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RAPPORT

dwar ir-reviżjoni strategika tal-Fond Monetarju Internazzjonali
((2005/2121(INI))

Kumitat għall-Affarijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji

Rapporteur: Benoît Hamon

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MOZZJONI GHAL RIŽOLUZZJONI TAL-PARLAMENT EWROPEW

dwar ir-reviżjoni strategika tal-Fond Monetarju Internazzjonali (2005/2121(INI))

Il-Parlament Ewropew,

- wara li kkunsidra l-Artikolu 111(4) tat-Trattat KE, li jitrattra r-rappreżentazzjoni u l-požizzjoni tal-Komunità fuq livell internazzjonali fil-kuntest ta' l-unjoni ekonomika u monetarja
- wara li kkunsidra l-proposta tal-Kummissjoni tad-9 ta' Novembru 1998 għal deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill dwar ir-rappreżentazzjoni u t-teħid ta' požizzjoni tal-Komunità fuq livell internazzjonali fil-kuntest ta' l-unjoni ekonomika u monetarja (COM(1998)0637),
- wara li kkunsidra l-konklużjonijiet tal-Presidenza tal-Kunsill Ewropew ta' Vjenna fil-11 u fit-12 ta' Diċembru, 1998,
- wara li kkunsidra r-riżoluzzjoni tiegħu tat-23 ta' Ottubru 2001 dwar is-sistema monetarja internazzjonali - kif tista' taħdem aħjar u kif jistgħu jiġu evitati kriżiżjiet fil-futur¹,
- **»wara li kkunsidra r-riżoluzzjoni tiegħu tat-3 ta' Lulju 2003² dwar iz-zona ta' l-euro fl-ekonomija dinjija u dwar l-iżviluppi li huma mistennija matul il-ftit snin li ġejjin.**

«

- wara li kkunsidra r-rapport tal-15 ta' Settembru 2005 miġbur mid-Direttur Maniġerjali tal-Fond Monetarju Internazzjonali (IMF) dwar l-Istrateġija tal-Fond fuq Tul Medju ta' Żmien³,
- wara li kkunsidra d-deċiżjonijiet tal-laqgħa tal-Ministri tal-Finanzi tal-G8 fil-11 ta' Ĝunju 2005 dwar il-ħfir ta' dejn għal pajjiżi fqar,
- wara li kkunsidra l-Artikou 178 tat-Trattat, dwar il-koerenza bejn il-politki li timplimenta l-UE li hemm čans tajjeb li jaffettaw pajjiżi li qed jiżviluppaw u l-objettivi tal-koperazzjoni fl-iżvilupp.
- wara li kkunsidra l-konklużjonijiet tal-Presidenza tal-Kunsill Ewropew ta' Brussell fis-16 u fis-17 ta' Ĝunju, 2005,
- wara li kkunsidra Rapport 2006 dwar l-Iżvilupp fid-Dinja maħruġ mill-Bank Dinji,
- wara li kkunsidra l-komunikazzjoni mill-Kummissjoni lill-Kunsill, lill-Parlament Ewropew, lill-Kumitat Ekonomiku u Soċjal u lill-Kumitat tar-Regjuni li ġgib l-isem ta' 'Proposta għal dikjarazzjoni kongunta mill-Kunsill, mill-Parlament Ewropew u mill-Kummissjoni dwar il-Politika ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea għall-Iżvilupp "Il-Konsensus

¹ GU C 112, 9.5.2002, p. 140

² GU C 74 E, 24.3.2004, p. 871.

Ewropew" ' (COM(2005)0311),

- wara li kkunsidra d-Dikjarazzjoni tal-Millenju tan-NU tat-8 ta' Settembru 2000 li tiddefinixxi l-Għanijiet tal-Millenju għall-Iżvilupp (MDGs) bħala kriterja fformolati mill-komunità internazzjonali kollha bl-iskop li jinqered il-faqar,
 - wara li kkunsidra r-riżoluzzjoni tat-12 ta' April 2005 dwar l-irwol ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea fit-twettiq ta' l-Għanijiet tal-Millenju għall-Iżvilupp¹
 - wara li kkunsidra r-riżoluzzjoni tiegħu tas-6 ta' Lulju 2005 dwar is-Sejħa Globali għal Azzjoni: "Making Poverty History"²,
 - wara li kkunsidra r-riżoluzzjoni tas-17 ta' Novembru 2005 dwar il-proposta għal Dikjarazzjoni Kongunta mill-Kunsill, mill-Parlament Ewropew u mill-Kummissjoni dwar il-Politika ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea għall-Iżvilupp "Il-Kunsensus Ewropew"³,
 - wara li kkunsidra l-Artikolu 45 tar-Regoli ta' Proċedura tiegħu,
 - wara li kkunsidra r-rapport tal-Kumitat għall-Affarijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji u l-opinjonijiet tal-Kumitat għall-Iżvilupp u tal-Kumitat għall-Kummerċ Internazzjonali (A6-0022/2006),
- A. billi l-evoluzzjoni ta' l-irwol ta' l-Istituzzjonijiet Bretton Woods minn mindu twaqqfu, u l-missjoni strateġika tagħhom sabiex jippromwovu t-tkabbir, l-iżvilupp u l-istabilità finanzjarja; billi hemm bżonn ta' ħidma lejn sistema monetarja u finanzjarja internazzjonali kkaratterizzata minn stabilità u minn solidarjetà,
- B. billi s-saħħa ta' l-Istati Membri individwali fil-kuntest ta' drittijiet ta' vot u kwoti ma' tirriflettix aktar l-importanza relativa tagħhom, u billi l-irwol li għandha l-Unjoni Ewropea - minkejja d-daqqs tal-kontribuzzjoni tagħha għall-kapital ta' l-istituzzjonijiet Bretton Woods - ma jikkorespondux mas-saħħa tagħha fl-ekonomija dinjija u fil-kummerċ dinji,
- C. billi l-konklużjonijiet tal-Presidenza tal-Kunsill Ewropew ta' Vjenna tal 11 u tat 12 ta' Diċembru hawn fuq imsemmija, li jaffermaw mill-ġdid l-irwol ta' l-IMF bħala 'blata fis-sistema monetarja u finanzjarja internazzjonali', taħt it-titolu 'L-Ewropa bħala Protagonista Globali - Nitkellmu b'Vuċi waħda', jirrimarkaw li 'huwa importanti ħafna li l-Komunità taqdi l-irwol shih tagħha fil-politika għall-koperazzjoni monetarja u ekonomika internazzjonali fi ħdan flora bħal ma huma il-G7 u l-Fond Monetarju Internazzjonali' u jagħmlu sejħa biex l-ewwelnett l-EBC, bħala l-korp Komunitarju kompetenti mill-politika monetarja, jingħata status ta' osservatur fil-bord ta' l-IMF u ttieni biex l-opinjonijiet tal-Komunità Ewropea/EMU dwar kwistjonijiet oħrajn ta' rilevanza partikolari għall-EMU jiġu pprezentati lill-bord ta' l-IMF mill-membru rilevanti ta' l-uffiċċu tad-Direttur Eżekuttiv ta' l-Istat Membru li jkollu l-presidenza, mgħejjun minn rappreżentant tal-Kumissjoni', billi l-Artikolu 1 tal-proposta tal-Kummissjoni tad-9 ta' Novembru 1998 imsemmija hawn fuq tissuġġerixxi li 'fil-kuntest ta' l-Unjoni Ekonomika

¹ Testi adottati, P6_TA(2005)0115.

