ДОКЛАД относно Договора от Лисабон

29.1.2008 - (2007/2286(INI))

Комисия по конституционни въпроси
Докладчици: Richard Corbett и Íñigo Méndez de Vigo

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ПРЕДЛОЖЕНИЕ ЗА РЕЗОЛЮЦИЯ НА ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЯ ПАРЛАМЕНТ

относно Договора от Лисабон

(2007/2286(INI))

Европейският парламент,

–   като взе предвид Договора от Лисабон за изменение на Договора за Европейския съюз и на Договора за създаване на Европейската общност, подписан на 13 декември 2007 г.,

–   като взе предвид Договора за Европейския съюз и Договора за създаване на Европейската общност, във вида, в който са изменени с Единния европейски акт и с Договорите от Маастрихт, Амстердам и Ница,

–   като взе предвид Хартата за основните права от 12 декември 2007 г.[1],

–   като взе предвид Декларацията от Лаакен от 15 декември 2001 г. относно бъдещето на Съюза[2],

–   като взе предвид Договора за създаване на Конституция за Европа, подписан в Рим на 29 октомври 2004 г.,

–   като взе предвид своята резолюция от 7 юни 2007 г. относно пътната карта за конституционния процес на Европейския съюз[3] и своята резолюция от 11 юли 2007 г. относно свикването на Междуправителствена конференция[4],

–   като взе предвид член 45 от своя правилник,

–   като взе предвид доклада на комисията по конституционни въпроси и становищата на комисията по регионално развитие, комисията по външни работи, комисията по развитие, комисията по международна търговия, комисията по бюджети, комисията по промишленост, изследвания и енергетика и комисията по граждански свободи, правосъдие и вътрешни работи (A6 0013/2008),

А. като има предвид, че през последните 50 години развитието на Европейския съюз имаше съществено значение за създаването на пространство на мир и стабилност на континент, който в миналото е бил опустошаван от войни, за укрепване на демокрацията, свободата и правата на гражданите, за увеличаване на просперитета, солидарността и благоденствието чрез създаването на най-големия единен пазар в света с общи правила за социални стандарти, защита на околната среда и потребителите и лоялна конкуренция и с икономически и паричен съюз, за осигуряването на възможност държавите-членки да работят съвместно за решаването на въпроси, които надхвърлят националните граници, както и за засилване на ролята на Европа в международен план,

Б.  като има предвид, че е налице призната необходимост от реформиране и укрепване на структурите на Съюза с цел утвърждаване на тези постижения и подобряване на капацитета на Съюза, който включва 27 и евентуално повече държави-членки, да функционира ефективно, така че да успее да се справи с новите общи предизвикателства и върху дейността му да може да се упражнява повече демократичен контрол,

В.  като има предвид, че тази необходимост беше в основата на последователните реформи, които след Договора от Маастрихт - довел до промени в процеса на европейска интеграция със създаването на икономически и паричен съюз и преминаването от една основно икономическа общност към политически съюз - целяха изграждането на институционалната структура на Съюза и доведоха до Декларацията от Лаакен, която също така откри пътя за осъществяването на един различен процес на реформи, основан на метода на Конвента, а не изключително на междуправителствени конференции, както досега,

Г.  като има предвид, че Договорът за създаване на Конституция за Европа беше изготвен от Конвента, съставен от двама представители на всеки национален парламент, 16 членове на ЕП, двама представители на Европейската комисия и по един представител на всяко национално правителство, като Конвентът подготви проект чрез провеждане на публично обсъждане, като се достигна до консенсус; този проект по същество не беше променен от Междуправителствената конференция през 2004 г. и последващият Договор от Лисабон, в който не бяха включени някои елементи от Конституцията, беше изготвен по традиционни междуправителствени методи на работа, макар и с пълното участие на трима представители на Европейския парламент,

Д. като има предвид, че предишният опит за реформа на Съюза чрез замяна на Договорите с Конституция беше подкрепен от много голямо мнозинство от избраните представители на европейските граждани в Европейския парламент[5] и Конституцията беше ратифицирана от 2/3 от държавите-членки, но беше отхвърлена от две страни (Франция и Нидерландия) и след период на размисъл, през който стана ясно, че необходимото одобрение от всички държави-членки може и да не бъде получено, този подход беше изоставен в полза на изменението на вече съществуващите договори,

Е.  като има предвид, че тази промяна на метода и процеса, като същевременно се запазваха под нова форма голяма част от предвидените практически промени в институционалната структура на Съюза, предполагаше залагане на по-малко амбициозни цели и отпадане на редица елементи на Конституцията, отлагане на влизането в сила на някои от новите й механизми и включване в Договорите на специални, различни за отделните държави-членки мерки,

Ж. като има предвид, въпреки това, че одобрението на Договора от всяко отделно национално правителство в Съюза показва, че всички избрани правителства на държавите-членки считат, че този компромис представлява основа, на която те желаят да работят съвместно в бъдеще и всяко от тях трябва да покаже готовност за поемане на максимален политически ангажимент за ратифицирането му преди 1 януари 2009 г.,

З.  като има предвид, че е желателно Договорът от Лисабон да се ратифицира от всички държави-членки до края на 2008 г., за да могат гражданите да гласуват по време на изборите през 2009 г. при пълно познаване на новата институционална рамка на Съюза,

Положителна стъпка за бъдещето на Съюза

1.  заключава, че като цяло Договорът от Лисабон представлява значително подобрение на съществуващите Договори и ще допринесе за подобряване на демократичния контрол в рамките на Съюза и на процеса на вземане на решения (чрез засилване на ролята на Европейския парламент и националните парламенти), увеличаване на правата на европейските граждани по отношение на Съюза и повишаване на ефективността при функционирането на институциите на Съюза;

Подобряване на демократичния контрол

2.  приветства факта, че демократичният контрол и правомощията за вземане на решения ще бъдат засилени, като по този начин гражданите ще могат да упражняват по-голям контрол върху действията на Съюза, което се дължи до голяма степен на следните подобрения:

а)   приемането на цялото законодателство на Европейския съюз ще подлежи на такава форма на парламентарен контрол, каквато не съществува в друга наднационална или международна структура:

–  цялото европейско законодателство, с малки изключения, ще подлежи на двойно одобрение, на равноправна основа, от страна на Съвета (съставен от министри от националните правителства, които се отчитат пред съответните парламенти) и на Европейския парламент (съставен от пряко избрани членове на ЕП);

–  предварителният контрол от страна на националните парламенти върху цялото законодателство на Съюза ще бъде засилен, като те ще получават своевременно всички предложения за европейско законодателство, за да могат да ги обсъждат със своите министри, преди Съветът да приеме позиция, и също така ще получат правото да изискват преразглеждане на предложения, ако считат, че те нарушават принципа на субсидиарност;

б)   председателят на Комисията ще се избира от Европейския парламент, по предложение на Европейския съвет, като се вземат предвид изборите за Европейски парламент;

