RAPPORT dwar il-futur tar-riżorsi proprji ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea

13.3.2007 - (2006/2205(INI))

Kumitat għall-Baġit
Rapporteur: Alain Lamassoure

MOZZJONI GĦAL RIŻOLUZZJONI TAL-PARLAMENT EWROPEW

dwar il-futur tar-riżorsi proprji ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea

(2006/2205(INI))

Il-Parlament Ewropew,

–   wara li kkunsidra r-riżoluzzjonijiet tiegħu tat-22 ta' Novembru 1990 dwar il-futur ta' l-iffinanzjar tal-Komunità Ewropea[1] u tal-21 ta' April 1994 dwar sistema ġdida tar-riżorsi proprji għall-Unjoni Ewropea[2],

– wara li kkunsidra d-Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill 94/728/KE, Euratom tal-31 ta' Ottubru 1994 dwar is-sistema tar-riżorsi proprji tal-Komunitajiet Ewropej[3],

– wara li kkunsidra d-dokument tas-7 ta' Ottubbru 1998 intitolat 'L-Iffinanzjar ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea - Rapport tal-Kummissjoni dwar l-Operat tas-Sistema tar-Riżorsi Proprji' (COM(1998)0560 - C4‑0579/1998),

– wara li kkunsidra r-riżoluzzjoni tiegħu tal-11 ta' Marzu 1999 dwar il-bżonn li s-sistema tar-riżorsi proprji ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea tkun modifikata u rriformata[4],

– wara li kkunsidra l-pożizzjoni tiegħu tas-17 ta' Novembru 1999 dwar il-proposta għal deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill dwar is-sistema tar-riżorsi proprji ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea (COM(1999)0333)[5],

– wara li kkunsidra d-Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill 2000/597/KE, Euratom, tad-29 ta' Settembru 2000 dwar is-sistema tar-riżorsi proprji tal-Komunitajiet Ewropej[6],

– wara li kkunsidra r-Rapport tal-Kummissjoni dwar l-operat tas-sistema tar-riżorsi proprji[7] u l-proposta tal-Kummissjoni għal Deċiżjoni Ġdida tal-Kunsill dwar ir-riżorsi proprji, akkumpanjata minn proposta għal Regolament dwar l-implimentazzjoni ta' miżuri ta' korrezzjoni ta' l-iżbilanċi fil-baġit[8] imressqa fl-14 ta' Lulju 2004,

– wara li kkunsidra l-Istudju għall-Parlament Ewropew: Riżorsi Proprji: L-evoluzzjoni tas-sistema f'UE ta' 25, imressqa fit-30 ta' Ġunju 2005[9],

– wara li kkunsidra l-konklużjonijiet tal-Presidenza tal-Kunsill Ewropew ta' Brussell tal-15 - 16 ta' Diċembru 2005,

– wara li kkunsidra l-proposta tal-Kummissjoni għal Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill dwar is-sistema tar-riżorsi proprji tal-Komunitajiet Ewropej u d-dokument ta' ħidma tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-kalkolazzjoni, l-iffinanzjar, il-ħlas u d-dħul fil-baġit ta' korrezzjoni ta' żbilanċi fil-baġit favur ir-Renju Unit ("il-korrezzjoni tar-Renju Unit") skond l-Artikoli 4 u 5 tad-Deċżjoni tal-Kunsill 2006/xxx/KE, Euratom dwar is-sistema tar-riżorsi proprji tal-Komunitajiet Ewropej[10],

– wara li kkunsidra l-pożizzjoni tiegħu ta' l-4ta' Lulju 2006 dwar il-proposta għal deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill dwar is-sistema tar-riżorsi proprji ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea[11],

– wara li kkunsidra l-Istudju għall-Parlament Ewropew: Riżorsi Proprji ta' l-UE - Evalwazzjoni preliminari ta' l-iskop għal taxxi ta' l-Istati Membri li jappoġġjaw sistema ta' taxxa mifruxa ma' l-UE, imressqa f'Jannar 2007[12],

– wara li kkunsidra l-laqgħat tal-Kumitat għall-Baġit maċ-charipersons tal-kumitati għall-baġit tal-parlamenti nazzjonali li saru fis-16 ta' Ġunju 2005 u l-21 ta' Ġunju 2006,

– wara li kkunsidra t-tweġibiet għal stħarriġ dwar ir-riżorsi proprji mibgħut mill-Kumitat għall-Baġit fit-30 ta' Novembru 2005, lill kumitat għall-baġit tal-parlamenti nazzjonali kollha ta' l-Istati Membri,

– wara li kkunsidra l-iskambji formali u informali ta' opinjonijiet bejn ir-rapporteur permanenti għar-riżorsi proprji u l-kumitati parlamentari relevanti, jew ir-rappreżentanti tagħhom, li saru matul l-2006 u l-2007 fuq stedina tal-parlamenti nazzjonali interessati fid-diskussjoni dwar din il-kwistjoni,

– wara li kkunsidra r-riżultati miksuba fil-gruppi ta' ħidma dwar il-futur ta' l-iffinanzjar ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea, tal-Laqgħat Parlamentari Konġunti tat-8-9 ta' Mejju 2006 u l-4-5 ta' Diċembru 2006,

–   wara li kkunsidra l-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali tas-17 ta' Mejju 2006 bejn il-Parlament Ewropew, il-Kunsill u l-Kummissjoni għad-dixxiplina baġitarja u għall-immaniġġjar finanzjarju sod[13], b'mod partikolari punt 8 tagħha, u Dikjarazzjoni Nru.3 dwar ir-reviżjoni tal-qafas finanzjarju, annessi ma' dik il-ftehima,

–   wara li kkunsidra l-Artikolu 45 tar-Regoli ta’ Proċedura tiegħu,

–   wara li kkunsidra r-rapport tal-Kumitat għall-Baġit u l-opinjonijiet tal-Kumitat għall-Affarijiet Kostituzzjonali, tal-Kumitat għall-Kontroll tal-Baġit, tal-Kumitat għall-Affarijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji u tal-Kumitat għall-Iżvilupp Reġjonali (A6‑0066/2007),

A. billi l-ewwel Komunità Ewropea, il-Komunità Ewropea tal-Faħam u l-Azzar stabbilita fit-23 ta' Lulju 1952, kienet iffinanzjata minn sistema ġenwina ta' riżorsi proprji bbażata fuq taxxa imposta fuq kull tunellata ta' azzar prodott, li kienet titħallas direttament fil-baġit ta' l-ECSC mill-pajjiżi li jipproduċu l-faħam u l-azzar,

B.  billi, taħt it-Trattat ta' Ruma tal-25 ta' Marzu 1957, il-Komunità Ekonomika Ewropea kellha tkun finanzjata mill-kontribut nazzjonali għal perjodu transitorju biss li kelli jissegwa minn bdil lejn sistema ta' riżorsi proprji,

C. billi din il-bidla fl-aħħar seħħet fil-21/22 ta' April 1970 meta l-Kunsill Ewropew fil-Lussemburgu qabel dwar deċiżjoni li ġġib fit-tmiem il-kontributi nazzjonali u tintroduċi sistema ġdida ta' ffinanzjar bbażata fuq żewġ riżorsi proprji ġenwini - it-taxxi tal-biedja u d-dazji - ikkumplimentat mit-tielet riżors ibbażat fuq it-taxxa fuq il-valur miżjud (VAT),

D. billi l-isforzi kollha tal-Parlament sabiex jintuża r-ritorn attwali mill-VAT biex tiġi ddeterminata l-bażi ta' evalwazzjoni li għandha tintuża għar-riżors tal-VAT ("metodu tar-ritorn") minflok il-bażi armonizzata kkalkulata billi tiġi applikata rata medja aġġustata fuq it-total nett tad-dħul ("metodu tad-dħul") kien għal xejn, bir-riżultat li r-riżors tal-VAT inbidel minn riżors proprju ġenwin b'konnessjoni b'saħħitha maċ-ċittadin Ewropew għal apparat purament statistiku għall-kalkolu tal-kontribut ta' Stat Membru,

E.  billi l-"Ftehima ta' Fontainbleau" konkluża mill-Kapijiet ta' l-Istat u tal-Gvern fil-25/26 Ġunju 1984 ddikkjarat b'mod ċar li "il-politika ta' l-ispiża hija fl-aħħar mill-aħħar il-mezz essenzjali biex tinstab soluzzjoni għall-problema ta' żbilanċi baġitarji"; billi fl-istess ħin il-Kunsill Ewropew ħoloq "ir-roħs Brittanniku", mekkaniżmu ta' korrezzjoni għar-Renju Unit, li jistipula li mill-1985 'l quddiem, ir-Renju Unit għandu jirċievi 66% tad-differenza bejn il-sehem tiegħu tal-pagamenti tal-VAT u s-sehem tiegħu tan-nefqa allokata għal sena partikulari; billi l-ispiża ta' dan l-iskont kellu jkun iffinanzjat mill-Istati Membri kollha, b'ammont massimu fuq il-kontribut tal-Ġermanja; billi dan wassal li r-Renju Unit igawdi minn roħs fuq il-kontribut annwali tiegħu fil-baġit ta' l-UE li jammonta għal medja annwali ta' EUR 5.3 biljuni fil-perjodu 2001-2004,

F.  billi, fl-istess samit, il-Kapijiet ta' l-Istati u l-Gvern qablu wkoll, li bħala prinċipju u fiż-żmien xierq, għandu jkun jista' jgawdi mill-istess skont "kull stat membru li jġorr piż tal-baġit ikkunsidrat eċċessiv mal-prosperità relattiva tiegħu",

G. billi fil-11 sat-13 ta' Frar 1988 l-Kunsill Ewropew fi Brussell stabbilixxa massimu għall-baġit Komunitarju ta' 1.2% tal-Prodott Gross Nazzjonali għall-pagamenti u ta' 1.3% għall-impenji u kkonferma li l-Istati Membri jistgħu jżommu 10% tad-dħul minn riżorsi proprji tradizzjonali sabiex ikopru l-ispejjeż ta' ġbir tagħhom,

H. billi l-limitu tar-riżorsi propji żdied għal 1.24% tal-GNI ta' l-UE f'approprazjonijiet ta' ħlas u 1.31% f'approprjazzjonijiet ta' impenn fil-perjodu bejn l-1993 u l-1999, għal UE ta' 15-il Stat Membru, u baqa' ma nbidilx minn dak iż-żmien, minkejja t-tkabbir,

I.   billi, l-aktar importanti, il-Kunsill Ewropew ta' Brussell ta' l-1988 ħoloq ir-raba' riżors "żejjed" ibbażat fuq il-Prodotti Gross Domestiku li għandu jintuża jekk u meta l-ammont miġbur mill-VAT minn riżorsi proprji tradizzjonali ma jkunx biżżejjed sabiex ikopri l-impenji finanzjarji tal-Komunità,

J.   billi, bil-mogħdija taż-żmien, dan ir-riżors sar riżors prinċipali għall-baġit ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea, li huwa stimat li jakkonta għal 70% tad-dħul għas-sena finanzjarja 2007, filwaqt li r-riżors tal-VAT jakkonta għal madwar 15% sabiex b'hekk is-sehem tar-riżorsi proprji tradizzjonali (dazji u taxxi agrikoli flimkien) naqas biss għal 15% tad-dħul,

K. billi, d-deċiżjoni kurrenti dwar ir-Riżorsi Proprji tad-29 ta' Settembru 2000 daħlet fis-seħħ fl-1 ta' Marzu 2002 u għandha bħala karatteristiċi ewlenin: limitu massimu tar-riżorsi proprji ta' 1.24% tad-Dħul Gross Nazzjonali (GNI) ta' l-Unjoni (ekwivalenti għal 1.27% tal-GDP) għal approprazzjonijiet ta' ħlas u 1.31% tal-GNI (ekwivalenti għal 1.335% tal-GDP) għal approprjazzjonijiet ta' impenn, konċessjoni għall-Istati Membri għan-nefqa tal-ġbir tar-riżorsi proprji tradizzjonali tagħhom ta' 25%, ir-rata tal-ġbir tal-VAT ta' 0.5%, bażi ta' taxxa fuq il-valur miżjud ta' l-Istati Membri ristretta għal 50% tal-GNP tagħhom ('capping' tal-bażi tal-VAT) u 'rebate' favur wieħed mill-Istati Membri b'eċċezzjonijiet għal xi Stati Membri oħra dwar l-iffinanzjar ta' dan ir-roħs,

L.  billi, l-aktar proposta riċenti tal-Kummissjoni ppreżentata fl-2006 għandha l-għan li timplimenta d-deċiżjonijiet tal-Kunsill Ewropew ta' Brussell tal-15 u s-16 ta' Diċembru 2005 fil-qasam tar-riżorsi proprji li prinċiparjament huma kkaratterizzati miż-żieda ta' arranġamenti saħansitra aktar speċjali għal ċerti Stati Membri kontributuri netti, bħal rati tal-ġbir tal-VAT imnaqqsa jew tnaqqis gross tal-kontribuzzjonijiet annwali tal-GNI mal-lista ta' l-eċċezzjonijiet diġà eżistenti, biex b'hekk jiżdiedu l-komplessità u n-nuqqas ta' ftehim tas-sistema u jkompli jsaħħaħ l-kunċett ta' żbilanċi baġitarji li mhux immirat għat-tul,

K. billi, l-Kunsill Ewropew ġedded ukoll id-deċiżjoni li ttieħdet fl-2000 sabiex jiżdied il-premium tal-ġbir li għandu jinżamm mill-Istati Membri minn 10% għal 25% tar-riżorsi proprji tradizzjonali, minkejja l-fatt mhux dibattibbli li dan il-persentaġġ ma għandu l-ebda relazzjoni ma' l-ispejjeż kollettivi attwali ta' l-Istati Membri, jiffavorixxi l-Istati Membri li jiġbru sehem kbir mid-dazji, għad-detriment ta' dawk li ma jagħmlux hekk, u għalhekk għandu pjuttost jiġi kkunsidrat bħala forma oħra ta' roħs,

N. billi l-proposta tal-Kummissjoni għal deċiżjoni ġdida dwar riżorsi proprji, għalkemm sadanittant ġiet aċċettata mill-Parlament[14], għadha imblukkata fil-Kunsill mill-Istati Membri li l-ewwel kienu favuriha iżda li issa huma stess huma kontra li japplikawha,

O. billi l-Parlament iqis li r-reviżjoni komprensiva tad-dħul u n-nefqa ta' l-UE li se sseħħ fl-2008/2009, kif stipulata fil-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali tas-17 ta' Mejju 2006 bħala opportunità - li ma għandiex tintilef - sabiex immorru lura għas-sistema ġenwina iżda ġusta ta' riżorsi proprji fl-ispirtu tat-trattati li jsejsu l-Komunitajiet Ewropej,

P.  billi sa mill-bidu ta' l-2006 saru konsultazzjonijiet ma' dawk il-parlamenti nazzjonali li huma interessati li jiddiskutu din il-kwistjoni sabiex isir kull sforz biex tiġi stabbilita bażi parlamentarja komuni għal dan il-proċess ta' reviżjoni li ġej,

Q. billi, s'issa, dawn il-konsultazzjonijiet ma kienux biss skambji sempliċi ta' opinjonijiet personali fost il-membri parlamentarji, minħabba l-fatt li ħafna partiti politiċi nazzjonali u parlamentarji għad ma kellhomx l-opportunità li jadottaw pożizzjoni uffiċjali dwar il-kwistjoni ta' riżorsi proprji,

R.  madankolu, billi permezz ta' dawn il-laqgħat kien possibbli li jiġu identifikati, fost dawk li qed jipparteċipaw, bosta oqsma ta' konsensus u objettiv kondiviż b'mod wiesa' li jinstab metodu ta' ħidma flimkien dwar il-futur ta' l-iffinanzjar ta' l-UE,

S.  billi, sadanittant, saret proposta mill-President ta' l-Assemblea Nazzjonali Portugiża sabiex tiġi organizzata, fil-qafas tal-COSAC, konferenza taċ-'Chairpersons' tal-Kumitati dwar il Baġit u l-Finanzi tal-parlamenti nazzjonali u tal-Parlament Ewropew, iddedikata esklussivament għar-riżorsi proprji ta' l-Unjoni, matul il-Presidenza Portugiża iktar tard fl-2007,

