REPORT on the 2005 Annual Report of the European Central Bank
12.10.2006 - (2006/2206(INI))
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
Rapporteur: Pervenche Berès
MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION
on the 2005 Annual Report of the European Central Bank
The European Parliament,
– having regard to the 2005 Annual Report of the European Central Bank,
– having regard to Article 113 of the EC Treaty,
– having regard to Article 15 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank,
– having regard to its resolution of 2 April 1998 on democratic accountability in the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union[1],
– having regard to its vote of 5 July 2005 rejecting the motion for a resolution on the 2004 Annual Report of the European Central Bank,
– having regard to its resolution of 4 April 2006 on the situation of the European economy: preparatory report on the broad economic policy guidelines for 2006[2],
– having regard to its resolution of 17 May 2006 on public finances in the European Monetary Union[3],
– having regard to the Commission communication of 12 July 2006 on the annual statement on the euro area (COM(2006)0392),
– having regard to its position of 13 March 2003 on the recommendation of the European Central Bank for a proposal for a Council decision on an amendment to Article 10.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank[4],
– having regard to its resolution of 14 March 2006 on the strategic review of the International Monetary Fund[5],
– having regard to the European Central Bank’s reports on financial stability and on financial integration in the euro zone,
– having regard to the letter of 5 May 2006 from the chairwoman of its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs to the President-in-Office of the Ecofin Council concerning the procedure for appointing the European Central Bank's Executive Board,
– having regard to the Eurosystem economic forecasts issued in June 2006,
– having regard to Rules 106 and 112(1) of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A6‑0349/2006),
A. acknowledging the full independence of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB),
B. whereas the main objective of the ECB and of the ESCB is to maintain price stability while supporting the general economic policies of the Community, as defined in Article 2 of the EC Treaty; whereas Article 105 of the EC Treaty states that monetary policy should contribute 'without prejudice to the objective of price stability' to the achievement of the Community objectives,
C. whereas the gross domestic product (GDP) of the euro zone increased by 1.4% in 2005, below the 2004 figure of 1.8%, whilst the inflation rate in the euro zone was 2.2%, close to the 2004 figure of 2.1%,
D. whereas Member States were unable to benefit equally from strong worldwide growth in 2005; whereas, among other reasons, this can be attributed to rising oil prices and unfavourable movements in exchange rates, which left the euro at more than USD 1.17 in December 2005 (compared with its December 2004 peak of USD 1.36), whereas growth forecasts point to a degree of economic recovery, with projections by the Commission indicating growth of 2.5% for 2006 and between 1.3% and 2.3% for 2007, together with inflation at slightly more than 2%,
E. whereas the governing council of the ECB, after keeping key interest rates constant for two-and-a-half years at 2%, increased them by 25 basis points successively on 1 December 2005, 2 March, 8 June, 3 August 2006 and 5 October, and whereas interest rates remain at low levels in both nominal and real terms,
F. whereas in recent months, several third-country central banks have announced their intention to increase the proportion of their foreign exchange reserves held in euros,
G. whereas worldwide imbalances increased in 2005, mainly as a result of the increase in the US balance of payments deficit, which reached 6.4% of GDP,
H. whereas the ECB's annual accounts for 2005 show a net profit of zero, which is accounted for by full provisioning of the results achieved,
I. whereas the ECB plays a key role in the proper functioning of the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) and in the fight against inflation,
J. whereas Parliament is keen to help strengthen the role and international authority of the ECB on the international scene,
Economic and monetary developments
1. Emphasises that against the background of the recovery , with an annual growth in real GDP of 2.5% and a contribution of domestic demand of 2.1% in the second quarter of 2006; notes that recent economic growth is supported by national reforms and investment programmes in the labour, financial and product markets; considers that any raising of interest rates should be undertaken with caution in order not to endanger growth; draws attention to the risks linked to the increase in the euro exchange rate and the oil price, factors which contributed to the weak level of growth in 2005; praises the ECB's policy of concentrating on its most important objective, preserving price stability; considers, accordingly, that the ECB responded correctly to economic and financial developments in 2005 by raising its interest rate after peaks in inflation to 2.6% in September 2005;
2. Stresses that the ECB must, however, be aware of the risks, from the point of view of growth, of continuous interest rate rises in the context of the recent economic recovery; points out that, in order to support the economic recovery, Member States must implement the necessary structural reforms and investment activities; considers that interest rate policy is influenced by the progress made with improving public-sector finances in the Member States;
