RAPPORT dwar l-evalwazzjoni tar-Round ta' Doha wara l-Konferenza Ministerjali tad-WTO f'Hong Kong

1.3.2006 - (2005/2247(INI))

Kumitat għall-Kummerċ Internazzjonali
Rapporteur: Georgios Papastamkos

Emendi

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MOZZJONI GĦAL RIŻOLUZZJONI TAL-PARLAMENT EWROPEW

dwar l-evalwazzjoni tar-Round ta' Doha wara l-Konferenza Ministerjali tad-WTO f'Hong Kong (2005/2247INI))

Il-Parlament Ewropew,

– wara li kkunsidra d-Dikjarazzjoni Ministerjali tas-Sitt Sessjoni tal-Konferenza Ministerjali ta' l-Organizzazzjoni Dinjija tal-Kummerċ (WTO), adottata fit-18 ta' Diċembru 2005[1],

–   wara li kkunsidra d-Dikjarazzjonijiet Finali mill-Konferenza Parlamentari tad-WTO ta' bejn it-12 u l-15 ta' Diċembru 2005, u ta' bejn il-25 u s-26 ta' Novembru 2004.

– wara li kkunsidra r-riżoluzzjoni ta' l-1 ta' Diċembru 2005 dwar it-tħejjijiet għas-Sitt Konferenza Ministerjali tad-WTO f'Hong Kong[2],

– wara li kkunsidra l-konklużjonijiet tal-Kunsill dwar l-Aġenda ta' Żvilupp ta' Doha tad-WTO, wara l-laqgħa straordinarja tal-Kunsill għar-Relazzjonijiet Esterni u l-Affarjiet Ġenerali fil-Lussemburgu fit-18 ta' Ottubru 2005 (13378/05),

–   wara li kkunsidra r-riżoluzzjoni tiegħu tat-12 ta' Mejju 2005 dwar l-evalwazzjoni tar-Round ta' Doha wara d-Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill Ġenerali tad-WTO ta' l-1 ta' Awissu 2004[3],

– wara li kkunsidra d-Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill Ġenerali tad-WTO ta' l-1 ta' Awissu 2004[4],

– wara li kkunsidra d-Dikjarazzjoni Ministerjali ta' Doha tad-WTO ta' l-14 ta' Novembru 2001[5],

–   wara li kkunsidra r-riżoluzzjonijiet preċedenti tiegħu tal-15 ta' Diċembru 1999 dwar it-Tielet Konferenza Ministerjali tad-WTO f'Seattle[6], tat-13 ta' Diċembru 2001 dwar il-laqgħa tad-WTO f'Qatar[7], u dik tal-25 ta' Settembru 2003 dwar il-Ħames Konferenza Ministerjali tad-WTO f'Cancún[8],

–   wara li kkunsidra r-Rapport ta' Sutherland dwar "Il-Futur tad-WTO: Nindirizzaw l-Isfidi Istituzzjonali fil-Millennju l-Ġdid"[9],

–   wara li kkunsidra r-riżoluzzjoni tad-9 ta' Marzu 2005 dwar il-proposta għal regolament tal-Kunsill li jħaddem skema ta' preferenzi ġeneralizzati ta' tariffi[10],

–   wara li kkunsidra l-Artikolu 45 tar-Regoli ta' Proċedura tiegħu,

–   wara li kkunsidra r-rapport tal-Kumitat għall-Kummerċ Internazzjonali u l-opinjonijiet tal-Kumitat għall-Iżvilupp Reġjonali, il-Kumitat għall-Biedja u l-Iżvilupp Rurali, il-Kumitat għall-Industrija, ir-Riċerka u l-Enerġija u l-Kumitat għall-Affarijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji (A6-0051/2006),

A.  billi s-sistema tal-kummerċ multilaterali inkorporata fid-WTO tikkontribwixxi għal sigurtà msaħħa, għal trasparenza u għal stabilità fil-kummerċ internazzjonali kif ukoll għal immaniġġar aħjar tal-globalizzazzjoni bis-saħħa ta' regolamenti u dixxiplini multilaterali u l-ftehim ġudizzjarju ta' tilwim,

B.  billi l-Konferenza Ministerjali ta' Doha impenjat lill-Membri kollha tad-WTO għal round ta' żvillupp, li l-għan prinċipali tiegħu hu li jippromwovi sistema ta' kummerċ aktar ġusta u aktar favur l-iżvilupp ibbażata fuq regoli multilaterali,

C.  billi l-għeluq b'suċċess tar-Round ta' Doha, li jipprovdi għal aktar liberalizzazzjoni ġenwina tas-suq u għal regolamenti multilaterali aktar b'saħħithom, jista' jkun parametru importanti sabiex jiġu stimulati t-tkabbir ekonomiku dinji, l-iżvilupp u l-impjiegi u sabiex b'mod effettiv jikkontribwixxi sabiex pajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw jintegraw fl-ekonomija dinjija,

D.  billi l-UE dejjem ħadet sehem ewlieni fin-negozjati mindu tnieda r-Round ta' Doha, u dejjem ippreżentat offerti kredibbli u sostanzjali fl-oqsma kollha tan-negozjati, inkluż l-agrikoltura, filwaqt li pajjiżi żviluppati oħrajn u pajjiżi f'fażi ta' żvilupp avvanzat, ma wrewx l-istess flessibilità u livell ta' impenn,

E.  billi l-għeluq b'suċċess tar-Round ta' Doha li jwassal għal aktar liberalizzazzjoni reċiproka tal-kummerċ dinji ta' prodotti u servizzi, tkun element importanti sabiex jintlaħaq aktar tkabbir, kompetittività ta' l-impjiegi fl-Unjoni Ewropea u sabiex jintlaħqu l-għanijiet ta' l-istrateġija ta' Liżbona,

F.  billi f'Hong Kong giet stabilità skadenza ġdida għal April 2006 sabiex jintlaħaq ftehim bil-modalijtajiet kollha u skadenza oħra għal Lulju 2006 għall-preżentazzjoni ta' abbozz ta' skedi ta' implimentazzjoni,

G.  billi l-isforzi sabiex tinżamm l-iskadenza ta' l-2006 bħala żmien sa meta jrid jintemm ir-Round ta' Doha m'għandhomx jikkompromettu l-għan li jintlaħaq riżultat ambizzjuż u bbilanċjat, li jirrifletti l-għanijiet ta' żvilupp imsemmija fid-Dikjarazzjoni Ministerjali ta' Doha,

H.  billi jekk ma jiġux konklużi negozjati fl-2006 joħloq riskju ta' falliment għar-Round ta' Doha, li jista' wkoll jpoġġi s-sistema multilaterali ta' kummerċ kif inhi issa f'riskju u tinbidel kompletament bi ftehimiet ta' kummerċ bilaterali u reġjonali li ta' spiss jaċċentwaw żbilanċi bejn id-dinja żviluppata u d-dinja li għadha qed tiżviluppa,

I.  billi r-Round ta' Doha għandu jwassal għal riżultati favur l-iżvilupp fl-oqsma kollha tan-negozjati, speċjalment fl-interessi ta' pajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw u li huma ifqar u vulnerabbli,

J.  billi teżisti varjetà kbira ta' sitwazzjonijiet fost il-pajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw, li għandhom jagħmlu impenji u jirċievu trattament differenti u speċjali fi proporzjon mal-livell ta' żvilupp tagħhom, kif ukoll mal-kompetitività ġenerali u settorjali tagħhom, waqt li l-pajjiżi l-anqas żviluppati u vulnerabbli m'għandhomx jidħlu għal impenji,

K.  billi l-UE għandha tirrispondi għat-talbiet għall-liberalizzazzjoni tal-kummerċ fl-agrikoltura b'tali mod li tiżgura s-sostenibilità, il-kompetitività u l-karatru multifunzjonali tas-settur agrikolu ta' l-UE,

L.  billi l-2013 bħala data tat-tmiem għall-eliminazzjoni ta' sussidji għall-esportazzjoni agrikola ġiet miftiehma; billi ma ntlaħaq l-ebda progress komparabbli fl-oqsma ta' appoġġ domestiku u aċċess għas-suq,

M.  billi l-UE hi l-akbar importatur fid-dinja ta' prodotti agrikoli mill-pajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw,

N.  billi l-ħarsien ta' l-indikazzjonijiet ġeografiċi jibqa' ta' importanza kruċjali għall-EU, li tgawdi vantaġġ kompetittiv għal numru ta' prodotti reġjonali ta' kwalità għolja,

O.  billi n-NAMA għandu potenzjal ta' gwadann kummerċjali sinifikanti għall-UE, iżda daqstant għal pajjiżi li għadhom qegħdin jiżviluppaw peress li parti konsiderevoli tal-kummerċ tagħhom huwa fi prodotti industrijali u jridu jħabbtuha ma' ostakli tariffarji għolja fil-kummerċ ma' pajjiżi oħrajn li qegħdin jiżviluppaw,

P.  billi l-aċċess għas-suq qed ikun imfixkel b'ostakli sinnifikanti mhux relatati ma' tariffi,

Q.  billi fil-qasam tas-servizzi n-negozjati għadhom ma tawx riżultati sodisfaċenti; billi l-għan li l-UE qed tfittex li tilħaq huwa dak ta' aktar liberalizzazzjoni li, filwaqt li jitħarsu kemm l-objettivi tal-politika nazzjonali tal-membri tad-WTO kif ukoll id-dritt tagħhom li jirreġolaw is-servizzi pubbliċi, għandu minkejja dan jikkunsidra l-bżonnijiet speċifiċi tal-pajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw fuq bażi mhux preskrittiva,

R.  billi titjib fir-regolamenti tad-WTO li jirrigwardaw l-Iffaċilitar tal-Kummerċ, l-'anti-dumping', u aspetti oħra jkunu ta' vantaġġ għall-membri kollha tad-WTO billi jtejbu ċ-ċertezza legali, inaqqsu l-ispiża ta' tranżazzjonijiet kummerċjali u billi jimpedixxu l-użu abużiv jew protezzjonista,

S.  billi l-proċess ta' globalizzazzjoni u l-irwol tad-WTO ta' spiss huma interpretati jew mifhuma ħażin, u billi hemm bżonn ta' responsabbiltà u trasparenza akbar fid-WTO,

1. Itenni l-impenn tiegħu favur l-approċċ multilaterali għall-politika kummerċjali, u l-appoġġ tiegħu għad-WTO bħala l-entità li tagħti garanzija lill-kummerċ internazzjonali bbażat fuq ir-reġoli; jirrimarka li falliment tan-negozjati multilaterali u bidla lejn ftehimiet bilaterali jew reġjonali, iwasslu għal proċess tal-liberalizzazzjoni u żvilupp mhux ugwali li għaldaqstant ikunu ta' detriment l-aktar għall-pajjiżi l-anqas żviluppati;

2.  Jilmenta dwar il-progress bil-mod li s'issa kien hemm fin-negozjati u dwar il-livell baxx ta' ambizzjoni predeterminat għar-riżultat tal-Konferenza Ministerjali f'Hong Kong; jinnota li l-livell baxx ta' ambizzjoni jhedded l-abilità li joħorġu riżulati sinifikanti għar-Round ta' Doha; jittama li d-Dikjarazzjoni Ministerjali ser tiftaħ it-triq għal aktar negozjati fi kwistjonijiet importanti;

3. Jemmen li impenn ikbar min-naħa tal-parteċipanti ewlenin inklużi l-UE, l-Istati Uniti u l-ekonomiji emerġenti jkun neċessarju sabiex ikun promoss il-progress kollettiv; jitlob lill-membri kollha tad-WTO, speċjalment pajjiżi żviluppati u pajjiżi bi żvilupp avvanzat, sabiex jinvolvu ruħhom b'mod kostruttiv f'negozjati reali bil-għan li tintlaħaq konklużjoni b'suċċess; jappella b'mod speċjali lill-Unjoni Ewropea sabiex fix-xhur li ġejjin titfa' l-piż fin-negozjati li bla dubju ser ikunu kumplessi u diffiċli, tuża' s-saħħa tagħha sabiex jinkisbu relazjonijiet ta' kummerċ aktar liberi u ġusti mad-dinja kollha;

4.  Jenfasizza li f'sitwazzjoni fejn matul ir-Round ħafna skadenzi ġew injorati, il-mira ta' l-2006 bħala s-sena biex jiġi konkluż ir-Round sempliċiment ma tistax tinqabeż;

5.  Jerġa' jikkonferma l-appoġġ sħiħ tiegħu sabiex l-iżvilupp ikun il-qalb tad-DDA u jitlob lill-pajjiżi żviluppati, kif ukoll lill-pajjiżi f'fażi ta' żvilupp avvanzat, biex jikkontribwixxu għall-għanijiet ambizzjużi stipulati fid-Dikjarazzjoni ta' Doha sabiex ikun żgurat li r-Round ta' kummerċ il-ġdid jkun Round ta' żvilupp;

6. Jinsisti li r-Round ma jridx ikun iffukat biss fuq kwistjonijiet ta' agrikoltura u għalhekk l-oqsma ewlenin tan-negozjati għandhom jitqisu fuq l-istess binarju, b'konformità ma' l-Impenn Waħdieni (Single Undertaking) u ma' livell simili għoli ta' ambizzjoni u determinazzjoni li jikkontribwixxi għall-iżvilupp.