в)   върховният представител на Съюза по въпросите на външните работи и политиката на сигурност ще бъде избиран от Европейския съвет и председателя на Комисията, а в качеството си на член на Комисията трябва да премине в Парламента през същата процедура за назначаване, като всеки друг член на Комисията;

г)    създава се нова, опростена и по-демократична бюджетна процедура с едно четене: разграничението между задължителни и незадължителни разходи се премахва, като по този начин се гарантира пълно равенство между Парламента и Съвета по отношение на одобрението на общия годишен бюджет, като на Парламента се предоставя и правото на одобрение на правнообвързващата многогодишна финансова рамка;

д)   демократичният контрол, свързан със законодателните правомощия, делегирани на Комисията, ще бъде засилен чрез въвеждането на нова система за надзор, в която Европейският парламент или Съветът могат или да връщат решения на Комисията, или да оттеглят делегираните правомощия;

е)   необходимо е съгласието на Европейския парламент за одобрението на широк кръг от международни споразумения, подписани от Съюза, включително онези, които се отнасят до области, обект на обикновената законодателна процедура във вътрешната сфера на Съюза;

ж)  заседанията на Съвета ще са публични, когато обсъжда или гласува проекти на законодателни актове, като по този начин гражданите ще могат да следят работата на своите правителства в рамките на Съвета;

з)    агенциите, и по-специално Европол и Евроюст, ще подлежат на по-голям парламентарен контрол;

и)   Комитетът на регионите ще може да сезира Съда на ЕО, мандатът на неговите членове ще бъде увеличен до пет години и отношенията му с Европейския парламент ще се определят по-ясно;

й)   в бъдеще процедурата за преразглеждане на Договорите ще бъде по-открита и демократична, тъй като Европейският парламент също ще придобие правомощия да внася предложения за тази цел и всяко предложено преразглеждане ще се извършва под контрола на Конвент, който ще включва представители на националните парламенти и Европейския парламент, освен ако Парламентът реши, че това не е необходимо, като се въвеждат нови опростени процедури за преразглеждане, с които се изменят чрез единодушно решение определени разпоредби от Договора, с одобрението на националните парламенти;

Утвърждаване на ценностите, засилване на правата на гражданите, осигуряване на по-голяма на яснота

3.  приветства факта, че правата на гражданите ще бъдат засилени в резултат на следните подобрения:

а)   Хартата за основните права на ЕС, като включи пълен актуализиран списък с граждански, политически, икономически и социални права, ще придобие правнообвързващ характер; тя ще даде правна сигурност на гражданите на Съюза, като гарантира, че всички разпоредби на правото на ЕС и всички действия, предприети от институциите на ЕС или основаващи се на правото на ЕС, ще трябва да бъдат съобразени с тези стандарти, като се спазва принципът на субсидиарност;

б)   Съюзът ще кандидатства за присъединяване към Европейската конвенция за защита правата на човека, по силата на която Съюзът ще подлежи на същия външен контрол по отношение на задължението да се спазват правата на гражданите, както и неговите държави-членки;

в)   новите разпоредби ще улеснят участието на гражданите и представителните сдружения на гражданското общество в дебатите на Съюза; ще бъде насърчен диалогът със социалните партньори и диалогът с църквите, религиозните общности и нерелигиозните организации;

г)    въвеждането на правото на инициатива на гражданите на ЕС ще даде възможност на гражданите да внасят предложения по въпроси, по които те считат, че за целите на прилагането на Договорите е необходим правен акт на Съюза;

д)   съдебната защита на гражданите ще се подобри, тъй като юрисдикцията на Съда на Европейските общности ще се разшири по отношение на въпроси, свързани със свободата, сигурността и правосъдието, както и по отношение на актове на Европейския съвет, Европейската централна банка и агенциите на Съюза, и същевременно ще се приемат разпоредби за улесняване на достъпа на физическите и юридическите лица до правосъдие;

4.  приветства факта, че в Договора се определят по по-ясен и видим начин общите за всички държави-членки ценности, на които се основава Съюза, както и целите на Съюза и принципите, регулиращи дейностите и отношенията на ЕС с държавите-членки:

а)   ясно са разграничени компетенциите на Съюза от тези на държавите-членки, съгласно принципа, че всички компетенции, които не са предоставени на Съюза с Договорите, принадлежат на държавите-членки;

б)   поставя се по-силен акцент на политики, които очевидно са в полза на гражданите: налице са нови разпоредби с общо приложение относно насърчаването на високо равнище на заетост, гарантирането на подходяща социална защита, борбата със социалната изолация, високото равнище на образование, обучение и здравеопазване, премахването на всякакъв вид дискриминация и поощряването на равенството между мъжете и жените; с новите разпоредби се насърчава в по-голяма степен устойчивото развитие и опазването на околната среда, в това число и борбата с изменението на климата и извършването на услуги от общ интерес; икономическото, социално и териториално сближаване се утвърждава като цел на Съюза;

в)   ще се сложи край на объркването на понятията „Европейска общност“ и „Европейски съюз“, тъй като Европейският съюз придобива отделна юридическа самоличност и структура;

г)    клаузата за солидарност между държавите-членки предвижда гражданите да получават помощ от всички страни на Съюза, в случай на терористично нападение, природно или предизвикано от човека бедствие;

д)   Договорът потвърждава специфичната институционална организация на Съюза, на който държавите-членки предоставят част от компетенциите си, за които считат, че ще се упражняват по-добре чрез общи механизми, като същевременно, с оглед разсейване на всякакви съмнения, се осигуряват достатъчно гаранции, че Съюзът няма да се превърне в централизирана, всесилна супердържава:

–  задължението за зачитане на националната идентичност на държавите-членки, присъща на техните основни политически и конституционни структури, включително по отношение на регионалното и местно самоуправление, както и на техните основни функции на държавата, включително и тези, които имат за цел да осигуряват нейната териториална цялост, да поддържат законността и реда и да опазват националната сигурност;

–  принципа на предоставени правомощия (съгласно който Съюзът разполага единствено с тези компетенции, които държавите-членки са му предоставили), принципа на субсидиарност и принципа на пропорционалност;

–  участието на самите държави-членки в системата на вземане на решения на Съюза и в одобрението на всякакви промени в тази система;

–  признаването на правото на всяка държава-членка да напусне Съюза, ако желае това;

По-голяма ефективност

5.  приветства факта, че новият Договор ще укрепи капацитета на институциите на Съюза да изпълняват функциите си по-ефективно, и по-специално защото:

а)   ще се увеличи значително броят на областите, в които правителствата, заседаващи в рамките на Съвета, вземат решение, като гласуват по-скоро с квалифицирано мнозинство, отколкото с единодушие, като това ще даде възможност Съюзът от 27 държави-членки да функционира без опасност от блокиране на решенията с налагането на вето;