3. Notes that over the period 2003 to 2005, interest rates of 2% were historically low in order to support the economic recovery; calls on the ECB to continue to comply with its duty by its policy of ensuring a solid anchoring of medium to long-term inflation expectations at levels consistent with price stability; stresses that the ECB should continue to keep a close eye on oil prices, property prices and continuing surplus liquidity;
.4. Notes that it is essential for the consolidation embarked on by the Member States to continue, so as to provide the foundations for long-term growth, although at the same time investment in a society capable of facing the future must not be neglected; the IMF's current World Economic Outlook supports this diagnosis; further progress towards reform in the Member States of the euro zone remains a decisive factor in strengthening the foundations for long-term growth;
5. Notes that, at the end of 2001 and at the beginning of 2003, there were signs of economic recovery similar to those that can currently be observed, but that these did not produce sustained growth; notes that the Commission's estimates and those of the Eurosystem point to a slight recovery in 2006, followed by a slowdown in 2007; takes the view that any increase in the potential for growth in the euro zone depends on structural reforms as well as carefully implemented investment activities in the Member States; recognises that competition in EU markets and high quality of employment are a driving forces for economic growth and that its impact on efficiency gains and innovation should not be hindered ; notes the recent recovery in 2006 and stresses to better benefit from this positive situation for serious budgetary consolidation; recognises that competition in EU markets is a driving force for economic growth and that its impact on efficiency gains and innovation should not be hindered;
6. Takes the view that an increase in the potential for growth in the euro zone is contingent on the continued consistent implementation of the reform agenda; at all events this must include future-proofing social security systems with a view to demographic changes; against this backdrop, European macroeconomic dialogues to develop benchmarks for the national reform agendas and a well-balanced macro-economic policy remain an important factor; in this context it is important for the ECB to preserve its independence;
7. Considers that the divergences within the euro zone, where there are disparities in growth (up to 4.5% in 2005) and in inflation rates (up to 2.7% in 2005) constitute a major threat to the ERM in the long term;
8. Notes that there is an increasing risk of property prices being adjusted to reflect the rapid and unsustainable price rises in recent years; wishes to see a clarification of the ECB's policy with regard to changes in asset prices, including property prices; considers that, in the long term, a clearer position would help to avoid speculative bubbles developing;
9. Welcomes the accession of Cyprus, Latvia and Malta to ERM II on 29 April 2005 and that of Slovakia on 25 November 2005; supports the introduction of the euro by all the Member States; considers that due attention should be paid to the accuracy and credibility of Member States' statistics in connection with compliance with the convergence criteria; calls on the other Member States to take measures without delay to likewise comply with the criteria set for accession to the euro zone;
10. Notes that there are differences in the transmission mechanism of the monetary policy among the Member States of the euro zone with some countries, in particular, being more reactive on account of a predominance of indebtedness at variable rates; calls on the ECB and the Commission to submit a clear analysis of these differences and of improvements which might be made in order to facilitate the transmission of the monetary policy; the chances of an awakening in Europe can be increased only if the guiding principle of 'unity in diversity' is accepted both socially and economically;
11. Emphasises the risks inherent in rapid adjustments to international disequilibria which may lead to a rise in the euro exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar; points out, in this context, that the Treaty entrusts responsibility for exchange rate policy to the Council, but without specifying how this power is to be exercised; invites the Eurogroup, the Council and the ECB to exercise their respective powers to the full, and to step up coordination of their action in the sphere of exchange rate policy;
12. Notes that the ECB is in favour of strengthening the preventive arm of the stability and growth pact (SGP), but has also repeatedly taken a critical position in relation to a possible relaxation of the corrective arm of the SGP, a position which is consistent with that of all other central banks in the euro zone, some of which have expressed strong criticism in this context;
Monetary policy
13. Takes the view that more clarity and consistency are needed in the monetary policy applied by the ECB, in particular in defining the relative importance of and the relationship between the two main policy pillars, i.e. the money supply (M3) and all other relevant information on future inflation developments; believes that clear and transparent rules on how these two pillars affect the operational decisions on monetary policy would make the ECB's policies more predictable and effective;
