RAPORT referitor la propunerea modificată de regulament al Consiliului de modificare a Regulamentului (CE) nr. 1030/2002 privind stabilirea unui format standard pentru permisele de şedere pentru cetăţenii ţărilor terţe

7.6.2007 - (COM(2006)0110 – C6‑0157/2006 – 2003/0218(CNS)) - *

Comisia pentru libertăţi civile, justiţie şi afaceri interne
Raportor: Carlos Coelho

PROIECT DE REZOLUŢIE LEGISLATIVĂ A PARLAMENTULUI EUROPEAN

privind propunerea modificată de regulament al Consiliului de modificare a Regulamentului (CE) nr. 1030/2002 privind stabilirea unui format standard pentru permisele de şedere pentru cetăţenii ţărilor terţe

(COM(2006)0110 – C6‑0157/2006 – 2003/0218(CNS))

(Procedura de consultare)

Parlamentul European,

–   având în vedere propunerea modificată a Comisiei înaintată Consiliului (COM(2006)0110)[1],

–   având în vedere articolul 63 alineatul (3) litera (a) din Tratatul CE,

–   având în vedere articolul 67 din Tratatul CE, în temeiul căruia a fost consultat de către Consiliu (C6‑0157/2006),

–   având în vedere articolul 51 din Regulamentul său de procedură,

–   având în vedere raportul Comisiei pentru libertăţi civile, justiţie şi afaceri interne (A6-0211/2006),

1.  aprobă propunerea Comisiei astfel cum a fost modificată;

2.  invită Comisia să îşi modifice propunerea în consecinţă, în conformitate cu articolul 250 alineatul (2) din Tratatul CE;

3.  invită Consiliul să informeze Parlamentul, în cazul în care intenţionează să se îndepărteze de la textul aprobat de acesta;

4.  cere deschiderea procedurii de concertare prevăzută în Declaraţia comună din 4 martie 1975, în cazul în care Consiliul intenţionează să se îndepărteze de la textul aprobat de Parlament;

5.  solicită Consiliului să îl consulte din nou, în cazul în care acesta intenţionează să modifice în mod substanţial propunerea Comisiei;

6.  încredinţează Preşedintelui sarcina de a transmite Consiliului şi Comisiei poziţia Parlamentului.