б)   новата система на гласуване с двойно мнозинство ще улесни вземането на решения от Съвета;

в)   Европейският съвет ще стане пълноправна институция на Европейския съюз и неговото шестмесечно председателство на ротационен принцип ще бъде заменено с мандата на председател, избиран от неговите членове за период от две години и половина, като по този начин ще може да се постигне по-голяма последователност в подготовката и приемствеността на неговата работа;

г)    броят на членовете на Комисията ще бъде намален от 2014 г. на 2/3 от броя на държавите-членки, като това ще улесни Комисията в нейната работа и ще покаже по-ясно, че членовете на Комисията са представители на европейските интереси, а не на интересите на страните по произход, като същевременно равноправното участие на всички държави-членки ще продължи да се осигурява чрез ротационна система;

д)   видимостта и възможностите на Съюза като действащо лице в глобален план значително ще нараснат:

–  двете длъжности, които се дублират и внасят объркване - Върховен представител на Съюза за външната политика и член на Комисията по въпросите, свързани с външните отношения, ще бъдат слети, като се създаде длъжността „заместник-председател на Комисията/Върховен представител за външна политика и политика на сигурност“, който ще председателства Съвета по външни работи и ще може да се изказва от името на Съюза по въпроси, по които ЕС има обща позиция, като по този начин се осигурява повече последователност във външната дейност на Съюза;

–  ще има единна служба за външна дейност, съставена от държавни служители на Комисията и Съвета и на националните дипломатически служби, като се създава от Съвета след получаване на съгласие от Комисията и след консултации с Парламента; службата за външна дейност ще бъде председателствана от Върховния представител и има за цел да осигурява по-голяма последователност при разработването и прилагането на външната политика на Съюза;

–  ще бъде засилен капацитетът на Съюза за създаване на общи структури в областта на политиката на сигурност и отбрана, между другото чрез въвеждането на клауза за взаимопомощ и съдействие в случай на въоръжено нападение, с което ще се увеличи чувството за сигурност на гражданите, като се осигурява необходимата гъвкавост с оглед да се вземат предвид различните подходи на държавите-членки по тези въпроси;

е)   ще бъдат изяснени разликите между законодателните и изпълнителните актове и новото определение на понятието „делегирани актове“ ще позволи да се опрости и усъвършенства законодателството на Съюза;

ж)  структурата на стълбовете се премахва, като това ще осигури по-голямо единство в действията в различните области на дейност на Съюза с опростени механизми и инструменти, въпреки че специфичният характер на външната политика и политиката на сигурност предполага прилагането на специални процедури в тези области;

з)    дейностите в областта на свободата, сигурността и правосъдието ще се основават на по-амбициозни цели и по-ефективни процедури, като се преустанови използването на отделни междуправителствени инструменти и процедури; тези дейности ще подлежат на съдебен контрол, като това ще доведе до осезателен напредък в областта на правосъдието, сигурността и имиграцията;

и)   целите и компетенциите на Съюза в областта на изменението на климата, правата на детето, европейската политика на добросъседство, хуманитарната помощ, енергетиката (като в Договора се включва позоваване на солидарността между държавите-членки в тази област), космоса, изследванията, туризма, спорта, общественото здраве и гражданската защита са определени по по-ясен начин; общата търговска политика е призната за изключителна компетенция на Съюза;

й)   в много други области ще може да се прилагат по-ефективни методи на вземане на решения, при положение че е налице политическа воля за това;

к)   има повече възможности за прилагане на гъвкав подход, когато не всички държави-членки желаят или могат да продължат да прилагат определени политики едновременно;

Проблеми

6.  осъзнава широко разпространеното съжаление, че след резултатите от референдумите във Франция и Нидерландия, с цел да се постигне ново споразумение между 27-те държави-членки, се наложи:

–    да се изостави конституционният подход и някои негови елементи, като схващането за Съюз, основан на волята на неговите граждани и държави-членки, единният и структуриран текст, по-ясната терминология за обозначаване на законодателните актове, закрепването в Договора на знаме и химн и употребата на званието „министър на външните работи“ вместо „Върховен представител“;

–    да се отложи прилагането на важни елементи на новия Договор, като влизането в сила на новата система на гласуване в Съвета (наред със специални разпоредби за отлагане на гласуването, известни като „компромиса от Йоанина“) и в определени области на компетентност към обикновената законодателна процедура да се добавят ограничителни механизми, като например „аварийните спирачки“;

–    в Договора да се включат специфични за конкретни отделни държави-членки мерки, като разширяването на обхвата на клаузата за участие във връзка със сътрудничеството по полицейски и наказателноправни въпроси за две държави-членки, тъй като протоколът ограничава действието на хартата върху вътрешното право на две държави-членки, както и предоставеното на друга държава-членка допълнително място в ЕП, чрез допускане на изключение от принципа на намаляваща пропорционалност;

–    да се изменени текстът на редица пасажи от Договора или от протоколите и декларациите, приложени към него, които пораждат неоснователно негативни настроения, като това оставя впечатлението за недоверие към Съюза и неговите институции и по този начин изпраща погрешен сигнал към обществеността;

Заключения

7.  подкрепя Договора и подчертава необходимостта всички държави-членки на Съюза да го ратифицират своевременно, за да може да влезе в сила на 1 януари 2009 г.;

8.  счита, че Договорът от Лисабон ще осигури стабилна рамка, която ще позволи по-нататъшното развитие на Съюза за в бъдеще;

9.  осъзнава, че договорът за изменение неизбежно е по-неясен и неразбираем от един систематизиран договор; призовава следователно консолидираните договори да бъдат публикувани в кратки срокове, във вида, в който са изменени с Договора от Лисабон, което би предоставило на гражданите по-ясен основен текст на ЕС;

10. отново призовава да се положат всички възможни усилия, както от институциите на ЕС, така и от националните органи на управление, в съответствие с принципа на искрено сътрудничество, за да се информират европейските граждани по-ясно и обективно за съдържанието на Договора;

11. възлага на своята водеща комисия да подготви необходимите промени в Правилника за дейността на ЕП и да направи оценка на потребността от допълнителни мерки за прилагане;

12. възлага на своя председател да предаде настоящата резолюция и доклада на комисията по конституционни въпроси на националните парламенти на държавите-членки, на Съвета, Комисията и на бившите членове на Конвента за бъдещето на Европа, както и да гарантира предоставянето от службите на Парламента, в това число и от неговите външни информационни бюра, на по-подробна информация за позицията на Парламента по Договора.

• [1]  Харта за основните права на Европейския съюз от 7 декември 2000 г., провъзгласена в Страсбург на 12 декември 2007 г.
• [2]  Европейски съвет от Лаакен, Декларация от Лаакен относно бъдещето на Съюза, SN 273/01, 15.12.2001 г.
• [3]  Приети текстове, P6_TA(2007)0234.
• [4]  Приети текстове, P6_TA(2007)0328.
• [5]  С 500 гласа „за“, 137 гласа „против“ и 40 въздържали се (Резолюция на Европейския парламент от 12 януари 2005 г. относно Договора за създаване на Конституция за Европа - доклад на Corbett/Méndez de Vigo, ОВ С 247 Е, 6.10.2005 г., стр. 88).

