

# PARLAMENT EWROPEW

2004



2009

*Dokument ta' sessjoni*

FINALI  
**A6-0048/2006**

27.2.2006

## **RAPPORT**

dwar l-effettività ta' l-ghajnuna u l-korruzzjoni fil-pajjiżi li għadhom qed  
jiżviluppaw  
(2005/2141(INI))

Kumitat għall-Iżvilupp

Rapporteur: Margrietus van den Berg

PR\_INI

## WERREJ

Pagna

MOZZJONI GHAL RIŻOLUZZJONI TAL-PARLAMENT EWROPEW **Error! Bookmark not defined.**

NOTA SPJEGATTIVA ..... **Error! Bookmark not defined.**

PROCEDURA..... **Error! Bookmark not defined.**

## MOZZJONI GĦAL RIŻOLUZZJONI TAL-PARLAMENT EWROPEW

### dwar l-effettività ta' l-ghajjnuna u l-korruzzjoni fil-pajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw (2005/2141(INI))

Il-Parlament Ewropew,

- wara li kkunsidra l-Istqarrija Kongunta mill-Kunsill u r-Rappreżentanti tal-Gvernijiet ta' l-Istati Membri fi hdan il-Kunsill, il-Parlament Ewropew u l-Kummissjoni bit-titolu "Il-Kunsens Ewropew dwar l-Iżvilupp",
- wara li kkunsidra l-Konvenzjoni tan-Nazzjonijiet Uniti kontra l-Korruzzjoni tal-31 ta' Ottubru 2003,
- wara li kkunsidra d-Dikjarazzjoni tan-NU kontra l-Korruzzjoni u t-Tixhim f'Tranżazzjonijiet Kummerċjali Internazzjonali tas-16 ta' Diċembru 1996,
- wara li kkunsidra l-Konvenzjoni ta' l-OECD dwar il-Ġlieda kontra t-Tixhim ta' Uffiċjali Pubbliċi Barranin f'Tranżazzjonijiet Kummerċjali Internazzjonali tal-21 ta' Novembru 1997,
- wara li kkunsidra d-Dikjarazzjoni tal-Millennju tan-NU tat-8 ta' Settembru 2000, li tistipula l-Objettivi tal-Millennju għall-Iżvilupp (MDGs) bħala l-objettivi stabbiliti flimkien mal-komunità internazzjonali għall-eliminazzjoni tal-faqar,
- wara li kkunsidra d-Dikjarazzjoni ta' Pariġi dwar l-Effettività ta' l-Għajjnuna tat-2 ta' Marzu 2005,
- wara li kkunsidra r-Rapport ta' Evalwazzjoni ta' l-Ekosistema għar-Raba' Millennju tat-12 ta' Lulju 2005 intitolat "Ekosistemi u Benesseri Uman: Opportunitajiet u Sfidi għan-Negożju u għall-Industrija",
- wara li kkunsidra l-Artikoli 8, 9 u 97 tal-Ftehma ta' Shubija ta' Cotonou,
- wara li kkunsidra d-Dikjarazzjoni tas-Samit tal-G8 f'Evian dwar il-Ġlieda kontra l-Korruzzjoni u t-Titjib tat-Trasparenza tat-2 ta' Ġunju 2003,
- wara li kkunsidra r-Rapport tal-Kummissjoni għall-Afrika tal-11 ta' Marzu 2005 bit-titolu "L-Interess Komuni Tagħna",
- wara li kkunsidra l-istrategija ta' l-UE biex tiġġieled l-akkumulazzjoni u t-traffikar illeċitu ta' armi u armamenti żgħar (SALW - Small Arms and Light Weapons) u l-munizzjon tagħhom adottata mill-Kunsill Ewropew tal-15 u s-16 ta' Diċembru 2005;
- wara li kkunsidra r-riżoluzzjoni tiegħu tal-15 ta' Mejju 2003 dwar it-Tishiġ tal-Kapaċità fil-pajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw<sup>1</sup>,

---

<sup>1</sup> ĠU C 67 E, 17.3.2004, p. 206-255.