² Testi adottati, P6_TA(2005)0289.

- u Monetarja, il-Komunità għandha tkun irrappreżentata fuq livell internazzjonali mill-Kunsill flimkien mal-Kummissjoni, u mill-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew',
- D. billi b'mod partikolari n-nuqqas ta' kordinazzjoni ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea u taz-zona ta' l-Ewro, flimkien ma' rappreżentazzjoni mfarrka f'hafna kostiwenzi ma tippermettix lill-Istati Membri li jinfluwenzaw id-deċiżjonijiet mehudin mill-IMF skond il-piż ekonomiku tagħhom.
 - E. billi l-IMF hija responsabbi għall-azzjonisti tagħha (jiġifieri l-gvernijiet nazzjonali) u hija r-responsabilità ta' dawk l-azzjonisti li min-naħha tagħhom jagħtu kont lill-elettorat tagħhom,
 - F. billi l-politiki ta' stabilizzazzjoni implimentati mill-IMF mhux dejjem laħqu l-objettivi mixtieqa u billi l-istabilizzazzjoni mgħaż-ġġla ta' ekonomiji hemm ċans tajjeb li twassal għal aġġustamenti soċjali mhux mixtieqa; billi l-programmi ta' aġġustament li nħolqu jinħtiegu l-involvement ta' l-imsieħba nazzjonali kollha u l-immoniterjar ta' dawn il-programmi għandu jkun is-sugġett ta' superviżjoni demokratika trasparenti,
 - G. billi huwa diffiċli li l-principju li nazzjonijiet jerfghu ir-responsabilitajiet tagħhom jiġi rr-konċiljat man-numru dejjem jikber ta' kundizzjonijiet magħmulu fuq il-miżuri ta' għajjnuna u ħfir ta' dejn; billi dawn il-kundizzjonijiet immultiplikaw matul l-aħħar ftit snin u, bhala medja, self multilaterali lil pajjiżi Afrikani l-isfel mis-Sahara huma akkumpanjati b'xejn inqas minn 114-il kundizzjoni, li kważi tlett kwarti minnhom huma relatati mat-tmexxija,
 - H. billi l-IMF sar għandu rwol importanti fpajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw u kellu jadatta għal dan; billi, madankollu, il-promozzjoni ta' l-iż-żvilupp fl-ifqar pajjiżi titlob il-mobilizzazzjoni ta' strumenti ġoddha sabiex effettivament l-istokk ta' dejn jonqos, kif ukoll bħala tiftixa għal strumenti innovattivi sabiex jiġi ffinanzjat l-iż-żvilupp u jkun miġġieled il-faqar fil-kuntest ta' l-MDGs; billi azzjoni ta' dan it-tip titlob tqassim ta' rwoli aktar ċar u effiċjenti bejn l-IMF, il-Bank Dinji u l-istituzzjonijiet tan-NU kif ukoll livell għoli ta' koordinazzjoni u koperazzjoni,
 - I. billi l-konklużjonijiet hawn fuq imsemmija tal-Presidenza tal-Kunsill Ewropew ta' Brussell tas-16 u s-17 ta' Ĝunju 2005 jiġbdu l-attenzjoni għall-importanza li 'jítqiesu l-objettivi ta' koperazzjoni ghall-iż-żvilupp fil-politiki kollha li [il-Komunità] timplimenta u li hemm ċans tajjeb li jaftettaw pajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw' u li 'titqies id-dimensjoni soċjali tal-globalizzazzjoni f'politiki varji u fkoperazzjoni internazzjonali',
 - 1. Jikkunsidra li l-IMF bħala istituzzjoni ser tkompli taqdi rwol importanti fil-promozzjoni ta' tkabbir ekonomiku dinji bbilanċjat u stabilità fir-rata tal-kambju, fl-iffaċilar tal-kummerċ internazzjonali u ta' l-abilità ta' pajjiżi membri li jadattaw għas-suq globali u fl-ghajjnuna lil pajjiżi membri li jesperjenzaw diffikultajiet ta' ħlas;
 - 2. Jesprimi sodisfazzjoni dwar ir-reviżjoni strategika li qed issir mill-IMF; jappoġġja l-orientazzjoni mill-ġdid ta' poliltki ta' l-IMF sabiex jiġi enfasizzat il-mandat centrali tagħha li tistabilizza l-ossillazzjonijiet globali fir-rata tal-kambju u bhala istituzzjoni li ssellef lill-pajjiżi li qed jesperjenzaw problemi serji fil-bilanc tal-pagamenti meta m'hemmx triq oħra;