Nuqqasijiet fis-sistema attwali ta' ffinanzjar

1.       Jinnota li sistema fejn madwar 70% tad-dħul ta' l-Unjoni mhux ġej minn riżorsi proprji iżda ġej direttament mill-baġits nazzjonali permezz tar-riżors GNI, u 15% jiġi minn riżorsi bħal ma hu l-persentaġġ tar-rata tal-VAT li ma tistax titqies (minħabba l-mod ta' kif tiġi ddeterminata) li hija minn kull aspett riżors propju ta' l-UE, jitbiegħed mid-dispożizzjonijiet u l-ispirtu tat-Trattat ta' Ruma; jinnota li l-eżistenza ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea ġabet magħha żieda fil-kummerċ intrakomunitarju u żieda fil-"ġid" ta' l-Istati Membri, u għal din ir-raġuni l-UE hija intitolata bis-sħiħ li jkollha sistema ġenwina ta' riżorsi proprji minflok waħda alimentata mill-kontributi nazzjonali;

2.  Jirrikonoxxi li r-riżors tal-GNI huwa inqas viżibbli għaċ-ċittadini iżda hu aktar ekwitabbli fir-relatazzjoni tal-kontribuzzjonijiet mal-livell ġenerali tal-ġid/prosperità;

3.  Jenfasizza li kienu dawn il-"miżati ta' sħubija" ('membership fees') kienu l-kawża li spikka d-dibattitu b'vista qasira dwar il-kontributur nett ('the net-payer debate') li ma jagħmilx ġustizzja lill-benefiċċji ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea f'dak li huma l-paċi, il-libertà, il-prosperità u s-sigurtà, irrelevanti mill-fatt li l-kunċett ta' "bilanċi baġitarji netti" għandu nuqqasijiet serji anke f'termini tekniċi u ma jippermettix li jkun hemm aktar minn approssimazzjonijiet puri; jenfasizza li la n-naħa tad-dħul ("l-impatt ta' Rotterdam") u lanqas in-naħa ta' l-infiq ("l-impatt tal-Lussemburgu") tal-bilanċi netti ma jirriflettu bis-sħiħ ir-realtà;

4.  Huwa konvint bis-sħiħ li s-sistema kurrenti tar-riżorsi proprji bbażata fuq il-kontribuzzjonijiet ta' l-Istati Membri hija inġusta fir-rigward tal-pubbliku ġenerali u anti-demokratika, u ma tgħinx sabiex l-impenn għall-integrazzjoni Ewropea jkun enfasizzat; barra minn hekk, tali sistema, peress li tagħmel kontribut lill-Unjoni Ewropea jidher bħala piż żejjed fuq il-baġits nazzjonali, ma tipprovdix lill-Unjoni b'biżżejjed fondi għall-politiki kollha tagħha minħabba n-nuqqasijiet attwali fil-baġit, speċjalment dawk ta' l-akbar Stati Membri; jikkritika bil-qawwa l-possibilitajiet li qed jinħolqu għall-pajjiżi individwali sabiex jiffinanzjaw uffiċjalment biss il-politiki li għandhom interess fihom; jibża' li dan jista' jkun il-bidu tal-qerda tal-valuri li kkaratterizzaw is-suċċess ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea f'dawn l-aħħar 50 sena;

5.  Jenfasizza li s-sistema kurrenti, bl-erba' riżorsi differenti tagħha u d-diversi mekkaniżmi differenti tar-'rebate', sew jekk ikun ġenerali favur Stat Membru wieħed bħar-'rebate' Britanniku u sew jekk ikun 'rebate' speċjali bħal 'rebates' li jiffinanzjaw 'rebates' oħra, hija kumplessa ħafna, għandha nuqqas ta' trasparenza u ma tinftihem xejn maċ-ċittadini Ewropej; jenfasizza li s-sistema ma tikkontribwixxi xejn sabiex jintlaħqu r-rekwiżiti li jistabbilixxu rabta diretta bejn l-Unjoni u ċ-ċittadini tagħha;

6.  Jinnota li r-rekwiżit ta' l-unanimità fid-deċiżjonijiet dwar "ir-riżorsi proprji" u l-"oqfsa finanzjarji" tagħmel ir-riżultat tan-negozjati f'dawn l-oqsma dipendenti fuq il-volontà tajba u l-possibilitajiet finanzjarji ta' anki dawk l-Istati Membri li l-anqas għandhom interess, kemm għonja jew foqra; mhux sorpriż li r-riżultati huma ħafna drabi diżappuntanti;

7.  Jinnota li r-regola ta' l-unanimità dwar kwistjonijiet ta' tassazzjoni tikkumplika aktar l-affarijiet;

8.  Jattribbwixxi din is-sistema difettuża għan-nuqqasijiet tal-ftehima tal-Kunsill Ewropew dwar il-Qafas Finanzjarju l-ġdida 2007-2013 li sar waqt is-samit Ewropew ta' Brussell tal-14 u l-15 ta' Diċembru 2005; jemmen li l-pakkett finanzjarju miftiehem, bid-diversi eċċezzjonijiet li għandu fin-naħa tad-dħul tiegħu u fl-għotjiet ta' kumpens lil ċertu Stati Membri inklużi fin-naħa tan-nefqa tiegħu, huma l-iktar prova ċara tal-falliment totali tas-sistema kurrenti; iqis mhux aċċettabbli li l-Istati Membri kollha qablu fuq attivitajiet importanti tal-Komunità, bħall-programm Galileo jew in-netwerks Transewropej, u li ffissaw miri ambizzjużi, bħal ngħidu aħna fir-rigward ta' l-objettivi ta' Goteborg u ta' Liżbona jew l-Għanijiet tal-Millenju, li issa ħadd ma jrid jiffinanzjhom;

9.  Jiddeplora l-fatt li l-Kunsill Ewropew ta' Brussell minflok ħoloq sistema aktar sempliċi u trasparenti, għamilha aktar kumplikata u mhux ċara billi ħalla l-korrezzjoni tar-Renju Unit, "ir-rebate Brittannikku", intatt fil-prinċipju u żied aktar derogi u korrezzjonijiet ta' benefiċċju għal Stati Membri oħra;

10. Jinnota li kieku d-Deċiżjoni ta' Edinburgh ta' l-1988 li stabbilixxiet limitu massimu ta' 1.24% tal-GNI għar-riżorsi proprji ġiet użata kollha, il-baġit tal-Komunità kien jikseb 0.2% tal-GNI kull sena għal dawn l-aħħar 13-il sena, li huma ekwivalenti għal żieda ta' madwar EUR 240 biljun; iqis li dawn il-fondi li ġew adottati unanimament mill-Istati Membri skond proposta tal-Presidenza Britannika, huma neċessarji sabiex jippermettu lill-Unjoni Ewropea li taġixxi skond il-poteri tagħha li dejjem jiżdiedu , partikularment fir-rigward ta' l-isforzi biex jintlaħqu l-objettivi ta' Liżbona (l-innovazzjoni, l-infrastruttura u l-impjieg) jew kif miftiehem fit-Trattati ta' Maastricht, ta' Amsterdam u ta' Nizza, mingħajr ma ninkludu l-abbozz tal-Kostituzzjoni u għal Unjoni ta' 27 Stat Membru;

11. Jissottolinea li mill-1995, il-Baġit Ewropew żdied biss bi 8.2% f'termini reali u s-sehem tiegħu fil-GNI naqas, filwaqt li fl-istess ħin il-baġits nazzjonali żdiedu b'medja ta' 23%, jiġifieri kważi bi tliet darbiet;

L-ewwel fażi tar-riforma: sistema mtejba ta' kontributi nazzjonali

12. Jirrikonoxxi l-fatt li kwalunkwe riforma tas-sistema tar-riżorsi proprji se tkun eżerċizzju sensittiv u diffiċli, li għandu jitwettaq bl-involviment tal-parlamenti ta' l-Istati Membri; jitlob għalhekk li jkun hemm approċċ gradwali li jista' jiġi introdott f'żewġ stadji iżda li għandu jagħmel parti minn deċiżjoni waħda minħabba l-fatt li l-proċedura kumplessa tal-Komunità tagħmilha impossibbli li jittieħdu żewġ deċiżjonijiet fi żmien relattivament qasir. L-ewwel fażi provviżorja u transizzjonali twassal għal titjib tas-sistema kurrenti tal-kontribuzzjonijiet nazzjonali u li għaliha għandhom japplikaw il-prinċipji politiċi li ġejjin:

· l-ugwaljanza bejn l-Istati Membri

· is-sempliċità tal-preżentazzjoni kemm għar-rappreżentanti eletti u kemm għaċ-ċittadini

· is-solidarjetà u d-dinjità ugwali fost l-Istati Membri

· it-twaqqif ta' rabta politika bejn riforma tad-dħul u reviżjoni ta' l-infiq minħabba li hija diġà inkluża fil-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali;

L-ugwaljanza bejn l-Istati Membri

13. Jiddefinixxi "l-ugwaljanza bejn l-Istati Membri" permezz tan-nuqqas ta' kwalunkwe privileġġ baġitarju għal kwalunkwe Stat Membru; jammetti li jista' jkun diffiċli għal ċertu Stati Membri li jiftiehmu li jirrinunċjaw għal storja twila ta' arranġamenti speċjali fuq in-naħa tad-dħul u ta' ċertu distribuzzjoni ta' nfiq li jistgħu jiġġustifikaw kwalunkwe riforma biss jekk tkun applikata b'mod progressiv ("tneħħija gradwali" tas-sistema l-antika); madanakollu jirrifjuta, li jaċċetta l-istorja twila ta' arranġamenti baġitarji speċjali bħala argument favur iż-żamma ta' sistema li, ladarba r-riformi meħtieġa jkunu saru, ma tibqax ġustifikabbli;

Is-sempliċita tal-preżentazzjoni

14. Jenfasizza l-importanza li s-sistema mtejba tkun ippreżentata bl-aktar mod sempliċi possibbli sabiex tkun tinftiehem u tkun trasparenti għaċ-ċittadini Ewropej; jiddeplora preżentazzjonijiet li ma jinftehmux ta' deċiżjonijiet li jaffetwaw il-ħajja taċ-ċittadini Ewropej kollha, bħall-konklużjonijiet dwar il-finanzi ta' l-UE tal-Kunsill Ewropew ta' Brussell ta' Diċembru 2005;

Is-solidarjetà u d-dinjità ugwali fost l-Istati Membri

15. Jitlob sabiex ikun hemm salvagwardja tal-prinċipji ta' solidarjetà u dinjità ugwali fost l-Istati Membri; jikkunsidra li dawn il-prinċipji qed jinqerdu biż-żamma ta' privileġġi biex jivvantaġġjaw lil uħud, filwaqt li oħrajn huma kumpensati permezz ta' negozjar umiljanti li jsir bil-magħluq fil-laqgħat tal-Kunsill Ewropew; ifakkar li, mis-46 Artikoli fil-konklużjonijiet tal-Kunsill Ewropew ta' Brussell ta' Diċembru 2005 li jiddeterminaw in-nefqa fl-Intestatura 1b ġdida - Koeżjoni għat-Tkabbir u l-Impjieg, 20 sħaħ huma "Dispożizzjonijiet Addizzjonali" li jagħtu "Rigali tal-Milied" b'xejn lill-Istati Membri jew reġjuni varji[15];

Il-konnessjoni politika bejn ir-riforma tad-dħul u n-nefqa

16. Huwa konvint li r-rabta politika bejn riforma tad-dħul u reviżjoni ta' l-infiq hija inevitabbli u perfettament raġjonevoli, speċjalment sakemm il-loġika ta' l-iffinanzjar tal-politiki tal-Komunità permezz ta' dħul li ġej minn baġits nazzjonali għadha l-prinċipju li tigwida lill-Unjoni;

Il-karattru proviżorju u tranżizzjonali tas-sistema

17. Jinnota li kwalunkwe sistema attwali mtejba bħala l-ewwel stadju tal-metodu b'żewġ fażijiet li ġie propost għandha tkun ikkunsidrata bħala proviżorja u tranżizzjonali minħabba d-dgħjufija fonda tas-sistema ta' kontributi ta' l-Istati Membri li jagħmluha politikament mhux sostenibbli;

Rakkomnadazzjonijiet għal sistema mtejba ta' kontributi nazzjonali

Il-proposti Schreyer

18. Ifakkar li diġà saru proposti għat-titjib tas-sistema attwali ta' iffinanzjar, bħala eżempju, dawk imressqa mill-Kummissarju Michaele Schreyer f'Lulju 2004[16] li skond liema:

· kull Stat Membru, mingħajr kunsiderazzjoni tal-ġid li għandu, huwa intitolat għal 'rebate' li jiġi fis-seħħ meta l-kontribut tiegħu għall-baġit ta' l-UE jilħaq limitu ta' 0.35% tal-GNI,

· ir-rimbors għandu jkun f'forma ta' 66% tnaqqis fil-kontribuzzjoni netta at' Stat Membru, u

· ir-rimbors globali massimu disponibbli għar-'rebates' kollha qiegħed stabbillit għal EUR7.5 biljuni kull sena;

19. Jammetti li uħud mill-aspetti tal-proposti Schreyer kienu sejrin fid-direzzjoni t-tajba sa fejn kieku se jagħmlu s-sistema ftit aktar trasparenti billi mill-anqas jabolixxu l-prinċipju ta' 'rebate fuq ir-rebate' jew għax kien ikollhom kumpensi jew korrezzjonijiet limitati - u l-punt l-aktar pożittiv huwa dak li ġiet kkonċepita bħala sistema tranżizzjonali sa l-2014;

20. Huwa konvint madanakollu li l-ġeneralizzazzjoni tar-'rebate' anke meta dan ikun akkumpanjat minn limitu massimu għall-bilanċi baġitarji netti, se jkun żball doppju minħabba li dan se jsaħħaħ il-karatteristiċi mhux komunitarji tas-sistema u se jiffinalizza b'mod konkret l-approċċ li ma jħarisx fit-tul għal "juste retour" kwantifikat; jinsisti li l-unika soluzzjoni possibbli hija t-tneħħija darba għal dejjem tas-sistema tal-bilanċi netti b'mod parallel ma' riforma fix-xejriet ta' l-infiq; jenfasizza li dak li jwarrabb fuq naħa l-infiq Ewropew minn oħrajn huwa preċiżament il-valur miżjud tiegħu bbażat fuq il-prinċipju tas-solidarjetà finanzjarja;

Il-kwistjoni tan-nefqa strutturali u ta' koeżjoni

21. Jiċħad kategorikament l-idea inkluża fi proposti ta' riformi oħra li jeskludu n-nefqa strutturali u ta' koeżjoni mill-komputazzjonijiet kollha bil-użu li jiġu stabbiliti l-kontributi ta' l-Istati Membri jew 'rebates' fuq dawn il-kontribut minħabba li tali pass jġib differenza bejn nefqa "nobbli" u nefqa "suspettuża", u b'hekk jiftaħ bieb għall-Unjoni Ewropea à la carte fejn il-politiki jkunu fl-aħħar mill-aħħar iffinanzjati biss mill-Istati Membri li għandhom interess fihom;

Konklużjoni

22. Jinnota li l-proposta mressqa mill-Finlandja f'April 2004 dwar li l-sistema attwali ta' finanzjament ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea għandha tinbidel, filwaqt li tħalli f'posthom ir-riżorsi proprji tradizzjonali, ma' sistema bbażata fuq GNI, billi tieħu ishma bħala l-bażi tal-kontributi ta' l-Istati Membri lejn ir-riżorsi proprji ta' l-Unjoni, billi tabolixxi r-riżors tal-VAT fil-forma attwali tiegħu, għaliex huwa biss bażi matematika għall-kalkolu tal-kontributi nazzjonali, u gradwalment tnaqqas ir-'rebate' Brittanniku għal żero sa l-2013;