Text propus de Comisie	Amendamentele Parlamentului
Amendamentul 1 CONSIDERENTUL 3
(3) Introducerea identificatorilor biometrici este o etapă importantă în vederea utilizării noilor elemente, care creează o legătură mai sigură între titular şi permisul de şedere ca o măsură importantă de asigurare protecţiei împotriva utilizării frauduloase. Specificaţiile stabilite în documentul ICAO nr. 9303 referitor la recunoaşterea optică a vizelor trebuie luate în considerare.	(3) Introducerea identificatorilor biometrici este o etapă importantă în vederea utilizării noilor elemente, care creează o legătură mai sigură între titular şi permisul de şedere ca o măsură importantă de asigurare protecţiei împotriva utilizării frauduloase. Standarde riguroase de securitate, echivalente celor prevăzute pentru cărţile de identitate naţionale, trebuie aplicate şi pentru permisele de şedere.
Justification
It is important to point out that the residence permit is not a travel document and, therefore, given that the criteria laid down in ICAO Document No 9303 apply only to travel documents, they are logically not to be applied in this case. Furthermore, Document No 9303 should not be referred to in an EU regulation, since it has been successively altered by means of a process which is lacking in transparency and democratic legitimacy.
Amendamentul 2 CONSIDERENTUL 3A (nou)
	(3a) Caracteristicile biometrice din permisul de şedere standard trebuie utilizate numai pentru verificarea autenticităţii documentului şi pentru identificarea titularului prin intermediul caracteristicilor direct disponibile şi comparabile, atunci când legea cere prezentarea permisului de şedere.
Justification
Since the reason for incorporating biometric features into residence permits has to be explicit, appropriate, proportionate and clear, it needs to be incorporated into the legal text. The big advantage brought about by the introduction of biometrics in residence permit is to create a more reliable link between the residence permit and its holder.
Amendamentul 3 CONSIDERENTUL 5
(5) Prezentul regulament stabileşte doar specificaţiile care nu sunt secrete; aceste specificaţii trebuie completate cu altele, care pot rămâne secrete, pentru a preveni contrafacerea şi falsificările şi care nu pot să cuprindă date personale sau trimiteri la astfel de date. Competenţa de a adopta aceste specificaţii suplimentare ar trebui să fie conferită Comisiei, asistată de comitetul instituit prin articolul 6 din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1683/95 al Consiliului din 29 mai 1995 de instituire a unui model uniform de viză.	(5) Prezentul regulament stabileşte doar specificaţiile care nu sunt secrete; aceste specificaţii trebuie completate cu altele, care pot rămâne secrete, pentru a preveni contrafacerea şi falsificările şi care nu trebuie să cuprindă date personale sau trimiteri la astfel de date. Competenţa de a adopta aceste specificaţii suplimentare ar trebui să fie conferită Comisiei, asistată de comitetul instituit prin articolul 6 din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1683/95 al Consiliului din 29 mai 1995 de instituire a unui model uniform de viză.
Justification
Biometric identifiers are meant to establish a closer link between the holder and the residence permit. The insertion of personal data among the supplementary specifications will only increase the risk for counterfeiting and falsification without adding any additional value.
Amendamentul 4 ARTICOLUL 1 PUNCTUL 2 Articolul 2 alineatul (1) litera (d) [Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1030/2002]
(d) specificaţii tehnice pentru suportul de stocare al caracteristicilor biometrice şi securizarea acestora, inclusiv prevenirea accesului neautorizat;	(d) specificaţii tehnice pentru suportul de stocare al caracteristicilor biometrice şi securizarea acestora, în special pentru protejarea integrităţii, autenticităţii şi confidenţialităţii acestor date, precum şi a utilizării acestora în conformitate cu obiectivele stabilite în prezentul regulament, inclusiv prevenirea accesului neautorizat;
Justification
The technical specifications are crucial to privacy. The criteria to be respected should therefore be specifically mentioned.
Amendamentul 5 Articolul 2 alineatul (1) litera (e) [Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1030/2002]
(e) condiţiile de calitate şi standardele comune pentru imaginea feţei şi a amprentelor digitale.	(e) condiţiile de calitate şi standardele comune pentru imaginea feţei şi a amprentelor digitale, obligaţiile sau cerinţele comune cu privire la specificitatea acestor imagini, o metodologie comună şi cele mai bune practici pentru punerea lor în aplicare, proceduri specifice pentru persoanele care nu au amprente digitale lizibile prin tehnicile de imagine sau care ar fi putut fi identificate incorect;
Justification
Fallback procedures should be foreseen in order to take into account all possible cases where people either cannot provide readable fingerprints or could have been wrongly identified. Since these are not uncommon situations, it would be appropriate for this regulation to set up appropriate procedures dealing with such cases so that the imperfections of the system do not become a burden for the above-mentioned categories of people.
Amendamentul 6 Articolul 2 alineatul (1) litera (ea) (nou) [Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1030/2002]
	(ea) procedurile adecvate şi normele specifice pentru protecţia copiilor ale căror caracteristici biometrice sunt înregistrate, în special atunci când le sunt luate amprentele digitale.
Justification
It should be noted that specific rules and appropriate procedures should be put in place in order to protect the fundamental rights of children.
Amendamentul 7 ARTICOLUL 1 PUNCTUL 2A (nou) Articolul 2 alineatul (2a) (nou) [Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1030/2002)]
	(2a) La articolul 2, se inserează alineatul (2a) după cum urmează:
	„(2a) Măsurile de aplicare adoptate sunt comunicate cu regularitate Parlamentului European.”
Amendamentul 8 ARTICOLUL 1 PUNCTUL 1A (nou) Articolul 3 alineatul (1a) (nou) [Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1030/2002)]
	(3a) La articolul 3, se inserează alineatul (1a) după cum urmează:
	„(1a) Fiecare stat membru transmite Comisiei o listă a autorităţilor competente care sunt autorizate să acceseze datele referitoare la caracteristicile biometrice incluse în permisele de şedere în conformitate cu prezentul regulament, precum şi orice modificări ale acesteia. Această listă specifică, pentru fiecare autoritate, ce date este autorizată să consulte şi în ce scopuri. Comisia asigură publicarea anuală a listei în Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene şi publică o listă actualizată a autorităţilor competente pe site-ul său Internet.”
Justification
It is crucial for the protection of privacy that only authorised bodies have access to such data. The Commission should seize the opportunity to insert in this proposal the clear identification and definition of authorities which are competent for carrying out checks on residence permits, and this list should be public. Furthermore,if an additional chip for e-services is introduced in the residence permit, the number of authorities which might have access to the residence permit will increase. Each individual whose data are collected should be informed of which authorities have access to his/her own personal data.
Amendamentul 9 ARTICOLUL 1 PUNCTUL 4 Articolul 4 alineatul (2) [Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1030/2002]
Nu se includ informaţii care pot fi citite electronic în suportul de stocare al permisului de şedere prevăzut la articolul 4a, cu excepţia cazurilor prevăzute în prezentul regulament sau în anexa acestuia sau dacă sau dacă sunt menţionate în documentul de călătorie aferent de către statul emitent în conformitate cu legislaţia sa naţională. Statele membre pot include în permisul de şedere un cip suplimentar de contact în conformitate cu punctul 16 din anexa la prezentul regulament pentru accesul la servicii on-line, cum ar fi administraţia on-line sau afacerile electronice.	Nu se includ informaţii care pot fi citite electronic în suportul de stocare al permisului de şedere prevăzut la articolul 4a, cu excepţia cazurilor prevăzute în prezentul regulament sau în anexa acestuia sau dacă sau dacă sunt menţionate în documentul de călătorie aferent de către statul emitent în conformitate cu legislaţia sa naţională.
Justification
The new purposes and applications for which the residence permit could be used following the insertion of the additional chip for e-services is welcomed in principle by Parliament. However, the latest technical report from the Commission stating the different options and their advantages and disadvantages did not cover other aspects related to the protection and security of sensitive data. We therefore await further information on those aspects.
Amendamentul 10 ARTICOLUL 1 PUNCTUL 5 Articolul 4a [Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1030/2002]
Formatul standard pentru permisele de şedere include un suport de stocare care conţine imaginea facială. Statele membre includ, de asemenea, amprentele digitale, înregistrate în format interoperabil. Datele sunt securizate şi suportul de stocare are capacitate suficientă şi caracteristicile necesare pentru a garanta integritatea, autenticitatea şi confidenţialitatea datelor.	Formatul standard pentru permisele de şedere include un suport de stocare care conţine imaginea facială şi două imagini ale amprentelor digitale ale titularului, ambele înregistrate în format interoperabil. Datele sunt securizate şi suportul de stocare asigurat perfect au capacitate suficientă şi caracteristicile necesare pentru a garanta integritatea, autenticitatea şi confidenţialitatea datelor.
Justification
It is very important to ensure a great level of security as regards the storage medium.
Amendamentul 11 ARTICOLUL 1 PUNCTUL 1A (nou) Articolul 4b alineatul (1) (nou) [Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1030/2002]
	(5a) Se inserează următorul articol 4b:
	„Articolul 4b
	(1) Suportul de stocare poate fi utilizat doar de către autorităţile competente din statele membre, în conformitate cu dispoziţiile articolului 3 alineatul (1a), pentru a citi şi stoca datele biometrice.”
Justification
It should be clearly laid down in the legal text which authorities will have access to the data. Unauthorised access is not acceptable from a privacy point of view.
Amendamentul 12 ARTICOLUL 1 PUNCTUL 1A (nou) Articolul 4b alineatul (2) (nou) [Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1030/2002]
	(2) Datele biometrice înregistrate pe suportul de stocare nu pot fi modificate sau şterse de nicio autoritate. Acolo unde apare o astfel de necesitate, se va emite un nou permis de şedere.
Justification
It is important to guarantee that once the residence permit is issued, no other information will be added in the storage medium. If the need arises to make any changes, a new residence permit will be issued to make the holder aware of those changes.
Amendamentul 13 ARTICOLUL 1 PUNCTUL 1A (nou) Articolul 4b alineatul (3) şi (4) (noi) [Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1030/2002]
	(3) Deciziile cu implicaţii majore din punctul de vedere al protecţiei datelor, cum ar fi cele privind introducerea şi accesarea datelor, calitatea datelor, conformitatea tehnică a suportului de stocare şi măsurile de securitate pentru protecţia caracteristicilor biometrice sunt luate sub formă de reglementări, cu implicarea totală a Parlamentului European.
	(4) Autoritatea Europeană pentru Protecţia Datelor are un rol consultativ în toate deciziile cu implicaţii asupra protecţiei datelor.
Justification
An adequate role should be given to Parliament in all and any decision concerning data security and data protection, thus allowing for better democratic control and ensuring the lawfulness of data processing. The rapporteur also considers that the EDPS should have the possibility to advice on the choices made, in order to ensure that they completely respect the data protection principles.
Amendamentul 14 ARTICOLUL 1 PUNCTUL 1A (nou) Articolul 9 alineatul (4a) (nou) [Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1030/2002]
	(6a) La articolul 9, se inserează alineatul (4a) după cum urmează:
	„(4a) Statele membre transmit periodic Comisiei evaluări ale aplicării prezentului regulament, pe baza normelor aprobate de comun acord, în special cu privire la normele de limitare a scopurilor pentru care pot fi utilizate datele şi autorităţile care pot avea acces la date. Statele membre informează, de asemenea, Comisia cu privire la toate problemele întâlnite în aplicarea prezentului regulament şi realizează schimburi de informaţii privind cele mai bune practici cu Comisia, precum şi între ele.”
Justification
It is very important to have an effective control network in place in order to increase trust in the concept of biometrics.