- wara li kkunsidra r-risoluzzjoni tiegħu tal-31 ta' Marzu 2004 dwar l-Iggvernar fil-politika ta' żvilupp ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea<sup>1</sup>,
  - wara li kkunsidra l-Artikolu 45 tar-Regoli ta' Proċedura tiegħu,
  - wara li kkunsidra r-rapport tal-Kumitat għall-Iżvilupp (A6-0048/2006),
- A. billi l-korruzzjoni tolqot lill-foqra b'mod sproporzjonat, billi tirrestringi l-aċċess tagħhom għall-beni pubbliċi u tnaqqas il-kwalità tas-servizzi bażiċi, u tagħmilha aktar diffiċli li wiehed jōhroġ miċ-ċirku vizzjuż tal-faqar,
  - B. billi l-korruzzjoni għandha impatt negattiv fuq il-kundizzjonijiet għan-negozju, l-effettività tal-provediment tas-servizz pubbliku u l-fiducja tal-pubbliku fil-gvern ta' pajjiżu,
  - C. billi l-korruzzjoni tostakola l-effettività ta' l-għajnuna u għaldaqstant iddgħajjed l-għanijiet għall-iżvilupp ta' l-UE u tnaqqas il-pass ta' l-iżvilupp fil-pajjiżi ġirien ta' l-UE,
  - D. billi l-Bank Dinji jistima li aktar minn triljun Dollaru American jithallas f'tixhim kull sena fid-dinja u l-Unjoni Afrikana tistima li l-korruzzjoni tiswa lill-ekonomiji Afrikani aktar minn 25% tal-GDP annwali ta' l-Afrika,
  - E. billi l-korruzzjoni hija problema li tolqot lis-soċjetà kollha kemm hi u tinsab f'hafna forum u peress li strategija li tpoġġi kollox f'keffa waħda ma tapplikax peress li l-korruzzjoni tista' biss tingheleb għal dejjem billi tiġi ttrattata b'mod wiesgħa,
  - F. billi hafna esponenti, inkluż politikanti, uffiċjali governattivi, is-soċjetà ċivili, il-midja, kumpaniji multinazzjonali u donaturi internazzjonali, għandhom rwol fil-ġlieda kontra l-korruzzjoni,
  - G. billi l-korruzzjoni hija kemm waħda mill-kaguni kif ukoll waħda mill-konsegwenzi ta' sitwazzjonijiet ta' konflitt,
  - H. billi l-korruzzjoni hija theddida għall-bżonnijiet bażiċi tal-bniedem, bħalma huma l-aċċess għas-servizzi tas-saħħa u għall-edukazzjoni,
  - I. billi l-korruzzjoni hi prodott ta' tmexxija dgħajfa, li bla dubju ta' xejn għandha x'taqsam ma' l-irwol ta' l-Istat, u għalhekk għandha tkun miġġielda bi strategiji li jheggu gvernar tajjeb,
  - J. billi t-trasparenza u r-responsabilità huma prinċipji importanti fil-ġlieda kontra l-korruzzjoni,
  - K. billi għandha tingħata attenzjoni xierqa għar-rabta bejn il-produzzjoni, it-trasferiment u ċ-ċirkolazzjoni illeċiti ta' l-SALW, u l-prattiki ta' korruzzjoni, kemm fil-pajjiżi żviluppatti kif ukoll dawk li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw,
  - L. billi t-tnaqqis tal-korruzzjoni hu impossibbli mingħajr l-għarfien u l-partecipazzjoni tas-

<sup>1</sup> ĠU C 103 E, 29.4.2004, p. 449-550.

soċjetà ċivili u billi l-aċċess għall-informazzjoni kollha hi kruċjali f'dan il-proċess,