23. Jissottolinea l-fatt li din is-sistema għandu jkollha l-vantaġġi li hija sempliċi u trasparenti u li tikkostitwixxi possibbilità ta' pass 'l quddiem lejn l-istabbiliment ta' sistema ġenwina ta' riżorsi proprji għall-Unjoni u li l-Istati Membri kollha jikkontribwixxu għar-'rebate' tar-Renju Unit fil-mument huwa ta' benefiċċju għar-Renju Unit innifsu permezz tat-tneħħija tar-riżors tal-VAT; jenfasizza li dan ma jippreġudikax l-inklużjoni fit-tul tal-VAT fl-iffinanzjar ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea;

24. Huwa konxju mill-fatt li ftehima dwar sistema ġdida ta' ffinanzjar fuq il-linji tal-proposta Finlandiża hija politikament aċċettabbli biss fi ħdan il-qafas ta' proċess globali ta' negozjar li jinkludi wkoll in-nefqa; jistieden lill-Kummissjoni sabiex tikkunsidra s-sistema bbażata fuq il-GNI deskritta hawn fuq kull meta tressaq xi proposti ġodda dwar id-dħul ta' l-UE bħala segwitu tal-proċess ta' reviżjoni kif stipulat fil-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali tas-17 ta' Mejju 2006;

25. Jisħaq li r-rabta bejn id-dħul u n-nefqa għandha tifforma aspett mill-kunsiderazzjonijiet dwar il-bidla għas-sistema l-ġdida; jirrifjuta kull attentat sabiex il-Politika Komuni Agrikola terġa' tiġi nazzjonalizzata; għalhekk jipproponi li jsir użu mill-possibilità li gradwalment jiġi introdott il-proċess obbligatorju ta' koffinanzjar fi ħdan l-UE-15 sabiex jiġi garantit il-livell ta' appoġġ stipulat fid-Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill ta' Ottubru 2002;

26. Jirrakkomanda li l-ewwel fażi tar-riforma għandha tibda immedjatament wara r-ratifikazzjoni tal-ftehima li għad trid tintlaħaq; filwaqt li s-sistema ta' kontributi nazzjonali tibqa' kif inhi, tista' ssir iktar sempliċi, trasparenti u fi proporzjon assolut mal-ġid relattiv ta' kull Stat Membru; madanakollu jenfasizza n-natura temporanja ta' fażi bħal din, fis-sens li l-uniku għan tagħha jkun li jkun hemm preparazzjoni għall-introduzzjoni ta' sistema ġenwinamwent ġdida ta' riżorsi proprji;

It-tieni fażi tar-riforma: sistema ġdida ta' riżorsi proprji

27. Jikkonferma l-opinjonijiet li esprima aktar kmieni, li l-iskop tar-riforma tad-dħul tal-Komunità, se jkun il-ħolqien ta' riżors ġenwin proprju għall-Unjoni Ewropea sabiex jieħu post il-mekkaniżmi eżistenti; ifakkar li dan l-objettiv u l-proposti sabiex dan jintlaħaq mhumiex revoluzzjonarji iżda jfittxu li jqanqlu mill-ġdid l-ispirtu tat-trattati li jwaqqfu l-Unjoni Ewropea;

28. Iqis il-prinċipji li ġejjin, li dehru fil-kuntatti kollha mal-parlamenti nazzjonali bħala l-qofol ta' kwalunkwe sistema ta' riżorsi proprji futura:

· Rispett sħiħ tal-prinċipju tas-sovranità fiskali ta' l-Istati Membri

· Newtralità fiskali

· L-ebda tibdil għall-ordni ta' kobor tal-baġit ta' l-UE

· Dħul fis-seħħ progressiv tas-sistema l-ġdida

· Ħolqien ta' rabta politika ċara bejn riforma tad-dħul u riforma ta' l-infiq;

Rispett sħiħ tas-sovranità fiskali ta' l-Istati Membri,

29. Iqis li, kif imsemmi fit-Trattati u fl-abozz tal-Kostituzzjoni, is-sovranità fiskali se tibqa ma' l-Istati Membri, li jistgħu, madanakollu, jawtorizzaw lill-Unjoni għal perjodu limitat li jista' jiġi rrevokat fi kwalunkwe ħin, sabiex tibbenefika direttament minn ċertu sehem ta' taxxa kif inhu l-każ fil-maġġoranza ta' l-Istati Membri li għandhom awtoritajiet reġjonali jew lokali;

Newtralità fiskali

30. Jinsab konvint li, meta l-kundizzjonijiet ikunu l-istess, is-sistema l-ġdida la għandha żżid in-nefqa pubblika inġenerali u lanqas għandha żżid it-taxxi fuq iċ-ċittadini; jikkonkludi li, jekk sistema ġdida talloka taxxa b'mod dirett u viżibbli għaċ-ċittadini, parzjalment jew kompletament, lill-Unjoni Ewropea, ikollu jsir tnaqqis ekwivalenti x'imkien ieħor; jissuġġerixxi li l-qrati ta' l-awdituri nazzjonali u l-Qorti ta' l-Awdituri Ewropea għandhom ikunu mistiedna jiċċekkjaw u jiggarantixxu konformità ma' dan il-prinċipju;

31. Iqis li l-iżvilupp ta' sistema ġdida ta' riżorsi proprji għandha tqis l-isforzi ta' l-Istati Membri sabiex jikoordinaw il-politiki tagħhom fil-qasam ta' tassazzjoni;

L-ebda tibdil għall-ordni ta' kobor tal-baġit ta' l-UE

32. Fil-mument ma jara ebda bżonn li jinbidel il-massimu ta' 1.24% tal-GNI li diġà jippermetti li jkun hemm marġni ta' manuvrar imdaqqas; ifakkar li l-ebda baġit qatt ma ġie viċin dan il-limitu massimu miftiehem mill-Istati Membri nfushom fl-1992 waqt il-Presidenza Ingliża, bl-approprjazzjonijiet għal ħlas jilħqu l-livell massimu tagħhom ta' 1.18% tal-GNP fl-1993; jenfasizza li minkejja li l-prospettivi finanzjarji jipprevedu persentaġġ ta' 1.045% tal-GNI għas-snin 2007-2013, l-ewwel baġit ta' dan il-perjodu kien adottat f'livell baxx ta' 0.99% tal-GNI;

Dħul fis-seħħ progressiv tas-sistema l-ġdida

33. Jitlob li jkun hemm introduzzjoni gradwali tas-sistema l-ġdida li se tibda fl-2014; huwa favur li jkun hemm perjodu tranżizzjonali sabiex tkun garantita t-tneħħija mingħajr ħafna problemi tas-sistema finanzjarja l-antika bl-arranġamenti storiċi speċjali kollha tagħha;

Ħolqien ta' rabta politika ċara bejn riforma tad-dħul u riforma ta' l-infiq;

34. Juri li riforma fl-istruttura tad-dħul ta' l-UE u riforma fl-istruttura tan-nefqa ta' l-UE għandhom jimxu id f'id, kif maħsub fid-Dikjarazzjoni Nru 3 annessa mal-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali tas-17 ta' Mejju 2006;

35. Jinnota li sistema ta' riżorsi proprji li tiżgura tkabbir biżżejjed awtomatiku tad-dħul baġitarju annwali ta' l-UE ser ittejjeb il-klima politika tat-teħid ta' deċiżjonijiet baġitarji, u tippermetti lil dawk li jieħdu d-deċiżjonijiet sabiex jikkonċentraw fuq prijoritajiet li għandhom valur miżjud għall-UE minflok ta' nnegozjar dwar livelli ta' nfiq;

36. Jilqa' l-inizzjattiva mnedija mil-laqgħat konġunti tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Parlamenti ta' l-Istati Membri bil-għan li jinġabar flimkien grupp speċjali ta' ħidma dwar ir-riżorsi proprji; jikkunsidra li djalogu mal-parlamenti ta' l-Istati Membri huwa essenzjali jekk għandu jsir kwalunkwe progress fir-riforma tar-riżorsi proprji;

Għażliet possibbli għall-futur

37. Jerġa jtenni li, fil-kuntatti mal-parlamenti nazzjonali ta' l-Istati Membri, ħafna kkunsidraw li għadu ma wasalx iż-żmien għal taxxa Ewropea ġdida ġenwina fuq medda ta' żmien qasir; jenfasizza, madanakollu, li dan ma jeskludix il-possibilità li, jekk u meta l-Istati Membri jiddeċiedu li jiġbru taxxi ġodda, huma jistgħu fl-istess waqt, jew fi stadju aktar tard, jiddeċiedu li jawtorizzaw lill-Unjoni sabiex tibbenefika direttament minn dawn it-taxxi ġodda;

38. Jenfasizza, madanakollu, li jkun vitali li f'tieni fażi jiġi eżaminat il-ħolqien ta' sistema ġdida ta' riżorsi proprji bbażata fuq taxxa li diġà teżisti fl-Istati Membri, l-idea hija li din it-taxxa, parzjalment jew kompletament, tgħaddi direttament fil-baġit ta' l-UE bħala riżors proprju ġenwin, u għalhekk tiġi stabbilita rabta diretta bejn l-Unjoni u dawk li jħallsu t-taxxa fl-Ewropa; jirrimarka li dan iservi wkoll biex ikun hemm aprossimazzjoni tal-liġijiet nazzjonali; jenfasizza li din it-tip ta' soluzzjoni se tfisser biss pass lura lejn il-prinċipju stipulat fit-Trattat ta' Ruma, li permezz tiegħu l-infiq Ewropew għandu jkun iffinanzjat mir-riżorsi proprji Ewropej;

39. Ifakkar li t-taxxi l-aktar imsemmija għal dan l-iskop ġew meqjusa in toto jew in parte matul l-iskambji ta' opinjonijiet mal-parlamenti nazzjonali jew fir-rapporti tal-Kummissjoni dwar ir-riforma tas-sistema tar-riżorsi proprji jinkludu dawn li ġejjin:

· il-VAT

· it-taxxa tas-sisa fuq il-fjuwil għat-trasport u taxxi oħra fuq l-enerġija

· it-taxxa tas-sisa fuq it-tabakk u l-alkoħol

· it-taxxi fuq il-qligħ tal-kumpaniji;

40. Jinnota li fid-diskussjonijiet fil-Parlament Ewropew ġew esplorati possibilitajiet oħra bħal:

· taxxi fuq negozji u sigurtajiet

· it-taxxi fuq servizzi ta' trasport u telekomunikazzjoni

· it-taxxa fuq id-dħul

· il-'withholding tax' fuq l-interessi

· profitti ta' l-ECB (seigniorage);

· l-'ecotax'

· taxxa fuq transazzjonijiet fil-munita

· taxxi fuq it-tifdil

· taxxi fuq transazzjonijiet finanzjajri (Tobin tax);

41. Iqis li l-fatt dwar kemm sistema ġdida ta' riorsi proprji hija xierqa għandu jkun iġġudikat skond il-kriterji li ġejjin:

Suffiċjenza: Id-dħul se jkun biżżejjed sabiex ikopri l-infiq ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea għal tul ta' żmien?

Stabbilità: Is-sistema se twassal għal dħul stabbli għal baġit ta' l-UE?

· Viżibilità u sempliċità: Dan se jkun viżibbli għaċ-ċittadini ta' l-UE u ser jifmuh?

Spejjeż baxxi ta' l-operat: Is-sistema se tkun sempliċi sabiex tiġi amministrata u se tinvolvi spejjeż baxxi sabiex tiffunzjona?

Allokazzjoni effiċjenti tar-riżorsi: Is-sistema se twassal għal allokazzjoni effiċjenti tar-riżorsi fl-UE?

Ekwità vertikali: Din se tinvolvi d-distribuzzjoni mill-ġdid tad-dħul?

Ekwità orizzontali: Din se jkollha l-istess impatt fuq min iħallas it-taxxa b'mod ekwivalenti fl-UE?

· Kontribuzzjonijiet ġusti: Dan ir-riżors se jgħolli d-dħul mill-Istati Membri skond is-saħħa ekonomika tagħhom?

42. Jesprimi x-xewqa li jkompli l-istudju ta' dawn l-għażliet b'koperazzjoni mill-qrib mal-parlamenti nazzjonali qabel jieħu l-aħħar pożizzjoni tiegħu; jagħti prijorità għolja lill-istabbilixxar, possibbilment waqt il-Presidenza Portugiża, ta' bażi komuni għad-diskussjoni f'dak li jirrigwarda r-reviżjoni li ġejja tad-dħul ta' l-UE; se jagħmel kull sforz sabiex tittieħed pożizzjoni dwar il-futur tar-riżorsi proprji ta' l-UE li jistgħu jkunu appoġġjati minn maġġoranza tal-parlamenti ta' l-Stati Membri;

43. Jikkunsidra li din ir-riżoluzzjoni hija l-ewwel bażi, imma waħda soda, fuq liema għandhom isiru aktar sforzi sabiex tinstab sistema ġdida aktar ġusta u aktar trasparenti għall-iffinanzjar ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea; għandu l-intenzjoni li jiddiskuti u jadotta l-pożizzjoni finali tiegħu dwar sistema ġdida ta' riżorsi proprji għall-Unjoni Ewropea, f'biżżejjed żmien sabiex tkun ikkunsidrata fid-deliberazzjonijiet rigward ir-reviżjoni komprensiva tad-dħul u n-nefqa ta' l-UE kif miftiehem fit-IIA tas-17 ta' Mejju 2006;

o

o   o

44. Jagħti istruzzjonijiet lill President tiegħu sabiex jgħaddi din ir-riżoluzzjoni u l-Anness tagħha lill-Kunsill, lill-Kummissjoni u lill-gvernijiet u lill-parlamenti ta' l-Istati Membri.

ANNEX

Exceptions introduced by the European Council in December 2005 on the expenditure and income side of the budget, namely:

Earmarked for Projects:

· EUR 865 Mio. for the nuclear power plant Ignalina (LIT) and 375 Mio. for the nuclear power plant Bohunice (SLK)

· 200 Mio. for the peace process in Northern Ireland (UK)

Earmarked for Regions

· 879 Mio. for five Polish Objective 2 regions (EUR 107 per citizen)

· 140 Mio. for a Hungarian region (Közép-Magyarország)

· 200 Mio. for Prague

· "phasing-out" support for a Finnish Region and Madeira, which were originally "phasing-in" regions

· 100 Mio. for the Canary Islands

· 150 Mio. for Austrian border regions

· 75 Mio. for Bavaria

· 50 Mio. for Ceuta and Melilla (ES)

· 225 Mio. for eastern German Länder

· 136 Mio. for the most remote regions (EUR 35 per citizen)

· 150 Mio. for the Swedish regions in Objective "Competitiveness and Employment"

Special Funds for Member States

· absorption rate for Poland raised by 4%

· "phasing-in" support for Cyprus, despite never being Objective 1 region

· 2 000 Mio. for Spain, to be distributed freely among Structural Fund Objectives

· 1 400 Mio. for Italy (predefined distribution)

· 100 Mio. for France (Objective: "Regional Competitiveness and Employment")

· 47 Mio. for Estonia (EUR 35 per citizen)

· 81 Mio. for Lithuania (EUR 35 per citizen)

· additional payments from rural development:

o 1 350 Mio. for Austria	o 20 Mio. for Luxemburg
o 460 Mio. for Finland	o 100 Mio. for France
o 500 Mio. for Ireland	o 820 Mio. for Sweden
o 500 Mio. for Italy	o 320 Mio. for Portugal

Special Conditions

· 50% increased support for the former exterior borders to ROM and BLG, compared to regular support for border regions

· private Co-Financing can be counted in for Structural Fund supported projects in new Member States (per capita GDP <85% of EU average) and eastern German Länder

· in the new Member States (<85%), VAT can be considered eligible cost for Structural Fund projects

Special Conditions in Legal Bases

· departing from "n+2" rule for new Member States (<85%) in 2007-2010

· building projects are eligible for support in the new Member States (EU10 + ROM, BLG)

· 20% of funds from the first pillar (Agriculture) can be used by each country for rural development, disregarding general rules such as co-financing

· special funds for rural development in Portugal (320 Mio.), without co-financing

Special Conditions for Financing the Budget

· rate-of-call for VAT own resources contribution is reduced by 25% for Austria

· rate-of-call for VAT own resources contribution is reduced by 50% for Germany

· rate-of-call for VAT own resources contribution is reduced by 66% for Sweden and the Netherlands

· Netherlands gets 4 230 Mio. (GNI 'own-resources')

· Sweden gets 1 050 Mio. (GNI 'own resources')

· the rebate for the UK is kept, reduced by certain phased-in payments for the new Member States.