• [1]  Nepublicată încă în JO.

EXPUNERE DE MOTIVE

I. The context

With the intention of harmonising the format of residence permits issued by Member States to third-country nationals, on 13 June 2002 the Council adopted Regulation (EC) 1030/2002 laying down a uniform format for residence permits for third-country nationals. On 24 September 2003, the Commission presented a proposal amending Council regulation (EC) 1030/2002. This proposal was linked to another proposal concerning the amendment of Council Regulation 1683/95 establishing a uniform format for visas. However, when it came to dealing with the technicalities some problems arose concerning potential collisions between contact-less chips and which kind of format should have been used, namely a sticker or a standalone card. At that time, consultation was the procedure to follow for both kinds of regulation and Parliament was consulted accordingly.

The rapporteur, who had at the time also been designated as responsible for examining those proposals, expressed doubts about both proposals. The Commission decided to withdraw one of them, undertaking to submit a modified version on a uniform format for residence permits for third-country nationals as soon as all the technical uncertainties had been resolved.

The uniform format for visas is closely linked to the development of VIS, i.e. a system for the exchange of visa data between Member States on a common technical platform with the Schengen Information System II, and it will be dealt with in the framework of the VIS system.

As far as a uniform format for residence permits for third-country nationals is concerned, on 13 March 2006 the Commission submitted a modified proposal for a Council regulation amending Regulation (EC) 1030/2002. The two issues, residence permit and visas, have been separated since they serve two different goals, the former being to take mandatory biometric identifiers from visa applicants and to provide a legal framework,[1] and the latter being to establish a common format for residence permits for third-country nationals in the EU. At the current moment, Parliament has been re-consulted on the issue of a uniform format for the residence permit. The legal basis for this consultation is Article 63(3)(a) TEC.

The current proposal

This new proposal refers to the introduction of biometric data (facial image and two fingerprint images of the holder) in the residence permit which will be produced as a standalone card and must be machine readable. The residence permit will still be issued within a period up to two years after the adoption of the technical specifications[2], in a sticker form.

Furthermore, Member States which intend to insert in the residence permit a contact chip to be used in the context of e-services are allowed to do so in a defined area, i.e. Zone 16 as described in the annex to the proposal[3]. The possible insertion of an additional storage medium for national use in the residence permit would allow taking into account any national developments in the field of authentication, certification, digital signature and e-government services for third-country nationals living legally in EU territory. However, the use of this contact chip[4] or any other technically possible option in the same residence permit where biometrics are stored is only acceptable if it is accompanied by strict data protection rules and the necessary safeguards are in place.

The rapporteur's position

First of all, the rapporteur welcomes the new proposal, which represents a good effort towards the harmonisation of the format of residence permits issued by Member States to third-country nationals. He also highly appreciates the fact that visa and residence permits are no longer linked as they were in the Commission's first proposal of 2003,[5] since they serve two different goals, as is clarified in the first part of this report. Secondly, the rapporteur would like to stress that the residence permit in itself is not a travel document but will be considered as a 'species' of' ID document to be used in the Schengen area. This will imply that all third- country nationals legally residing in the EU and therefore possessing a residence permit can be identifiable in the same way inside the Schengen area. This consideration makes it possible to clarify that, like a simple ID card, the residence permit should respect the same high security standards as are defined for national ID cards, without any need to follow the specifications set out in the ICAO document 9303 on machine-readable visas. Those standards should apply only to travel documents proper, and in addition that document has been the object of successive alterations made via a process lacking in transparency or democratic legitimacy. The reference made in the third recital of the new proposal and in its Annex to the ICAO standards should therefore be replaced by more rigorous security specifications defined according to the specific goals the residence permit will be used for.