3. Jinnota t-tibdil profond li sar fil-missjonijiet ta' l-IMF minn mindu nħoloq u li kien akkumpanjat b'tibdil anqas sinifikanti fit-tmexxija tiegħu; jinnota li, minkejja r-reviżjonijiet successivi tal-kwoti u tas-sistema għal allokazzjoni uniformi ta' pakkett ta' drittijiet bažiċi tal-vot, l-allocazzjoni tal-kapital u tad-drittijiet tal-vot waqgħet lura meta mqabbla ma' žviluppi oħra matul is-snini; jagħmel sejħa, għalhekk, lill-IMF, fl-interess tal-leġittimità tiegħu stess, sabiex jikkunsidra mezzi possibbi sabiex id-drittijiet għall-vot u l-kwoti fi ħdan l-istituzzjonijiet ta' tmexxija tiegħu jitqassmu b'mod li jagħmilhom aktar rappreżentativi tas-sitwazzjoni ekonomika internazzjonali u sabiex jippermetti li ekonomiji emergenti u li qed jiżviluppaw jingħataw importanza aktar xierqa;
4. Jirrimarka li l-fatturi prinċipali li qed iċaħħdu lill-pajjiżi li qed jiżviluppaw milli jkollhom vuċi fl-IMF li tkun proporzjonata mal-parti tal-popolazzjoni tad-dinjal li jirrapprezentaw huma n-nuqqas ta' voti fil-Bord tal-Gvernaturi (pajjiżi Afrikani, li jirrapprezentaw 25% tas-shubija għandhom biss ffit aktar minn 4% tal-voti) u n-nuqqas ta' riżorsi umani kkwalifikati u kapacitajiet teknici u istituzzjonali sabiex jipparteċipaw b'mod sinifikanti fid-deliberazzjonijiet u d-deċiżjonijiet;
5. Jagħmel sejħa sabiex ikun hemm reviżjoni tas-sistema ta' votazzjoni billi:
 - jiżdiedu n-numru u l-importanza tal-voti bažiċi (li bħalissa jirrapprezentaw inqas minn 3% tal-voti), li kienu orīginarjament introdotti sabiex jassiguraw aktar ugwaljanza bejn il-membri, bilanċ aħjar fil-mod kif jittieħdu d-deċiżjonijiet u għalhekk leġġitimità akbar ta' l-IMF; jagħmel ukoll sejħa għall-ħolqien ta' mekkaniżmu li jippermetti lill-pajjiżi li għadhom qegħdin jiżviluppaw sabiex iżidu sehemhom bhala membri tal-Fond, bħal m'h u t-twaqqif ta' 'Trust Fund' sabiex l-ishma ta' shubija ta' l-ifqar pajjiżi jiġu ffinanzjati;
6. Jinnota li l-IMF estendiet ukoll ir-rakomandazzjonijiet tagħha għal kwistjonijiet barra l-qasam makroekonomiku orīginali, għal oqsma ta' politika strutturali, permezz ta'rakkomandazzjonijiet li l-kliem tagħhom għandu impatt dirett jew indirett fuq it-thaddim tal-politika dwar il-ħarsien soċjali, id-dritt għax-xogħol, is-saħħa, l-ambjent u l-edukazzjoni; jinnota li dan l-iżvilupp qajjem b'mod ċar il-kwistjoni tal-konfini bejn il-kompetenzi tal-varji istituzzjonijiet tan-NU u dawk tal-Bank Dinji;
7. Jikkunsidra li, fid-dawl tal-prerogattivi ta' l-IMF, ix-xejra ta' l-istaff tagħha għandha tirrifletti sfondi aktar varjati, filwaqt li tassigura kontinwazzjoni ta' eċċellenza, sabiex tippermetti lill-IMF li jagħti kontribut deċiżiv sabiex jintlaħqu l-MDGs
8. Jinnota li, minħabba l-ftuħ progressiv tas-swieq kapitali u l-liberalizzazzjoni tal-moviment tal-kapital, huwa diffieli li jiġi evitati l-kriżijiet finanzjarji; għalhekk jisħaq dwar il-bżonn li l-IMF twettaq sorveljanza sistematika tal-pajjiżi membri kollha;
9. Jikkunsidra li l-persistenza ta' l-iżbilanci globali fil-kummerċ u fir-rati tal-kambju titlob it-tiċċiħ ta' l-irwol superviżorju ta' l-IMF, li huwa importanti kemm għat-tbassir, kif ukoll biex jgħin fit-tnaqqis ta' l-instabilità b'mod globali u fl-ghoti ta' pariri lil pajjiżi individwali dwar politiki relatati ma' stabilità finanzjarja, tkabbir ekonomiku, rati ta' kambju u akkumulazzjoni ta' riservi; jikkunsidra li l-IMF jista' jwettaq biss sorveljanza sistematika u jagħti pariri dwar azzjonijiet mixtieqa sabiex jiġi evitati kriżijiet finanzjarji jekk il-pajjiżi membri jikxfu l-istatistiċi kollha dwar, per eżempju, ir-riservi monetarji u l-

volum ta' flus fiċ-ċirkulazzjoni, fuq baži regolari;

10. Jikkunsidra li l-ghan ta' l-istabilità finanzjarja li tifforma parti mill-missjoni ta' l-IMF ssir aktar diffiċli minħabba n-nuqqas ta' attenzjoni globali u trasparenti mogħtija lill-proċess ta' standardizzazzjoni li jaffetwa direttament is-swieq finanzjarji, lill-implementazzjoni ta' dik il-missjoni fuq baži reciproka jew lill-interpretazzjoni tagħha;
11. Fl-interess tal-parallellizmu mad-WTO, jagħmel sejħa lill-Istituzzjonijiet Ewropej responsabbli, b'mod partikolari lill-Kunsill u lill-Kummissjoni, sabiex jieħdu l-passi meħtieġa biex jassiguraw li z-zona ta' l-euro jew jekk hu possibbli l-Komunità Ewropea jkunu rappreżentati u jivvotaw bħala blokk wieħed u sabiex jiffacilitaw it-twettiq ta' dak l-objettiv mill-aktar fis possibbli bħala mizura tranzizzjoni; iħeġġeg lill-Istati Membri sabiex jingħaqdu flimkien farranggament ekwivalenti għal 'patt bejn azzjonisti' fi ħdan il-ligi tal-kumpaniji li tiggarantixxi li jiffurmaw blokk wieħed ta' negozjar;
12. Jinnota li l-irwol ta' l-IMF li jintegra pajjiżi bi dħul baxx fl-ekonomija dinjija u jisħaq dwar l-interdipendenza tal-kummerċ internazzjonal, il-problemi tal-bilanċ tal-ħlas, politki ta' żvilupp nazzjonali, regolamenti li jmexxu s-suq tax-xogħol u servizzi pubblici tas-saħħha mmirati sabiex inaqqsu l-faqar; jara rwol predominant għall-IMF fl-iffacilitar ta' strategijni nazzjonali favur il-foqra permezz ta' self li jippermetti flessibilità akbar fil-politika monetarja u dik tal-kambju ta'pajjiżi bi dħul baxx;
13. Jagħmel sejħa lill-Kummissjoni u lill-Kunsill sabiex flimkien mal-Parlament jirriflettu dwar il-possibilità li jużaw il-proċedura Lamfalussy sabiex jiddefinixxu l-pożizzjoni tal-kopri awtorizzati sabiex jitkellmu fisem l-Unjoni fl-entitajiet internazzjonali varji li għandhom responsabilità fis-settur finanzjarju;
14. Jinnota li, il-politiki ta' aġġustament ta' l-IMF xi drabi naqṣu milli jevitaw li kriżijiet isiru infettivi u rikorrenti; f'dan ir-rigward jesprimi dispjaċir għal kull sforz fallut li kien maħsub sabiex jiġi promossi politiki ekonomikament sodi li jevitaw kriżijiet; ifakk li l-inflazzjoni mhix l-unika problema ekonomika f'pajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw u li l-politiki ta' l-IMF għandhom ikunu mmirati lejn l-objettivi ta' stabilità makroekonomika u tkabbir sostenibbli; jissuġġerixxi li l-kundizzjonalità għandha wkoll tiġi ddefinita fil-kuntest ta' koperazzjoni mtejba ma' l-istituzzjonijiet speċjalizzati tan-NU u kordinati bejn donaturi internazzjonali;
15. Jinnota li l-eżistenza ta' politiki makroekonomici garantiti hija essenzjali sabiex tibda l-mixja lejn tkabbir sostenibbli; għal dak il-ghan, jafferma li l-istabilità makroekonomika mhix inkompatibbli mad-distribuzzjoni ġusta tat-tkabbir;
16. Jirrikonoxxi li l-kundizzjoni imposti mill-IMF kienu xi drabi wisq riġidi u mhux dejjem konsistenti ma' ċirkustanzi lokali speċifici; madankollu jenfasizza l-ħtieġa li s-self jintuża tajjeb, filwaqt li jikkunsidra l-pożizzjoni ta' l-istituzzjonijiet li ġew eletti demokratikament fil-pajjiż riċevitur;
17. Jirrikonoxxi r-reviżjoni dejjem għaddejja tal-kundizzjoni imposti mill-IMF jorbot mas-self tiegħu lil pajjiżi bi dħul baxx; jirrakomanda li r-reviżjoni tagħmel referenza prioritarja għat-tnaqqis tal-faqar bħala l-ghan tas-self kollu ta' l-IMF lill-pajjiżi bi dħul baxx;