7. Jilqa' b'sodisfazzjon il-livell ogħla ta' organizzazzjoni u kunfidenza milħuq mill-pajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw (b'mod partikulari l-G-90 u l-G-20);

8. Jenfasizza li l-impenji li daħlet għalihom il-Kummissjoni fin-negozjati dwar il-biedja fid-WTO ma jistgħux imorru aktar il-bogħod mill-ftehimiet preżenti tal-CAP u lanqas il-mandat tan-negozjati;

9. Jemmen li hu essenzjali li l-offerta attwali tal-Kummissjoni tibqa' kundizzjonali fi ħdan il-qafas ta' l-Aġenda ta' Żvilupp tad-WTO ta' Doha kif ukoll li tibqa' l-possibilità li tirtirha waqt li jkunu għaddejjin in-negozjati jekk ma jkunx hemm offerti sodisfaċenti min-naħa ta' l-imsieħba l-oħra tad-WTO;

10. Itenni l-bżonn li jiġi rrispettat il-karattru multifunzjonali ta' l-agrikoltura fi ħdan l-UE;

11. Ifakkar li minħabba r-riforma tal-CAP fl-2003, l-UE naqqset sew l-appoġġ domestiku tagħha li joħloq distorsjoni fil-kummerċ u jitlob impenji konkreti fl-istess direzzjoni minn sħab oħra tal-kummerċ; jilqa b'sodisfazzjon, il-limitazzjoni imposta fid-Dikjarazzjoni Ministerjali, fuq il-"box shifting" permezz ta' l-obbligu għal tnaqqis ġenerali fl-appoġġ domestiku li joħloq distorsjoni fil-kummerċ;

12. Ifakkar l-iskop tal-Ftehim tal-Lussemburgu dwar ir-riforma tal-politika komuni għall-agrikoltura u jinsisti fuq il-bżonn li jkunu definiti l-miżuri tal-'green box', inklużi appoġġi separati;

13. Jenfasizza l-offerta importanti magħmula mill-UE biex telimina s-sistema tagħha ta' rimbors fuq l-esportazzjoni sa l-2013 u tisħaq li tinħtieġ ċaqliqa simili minn membri oħra tad-WTO fl-oqsma tal-krediti ta' l-esportazzjoni, intrapriżi kummerċjali ta' l-Istat u għajnuna ta' ikel; jenfasizza li l-2013 hija d-data għat-tmiem ta' dan il-proċess u jitlob li parti sustanzjali tat-tnaqqis issir fl-ewwel nofs taż-żmien ta' implimentazzjoni,

14. Jilqa' b'sodisfazzjon il-progress qawwi dwar il-ftehima dwar il-qafas biex jiddetermina dixxiplini ġodda biex ma' titwarrabx għajnuna ta' ikel li ma tkunx f'każ ta' emergenza, li jikkonstitwixxi forma moħbija ta' sussidju ta' esportazzjoni, u l-ħolqien ta' "safe box" għall-eżentazzjoni ta' għajnuna ta' emerġenza bona fide;

15. Jissuġġerixxi li għandu jkun hemm verifika indipendenti ta' kull forma ta' għajnuna għall-kummerċ internazzjonali (krediti ta' esportazzjoni, sistemi ta' garanzija, intrapriżi ta' l-Istat, għajnuna ta' l-ikel, eċċ); Jissuġġerixxi li l-għan ta' din il-verifika għandu jkun li ssir distinzjoni bejn l-aspetti umanitarji, li għandhom ikunu suġġetti għal immoniterjar pubbliku, u l-aspetti li joħloq distorsjoni fir-regoli ta' kompetizzjoni fil-kummerċ internazzjonali, li għandhom jiġu eliminati;

16. Jikkunsidra li l-aċċess għas-suq hu kwistjoni importanti għan-negozjar u l-implimentazzjoni tar-riforma tal-CAP; fir-rigward ta' dan, jemmen li t-tnaqqis ġenerali tat-tariffi tad-dwana għandhom jiġu evalwati fid-dawl ta' l-isforzi magħmula mill-membri kollha tad-WTO rigward l-aspetti varji tan-negozjazzjonijiet dwar l-agrikoltura u l-isforzi ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea fir-rigward ta' l-appoġġ domestiku u l-kompetizzjoni fl-esportazzjoni, f'liema konnesjoni jrid jibqa' l-possibilità li l-istess rekwiżiti jiġu imposti fuq il-prodotti importati, bħall-prodotti manufatturati domestikament;

17. Jiddikjara, li fir-rigward l-aċċess għas-suq jinħtieġ ammont limitat ta' flessibilità permezz kemm ta' formula għat-tnaqqis tat-tariffi kif ukoll permezz ta' deskrizzjoni ta' prodotti sensittivi; jilqa' b'sodisfazzjon il-formolazzjonijiet fuq Prodotti Speċjali u fuq Mekkaniżmu Speċjali ta' Salvagwardja li jikkorrispondi għat-talbiet tal-pajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw u joffrilhom aktar spażju għal manuvri ħalli jissalvagwardjaw is-sikurezza ta' l-ikel u l-għajxien rurali tagħhom; jirreferi, f'dan ir-rigward, għall-istipulazzjoni ta' ġabra komuni ta' indikaturi speċifiċi;

18. Jilqa' b'sodisfazzjon il-ftehima dwar l-eliminazzjoni, mill-pajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw, ta' sussidji ta' esportazzjoni għall-qoton sa l-2006 imma jirrimarka li dan hu diġà mitlub li jsir skond deċiżjoni meħuda fuq tilwima riċenti tad-WTO u jinnota ukoll li dawn jikkonstitwixxu biss proporzjon żgħir mis-sussidji li l-Istati Uniti tagħti lill-bdiewa tal-qoton; jilqa' b'sodisfazzjon il-provvediment ta' aċċess għas-suq ħieles minn dazji u kwoti għall-esportazzjonijiet tal-qoton mil-LDCs; madankollu, jinnota l-impatt limitat li dan se jkollu; għalhekk jenfasizza l-importanza li jinkisbu riżultati pożittivi sabiex jitnaqqsu u jiġu eliminati sussidji domestiċi; jikkunsidra li dawn il-miżuri għandhom jiġu kkumplimentati minn programmi ta' riforma strutturali u ta' appoġġ għall-bdiewa u għall-industrija fir-reġjuni affettwati ta' l-UE u minn miżuri ta' appoġġ għall-iżvilupp għall-pajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw li għandhom jittieħdu mill-Bank Dinji u l-Fond Monetarju Internazzjojnali, mill-Programm ta' Żvilupp tan-NU u minn organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali oħra;

19. Jitlob lill-Kummissjoni sabiex tikkunsidra l-possibilità li fin-negozjati ta' l-agrikoltura tintroduċi 'development box' għall-Pajjiżi l-Anqas Żviluppati, sabiex dawn ikunu jistgħu jieħdu ħsieb is-sikurezza ta' ikel u l-impjieg rurali, li huma kwistjonijiet prinċipali fejn għandha x'taqsam l-qirda tal-faqar;

20. Jinnota l-bżonn li l-Unjoni Ewropea ssaħħaħ ir-relazzjonijiet tagħha mal-pajjiżi li għandhom viżjoni komuni fejn għandha x'taqsam l-agrikoltura, b'mod partikulari l-G10 u l-pajjiżi Afrikani, tal-Karabew u tal-Paċifiku (ACP); f'dan ir-rigward jikkunsidra li l-ftuħ tas-suq Komunitarju sussegwentament għal impenji riċenti għandu japplika l-ewwel u qabel kollox għall-pajjiżi l-anqas żviluppati (l-LDCs) u l-istati ta' l-ACP; jenfasizza li għandhom jiġu kkunsidrati sew il-problemi li għandhom x'jaqsmu ma' l-erożjoni tal-margini preferenzjali li minnhom igawdu dawn il-pajjiżi;

21. Jikkunsidra li l-konċessjonijiet kollha mogħtija lill-pajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw u l-anqas żviluppati għandhom jimxu stettament mar-regoli tal-oriġni u mal-mekkaniżmu għall-prevenzjoni tal-kummerċ trijangulari;

22. Jilmenta dwar in-nuqqas ta' progress f'dak li huwa t-twaqqif ta' reġistru għall-inbejjed u l-ispirti kif ukoll f'dak li huwa it-twessigħ tal-protezzjoni ta' indikazzjonijiet ġeografiċi biex din tkopri prodotti oħra; ifakkar li dawn l-elementi huma essenzjali għal riżultat bilanċjat tan-negozjati;

23. Jitlob għal riżultati ambizzjużi u bilanċjati fin-negozjati dwar in-NAMA, sabiex ikunu garantiti opportunitajiet ġodda ta' aċċess għas-suq reali, inkluż il-kummerċ bejn il-pajjiżi tan-Nofsinhar infushom, permezz ta' tnaqqis sostanzjali fir-rati applikati, filwaqt li jitqies kif jixraq it-trattament speċjali u differenzjali meħtieġ mill-pajjiżi vulnerabbli li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw; jinsisti li r-rabta bejn il-livelli ta' ambizzjoni fl-AMA u fin-NAMA għandha tfisser tnaqqis fir-rati applikati; jitlob lil pajjiżi li qed jiżviluppaw b'rata avvanzata sabiex jerfgħu s-sehem tagħhom tar-responsabiltà, f'proporzjon mal-livell tagħhom ta' żvilupp, filwaqt li jisħaq li r-riżultat għandu jirrifletti l-prinċipju miftiehem ta' reċiproċità anqas;

24. Jilqa' b'sodisfazzjon il-ftehima li tintuża l-formula Żvizzera għat-tnaqqis fit-tariffi; madankollu jenfasizza li l-effett ta' armonija ta' formula ta' dan it-tip m'għandux jiddgħajjef minħabba d-definizzjoni ta' koeffiċjenti multipli; jiffavorixxi l-attività ta' inizjattivi settorjali f'setturi ta' interess għall-UE fir-rigward ta' esportazzjoni;

25. Jirrikonoxxi li baqa' ħafna x'isir biex jiġu stabbiliti l-arrangamenti u jiġu konklużi n-negozjati; jenfasizza li deċiżjonijiet diffiċli dwar l-arrangamenti tat-tnaqqis fit-tariffi jridu jsiru sat-30 ta' April 2006, kemm fir-rigward tan-numru kif ukoll tal-livell ta' koeffiċjenti;

26. Jinnota li huwa ta' importanza strateġika li s-sħab kollha tal-kummerċ ineħħu wkoll l-ostakli li ma jirrigwardawx tariffi u li m'humiex ġustifikati, peress li dawn ifixklu l-aċċess għas-suq u jistgħu jaħdmu kontra l-benfiċċji li jistgħu joħorġu mit-tnaqqis tat-tariffi, waqt li jippreservaw l-politika neċessarja biex tħares kwistjonijiet mhux ta' kummerċ; jitlob għal aktar sforzi fil-promozzjoni ta' standardizzazzjoni internazzjonali u rikonoxximent reċiproku; jiddispjaċih għan-nuqqas ta' progress rigward dan il-punt f'Hong Kong;

27. Jiddeplora n-nuqqas ta' progress fil-qasam tas-servizzi u jitlob għall-intensifikazzjoni ta' negozjati kemm fuq livell bilaterali kif ukoll fuq livell multilaterali, b'kunsiderazzjoni xierqa ta' l-interessi ta' l-ekonomiji dgħajfa u vulnerabbli u mingħajr ma tiddgħajef il-pożizzjoni tagħhom billi jiġu sfurzati li jilliberalizzaw aktar setturi ta' servizzi; jinnota li d-WTO qed tbiddel l-istruttura tal-metodu ta' negozzjar GATS; jinsisti dwar il-bżonn ta' evalwazzjoni ta' l-impatt f'waqtha; jesprimi dispjaċir għall-fatt li d-Dikjarazzjoni finali ma tistipulax miri kwantitattivi għal-prezentazzjoni ta' offerti reveduti; itenni li s-servizzi pubbliċi essenzjali bħas-saħħa, l-edukazzjoni u s-servizzi awdjoviżivi għandhom ikunu esklużi mil-liberalizzazzjoni;

28. Jesprimi tħassib rigward il-fatt li l-iskadenzi intermedjarji sabiex in-negozjati dwar is-servizzi jaslu f'konklużjoni b'suċċess 'm'humiex sinkronizzati' ma' dawk stipulati biex jitlestew il-modalitajiet u t-tressiq ta' abbozzi ta' skedi fl-aġrikoltura u n-NAMA u li perjodu ta' żmien daqstant differenti jista' joħloq problemi sabiex jintlaħaq riżultat bbilanċjat fl-oqsma kollha importanti.