ИЗЛОЖЕНИЕ НА МОТИВИТЕ

There is a tide in the affairs of men,

Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;

Omitted, all the voyage of their life

Is bound in shallows and in miseries.

On such a full sea are we now afloat;

And we must take the current when it serves,

Or lose our ventures.

William Shakespeare. Julius Caesar.

I.    Background

1.   The European integration process is anything but plain sailing. In 2004 we co-rapporteurs had the privilege of drafting Parliament's report on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and now, three years later, we have been given the same responsibility for the Lisbon Treaty that has taken its place.

We thus find ourselves in the singular position of having to answer the age-old question of whether one can step into the same river twice. And the answer must be 'yes', as this is the only way that we will be able to provide Parliament with guidance in how, in the words of William Shakespeare, to 'take the current when it serves', so as not to 'lose our ventures'.

The task entrusted to the co-rapporteurs is necessarily didactic in nature: as we did in 2004, we now propose to compare the Treaties currently in force with the Treaty signed in Lisbon on 13 December 2007, which is currently undergoing ratification in the 27 Member States.

In order to know where we are going, it is a good idea to consider where we are coming from: more than half a century ago, the Schuman Declaration set in train an ambitious undertaking: that of uniting Europeans, who had been divided for centuries by fratricidal conflicts, around a common project.

Since the first European Community (Coal and Steel: Paris Treaty of 18 April 1951[1]), which brought together six Western European countries[2], was established, the European integration process has been extended to embrace 27 European States[3] and has seen its scope expand to cover new areas through the establishment of the Economic Community and the Atomic Energy Community/Euratom (Treaties of Rome of 25 March 1957[4]) and, subsequently, the European Union (Maastricht Treaty of 7 February 1992).

2. Ever since the first European elections by universal suffrage in 1979, Parliament has consistently sought to democratise and make more effective and transparent the workings of what was to become the European Union. By adopting, on 14 February 1984, the first draft Treaty establishing the European Union (known as the ‘Spinelli’ draft, after its rapporteur), Parliament initiated a reform process which was to continue for the following 20 years and lead to the drafting of the Single European Act[5], the Maastricht Treaty[6], the Treaty of Amsterdam[7], the Treaty of Nice[8], the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe[9] and, now, the Treaty of Lisbon[10].

At each stage, with the Committee on Institutional Affairs, which in 1999 became the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, providing the driving force, Parliament played an active part in the preparatory talks and assessed the outcome of the various Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs)[11].

Right from the start of this process, it advocated clarifying and enhancing the constitutional basis for the European Union, a need which became more and more acute under the pressure of successive enlargements, given their capacity to jeopardise the political dimension of the integration process.

Three distinct but related objectives have been pursued by Parliament to this end:

First, it has sought to clarify and where necessary strengthen the competences and responsibilities of the European Union itself. Parliament has consistently argued that powers should be attributed to, and exercised by, the Union on the basis of the ‘principle of subsidiarity’, i.e. it should exercise those responsibilities - but only those responsibilities - that can be carried out more effectively by common policies than by the Member States acting separately.

Second, it has argued that responsibilities exercised at European level should be carried out more effectively. Parliament was particularly critical of the practice of unanimity in the Council, arguing that, where agreement has been reached to run a policy jointly, it makes no sense to give a blocking power to each of the component States of the Union. It has also pleaded for a stronger role to be given to the Commission in carrying out policies once they have been agreed, subject to proper scrutiny and control.

Third, it has made the case for better democratic control and accountability at European level. Those responsibilities which national parliaments, in ratifying the Treaties, have transferred to the Union should not be exercised by the Council (i.e. national ministers) alone. The loss of parliamentary powers at the national level should be offset by an increase in parliamentary power at European level.

In the light of the mixed and clearly inadequate results achieved by the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice, when set against the challenge posed by the doubling in the number of Member States, but also that of the further deepening of the Union, it became more and more apparent that the established method of revising the Treaties was no longer able to provide genuine responses to the issues raised by the development of Europe.

Parliament had already reached that conclusion, and outlined it clearly, in its resolution of 19 November 1997 (based on the report by Íñigo Méndez de Vigo and Dimitris Tsatsos, see footnote 8 above) which marked the real starting point of the political review process which was to culminate, in 1999, in the establishment, at the instigation of the German Council Presidency, of the Convention model, one first employed in connection with the drafting of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

The signatories to the Treaty of Nice, being aware of its imperfections, in fact annexed to it a Declaration No 23 'on the future of the Union'[12] which paved the way for further reform of the Treaties, originally scheduled for 2004. This reform was to be prepared for by 'wide-ranging discussions with all interested parties: representatives of national parliaments and all those reflecting public opinion (...) representatives of civil society, etc.', which was to take place in 2001 with a view to the adoption of a declaration 'containing appropriate initiatives for the continuation of this process' at the European Council in Laeken.

3. Parliament, for its part, after having sought to work in partnership with the national parliaments during the preparations for successive IGCs[13], was the first to propose[14], on the basis of the precedent set when the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union was drawn up[15], the convening of a Convention comprising representatives of the Heads of State and Government of the Member States, the national parliaments and the European Parliament and the Commission and with the involvement, as full members, of representatives of the governments and parliaments of the applicant States.

The Convention on the Charter of Fundamental Rights demonstrated that a body of this kind was able to prepare a draft text likely to secure the approval of the Heads of State or Government. The open and transparent nature of the Convention and the quality of its debates had also facilitated efforts to achieve a consensus by giving every representative the opportunity, first of all, to express his or her own views, and, subsequently, to understand those of the other representatives.

The Laeken European Council of 14 and 15 December 2001, by adopting the 'Laeken declaration on the future of European Union'[16], followed up this initiative by setting out the organisational arrangements for the work of the Convention and, above all, defining its terms of reference and the issues that it would be called upon to discuss. Thus, the Convention on the Future of Europe (chairman: Valéry Giscard d’Estaing; vice-chairmen: Giuliano Amato and Jean-Luc Dehaene) was given the task of drawing up a preliminary draft Constitution to serve as the basis for the work of the IGC which was to follow.

The outcome of the Convention confirmed that the choice of this method had been a wise one, since it led to the presentation, after 16 months’ work, of a consensus-based text informed by intense debates which also drew on close dialogue with civil society.

For its part, Parliament, through the work of its Committee on Constitutional Affairs, exerted a major influence on the draft Constitutional Treaty[17], only a very few provisions of which would be modified by the IGC. At that IGC, for the first time Parliament was fully involved in the proceedings, in the persons of its President, Pat Cox, and its two representatives, Íñigo Méndez de Vigo, subsequently replaced by Elmar Brok, and Klaus Hänsch.