14. Emphasises the need to formulate a clear interpretation of the ECB mandate as defined in Article 105(1) of the EC Treaty; in particular, calls on the ECB to offer an authoritative and consistent explanation of how, and by which ways and means, the ECB intends to fulfil its Treaty obligation to support the general economic policies in the Community while preserving price stability; notes that the EC Treaty explicitly distinguishes between the goals of price stability and support for general economic policies, and therefore the two goals cannot simply be treated as substitutable, if real meaning is to be given to Article 105(1);
Financial stability and integration
15. Welcomes the publication of the ECB's first report on financial integration in the euro zone, since this is vital both for putting across information concerning monetary policy and for financial stability; notes that, according to the ECB, financial integration calls for the integration of market infrastructures, in particular settlement-delivery systems, note the intention of the ECB to create its own settlement infrastructure ;
16. Condemns the fact that the ECB made contact with CESR concerning level 2 measures even before the legislator became active;
17. Shares the fears expressed by the ECB regarding hedge funds and notes that hedge funds are, essentially, monitored indirectly, via the banks which are their counter parties; notes that little is known about the workings of such funds, even though they have unlimited access to markets; notes that the valuation of such funds is often highly arbitrary and does not offer investors a clear picture of their holdings and performance; considers that the European Union should take the initiative in the debate which is getting under way globally - especially in the light of developments in the U.S. - about the need better to control the activities of hedge funds, so that it can play a leading role; therefore calls on the ECB to carry out further analyses in this area;
18. Invites the Commission to pay closer attention to the impact of the behaviour of the financial markets on the macroeconomic situation of the euro zone;
19. Notes the threats to financial market stability generated by cross-border mergers; therefore calls on the ECB to carry out an analysis, focusing in particular on the question of the lender of last resort, and to present corresponding analyses in the 2007 monetary dialogue;
20. Looks forward to the implementation of an integrated TARGET II system, which will improve liquidity management across the ESCB and will generate considerable efficiency gains; urges the ESCB to draw up a comprehensive, transparent and robust legal framework for the future operation of TARGET II;
21. Calls on the ECB to take action with regard to the persistently high values of the M3 money supply (8.8% in May 2006, as against 7.4% in December 2005) by comparison with the long-term reference value of 4.5%; points, in particular, to the substantial growth in notes and cash in circulation and in call money deposits, is concerned that such expansion will be unsustainable in the long term; asks the ECB to investigate closely developments in the mortgage market and merger and acquisition loans, and their possible effects in terms of systemic risk, consumer confidence and interest rate development;
22. Regrets the fact that the ECB, like the Council, has not seen fit to inform Parliament of the Memorandum of Understanding on the management of financial crises;
External role of the euro
23. Repeats its request for moves to unify the representation of the euro zone within international financial institutions so as to defend its interests with a force consistent with its economic weight;
24. Notes with interest that several central banks have announced that they intend to increase the proportion of their reserves held in euros; calls on the ECB to monitor these movements closely and, as part of its annual report on the international role of the euro, to present a quantification thereof and to analyse their consequences, in particular with regard to exchange rates;
Banknotes
25. Notes that the value of the euro banknotes in circulation has continued to increase quickly, with a rise of 12.8% in 2005; notes that this steady increase is mainly accounted for by large denomination notes, in particular EUR 500 banknotes, the number of which in circulation has increased by 20.9%; calls on the ECB to examine the reasons for this substantial increase, and to analyse the type of transactions carried out with these notes and the breakdown in demand by country, with a view to identifying the attendant risks;
26. Considers that the first generation of banknotes, which are devoid of all representations of real living beings, landscapes or monuments, helps to convey a cold image of monetary integration, and contributes to Europeans distancing themselves from the euro; invites the ECB to introduce living beings, landscapes, European human undertakings or European personalities on which there is a consensus into the second generation of notes; invites the ECB to present its ideas on this issue to Parliament;
Democratic scrutiny
27. Welcomes the ECB’s clear commitment to the ratification of the draft Constitution, which lists the essential elements for the policy framework for EMU under both the monetary pillar and the economic and fiscal pillar; stresses that the ratification process has no bearing on the functioning of the monetary union and does not affect the stability of the euro; calls on the ECB to continue to ensure the credibility of the euro and to deliver price stability, which is a prerequisite for a non-inflationary macroeconomic environment conducive to economic growth and employment creation;