- M. billi l-Konvenzjoni tan-NU Kontra l-Korruzzjoni ta' l-2003 hi l-ewwel strument legali internazzjonali li jirrikonoxxi l-bżonn li l-Istati kollha jimpenjaw ruħhom għar-rimpatrijar ta' l-assi, u billi l-uniċi Stati Membri ta' l-UE li rratifikaw din il-Konvenzjoni huma l-Ungerija u Franza,
- N. billi, minn fost l-Istati Membri ta' l-UE, il-Konvenzjoni ta' l-OECD dwar il-Ġlieda kontra t-Tixhim ta' Uffiċjali Pubbliċi Barranin f'Tranżazzjonijiet Kummerċjali Internazzjonali għadha ma gietx irratifikata minn Malta, mil-Litwanja u mil-Latvija, u billi dawn l-Istati Membri għandhom jitheggu jagħmlu dan fil-futur qarib,
1. Jitlob lill-Kummissjoni biex fit-tfassil tal-programmi ta' żvilupp tagħha, tiffoka b'mod aktar speċifiku fuq il-kwistjonijiet ta' responsabilità u trasparenza, peress li mekkaniżmi dgħajfa ta' responsabilità għandhom it-tendenza li jiffaċilitaw il-korruzzjoni;
  2. Jenfasizza li aktar attenzjoni għandha tingħata lill-irwol tas-soċjetà ċivili sabiex thaddan gvernar tajjeb u kontroll volontarju tal-korruzzjoni;
  3. Ifakkar li, skond il-Ftehim emendata ta' Partnership ta' Cotonou, każijiet serji ta' korruzzjoni jistgħu jwasslu għal konsultazzjonijiet skond l-Artikoli 96 u 97 tal-Ftehim;
  4. Jenfasizza l-bżonn li l-parlamenti nazzjonali f'pajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw jiġu appoġġati fix-xogħol tagħhom bħala awtoritajiet baġitarji permezz ta' djalogu, taqsim ta' informazzjoni u bini ta' kapacità;
  5. Jenfasizza l-irwol importanti li midja hielsa u indipendenti jista' jkollha fil-ġlieda kontra l-korruzzjoni u jitlob għal appoġġ akbar mill-UE għal proġetti li jassistu jew isahhu l-midja fil-pajjiżi msieħba;
  6. Jenfasizza l-htieġa ta' kontribut għall-bini u għat-tisħih tas-sistema legali f'dawk il-pajjiżi,
  7. Jenfasizza l-irwol importanti li għandhom in-nisa anke fil-ġlieda kontra l-korruzzjoni u għaldaqstant jishaq il-bżonn ta' edukazzjoni akbar u aħjar tan-nisa u tal-bniet u ta' promozzjoni ta' l-involvement tan-nisa fil-politika;
  8. Jappoġġa l-kampanja "Ippubblika Dak Li Thallas" li tappella lill-kumpaniji multinazzjonali sabiex jiżvelaw informazzjoni dwar hlasijiet lill-gvernijiet;
  9. Jenfasizza l-importanza ta' investiment fil-pajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw u jhegġeg lill-Kummissjoni u lill-Istati Membri biex jgħinu l-fluss ta' investiment bħal dan;
  10. Jenfasizza l-importanza li s-soċjetà ċivili fil-pajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw jitwaqqfu istituzzjonijiet b'funzjoni ta' sorveljanza, biex b'hekk tintalab sistema ta' kontrolli u bilanċi mill-gvern tagħhom; jitlob lill-Kummissjoni sabiex tappoġġa dan il-proċess billi ttrriserva persentaġġ adattat mill-għajnuna baġitarja għall-istituzzjonijiet ta' sorveljanza tas-soċjetà ċivili;
  11. Jikkunsidra li l-organizzazzjoni interna ta' spiss ikollha tinbidel sabiex tingheleb il-korruzzjoni; jenfasizza l-bżonn ta' bini ta' kapacitajiet f'istituzzjonijiet ċentrali u lokali

sabiex tiġi miġġielda l-korruzzjoni, speċjalment fid-dawl taż-żieda fl-ġhajjnuna mogħtija f'forma ta' ġhajjnuna baġitarja;

