty-revisions having impact on the sub-Member State levels and to future as well as in delegations for any future Convention;

(d)       Concluding remark

2.21    instructs its President to forward this Opinion to the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament, and the European Commission.

           Brussels, 17 November 2004.

The President of the Committee of the Regions Peter Straub	Secretary-General of the Committee of the Regions Gerhard Stahl

• [1]               OJ C 23 of 27.1.2004, p. 1
• [2]               OJ C 256 of 24.10.2003, p. 62
• [3]               OJ C 109 of 30.4.2004, p. 52
• [4]               OJ C 107 of 3.5.2002, p. 5

PROCEDURE

Title

Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe

Procedure number

2004/2129(INI)

Basis in Rules of Procedure

Rule 45

Committee responsible   Date authorisation announced in plenary

AFCO 16.9.2004

Committee(s) asked for opinion(s)   Date announced in plenary

All 16.9.2004

Not delivering opinion(s)   Date of decision

ECON 21.9.2004

IMCO 28.9.2004

TRAN 7.10.2004

CULT 13.9.2004

FEMM 22.9.2004

Enhanced cooperation   Date announced in plenary

Motion(s) for resolution(s) included in report

Rapporteur(s)   Date appointed

Richard Corbett 27.7.2004

Íñigo Méndez de Vigo

Previous rapporteur(s)

Discussed in committee

26.7.2004 25.10.2004

1.9.2004 16.11.2004

29.9.2004 25.11.2004

5.10.2004 29.11.2004

Date adopted

30.11.2004

Result of final vote

for: against: abstentions:

20 3 3

Members present for the final vote

James Hugh Allister, Jens-Peter Bonde, Carlos Carnero González, Richard Corbett, Jean-Luc Dehaene, Panayiotis Demetriou, Andrew Duff, Maria da Assunção Esteves, Ingo Friedrich, Bronisław Geremek, Genowefa Grabowska, Ignasi Guardans Cambó, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Jo Leinen, Íñigo Méndez de Vigo, Borut Pahor, Rihards Pīks, Sérgio Sousa Pinto, Alexander Stubb, Johannes Voggenhuber

Substitutes present for the final vote

Mercedes Bresso, Ashley Mote, Gérard Onesta, Georgios Papastamkos, Reinhard Rack, Joachim Wuermeling

Substitutes under Rule 178(2) present for the final vote

Date tabled – A6

9.12.2004

A6-0070/2004

Comments