28. Considers that the independence of the ECB, including the procedure for appointing the members of the Executive Board, has proved its worth; stresses that Article 112(2)(b) of the Treaty provides for the members of the Executive Board of the ECB to be appointed from among persons of recognised standing and professional experience in monetary or banking matters, and emphasises that their nationality should be irrelevant and that they will continue to be judged by the strict criteria of the Treaty, such as that of their qualifications; regards it as important that a variety of backgrounds should be represented on the Executive Board, with a view to making ex post scrutiny of the ECB effective;
29. Calls on the Council to continue with the procedure for appointing the members of the Executive Board; stresses its willingness to join the other institutions in exploring possible improvements before the Executive Board next comes up for renewal in 2010;
30. Considers that the monetary policy dialogue between Parliament and the ECB has been a success, and one which should be built on further; emphasises that the ex post accountability of the ECB is of primordial importance for confidence, and hence stability, on the financial markets; it is important for the unity of the Executive Board and the Governing Council to continue to be assured in their public presentation; supports a targeted information policy on the part of the ECB vis-à-vis the Parliament, the Council and the Commission; stresses very strongly that the call for improvements in the ECB's communication policy must be seen solely against the backdrop of the simultaneous preservation of the independence of the ECB and of its bodies; reiterates, however, its call for the annual publication not only of an overview broken down by country, but also of a regional and cross-border overview about relevant trends, along the lines of the US Federal Reserve Beige Book, which would give the ECB the opportunity to influence the debate about productivity trends and the outlook for prices and pay; urges the ECB to examine the possibility of publishing summary minutes;
31. Emphasises that the credibility of the ECB is also dependent on a high degree of transparency in its decision-making processes; reiterates its call, that, shortly after meetings of the Governing Council of the ECB, summary minutes of these meetings will be published containing a clear statement of the arguments in favour and against the decisions taken, the reasons why these decisions were taken; insists that this form of communication should not replace the information given by the President of the ECB immediately after monetary decisions are taken, which provide an invaluable and timely insight for observers and market participants; considers this transparency to be important because in this way the market will be able to gain a clearer picture of the ECB's monetary policy;
32. Points out that it rejected as too complex the system of rotating voting rights applicable to decisions of the Governing Council as adopted in 2003; considers, with a view to future enlargements of the euro zone, that a system should be introduced which combines fairness and effectiveness; recalls its resolution calling for an ECB board of nine members, which would be in charge of monetary policy, thus replacing the cumbersome system existing now and avoiding the even more complex solution decided upon for the future; urges that the Treaty be changed accordingly;
33. Invites the ECB to give greater weight in its communication strategy to hearings of its President by the Parliament committee responsible for economic and monetary affairs;
Management of the ECB
34. Notes that the ECB’s staff complement has increased steadily and substantially since 1999, an increase of 86% over that period; notes that the ECB reports a temporary freeze on its staff complement over several months in 2005, but that it nonetheless continued to increase by 3.5% that year; notes that the ECB has emphasised its determination to increase its internal effectiveness; regards that objective as laudable, and hopes that it can be achieved on a sustainable basis, in particular by means of a long-term stabilisation in staff numbers;
35. Stresses the importance that the ECB and the national central banks must accord to the quality of dialogue, transparency of information and recognition of the existence of trade unions at meetings of the Staff Committee;
36. Considers that involving the staff and their trade unions in the decisions that concern them, and high-level social dialogue, will contribute to the emergence of a common culture within the Eurosystem and the ESCB;
37. Notes that the ECB’s entire 2005 surplus of EUR 992 million has been set aside as a provision to cover exchange rate risk, interest rate risk and the risk of fluctuations in the price of gold, resulting in a net profit of zero; notes that the level of this provision will be reviewed annually; notes, at the same time, that the cost of constructing the ECB’s new headquarters is put at EUR 850 million; calls on the ECB to clarify its targets regarding the level of own funds and provisions, and also to implement a budgetary policy which, while ensuring appropriate cover for the risks to which it is exposed, enables it to achieve satisfactory financial results;
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38. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the Eurogroup, the Council, the Commission and the European Central Bank.