29. Jinsisti sabiex l-UE tkompli tenfasizza, fid-WTO, il-liberalizzazzjoni tas-servizzi u l-ftuħ ta' swieq, speċjalment fis-settur finanzjarju, turistiku u distributorju, li huma setturi importanti għall-ekonomija Ewropea;

30. Jenfasizza li l-progress li sar meta ġiet eżaminata r-relazzjoni bejn kummerċ, dejn u finanzi u jitlob lill-Kummissjoni sabiex fit-talbiet tagħha multilaterali u bilaterali lis-sħab kummerċjali tad-WTO tinkorpora impenji ġodda u mtejba tal-GATS fis-servizzi finanzjarji, sabiex tiżgura li l-liberalizzazzjoni kummerċjali, b'mod partikolari fir-rigward ta' servizzi finanzjarji, tkun ta' benefiċċju reċiproku għall-partijiet kollha involuti;

31. Jinnota li l-membri kollha tad-WTO qablu li jsibu soluzzjonijiet li l-anqas joħolqu distorzjonijiet lill-kummerċ meta jsir l-abbozz ta' leġiżlazzjoni ġdida u jenfasizza kemm hu importani għall-Unjoni Ewropea li turi aktar sens ta' tmexxija f'dan l-aspett;

32. Itenni li jekk in-negozjati jiġu konklużi b'suċċess dan għandu jaħdem lejn impenn lejn benefiċċji konkreti ta' żvilupp fl-oqsma kollha tan-negozjati, b'mod partikolari fl-interess ta' l-LDCs, u għandha tikkontribwixxi għall-Objettivi tal-Millenju għall-Iżvilupp ta' l-2015, il-qerda tal-faqar, id-distribuzzjoni aktar ġusta tal-benefiċċji tal-globalizzazzjoni, aċċess għas-suq aħjar għall-pajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw u diversifikazzjoni ekonomika tal-pajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw, u li huma m'għandhomx idgħajfu s-setturi ekonomiċi l-aktar fraġli f'dawn il-pajjiżi;

33.  Jilqa' b'sodisfazzjon il-pakkett ta' żvilupp adottat Hong Kong, għalkemm huwa anqas ambizzjuż milli mistenni; madankollu jesprimi dispjaċir, li l-aċċess mingħajr dazji u kwoti għal prodotti ta' l-LDCs għas-swieq ta' pajjiżi oħra żviluppati, inaqqsu b'mod sostanzjali l-benefiċċji ta' l-LDCs, ħlief għal 3% tal-linji ta' tariffa li jkopru wħud mill-prodotti kruċjali għall-pajjiżi l-foqra; jitlob lill-pajjiżi kollha, kemm żviluppati kif ukoll dawk fi stat avvanzat ta' żvilupp, sabiex jimxu mal-mudell ta' l-inizzjattiva "everything but arms" ta' l-UE sabiex jiġi garantit dazju ta' aċċess għas-suq li huwa100% mingħajr dazji u kwoti għall-LDCs;

34. Jesprimi dispjaċir bil-progress bil-mod ta' xogħol fuq il-kwistjoni importanti tal-preferenza tal-mikrokrediti; jikkonsidra li l-problemi tal-preferenza kummerċjali tal-mikrokrediti u l-waqgħa tal-prezzijiet tal-prodotti għandhom ukoll jiġu indirizzati f'dan ir-Round; jitlob lill-Kummissjoni sabiex tikkontribwixxi b'mod pożittiv għall-identifikazzjoni ta' soluzzjonijiet possibbli;

35. Jikkunsidra li trattament speċjali u differenzjali jrid jifforma parti integrali mill-ftehimiet tad-WTO; jikkonsidra wkoll li aktar ftuħ progressiv tas-suq bejn il-pajjiżi tan-nofsinhar, speċjalment kummerċ reġjonali u impenn għal regoli multilaterali aktar b'saħħithom jistgħu jkun ta' benefiċċju għall-iżvilupp ekonomiku u l-integrazzjoni fl-ekonomija globali tal-pajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw;

36. Jenfasizza l-importanza ta' assistenza teknika xierqa biex tgħin lil pajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw ifasslu l-interessi tal-kummerċ tagħhom, jinvolvu ruħhom b'mod aktar effettiv fin-negozjati, jżommu ma' l-obbligi l-ġodda, jadattaw ruħhom għar-riformi, u jimplementaw b'mod effettiv ir-regolamenti tad-WTO; jenfasizza wkoll il-ħtieġa li ekonomiji dgħajfa u vulnerabbli jitħeġġu sabiex jintegraw il-kummerċ fil-politiki nazzjonali ta' żvilupp tagħhom u fl-istrateġiji ta' tnaqqis tal-faqar tagħhom mingħajr ma jikkompetu ma' objettivi oħra ta' żvilupp; jappoġġja t-tkabbir tal-kunċett ta' 'Aid for Trade' għall-pajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw, sabiex jingħataw għajnuna fit-tisħiħ tal-kapaċità li hemm bżonn sabiex jitwettqu l-benefiċċji mit-titjib ta' l-aċċess għas-suq, bil-għan li tissaħħaħ il-kapaċità kummerċjali u ta' esportazzjoni tagħhom, jekk ikun hemm bżonn jiġu ddiversifikati l-bażijiet ta' produzzjoni, u jiġu sostitwiti r-riżorsi ta' dħul mid-dwana minn riżorsi fiskali oħrajn;

37. Jitlob lill-Unjoni Ewropea sabiex tiżgura li l-għajnuna addizzjonali għall-kummerċ imħabbra f'Hong Kong tiġi finanżjata minn riżorsi ġodda permezz ta' żieda fil-Perspettivi Finanzjarji u ma tkunx tinvolvi ċaqliq ta' riżorsi diġà allokati għal inizzjattivi oħra ta' żvilupp, bħall-Objettivi tal-Millenju għall-Iżvilupp; fl-istess waqt jitlob għal aktar koerenza fost id-donaturi varji ta' l-għajnuna;

38. Jilqa' b'sodisfazzjon id-deċizjoni tal-Kunsill Ġenerali tad-WTO tas-6 ta' Diċembru 2005 fuq emenda tal-Ftehim TRIPs li għandha l-għan li ttejjeb l-aċċess ta' pajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw għall-mediċini ;

39. Jilqa' b'sodisfazzjon il-progress milħuq s'issa fin-negozjati dwar l-Iffaċilitar tal-Kummerċ; jitlob għall-ħolqien ta' impenji multilaterali għal aktar ċertezza legali, speċjalment fil-qasam ta' miżuri ta' difiża tal-kummerċ u regoli dwar iffalsifikar, simplifikazzjoni u modernizzazzjoni tal-proċeduri ta' kummerċ; jenfasizza l-importanza partikolari f'dal-qasam ta' assistenza teknika mmirata;

40. Jitlob għat-tisħiħ tal-mekkaniżmi tad-WTO għall-infurzar tal-Ftehim TRIPS, li huma meħtieġa għall-ġlieda kontra l-bejgħ ta' prodotti ffalsifikati u l-ksur tad-drittijiet tal-privattiva ta' l-UE; jistipola li l-ħarsien tal-propjetà intellettwali ta' l-Ewropa, inklużi l-indikaturi ġeografiċi, jibqa' waħda mill-kwistjonijiet l-aktar importanti li għandha tiġi indirizzata fid-WTO; f'dan il-kuntest jilqa' b'sodisfazzjon, il-fatt li l-Kummissjoni Ewropea għandha tqiegħed uffiċjal għal-privattivi f'Beijing mill-1 t'April 2006; jenfasizza li l-internalizzazzjoni ta' prodotti iffalsifikati taffetwa b'mod ħażin l-irċevuti tat-taxxa fil-pajjiżi żviluppati, jgħin l-iffinanzjar ta' organizzazzjonijiet kriminali fuq livell internazzjonali u jnaqqas l-inċentivi għall-invenzjoni u l-innovazzjoni fil-pajjiżi kollha, allura jkun riskju għall-investimenti l-kbar ta' l-industriji ta' l-UE fi prodotti u servizzi b'teknoloġija għolja;

41. Jitlob lill-Kummissjoni sabiex waqt id-diskussjonijiet tiegħu ma' sħab oħra tal-kummerċ tagħmilha ċara li l-UE ma tapprovax regoli tad-WTO, partikolarment fejn għandha x'taqsam il-propjetà intellettwali, l-iffalsifikar tal-prodotti u ostakli kummerċjali mhux tariffarji;

42. Jitlob għal aktar dixxiplina fejn għandu x'jaqsam l-'anti-dumping' u kwistjonijiet oħra ta' regoli sabiex jiġu evitati rikorsi abbużivi għal strumenti ta' difiża tal-kummerċ filwaqt li jitħarsu l-użu leġittimu u l-effettività ta' dawn l-istrumenti;

43. Jinsisti li l-forom kollha ta' "dumping" jiġu projbiti u definiti bħala esportazzjonijiet magħmula bi prezzijiet taħt il-medja ta' l-ispejjeż kollha tal-produzzjoni , filwaqt li jkunu kkunsidrati t-tipi kollha ta' sussidji minn isfel għall-fuq (upstream) u viċi-versa (downstream) u sussidji reċiproċi (cross-subsidisation);

44. Jinnota l-bżonn għal koerenza imtejba u appoġġ imsaħħaħ ta' sistemi legali u politiki kummerċjali u ambjentali; jitlob għal progress fil-qasam tal-kummerċ ta' prodotti ambjentali u regoli aktar ċari rigward ir-relazzjoni bejn ir-regoli tad-WTO u l-Ftehimiet Multilaterali Ambjentali;

45. Jenfasizza l-importanza li fir-Round ta' Doha jiġu kkonsidrati kwistjonijiet mhux ta' natura kummerċjali bħal kwistjonijiet soċjali, ambjentali u kulturali;

46. Filwaqt li jqis l-importanza tad-dimensjoni soċjali fir-relazzjonijiet kummerċjali, jiddispjaċih li t-tisħiħ tar-rabtiet bejn id-WTO u l-ILO għaldarboħra mħux espress fid-Dikjarazzjoni Ministerjali; jemmen fl-importanza ta' standards għas-sistema moderna tal-kummerċ; itenni l-impenn li dejjem kellu li jagħti l-istatus ta' osservatur lill-ILO fil-laqgħat tad-WTO u jappoġġa bi sħiħ il-ħolqien ta' Forum Permanenti konġunt bejn l-ILO u d-WTO dwar din il-kwistjoni;