• [1]  ĠU C 324, 24.12.1990, p. 243.
• [2]  ĠU C 128, 9.5.1994, p. 363.
• [3]  ĠU L 293, 12.11.1994, p. 9.
• [4]  ĠU C 175, 21.6.1999, p. 238.
• [5]  ĠU C 274 E, 28.9.1999, p. 39.
• [6]  ĠU L 253, 7.10.2000, p. 42.
• [7]  COM(2004)0505.
• [8]  COM(2004)0501.
• [9]  Studju magħmul mill-Grupp ta' Studju għall-Politiki Ewropej (SEP), ara wkoll l-Anness: Kummenti dwar l-adegwatezza tad-dħul ta' taxxi possibbli ta' l-UE, 30 ta' Awwissu 2005.
• [10]  COM(2006)0099.
• [11]  Testi adottati, P6_TA(2006)0292.
• [12]  Studju magħmul minn Deloitte u Touche: Rapport tat-Tieni Fażi - Abbozz preliminari, 12 ta' Jannar 2007.
• [13]  ĠU C 139, 14.6.2006, p. 1.
• [14]  Testi adottati, P6_TA(2006)0292.
• [15]  Ara l-Anness għar-riżoluzzjoni.
• [16]  "Rapport Schreyer": COM(2004)505 u COM(2004)501 ta' l-14 ta' Lulju 2004.

NOTA SPJEGATTIVA

Ir-rapport attwali dwar l-inizjattiva proprja dwar il-futur tar-riżorsi proprji ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea għandha tkun ikkunsidrata fil-kuntest ta' preparazzjoni għal "reviżjoni sħiħa u aktar wiesgħa ta' l-oqsma kollha tan-nefqa u d-dħul ta' l-UE, ikluż ir-'rebate' Brittanniku", li l-Kummissjoni ġiet mistiedna li twettaq mill-Kunsill Ewropew ta' Brussell ta' Diċembru li għadda, bil-għan li tħejji rapport fl-2008/2009.

Ir-Rapporteur tiegħek, fir-rapport tiegħu dwar il-proposta l-aktar riċenti tar-riżorsi proprji mressqa mill-Kummissjoni fil-bidu ta' l-2006 bil-għan li timplimenta d-deċiżjonijiet rilevanti meħuda mill-Kunsill Ewropew ta' Brussell, diġà ddikjara li d-difetti fis-sistema attwali ta' riżorsi proprji huma fundamentali. Din hija r-raġuni għala fl-2006 ir-Rapporteur lanqas beda jipprova jemenda d-dispożizzjonijiet ta' dik il-proposta tal-Kummissjoni li tagħmel is-sistema attwali aktar mhux trasparenti, kumplikata, inġusta u kontra l-Ewropa.

Il-kontenut tar-rapport fuq inizzjattiva proprja huwa bbażat ħafna fuq il-laqgħat li kellu r-Rapporteur tiegħek mal-membri parlamentari nazzjonali sa mill-bidu ta' l-1996. Filwaqt li xi parlamenti nazzjonali għażlu li jwieġbu bil-miktub l-istħarriġ dwar ir-riżorsi proprji li ntbagħat lilhom f'Novembru 2005, oħrajn preferew skambju aktar personali ta' opinjonijiet: S'issa r-Rapporteur tiegħek ġie mistieden fil-parlamenti nazzjonali ta' disa' Stati Membri. Irrilevanti minn jekk dawn il-laqgħat kienu ta' natura formali (laqgħat tal-kumitat) jew ta' natura informali (ikliet tax-xogħol): F'dan l-istadju, l-opinjonijiet espressi f'dawn l-okkażjonijiet mill-membri parlamentari nazzjonali interessati għandhom jiġu kkunsidrati bħala l-opinjonijiet personali tal-kelliema - s'issa, l-ebda parlament nazzjonali jew partit politiku għadu ma ħa pożizzjoni formali dwar il-kwistjoni tal-futur tar-riżorsi proprji ta' l-Unjoni!

Madankollu, dawn il-laqgħat personali u d-diskussjonijiet animati li saru waqt il-laqgħat multilaterali (żewġ laqgħat parlamentari konġunti fl-2006 u żewġ lagħat tal-COBU maċ-Chairmen tal-Kumitati għall-Baġit tal-parlamenti nazzjonali fl-2005 u fl-2006) jidhru li ppermettew lir-Rapporteur tiegħek li jilħaq l-ewwel konklużjonijiet dwar dak li għandu jsir, dak li ma għandux isiri u dak li forsi għandu jsir, b'konnessjoni ma' kwalunkwe riforma futura fid-dħul ta' l-UE.

Għalkemm bil-mod, ċertament bdew iqumu wħud mill-ewwel punti possibbli ta' konsenus, bħala eżempju r-rifjut ġenerali ta' l-idea ta' taxxa Ewropea ġenwina ġdida jew tat-trasferiment ta' kwalunkwe poter ta' tassazzjoni fuq il-livell Ewropew. Min-naħa l-oħra, il-maġġjoranza l-kbira ta' dawn il-kollegi nazzjonali li esprimew ruħhom kienu miftuħa li jiddiskutu l-possibbilità li jużaw parti minn taxxa eżisitenti għall-iffinanzjar ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea, anki li jaħsbu dwar taxxi kandidati "xierqa"...

Għad irid isir ħafna xogħol sabiex tinlaħaq deċiżjoni finali li sservi l-bżonnijiet ta' sistema ta' riżorsi proprji ġdida u verament Ewropea, li tkun ekwitabbli, sempliċi u trasparenti. Ir-Rapporteur tiegħek jispera li matul l-2007 jista' jiġi stabbilit fajl komuni b'koperazzjoni aktar mill-qrib mal-parlamenti nazzjonali, li jista' jkun il-bażi ta' deċiżjonijiet futuri li jinħtieġu li jittieħdu sabiex jinħatfu l-opportunitajiet tal-proċess ta' reviżjoni li ġej.

ANNEXES TO THE EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

WORKING DOCUMENT NR. 1 ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES OWN RESOURCES

27 January 2005

History of the European Community's revenue

Under the current system there are four main sources[1] of revenue for the European Community:

Customs duties are levied at external frontiers on imports under the common customs tariff. The Treaty of Rome had earmarked customs duties as the principal resource to be assigned to the EEC to finance its expenditure. ECSC customs duties have been included since 1988.

Agricultural levies were introduced under the common agricultural policy in 1962, are charged on trade in agricultural products with non-member countries and vary according to price levels on the world and European markets. Besides agricultural levies, there are also levies on the production and storage of sugar and isoglucose (unlike the levies on agricultural imports, they are internal to the Community).

Customs duties and agricultural levies were the first own resources and became known as traditional own resources (TOR) because they are revenue collected by virtue of Community policies rather than revenue obtained from the Member States as national contributions.

VAT own resources were introduced because the traditional own resources were not sufficient to finance the Community budget. Because of the need to harmonise the VAT base this complex resource did not come into use until 1980. It is obtained by applying a given rate to a base determined in a uniform manner.[2] Thus it is not a true own resource based on a tax levied nationally, but only a way to calculate a Member State's contribution.

The GNI-based own resource is obtained by applying a rate fixed each year under the budget procedure to a base representing the sum of the gross national products at market prices. It is calculated by reference to the difference between expenditure and the yield of the other own resources. It is the "key" resource, as it determines the cap on the VAT base, how the cost of the UK rebate is shared, and the ceiling on total resources under the financial perspective. The Edinburgh agreement of December 1992, which entered into force at the beginning of 1995, increased this overall ceiling from originally 1.14% to 1.27% of Europe's GNP.

The origins of own resources

1958 - 1970: Contributions from the Member States

Under the Treaty of Rome of 25 March 1957 the European Economic Community was to be financed by national contributions for a transitional period before changing over to a system of own resources[3]. The principle was set down in Article 201 of the Treaty, which stated: "Without prejudice to other revenue, the budget shall be financed wholly from own resources."

In 1965 a first attempt to transfer customs duties and agricultural levies - the "natural" own resources deriving from Community policies (the customs union and the common agricultural policy) - failed in the face of French opposition. The ensuing "crisis" was resolved a year later by the famous Luxembourg compromise but the 1966 target date for the changeover to a system of financing that would guarantee the Community some measure of independence could not be kept. It was not until the Hague summit in 1969 that the Heads of State or Government, in an effort to revive the Community after some years of difficulty, finally took the decision to go ahead with the change.

1970: First own resources decision

On 21 April 1970 the Council adopted a decision assigning to the Communities own resources to cover all their expenditure. This decision marked the end of national contributions, through which the Member States had enjoyed some scope for controlling the policies undertaken by the Communities, and the beginning of an independent system of financing by "traditional" own resources (agricultural levies and customs duties) and a resource based on value added tax (VAT).

The 1970 decision on own resources set the Communities apart from other international organisations, which all rely for funding on contributions from their members.

1985: Second own resources decision - British rebate

In 1984 the Fontainebleau European Council decided to introduce a correction for the United Kingdom. This mechanism gives the United Kingdom a rebate equivalent to 0.66% of its net balance. The cost of financing the UK rebate is shared between the other Member States according to their share of GNP (except in the case of Germany, whose share is reduced by a third).

1988: Third own resources decision - Introduction of GNP based resource and overall ceiling

Since CAP spending remained unchanged and the revenues from TORs continued to decline, in 1988, the Brussels European Council introduced a new own resource based on the Member States' GNP. It also set up an overall ceiling of 1.14% percent of GNP to the total amount of own resources which could be called to finance the Community's spending.

1994: Fourth own resources decision - Deduction of collection costs for traditional own resources

Own resources are collected by the Member States on behalf of the Community. Therefore, the 1994 decision allowed for the Member States to retain 10% of the traditional own resources they collected in order to cover their collection costs.

2000: Fifth own resources decision[4] - "Equitable, transparent, cost-effective and simple"

In 1999, the Berlin European Council called on the Commission to prepare a new own resources decision which should provide the Union with adequate means for the period 2000-2006 while at the same time adhering to strict budgetary discipline. The new system should be “equitable, transparent, cost-effective and simple”, and based on criteria which express best the member States' ability to contribute to the financing of the Union.

This latest Own Resources Decision of 29 September 2000 has entered into force on 1 March 2002. The revision clause it contains calls on the Commission to undertake a general review of the own resources system before 2006 in the light of the effects of enlargement. The review is also to explore the possibility of modifying the structure of the own resources system by creating new autonomous resources and examining the correction of budgetary imbalances granted to the UK.

The main features of the system currently in force are:

Ø the own resources ceiling remains at 1.27% of the Union's GNP (=1.24% of GNI)[5];

Ø the allowance for the collection cost of own resources has risen from 10% to 25%;

Ø the maximum call-in rate of VAT was reduced to 0.75% in 2002 and 2003, and to 0.50% from 2004;

Ø the value added tax base of the Member States continues to be restricted to 50% of their GNP (capping of the VAT base);

Ø Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden pay only 1/4 of their normal share of the cost of the UK rebate. The remaining 3/4 are financed by the other 10 Member States;

Ø two technical adjustments were made to the UK rebate to offset the windfall effects arising from the increase in collection costs and pre-accession expenditure.

British rebate

The so-called British rebate was established by the Fontainebleau European Council in 1984, which stated in its conclusions:

Expenditure policy is ultimately the essential means of resolving the question of budgetary imbalances. However, it has been decided that any Member State sustaining a budgetary burden which is excessive in relation to its relative prosperity may benefit from a correction at the appropriate time.

The origin of the problem was the special situation of the United Kingdom which was characterised by two factors:

Ø a small agricultural sector resulting in very low Community agricultural spending in the UK

Ø a large contribution to the financing of the Community budget because of the large proportion of the country's GNP accounted for by the VAT base.

Under the current compensation mechanism, two thirds (66%) of the difference between the United Kingdom's percentage share of VAT payments and its percentage share of allocated Community expenditure, applied to total allocated expenditure, is refunded to the United Kingdom by way of a reduction in its VAT base.

Since 1985 the United Kingdom has thus been receiving a rebate on its yearly contribution to the budget, amounting to a yearly EUR 4,6 billion average over 1997-2003.

This rebate is financed jointly by all the other Member States in accordance with their respective percentage of VAT payments with Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden only paying a quarter of what their shares ought to be.

Despite the general approach the Fontainebleau Council took ("any Member state sustaining an excessive budgetary burden"), this correction mechanism has ever since applied only to the UK. Over the years, slowly but surely, it has become obvious that the presence of the UK rebate has noticeably reduced the desired correlation between the ability of each Member State to contribute to the EU budget and its own resources payments. In addition, the complexity of the correction mechanism has also considerably diminished the transparency of the whole own resources system.

Shares of the main own resources components

From the introduction of the GNP-based resource in 1988 until today the share of each individual component in the Community's revenue has undergone a dramatic change:

Type of revenue	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04*	05**
Agricultural duties and sugar levies	6,2	5,2	4,0	4,4	3,3	2,9	3,1	2,6	2,2	2,4	2,3	2,5	2,3	2,1	1,5	1,5	1,2	1,5
Customs duties	22,3	22,5	22,1	20,4	18,9	16,8	16,9	16,7	14,5	15,2	14,4	13,5	13,0	14,5	10,7	10,2	10,2	9,8
VAT resource	57,2	57,3	59,1	55,8	58,0	52,5	50,4	52,2	41,8	42,5	39,2	35,9	38,1	32,7	23,6	23,5	14,4	14,0
GNI based resource	10,6	9,8	0,2	13,3	13,9	25,2	26,8	18,9	29,0	33,4	41,4	43,2	42,3	37,5	48,7	55,5	73,4	73,8
Miscellaneous - Surplus from previous year	3,7	5,2	14,6	6,1	5,8	2,6	2,7	9,7	12,5	6,5	2,7	5,0	4,3	13,1	17,6	9,2	0,8	0,9
TOTAL %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

*          based on Budget 2004

**        based on PDB 2005

Clearly, the GNI based resource has become overwhelmingly important while the share of traditional own resources has shown a trend to decline dramatically (accelerated by the fact that the percentage Member States were permitted to retain to compensate for their collection costs was raised from 10% to 25% with effect of 1 January 2001). VAT contributions have also declined due to the reforms limiting the VAT base of the Member States to 50% of their GNI.

With the introduction of the GNP resource and the reduction in the VAT call-up rate, Member States' contributions have become more closely correlated with national GNPs; this means improved equity[6] in gross budget contributions. While this development might lead to a closer correlation of the Member States' ability to contribute with their actual levels of contributions, at the same time, the decline of traditional own resources has resulted in a loss of financial autonomy for the European Union.

• [1]  In addition, there are some small "specific resources" (results of measures taken by the Commission), such as taxes and contributions paid by staff, income from interest and guarantees, and other miscellaneous charges levied.
• [2]  From 1988 to 1994 the base could not exceed 55% of the Member States' GNP. After 1995 the limit was lowered to 50% of GNP for Member States with a per capita GNP below 90% of the Community average. Between 1995 and 1999 the new limit was gradually extended to all the Member States. The maximum call-in rate of VAT was originally limited to 1% of the base. From 1986 this ceiling was raised to 1.4% to meet the costs of the Spanish and Portuguese enlargement. The 1994 own resources decision however, for reasons of equity, provided for a gradual return to the 1% limit between 1995 and 1999. In 2002 and 2003, the maximum rate was reduced to 0.75% , and from 2004 to 0.50%.
• [3]  Own resources can be taken to mean a source of finance separate and independent of the Member States, some kind of tax revenue assigned once and for all to the Community to fund its budget and due to it by right without the need for any subsequent decision by the national authorities. The Member States, then, would be required to make payments available to the Community for its budget.
• [4]  Council Decision 2000/597/EC, Euratom, of 29 September 2000 on the system of the European Communities' own resources, OJ L 253, 07.10.2000.
• [5]  As from the year 2002, the concept of gross national product (GNP) has been replaced by the concept of gross national income (GNI) in the EU budgetary and own resources area. Thus, percentages for years before 2002 relate to the GNP, later ones to the GNI. For example: The EU expenditure ceiling of 1.27% of GNP corresponds to 1.24% of GNI using the new statistical approach.
• [6]  In the sense of “proportionality of gross contributions to income across Member States”; it has to be noted, however, that under the current system perfect equity cannot be expected since the VAT resource will continue to yield revenues which will not be correlated with national income.