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT
In the resolution it adopts on the ECB's annual report, Parliament assesses the work of the Central Bank. In the light of seven years' experience with the euro, and following the completion of a full cycle of new appointments to the ECB's Executive Board, this year your rapporteur would like to highlight the need to improve ex ante and ex post democratic scrutiny of the ECB.
Economic and monetary developments in 2005
In 2005, GDP by volume increased by 1.4% in the eurozone, below the 2004 figure of 1.8%. In the first half of 2005, the volume of economic activity increased only moderately, but that increase then gained pace in the second half of the year. Inflation reached 2.2% in 2005, a level comparable to the 2004 figure of 2.1%. The increase in energy prices did not give rise to internal inflationary pressures, in particular as a result of continuing wage moderation.
After keeping interest rates constant at 2% for two-and-a-half years, the Governing Council decided to increase the key rates by 25 basis points on 1 December 2005 and then, successively, on 2 March, 8 June and 3 August 2006. These decisions were prompted by the fear that future oil price rises might lead to second-round wage effects against a background of a rapid expansion in the provision of credit.
The Eurosystem economic forecasts point to growth of between 1.8% and 2.4% in 2006 and between 1.3% and 2.3% in 2007. This recovery would seem to be fairly fragile, as reflected in the broad range of the estimates and the likely slow-down in activity as from 2007.
Your rapporteur would like to draw attention to the statements made by the IMF and the OECD calling for a cautious approach to future changes in interest rates in the eurozone, which should take account of the recent nature, the strength and the resilience of the economic recovery. The two institutions refer to a number of factors likely to endanger what is still a hesitant recovery, such as sudden increases in the euro exchange rate and oil prices. These factors already contributed to the weakness of economic growth in 2005.
In 2005, the international economic environment was dominated by widening disequilibria, in particular the US balance of payments deficit, which reached 6.4% of GDP. These disequilibria represent a serious risk, since the measures taken to resolve them could have an immediate impact on the euro-dollar exchange rate. Any sudden, marked increase in the value of the euro would seriously undermine European economic growth. The eurozone must prepare as well as it can for such an eventuality. Against this background, your rapporteur takes the view that the degree of importance attached to the euro exchange rate in the conduct of monetary policy must be clarified and that the Council's scope for action should also be properly defined with a view to making clear precisely what its institutional responsibilities in this area are.
Improving the coordination of economic and monetary policy is vital and your rapporteur would like to point out that the definition of a suitable policy mix, something which has been lacking since the euro was introduced, is a precondition for the consolidation of the economic recovery which is taking shape. Increasing the growth potential is also contingent on effective macroeconomic fine-tuning. Accordingly, your rapporteur wishes to support the efforts made by the Eurogroup to foster more active macroeonomic dialogue between the Council, the ECB and the social partners.
Financial stability and integration
Your rapporteur applauds the ECB's contribution to the monitoring of financial integration and stability in the eurozone.