The core of the proposal lies in the introduction of biometric identifiers, i.e. a Radio Frequency Chip (RFID) containing a facial image (within two years of the adoption of technical measures) and fingerprints in interoperable formats (within three years). As a matter of principle, the rapporteur agrees with the intention of the proposal, i.e. to use biometrics in order to strengthen the security of residence permits. The introduction of biometrics will in fact help combat document fraud, thus preventing falsification and identity theft. Furthermore, the major advantage of the use of biometrics is to create a more reliable link between the residence permit and its holder. Nevertheless, the introduction and processing of biometric data for identity documents needs to have particularly consistent and serious safeguards, especially regarding the way they are collected and used. Biometric features stored in residence permits should only be used for verifying the authenticity of the document and the identity of the holder by means of directly available comparable features. As the former European Justice and Home Affairs Commissioner Antonio Vitorino has rightly pointed out, biometrics, 'like any other technology, is not dangerous in itself, but it is the use one makes of it that might endanger fundamental rights'[6].

There are some issues in the new proposal that need further clarification, above all as far as the means of collection of biometric data is concerned. A list of common obligations or requirements to follow should be drafted for Member States taking into account the specificity of such data. Moreover, in order to facilitate the implementation of the biometric residence permit it would be useful to provide Member States with a common methodology and best practices.

The rapporteur notes with disappointment that nothing is foreseen in the current proposal on which we are consulted as regards the collection of biometrics as far as children are concerned. Further clarification on this matter will be welcome.

The rapporteur is also concerned about the lack of fallback procedures for those people who cannot provide usable fingerprints or facial scanning because of physical reasons such as a disability or an accident. A general obligation to provide facial scanning and fingerprints should be accompanied by the exemption from this obligation for any person unable to provide biometric data because of physical incapacities in order to respect that person's dignity. This exemption from providing fingerprints should neither decrease the security level of the residence permit nor stigmatise those individuals with unreadable fingerprints. The reason for the exemption could be stored in the chip of the residence permit.

As already pointed out, the question of allowing access to e-services (e-government, health, identification, etc) via ID cards and residence permits and the insertion of an additional chip raises several concerns. The Article 6 Committee's conclusions of February 2007 try to give answers as regards the various technical possibilities concerning compatibility between different kinds of chips[7] storing both biometrics and national data. The rapporteur recognises the importance of technical issues, but would like to stress his disappointment at the lack of any reference to the security level of a system that is made up of different parts. Independently of the choice made regarding the type of chip to be used and the technical implications[8] related to it, it is equally important to guarantee that any choice ensures a high level of security as far as sensitive data (e.g. biometrics) are concerned. Contrary to the current situation, can the use of e-government services be implemented in a relatively 'safe' environment? Until there is a satisfactory answer to this question, we should think carefully as regards the possibility of introducing e-services data at this point, since we cannot risk rushing into solutions which could force us to admit later on that we were not properly prepared, or that a given solution was in fact too expensive or technologically out-of-date or could compromise the security of sensitive data. Any such action would undermine the trust of all in biometrics.

In fact, we should establish a list of criteria that should be met before introducing the possibility of storing e-services data - for instance, a limited list of purposes and data which will be stored.

As was recalled in the first recital of the proposal, one of the aims of the Treaty of Amsterdam is to confer the right of initiative on the Commission for proposing necessary and relevant measures for a harmonised immigration policy. In order to do so, the Commission should provide Member States with a clear definition of which authorities will be competent for carrying out checks on residence permits. This will become even more relevant if the e-services option is implemented, as in this case the number of authorities which might have access to the residence permit will increase considerably. It will then be crucial, for both Member States issuing the residence permit and those where third-country nationals need to be identified, to have a detailed list of the authorities responsible for carrying out checks on residence permits, in order to avoid misuse of these sensitive data.