18. Jisħaq li l-prinċipju ta' adeżjoni bħala pajjiż sieħeb għandu jkun fiċ-ċentru tal-koperazzjoni dwar l-iżvilupp; għalhekk jagħmel sejħa lill-IMF sabiex jirrikoxxi bis-shiħ, meta jkun qed jikkunsidra l-kundizzjonijiet tas-self; il-prioritā li għandha tingħata lill-qedra tal-faqar u biex bl-ebda mod ma jagħmel it-twettiq ta' l-MDGs aktar diffiċli;
19. Jargumenta favur liberalizzazzjoni gradwali, sekwenzjali u stabbli tas-sistemi finanzjarji ta' pajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw, aġġustata sabiex tqis il-kapaċitajiet istituzzjonali tagħhom, u għalhekk tippermetti r-regolamentazzjoni u l-immaniġġjar effettiv tal-moviment tal-kapital;
20. Jappoġġja l-opinjoni li l-IMF għandu jikkonċentra aktar fuq l-analizi ta' žviluppi finanzjarji u kapitali tas-suq u l-implikazzjonijiet għall-istabilità finanzjarja kemm domestika kif ukoll globali;
21. Jemmen bis-shiħ li pajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw m'għandhomx għalfejn jiftu swieq tagħhom kompletament u mingħajr restrizzjonijiet ghall-importazzjoni barranija u li għandhom ikunu jistgħu jistabbilixxu protezzjoni għal certi industrijji għal perjodu limitat ta' żmien sabiex jippermettu žvilupp kostanti; iheġġeg lid-Diretturi Eżekuttivi Ewropej fil-Bord ta' l-IMF biex jiżguraw li l-kundizzjonalitat jidher li jifdal ma jagħmlux pressjoni fuq pajjiżi bi dhul baxx biex jiftu swieq lilhinn mill-qafas tan-negożjati tad-WTO b' mod unilaterali jew li ma jfixklux il-kapaċitajiet ta' dawn il-pajjiżi li jinnejgo, fil-qafas tan-negożjati tad-WTO, minn rajhom u bil-kundizzjonijiet tagħhom innifishom, il-livell ta' ftuħ tas-suq li lesti jintrabtu dwaru; jitlob ukoll lill-IMF biex jiżgura livell xieraq ta' flessibiltà fl-implementazzjoni ta' kundizzjonalitat jidher relataati mal-kummerċ sabiex b'hekk pajjiżi beneficijari jkunu jistgħu jiddeterminaw il-livell ta' ftuħ tas-suq li huma jridu ;
22. Jitlob lill-IMF biex ikompli l-isforzi tiegħi sabiex iżid it-trasparenza u jibni struttura istituzzjonali li twassal għall-missjonijiet tiegħi u għall-evoluzzjoni tal-politika finanzjarja internazzjonali;
23. Jenfasizza l-irwol ta' l-IMF li jgħib fuq l-istess linja il-politiki Ewropej u nazzjonali ta' žvilupp immirati sabiex jittrattaw il-faqar permezz ta' approċċ komprensiv ibbażat fuq l-idea li l-politki kummerċjali u monetarji m'humiex għanijiet fihom infuħom iżda għodda biex jiġi ttrattat il-faqar;
24. Jagħmel sejħa lill-Istati Membri ta' l-UE sabiex jużaw is-sistema kostitwenti eżistenti sabiex jiżguraw li l-kostiwenzi li tagħhom huma membri jippromwovu bilfors aġenda favur l-iżvilupp ibbażata fuq it-twettiq ta' l-MDGs sa l-2015, u li l-kostitwenzi jagħtu attenzjoni speċċiali għad-dgħejx integrati u tkomprezzu kieni jidher;
25. Jagħmel sejħa għal kordinazzjoni aħjar u koerenza akbar bejn il-politiki ta' l-IMF, il-Bank Dinji, id-WTO, il-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew, organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali oħrajn u l-Unjoni Ewropea, b'mod partikolari fir-rigward ta' strumenti li jgħaqqu swieq diversi, bħall m'hu l-Qafas Integrat, il-Mekkaniżmu għall-Integrazjoni Kummerċjali, il-Faċilità għat-Tnaqqis tal-Faqar u t-Tkabbir u l-Instrumenti għall-Appoġġ tal-Politika (PSI) li ġew adottati riċentament, sabiex jiżgura li politiki ta' suq miftuh ikollhom impatt pożittiv fuq it-tnaqqis tal-faqar; jitlob għal aktar koerenza bejn il-programmi ta' l-IMF u l-MDGs;

jiġbed l-attenzjoni f'dan ir-rigward għall-ambivalenza fil-pożizzjoni ta' l-IMF li, għalkemm hija responsabbli għal aspett wieħed biss ta' azzjoni pubblika li huwa speċifiku hafna, għandu rwol ta' tmexxija, jekk mhux ta' dominanza, fl-implementazzjoni ta' l-istratgeġi li l-imsieħba kollha jwettqu; għalhekk jikkunsidra li huwa essenzjali li tinholoq struttura għall-kordinazzjoni u anke għall-ippjanar ta' strategiċi bħal dawn li jinvolvu msieħba internazzjonali;