47. Itenni t-talba tiegħu għal riforma mil-qiegħ tad-WTO u għal integrazzjoni aħjar tagħha fil-qafas ġenerali ta' gvernar globali; jitlob għal aktar koordinazzjoni u koerenza fost l-istituzzjonijiet internazzjonali kollha attivi fil-qasam tal-kummerċ u ta' l-iżvilupp, inklużi organizzazzjonijiet ibbażati fuq in-NU li jieħdu ħsieb l-iżvilupp tal-bniedem, is-saħħa, l-ambjent u jitlob lill-Membri tad-WTO sabiex jipprovvduhom b'mandat ċar għal koperazzjoni aħjar;

48. Jappoġġja n-neġozjati dwar it-titjib fl-effettività u t-trasparenza tal-mekkaniżmu biex isolvi t-tilwim li fost l-oħrajn għandu l-għan li jtejjeb ir-regoli u l-proċeduri għall-kompożizzjoni tal-'panel', jindirizza l-kwistjoni ta' preċedenza ("sequencing"), inkoraġġixi l-ftehimiet ta' kumpensazzjoni, itejjeb id-drittijiet ta' partijiet terzi jikkonċedi d-dritt għal posponiment lill-Awtorità ta' l-Appell, u jiffaċilita l-aċċess għall-pajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw;

49. Jistqarr li investiment, kompetizzjoni u trasparenza fl-infiq tal-gvern jibqgħu oqsma importanti li jridu jiġu negozjati fi ħdan id-WTO;

50. Jipproponi lin-negozjaturi ta' l-UE fil-kuntest tad-WTO, biex jibdew jifformulaw pożizzjoni ta' l-UE dwar l-enerġija li tintroduċi aktar sikurezza ta' provvista u forżi tas-suq aktar b'saħħithom fil-qasam ta' l-enerġija u li tkopri applikazzjonijiet industrijali fil-qasam ta' l-enerġija, tiffaċilita l-investiment fil-pajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżviluppaw u li telimina l-ippreżżar doppju u forom oħra ta' restrizzjonijiet ta' esportazzjoni jew taxxi li jgħeddu l-eżistenza ta' ħafna industriji ta' l-UE;

51. Ifakkar fil-fatt li intrapriżi żgħar u medji (SMEs) huma s-sinsla ta' l-ekonomiji ta' l-UE u l-pajjiżi li għadhom qed jiżvilluppaw, però l-eżistenza tagħhom f'sistema ta' kummerċ globali teħtieġ li d-drittijiet tal-propjetà privata jiġu definiti b'mod ċar, li jkun hemm limiti ċari għall-kirjiet monopolistiċi, u li drittijiet bħal dawn jiġu effettivament infurzati sabiex ikunu ta' inċentiv għall-SMEs biex jinvestu fir-riċerka u l-innovazzjoni; jipproponi li l-politika tal-kummerċ ta' l-UE jkollha l-għan li tnaqqas ir-riskji tal-kummerċ internazzjonali u l-investiment għall-SMEs billi twessa ħafna l-aċċess għas-suq fil-pajjiżi emerġenti bit-tneħħija effettiva ta' tariffi u ostakli mhux tariffarji f'dawn il-pajjiżi, billi jitneħħew ir-restrizzjonijiet fuq l-attivitajiet kummerċjali Ewropej (investiment, stabbiliment, dritt għall-kummerċ) u bil-ħolqien ta' mekkaniżmi msaħħa ta' medjazzjoni tad-WTO biex jittrattaw ostakli mhux tariffarji b'mod rapidu u effiċjenti;

52. Jissuġġerixxi li għandu jiġi emfasizzat it-tbassir ekonomiku u soċjali bl-għan li jiġu mkejla kemm kwantitivament kif ukoll kwalititivament, l-impatt ekonomiku u soċjali ta' l-iżviluppi li jirriżultaw minn ftehimiet internazzjonali ta' kummerċ; huwa tal-fehma li din l-għajnuna għat-teħid ta' deċiżjonijiet hi essenzjali kemm biex tgħin in-negozjar, kif ukoll biex tantiċipa konsegwenzi ekonomiċi tal-ftehimiet li jistgħu jaffetwaw l-Istati Membri u lis-setturi ekonomiċi kkonċernati;

53. Jenfasizza l-importanza li jiġi mħeġġeġ l-appoġġ pubbliku u politiku għas-sistema ta' kummerċ multilaterali tad-WTO; jinnota li l-kumpaniji għandhom interess leġittimu li jiffurmaw politiki li jaffetwaw il-mod tagħhom ta' kif jinnegozjaw u li l-parteċipazzjoni ta' gruppi differenti, inkużi l-NGOs, huwa kruċjali għall-funzjonament tad-WTO; mandankollu jenfasizza li prijoritajiet tal-kumpaniji u ta' l-NGOs jinfluwenzaw b'mod sproporzjonat l-aġenda politika tad-WTO u jista' jkollhom rwol akbar fuq id-dokument finali minn parlamentarji eletti demokratikament; iħeġġeġ lill-Kummissjoni sabiex teżamina b'reqqa l-irwol ta' kumpaniji u NGOs fil-proċess tan-negozjati; jitlob għal aktar trasparenza u għal tnaqqis ta' privileġġi li l-kumpaniji u l-NGOs igawdu; jenfasizza li jinħtieġ li l-pubbliku ikun aktar infurmat u li s-soċjetà ċivili tkun ikkonsultata aktar; itenni f'dan ir-rigward, il-kontribut importanti li d-dimensjoni parlamentari tista' tagħti bħala mezz biex tissaħħah ir-responsabiltà demokratika tagħha u t-trasparenza tagħha maċ-ċittadini;

54. Jenfasizza l-ħtiega ta' riformi istituzzjonali sabiex jittejjeb il-funzjonament tad-WTO, fuq il-bażi, fost l-oħrajn, tar-rakkomandazzjonijiet li jinsabu fir-Rapport Sutherland hawn fuq imsemmi;

55. Jenfasizza l-importanza tax-xogħol ta' l-Unjoni Interparlamentari (IPU) fit-tisħiħ tad-dimensjoni demokratika tad-WTO; però jinnota n-nuqqas ta' konsiderazzjoni mogħtija lid-Dikjarazzjonijiet Finali tagħha minn negozjaturi tad-WTO; jinnota l-isforz li n-negozjaturi ta' l-UE għamlu sabiex jindirizzaw l-IPU imma jiddeplora n-nuqqas ta' impenn ta' negozjaturi oħra tad-WTO;

56. Jiddikjara li huwa lest li jikkontribwixxi b'mod pożittiv għall-proċess ta' negozjati permezz tad-diversi kuntatti li l-Membri tiegħu għandhom mal-membri parlamentari ta' pajjiżi li magħhom l-UE għandha interessi komuni;

57.  Jilqa' l-ispirtu qawwi ta' għaqda fost it-tliet Istituzzjonijiet prinċipali Ewropej li kienu preżenti f'Hong Kong u jenfasizza s-siwi li tinżamm kollaborazzjoni mill-qrib bejniethom f'dawn ix-xhur kruċjali tan-negozjati; jitlob lill-Kunsill u lill-Kummissjoni sabiex ikomplu jżommu lill-Parlament involut kif xieraq u infurmat il-ħin kollu bl-istrateġija ta' l-UE ta' wara Hong Kong u bil-progress tan-negozjati, u kif ukoll waqt il-laqgħa tal-Kunsill Ġenerali li jmiss f'Ġinevra;

58. Jerġa' jtenni l-importanza tad-dimensjoni parlamentari tad-WTO sabiex tissaħħaħ il-leġittimità demokratika u t-trasparenza fin-negozjati tad-WTO, peress li membri ta' Parlament jistgħu jikkonstitwixxu kollegament importanti maċ-ċittadini, b'mod partikolari bħala sors ta' informazzjoni u mezz ta' tweġiba għall-kwistjonijiet tagħhom; jilqa' b'sodisfazzjon ir-riżultati tas-sessjoni ta' Hong Kong tal-Konferenza Parlamentari dwar id-WTO; jitlob lill-Kummissjoni u lill-Kunsill sabiex jappoġġjaw b'mod attiv referenza fid-dokument finali tad-DDR li jenfasizza l-irwol tal-leġiżlaturi fit-tfassil ta' politika kummerċjali;

59. Jagħti istruzzjonijiet lill-President tiegħu sabiex jgħaddi din ir-riżoluzzjoni lill-Kunsill u lill-Kummissjoni u lill-parlamenti ta' l-Istati Membri, tal-pajjiżi li se jidħlu u tal-pajjiżi applikanti, kif ukoll lid-Direttorat Ġenerali tad-WTO u lill-President ta' l-Unjoni Interparlamentari.

• [1]  Numru tad-dokument 05-6248, simbolu tad-dokument WT/MIN(05)/DEC)
• [2]  Testi Adottati, 1.12.2005, P6_TA(2005)0461.
• [3]  Testi Adottati, 12.5.2005, P6_TA(2005)0182.
• [4]  Numru tad-Dokument 04-3297, simbolu tad-dokument WT/L/579)
• [5]  Numru tad-dokument 01-5859, simbolu tad-dokument WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1)
• [6]  ĠU C 296, 18.6.1999, p. 121.
• [7]  ĠU C 177 E, 29.4.2004, p. 290.
• [8]  ĠU C 77 E, 29.4.2004, p. 393.
• [9]  Rapport tal-Bord konsultattiv għad-Direttur Ġenerali Supachai Panitchpakdi, WTO, Diċembru 2004.
• [10]  Testi Adottati, 9.3.2005, P6_TA-PROV(2005)0066.

NOTA SPJEGATTIVA

Ηράκλειτος [έφη] "το αντίξουν συμφέρον και εκ των διαφερόντων καλλίστην αρμονίαν και πάντα κατ΄ έριν γίνεσθαι"

Αριστοτέλης, Ηθικά Νικομάχεια, Θ2.1155 β 5

Heracleitus [said] that "'it is what opposes that helps and from different tones comes the fairest tune and all things are produced through strife"

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 8I

1. The Hong Kong Ministerial Conference: limited expectations - modest results

The aim of this own-initiative report is to provide an assessment of the Doha Round following the 6th WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong (13-18 December 2005).

The current round of multilateral trade negotiations has been going on since November 2001 and, given the collective ambition to conclude this round before the end of 2006, it has now entered its final phase.

The previous phases of the negotiations - from Doha to Hong Kong via Cancún and Geneva - have revealed wide differences in the expectations, approaches and strategies of the main participants, and highlighted the difficulties involved in trying to reach an ambitious and balanced outcome covering all negotiating areas. As a result, progress has often proven elusive, many intermediate deadlines have been missed and negotiations have not been brought as much forward as one could have hoped and expected.

Because of the complete failure of the 5th Ministerial Conference in Cancún in September 2003 and the sketchy character of the Framework adopted by the WTO General Council in August 2004, the initial objective of the Hong Kong meeting was to consolidate the latter and to achieve a breakthrough by defining modalities in a number of key negotiating areas, such as agriculture, non-agricultural market access and services, and to agree on a significant development package, while encouraging progress in other chapters of the negotiations. Due to a persistent stalemate on the key issue of agricultural market access and a lack of flexibility on the part of other major players, however, the level of ambition for this event had to be eventually scaled down and it became clear, even before the Ministerial Conference started, that only modest results could be achieved.

Parliamentary monitoring of the Hong Kong negotiations - the European Parliament being represented in Hong Kong by a delegation of MEPs - led to the adoption of a joint declaration by the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the European Parliament on 15 December 2005. Although this contribution was undoubtedly positive, the current arrangements still fall short, in qualitative terms, of a proper forum to ensure WTO democratic accountability and openness. The European Parliament delegation was assisted by the information provided by the Commission and the United Kingdom Presidency regarding the EU negotiating strategy and the general progress achieved in the negotiations before and during the Hong Kong Conference.

The present report comments upon the limited results achieved in Hong Kong. It also draws attention to the considerable work that remains to be done, contains a message of support to the EU negotiators and is intended to focus attention in view of the next phases of the negotiations.