WORKING DOCUMENT NR. 2 ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES OWN RESOURCES

27 January 2005

The current Own Resources system - Problems and shortcomings

The net-payer debate

Traditional own resources are the only true own resources of the Union (although Member States tend to also regard them as national contributions). The lower their share becomes, the more the EU will depend on what is considered classical intergovernmental transfers. This, in turn, will almost automatically lead Member States to try and maximise concepts of the national benefit from the EU budget. The more it is generally felt that it is the Member States' money that is transferred to Brussels rather than the EU’s genuinely own resources, the more Member States will concentrate on what they get in return. This is why the concept of “budgetary balances”, the roles of “net payers” and “net receivers”, have become so important.

Budgetary balances

Nevertheless, it has to be pointed out that - although there is an established system of calculating Member States' budgetary balances[1] - this is merely an accounting exercise of the purely financial costs and benefits that each Member State derives from the Union. It does not take any account of many of the other benefits gained from EU policies such as those relating to the internal market and economic integration, not to mention political stability and security.

Bearing in mind these limitations, what do the budgetary balances actually show? They show the relation between the share of a Member State in total payments of the VAT-based and GNP/GNI-based own resources and its share in total EU operating expenditure (i.e. excluding administrative expenditure) allocated to the Member States.

The following table gives a picture of these "operational" budgetary balances (after deduction of the UK rebate) between 1997 and 2003:

Letter of the Six

As can be clearly seen, this division among the Member States between net-contributors and net-receivers, as little indication as it might give on the overall benefits of EU-membership, has not significantly changed over the last few years. It provides the context for the famous letter signed by six Heads of State - all net-contributors - after the European Council of Brussels on the future EU expenditure level:

We see in this context no room for a EU-budget near the current ceiling for own resources. Average expenditure during the next financial perspective should in our view be stabilised around current expenditure levels, and should not exceed 1.0% of GNI, including agriculture spending within the ceiling set by the European Council in October 2002. This would still allow for annual increases on the EU-budget well above growth rates of national budgets in most Member States, and permit a sufficient margin for policy-implementation in the enlarged Union.

With this letter the main net-contributors to the EU budget have made a strong statement which has become almost an official starting point for the negotiations on the new financial perspectives 2007-2013. In the meantime, the discussion has even gone so far as to imply that the figure of 1.0% of GNI, as mentioned in the letter, refers to commitment appropriations and not to payments as initially taken for granted.

Comparison EU budget - national budgets

Judging from the Letter of the Six it might seem as if the EU budget has gone totally out of control in the recent past. However, a closer look at the development of the EU budget over the last few years reveals that during the period 1996[2]-2002 the EU budget only increased by 8,2 % while the national budgets increased by an average of 22.9 %:

                                    Current prices, € million

	1996	2002	Increase
B	112,371	131,281	16.8 %
DK	86,187	101,989	18.3 %
D	944,279	1,023,870	8.4 %
GR	48,170	66,266	37.6 %
E	210,036	276,507	31.6 %
F	678,048	812,935	19.9 %
IRL	22,802	43,070	88.9 %
I	516,521	599,804	16.1 %
L	6,515	9,909	52.1 %
NL	161,044	211,162	31.1 %
A	103,542	112,094	8.3 %
P	40,459	59,573	47.2 %
FIN	60,051	69,795	16.2 %
S	139,206	149,420	7.3 %
UK	403,057	675,191	67.5 %
TOTAL	3,532,288	4,342,866	22.9 %

	1996	2002	Increase
EU budget	77,032	83,371	8.2%

This very modest increase is even more remarkable considering the fact that, in the meantime, the Union has become responsible for more and more policies. It has thus gained a great number of competencies while at the same time its financial resources have remained very limited.

Discrepancy between expenditure ceilings and actual expenditure

Not only has the EU budget grown much more slowly than the budgets of the Member States: Concerning payments[3], the EU budgets of the last few years have not only remained considerably under the maximum own resources ceiling of 1,27% of GNP/1,24% of GNI set by the Member States but also under the payment ceilings of the current financial perspective which range from a minimum of 1,07% of GNI in 2000 to a maximum of 1,11% of GNI for 2003 and 2004:

Payments in % of GNP/GNI[4]		Payments in % of GNP/GNI
1986	0.99	1996	1.14
1987	0.96	1997	1.12
1988	1.03	1998	1.08
1989	0.94	1999	1.03
1990	0.94	2000	0.99
1991	1.03	2001	0.92
1992	1.09	2002	0.93
1993	1.18	2003	0.96
1994	1.04	2004	0.98
1995	1.04	2005	1.00

This means that the EU has spent millions of euro less than, according to the decision of the Member States, it could have. Especially after the budgetary procedure for 2005, when the 1% threshold introduced by the Letter of the Six for the first time played such a prominent role, the question remains how the gap between the own resources ceiling of 1,24 % and the actual payment expenditure can be justified. What is the margin left for?

Criticism of Parliament's agreement to the financial perspectives with their rigid classification of expenditure and their rather inflexible heading ceilings, has always been countered by pointing out that at the same time the financial perspectives would guarantee the steady growth of expenditure necessary to finance new policies important to the European citizens. However, the real figures (see table above) indicate that this has not been the case.

Small margin for manoeuvre

Overall, the structure of EU-expenditure has remained more or less the same over the past few years. Despite all efforts to the contrary, agricultural expenditure still accounts for around 50% of the European Union's budget[5]:

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004*	2005*
Share of agricultural spending in total EU expenditure	50,63%	48,08%	49,53%	48,61%	51,93%	51,11%	49,01%	46,91%	46,20%

* Budgets EU 25

The agriculture share in expenditure together with the structural funds payments leave very little room for manoeuvre for flexibility with regard to the financing of new policies or priorities.

For example, will the resources at hand truly allow for efforts towards reaching the Lisbon goals for growth, employment and competitiveness? Or even more general, will it be at all possible to finance the needs of 25 (or 27) Member States with regard to maintaining the acquis communautaire, enhancing cohesion and strengthening new neighbourhood policies?

Given this financial framework, can the Union fulfil the provisions of article 6, paragraph 4, of the Nice Treaty according to which "the Union shall provide itself with the means necessary to obtain its objectives and carry through its policies"?

Accordingly, in its proposals for the new financial perspectives, the Commission moves between two options: to give the Union the means to realise its objectives (Lisbon process) on the one hand and to consider threats of budgetary cuts expressed in the Letter of the Six after the European Council of Brussels on the other.

RAL

At the same time as the 1%-discussions have gained momentum, the RAL (outstanding commitments as a consequence of level of payments lower than level of commitments)[6] have kept increasing at a steady pace, in fact, much faster than the budgets.

The following table shows the evolution of overall RAL against the budget (Section III, 1996-2005, in EUR million):

In 1996, overall RAL represented only 56% of the budget, while in 2003 it had already increased to 107% of the budget. Since Headings 1 and 5, which together represent some 50% of the budget, are mainly composed of non-differentiated appropriations and have thus no RAL, the outstanding commitments concentrate in Headings 2, 3, 4 and 7.

Even considering the fact that there has always been some controversy as to which amount/percentage of RAL is "normal" and which is "abnormal", the general perception of RAL as "unspent appropriations" is undoubtedly a factor that will be raised in the coming discussions on the future of own resources.

Political responsibility

The current situation with the European Union's finances is also characterised by the fact that political responsibility for EU revenue and expenditure is split up among a number of independent key actors.

While it is the national parliaments which, in addition to their involvement in the own resources decisions per se, determine the Union's revenue via the tax policies of their countries, it is the European Parliament and Council which decide upon the Union's expenditure.

Here again, there is a splitting of responsibilities - which is anything but transparent - according to the nature of EU-expenditure being obligatory or non-obligatory. The difference between obligatory expenditure where Council has the last say and non-obligatory expenditure where it is up to Parliament to take the final decision may have historical reasons but is not logical anymore and makes the system even more obscure.

The European Council, on the other hand, more and more often takes decisions on new policies or new priorities with far-reaching financial consequences seemingly without giving too much thought to how the budgetary authority is going to make the necessary funds available within the tight framework of the headings of the financial perspective.

• [1]  The method used by the Commission is based on the same principles as the method used for the calculation of the correction of budgetary imbalances in favour of the UK. This is the only method that has a degree of formal recognition, based on the June 1984 Fontainebleau agreement. Accordingly, traditional own resources being pure Community revenue are not included in the calculation of the balances. Instead, it is the allocation key of Member States' VAT-based and GNP/GNI-based payments which is used for the calculations.
• [2] 1996 was the first year when the entire EU budget involved all 15 current Member States.
• [3]  Of course, the same is true for commitments where the actual budget figures have never even come close to the ceiling established by the decision on the system of own resources of 1.31% of GNI and 1.24% in payment appropriations of GNI.
• [4]  1986 to 2002 based on the outturn in payments. 2003 to 2005 based on the budget.
• [5]  1997 to 2002 based on the outturn in payments. 2003 to 2005 based on the budget.
• [6]  RAL, in the first place, thus are a direct and "normal" consequence of differentiated appropriations. However, besides this normal RAL, overall RAL as the total of outstanding commitments which remain to be paid once the conditions for payment are fulfilled also contains potentially abnormal RAL and actually abnormal RAL. Per definitionem, potentially abnormal RAL are dormant commitments in respect of which no payment has been made for the last two financial years or old commitments that have been in the accounts for at least five financial years. In contrast, actually abnormal RAL is the sum of commitments recorded in the accounts which lack a legal or factual justification for payment.

WORKING DOCUMENT NR. 3 ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES OWN RESOURCES

27 January 2005

Scenarios for the future of the European Communities' own resources

The current Council Decision of 29 September 2000 on the system of the European Communities' own resources[1], in its Article 9, contains a revision clause according to which

The Commission shall undertake, before 1 January 2006, a general review of the own resources system, accompanied, if necessary, by appropriate proposals, in the light of all relevant factors, including the effects of enlargement on the financing of the budget, the possibility of modifying the structure of the own resources by creating new autonomous own resources and the correction of budgetary imbalances granted to the United Kingdom as well as the granting to Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden of the reduction pursuant to Article 5(1)[2].

In response to a request from the European Parliament and in agreement with Council, the Commission committed itself to present the above mentioned report on the functioning of the financing system at a much earlier date.

On 14 July 2004 it published its Report on the operation of the own resources system[3] together with a proposal for a new Council Decision on own resources, accompanied by a proposal for a Regulation on the implementing measures for the correction of budgetary imbalances[4].

What Parliament expected from a new own resources system it had already formulated in its amendments to the proposal of 1999, stating the need for the European Union

· to create a system that must be "simple and readily understood by the public"

· to base it on criteria that best express "the ability to contribute of the citizens of Europe" while, at the same time, avoiding "recourse to compensation mechanisms for purposes of revenue" but instead correcting imbalances "by reforming the structure of expenditure"

· to "move steadily away from dependence on transfers from Member States"

· to "correct those features of its existing own resources which generate confusion because of the derogations applicable to national contributions".

Generalised correction mechanism

The Commission's own resources proposal does not foresee the introduction of new sources of funding for the next financial perspective. The major change introduced by the proposal concerns the correction mechanism for Member States' excessive budgetary burdens acknowledged as a principle in Fontainebleau in 1984.

The Commission argues in favour of replacing the current system with a generalised correction mechanism (GCM). This proposal for a GCM is based on the fact that despite the very positive evolution of its relative prosperity it remains only the United Kingdom which receives a partial refund of its contribution, while other net contributors with similar or lesser prosperity do not.

The changes in the degree of prosperity enjoyed by EU net contributors since 1984 are outlined in the following table:

GNI per capita of net contributors (EU-15 average = 100)
	2003	1984
United Kingdom	111.2	90.6
Denmark	111.1	104.0
Austria	109.8	--
Netherlands	106.6	95.0
Sweden	104.6	--
France	104.2	104.0
Germany	98.6	109.6
Italy	97.3	92.9

The main characteristics of the generalised correction mechanism applicable to any Member State are

Ø triggering if net contributions exceed 0,35% of a Member State's GNI (this threshold would represent the maximum accepted level of financial solidarity between Member States)

Ø refunding of contributions above this at a rate of 66% (the refund rate would be phased in for all Member States except the UK at the rate of 33%, 50%, 50% and 66%)

Ø limitation of the total refund volume to a maximum of EUR 7,5 billion a year, financed by all Member States based on their relative share of GNI.

In order to alleviate the impact of the introduction of the new system, the UK would receive, in addition to the ordinary correction, degressive top-up payments totalling EUR 5 billion over a four-year period ending in 2011.

The cost of the financial corrections entailed by the introduction of the 0,35% triggering threshold is estimated at max. EUR 7,5 billion for the period 2008-2013, comparable with what would be the overall cost of the current rebate mechanism under the future financial perspective.

The outcome of the system would be that the net balances of the largest net contributors would be at comparable levels, as shown below:

Estimated net budgetary balances (average 2008-2013)
	in % of GNI
	New correction mechanism	Current mechanism	No correction
United Kingdom	-0.51%	-0.25%	-0.62%
Netherlands	-0.48%	-0.56%	-0.55%
Germany	-0.48%	-0.54%	-0.52%
Sweden	-0.45%	-0.50%	-0.47%
Austria	-0.41%	-0.38%	-0.37%
Italy	-0.35%	-0.41%	-0.29%
France	-0.33%	-0.37%	-0.27%
Cyprus	-0.33%	-0.37%	-0.28%
Denmark	-0.25%	-0.31%	-0.20%
Finland	-0.19%	-0.25%	-0.14%
Spain	0.26%	0.23%	0.32%
Ireland	0.51%	0.47%	0.56%
Malta	1.10%	1.06%	1.16%
Belgium	1.27%	1.21%	1.32%
Slovenia	1.34%	1.31%	1.40%
Portugal	1.54%	1.50%	1.60%
Greece	2.20%	2.16%	2.25%
Hungary	3.09%	3.06%	3.15%
Czech Republic	3.21%	3.17%	3.26%
Slovakia	3.31%	3.27%	3.36%
Estonia	3.79%	3.76%	3.85%
Poland	3.80%	3.76%	3.85%
Lithuania	4.44%	4.41%	4.50%
Latvia	4.45%	4.40%	4.51%
Luxembourg	5.84%	5.80%	5.89%

Genuinely tax-based own resource as from 2014

As shown above, the Commission's new own resources proposal does not foresee the introduction of new sources of funding for the next financial perspectives but rather tries to update the national contribution shares via the generalised correction mechanism. Nevertheless, in its Report on the operation of the own resources system, the Commission argues in favour of introducing as from 2014 a genuine fiscal own resource.[5]

With this new tax based resource the Commission aims at "forging the link between citizens and the EU budget". It would increase understanding by citizens of the resources going to the EU budget and would make decision makers more accountable. The fiscal resource would be introduced progressively as a replacement to the current VAT resource, alongside a more limited GNI resource. Since it would thus replace existing resources it would be neutral in terms of the level of EU funding.

At the current stage of EU integration a fully tax-based system is considered not realistic by the Commission and is therefore not proposed.

The Commission's three options

The Commission's three main candidates as tax based own resource are

Ø a share of the tax rate on energy consumption, limited to motor fuel for road transport ("eco-tax") with consideration also being given to aviation fuel and related emissions as a possible future development to end the current tax exemption for jet fuel;

Ø a share of the national VAT rate, making the financing of the EU more understandable to citizens (EU and national VAT should appear as separate taxes on the invoices or receipts);

Ø a share of the corporate income tax as a longer term option.