Unfortunately, the ratification procedure took an unexpected turn: the ‘no’ votes in the referendums in France and the Netherlands forced a rethink.

The European Council held in June 2005 ordered a period of reflection, to last at least one year, which was to be used to enable a broad debate to be held in all the Member States 'involving citizens, civil society, social partners, national parliaments and political parties'. The European institutions were also invited to make their contribution. In the meantime, further ratifications have been carried out, some by means of referendums.  

5. For its part, Parliament has fulfilled all its responsibilities in this area. From the outset, it supported the idea of initiating an in-depth public debate at European level on the main issues at stake in the European integration process and rejected any attempt to push through the selective implementation of the Constitutional Treaty (cherry picking). Parliament made its own particular contribution to the public debate by proposing that ‘interparliamentary forums’ should be held to discuss issues fundamental to the future of Europe. A total of three forums were held in the period leading up to the June 2007 European Council at which the decision was taken to reconvene the IGC[18]. These forums helped to strengthen, among the elected representatives of the citizens of all the Member States, the conviction that the problems to which the Constitutional Treaty was intended as a response had not simply disappeared following the failure of the ratification process and that, although perhaps in a different form, the institutional changes it incorporated were overall still vitally needed in order to enable the Union to address the challenges awaiting it in an ever more globalised world.

The German Presidency saw institutional issues return to the top of the Union agenda. The procedure employed inevitably disappointed those who had experienced the atmosphere of dialogue and transparency which had marked the Convention, an atmosphere which had spilled over to the 2004 IGC, moreover. In an effort to guarantee real chances of success, the discussions on the relaunching of the reform of the Treaties were initially held bilaterally, between the Presidency and each of the Member States. It should be noted that the EP was involved in the consultations from the outset through the work of the 'sherpas'[19] and was thus able to make its contribution to the drafting of the mandate which the German Presidency submitted to the June 2007 European Council. Since those 'sherpas' were appointed directly by the President of Parliament from among the staff of the Secretariat, an ad hoc information/consultation procedure was established involving the President, the chairman of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and the political group coordinators from that committee.

6. This preparatory work enabled the June 2007 European Council to convene a new IGC to resume the process of reforming the Treaties and also to lay down a very clear, precise and detailed remit, on the basis of which the Portuguese Presidency was able to conduct the proceedings of the IGC quickly and effectively.

The IGC, which opened on 23 July 2007, at the meeting of the General Affairs Council, essentially operated on two levels: at ministerial level, with Parliament represented by three Members – Elmar Brok, Enrique Barón Crespo and Andrew Duff; and at the level of the group of legal experts, whose work had been prepared by the Council Legal Service and on which Parliament and the Commission were also represented.

The work of the group of legal experts proved decisive in helping the IGC reach an agreement so quickly. At political level, although the IGC met only three times prior to the Lisbon European Council it nevertheless resolved or excluded from discussion a large number of sensitive issues – the Portuguese Presidency having successfully imposed the rule that the remit would be changed only to deal with matters on which there was unanimous agreement among the Member States – so that in Lisbon the Heads of State or Government were left with negotiations on no more than two fundamental issues, only one of which derived from the Treaty itself: the definition of the new qualified-majority voting system in the Council, in the light of Poland's persistent dissatisfaction not only with the agreement reached in 2004, but also with the compromise laboriously thrashed out at the June 2007 European Council in Brussels. The other key unresolved matter was the composition of the EP as from the parliamentary term starting in 2009, an issue which, although not deriving directly from the Treaty, had become one of the main obstacles to the conclusion of an agreement, since Italy was fiercely opposed to the proposal for a decision drawn up by the EP at the request of the European Council.

The other issues still under discussion – the British and Irish opt-outs/opt-ins on matters previously covered by the third pillar, the safeguarding of the EP's role in the appointment of the Vice-President/High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, etc. – had practically all been dealt with in the final days leading up to the European Council, in particular at the meeting of the IGC at ministerial level held during the General Affairs Council which took place on 15 October 2007 in Luxembourg.

In Lisbon the Heads of State or Government were thus able to reach an agreement quickly: the IGC came to an end towards 01.00 on Friday, 19 October 2007.

In the second part of this explanatory statement, we propose to consider the implications and the merits (or drawbacks) of the Treaty of Lisbon, which was officially signed on 13 December 2007 in Lisbon.

II.       How does the new Treaty represent a step forward by comparison with the Treaties in force?

The Treaty of Lisbon incorporates a large number of significant reforms and improvements to the current Treaties. It is, of course, a compromise and one which, in Parliament’s eyes, regrettably abandons some important provisions of the Constitution, delays the entry into force of other provisions and contains specific measures introduced to satisfy the demands of some Member States. This was the political price to be paid in order to end the crisis into which the 'no' votes in the French and Dutch referendums had plunged the Union.

1.        The return to the traditional approach of revising Treaties and the abandonment of the idea of a Constitution

1.1.     The return to the traditional method of revising the Treaties, through the adoption of a new Treaty amending the current Treaties, which themselves remain in force, implies the abandonment of the Constitution as a single, consolidated Treaty which would replace the current Treaties in their entirety. As a result, the question which has proved so controversial, that of whether the document was really a Constitution or a Treaty, is no longer relevant. A sterile debate on an issue which is nothing more than a red herring has thus been avoided: there was never any doubt that, in formal terms, the document was a Treaty which would have to be adopted and ratified in accordance with the rules in force governing the revision of Treaties. There was no other possible procedure. However, it is also true that, by virtue of its nature and substance, the Constitutional Treaty established a more recognisable ‘constitution’. The return to the traditional method involves the abandonment of the very term 'Constitution', so that the controversy has been settled politically.

           This approach also involves a splitting of the text and a rejection of the very idea of a single text of a constitutional nature, one which some regarded as being too close to State practice to be applicable to the Union.

1.2.     However, the new Treaty substantially clarifies the definition of the values, principles and objectives which guide the actions of the European Union (EU); it describes the Union’s competences; it lays down what institutions the EU will have, outlines its decision-making procedures, and stipulates what form its acts will take; it defines citizens' rights vis-à-vis the EU; it lays down the rules governing its own revision, etc. In that respect, it could be said that the Treaties on which the Union is founded in some way establish its 'constitution', taking the word 'constitution' in its material sense. After all, the role of a constitution is precisely that of laying down the conditions governing, and the limits to, the exercise of power in the context of a political entity and safeguarding citizens’ rights, something which the new Treaty does. However, the very fact that the attempt to give that material concept practical form was rejected signifies that there was no desire to endow the Union with a ‘Constitution’ in the formal sense, i.e. the most commonly used political sense, of the term. This represents a difference by comparison with the Constitutional Treaty.