26. Jemmen bis-shiħli li t-trasparenza ta' l-IMF u ta' l-allokazzjoni tal-fondi tagħha għandha tiżdied permezz ta' kontroll parlamentari msaħħa mill-pajjiżi membri ta' l-IMF;
27. Jesprimi sodisfazzjoni għall-enfasi ta' l-IMF fuq it-titjib tal-livelli ta' l-edukazzjoni u tas-saħħa f'pajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw; jenfasizza li żieda fin-nefqa pubblika flimkien ma' titjib ta' tmexxija, il-ġlieda kontra l-korruzzjoni u l-użu effiċċenti tar-riżorsi, jibqa' l-iktar mod ġert biex titnaqqas l-inugwaljanza ta' l-acċess għal ogġetti u għal drittijiet fundamentali bħas-saħħa u bhall-edukazzjoni;
28. Jisħaq li l-istabilità finanzjarja internazzjonali tista' tīgħi promossa biss jekk ir-riforma ta' l-IMF timxi id f'id ma' politika baġitarja sostenibbli u ma' bilanċ ta' ħlas aġġustat sew f'kull pajjiż membru;
29. Jinnota l-kuntrast impressjonanti bejn il-livell ta' pressjoni li l-IMF tista' titfa' fuq pajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw u dawk tranzizzjoni u n-nuqqas ta' saħħa li għandha li tinfluwenza b'mod sinifikanti l-politiki ta' pajjiżi industrijalizzati, li l-politika baġitarja u l-bilanċ tal-ħlas tagħhom jonqsu parzjalment milli jissodisfaw il-kriterji stabbiliti mill-IMF u jistgħu għalhekk idghajfu l-istabilità finanzjarja internazzjonali;
30. Jesprimi sodisfazzjoni għad-deċiżjoni ta' l-IMF u tal-Bank Dinji li jestendu l-esperiment ta' l-inizzjattiva HIPC (Pajjiżi Focra li għandhom Dejn Kbir); jinnota l-effetti devjanti tal-programm ta' l-HIPC u ta' l-esperjenzi storici ta' ristrutturar ta' dejn u l-ħfir ta' dejn; jissuġġerixi li l-IMF jiżviluppa politiki sabiex jevita krizijiet godda ta' dejn fil-futur;
31. Jinnota l-Qafas ta' Sostenibilità ta' Dejn ta' l-IMF u l-Bank Dinji fir-rigward tal-Pajjiżi li għandhom Dħul Baxx (LICs); jesprimi sodisfazzjon għall-fatt li l-Qafas il-ġdid jimmira sabiex ipoġġi d-dejn fiċ-ċentru tal-proċess ta' deċiżjonijiet ta' l-istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji internazzjonali; jesprimi dispjaċir dwar il-fatt li l-proposta kollha għadha lura milli tindirizza l-problema ta' sostenibilità reali għal tul ta' żmien fir-rigward ta' holqien ta' kundizzjonijiet biex pajjiżi bi dħul baxx jilħqu l-MDGs;
32. Jesprimi sodisfazzjoni dwar il-programm ta' l-IMF dwar Faqar u Faċilità għat-Tkabbir (PRGF) b'mod generali, iżda jesprimi thassib li fil-PRGF l-IMF għadu qed juža l-istess mudell ekonomiku riġidu u jonqos milli jirrikonoxxi l-oqfsa makroekonomiċi differenti; jibża', għalhekk, li l-konċentrazzjoni tal-PRGF fuq il-faqar, li tant instema' dwarha, ser tkun skreditata fil-parti l-kbira tagħha;
33. Jappoġġja s-sejħa tas-Segretarju Ĝenerali tan-NU waqt id-Djalogu fuq Livell Għoli ta' l-2005 dwar l-Iffinanzjar ta' l-Iżvilupp sabiex is-sostenibilità tad-dejn tīgħi definita mill-ġdid bħala l-livell ta' dejn li jippermetti pajjiżi li jilħaq l-MDGs sa l-2015 mingħajr żieda fil-proporzjoni tad-dejn, li tinhieg aktar komplimentarjetà bejn il-ħfir tad-dejn u r-rekwiziti finanzjarji għall-iżvilupp li jifdal; jesprimi dispjaċir dwar il-fatt li l-Qafas għas-

Sostenibilità tad-Dejn għall-Pajjiżi bi Dħul Baxx approvat f'April ta' l-2005 (li huwa strument mhux ta' min joqgħod fuqu għat-tbassir tas-sostenibilità tad-dejn għall-pajjiżi li huma kkaratterizzati minn vulnerabilità estrema għal xokk u ossilazzjonijiet qawwija fid-dħul mill-esportazzjoni), huwa nieqes minn evalwazzjonijiet realistici ta' vulnerabilità u li m'hemmx analiżi sistematika li tgħaqquad il-benefiċċċi ta' l-Inizzjattiva ta' l-HIPC u l-fondi żejda li jinħtiegu sabiex jintlaħqu l-MDGs;

34. Jesprimi sodisfazzjoni għall-inizzjattivi li ħadu kemm l-Istituzzjonijiet Bretton Woods kif ukoll il-korpi internazzjonali sabiex isibu mekkaniżmi innovattivi ta' fondi sabiex jippromwovu l-iżvilupp u jilħqu l-MDGs, b'mod partikolari fir-rigward tal-ġlied kontra l-faqar; jesprimi sodisfazzjoni għall-isforzi li l-istituzzjonijiet multilaterali għamlu sabiex jagħtu l-kontribut tagħhom fl-iffinanzjar tat-tnaqqis tad-dejn fil-kuntest tal-ftehma konkluża mill-G8;
35. Iheġġeg koperazzjoni aħjar bejn l-IMF u l-Parlament Ewropew u l-parlamenti nazzjonali, specjalment fpajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw, sabiex jissahħu t-trasparenza, ir-responsabilità demokratika u l-leggħiġinità ta' l-IMF u tal-politiki tagħha;
36. Jisħaq dwar l-importanza ta' kuntatti regolari bejn id-Diretturi Eżekuttivi ta' l-IMF u r-rappreżentanti nazzjonali tal-pajjiżi minn fejn ġejjin;
37. Jagħti istruzzjonijiet lill-President sabiex jgħaddi din ir-riżoluzzjoni lill-Kunsill u lill-Kummissjoni, u lill-IMF, lill-organizzazzjonijiet tan-NU, lill-ECB u lill-gvernaturi ta' l-IMF ta' l-Istati Membri.