By chosing any of these three options the concept of the EU as a Union of Member States and citizens would be transposed into the area of financing the EU budget. Strengthening the direct link of citizens to the budget would also help focussing expenditure debates on substance rather than on purely national budget net positions.

Feasibility of the Commission's options

As to the feasibility of the three options the following remarks can be made:

Option 1: Own resources system with fiscal resources related to energy consumption

The introduction of a fiscal resource based on road transport fuel would be technically possible in around 3 - 6 years. It would be relatively simple from an administrative point of view as the tax base is already harmonised at EU level by the new directive on energy taxation.[6]

EU rates below half of the minimum rates set by the directive would be enough to finance half of the EU budget.

Option 2: Own resources system with a fiscal VAT resource

The introduction of an EU VAT rate would be technically possible in around 6 years. Contrary to the current "statistical" VAT resource, it would create a clear direct link between the financing of the EU budget and the citizen and would increase awareness of the costs of the Union. Potential difficulties with this proposal are related to incomplete harmonisation of Member States' VAT systems mainly linked to zero-rated goods. If the effects of zero-rates could be neutralised, the EU rate would have the same impact on comparable consumers across the Union.

An EU rate of 1% would be enough to cover about half of the financing needs of the EU budget.

Option 3 - Own resources system with a fiscal resource based on corporate income

This alternative would take longest to implement, both from a political as well as from an administrative perspective. It would need a common consolidated tax base with a minimum tax rate instead of 25 separate national tax systems and a multiplicity of tax laws, conventions and practices.

Since revenue from corporate income taxes is significant (with total revenue in the EU currently representing on average 2,6% of total EU GNI), for the needs of the EU budget less than a quarter of that revenue would need to be assigned to the EU.

• [1]  OJ L 253, 7.10.2000, p. 42
• [2]  Article 5(1) restricts the financing share in the cost of the British rebate of Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden to one fourth of their normal share resulting from the calculation method.
• [3]  COM(2004)0505.
• [4]  COM(2004)0501.
• [5]  This reflects in a single article (Art. 9) of the actual own resources proposal which reads: The Commission shall submit to the Council a proposal to modify the own resources structure by introducing a genuinely tax-based own resource to be operational from 1 January 2014.
• [6]  Directive 2003/96/EC of 27.10.2003 of the Council restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity (OJ L 283 of 31.10.2003).

WORKING DOCUMENT NR. 4 ON THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S OWN RESOURCES

8 November 2006

Starting point

Background

Parliament’s demands …

In its opinion[1] to the 1999 Commission proposal on which the current own resources system is based, Parliament asked for a system of EU revenue that should be

· simple and readily understood by the public,

· based on criteria that best expressed the ability to contribute while, at the same time, avoiding recourse to compensation mechanisms for purposes of revenue,

· independent of transfers from Member States and

· that should do away with those features of the existing system which generate confusion because of the exemptions applicable to national contributions.

… and Council’s response

The Council decision[2] that was finally adopted on 29 September 2000, entering into force on 1 March 2002, did anything but fulfil these demands: It has codified the UK rebate as well as the adjustments of the financing shares for the rebate of Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden - instead of planning for a phasing-out of the UK rebate a similar mechanism was extended to other Member States. By raising the share of traditional own resources that can be retained by the Member States to compensate for their collection costs from 10% to 25%, the “traditional own resources”-part of EU revenue was further reduced.

However, despite all these arrangements that were not welcomed by Parliament, the Council decision also contained some chances for a "better" future in form of a detailed revision clause.

The “Schreyer proposals” of 2004

In July 2004, in accordance with Article 9 of the Council decision, the Commission presented its Report on the operation of the own resources system[3] as well as proposals for a new decision on the system of own resources and for an implementing regulation for the correction of budgetary imbalances[4].

In its report, the Commission proposed that the Council reflect on the introduction by 2014 of a new funding system for the EU, centred around a main fiscal resource based on either energy, VAT or corporate income tax. This tax based resource would replace existing resources and would therefore be neutral in terms of the level of EU funding.

Three main candidates as a tax based own resource were listed, namely a share of:

· the tax rate on energy consumption, limited to motor fuel for road transport[5]

· the national VAT rate, making the financing of the EU more understandable to citizens[6]

· a corporate income tax[7].

A fully tax-based system was not considered realistic at this stage of EU integration and not proposed by the Commission. The fiscal resource would be introduced progressively as a replacement to the current VAT resource, alongside a more limited GNI resource.

As for the question of the British rebate, the Commission proposed to adjust the existing correction mechanism so as to apply it to all main contributors, while giving assurances to those not benefiting from such a correction that the cost for them would not soar, by limiting the volume of corrections to a maximum amount.[8]

Your rapporteur thought the Commission’s ideas very interesting and worth serious reflection. However, the Member States seemed not willing to pursue them and the new Commission, instituted in 2005, made no serious effort for progress. Of course, this standstill was mainly due to the ongoing negotiations for the new multiannual financial framework and to the fact that EU expenditure and revenue could not be considered isolated from each other.

At the Brussels European Council in December 2005, Member States could finally agree on a new financial perspective for 2007 – 2013, an agreement on expenditure that had only become possible by granting far-reaching concessions for this, that and the other Member State on the revenue side.

The “reform” proposed by the Brussels European Council 2005

In consequence, the Commission proposal of 2006 aiming at implementing the results of the European Council’s conclusions makes the financing of the European Union's budget certainly not more, but less, transparent, so that not even the adherence to the principle of equity can be judged easily. The requirements for a new system as adopted by the European Parliament in its position of 1999 again are certainly not met.

According to this proposal, some Member States were to benefit, between 2007-2013, from reduced rates of call of VAT or from gross reductions in their annual GNI contributions. These gross reductions would be financed by all Member States, including the two beneficiaries themselves.

The proposal, in principle, leaves the UK correction, the "British rebate", intact except for expenditure in the new Member States (which will be excluded from total allocated expenditure for the purpose of calculating the UK correction). However, CAP market expenditure in the new Member States shall be excluded from this exception, i.e. be part of the total allocated expenditure that is used for calculating the UK rebate.

Parliament's opinion - Lamassoure report 2006

Because this latest Commission proposal does anything but meet the criteria set out by Parliament in its 1999 resolution and is running against his own personal conviction on the need for a profound reform towards more simplicity, equity and transparency, your rapporteur in his report adopted on 4 July 2006[9] has limited himself to additions to the text stressing the importance of the review process to come.

His amendments have simply indicated the conditions for the review and Parliament's involvement, as laid down in the new Interinstitutional Agreement of 17 May 2006 on budgetary discipline and sound financial management. Special provisions for certain Member States may be unavoidable in the current system. They are, however, anything but desirable and should only be considered a necessary evil until a new, genuinely fair system has been devised in the review process.

In his report your rapporteur also pointed out that the conclusions of the dialogue on the own resources topic that has been led between the national parliaments and the European Parliament for some time now should be duly taken into account for the review. He concluded that he intended to present the results of the work conducted jointly by the national parliaments and the European Parliament in a comprehensive own initiative report on the future of the EU's own resources in the months to come.

• [1]  Resolution of 11 March 1999, on the need to modify and reform the European Union’s own resources system (Haug report).
• [2]  Council Decision 2000/597.
• [3]  (COM(2004)0505).
• [4]  Both proposals contained in COM(2004)501final/2
• [5]  Consideration was also given to aviation fuel and related emissions as a possible future development to end the current tax exemption for jet fuel.
• [6]  There would be no additional tax burden as the EU rate would be offset by an equivalent decrease of the national VAT rate. The EU and national VAT should appear as separate taxes on the invoices or receipts.
• [7]  This alternative would take longest to implement since a political agreement would be needed on the principle of achieving harmonization of the tax base, before setting a minimum rate.
• [8]  This general correction mechanism would be triggered if net contributions exceeded 0.35% of each country’s GNI. Contributions above this would be refunded at a rate of 66%. The total refund volume would be limited to a maximum of EUR 7.5 billion a year. The introduction of the mechanism should be accompanied by transitional measures for the UK in order to alleviate the financial impact of the changeover, over a 4-year period.
• [9]  T6-0292/2006

WORKING DOCUMENT NR. 5 ON THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S OWN RESOURCES

13 November 2006

Towards the review

"If we, as parliamentarians, want a say on the finances of the Union, as to both revenue and expenditure, the review process 2008 - 2009, will be our opportunity, but the formulation of that [our] input needs to begin right away."

Lord Grenfell in his summary of Working Group 4 of the

Joint Parliamentary Meeting on the Future of Europe, 8-9 May 2005

The need for reform

The negotiations for the new Financial Framework 2007-2013 have shown that the current system of own resources does not provide the European Union of 25 (27) Member States with a solid and coherent financial basis for implementing its political choices. The Member States' contributions still come out of the national budgets. They are calculated according to a method that has become increasingly obscure, unfair and impossible for the citizens to understand. Besides, the modalities of the current system are decided behind closed doors without any parliamentary control.

Your rapporteur is deeply convinced that EU revenue needs to be thoroughly reformed in a way which prevents Member States from only wanting to spend Community funds in those areas where they themselves profit most instead of concentrating the money available on those policies beneficial to Europe as a whole and most important for its future.

The "full and wide-ranging review of all areas of EU expenditure and revenue, including the British rebate"[1], which the Commission has been invited to undertake by the Brussels European Council of last December, with a view to reporting in 2008 / 2009, may offer a last chance in the foreseeable future, to create such a new and truly European system which could then become operational at the beginning of the next financial framework starting in 2014. For all past efforts to steer the Union towards a more transparent system that is fair by its own virtue have failed so far.

Cooperation with the national parliaments

When studying the proposals made by the Commission in 2004[2], your rapporteur came to the conclusion that any work of the European Parliament on the own resources topic with an aim to finding an equitable, simple and transparent solution would need to be done in close cooperation with the parliaments of the Member States because it was them, that in the end, would need to agree on any proposal made.

This was why the own resources topic was put on the agenda of the June 2005 meeting of the EP Committee on Budgets with the national parliaments' budget committees. The positive reaction of the representatives of the national parliaments to having the own resources item on the agenda and the interesting and open discussions led on this occasion encouraged your rapporteur to proceed in this direction.

In November 2005, a questionnaire drafted by the rapporteur was sent to all budget committees of the national parliaments. The objective of this questionnaire was to begin to explore whether some central basic principles for a reform of the own resources system could be established which could be supported by the European Parliament and a representative majority of the parliaments of the Member States ("old" and "new" ones, "net-payers" and "net-contributors", Southern and Northern ones, etc.).

The reactions to this questionnaire were manifold: Some parliaments, for one reason or another, chose not to reply at all, some parliaments replied in writing and some parliaments invited the rapporteur for a personal exchange of views. So far, the rapporteur has been given the opportunity to speak to the budget committees, or their representatives, of Luxembourg, Portugal, Finland, France, Germany, Spain, Belgium and Hungary.

In analysing the written replies to the questionnaire as well as the results of the bilateral meetings, some general points of possible agreement have slowly begun to emerge. These were further developed by the Working Group on Own Resources of the Interparliamentary meeting of 8 – 9 May 2006, jointly organised by the European Parliament and the Austrian Parliament in Brussels.

Many participants of this meeting considered the idea of supporting a future informal working group of parliamentarians to feed suggestions into the review planned for 2008 / 2009 as a good way to ensure that parliaments were fully involved in the process[3]. This positive assessment on establishing a working group was also shared by the participants of the annual meeting between the chairs of the national parliaments' committees on budget and the EP's Committee on Budgets which took place on 21 June 2006 in Brussels and which provided an excellent opportunity for another round of talks.

In your rapporteur's view, the next Joint Parliamentary Meeting of 4 - 5 December 2006 will offer the opportunity to promote the involvement of the European Parliament and the national parliaments in the review process and steer the dialogue into a more structured phase. "The future financing of the Union" will again be the topic of one Working Group. Interesting and productive discussions on the basis of the work already done jointly will certainly follow.

If parliamentary contacts, be they on a multilateral or bilateral level, continue in the spirit of mutual trust and openness they have started in, your rapporteur is convinced that some common understanding on basic principles how the own resources system of the future should look like could be achieved between the European Parliament and the parliaments of the Member States.

Own initiative report on the future of the EU's own resources

Your rapporteur intends to include the results of the work conducted jointly by the national parliaments and the European Parliament in his own initiative report on the future of the EU's own resources, to be debated and voted in plenary in spring of 2007. This report could then provide some common guidelines for the Commission's review work, thus giving a clear signal to the Heads of State and government of what their parliaments' concepts for the future may be.

Basic principles for any new system

With the Schreyer proposals of 2004 as a starting point and the study on own resources commissioned by Parliament in 2005[4] as some further food for thought, your rapporteur, in his numerous discussions with representatives of the national parliaments, would hope for a consensus emerging on the following cornerstones for a reform:

· Full respect of the fiscal sovereignty of the Member States

Under no circumstances shall a new system grant the European Union the right to levy taxes. Fiscal sovereignty will remain with the Member States alone who might authorise the Union for a limited period of time to directly benefit from a certain share of a tax. This decision by the Member States can be revoked at any time.

· Fiscal neutrality

All other things equal, the transfer of a policy to the European level must not increase overall public expenditure nor the tax burden for the citizens. Should a new system directly allocate part of a tax to the European Union, an equivalent reduction will have to take place elsewhere.

· No changes to the order of magnitude of the EU budget

The ceiling of 1,24% of GNI will be taken for granted. Reforming the own resources of the Union shall not result in any increase in the level of magnitude of the budget, which is a different issue.

· Progressive phasing-in of the new system

Transition periods for a gradual introduction of the new system have to be foreseen. If political agreement could be achieved, a first phase of the reform could start from 2009. While keeping the system of national contributions as such, it could be modified to become more simple, transparent and absolutely in proportion with the relative wealth of each Member State.

· Establishment of a clear political link between a reform of revenue and a reform of expenditure

A reform of the structure of EU revenue and a reform of the structure of EU expenditure have to go hand in hand, as foreseen in Declaration 3 of the new Interinstitutional agreement. Changing from a system of Member States’ contributions to a system of genuine own resources directly allocated to the Union will also free EU expenditure from having to comply with any “I want my money back!” requirements.

Further considerations

While it is clear to your rapporteur that the time for a genuine European tax has not yet come,

in the long term, the possibility of returning to a system as originally intended by the Treaty of Rome should be considered. The burden on national treasuries of contributing to EU finances could be reduced by directly attributing to the European Union a fiscal resource, decided upon within a national framework but closely linked to community activities. Such a second phase could be progressively introduced from 2014.

In order to have up-to-date reliable data to explore concrete possibilities for future components of EU revenue, your rapporteur is also looking forward to the results of a study commissioned by the European Parliament in October 2006 which will focus on some taxes that might be candidates for a new Own resources system. To clearly establish the political choices available, the Commission could also be invited to present a detailed account of the advantages and disadvantages of existing national taxes that could be used for this purpose while fully respecting the basic principles as listed above.

In his initiative report on own resources that is scheduled to go to plenary in spring 2007 your rapporteur, on the basis of the work done in the last year, in close cooperation with the national parliaments, expects to be in a position to present some concrete ideas on how a future system of own resources that is fair and easily understandable for our citizens and can do without compensation mechanisms and national exemptions, could look like.

ANNEX

Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary discipline and sound financial management

3. Declaration on the review of the financial framework

1. In accordance with the conclusions of the European Council, the Commission has been invited to undertake a full, wide-ranging review covering all aspects of EU spending, including the Common Agricultural Policy, and of resources, including the United Kingdom rebate, and to report in 2008/2009. That review should be accompanied by an assessment of the functioning of the Interinstitutional Agreement. The European Parliament will be associated with the review at all stages of the procedure on the basis of the following provisions:

- during the examination phase following the presentation of the review by the Commission, it will be ensured that appropriate discussions take place with the European Parliament on the basis of the normal political dialogue between the institutions and that the positions of the European Parliament are duly taken into account;

- in accordance with its conclusions of December 2005, the European Council "can take decisions on all the subjects covered by the review". The European Parliament will be part of any formal follow-up steps, in accordance with the relevant procedures and in full respect of its established rights.