1.3.     In fact, in the existing Treaties the Union effectively already has its 'Constitution', deriving from the Treaties which brought it into being, just like any other political entity. By simplifying those Treaties, by giving them a more readily comprehensible structure, a vital step has been taken towards clarifying the system and making it more transparent and understandable for the public. However, the method chosen – a Treaty containing amendments to the two Treaties in force – makes the text unreadable for ordinary citizens. A consolidated version is now a necessity.

1.4.     It is clear, therefore, that the Member States wanted to dispel any fear, however unfounded, that endowing the Union with a Constitution would represent the first step towards the creation of a centralised 'superstate' which would inevitably sound the death knell for national States and change the nature of the European Union. Parliament, which has been campaigning from the start of the process for the 'constitutionalisation' of the Union, is aware of the fact that this fear fails to take proper account of the significance of a constitution as a fundamental act governing the exercise of power in a political entity (unless the aim is to deny the 'political' nature of the Union). Moreover, there are many examples of international organisations whose constituent act is rightly termed a constitution, including the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the World Health Organisation (WHO), or the Universal Postal Union (UPU). Seen in this way, a 'constitution' could even be said to offer the Member States and Union citizens formal safeguards against unwelcome Union action. On that basis, whilst acknowledging that the political situation in the Member States made such a step the only way out of the institutional impasse which had been reached, the EP can only regret the abandonment of the constitutional approach.

1.5.     By the same token, your co-rapporteurs can only deplore the fact that the new Treaty makes no reference to symbols of the Union – the flag, the anthem, the motto, the euro, and Europe Day – as the Constitutional Treaty did. Although this does not mean that these symbols no longer exist – they had already existed for a long time without ever being mentioned as such in the Treaties and will continue to exist in the same way – it would only be logical for texts which define the legal and political status of the Union to refer to them. This abandonment of the symbols was forced through by certain Member States on the pretext that recognising them in the Treaties would enable people to claim erroneously that the Union was in fact a 'State-like' structure. That this viewpoint is by no means unanimously held seems to be borne out by the declaration on the symbols of the Union which 16 Member States have annexed to the Treaty (Declaration No 52 on the symbols of the Union) reiterating that in their view the symbols mentioned continue 'to express the sense of community of the people in the European Union and their allegiance to it'. Accordingly, your co-rapporteurs can only welcome with enthusiasm the initiative taken by the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, which is in the process of preparing a report on the use of the Union's symbols which will propose changes to Parliament's Rules of Procedure designed to ensure that Parliament makes more systematic use of those symbols[20].

2.       One single entity: the European Union

2.1.     Despite the retention of two separate Treaties, a crucial step forward, in terms of transparency and understanding by citizens of the nature of the European project, has been taken by merging several overlapping entities (European Union, European Community) into a single entity, the European Union[21], endowed with legal personality. This will also increase the effectiveness and visibility of Union action in the international arena, bringing an end to a confusing situation in which the European Union is universally recognised as the common entity, whereas it is the European Community, which covers only some of the Union's functions, which has explicit legal personality[22].

2.2.     A further result is that the Treaty establishing the European Community now becomes the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The two Treaties thus now serve the same political entity: the European Union. The first focuses on the principles, values and fundamental organisational aspects of the Union. The second deals with the nuts and bolts of organisation and functioning of the Union and the definition of the principles and objectives which guide Union action in the area of each of its sectoral policies, specifying in detail the scope of and limits to the Union's competences in each of its areas of action. The exception, which represents a major break with the logic of the separation between the two Treaties, stems from the fact that the TEU contains an entire title dealing with the Union's external action, which deals in detail with every aspect of the common foreign and security policy.

2.3.     This merger into a single entity has been accompanied by the abolition of the three-pillar structure [common foreign and security policy (CFSP), justice and home affairs (JHA) and European Community]; all three have been merged into the single corpus of the Union, with a single institutional framework and the across-the-board application of the Community method, the sole exception being the area of the CFSP (including defence), where specific decision-making procedures remain in force, as warranted by the particular nature of that policy area.

3.        A clear definition of the Union’s values, principles and objectives

           The new Treaty provides that the TEU will open with articles defining the nature of the Union and the values and principles on which it is founded and the objectives which it is supposed to pursue by means of its action.

3.1.     The very first article of the amended TEU lays down the basis on which the European integration process is founded: it defines the EU as a Union established by the Member States ‘on which the Member States confer competences to attain objectives they have in common’. This definition departs from that set out in the Constitution, which enshrined the dual legitimacy of the Union reflecting the will of the citizens and States of Europe. However, although that formal recognition of the Union’s dual legitimacy has disappeared, practical expressions of that legitimacy appear at various points in the text of the Treaties, in keeping with a development which has been continuing at least since the election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage.

3.2.     This European Union must be firmly anchored to the values on which it is founded and which guide every action taken by its institutions.

           In accordance with Article 2 of the revised TEU, these values, on which the entire European integration process is founded, are respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. Moreover, these values represent the reference criteria governing future accessions to the Union and may serve as the basis for imposing sanctions on any Member States which violate them on a serious, persistent basis.

           This article also defines the principles which guide the Union’s action: pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men.

           In this respect, the Treaty of Lisbon closely mirrors the Constitutional Treaty, given that there is a fairly broad consensus among the Member States regarding the set of common values on which the Union is founded, a consensus which was not seriously challenged at any stage in the discussions on the future of the Union.

3.3.     In the new Treaty, the definition of the Union’s objectives, which is at present split between Article 2 of the TEU and Article 3 of the TEC, is brought together in the TEU, immediately after the enumeration of the values on which the Union is founded. That definition has been amended slightly by comparison with the Constitution, so that in accordance with the new Article 3 of the TEU the Union is to pursue political objectives, which justify its existence and which can be summarised as follows: the promotion of peace, the Union’s values and the well-being of its peoples. They are fleshed out, in Article 3 of the TEU, in political, economic and social objectives to be pursued within the Union and in the sphere of external relations.

           Accordingly, at an internal level the Union is to offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of persons is guaranteed, a freedom which is to be accompanied by appropriate measures concerning checks at external borders, asylum, immigration and the prevention of and fight against crime. It is to establish an internal market[23]. It is to work for the sustainable development of Europe, on the basis of balanced economic growth and price stability; to develop a highly competitive social market economy aiming at full employment and social progress; and to secure a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. It is to promote scientific and technological advance. It is to combat social exclusion and all forms of discrimination and is to promote social justice and protection, equality between men and women, solidarity between generations and the protection of the rights of the child. It is to promote economic, social and territorial cohesion and solidarity among the Member States. It is to respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity and ensures that Europe's cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced. Finally, it is to establish an economic and monetary union, whose currency is the euro.

In the international arena, where it is to promote its values and interests, the Union is to contribute to peace and security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, the eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, and to strict observance and the development of international law, in particular the United Nations Charter.

These objectives thus make up a basic political programme which was the well-spring for the establishment of the Union. It is incumbent on the Union to pursue these objectives by appropriate means, using the competences conferred on it in the Treaties.