12. Jenfasizza li l-ġhoti ta' ġhajjnuna baġitarja trid tkun dejjem preċeduta b'attenzjoni minn evalwazzjonijiet fiduċarji ta' riskju fuq bażi ta' każ b'każ;
13. Jenfasizza li l-ġhajjnuna baġitarja għandha dejjem tkun allokata għal settur speċifiku;
14. Jenfasizza li kull ġhajjnuna baġitarja mogħtija għandha ssir flimkien ma' djalogu politiku li għandu l-ġhan li jtejjeb it-Tmexxija Finanzjarja Pubblika (PFM - Public Financial Management), biex jitnaqqas ir-riskju ta' korruzzjoni jew ta' tmexxija hażina tal-fondi;
15. Jappella għal aktar trasparenza fil-programmi għal ġhajjnuna baġitarja mill-UE, inkluża l-publikazzjoni ta' informazzjoni rilevanti dwar kif intefqet l-ġhajjnuna fil-pajjiż riċevitur, u billi jiġu involuti l-parlamenti u jiġu informati l-esponenti ċivili f'dan il-proċess;
16. Jappella għall-appoġġ għal monitoraġġ effiċjenti tal-baġit permezz ta' 'Surveys' ta' Monitoraġġ ta' l-Infiq Pubbliku (PETS - Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys) mis-soċjetà ċivili u mill-parlamenti nazzjonali, li b'mod ċar tkejjel id-dhul u l-hruġ skond il-kriterji tal-Kumitat ta' Assistenza għall-Iżvilupp (DAC - Development Assistance Committee) ta' l-OECD;
17. Jikkonsidra li għandhom jitfasslu indikaturi soċjali speċifiċi bl-iskop li tingabar dejta aktar preċiża dwar il-kwalità ta' gvernar milhuqa mill-pajjiżi involuti u jitlob lis-soċjetà ċivili sabiex tkun hażna aktar involuta f'dan il-qasam;
18. Jitlob lill-UE, bhala kopresident tal-Programm għall-Infiq Pubbliku u r-Responsabilità Finanzjarja (PEFA Programme - Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Programme), li jipprovdi qafas armonizzat għall-evalwar ta' riskju fiduċarju fil-pajjiżi benefiċarji, sabiex tinkludi indikaturi speċifiċi biex jitkejjel il-livell ta' korruzzjoni;
19. Jitlob lill-Kummissjoni sabiex tuża dawn il-livelli ta' korruzzjoni kif immonitorjati sabiex tappoġġa gvernar tajjeb u tieġu miżuri adegwati kontra reġimi korrotti;
20. Iheġġeġ lill-Kummissjoni biex tikkunsidra deċiżjonijiet sabiex jitnaqqas id-dejn estern ta' pajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw;
21. Jenfasizza l-bżonn sabiex donaturi internazzjoni jikkoordinaw mill-qrib l-attivitajiet tagħhom fil-qasam ta' ġhajjnuna baġitarja bl-iskop li tittejjeb it-trasparenza u r-responsabilità fil-pajjiż benefiċarju;
22. Jappella lill-Istati membri kollha ta' l-UE kif ukoll lill-pajjiżi kollha firmatarji tal-Konvenzjoni tan-NU kontra l-Korruzzjoni ta' l-2003 sabiex jirratifikaw il-Konvenzjoni ta' l-OECD dwar il-Ġlieda kontra t-Tixħim ta' Uffiċjali Pubbliċi Barranin f'Tranzazzjonijiet Kummerċjali Internazzjonali ta' l-1997;
23. Ifakkar l-irwol importanti ta' inizjattivi reġionali sabiex titrażżan il-korruzzjoni u jiġi promoss gvernar tajjeb, bhall-'African Peer Review Mechanism' (APRM); jenfasizza l-ħtieġa li pajjiżi Afrikani jimplementaw dawn l-inizjattivi u li l-Kummissjoni u l-Istati

Membri jipprovdu assistenza teknika u finanzjarja għal dan l-iskop;

24. Jitlob lill-Istati Membri sabiex jippromwovu kemm jista' jkun malajr strument internazzjonali li jorbot legalment dwar l-ittraċċar u l-immarkar ta' SALW u munizzjon, kif ukoll sabiex jappoġġjaw inizzjattivi reġjunali li jikkumbattu il-kummerċ illeċitu fl-SALW u l-munizzjon tagħhom fil-pajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw;
25. Jitlob għal aktar infurzar u impenn għall-"Inizzjattiva ta' Trasparenza mill-Industriji ta' Estrazzjoni" sabiex jiġi żgurat il-kxif ta' informazzjoni dwar ħlasijiet bejn il-gvernijiet fil-pajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw u l-kumpaniji multinazzjonali;
26. Jitlob lill-Istati Membri b'ċentri finanzjarji sabiex jieħdu l-passi legali u amministrattivi kollha biex jiżguraw li fondi akkwistati illegalment jkunu jistgħu jiġu mġoddija lura lill-Istat oriġinarju; aktar minn hekk jenfasizza l-bżonn ta' bini ta' kapaċità, l-aktar dwar il-prevenzjoni ta' serq ta' assi u ta' l-użu hażin u l-appropriazzjoni bla dritt tal-fondi pubbliċi;
27. Ihegġeġ lill-Kummissjoni u lill-Istati Membri sabiex iwaqqfu sistema internazzjonali ta' 'blacklisting' biex twaqqaf l-banek milli jsellfu kwantitajiet kbar ta' flus lil reġimi jew persuni korrotti li jirrapreżentaw lil xi gvern;
28. Jitlob lill-Kummissjoni u lill-Istati Membri sabiex jipprojbixxu xiri pubbliku jew kuntratti ta' xiri ma' kumpaniji li l-impjegati tagħhom kienu involuti f'attivitajiet korrotti ma' ministri jew uffiċjali tal-gvern jew b'xi mod ieħor f'pajjiż li għadu qed jiżviluppa, jekk dawk l-impjegati mhumiex suġġetti għal proċeduri dixxiplinari; aktar minn hekk jitlob lill-Istati Membri biex jirreferu dan it-tip ta' każijiet lill-awtoritajiet prosekuzzjonali xierqa, sabiex dawn il-persuni jiġu investigati u jitressqu l-qorti, jekk ikollhom każ li jridu jagħtu kont tiegħu;
29. Jenfasizza li hemm riskji ewlenin ta'korruzzjoni involuti fil-proċeduri ta' prokurament pubbliku, u għalhekk, regoli ta' xiri u proċeduri trasparenti għandhom ikunu promossi bħala prijoritajiet ewlenin;
30. Jagħti istruzzjonijiet lill-President tiegħu sabiex jgħaddi din ir-risoluzzjoni lill-Kunsill u lill-Kummissjoni.