In 2005, the ECB published a new report on financial integration in the eurozone setting out a series of indicators. That report shows that the degree of integration varies substantially between market compartments: the money markets and the markets for government securities and private sector bonds are highly integrated; progress has been made as regards the integration of stock markets; the integration of banking markets, in particular retail banking, is lagging well behind. The ECB emphasises that a financial market cannot be fully integrated without integrated market infrastructures, in particular clearing and settlement-delivery infrastructures, and takes the view that substantial progress is still required, calling for a legislative initiative in this area. Your rapporteur fully supports that standpoint.
As regards financial stability, the ECB takes the view that the solidity of the financial system in the eurozone has improved, but highlights the risks stemming from hedge funds. Very little is known about such funds and the arbitrary valuation of their holdings does not offer investors a clear picture of their performance. Your rapporteur urges the ECB to improve its monitoring of speculative funds and takes the view that financial stability considerations must be central to any regulatory approach which is developed with regard to such funds.
Your rapporteur takes the view that the process of transferring risk from the financial sector to private individuals, which has become more pronounced in recent years, must be monitored closely. In particular, it is important that the macroeconomic implications should be assessed.
Banknotes
Ever since the introduction of the fiduciary euro, the value of the banknotes in circulation has increased very quickly, the figure for 2005 being 12.8%. That growth is essentially accounted for by large denomination notes, in particular € 500 banknotes, the number of which in circulation increased by 20.9% in 2005. Given the increased risk of money laundering and tax fraud linked to these developments, your rapporteur takes the view that the ECB should analyse the factors behind this substantial increase and assess the implications.
Management of the ECB
Echoing the statements made by its President, your rapporteur takes the view that the management of the ECB must be exemplary, and therefore applauds the ECB's stated intention of improving its internal effectiveness.
The size of the ECB's staff complement has increased by 86% since 1999. Part of that increase can no doubt be explained by the fact that the institution is in its infancy. However, the need to curb staff numbers became clear, leading to a temporary recruitment freeze in 2005, although the size of the staff complement still increased by 3.5% over the year. Your rapporteur takes the view that the aim of improving the ECB's internal effectiveness should be reflected, in the long term, by a stabilisation of its staff complement and transparent social dialogue.
As regards its financial results, in 2005 the ECB showed a net profit of zero, as a result of provisions to cover exchange-rate and interest-rate risks and risks linked to fluctuations in the gold price. At the same time, the cost of constructing the ECB's new headquarters is put at € 850 million. Your rapporteur would like the ECB to implement a financial policy which enables it to generate satisfactory financial results.
Democratic scrutiny
EMU has now been in operation for seven years, so that, with regard to the ECB, enough time has passed to make a realistic assessment possible of the improvements required to the arrangements for the exercise of democratic scrutiny by Parliament.
Democratic scrutiny is exercised in two ways: ex ante, in the procedure for making appointments to the ECB's Executive Board, and ex post, in the monitoring of ECB decisions. Both these forms of scrutiny need to be strengthened. Your rapporteur is proposing a set of improvements, limited in scope when taken individually, but which together can make democratic scrutiny genuinely more effective.
As regards the process of appointing the ECB's Executive Board, the appointment of a completely new set of members has confirmed that the large countries (France, Germany, Italy and Spain) have each claimed a de facto right to one seat, with the two remaining seats falling to the smaller countries. This practice is not consistent with the spirit of the Treaty (Article 112(b) and Article 11.2 of the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB).
The representation which these four large countries have claimed serves to restrict the Council's choice at the nomination stage. With a view to guaranteeing confirmation, these countries nominate individuals with a standard background as civil servants or central bankers. As a result, the make-up of the ECB's Executive Board is much less varied than that of other central banks. However, the representation of a variety of backgrounds on the Executive Board is a precondition for open and fruitful dialogue during the ex post scrutiny stage.
Accordingly, the nomination stage should be made more transparent by opening it up to discussion. A number of approaches spring to mind. Your rapporteur takes the view that there is one simple way of making the procedure consistent with the spirit of the Treaty: in order to ensure that decisions are taken on the basis of a genuine choice of nominees, a minimum number of names put forward by a minimum number of countries should be discussed openly. In that way, the Council proposal would be based on a discussion of at least three names put forward by several countries.