3.4.     The principles governing relations between the Union and the Member States are also set out in the first articles of the amended TEU: the Union undertakes to respect the national identity of the Member States, i.e. the fundamental elements of their political and constitutional structures; it respects the decisions which each Member State may take regarding the territorial distribution of power - from the fixing of its borders to regional or local autonomy - the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of national security. Moreover, the agreement reached in Lisbon emphasises that ‘national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State’[24]. Finally, in that same article the amended TEU also lays down the principle of sincere cooperation between the Union and the Member States with a view to the achievement of their shared objectives.

In its introductory provisions the amended TEU also lays down the principle of the conferral of competences (the Union has only those competences which are conferred on it by the Member States in the Treaties) and the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, the principles which govern the exercise of the Union's competences, even though the chapter dealing with the definition of the Union's competences has been incorporated into the TFEU.

In order to placate certain Member States primarily concerned to demonstrate that the amending Treaty is not simply a Constitution by another name, a statement of the principle of the primacy of Union law over national law has regrettably not been retained in a prominent position in the Treaties, but is the subject of a declaration (Declaration No 17), which draws attention to the settled case law of the Court of Justice concerning the primacy of Union law and incorporates an opinion of the Council Legal Service which states that this principle is a cornerstone principle of Community law and that the fact that the principle of primacy will not be included in the future Treaty ‘shall not in any way change the existence of the principle and the existing case law of the Court of Justice’.

3.5.     The values and principles outlined in the preceding paragraphs thus represent the ethical foundation of the Union, a foundation which is given practical form in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. That Charter is not incorporated into the Treaties, as it was into the Constitution, but is the subject of a provision which makes it legally binding by acknowledging that it has the same legal value as the Treaties themselves.

           The objectives assigned to the Union justify its existence and are the reason behind the Member States' decision to establish the Union. They govern its action in all areas. Although the values, principles and objectives defined in these articles are not entirely new, some of them had never previously been clearly stated and had never previously been systematised. This represents an important step towards providing citizens with a clear, highly symbolic insight into precisely what the Union signifies.

4.        Citizens at the heart of the European integration process: European citizenship and the new status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights

           In its opening provisions, the TEU also recognises European citizenship, which complements, but does not replace, citizenship of each Member State (in fact, national citizenship is the basis for recognition of European citizenship). However, the articles dealing with the practical substance of European citizens’ rights are relegated to the TFEU[25]. However, this regrettable physical separation in no way alters the fact that the Treaties increasingly place individuals at the heart of the European integration process, that is to say the men and women who have rights and obligations, who are Union citizens because they are citizens of a Member State and who, by virtue of that fact, enjoy all the additional rights conferred on them by European citizenship.

4.1.     The Constitution incorporated the Charter of Fundamental Rights into its Part II. That arrangement, fervently advocated by Parliament, represented full acknowledgement of the fact that people are at the heart of the European integration process. At the 2007 IGC, in the face of opposition from some Member States, the decision to incorporate the Charter into the Treaty had to be reversed. However, most Member States joined Parliament in making agreement to that concession contingent on recognition in the Treaties of the binding legal force of the Charter. This is precisely what Article 6 of the new TEU does, stating that ‘the Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties’. As a result of this formal recognition, the Charter has acquired a binding legal force and the same legal value as the Treaties (the only way, moreover, in which it could serve as a parameter by which to judge the validity of Union acts): it is thus binding both on the European institutions, acting in the framework of their respective competences, and on the Member States, but only when they act as implementers of Community law. It thus offers citizens a further guarantee of the protection of fundamental rights vis-à-vis the Union.

4.2.     This in no way signifies that the protection of the fundamental rights guaranteed to citizens, vis-à-vis their States, under national law is being called into question, or that competences are being surreptitiously conferred on the Union, despite the claims made by some critics that the Union could in this way impose economic and social policy guidelines on the Member States. The assertion in the Charter itself that it does not extend the field of application of Community law beyond the competences conferred on the Union, does not establish any new competence or task for the Union and does not modify the competences and tasks conferred on the Union in the Treaties (Article 52(2) of the Charter) is particularly clear on this subject.

4.3.     The fact that the Charter no longer forms an integral part of the Treaties led the 2007 IGC, in an effort to meet the demands of the most recalcitrant Member States, to repeat those guarantees in the same article of the TEU which recognises the Charter.

           However, even this was not enough to convince certain Member States. Thus, at the insistence of the United Kingdom, supported late in the day by Poland, the IGC added a protocol (No 9) on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights to Poland and to the United Kingdom, which stipulates that the Charter does not extend the ability of the Court of Justice, or of any court or tribunal of Poland or the United Kingdom, 'to find that the laws, regulations or administrative provisions, practices or actions of Poland or of the United Kingdom are inconsistent with the fundamental rights, freedoms and principles that it reaffirms'. With particular reference to social rights (Title IV of the Charter), the protocol specifies that the Charter does not create justiciable rights applicable to Poland or the United Kingdom except insofar as such rights are provided for in their respective national laws (which is, anyway, the general rule as regards this title of the Charter).

           Its provisions essentially repeat principles already laid down in the Charter. However, if that turns out to be the case, the EP can only regret the fact that the citizens of two Member States may be deprived, by those States, of the full protection of fundamental rights recognised by the Charter, a document which, it should be emphasised, is primarily addressed to the Union institutions and is binding on the Member States only when they act to implement Union law.

4.4.     The rights set out in the Charter correspond, in general terms, to the common set of fundamental rights which the Union already recognised and which were drawn from the constitutional traditions of the Member States or the European Convention on Human Rights.

           The amended TEU provides for a further step towards the protection of fundamental rights at Union level by stipulating that the Union will seek accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (to which all the Member States are parties), as Parliament has long been proposing. This will entail an agreement with the Council of Europe. The decision to conclude that agreement will have to be adopted by the Council unanimously (as against the qualified majority provided for in the Constitution), after approval by Parliament.

4.5.     Moreover, further aspects of the new Treaty could be cited which strengthen citizens’ rights of participation in the European political process (such as the people’s legislative initiative, or citizens’ initiative: Article 11(4) of the amended TEU) or which help to enhance the legal protection of their rights by facilitating access to the Court of Justice.

           Parliament can only welcome these improvements.

5.        A clear and readily understandable definition of the Union’s competences

5.1.     One of the most important questions which had been posed from the start of the reform process which culminated in the Treaty of Lisbon was that of ‘who does what’ in Europe. Such clarification is essential if citizens are to grasp properly the allocation of political responsibilities at European level. It will help to make Union action more effective. It will also offer an additional safeguard to all those who fear excessive intervention on the part of the Union.