2. Results of the Conference by Subject

This section is based on the text of the Ministerial Declaration, with special reference to EU negotiating positions.

2.1 Agriculture

The question of agricultural products was designated by a number of developing and developed countries as crucial to the negotiations as a whole, placing the EU and the US in particular on the defensive. It was therefore necessary to break this deadlock if negotiations in other areas were to make any progress. The Hong Kong Conference made a valuable contribution on certain aspects of this dossier as indicated below:

· Agreement was reached on the definitive elimination of all forms of export subsidies by 2013, the year in which current CAP arrangements are due to end. In order to ensure parallelism between export refunds and other forms of export subsidies, such as export credits, exporting state trading enterprises and food aid, however, this date will only be confirmed upon completion of appropriate disciplines on these practices. Other issues, such as the substantial subsidy cuts to be made before 2013, also remain to be settled.

· Regarding domestic support, there was agreement on the fixing of three bands for reductions and on greater linear cuts in the higher levels of support (higher bands). There also appears to be some convergence concerning cuts to be made in Final Bound Total Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS), the overall cut in trade-distorting domestic support, and the de minimis limits. A review of the Green Box criteria was also agreed.

· On the difficult issue of market access, i.e. the reduction of agricultural tariffs, no substantive progress was made. There appears to be agreement on the adoption of four bands for structuring tariff cuts, but not on the limits of those bands, the magnitude of the cuts, and other issues such as the selection and special treatment of sensitive products, the operation of the Special Safeguard Mechanism, etc.

· Reference was made to the continuation of work in relation to geographical indications (establishment of a register for wines and spirits and extension of GI protection to other products), but no progress has been recorded on this issue of crucial importance for the EU.

· On the specific subject of cotton, it was agreed that export subsidies would be eliminated by developed countries in 2006, and that these countries would give duty and quota free access for cotton exports from LDCs from the commencement of the implementation period. However, no progress was made on the important issue of domestic support.

2.2 Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA)

The limited progress made in the agricultural negotiations helped to satisfy, to a certain extent, the demand of the EU and other developed countries for the acceptance of a progressive reduction in tariffs, leading to the adoption of a 'Swiss Formula' for the elimination or reduction of tariffs. There was also agreement on special treatment for developing countries, including asymmetrical reciprocity arrangements regarding tariff reductions.

While acceptance of the Swiss Formula is a particularly significant development, difficult decisions will have to be reached by 30 April 2006 regarding the magnitude of the tariff reductions (through the adoption of coefficients) and the establishment of base rates for commencing such reductions. The Declaration also encourages members to submit proposals aimed at addressing the issue of non-tariff barriers (NTBs).

2.3 Services

On the subject of services, reference was simply made to progress achieved from the establishment of the GATS to the agreement of August 2004. A statement was also issued by members concerning the intensification of the relevant negotiations in accordance with Annex C to the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration. The Conference failed to make any substantial headway regarding the further liberalisation of international trade in services, which means that spectacular progress must now be made, both on a plurilateral and bilateral basis, if the objectives of the Doha Round are to be achieved. For the EU, progress in this sector is of vital importance to the development of its economy and to employment.

2.4 Trade and Development

Regarding support for developing countries and their smoother integration into the global economy, a number of decisions were taken, such as:

· The abolition, by 2008 or no later than the start of the implementation period, of tariff and quantitative restrictions for exports from the LDCs. However, this concession will only be given by developed countries and developing countries "declaring themselves in a position to do so" and restrictions may be maintained for up to 3 percent of tariff lines. The Ministerial Declaration also refers to measures to facilitate transactions and simplify rules of origin, increase technical support, encourage the creation of institutions, etc.

· The more active involvement of the WTO in efforts by international organisations and individual countries to implement ‘Aid for Trade’ arrangements enabling the LDCs to reinforce their production and export capacity and requisite commercial infrastructure.

· The reappraisal and further enhancement of the WTO’s strategy for the provision of Technical Assistance and Training Plans to developing countries.

2.5 Other Business

On all other matters (e.g. WTO rules, Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), environment, trade facilitation, implementation of existing agreements, small economies, trade and transfer of technology, e-commerce, cooperation with other international organisations, etc.), the Hong Kong Conference did not, essentially, add anything new, but merely reconfirmed the acquis and called on participating members to continue and step up the negotiations.

3. Overall Assessment

Considered as a whole, the outcome of the Hong Kong Conference may, under the circumstances, be regarded as positive, although the actual results were modest, given the absence of any creative breakthroughs on many crucial issues. A package of development measures was agreed upon and, even more importantly, members reiterated their commitment to a successful conclusion of the round by the end of 2006 and set a number of intermediate deadlines to achieve this objective.

The EU once again made a major contribution to this positive result by accepting a conditional commitment to 2013 as the end-date for the elimination of export subsidies. It is not clear, however, that much has been obtained in return for this concession, whether in other chapters of the agriculture negotiations or in other key areas.

Major advanced developing countries continue to reject the EU proposal on agricultural market access, despite the considerable sacrifices this proposal entails for our rural communities, and they have thus far refused to make any meaningful concessions in NAMA and services. This attitude is all the more worrying if one considers that these countries are those which maintain the highest levels of protection and hold the key to the development of poorer countries through the promotion of South-South trade.

Although development concerns should and will continue to remain at the heart of these negotiations, they should not be confused with the single-sided advancement of the interests of large agricultural exporters nor be allowed to serve as a cover for protectionism.

The EU has, along the different phases of the negotiations, exercised leadership in the adoption of measures in favour of the poorest members, such as those concerning access to medicines, duty-free quota-free access to markets for LDCs and cotton. Although other members have also accepted commitments on these issues before and during the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, these commitments are not as far reaching (duty-free quota-free access, cotton) or at the same advanced stage of implementation (access to medicines) as in the case of the EU.

The EU has also, alongside other developed country members, launched the idea of a "round for free" in favour of the poorest members which, as a result of all these initiatives, stand to obtain a lot, including in the form of increased aid for trade, and are expected to give little.

Further unilateral EU concessions in agriculture at this stage would clearly jeopardise the implementation of our reformed CAP and be of no or little benefit to those countries for which the development agenda has been designed.

It is time therefore that the attention of negotiators start shifting to other important areas of the negotiations, such as NAMA, services, but also trade facilitation and rules issues, with a view to defining modalities and disciplines which really make a difference in international trade.

This would be in the interest of the EU, whose participation in the Doha Round should remain consistent with the objectives of enhanced growth, employment and competitiveness laid out in its Lisbon Strategy. It would also be in the interest of those many developing countries which enjoy actual or potential comparative advantages in industrial or services sectors and for which an "agriculture only" round would represent a major loss of opportunities.

4. Beyond Hong Kong

The Hong Kong Conference showed that the road to a successful conclusion of the current round remains open. However, this road is a bumpy one and may soon hit a dead end.

The political will seems to be there but positions still widely differ and the almost exclusive focus of the negotiations on agriculture thus far has not allowed the trade-offs across issues to materialise, which are so crucial at such an advanced stage.

Whether the very tight deadlines defined in Hong Kong can be met remains to be seen.

As WTO members engage into the last and most difficult phases of the negotiations, it would probably be useful to replace this whole process into a general perspective.

There should be an awareness on all sides that there is no viable alternative to the multilateral trading system when it comes to ensuring economic integration and development, the effective management of increased economic interdependency and the peaceful and fair settlement of disputes. The successful conclusion of the Doha Round would strengthen and widen international trade and development, making the international trading system fairer and more effective for the benefit of all members. Moreover, it would act as a barrier to the spread of protectionism. Likewise, in an age where demand for international institutions and for the management of world politics outstrips supply, the success of the Doha Round could provide a significant impetus to international cooperation and integration as a whole.

While there is some room in the WTO for considerations related to the development of the poor countries of the South, environmental protection and social responsibility, it should be borne in mind that the WTO is not purely a development body and much less an environment or social-policy organisation. It is in fact a specialised organisation with specific terms of reference regarding international trade. Overloading its agenda with matters beyond the confines of ‘trade-related issues’ and overemphasising them in the Doha Declaration has made the negotiations even more difficult. These difficulties tend to be exacerbated by a lack of democracy in the WTO’s relations with civil society and insufficient efforts of communication and information.

Moreover, the direction taken by negotiations so far, set against the increasingly heterogeneous composition of the WTO, has shown that moves to regulate those areas of its members’ domestic economic policies which have a trade-policy dimension meet with resistance, causing negotiations to become bogged down and resulting in persistent breakdowns in communication.

During the pre-Hong Kong negotiations, and at the conference itself, the EU has continued to promote a comprehensive vision of the Doha round, seeking at the same time a further liberalisation of international trade in goods and services and the strengthening of multilateral trade rules and disciplines, while encouraging and supporting the development efforts of the world's poorest countries. Thanks to the indefatigable efforts of the Commission's team of able negotiators, the unity of its Member States, and the support of the European Parliament, the EU was able to submit important, credible and constructive proposals on all the subjects covered by the Hong Kong negotiations. The EU will certainly continue its efforts during the months to come and should become even more actively involved in efforts to ensure the successful conclusion of the Round.

The EU's negotiating springboard and objective reference framework is provided by the regulatory acquis of its internal market. The cognitive projection of the European governance model – based on the characteristics of normative power – at the larger scale of world trade governance runs contrary to the less regulatory and less binding WTO system. The more stable and comprehensive the WTO regulatory system becomes, the greater the resulting global convergence, and the closer the multilateral trading system will come to the European model of external action.

OPINJONI Tal-Kumitat għall-IŻVILUPP (20.2.2006)

for the Committee on International Trade

on the assessment of the Doha Round following the WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong
(2005/2247(INI))

'Rapporteur' għal opinjoni: Maria Martens

SUĠĠERIMENTI

The Committee on Development calls on the Committee on International Trade, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:

1.   Recalls that the 2001 Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration places the needs of developing countries at the heart of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), in order to enable them to integrate in the global economy;

2.   Reiterates that trade can be an important and effective tool for development and poverty reduction, which - together with other development tools - must contribute to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals;

3.   Considers that the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference has not yet succeeded in achieving this goal and warns that after the expiry of the US Presidential Trade Promotion Authority (the "fast track") in 2007 negotiations may become even more complicated; reiterates, however, that efforts to meet the 2006 deadline for the conclusion of the Doha Round should not compromise the objective of reaching a development-oriented outcome;

4.   Welcomes the progress made in the area of Special and Differential Treatment (SDT), but emphasizes that a great deal more remains to be done and that SDT - giving the least developed and vulnerable countries special privileges - should be a genuine development tool, which forms an integral and binding part of the WTO agreements;

5.   Welcomes the elimination of export subsidies in agriculture, including those in the form of food aid and other export refund systems, by all developed countries at the latest in 2013; equally welcomes the frontloading of a substantial part of the cuts in the first half of the implementation period and calls on developed countries to stand by those pledges; urges the Commission and the other developed WTO Members to finalise the modalities for an important reduction of trade-distorting agricultural domestic subsidies and tariffs;

6.   Welcomes the agreement on Special Products and a Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM), recognising the needs of developing countries to safeguard food security, rural development, and the livelihoods of poor farmers;

7.   Regrets that the Hong Kong agreement is limited to the elimination of cotton export subsidies and does not deal with domestic subsidies which constitute the vast majority of trade distorting supports;

8.   Asks the Commission to consider the possibility of introducing a ‘development box’ for the Least Developed Countries into the agricultural negotiations, so that they can tackle food safety and rural employment, which are major issues when it comes to eradicating poverty;

9.   Stresses the importance of market access of non-agricultural products for developing countries, while keeping the right to regulate ecologically-sensitive sectors; urges developed and emerging countries to contribute to this process, commensurately with their degree of development, by giving market access to LDCs and stimulating North-South, as well as South-South trade; insists that the least developed and vulnerable countries should not have to make any commitments at all;

10. Takes note of the agreement on the Swiss formula for tariff reduction in NAMA, and notes that it must fully respect the principle of "less than full reciprocity";