NOTA SPJEGATTIVA

I. Introduction - transformation of the IMF

The Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), created in 1944 under the Bretton Woods agreements, include among the IMF's objectives the following:

- to promote international monetary stability;
- to facilitate the expansion of international trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real income;
- to promote exchange stability and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation;
- to lessen the degree of disequilibrium in balances of payments;

To achieve these objectives, the IMF:

- **monitors** the development of financial and economic policies, and **supplies advice** on economic policy;
- **lends** to Member States which are experiencing balance of payments problems, and **stimulates adjustment** and reform **policies** it regards as likely to correct the underlying problems;
- supplies governments and central banks with **technical assistance** in its areas of expertise.

This extremely ambitious programme shows the scale of the task which devolves on the IMF. In practice, through its role as lender of last resort, and in particular through the conditionalities associated with these loans, the IMF has become a major actor in the economic, financial and social policies of the world's poorest countries.

The developed countries remain covered by the Article IV multilateral surveillance system, and are always potential clients of the IMF in the event of a major financial crisis.

Today the IMF is faced with a legitimacy crisis resulting from two factors. The first relates to the nature and the increasingly wide scope of its recommendations and of the structural adjustment policies which it implements through the conditions attached to its loans. The second relates to the allocation of voting rights within the IMF, the under-representation of the emergent countries and the marginal influence of the developing countries. This adds up to a crisis of legitimacy which harms the reputation both of the IMF's operations and of the substance and impact of its policies.

The Bretton Woods system was originally intended to support growth by liberalising international trade while at the same time guaranteeing global financial stability through fixed exchange rates and limited and controlled capital flows. However, the 1972 agreement

changed everything. Floating exchange rates replaced fixed ones, financial deregulation and privatisation became widespread, initially in the OECD countries, and then elsewhere under IMF pressure through the conditions attached to its loans and its consultancy activity. There was an explosive growth in cross-border capital flows, as well as in financial speculation, leading to multiple financial crises. This contrasts starkly with the IMF's original role of maintaining international financial stability. It therefore appears essential to encourage the IMF to refocus its activities on the prevention and surveillance of financial crises.

Moreover, in applying the Washington consensus principles across the board to all Member States (numbering 29 in 1944, and 184 today), the IMF strayed outside the strictly macroeconomic field to take an interest in all public policies, including education, public health and regulation of the labour market, because of the influence on budgetary balance, and economic impact, which these policies have.

And yet there are specialist international organisations such as the ILO, the WHO, the UNDP, UNCTAD, the World Bank and many others with much greater expertise in these areas of IMF intervention. The policies ultimately pursued by the IMF's debtor countries follow its recommendations more closely than those of the specialised institutions, because the IMF – with its power to grant or refuse a loan, and thanks to the influence of its decisions on the whole donor and lending community – has at its disposal a powerful instrument in support of its policies which the other international organisations lack. This potential conflict between the standards issuing from the various international organisations is a source of incoherence and imbalance. In practice there is a hierarchy of norms at work in which the IMF's recommendations have the highest status of all the regulations and programmes implemented by international and multilateral institutions. Now that a global debate has been launched on the reform of global governance, we should question the legitimacy of this *de facto* hierarchy and push for a process whereby the IMF's action is refocused on its real area of expertise, while leaving the other international organisations to take the lead in their own fields.

II. Governance of the IMF

The IMF has no machinery for internal democratic parliamentary control, and lies outside the UN system, which is an admittedly imperfect but unique form of world democracy.

The debates which precede IMF decisions are thus confined to a restricted circle of experts, drawn mainly from the staff of the IMF itself, from finance ministries and central banks, often sharing the same kind of training and experience.

Then there is the IMF's decision-making procedure, based essentially on the principle of "one dollar one vote", thus ensuring that the bulk of voting rights are reserved for the richest countries, headed by the USA.

This situation cries out for reform in many respects:

Firstly, we should look to see the IMF diversify in terms of the origin, training and expertise of its staff, so as to improve their understanding of the complexity of local situations and challenges.

Secondly, the IMF should considerably increase its transparency and step up its dialogue with

NGOs and civil society.

Thirdly, the IMF should embark upon a new type of relationship with parliamentary assemblies, characterised by greater openness, dialogue and transparency. The need for this is particularly pressing in the indebted countries, since the essential negotiations between these countries and the IMF must not marginalise the democratic parliamentary debate – not only out of respect for democratic institutions but also to ensure that these countries can take charge of their stabilisation and development programmes, which is the only lasting guarantee of these programmes' being put into practice.

Finally, it is clear that in spite of successive reforms, the current distribution of quotas and voting rights is open to dispute. On the one hand the newly-industrialised countries, particularly those of Asia, feel they are insufficiently represented by a distribution which no longer reflects the reality of the world economic balance. On the other hand the indebted countries, many of them in Africa, find it impossible to make their voices heard on the IMF bodies, in spite of being the main interested parties in the decisions taken there.

III. The European dimension

With 17.11% of the votes, the USA is the leading force in the IMF, and has a right of veto in view of the special 85% majority needed to take the most important decisions.

If the 25-state European Union were regarded as a member of the IMF, it would have 31.92% of the votes, exceeding the votes of the USA, would share the right of veto, and could even – under the terms of the Articles of Agreement – insist that the headquarters of the IMF be moved to Europe.

The reality of European influence in the debates of the IMF is in stark contrast to its apparent strength in arithmetical terms. Divided among several constituencies and bypassed by other fora (notably the G7), the EU has difficulty in making a genuine common or coordinated position heard within the IMF, in spite of the progress it has made in terms of economic, monetary and political integration.

Nevertheless, a coherent and audible European voice on the IMF is essential for the emergence of a genuine European development cooperation policy, and so that Europe can have some influence on changes in the international monetary and financial system.

In line with the spirit of the conclusions of the 1998 Vienna European Council, a gradual process of strengthening European coordination within the IMF should be embarked upon with the long-term objective of a single representation respecting the prerogatives of the Community institutions, notably the role of the Commission and the democratic scrutiny exercised by the European Parliament.

In the immediate future the European Parliament should step up its surveillance and monitoring of the policies of the international financial institutions. Initiatives which might be taken in this context include forming an ad hoc working party, and inviting representatives of these institutions – and of the European Union's position within them – to regularly attend Parliament's debates.