The role of the European Data Protection Authority in all matters related to data protection should also be recognised. Its advisory role would be of great help for any decisions having a substantial impact on data protection, such as access to and introduction of biometric data, quality and collection of those data, technical compliance of the storage medium, and implementation of security measures for the protection of the biometric features[9].

A final consideration, more general in character, concerns the need to put forward a crucial change in the field of the AFSJ. The rapporteur believes that the whole Title IV TEC should be governed by the ordinary legislative regime, i.e. the codecision procedure under Article 251 TEC[10]. In this context, the rapporteur invites the Commission to put forward proposals for a higher level of harmonisation in this area.

• [1]  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending the Common Consular Instructions on visas for diplomatic missions and consular posts in relation to the introduction of biometrics including provisions on the organisation of the reception and processing of visa applications, COM(2006) 269 .
• [2]  Point (1)(a) in Annex to COM (2006) 110
• [3]  See Point 16 in the Regulation's Annex, COM (2006) 110. This proposal of inserting a contact chip to allow the use of new technologies such as e-government, digital signatures, etc was introduced following the reasoning of the Estonian government wishing to treat their citizens and third-country residents on an equal basis giving them access to e-services via ID cards and residence permits.
• [4]  The employment of a contact chip for national use is optional - see Point 16 in the Regulation's Annex, COM (2006) 110.
• [5]  COM (2003) 558
• [6]  Opinion expressed by European JHA Commissioner Antonio Vitorino at a public hearing at the EP on 2 March 2004.
• [7]  Three options are to be considered: 1) a contactless chip for biometrics and a contact chip for national uses; 2) a single contactless chip for both national data and biometric identifiers, with clearly separated architecture and access; 3) a single chip with a dual interface, i.e. contactless for biometrics data and with contact for national data.
• [8]  Such as the deadline for adoption and implementation of the technical specifications, the storage capacity, the production costs and the durability.
• [9]  See the opinion of the European Data Protection Authority on the modified proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) 1030/2002 laying down a uniform format for residence permits for third-country nationals., Brussels, 16 October 2006.
• [10]  Certain progress was achieved in enhancing codecision in the field of the AFSJ, thanks to the Council Decision of 22 December 2004 providing for certain areas covered by Title IV of Part Three of the Treaty establishing the European Community to be governed by the procedure laid down in Article 251 of that Treaty, OJ L 396, 31.12.2004, p. 45. Unfortunately the area at stake, i.e. the legal immigration of third-country nationals to and between Member States referred to in Article 63(3)(a), was left out and is therefore still subject to unanimous voting in Council and the consultation procedure as far as Parliament is concerned (see recital 7 of the above-mentioned Council Decision).

OPINIE MINORITARĂ

by Giusto Catania

PROCEDURĂ

Titlu	Format standard pentru permisele de şedere pentru cetăţenii ţărilor terţe
Referinţe	(COM(2006)0110 – C6‑0157/2006 – 2003/0218(CNS))
Data consultării PE	17.5.2006
Comisia competentă în fond Data anunţului în plen	LIBE 1.6.2006
Raportor(i) Data numirii	Carlos Coelho 1.6.2006
Examinare în comisie	27.11.2006		11.4.2007		8.5.2007		5.6.2007
Data adoptării	5.6.2007
Rezultatul votului final	+: –: 0:	31 2 0
Membri titulari prezenţi la votul final	Alexander Alvaro, Philip Bradbourn, Mihael Brejc, Kathalijne Maria Buitenweg, Michael Cashman, Giusto Catania, Carlos Coelho, Fausto Correia, Panayiotis Demetriou, Agustín Díaz de Mera García Consuegra, Bárbara Dührkop Dührkop, Claudio Fava, Kinga Gál, Patrick Gaubert, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, Ewa Klamt, Magda Kósáné Kovács, Stavros Lambrinidis, Henrik Lax, Claude Moraes, Javier Moreno Sánchez, Martine Roure, Inger Segelström, Károly Ferenc Szabó, Adina-Ioana Vălean, Manfred Weber
Membri supleanţi prezenţi la votul final	Simon Busuttil, Gérard Deprez, Ignasi Guardans Cambó, Sophia in ‘t Veld, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Bogdan Klich, Jean Lambert, Marianne Mikko, Hubert Pirker
Membri supleanţi [articolul 178 alineatul (2)] prezenţi la votul final	Aloyzas Sakalas