## NOTA SPJEGATTIVA

Corruption is a common phenomenon that can manifest itself in various ways and in all levels of society, varying from bribing civil servants and theft of public resources to fraud and nepotism. Corruption imposes massive costs on countries, institutions and ordinary citizens. It obstructs growth and creates a serious risk of marginalization in the global economy for countries with high levels of corruption. The World Bank estimates that more than USD 1 trillion is paid in bribes every year worldwide. The African Union estimates that corruption costs African economies more than USD 148 billion a year, representing 25 % of Africa's GDP.

The effects of corruption impose a disproportionately heavy burden on the poor since they are the most vulnerable and suffer most from restricted access to public goods and lower quality basic services. As a result, corruption creates obstacles to development in third world countries. It is understood that corruption can directly and indirectly affect the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals as budget resources in key MDG sectors leak away. Moreover, aid is also less effective in corrupt countries since substantial parts of the granted funds leak away.

Since corruption hinders aid effectiveness, there is a clear interest among international donors to help curb corruption in the countries where they spend their money. The EU should make the fight against corruption a central element of its development policy, focussing on issues such as good governance, state capacity and public sector management. This must also involve good risk management on the supply side, making sure aid is not spent in a weak governance environment where funds leak due to corruption.

Meanwhile, donors should put more confidence in countries that they find low on the corruption scale, and give them time to produce results. Without a predictable flow of funds and the ability to use development assistance for recurring expenditure, such as salaries, governments will be cautious about hiring teachers or nurses and this will hamper their development.

### **Promotion of good governance**

Corruption is a by-product of weak governance. As corruption often involves an important role for the state, it is sometimes defined as the abuse of public power for private benefit. Weak institutions and administrations with limited accountability often allow for the misuse of public goods by politicians or public officials. Research has proven that countries improving control on corruption and rule of law can expect in the long run a four-fold increase in income per capita. Therefore curbing corruption is and should remain an important goal of policies aiming for "good governance" in developing countries. The EU has identified good governance as an integral part of its long-term development strategy.

Good governance evolves around the principles of accountability and transparency. Accountability means that there are rules, procedures and control mechanisms that make it possible to control what the government is doing with money that belongs to the people. Both state and non-state actors should be involved in this process.



Transparency is a vital component of accountability. If financial allocations are visible, it is more difficult to divert money into corrupt pockets. Access to information is crucial for the robust democratic engagement of citizens in public affairs. This is based on the basic right to receive public information and helps in building effective monitoring structures by civil society organisations.

### *Budget tracking*

Budget transparency is one of the most critical areas where good governance can be promoted by better access to information. Citizens have the right to information about how budgets are spent. This is particularly important when it comes to large revenue items, such as the amounts received from international donors delivered as budget support.

Public and legislative scrutiny is often not very efficient because of a lack of information. It is important that the established objectives and policy priorities are reflected in annual budgets. Budget transparency is needed to check the sectors that were supposed to receive the money. In some countries only parts of the budget are public and other parts, such as military expenditure, are not public. This should never be the case: donors, national parliaments and civil society should always have sight of the full budget.