IV. The Millennium Development Goals

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are the responsibility of the whole international community, including the IMF. This is why the IMF must continue the work it has already begun with the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), placing development and the relief of poverty at the centre of its activities.

This involves a thorough-going transformation of the IMF's action towards the indebted countries. Firstly the countries themselves must take charge of their own development and poverty-reduction strategy, in other words they must form the basis for defining and implementing these strategies. Accordingly the conditionalities imposed by the IMF must be considerably scaled down. We must not forget that the true guarantee of good governance – which is a central theme of the conditionalities – is the proper functioning of democratic institutions, and that the fight against corruption need not always mean a reduction in public resources and in the sphere of intervention of the public authorities.

The relationship between the IMF, the other specialist international organisations and the donors needs to be clarified so that they will all operate in a coherent fashion towards the same end, namely the realisation of the MDGs.

Finally, the IMF's macroeconomic approach in relation to development strategies must become more flexible and less dogmatic. In particular, public expenditure devoted to health and education must stop being regarded purely and simply as drains on the budget to be reduced at all costs, and start being seen on the contrary as genuine investments in a country's human and economic development. Opening the country up to international trade must no longer be demanded as a *sine qua non*, and it must be possible to take account of other factors such as the need for customs revenue, often indispensable in the short term, and the need to protect certain emergent economic sectors on a temporary basis from the sudden impact of international competition. In meeting the objective of liberalising the financial sector, it must be possible to take account of the country's institutional capacity to establish an adequate regulatory and supervisory framework.

V. International monetary and financial stability

In accordance with its aims under the Articles of Agreement, the IMF's primary task is to preserve world monetary and financial stability. It is pertinent to ask whether this stability is today threatened principally by the risk of a balance of payments crisis in the poor and emerging countries, or whether the main source of instability does not rather lie with the major developed economies and their imbalances, notably the twin deficits of the USA.

The issue of how to adjust these global imbalances thus appears as a priority area for action by the international community and the IMF. And yet, beyond mere declarations and recommendations, we are still far from meeting our goal. A genuine global governance of monetary and financial stability, in terms of exchange rate stability, managed capital flows and prevention of major financial crises, has yet to be achieved.

27.1.2006

OPINJONI TAL-KUMITAT GHALL-KUMMERĊ INTERNAZZJONALI

for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

on the strategic review of the International Monetary Fund
(2005/2121(INI))

Draftsman: Jean-Louis Bourlanges

SUGGESTIONS

The Committee on International Trade calls on the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:

1. Welcomes the strategic review under way at the IMF; supports a re-orientation of IMF policies towards emphasising its core mandate of stabilising global exchange rate fluctuations and as a lender of last resort for countries experiencing serious balance of payment problems;
2. In the interests of parallelism with the WTO, calls on the European institutions responsible, in particular the Council and the Commission , to take the necessary measures to ensure that the eurozone or if possible the European Community is represented and votes as a single block and to facilitate the achievement of that objective as soon as possible as a transitional measure; urges the Member States to join together in an arrangement equivalent to a 'shareholders agreement' under company law that will guarantee that they form a single negotiating block;
3. Welcomes the IMF's role in integrating low-income countries into the world economy and stresses the interdependence of international trade, balance of payments problems and national development policies, regulations governing the labour market and public health services aimed at reducing poverty;
4. Recognises the ongoing review of IMF conditionalities attached to its loans to low-income countries; recommends that the review makes priority reference to poverty reduction as the goal of all IMF lending to low-income countries; urges European Executive Directors on the Board of the IMF to make sure that remaining conditionalities do not drive low-income countries to unilaterally open their markets outside the framework of WTO negotiations or restrict their freedom to negotiate on their own terms within the framework

of WTO negotiations the degree of market opening that they are willing to commit to;

5. Also calls on the IMF to ensure an adequate degree of flexibility in implementing trade-related conditionalities so as to enable beneficiary countries to determine their degree of market opening;
6. Emphasises the IMF's role in aligning European and national development policies aimed at tackling poverty by means of a comprehensive approach based on the idea that trade and monetary policies are not ends in themselves but a tool for tackling poverty;
7. Calls for better coordination and greater coherence between the policies of the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO, the European Central Bank and other international organisations and the European Union, in particular as regards the instruments linking the various markets, such as the Integrated Framework, the Trade Integration Mechanism, the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility and the recently adopted Policy Support Instruments (PSI), in order to ensure that open-market policies have a positive impact on poverty reduction; asks for more coherence between IMF programmes and the Millennium Development Goals; draws attention in this context to the ambivalence in the position of the IMF which, although it is responsible for only one very specific aspect of public action, plays a leading, if not predominant, role in implementing the strategies pursued by all players; therefore considers that it is essential to create a structure for coordinating and even planning such strategies that involves all international stakeholders;
8. Encourages better cooperation between the IMF and the European Parliament and national parliaments, especially in developing countries, in order to strengthen transparency, democratic responsibility and the legitimacy of the IMF and its policies;
9. Calls on the Council to take the necessary measures to obtain more equity in voting power, especially concerning more balanced voting rights between rich and poor countries and adjusting the voting powers of emerging countries in a way that will more equitably reflect the current economic relations worldwide ;
10. Calls for the integration of the fight against corruption into all IMF policies in order to enhance its effectiveness.

PROCÉDURA

Title	Ir-reviżjoni strategika tal-Fond Monetarju Internazzjonali		
Numru tal-Proċedura	2005/2121(INI)		
Kumitat responsabbi	ECON		
Kumitat mitlub jaghti opinjoni Data tat-thabbir fis-seduta plenarja	INTA 4.7.2005	DEVE 4.7.2005	AFET 4.7.2005
Koperazzjoni aktar mill-qrib	–		
Rapporteur għal opinjoni: Data tal-ħatra	Jean-Louis Bourlanges 12.7.2005		
Diskussjoni fil-kumitat	24.11..2005		
Data ta' l-adozzjoni tas-suġġerimenti	25.1.2006		
Riżultat tal-votazzjoni finali	favur: kontra: astensjonijiet:	28 0 0	
Membri preženti ghall-votazzjoni finali	Jean-Pierre Audy, Enrique Barón Crespo, Jean-Louis Bourlanges, Daniel Caspary, Christofer Fjellner, Béla Glattfelder, Jacky Henin, Syed Kamall, Sajjad Karim, Caroline Lucas, Erika Mann, Helmuth Markov, David Martin, Javier Moreno Sánchez, Georgios Papastamkos, Godelieve Quisthoudt-Rowohl, Bogusław Rogalski, Tokia Saïfi, Robert Sturdy, Johan Van Hecke, Daniel Varela Suanzes-Carpegna, Zbigniew Zaleski		
Sostituti preženti ghall-votazzjoni finali	Margriet van den Berg, Elisa Ferreira, Robert Goebbels, Antolín Sánchez Presedo, Frithjof Schmidt		
Sostituti preženti ghall-votazzjoni finali skond ir-Regola 178(2)	Seán Ó Neachtain		