2.     The Commission undertakes, as part of the process of consultation and reflection leading up to the establishment of the review, to draw on the in-depth exchange of views it will conduct with European Parliament when analysing the situation. The Commission also takes note of the European Parliament's intention to call for a conference involving the European Parliament and the national parliaments to review the own-resources system. It will consider the outcome of any such conference as a contribution in the framework of that consultation process. It is understood that the Commission's proposals will be put forward entirely under its own responsibility.

20.12.2006

OPINJONI għall-Kumitat għall-Kontroll tal-Baġit

għall-Kumitat għall-Baġits

dwar il-futur tar-riżorsi proprji ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea

(2006/2205(INI))

Rapporteur għal opinjoni: Bart Staes

SUĠĠERIMENTI

Il-Kumitat għall-Kontroll tal-Baġit jistieden lill-Kumitat għall-Baġit, bħala l-Kumitat responsabbli, sabiex jinkorpora s-suġġerimenti li ġejjin fil-mozzjoni għal riżoluzzjoni li se jadotta:

1. Jinnota li s-sistema tad-dħul ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea saret waħda antikwata. Il-kontribuzzjonijiet nazzjonali, li fil-bidu kienu maħsuba bħala riżorsi supplimentari (“riżorsi tal-VAT”) jew bħala riżorsi speċjali (“riżorsi tal-GNP"), illum jiffurmaw 90% ta’ l-iffinanzjament ta’ l-Unjoni; f’livell bħal dan, u meta wieħed iqis il-ħafna aġġustamenti tekniċi li saru matul is-snin, is-sistema issa qed tippreżenta żvantaġġi inaċċettabbli, fatt li kien rikonoxxut ukoll mill-Kummissjoni u mis-Segretarjat tal-Kunsill;

2. Jenfasizza li din is-sistema tikkostitwixxi dgħajfien serju fl-ispirtu Komunitarju. Li n-nefqa komuni tkun iffinanzjata permezz ta’ kontribuzzjoni nazzjonali jfisser li kull pajjiż ikun imwassal li jirraġuna fis-sens ta’ “rendimenti ġusti”. Jistieden lill-Istati Membri u l-Kummissjoni biex isibu rimedju, filwaqt li jistennew sistema ġdida ta' riżorsi proprji, In-nuqqasijiet tas-sistema reali ta' riżorsi proprji tradizzjonali, ir-riżorsi proprji bbażati fuq il-VAT u l-GNI, kif ġie nnutat fir-rapport annwali ta' l-2005 tal-Qorti ta' l-Awdituri. Jistieden lill-Kummissjoni biex tippreżenta kemm jista' jkun malajr proposta għall-FSIM (Servizzi ta' Intermedjazzjoni Finanzjarja Mkejla b'Mod Indirett);

3. Jaqbel mal-Qorti Ewropea ta' l-Awdituri[5] li huwa diffiċli ħafna li ssir riforma bir-reqqa tas-sistema tar-riżorsi proprji tal-Komunità jekk id-diskussjoni ta' riforma bħal din issir flimkien ma' negozjati dwar limiti massimi finanzjarji u ammonti li jridu jintnefqu għal politiki Komunitarji skond qafas finanzjarju plurijennali;

4. Għalhekk jilqa' l-fatt li l-klawsola ta' reviżjoni miftiehma mill-Kunsill Ewropew ta' Brussell tal-15 u s-16 ta' Diċembru 2005 tippermetti b'mod ċar it-tħejjija u l-aċċettazzjoni ta' riforma sħiħa tas-sistema tar-riżorsi proprji qabel tmiem it-term tat-tbassira finanzjarja ġdida;

5. Ifakkar li kwalunkwe sistema tintgħażel, għandha tkun trasparenti u effiċjenti f'sens ta' nfiq u għandha tinkludi l-prinċipju li d-dejta tal-benefiċjarji kollha ta' l-iffinanzjar Ewropew għandha tkun pubblika. Is-sistema għandha tkun mibnija b’tali mod li l-frodi u l-irregolaritajiet ikunu evitati, li l-prinċipju tal-valur għall-flus jinżamm u li l-Qorti Ewropea ta' l-Awdituri jkollha kontroll xieraq u effettiv fil-livelli kollha;

6. Jinsisti li kull riforma ta’ dan it-tip għandha tkun newtrali fl-ispejjeż sabiex tkun aċċettata mill-pubbliku; m’għandhiex tirriżulta f’żieda fin-nefqa pubblika u f'piż fuq dawk li jħallsu t-taxxa; l-uffiċċji nazzjonali tal-verifika u l-Qorti Ewropea ta’ l-Awdituri għandhom jintalbu jivverifikaw li dan il-prinċipju jkun applikat b’mod korrett.

7. B'konformità man-natura doppja ta' l-UE bħala Unjoni taċ-ċittadini u ta' l-Istati, id-deċiżjoni dwar sistema ġdida ta' riżorsi proprji għandha tittieħed mill-Parlament Ewropew u l-Kunsill flimkien;

8. Ir-responsabilità ta' l-organi Ewropej lejn min iħallas it-taxxa għandha titjieb biex tissaħħaħ il-fiduċja taċ-ċittadini fihom. L-iffinanzjar ta' l-UE jinkludi wkoll l-adattament tal-perjodu tal-qafas finanzjarju plurijennali mal-perjodu leġiżlattiv tal-Parlament Ewropew;

9. Fir-rigward tal-baġit annwali, it-tmiem tad-distinzjoni bejn infiq obbligatorju u nfiq mhux obbligatorju, stipulat diġà fit-Trattat tal-Kostituzzjoni, għandu jiġi implimentat kemm jista' jkun malajr sabiex tiġi ggarantita kodeċiżjoni sħiħa fil-kategoriji kollha tal-baġit;

10. Jistieden lill-Kumitat kompetenti tiegħu biex jorganizza konferenza dwar il-futur tar-riżorsi proprji ta' l-Unjoni bil-parteċipazzjoni ta' rappreżentanti mill-Parlamenti Nazzjonali ta' l-Istati Membri.

PROĊEDURA

Titolu	Il-futur tar-riżorsi proprji ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea
Referenzi	2006/2205(INI)
Kumitat responsabbli	BUDG
Opinjoni mogħtija minn   Data tat-tħabbir fis-seduta plenarja	CONT 7.9.2006
Koperazzjoni aktar mill-qrib - data tat-tħabbir fis-seduta plenarja
Rapporteur għal opinjoni     Data tal-ħatra	Bart Staes 20.6.2006
Eżami fil-kumitat	27.11.2006		20.12.2006
Data ta' l-adozzjoni	20.12.2006
Riżultat tal-votazzjoni finali	+: –: 0:	22
Membri preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali	Inés Ayala Sender, Herbert Bösch, Paul van Buitenen, Simon Busuttil, Paulo Casaca, Antonio De Blasio, Petr Duchoň, Szabolcs Fazakas, Christofer Fjellner, Ingeborg Gräßle, Umberto Guidoni, Dan Jørgensen, Ona Juknevičienė, Rodi Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou, Jan Mulder, Bart Staes, Margarita Starkevičiūtė, Kyösti Virrankoski, Marilisa Xenogiannakopoulou
Sostitut(i) preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali	Daniel Caspary, Valdis Dombrovskis, Paul Rübig
Sostitut(i) (skond l-Artikolu 178(2)) preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali

1.2.2007

OPINJONI tal-kumitat għall-affarijiet ekonomiċi u monetarji

għall-Kumitat għall-Baġits

dwar il-futur tar-riżorsi proprji ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea

(2006/2205(INI))

Rapporteur għal opinjoni: Elisa Ferreira

SUĠĠERIMENTI

Il-Kumitat għall-Affarijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji jistieden lill-Kumitat għall-Baġits, bħala l-kumitat responsabbli, sabiex jinkorpora s-suġġerimenti li ġejjin fil-mozzjoni għal riżoluzzjoni li se jadotta:

1.   Itenni mill-ġdid il-ħtieġa li tkun riveduta s-sistema kurrenti tar-riżorsi proprji sabiex issir iktar trasparenti, ġusta, sempliċi, li tinftiehem miċ-ċittadini Ewropej, u kompatibbli mal-prinċipju ta' solidarjetà Ewropea;

2.   Jenfasizza l-importanza ta' l-involviment tal-Parlament fl-"iskambju ta' opinjonijiet fil-fond" dwar ir-riforma tas-sistema tar-riżorsi proprji ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea, kif stipulata fil-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali tas-17 ta' Mejju 2006;

3.   Jirrikonoxxi li d-diskussjoni diffiċli dwar il-Prospettivi Finanzjarji 2007-2013 kif ukoll il-kumplessità tal-ftehim finali juru l-limiti tas-sistema preżenti u jikkonfermaw kemm hi xierqa u f'waqtha l-inizjattiva preżenti;

4.   Jilqa' l-metodu ta' ħidma li użat ir-rapporteur u, b'mod partikulari, l-involviment mill-qrib tal-parlamenti nazzjonali fl-istadji differenti tal-proċedura, li ppermetta l-konverġenza;

{AM\FR\647025}5.   Jikkunsidra r-riżorsi proprji bħala ċentrali għar-reviżjoni tal-perspettiva finanzjarja; għandu l-intenzjoni, għalhekk, li jibda l-preparamenti għal dan l-avveniment ewlieni mingħajr aktar dewmien, billi juża metodu biex jassigura l-involviment tal-kumitati kollha konċernati, wara l-preċedent pożittiv tan-negozjati inizjali;

6.   Jistenna b'ħerqa r-riżultati ta' l-istudji tekniċi kkummissjonati mill-Parlament f'Ottubru 2006 bħala bażi għall-għażla politika dwar mekkaniżmi alternattivi ta' ffinanzjar tal-baġit, li madankollu m'għandhom la jżidu l-piż tat-taxxa fuq ċittadini Ewropej u lanqas jippermettu t-tkomplija ta' skemi ta' kumpens ta' Stati Membri individwali; jemmen li l-impatt makroekonomiku tal-mekkaniżmi differenti li qed jiġu kkunsidrati għandhom jiġu evalwati;

7.   Jisħaq li l-prinċipju tas-sovranità ta' l-Istati Membri fi kwistjonijiet ta' taxxa irid jingħaqad mal-ħtieġa għal baġit komuni sod li kapaċi jappoġġja dawk il-politiki li huma żviluppati b'mod aktar effettiv f'livell ta' l-UE, bħat-tisħiħ tas-solidarjetà interna u l-kompetittività esterna;

{AM\EN\647025}8.   Jissuġġerixxi li għandu jkun hemm aktar ċarezza u trasparenza għal ċittadini Ewropej fir-rigward tar-riżorsi proprji ta' l-UE, biex iservu bħala dixxiplina meħtieġa fuq il-Kummissjoni u l-awtorità baġitarja dwar id-deċiżjonijiet tagħhom dwar l-infiq;

9.   Juri l-ħtieġa li s-sistema l-ġdida tkun ibbażata fuq l-prinċipju tal-progressività u b'hekk tirrifletti, fejn meħtieġ, il-livelli ta' dħul ta' l-Istati Membri individwali sabiex jiġi determinat sa liema punt se jkunu jistgħu jikkontribwixxu għall-baġit ta' l-UE;

10. Jenfasizza aktar l-implikazzjonijiet li ż-żieda fis-sħubija jista' jkollha fuq il-kapaċità ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea biex tintegra, primarjament fir-rigward tal-politiki ta' koeżjoni tagħha; jissuġġerixxi, għalhekk, li kull reviżjoni tas-sistema attwali tar-riżorsi proprji għandha tassigura s-sostenibilità tat-tkabbir kemm ta' l-imgħoddi kif ukoll tal-ġejjieni;

11. Isostni li l-potenzjal ta' formuli ta' tassazzjoni eżistenti għandu jiġi esplorat kompletament qabel ma jiġu kkunsidrati oħrajn ġodda sabiex tiġi evitata l-introduzzjoni ta' formuli ġodda li jistgħu jġibu magħhom aktar pressjoni ta' taxxa;

12. Jenfasizza li, kif dikjarat fil-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali ġdida, l-ispirtu tar-riforma globali għandu jinkludi kemm id-dħul kif ukoll l-infiq tal-baġit, u jinkludi reviżjoni aktar akkurata ta' ċerti intestaturi dwar l-infiq, bħal dik konnessa mal-politika agrikola komuni, biex b'hekk ikun assigurat li l-Unjoni Ewropea għandha baġit, min-naħa tad-dħul u min-naħa ta' l-infiq, li jikkontribwixxi għas-suċċess ta' l-istrateġija ta' Liżbona;

13. Jappoġġja d-dħul gradwali ta' kwalunkwe mekkaniżmu ta' ffinanzjar ġdid, bħall-introduzzjoni ta' riżorsi proprji ġenwini ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea, fil-forma, per eżempju, ta' taxxa fuq il-valur miżjud, taxxa tas-sisa fuq il-fjuwil tal-karozzi għat-trasport fit-toroq, taxxa tas-sisa fuq it-tabakk u l-alkoħol, taxxa ambjentali jew perċentwali tat-taxxa fuq il-kumpaniji kkalkulata skond bażi ta' taxxa komuni kkonsolidata matul perjodu ta' tranżizzjoni estiż.

PROĊEDURA

Titolu	Il-futur tar-riżorsi proprji ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea
Numru tal-proċedura	2006/2205(INI)
Kumitat risponsabbli	BUDG
Opinjoni mogħtija minn   Data tat-tħabbir fis-seduta plenarja	ECON 16.11.2006
Koperazzjoni aktar mill-qrib - data tat-tħabbir fis-seduta plenarja
Rapporteur ta' opinjoni        Data tal-ħatra	Elisa Ferreira 24.10.2006
Rapporteur ta' opinjoni preċedenti
Diskussjoni fil-kumitat	19.12.2006		23.1.2007
Data ta' l-adozzjoni	30.1.2007
Riżultat tal-votazzjoni finali	+: –: 0:	41 0 1
Membri preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali	Zsolt László Becsey, David Casa, Konstantin Dimitrov, Pervenche Berès, Sharon Bowles, Udo Bullmann, Ieke van den Burg, Elisa Ferreira, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Jean-Paul Gauzès, Donata Gottardi, Sophia in 't Veld, Othmar Karas, Piia-Noora Kauppi, Evgeni Kirilov, Wolf Klinz, Christoph Konrad, Kurt Joachim Lauk, Andrea Losco, Astrid Lulling, Gay Mitchell, Cristobal Montoro Romero, Joseph Muscat, John Purvis, Alexander Radwan, Bernhard Rapkay, Eoin Ryan, Antolín Sánchez Presedo, Manuel António dos Santos, Olle Schmidt, Margarita Starkevičiūtė, Ivo Strejček, Sahra Wagenknecht, Lars Wohlin
Sostitut/i preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali	Harald Ettl, Vladimír Maňka, Thomas Mann, Giovanni Pittella
Sostitut/i preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali skond ir-Regola 178(2)	Dariusz Maciej Grabowski, Holger Krahmer, Kurt Lechner, Heide Rühle
Kummenti (disponibbli b'lingwa waħda biss)	...