Budget tracking can and should be executed by both national parliaments and civil society. A specific tool that is often used to examine the flow of funds and materials from governments to destinations like schools and health centres are Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS). PETS can help identify potential corruption zones, monitor the fight against corruption and empower stakeholders. The EU should support the development of PETS and the training of its users.

### *The role of parliaments*

Parliaments, in discharging the functions provided for in national constitutions, overseeing the government and representing the people, are important stakeholders in the fight against corruption. Parliaments play a significant role in advancing reforms in public finance management but low levels of training of legislators in many countries limit their ability to perform efficiently. Since national parliaments are often sidelined in good governance programmes they merit more attention from international donors.

In particular, capacity development in national parliaments should consist of:

- a) Supporting national parliaments in instituting or reinforcing mechanisms within parliament for bringing government to account;
- c) Help building up budget literacy - developing the skills to adequately assess and evaluate the budget during the budgetary cycle;
- d) Help national parliaments to create public awareness by introducing civic education in school curricula and by setting up public awareness campaigns.

There is evidence that corruption falls as the proportion of parliamentary seats held by women rises. Closing the gender gap is thus another instrument that could reduce corruption. Countries that adopt specific measures to develop women's skills and protect their rights are better off. According to the World Bank, when women have access to resources and schooling, less corruption and faster economic growth is achieved. The EU should therefore support the involvement of more women in politics.

### *Civil society watchdogs*

Public pressure and a general intolerance of corruption in a society are essential in the fight against corruption. Public feedback, organised through civil society, can be a powerful tool to make social services more responsive and accountable. For civil society to fulfil this role it is essential to raise public awareness, educate people and make sure that structures are in place so that these civil society watchdogs can actually do their work. Across the world there are many examples of organisations that are effectively monitoring their governments and attempting to hold them to account. The Publish What You Pay-campaign of hundreds of NGOs focuses on the disclosing of payments of multinationals to governments in the natural resources sector. Good governance policies and especially policies aimed at reforming public finance management should support the development and strengthening of these organisations.

### **Budget support**

There is a growing tendency for the EU to give developing countries budgetary aid - money that goes directly into the national coffers of recipient countries - instead of investing in a large number of smaller development projects. EU budget support, which grew from 14% in 2001 to around 30% in 2004, is considered a useful aid modality in a strategy focusing on improving public financial management for the whole budget.

However, budget support also involves serious risks because of its lack of transparency and the possible opening for corrupt activities. Budget support works very well when institutions are good but corruption moderates the impact of budget support on growth and poverty. Therefore, before budget support is given, an analysis of the macro-economic and financial situation of the country is made. Improvement in the quality and effectiveness of public expenditure is one of the most important criteria for the decision to grant budget support. Budget support should only be granted to a government if it is diagnosed as improving its PFM.

Even if institutions work well, care should be taken when providing aid directly to national budgets. The Court of Auditors has recently concluded that the European Commission's current budget aid programmes do not adequately take into account the problems related to corruption.<sup>1</sup> Corruption should be analysed in all fiduciary risk assessments and the European Commission should maintain involvement in the implementation of budget support either through ex-ante or ex-post control and audit. In order to further reduce risks, budget support should always take the form of sector specific budget aid that earmarks money for a specific

---

<sup>1</sup> Special Report No 2/2005, concerning EDF budget aid to ACP countries: the Commission's management of the public finance ref.

sector in which the funding should be spent.

The effectiveness of budget aid is measured by performance indicators. These indicators often focus mainly on the correct management of public funds, and do not pay enough attention to the pro-poor outcome. From a development point of view it is better to use poverty-related targets that directly measure the outcome of, for example, policies in the education and health sector forcing governments to focus on a policy outcome instead of budgetary input and output. Details on the grounds, definition, calculation method and sources of information for each indicator should systematically be included when applying these indicators.

As was discussed above, monitoring by civil society is vital in the process of budget support. These groups need to have access to the resources of information and better knowledge of macro-economic mechanisms. It is therefore necessary that a percentage of 0.5 % of the granted budget support should be reserved exclusively for civil society watchdogs.

### **What the international community can do**

The two most important conventions on the fight against corruption are the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (1999) and The UN Convention against Corruption (2003). The OECD Convention has been ratified by most EU Member States, except for Malta, Lithuania and Latvia. These Member States should be pressed to sign the convention. The UN Convention has, at the time of writing, only been ratified by Hungary and France. The Convention should be ratified by all other EU Member States as soon as possible. The international community as a whole, and the EU in particular, should work towards better enforcement of these conventions.