As an adjunct to the openness and transparency required at the nomination stage, Parliament's role should be strengthened by granting it the power to confirm appointments to the Executive Board, by means of a procedure similar to that employed in many countries, in particular the USA. Such a power would be a further incentive for the Council to hold a genuinely open discussion when preparing its proposal.
Ex post democratic scrutiny also needs to be improved. Admittedly, monetary dialogue, in the form of the presentation of the ECB's annual report to Parliament and the hearings of the President of the ECB held four times a year by the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, has focused attention on the need to justify monetary policy decisions. The press conferences held by the ECB after taking monetary policy decisions are also welcome. However, it must be acknowledged that these arrangements are much more a part of the ECB's communications policy than a genuine exercise in accountability.
The independence which the ECB enjoys, to a degree which has no equivalent anywhere else in the world, demands greater transparency in its monetary decision-making, whether in its relations with Parliament or in the use of all the forms of communication it can employ to explain its decisions. In that connection, your rapporteur would like to reiterate the call made to the Governing Council that it should take its decisions by means of a vote, as implicitly provided for by Article 10 of the Protocol on the Statute of the ESBC and the ECB, and that summary minutes of each meeting of the Governing Council should be published, setting out the positions of the parties for and against any given proposal, details of votes and any minority opinions. Your rapporteur is also urging that Parliament should be represented at meetings of the Governing Council, in the same way as the Council and Commission.
Your rapporteur would also like to point out that the system of rotating voting rights applicable to decisions of the ECB's Governing Council, as adopted in 2003, is too complex and therefore unsuitable, and, with a view to future enlargements of the eurozone, calls for a system to be introduced which combines fairness and effectiveness.
Since Parliament's earlier calls have gone unheeded, and in the light of the experience gained in the seven years following the introduction of the euro, your rapporteur takes the view that the opportunity offered by the revision of the Constitutional Treaty must be exploited. Accordingly, the calls concerning the transparency of the process for appointing the Executive Board and the granting of a right of assent to Parliament, the transparency of the ECB's decision-making processes and the representation of Parliament on the Governing Council should, in addition to being voluntarily implemented by the institutions concerned, be taken into account in the revised draft Constitutional Treaty.
PROCEDURE
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Title |
2005 Annual report of the European Central Bank |
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Procedure number |
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Committee responsible |
ECON |
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Committee(s) asked for opinion(s) |
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Not delivering opinion(s) |
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Enhanced cooperation |
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Rapporteur(s) |
Pervenche Berès |
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Previous rapporteur(s) |
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Discussed in committee |
30.5.2006 |
20.6.2006 |
12.9.2006 |
2.10.2006 |
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Date adopted |
10.10.2006 |
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Result of final vote |
+ - 0 |
23 0 15 |
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Members present for the final vote |
Zsolt László Becsey, Pervenche Berès, Sharon Bowles, Udo Bullmann, Ieke van den Burg, David Casa, Jan Christian Ehler, Jonathan Evans, Jean-Paul Gauzès, Robert Goebbels, Donata Maria Assunta Gottardi, Benoît Hamon, Gunnar Hökmark, Karsten Friedrich Hoppenstedt, Sophia in 't Veld, Wolf Klinz, Christoph Konrad, Guntars Krasts, Kurt Joachim Lauk, Andrea Losco, Astrid Lulling, Gay Mitchell, Joseph Muscat, John Purvis, Alexander Radwan, Bernhard Rapkay, Dariusz Rosati, Eoin Ryan, Antolín Sánchez Presedo, Manuel António dos Santos, Peter Skinner, Margarita Starkevičiūtė, Sahra Wagenknecht |
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Substitute(s) present for the final vote |
Werner Langen, Alain Lipietz, Antonis Samaras, Charles Tannock, Corien Wortmann-Kool |
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Substitute(s) under Rule 178(2) present for the final vote |
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Date tabled |
12.10.2006 |
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Comments |
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