11. Is disappointed that the "development package", giving the LDCs duty-free and quota-free access to markets in developed countries by 2008, has not followed the full EU's "Everything but Arms" (EBA) initiative, but that it restricts market access to 97% of LDC products (excluding about 300 tariff lines) - enough to effectively deprive some LDCs of market access for all their products;

12. Stresses that a gradual well-regulated liberalisation of services could result in higher economic growth and job creation; stresses however that the ability of all WTO Members to regulate their service sectors should be safeguarded, especially in key service sectors such as healthcare and education; flexibilities should be included for those countries that do not feel ready yet to negotiate on trade in services;

13. Calls on the Commission to take due account of the preference erosion in the DDA negotiations and to consider what measures should be taken to guarantee that the effectiveness of EU preferences will be continued, especially for the poorest countries; is deeply concerned, in particular, about the reform of the EU sugar regime and its impact on ACP countries and calls on the Commission to fulfil its commitment made in Hong Kong to providing at least EUR 190 million each year to these countries for accompanying measures;

14. Deeply deplores the fact that the problem of the decline in commodity prices has so far not been tackled in an adequate way within the DDA;

15. Welcomes the Aid for Trade programme, as part of the "development package", providing trade-related aid for developing countries, especially LDCs; strongly criticises, however, the fact that the announced programme is drawing on already pledged aid; calls on the European Union to ensure that its contribution is financed out of new resources and that these funds are used to support trade programmes in developing countries that are most in need;

16. Welcomes the amendment to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) to allow countries with insufficient pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity to import generic versions of drugs still under patent, and calls upon all Members to fully implement the Doha Declaration and refrain from negotiating trade agreements that go beyond what was agreed in Doha; calls for an urgent review in order to assess the effectiveness of the measures in place;

17. Stresses the importance of technical assistance and capacity-building for developing countries which need assistance to enable them to reap the benefits from improved market access, to diversify their production, to replace customs resources and to fulfil the WTO commitments, and recognises the potential gains for developing countries of progress in the area of trade facilitation;

18. Regrets the lack of democratic accountability and transparency of the WTO negotiating process and calls for a strengthening of the parliamentary dimension of the WTO;

19. Stresses the importance of the multilateral trading framework; stresses that transparent decision-making within the WTO, a better system of accountability to elected national representatives, enhanced possibilities for public scrutiny and wider consultation of civil society are needed in order to guarantee a fair rules-based system for international trade and for allowing the poorest countries to strengthen their voice during the trade negotiations; emphasises, moreover, that for this to be possible the LDCs must receive the necessary support to increase their negotiating capacity;

PROĊEDURA

Titolu	Evalwazzjoni tar-Round ta' Doha wara l-Konferenza Ministerjali tal-WTO f' Hong Kong
Numru tal-proċedura	2005/2247(INI)
Kumitat responsabbli	INTA
Opinjoni minn   Data tat-tħabbir fis-seduta plenarja	DEVE 15.12.2005
Koperazzjoni aktar mill-qrib - data tat-tħabbir fis-seduta plenarja
'Rapporteur' ta' opinjoni   Data tal-ħatra	Maria Martens 1.12.2005
'Rapporteur' ta' opinjoni preċedenti
Eżaminazzjoni fil-kumitat	20.2.2006
Data ta' l-adozzjoni	20.2.2006
Riżultat tal-votazzjoni finali	+: –: 0:	19 0 2
Membri preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali	Margrete Auken, Thierry Cornillet, Alexandra Dobolyi, Michael Gahler, Filip Andrzej Kaczmarek, Glenys Kinnock, Ģirts Valdis Kristovskis, Maria Martens, Miguel Angel Martínez Martínez, Jürgen Schröder, Feleknas Uca, María Elena Valenciano Martínez-Orozco, Anna Záborská.
Sostitut(i) preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali	John Bowis, Milan Gaľa, Ana Maria Gomes, Fiona Hall, Manolis Mavrommatis, Zbigniew Zaleski and Gabriele Zimmer.
Sostituti(i) (skond l-Artikolu 178(2)) preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali	Robert Evans.
Kummenti (disponibbli b'lingwa waħda biss)

OPINJONI tal-Kumitat għall-Affarijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji (20.2.2006)

for the Committee on International Trade

on the assessment of the Doha Round following the WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong
(2005/2247(INI))

'Rapporteur' għal opinjoni: Margarita Starkevičiūtė

SUĠĠERIMENTI

The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs calls on the Committee on International Trade, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:

1.  Encourages the Commission to intensify its efforts to achieve progress in WTO negotiations, bearing in mind their multi-sectoral character; regrets that political attention within the EU on WTO negotiations has tended to focus on agricultural and textile production and has somehow ignored the far more significant economic potential of commercial services, including financial services and Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights;

2.  Points out that poor access to finance, including a wide range of innovative financial products, hinders the economic growth of developing countries; in this regard, recalls that EU countries cannot bring to fruition the enormous potential of financial services; reiterates the importance of technical and administrative cooperation between EU and developing countries' administrations in order to improve the quality of local legal and regulatory frameworks, in particular where financial services are concerned;

3.  Notes that a fair balance should be struck between the profits and losses resulting from the WTO Agreement;

4.  Notes that advance knowledge to others of relatively fixed EU negotiating positions can lead to disadvantages in negotiation, and that strategies to tackle such disadvantages should be investigated;

5.  Considers that trade in financial services, as in other services, should be supported by strong scheduled commitments under GATS, pertaining to the cross-border supply of goods, consumption, commercial presence, as well as the free movement of natural persons; the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (Declaration) provides a roadmap for achieving significant progress in the liberalisation of financial services markets; the following commitments should be sought by WTO members: (i) full market access in Mode 1, which means that suppliers and consumers of capital-market related services can transact business on a cross-border basis, free from quantitative restrictions, economic needs testing, or discrimination based on nationality, (ii) in Mode 2, to ensure that consumers can travel outside their territories to obtain capital-market related services, (iii) in Mode 3, to ensure that foreign service suppliers are able to establish and operate enterprises in other members' territories, free from quantitative restrictions, economic needs testing, restrictions on corporate form, limits or caps on foreign ownership, and discrimination on the grounds of nationality, (iv) in Mode 4, to ensure that all measures relating to financial services are accepted and applied in a fair, non-discriminatory, transparent and efficient manner; concludes that financial supervision and banking systems in developing countries need to be strengthened in order to avoid financial crises in the future;

6.  Welcomes the opportunity afforded by the WTO Doha Development Round to eliminate barriers to business, to improve regulatory transparency, and to increase legal security through the adoption of regulations on a par with EU standards;

7.  Applauds the Declaration's commitment to the elimination of non-tariff barriers; stresses that these are an important source of distortion of international trade and therefore calls for an increased focus on their removal, in particular within the scope of the NAMA negotiations;

8.  Reaffirms the importance of multilateral recognition of financial markets' regulatory standards, in the context of which mutual recognition of, and compliance with, international accounting standards and rules on capital requirements between the EU and the USA are of paramount importance;

9.  Advocates the use of Model Schedules to assist WTO members when scheduling their commitments on financial services, in order to achieve the most effective commercial impact possible and boost economic growth and job creation in both developed and developing countries, including an assessment of the regulatory framework of the countries to whom the request is addressed, for example, in line with the IMF's Financial Sector Assessment Programme; notes the increasing relevance of cross-border mergers and acquisitions in international economic relations; recognises the decisive role, in this respect, of corporate governance rules and therefore calls for corporate governance to warrant greater attention in WTO negotiating rounds; notes the potentially trade-distorting effect of inadequate competition frameworks in individual countries; calls for strong WTO vigilance regarding abuses of dominant market positions and collusive behaviour;

10.  Acknowledges that developing countries might need to have a sufficiently flexible framework to accommodate the phasing-in of regulations during transitional periods; believes, however, that such measures should not be used as a means of protecting a country from global competition;

11.  Respects the time and pace that developing countries need to open up their financial markets;

12.  Notes that countries may adopt measures for prudential reasons, including for the protection of investors, depositors and policy holders and for the preservation of the integrity and stability of the financial system;

13.  Emphasises the progress made when examining the relationship between trade, debt and finance and calls upon the Commission to incorporate in its multilateral and bilateral requests to its WTO trading partners new and improved GATS commitments in financial services, in order to ensure that trade liberalisation, particularly as regards financial services, is mutually beneficial to the parties involved;

14.  Highlights that recent experiences have shown that the liberalisation of capital movements should not precede the opening of banking sectors to foreign competition and the reform of supervisory systems; suggests that these experiences should be taken into account when setting the deadlines for the implementation of liberalisation measures.

PROĊEDURA

Titolu	Assessment of the Doha Round following the WTO Conference in Hong Kong
Numru tal-proċedura	2005/2247(INI)
Kumitat responsabbli	INTA
Opinjoni minn   Data tat-tħabbir fis-seduta plenarja	ECON 2.2.2006
Koperazzjoni aktar mill-qrib - data tat-tħabbir fis-seduta plenarja
'Rapporteur' ta' opinjoni   Data tal-ħatra	Margarita Starkevičiūtė 13.12.2005
'Rapporteur' ta' opinjoni preċedenti
Eżaminazzjoni fil-kumitat	13.2.2006		20.2.2006
Data ta' l-adozzjoni	20.2.2006
Riżultat tal-votazzjoni finali	+: –: 0:	27 2 0
Membri preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali	Zsolt László Becsey, Pervenche Berès, Sharon Bowles, Udo Bullmann, Ieke van den Burg, David Casa, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Jean-Paul Gauzès, Robert Goebbels, Gunnar Hökmark, Karsten Friedrich Hoppenstedt, Sophia in 't Veld, Wolf Klinz, Guntars Krasts, Joseph Muscat, Astrid Lulling, Cristobal Montoro Romero, John Purvis, Karin Riis-Jørgensen, Dariusz Rosati, Peter Skinner, Margarita Starkevičiūtė, Ivo Strejček, Sahra Wagenknecht
Sostitut(i) preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali	Harald Ettl, Klaus-Heiner Lehne, Thomas Mann, Diamanto Manolakou, Corien Wortmann-Kool
Sostituti(i) (skond l-Artikolu 178(2)) preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali
Kummenti (disponibbli b'lingwa waħda biss)

OPINJONI tal-Kumitat għall-Industrija, ir-Riċerka u l-Enerġija (21.2.2006)

for the Committee on International Trade

on the assessment of the Doha Round following the WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong
(2005/2247(INI))

Rapporteur għal opinjoni: Paul Rübig

SUĠĠERIMENTI

The Committee on Industry, Research and Energy calls on the Committee on International Trade, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:

1.   Welcomes the progress made at the 2005 Hong Kong WTO Ministerial Conference on trade facilitation; underlines the importance of simplifying and harmonising customs and border procedures worldwide; urges all WTO members to further enhance their efforts to negotiate a WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation, resulting in tangible improvements for EU traders trading with third countries;

2.   Reiterates its disappointment that three of the four Singapore issues (investment protection, competition policy and transparency in government procurement) are no longer on the agenda of the Doha Round; insists that all Singapore issues and associated matters need to be clarified in terms of their implementation at national level and as regards the applicable rules at multilateral and/or plurilateral level, including effective enforcement mechanisms;

3.   Hopes that the shift in the conduct of the service negotiations, announced by the Commission, whereby the traditional bottom-up "request and offer" approach will be supplemented by plurilateral negotiations, will have a positive effect on the EU services sector; reiterates that Member States' powers to individually regulate their services of general interest should remain untouched by this round of negotiations;

4.   Recalls its previous resolutions relating to the Singapore issues, which concentrate on the underlying causes of failure of the 1999 Seattle and 2003 Cancún WTO Ministerial Conferences; believes, therefore, that the EU should insist on making these issues key negotiating areas at WTO and/or plurilateral level, to be treated in parallel with trade in industrial goods and opening service markets, while also addressing roaming charges and standards in the telecoms sector;

5.   Recommends that, after the Doha Round is concluded, the Commission evaluate the utility of a second generation stand-alone telecommunications agreement in the framework of the WTO in order to build a stronger and open international telecommunications market; asks the Commission to report back on this issue to Parliament, and its committee responsible, by Autumn 2006;