27.2.2007

OPINJONI tal-Kumitat għall-Iżvilupp Reġjonali

għall-Kumitat għall-Baġits

dwar il-futur tar-riżorsi proprji ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea

(2006/2205(INI))

Rapporteur għal opinjoni: Gerardo Galeote

SUĠĠERIMENTI

Il-Kumitat għall-Iżvilupp Reġjonali jistieden lill-Kumitat għall-Baġit, bħala l-Kumitat responsabbli, sabiex jinkorpora s-suġġerimenti li ġejjin fil-mozzjoni għal riżoluzzjoni li se jadotta:

1.   Jilqa' d-deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill Ewropew tal-15 u s-16 ta' Diċembru 2005 li titlob lill-Kummissjoni biex jagħmlu użu minn reviżjoni sħiħa u varjetà wiesgħa ta' l-aspetti kollha ta' l-infiq u r-riżorsi ta' l-UE u biex tirrapporta fl-2008/2009; jilqa' wkoll id-dikjarazzjoni dwar ir-reviżjoni tal-qafas finanzjarju anness mal-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali bejn il-Parlament, il-Kunsill u l-Kummissjoni tas-17 ta' Mejju 2006 dwar id-dixxiplina baġitarja u l-immaniġġjar finanzjarju sod[6]; jisgħobbih li l-Kunsill Ewropew qabel ma' iżjed tnaqqis għal ċertu pajjiżi li jikkontribwixxu n-net, li jagħmel is-sistema tar-riżorsi proprji iżjed u iżjed kumplikati u jitfa' iżjed enfasi fuq il-kunċett li ma jaħsibx fit-tul tal-'juste retour';

2.   Ifakkar li l-prinċipju ta' l-awtonomija finanzjarja, kif imsemmi fl-Artikolu 269 tat-Trattat KE u implimentat mid-Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill Nru 70/243/ECSC, KEE, Euratom tal-21 ta' April 1970 dwar it-tibdil tal-kontribuzzjonijiet finanzjarji min-naħa ta' l-Istati Membri mir-riżorsi proprji tal-Komunitajiet[7], kien ibbażat fuq ir-rieda li jiġi żgurat li l-Komunità tiddisponi minn riżorsi suffiċjenti biex jibqgħu indipendenti mill-kunsiderazzjonijiet nazzjonali u biex jiġi żgurat ir-rispett għall-prinċipju tas-solidarjetà li fuqu hija mwaqqfa l-politika reġjunali ta' l-Unjoni;

3.   Jirrikonoxxi li l-prinċipji tas-sovranità fiskali, tas-sussidjarjetà, tan-newtralità fiskali u tal-kontabilità jridu jiġu rispettati;

4.   Jitlob lill-Kummissjoni, fil-kuntest tar-reviżjoni tagħha ta' l-2008, biex tikkunsidra b'mod serju l-bżonn li tiġi żgurata rabta trasparenti, diretta u sempliċi bejn ir-riżorsi ta' l-Unjoni u ċ-ċittadini ta' l-Unjoni billi tiġi introdotta sistema ta' riżorsi inqas kumplessa u iżjed demokratika għall-Unjoni u biex tiġi provduta informazzjoni aħjar kemm fil-livell Ewropew kif ukoll f'dak nazzjonali billi jitqiesu l-problemi reġjunali fir-rigward ta' l-oriġini ta' l-iffinanzjar ta' l-Unjoni;

5.   Jipproponi li, biex tiġi żgurata rabta bħal din, għandha tingħata kunsiderazzjoni li titħallas parti mit-taxxa identifikata lill-baġit ta' l-Unjoni, filwaqt li jitqiesu b'mod xieraq ir-rekwiżiti tat-Trattat fir-rigward tar-reġjuni l-iżjed 'il barra (Artikolu 299(2) tat-Trattat KE);

6.   Jirrikonoxxi li, għall-futur qrib, billi jitqiesu l-poteri u r-responsabilitajiet futuri ta' l-Unjoni, il-kontribuzzjonijiet nazzjonali se jibqgħu sors importanti ta' dħul għall-Unjoni; madankollu jħeġġeġ lill-Kummissjoni biex tipproponi sistema ta' żieda fid-dħul li tnaqqas b'mod sinifikanti l-importanza relattiva ta' kontribuzzjonijiet nazzjonali bħal dawn filwaqt li jinżamm livell minimu ta' kontribuzzjonijiet ibbażat fuq il-prosperità relattiva ta' kull Stat Membru;

7.   Jenfasizza l-bżonn li jiġi żgurat li kwalunkwe sistema ġdida tirrifletti l-prosperità relattiva ta' kull Stat Membru u l-kapaċità tiegħu li jħallas;

8    Jitlob lill-mexxejja Ewropej biex ma jillimitawx id-diskussjonijiet għas-suġġett tan-nefqa, imma biex jenfasizzaw fuq il-benefiċċji li joħorġu minnu u fuq ir-redditi fuq l-investiment, speċjalment għall-iktar Stati Membri antiki;

9.   Jitlob li l-'prinċipju ta' Fontainebleau' jiġi rrispettat sakemm din il-koeżjoni territorjali ta' l-UE ma tiddgħajjifx u bħala konsegwenza jitneħħa t-tnaqqis li m'għadux iżjed ġustifikat b'mod ċar;

10. Jispera li l-kunsiderazzjonijiet reġjunali jitqiesu fid-dibattitu dwar ir-riforma tas-sistema tar-riżorsi proprji li jsir mill-parlamenti nazzjonali u l-Parlament Ewropew, li għandhom jikkonsultaw ukoll lill-Kumitat tar-Reġjuni.  

23.1.2007

OPINJONI tal-Kumitat għall-Affarijiet Kostituzzjonali

għall-Kumitat għall-Baġits

dwar il-futur tar-riżorsi proprji ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea

(2006/2205(INI))

Rapporteur għal opinjoni: Carlos Carnero González

SUĠĠERIMENTI

Il-Kumitat għall-Affarijiet Kostituzzjonali jistieden lill-Kumitat għall-Baġit, bħala l-Kumitat responsabbli, sabiex jinkorpora s-suġġerimenti li ġejjin fil-mozzjoni għal riżoluzzjoni li se jadotta:

1.  Jinnota li s-sistema preżenti ta’ l-Unjoni dwar ir-riżorsi proprji la hija trasparenti u komprensibbli għaċ-ċittadini u lanqas tilħaq l-objettivi stipulati fit-Trattati, b’mod partikulari rigward il-garanzija ta’ l-awtonomija finanzjarja ta’ l-Unjoni;

2.  Iqis li s-sistema tar-riżorsi proprji teħtieġ li tkun adattata għar-riformi istituzzjonali ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea li jsaħħu kemm id-drittijiet taċ-ċittadini u kemm l-irwol li għandhom fl-Unjoni;

3.  Jirrimarka li, minflok ma tipprovdi riżorsi proprji suffiċjenti lill-UE sabiex timplimenta l-politiki tagħha, is-sistema preżenti tagħmel il-finanzjament Komunitarju iktar u iktar inkomprensibbli għall-pubbliku u twassal għal tnaqqis fin-negozjati bejn l-Istati Membri  kemm il-kontributuri netti u kemm il-benefiċjarji netti  fuq il-bażi ta’ l-hekk imsejjaħ ‘dħul ġust’, li kompletament ma jagħtix kas il-ħafna vantaġġi differenti li l-imsieħba Komunitarji kollha jiksbu mis-sħubija tagħhom fl-Unjoni u kwalunkwe loġika ta’ koeżjoni;

4.  Jappoġġja, għalhekk, ir-reviżjoni dettaljata tas-sistema ta’ finanzjament ta’ l-Unjoni (kemm l-infiq u kemm id-dħul) li l-Kummissjoni impenjat ruħha li twettaq fl-2008/2009, f’konformità mal-ftehimiet milħuqa fil-Kunsill Ewropew tal-15 u s-16 ta’ Diċembru 2005 u skond id-dikjarazzjoni dwar ir-reviżjoni tal-qafas finanzjarju annessa mal-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali, bejn il-Parlament Ewropew, il-Kunsill u l-Kummissjoni dwar id-dixxiplina baġitarja u l-immaniġġjar finanzjarju sod tas-17 ta’ Mejju 2006;

5.  Iqis li sistema ġdida ta’ riżorsi proprji ta’ l-UE hija meħtieġa li

- tkun magħmula minn riżorsi proprji Komunitarji ġenwini u mhux minn kontribuzzjonijiet nazzjonali għall-baġit Ewropew;

- isservi b’mod ġenwin sabiex titjieb il-koeżjoni fi ħdan l-Unjoni Ewropea;

- tiggarantixxi mezzi suffiċjenti lill-Unjoni sabiex tiffinanzja l-politiki tagħha b’mod adegwat, speċjalment fid-dawl ta’ tkabbir futur, u sabiex tqabbel b’mod iktar dirett l-infiq tagħha mal-prijoritajiet politiċi tagħha;

- tkun trasparenti u komprensibbli;

- tkun suġġetta għal proċeduri ta’ teħid ta’ deċiżjonijiet u skrutinju kompletament demokratiċi;

- tkun ġusta;

- toħloq rabta diretta bejn iċ-ċittadin u l-Unjoni;

6.  Għal dan il-għan, iqis li tkun ħaġa xierqa li tiġi introdotta riżorsa proprja ġenwina ta’ l-Unjoni ta’ natura fiskali li teħles lill-Unjoni mid-dipendenza tagħha fuq trasferimenti mill-Istati Membri, li tistabbilixxi rabta diretta bejn il-finanzi pubbliċi u dawk Komunitarji, li tkun effettiva u ġusta, u li ma tirrappreżenta l-ebda żieda fil-piż fiskali globali fuq dawk li jħallsu t-taxxa;

7.  Rigward il-mekkaniżmi ta’ teħid ta’ deċiżjonijiet dwar riżorsi proprji,

- jafferma mill-ġdid, bħala l-ewwel pass, li huwa jaqbel mas-sistema maħsuba fil-Kostituzzjoni Ewropea, jiġifieri dispożizzjonijiet bażiċi li jkunu f’liġi Ewropea tal-Kunsill wara konsultazzjoni mal-Parlament u wara li tkun approvata mill-Istati Membri kollha f’konformità mar-regoli kostituzzjonali rispettivi tagħhom, min-naħa l-waħda, u miżuri ta’ implimentazzjoni stipulati b’liġi tal-Kunsill adottata minn maġġoranza kwalifikata wara li tkun approvata mill-Parlament, min-naħa l-oħra;

- jirrimarka, iżda, li tali dispożizzjonijiet jiffurmaw parti inseparabbli mill-ftehima globali dwar il-finanzi ta’ l-Unjoni mħaddna fil-Kostituzzjoni u bbażata fuq l-elementi li ġejjin:

●    l-aħħar kelma dwar riżorsi proprji tibqa’ ta’ l-Istati Membri,

●    il-qafas finanzjarju preżenti huwa inkluż fit-Trattat bis-saħħa ta’ liġi dwar il-qafas finanzjarju plurijennali li tirrikjedi l-ftehim tal-Kunsill u l-Parlament,

●    titneħħa d-distinzjoni bejn infiq obbligatorju u mhux obbligatorju fil-baġit annwali,

●    il-Parlament jingħata setgħa ta’ teħid ta’ deċiżjonijiet fuq il-baġit annwali kollu;

8.  Jenfasizza li l-integrazzjoni politika Ewropea iktar fil-fond se tfisser b’mod inevitabbli s-simplifikazzjoni tal-proċedura tat-teħid ta’ deċiżjonijiet rigward riżorsi proprji sabiex issir iktar effettiva, u l-għoti lill-Parlament tas-setgħa li japprova dawk ir-riżorsi, flimkien mal-parlamenti nazzjonali ta’ l-Istati Membri, sabiex tkun proċedura kompletament Komunitarja;

9.  Huwa tal-fehma li s-suċċess ta’ dik ir-reviżjoni jeħtieġ, flimkien ma’ riforma tas-sistema ta’ riżorsi proprji, riformulazzjoni ta’ l-objettivi ta’ l-infiq ta’ l-Unjoni sabiex jissaħħu l-politiki kollha tagħha, filwaqt li jitqies il-mod li bih jevolvi l-proċess ta’ integrazzjoni Ewropea u fuq il-bażi ta’ riflessjoni konġunta mill-Parlament, il-Kummissjoni, il-Kunsill u l-parlamenti nazzjonali;

10. Iqis li r-reviżjoni ta’ nofs it-terminu tal-qafas finanzjarju tipprovdi opportunità sabiex ikunu riformulati l-objettivi tal-politiki Komunitarji; jixtieq jara, għalhekk, li t-tħejjijiet rilevanti jkunu nbdew mingħajr iktar dewmien, bl-involviment tal-kumitati kollha responsabbli f’dan il-qasam, kif kien il-każ għan-negozjati inizjali;

11. Jilqa’ b’sodisfazzjoni, għalhekk, il-metodoloġija użata mir-rapporteur rigward id-djalogu mal-parlamenti nazzjonali, kif ukoll id-dibattiti produttivi dwar il-futur ta’ l-Ewropa li saru f’fora parlamentari sa llum.

PROĊEDURA

Titolu	Il-futur tar-riżorsi proprji ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea
Numru tal-proċedura	2006/2205(INI)
Kumitat responsabbli	BUDG
Opinjoni mogħtija minn   Data tat-tħabbir fis-seduta plenarja	AFCO 7.9.2006
Koperazzjoni aktar mill-qrib - data tat-tħabbir fis-seduta plenarja
Rapporteur għal opinjoni   Data tal-ħatra	Carlos Carnero González 23.11.2006
Rapporteur għal opinjoni preċedenti
Eżami fil-kumitat	23.11.2006		22.1.2007
Data ta’ l-adozzjoni	23.1.2007
Riżultat tal-votazzjoni finali	+: –: 0:	15 2 1
Membri preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali	James Hugh Allister, Carlos Carnero González, Richard Corbett, Jean-Luc Dehaene, Panayiotis Demetriou, Andrew Duff, Ingo Friedrich, Bronisław Geremek, Genowefa Grabowska, Jo Leinen, Íñigo Méndez de Vigo, Marie-Line Reynaud, Adrian Severin, Alexander Stubb, Riccardo Ventre
Sostitut(i) preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali	Ashley Mote, Gérard Onesta, Jacek Protasiewicz
Sostitut(i) (skond l-Artikolu 178(2)) preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali
Kummenti (informazzjoni disponibbli b’lingwa waħda biss)

PROĊEDURA

Title

The future of the European Union's own resources

Procedure number

2006/2205(INI)

Committee responsible   Date authorisation announced in plenary

BUDG 7.9.2006

Committee(s) asked for opinion(s)   Date announced in plenary

CONT 12.10.2006

ECON 7.9.2006

REGI 7.9.2006

AFCO 7.9.2006

Not delivering opinion(s)   Date of decision

Enhanced cooperation   Date announced in plenary

Rapporteur(s)   Date appointed

Alain Lamassoure 20.9.2004

Previous rapporteur(s)

Discussed in committee

28.11.2006

5.12.2006

24.1.2007

26.2.2007

12.3.2007

Date adopted

12.3.2007

Result of final vote

+ - 0

28 5 1

Members present for the final vote

Richard James Ashworth, Reimer Böge, Herbert Bösch, Simon Busuttil, Joan Calabuig Rull, Gérard Deprez, Brigitte Douay, James Elles, Salvador Garriga Polledo, Neena Gill, Ingeborg Gräßle, Nathalie Griesbeck, Louis Grech, Catherine Guy-Quint, Jutta Haug, Ville Itälä, Ralf Walter, Anne E. Jensen, Wiesław Stefan Kuc, Zbigniew Krzysztof Kuźmiuk, Alain Lamassoure, Janusz Lewandowski, Vladimír Maňka, Mario Mauro, Francesco Musotto, Gianni Pittella, Nina Škottová, László Surján, Helga Trüpel, Kyösti Virrankoski

Substitute(s) present for the final vote

Thijs Berman, Richard Corbett, Bárbara Dührkop Dührkop, Michael Gahler, Romana Jordan Cizelj, Paul Rübig, José Albino Silva Peneda, Margarita Starkevičiūtė, Peter Šťastný

Substitute(s) under Rule 178(2) present for the final vote

Date tabled

13.3.2007

Comments (available in one language only)

• [1]  Revision clause included in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 17 May 2006 - see ANNEX.
• [2]  "Schreyer proposals", COM(2004)505 and COM(2004)501
• [3]  Summary of Working Group 4 as presented to the plenary of the JPM on 9 May 2006
• [4]  Study Group for European Policies (SEP), 30 June 2005: Own resources: Evolution of the system in a EU of 25. Study for the European Parliament.
• [5]  Ara paragrafu 18 ta' l-Opinjoni Nru 2/2006 (ĠU C 203, 25.8.2006, p. 50).
• [6]  ĠU C 139, 14.6.2006, p.1.
• [7]  ĠU L 94, 28.4.1970, p. 19.