26.1.2006

OPINJONI TAL-KUMITAT GHALL-IŻVILUPP

for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

on the strategic review of the International Monetary Fund IMF
(2005/2121(INI))

Draftsman: Anders Wijkman

SUGGESTIONS

The Committee on Development calls on the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:

1. Welcomes the strategic review under way at the IMF; supports a re-orientation of IMF policies towards emphasising its core mandate of stabilising global exchange rate fluctuations and as a lender of last resort for countries experiencing serious balance of payment problems;

Points out that the main factors preventing the developing countries from having a voice in the IMF commensurate with the share of the world population they represent are the lack of votes on the Board of Governors (African countries, accounting for 25% of the membership, have just over 4% of the vote) and the lack of technical and institutional capacity to participate in a meaningful way in deliberations and decisions;

3. Calls therefore for a revision of the voting system by:
 - increasing the number and the weight of the basic votes (currently representing less than 3% of votes), which were originally introduced in order to ensure greater equality between members, a better balance in decision making and thus greater legitimacy of the IMF;
 - devising a mechanism which would allow developing countries to increase their membership shares in the Fund, such as the setting up of a Trust Fund to finance member shares for the poorest countries;
4. Calls on the EU Member States to use the existing constituency system to ensure that the constituencies of which they are members forcefully promote a pro-development agenda based on reaching the MDGs by 2015, and that their constituencies give special attention to the technical and institutional weakness of the developing countries in the constituency and provide the necessary technical assistance to overcome them;

5. Supports the call by the UN Secretary-General at the 2005 High Level Dialogue on Finance for Development to redefine debt sustainability as the level of debt that allows a country to achieve the MDGs by 2015 without an increase in debt ratios, which requires greater complementarity between debt relief and outstanding development financing requirements; regrets therefore that in the new Debt Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Countries approved in April 2005, the IMF continues to define debt sustainability essentially in terms of export ratios (which is an unreliable predictor of debt sustainability for countries characterised by an extreme vulnerability to shock and steep fluctuations in export earnings), that it lacks realistic assessments of vulnerability and that there is no systematic analysis linking the benefits of the Debt Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (the HIPC initiative) and the extra funds needed to achieve the MDGs;
6. Stresses that the principle of partner country ownership must be at the centre of development cooperation; therefore calls on the IMF to fully recognise, when considering conditionalities for lending, the priority given to poverty eradication and not to make in any way the achievement of the MDGs more difficult;
7. Recognises the ongoing review of IMF conditionalities attached to its loans to low income countries; recommends that the review makes priority reference to poverty reduction as a key priority of all IMF lending to low-income countries; urges European members of the IMF Executive Board to make sure that remaining conditionalities do not drive low income countries to unilaterally open their markets outside the framework of WTO negotiations or restrict their freedom to negotiate on their own terms in the framework of WTO negotiations the degree of market opening that they are willing to commit to.

PROCEDURA

Title	Revizjoni strategika tal-Fond Monetarju Internazzjonali (IMF)
Numru tal-procedura	2005/2121(INI)
Kumitat responsabbi	ECON
Opinjoni minn Data tat-thabbir fis-seduta plenarja	DEVE 4.7.2005
Koperazzjoni aktar mill-qrib - data tat-thabbir fis-seduta plenarja	
'Rapporteur' ta' opinjoni Data tal-ħatra	Anders Wijkman 24.5.2005
'Rapporteur' ta' opinjoni précédenti	
Diskussjoni fil-kumitat	24.1.2006
Data ta' l-adozzjoni	26.1.2006
Riżultat tal-votazzjoni finali	+ : 18 - : 0 0 : 0
Membri prezentati għall-votazzjoni finali	Alessandro Battilocchio, Margriet van den Berg, Danutē

	Budreikaité, Marie-Arlette Carlotti, Koenraad Dillen, Filip Andrzej Kaczmarek, Maria Martens, Miguel Angel Martínez Martínez, Frithjof Schmidt, Jürgen Schröder, Anna Záborská and Mauro Zani.
Sostitut(i) prezenti ghall-votazzjoni finali	Marie-Hélène Aubert, John Bowis, Linda McAvan, Manolis Mavrommatis, Anders Wijkman and Zbigniew Zaleski.
Sostituti(i) skond l-Artikolu 178(2) prezenti ghall-votazzjoni finali	
Kummenti (disponibbli b'lingwa wahda biss)	...

PROCEDURA

Title	The strategic review of the International Monetary Fund		
Procedure number	2005/2121(INI)		
Basis in Rules of Procedure	Rule 45		
Committee responsible	ECON 4.7.2005		
Committee(s) asked for opinion(s) Date announced in plenary	INTA 4.7.2005	DEVE 4.7.2005	AFET 4.7.2005
Not delivering opinion(s) Date of decision	AFET 16.11.2005		
Rapporteur(s) Date appointed	Benoît Hamon 7.3.2005		
Previous rapporteur(s)			
Discussed in committee	29.11.2005	16.12.2005	
Date adopted	31.1.2005		
Result of final vote	unanimously		
Members present for the final vote	Zsolt László Becsey, Udo Bullmann, Ieke van den Burg, David Casa, Jan Christian Ehler, Elisa Ferreira, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Jean-Paul Gauzès, Robert Goebbels, Benoît Hamon, Gunnar Hökmark, Karsten Friedrich Hoppenstedt, Christoph Konrad, Kurt Joachim Lauk, Astrid Lulling, Gay Mitchell, Joseph Muscat, John Purvis, Alexander Radwan, Bernhard Rapkay, Eoin Ryan, Antolín Sánchez Presedo, Manuel António dos Santos, Peter Skinner, Margarita Starkevičiūtė, Ivo Strejček, Sahra Wagenknecht		
Substitutes present for the final vote	Pilar del Castillo Vera, Harald Ettl, Satu Hassi, Ona Juknevičienė, Werner Langen, Klaus-Heiner Lehne, Alain Lipietz, Sarah Ludford, Jules Maaten, Thomas Mann, Tobias Pflüger, Giovanni Pittella, Gilles Savary		
Substitutes under Rule 178(2) present for the final vote			
Date tabled – A6	1.2.2006	A6-0022/2006	