6.   Welcomes the pledges of 'aid for trade' but calls for a framework agreement within the WTO, which should define its scope: in particular, what it will be used for, and the rules governing its application and its recipients, coupled with an enforcement mechanism; reiterates its position that market access should be linked to technical assistance to overcome gaps in infrastructure, boost product quality and connect the exportable goods and services of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to international supply chains whilst focusing on SME partnerships;

7.   Welcomes the LDCs' Duty Free Initiative adopted in Hong Kong; stresses that the world’s poorest countries need improved market access to take part in international trade, and that this requires OECD countries to commit to a binding 'Everything But Arms' agreement in the WTO; calls upon the emerging countries to open their markets in the WTO and start industrial market access negotiations on a Most Favoured Nation basis; emphasizes that the WTO system must underpin rather than hinder South-South trade;

8.   Stresses that the search for partners in world trade negotiations is a major objective, as the outcome of the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference has shown that making consistent proposals alone might not be sufficient for a successful negotiation, urges the Commission to carefully examine the role of NGOs in the negotiation process; regrets the fact that NGOs could play a bigger role than democratically-elected parliamentarians with regard to the final document;

9.   Regrets the lack of concrete results for European business at the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference; points out that in the industrial market access negotiations, no decision was made on a tariff-cutting formula for industrial goods or, then, on pursuing industry-specific sector agreements to improve market access even further; deplores the fact that no progress was made on removing non tariff barriers, and that the agreement on services was a 'bare minimum' deal that offers no concrete guarantees for further liberalisation; stresses also that without substantial progress on market access issues over the coming year European businesses will lose numerous new business opportunities in the high-growth emerging countries;

10. Takes note of the agreement on the Swiss formula for tariff reduction in non-agriculture market access (NAMA), leaving the number and the value of coefficients open; reiterates that the formula adopted must, on the one hand, allow vulnerable developing countries the possibility of safeguarding their fragile sectors and, on the other hand, allow specific European sectors, like the automotive sector, to maintain their competitive position;

11. Recalls the underlying logic of the multilateral rules-based system: 'liberalisation can create opportunities but does not guarantee economic success and fair distribution of gains from international trade'; stresses the need to strengthen the dispute settlement mechanisms of the WTO by enhancing WTO members' willingness to comply with the rules and the enforcement mechanisms that ensure a free, fair and competitive global market;

12. Proposes to the EU negotiators in the context of the WTO, to start formulating an EU position on energy that introduces greater security of supply and stronger market forces in the field of energy, which covers industrial applications in the field of energy, facilitating investment in developing countries and eliminating dual pricing and other forms of export restrictions or taxes that threaten the survival of many EU industries;

13. Calls upon the EU negotiators to insist on the strengthening of the WTO enforcement mechanisms of the TRIPS Agreement, which are necessary to combat the sale of counterfeit products and the violation of EU patent rights; states that protecting Europe's intellectual property, including geographical indications, remains one of the most important issues to be dealt with in the WTO; welcomes, in that context, the news that  the Commission will send a patent officer to Beijing as of 1st April; points to the fact that internalisation of counterfeit products has adversely affected tax receipts in developed countries, has helped fund organised crime at international level, has reduced the incentives to invent and innovate in all countries and risks undermining EU industries´ heavy investments in high technology products and services;

14. Recalls the fact that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are the backbone of the economies of the EU and developing countries but their survival in a global trading system requires that private property rights be clearly defined, that there be clear limits to monopoly rents, and that such rights be effectively enforced in order to act as incentives for SMEs to invest in research and innovation; proposes that EU trade policy aim to reduce the risks of international trade and investment for SMEs by vastly increasing market access in emerging countries with the effective removal of tariffs and non-tariff barriers in those countries, by removing restrictions to European commercial activities (investment, establishment, right to trade) and by creating strengthened WTO mediation mechanisms to deal with non-tariff barriers in a rapid and efficient manner;

15. Stresses the importance of a parliamentary dimension of the WTO, and calls on the Commission and the Council to support actively a reference in the final document of the Doha Round highlighting the role of legislators in trade policy-making.

PROĊEDURA

Titolu	Evalwazzjoni tar-Round ta' Doha wara l-Konferenza Ministerjali tal-WTO f' Hong Kong
Numru tal-proċedura	2005/2247(INI)
Kumitat responsabbli	TRADE
Opinjoni minn   Data tat-tħabbir fis-seduta plenarja	ITRE 15.12.2005
Koperazzjoni aktar mill-qrib - data tat-tħabbir fis-seduta plenarja
'Rapporteur' ta' opinjoni   Data tal-ħatra	Paul Rübig 13.12.2005
'Rapporteur' ta' opinjoni preċedenti
Eżaminazzjoni fil-kumitat	31.1.2006		21.2.2006
Data ta' l-adozzjoni	21.2.2006
Riżultat tal-votazzjoni finali	+: –: 0:	39 6 0
Membri preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali	John Attard-Montalto, Šarūnas Birutis, Jan Březina, Jerzy Buzek, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jorgo Chatzimarkakis, Giles Chichester, Den Dover, Lena Ek, Adam Gierek, Norbert Glante, Umberto Guidoni, András Gyürk, David Hammerstein Mintz, Rebecca Harms, Erna Hennicot-Schoepges, Romana Jordan Cizelj, Werner Langen, Anne Laperrouze, Vincenzo Lavarra, Pia Elda Locatelli, Angelika Niebler, Reino Paasilinna, Miloslav Ransdorf, Vladimír Remek, Herbert Reul, Teresa Riera Madurell, Mechtild Rothe, Paul Rübig, Andres Tarand, Britta Thomsen, Patrizia Toia, Catherine Trautmann, Claude Turmes, Nikolaos Vakalis, Alejo Vidal-Quadras Roca
Sostitut(i) preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali	Jean-Pierre Audy, María del Pilar Ayuso González, Ivo Belet, Françoise Grossetête, Edit Herczog, Mieczysław Edmund Janowski, Erika Mann, Lambert van Nistelrooij, Vittorio Prodi
Sostituti(i) (skond l-Artikolu 178(2)) preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali
Kummenti (disponibbli b'lingwa waħda biss)	...

OPINJONI tal-Kumitat għall-Biedja u l-Iżvilupp Rurali (20.2.2006)

à l'intention de la commission du commerce international

sur l'évaluation du cycle de Doha à la suite de la Conférence ministérielle de l'OMC à Hong Kong
(2005/2247(INI))

Rapporteur ta' opinjoni: Joseph Daul

SUĠĠERIMENTI

La commission de l'agriculture et du développement rural invite la commission du commerce international, compétente au fond, à incorporer dans la proposition de résolution qu'elle adoptera les suggestions suivantes:

A.  considérant la déclaration ministérielle adoptée par les pays membres de l’Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC) lors de la sixième Conférence ministérielle de l’OMC qui s’est tenue à Hong Kong du 13 au 18 décembre 2005, et notamment le programme de travail pour les prochains mois,

B    considérant la volonté de l’Union européenne de préserver le modèle agricole européen tel qu’il a été redéfini par l’accord de Luxembourg du 23 juin 2003 relatif à la réforme de la politique agricole commune (PAC),

C   considérant qu'en sa qualité d'acteur mondial majeur en matière de production et d'échanges commerciaux de produits agricoles et de l'agroalimentaire, l'Union européenne a tout intérêt, par la voie multilatérale de l'OMC, à participer à l'élaboration de régulations commerciales et à rechercher un accord global et équilibré entre tous les secteurs et les acteurs de la négociation,

1.   se félicite de la cohésion de l’Union européenne lors de cette sixième Conférence ministérielle de l’OMC; rappelle que la déclaration ministérielle de Hong Kong ne constitue qu’une étape du programme de Doha pour le développement et que dans ce cadre, l’équilibre entre les différents volets de la négociation est un objectif impératif; regrette, cependant, la portée limitée de la déclaration ministérielle concernant le volet relatif au développement, ainsi que l’absence d’offre globale de la part des principaux partenaires de l’Union européenne, à l’instar de l’importante contribution communautaire en date du 28 octobre 2005 notamment pour ce qui concerne le volet agricole;

2.   considère l’importance des échéances à venir pour la définition des modalités de négociation et la nécessité d’engagements équilibrés au sein du volet agricole; rappelle à la Commission que ces modalités ne doivent en aucun cas remettre en cause ni le modèle agricole européen, ni le caractère multifonctionnel de l’agriculture;

3.   souligne que les engagements pris par la Commission au cours des négociations agricoles à l'OMC ne peuvent dépasser le cadre du régime en vigueur pour la PAC ni le mandat de négociation;

4.   estime qu'il est indispensable de conserver à l'offre actuelle de la Commission son caractère conditionnel dans le cadre du programme de Doha pour le développement ainsi que la possibilité de la retirer en cours de négociation en cas d'absence d'offres satisfaisantes de la part des autres partenaires à l'OMC;

5.   rappelle que les efforts déjà consentis par les producteurs communautaires à travers les réformes successives de la PAC constituent une contribution substantielle en faveur du cycle de négociations; que ce crédit doit être mis à l’actif de l’Union européenne pour la recherche d’un accord équilibré et que par conséquent celle-ci peut consentir des efforts plus limités dans les autres volets de la négociation agricole, notamment en matière d’accès au marché;

6.   rappelle la portée de l’accord de Luxembourg sur la réforme de la PAC et insiste de ce fait sur la nécessité d’une définition des mesures contenues dans la « boîte verte » incluant les aides découplées;

7.   considère que l’Union européenne a d’ores et déjà accompli des efforts importants pour la réduction du soutien interne ayant des effets de distorsion des échanges; qu’il est donc indispensable que les modalités devant être définies pour le 30 avril soient suffisamment dynamiques pour contraindre les autres pays industrialisés, notamment les plus importants d’entre eux, à procéder à des réformes de leurs politiques internes;

8.   souligne l’importance que revêt l’engagement de tous les membres de l’OMC pour mettre fin, d’ici 2013, à toutes les formes de subventions à l’exportation, ainsi que la définition de disciplines précises et contraignantes concernant les mesures ayant des effets équivalents comme les entreprises commerciales d’État ou les monopoles à l’exportation, les crédits à l’exportation et l’aide alimentaire;

9.   attire l’attention de la Commission sur une définition adéquate des modalités de mise en œuvre de l’élimination des subventions à l’exportation en raison des conséquences en matière de gestion des marchés; dans ce cadre, demande à la Commission de faire rapport au Parlement sur ses intentions en la matière afin de préserver l’équilibre économique et social des filières agricoles communautaires;

10. considère que l’accès au marché constitue un enjeu important pour les négociations et pour la mise en œuvre de la réforme de la PAC; que, dans ces conditions, le cadre général de la réduction des droits de douane doit être apprécié en fonction des efforts consentis par tous les membres de l’OMC dans les différents volets de la négociation agricole et des efforts de l’Union européenne dans les volets relatifs au soutien interne et à la concurrence à l’exportation, tout en laissant la possibilité d'appliquer aux produits d'importation les mêmes exigences qu'aux produits domestiques;

11. recommande, compte tenu du démantèlement tarifaire drastique proposé dans le cadre de l'OMC pour les produits agricoles, que des conditions d'accès au marché soient définies à titre préventif afin d'éviter un dumping économique, environnemental et social; propose, par conséquent, d'appliquer des prélèvements aux importations agricoles, notamment par une clause de sauvegarde spéciale, lorsque les conditions de production sont contraires aux droits de l'homme, aux accords internationaux ou à la législation européenne de protection de la faune et de l'environnement; propose d'affecter le produit de ces prélèvements à la sécurité alimentaire et au développement rural des pays en développement concernés afin de prévenir l'apparition de crises;

12. invite la Commission à établir, dans le respect des intérêts économiques des États membres, une liste de produits agricoles sensibles auxquels s'appliquera une libéralisation moins importante qu'aux autres produits, ainsi qu'à appliquer une clause de sauvegarde spéciale aux produits agricoles dont la protection tarifaire actuelle n'est plus suffisante ou ne le serait plus, à la lumière des analyses effectuées, après l'application des engagements de réduction tarifaire;