Another important issue is transparent cooperation with other donors such as the World Bank and the IMF. An example of this is the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Programme (PEFA) in which the EU and the World Bank jointly chair the steering committee. This programme provides a harmonized framework for assessing fiduciary risk with a common set of indicators. The current system, however, is inadequate for measuring corruption since it does not include a direct indicator on corruption. This should be tackled in the future.

The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a multi-stakeholder agreement under which oil, gas and mining companies agree publicly to disclose all payments they make to developing country governments and governments agree to publish what they receive. The international community should give strong political and financial support to initiatives such as this to increase transparency. In addition the EU should support local measures for combating corruption, such as the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which is perhaps the most innovative aspect of the NEPAD.

### **Stealing of assets**

A significant problem affecting many developing countries is the illicit acquisition of public funds and assets by former dictators or presidents who lodge them in foreign bank accounts. Countries that have large financial centres holding such funds should take all legal and

administrative action to ensure that these illicitly acquired state funds can be frozen and confiscated and that eventually the money is repatriated to the governments of the countries they were stolen from. Currently this is not done effectively, as assets often remain unfrozen until criminal investigation is in an advanced stage which gives the former dictators time to move the money away.

As judicial systems in affected countries are often unable to meet the requirements to enter a claim for recovery and repatriation of illicit funds, specific donor efforts should be targeted at developing this capacity. Furthermore it is important to focus technical assistance on the *prevention* of the stealing of assets. In most developing countries there is a lack of appropriate legislation and good financial institutions capable of identifying of illicit funds before they leave the country. EU development aid in this field should focus on this capacity, for example by providing expert advice, training courses and coaching.

A final measure that can prevent states from incurring financial problems is to impede banks and other financial centres from lending large sums of money to dictators or corrupt regimes. Many former dictators, now long gone, have left their countries indebted, creating serious obstacles for development. Criteria for lending could include the question of whether a government is democratically elected. A black-list of these regimes could be established by the international community, for instance by the Club of Paris. As soon as a country has experienced a regime change by democratic elections, or has otherwise improved its democratic governance, it can be removed from this list.

## PROĊEDURA

<b>Titolu</b>	L-effettività ta' l-għajjnuna u l-korruzzjoni fil-pajjizi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw		
<b>Numru tal-proċedura</b>	2005/2141(INI)		
<b>Bażi fir-Regoli ta' Proċedura</b>	Regola 45		
<b>Kumitat responsabbli</b> L-awtorizzazzjoni tad-data mhabbra fis-seduta plenarja	DEVE 8.9.2005		
<b>Kumitat(i) mitlub(a) jagħti/u opinjoni(jiet)</b> Data tat-thabbir fis-seduta plenarja	INTA 8.9.2005		
Opinjoni mhix mogħtija Data tad-deċiżjoni	INTA 29.8.2005		
<b>Koperazzjoni aktar mill-qrib</b> Data tat-thabbir fis-seduta plenarja	Le		
<b>Mozzjoni(jiet) għal riżoluzzjoni inkluża(i) fir-rapport</b>	-		
<b>Rapporteur(s)</b> Data tal-hatra	Margrietus van den Berg 24.5.2005		
<b>Rapporteur(s) preċedenti</b>			
<b>Diskussjoni fil-kumitat</b>	29.8.2005	4.10.2005	1.12.2005
<b>Data ta' l-adozzjoni</b>	20.2.2006		
<b>Riżultat tal-votazzjoni finali</b>	favur: 22 kontra: 0 astensjonijiet: 0		
<b>Membri preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali</b>	Margrete Auken, Thierry Cornillet, Alexandra Dobolyi, Michael Gahler, Filip Andrzej Kaczmarek, Glenys Kinnock, Ġirts Valdis Kristovskis, Maria Martens, Miguel Angel Martínez Martínez, Jürgen Schröder, Feleknas Uca, María Elena Valenciano Martínez-Orozco, Anna Záborská		
<b>Sostituti preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali</b>	John Bowis, Milan Gaľa, Ana Maria Gomes, Fiona Hall, Manolis Mavrommatis, Zbigniew Zaleski, Gabriele Zimmer		
<b>Sostituti preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali skond ir-Regola 178(2)</b>	Emine Bozkurt, Robert Evans		
<b>Data tat-tressiq - A6</b>	27.2.2006	A6-0048/2006	