13. Regrets that the European Union has been unable to include recognition of the so-called Non-Trade Concerns (NTCs) in either the Ministerial Declaration or its work programme for the coming months; calls on the Commission to give more priority to this issue in the coming negotiations;

14. regrette que, conformément au cadre adopté par le Conseil général de l'OMC du 1^er août 2004, rien n'ait été engagé concernant les aspects non commerciaux du volet agricole des négociations et considère encore insuffisants les progrès accomplis au sujet de l'extension et du renforcement d'une protection des indications géographiques;

15. estime que la Commission doit défendre fermement les "considérations autres que d'ordre commercial" dans les négociations au sein de l'OMC, afin d'obtenir un consensus mondial sur cette question; est en outre d'avis que la Commission doit s'efforcer également de faire accepter les exigences communautaires d'ordre non commercial dans les pays qui n'appartiennent pas à l'UE;

16. Notes that the Institute d'Elevage et de Médecine Vétérinaire des Pays Tropicaux estimated the costs born by European farmers for compliance with animal welfare standards and other NTCs to be around EUR 10 billion; stresses the heavy distortion of competition suffered by European farmers as long as imported products are not subject to the same standards as home products; notes that compensation through Green Box payments is not a desirable solution, as such funding is expected to be largely insufficient;

17. considère indispensable l’intégration dans les négociations agricoles des discussions relatives à la création d’un registre international pour les vins et les spiritueux, ainsi que son extension à d’autres produits; considère que ce registre peut constituer, avec d'autres produits de haute qualité, le socle d’une politique communautaire de promotion des produits de qualité sur le marché mondial; demande également que soient pleinement pris en compte les intérêts à l’exportation des produits européens;

18. constate la nécessité pour l’Union européenne de renforcer ses relations avec les pays avec lesquels elle partage une vision commune de l’agriculture, notamment les pays du G10 et les États d'Afrique, des Caraïbes et du Pacifique (ACP); considère, à ce titre, que l’ouverture du marché communautaire découlant des nouveaux engagements doit être prioritairement réservée aux pays les moins avancés (PMA) et aux États ACP; rappelle qu’il doit être tenu pleinement compte des problèmes liés à l’érosion des marges préférentielles dont ils bénéficient;

19. rappelle que le programme de Doha pour le développement a pour objectif une meilleure intégration des pays en développement dans le commerce international; considère que la réalisation de cet objectif nécessite la participation active des pays industrialisés et des pays émergents; à ce titre, se félicite de l’accord intervenu à Hong Kong concernant l’ouverture des marchés aux produits originaires des PMA, et qu’un début de solution au problème du coton soulevé par les pays africains ait pu être trouvé lors de la Conférence ministérielle; considère, cependant, que les efforts consentis par les États-Unis sont nettement insuffisants; rappelle donc à la Commission la nécessité de trouver des solutions plus en adéquation avec les problèmes posés;

20. estime qu'il convient de différencier les pays en développement et d'exiger d'eux, en matière de libéralisation, des engagements proportionnels à leur niveau de développement, à leur potentiel économique et à la compétitivité de leur industrie et de leurs exportations; est d'avis que les grands producteurs agricoles et les grands exportateurs (tels que l'Inde, le Brésil ou la Chine) devraient s'engager dans une libéralisation plus poussée que, par exemple, les importateurs nets de produits alimentaires;

21. estime que toute concession accordée aux pays en développement ou aux PMA devrait être subordonnée au respect strict des règles d'origine ainsi qu'au mécanisme de prévention des pratiques de commerce triangulaire;

22. estime qu'au cours des négociations, la Commission doit garantir une information constante des États membres dans un souci de transparence, en particulier lors de la prise d'engagements essentiels; est d'avis que l'application effective du mandat de négociation de la Commission doit être confirmée par des consultations régulières avec les États membres;

23. demande à la Commission de communiquer à la commission de l’agriculture et du développement rural les évaluations des conséquences des concessions offertes par l’Union européenne en termes économiques et sociaux; lui demande également de faire rapport régulièrement devant cette commission de l’évolution des discussions;

24. demande enfin au président de la commission de l’agriculture et du développement rural de transmettre le présent avis au président de la commission du commerce international.

JUSTIFICATION

La VI^ème Conférence Ministérielle de l’Organisation Mondiale du Commerce s’est conclue par l’adoption d’une déclaration commune des pays membres de l’OMC.

Cette déclaration, qui consolide la décision adoptée par le Conseil Général de l’OMC le 1^er août 2004, constitue une étape importante dans le processus de l’Agenda pour le Développement de Doha, défini dans la déclaration du 14 novembre 2001 qui a conclu la IV^ème réunion ministérielle.

Les membres de l’OMC sont parvenus à une déclaration commune en raison de la détermination de l’Union européenne pour l’inclusion d’engagements précis permettant une meilleure intégration des pays les plus pauvres dans la croissance des échanges mondiaux.

Cette position de l’Union européenne a été prise en compte par ses partenaires grâce à la cohésion des instances communautaires – le Parlement, le Conseil et la Commission. Cette unité est d’autant plus importante aujourd’hui que la déclaration ministérielle prévoit une accélération des négociations pour parvenir à une conclusion du cycle à la fin de cette année.

Lors de cette VI^ème Conférence Ministérielle, les pays membres de l’OMC se sont mis d’accord sur trois points essentiels, permettant ainsi une avancée pour les négociations :

1.  l’élimination parallèle et progressive de toutes les formes de subventions à l’exportation et des disciplines concernant toutes les mesures à l’exportation d’effet équivalent, qui doit être achevée pour la fin 2013,

2.  la mise en place d’un régime spécifique pour l’accès au marché pour les produits en provenance des Pays les Moins Avancés (PMA) qui, malgré une ouverture ne devant couvrir que 97% des lignes tarifaires, constitue néanmoins une première étape importante pour les PMA,

3.  et enfin le début d’une solution au problème du coton, dossier sensible pour les pays africains.

D’autre part, la déclaration ministérielle a défini un agenda de travail qui prévoit pour l’agriculture les échéances suivantes :

pour le 30 avril 2006 : les négociateurs devront définir les modalités chiffrées concernant :

- pour le soutien interne : la définition des bandes pour la mise en œuvre d’une réduction étagée et des taux de réduction pour ce qui concerne tant la Mesure Globale de Soutien et que l’abaissement global du soutien interne ayant des effets de distorsion des échanges,

- pour la concurrence à l’exportation : la détermination des disciplines concernant les crédits à l’exportation ou les programmes d’assurance, les entreprises commerciales d’Etat exportatrices et l’aide alimentaire, ainsi que les modalités de mise en œuvre de l’élimination parallèle et progressive de toutes les formes de subventions à l’exportation,

- pour l’accès au marché, la définition des bandes pour la réduction tarifaire, les taux de réduction des droits de douane, le traitement des produits sensibles et celui des produits spéciaux pour les pays en développement, et le mécanisme concernant la clause de sauvegarde spéciale,

- le traitement spécial et différencié applicable aux pays en développement concernant les trois volets de la négociation agricole.

pour le 31 juillet 2006, les pays membres de l’OMC devront déposer des offres chiffrées élaborées à partir des modalités ainsi définies.

L’ensemble des discussions sur les listes de concessions doivent se dérouler cet automne, afin de permettre une conclusion du cycle de négociations entamé à Doha pour le 31 décembre 2006.

Dans ce cadre, il est impératif que l’Union européenne participe activement aux discussions sur les modalités de négociations qui vont conduire à l’élaboration des listes de concessions.

Un accord pour les négociations commerciales ne peut être trouvé qu’à travers un triple équilibre :

- un équilibre général au sein de la négociation, dans l’objectif du respect du principe de l’engagement unique,

- un équilibre au sein de la négociation agricole, prenant en compte les efforts déjà réalisés par les producteurs de l’Union européenne à travers les réformes successives et préservant la réforme de la PAC ainsi que le caractère multifonctionnel de l’agriculture,

- enfin, un équilibre des efforts consentis par les membres de l’Organisation Mondiale du Commerce, tenant compte de leur possibilité de participation dans la négociation et leur niveau de développement. Pour cela, il est impératif d’évaluer les conditions d’une différenciation entre les pays en développement, et limiter les conséquences d’une libéralisation des échanges pour les pays ayant des accords préférentiels avec l’Union européenne, à travers l’érosion des préférences dont ils bénéficient.

Enfin, la cohésion dont a fait preuve l’Union européenne lors de la VI^ème réunion ministérielle de l’Organisation Mondiale du Commerce doit être préservée. C’est la raison pour laquelle il est impératif que la Commission européenne rende compte pour autant que de besoin de l’avancée des discussions à la Commission de l’Agriculture du Parlement européen.

PROĊEDURA

Titolu	Evaluation du cycle de Doha à la suite de la Conférence ministérielle de l'OMC à Hong Kong
Numru tal-proċedura	2005/2247(INI)
Kumitat responsabbli	INTA
Opinjoni mogħtija minn   Data tat-tħabbir fis-seduta plenarja	[AGRI] 15.12.2005
'Rapporteur' għal opinjoni   Data tal-ħatra	Joseph Daul 23.11.2005
Diskussjoni fil-kumitat	20.2.2006
Data ta' l-adozzjoni	20.2.2006
Result of final vote	+: 21 –: - 0: -
Membri preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali	Marie-Hélène Aubert, Peter Baco, Katerina Batzeli, Joseph Daul, Albert Deß, Carmen Fraga Estévez, Jean-Claude Fruteau, Elisabeth Jeggle, Heinz Kindermann, Stéphane Le Foll, Albert Jan Maat, Mairead McGuinness, Neil Parish, María Isabel Salinas García, Willem Schuth, Czesław Adam Siekierski, Marc Tarabella, Jeffrey Titford
Sostitut(i) preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali	Jan Mulder, James Nicholson, Zdzisław Zbigniew Podkański
Osservazzjonijiet (informazzjoni disponibbli f'lingwa waħda biss)

PROĊEDURA

Titolu	Evalwazzjoni tar-Round ta' Doha wara l-Konferenza Ministerjali tal-WTO f' Hong Kong
Numru tal-proċedura	2005/2247(INI)
Bażi fir-Regoli ta' Proċedura	Regola 45
Kumitat responsabbli        L-awtorizzazzjoni tad-data mħabbra fis-seduta plenarja	INTA 15.12.2005
Kumitat(i) mitlub(a) jagħti/u opinjoni(jiet)   Data tat-tħabbir fis-seduta plenarja	DEVE 15.12.2005	ECON 2.2.2006				ITRE 15.12.2005			[AGRI] 15.12.2005
Opinjoni mhix mogħtija   Data tad-deċiżjoni
Koperazzjoni aktar mill-qrib   Data tat-tħabbir fis-seduta plenarja	Le
Mozzjoni(jiet) għal riżoluzzjoni inkluża(i) fir-rapport
'Rapporteur(s)'   Data tal-ħatra	Georgios Papastamkos 13.6.2005
Rapporteur(s) preċedenti
Eżaminazzjoni fil-kumitat	23.11.2005	25.1.2006			21.2.2006
Data ta' l-adozzjoni	22.2.2006
Riżultat tal-votazzjoni finali	favur: kontra: astensjonijiet:			24 2 2
Membri preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali	Jean-Pierre Audy, Enrique Barón Crespo, Daniel Caspary, Françoise Castex, Nigel Farage, Christofer Fjellner, Glyn Ford, Béla Glattfelder, Jacky Henin, Syed Kamall, Sajjad Karim, Erika Mann, Helmuth Markov, David Martin, Javier Moreno Sánchez, Georgios Papastamkos, Godelieve Quisthoudt-Rowohl, Bogusław Rogalski, Tokia Saïfi, Robert Sturdy, Daniel Varela Suanzes-Carpegna, Zbigniew Zaleski
Sostituti preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali	Panagiotis Beglitis, Jorgo Chatzimarkakis, Pierre Jonckheer, Maria Martens, Zuzana Roithová, Antolín Sánchez Presedo, Frithjof Schmidt
Sostituti preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali skond ir-Regola 178(2)	Seán Ó Neachtain
Data tat-tressiq - A6	1.3.2006					A6-0051/2006