5.2.     The reform Treaty broadly retains the provisions of the Constitution concerning the delimitation of the Union’s competences, which was itself based on that laid down in the existing Treaties. However, as a result of the retention of the two current Treaties in amended form, the conceptual unity of the chapter on Union competences in Part I of the Constitution has been lost: whilst the principles governing the exercise of its competences by the Union are set out in the general provisions of the TEU, the different types of competences are detailed in the TFEU, in its Title I dealing with ‘Categories and Areas of the Union’s Competences’. Although the two Treaties have the same legal value, this approach necessarily runs counter to the objective of providing citizens with a clear text.

           The new Treaty defines the Union's competences, dividing them into three categories, each with a different legal status and each implying a different degree of Union intervention: the Union's exclusive competences; the competences it shares with the Member States; and action to support or complement that taken by the Member States. By virtue of their specific nature, the common foreign and security policy and the coordination of economic and employment policies warrant specific provisions which fall outside the three categories (cf. Annex 1).

           This definition of the Union's competences is consistent with the basic principle governing the allocation of competences, i.e. that the Union enjoys only those competences which have been conferred on it by the Member States in the Treaties with a view to achieving the objectives laid down in those documents. This principle is in itself sufficient to prevent the emergence of any kind of centralised superstate, since it implies that all competences rest with the States, except in those cases where they transfer them to the Union.

5.3.     The Treaty of Lisbon does not increase the Union’s competences: the small number of ‘new’ competences laid down correspond essentially to areas in which the Union already took action under existing articles, or even Article 308 of the EC Treaty, and for which the new text establishes a precise legal basis. The changes made in the TFEU essentially reflect the need to bring its provisions into line with the new decision-making procedures and the new legal instruments (see below, point 7).

5.4.     In addition, the Treaty of Lisbon strengthens the requirement for the Union to comply with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality when exercising its competences; monitoring of that compliance is already a matter for the Member State governments, in the Council, and Parliament. Although the definition of these principles set out by the new Treaty corresponds to that already employed in the Treaties in force, the protocol on the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality provides for new mechanisms to guarantee compliance with those principles, in particular by substantially strengthening the role of the national parliaments.

5.5.     Above all, the latter gain the right to be informed in good time of all Commission legislative proposals, which must be duly substantiated as regards compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. This provision will enable the national parliaments to exercise more effectively the rights they enjoy at national level and will, in particular, enhance their ability to influence the actions of their governments in the Council of Ministers. Moreover, as regards the subsidiarity principle in particular, in accordance with a protocol annexed to the Treaty[26] the national parliaments may, within eight weeks following the forwarding of the proposal, send directly to the Union institutions, which must take due account of them, opinions setting out the reasons why they take the view that a proposal is not consistent with the subsidiarity principle. An 'early warning' mechanism even requires the Commission to reconsider its proposal should one-third of the national parliaments consider that the proposal in question does not comply with the subsidiarity principle.

           The 2007 IGC supplemented this mechanism, already provided for under the Constitution, with a provision which works as follows: if, under the ordinary legislative procedure, the number of reasoned opinions on the non-compliance of a proposal for a legislative act with the principle of subsidiarity represents at least half the number of national parliaments, and if the Commission, following its review of the proposal, decides to maintain it, it must also justify that step in a reasoned opinion. All these opinions will then be forwarded to the two branches of the legislative authority, the EP and the Council, which must assess the issue of subsidiarity before the first reading. If the EP, acting by a majority of its component Members, or the Council, acting by a 55% majority of the Member States, decides to uphold the objection raised by the national parliaments, the legislative procedure is halted.

Finally, that same protocol also offers the Member States the possibility, if the national legal system allows such provision, of bringing an action before the Court of Justice, on behalf of their national parliament or one of its chambers, against a legislative act on the grounds that it violates the subsidiarity principle. The Committee of the Regions also gains the right to bring such actions against legislative acts on which, under the Treaties, it must be consulted prior to their adoption.

           These mechanisms offer further important safeguards against any potentially ill-considered exercise of Union competences and will clear the way for much more detailed democratic scrutiny of Community legislation. In particular, they also strengthen substantially the role of the national parliaments.

5.6.     It is true that in order to gain a full picture of the specific methods for implementing these competences the definition must be read in conjunction with the specific provisions set out in Parts III and IV of the TFEU. However, it is equally true that a simple reading of these provisions will give European citizens a fairly clear insight into who does what in Europe. This represents a degree of improvement in terms of transparency, but that improvement could have been greater if all the provisions concerning the Union’s competences had been brought together in a single title in the TEU, as they were in Part I of the Constitution.

5.7.     One of the further welcome features is that the new Treaty provides the system with the requisite degree of flexibility by means of a clause similar to the current Article 308 TEC (new Article 352 TFEU), which authorises the Council, should the need arise, to adopt measures in areas where the Union has no explicit competences. This flexibility clause offers the Member States full safeguards: decision-making by unanimity and clause to be used only in the context of the policies defined in the Treaties or to achieve the objectives laid down therein; the procedure to put it into effect has become more democratic, in that it is subject to approval by Parliament and the national parliaments must be notified in good time before the decision is taken. In addition, the 2007 IGC went further by making clear that measures based on that clause cannot provide for legislative harmonisation in areas where the Treaties rule this out. This article can likewise not be used with a view to achieving objectives under the common foreign and security policy.

6.      A revamped institutional framework for a stronger, more democratic and more transparent Union

One of the key questions which the new Treaty was required to resolve was that of the changes to be made to the Union institutions in order to enable them to deal with the new situation resulting from the enlargement, particularly as the Union's institutional organisation has essentially been based on the same structures for almost 50 years, even though the Union’s range of tasks has expanded substantially and the number of Member States has increased from six to 27. Despite the work of a series of Intergovernmental Conferences, the key institutional issues had remained unresolved and the solutions agreed on at Nice were not satisfactory even to some of those who had negotiated them. For its part, Parliament has repeatedly drawn the attention of the public and the leaders of the Member States to the need for a radical institutional reform to endow the Union with effective, democratic and transparent institutions, whilst safeguarding the institutional balance and the Community method: the Commission which proposes legislation, Parliament and the Council which take the decisions, and the Court of Justice which guarantees the application of the texts adopted.

   The Constitution already contained significant institutional changes which satisfied that need and which had not been fundamentally called into question during the ratification procedure.

  Apart from certain changes stemming directly from the abandonment of the idea of a constitution and the retention of the two current Treaties in amended form, and from the abandonment of symbols or vocabulary which might prompt comparisons with a State, institutional issues were not set to be a focal point of the 2007 negotiations. Not only had these issues not been at the heart of the public debates, in particular in those Member States which had voted against the Constitutional Treaty, but what is more, most Member States did not want to re-open the discussion on the institutional package, aware that any such step would call the whole agreement into question. Nevertheless, although some of these questions were central to the discussions at the 2007 IGC, the 2004 agreement was essentially left untouched.

6.1.   European Parliament

(1)        The Treaty of Lisbon substantially enhances the role of the European Parliament, the only European institution directly elected by citizens:

             -  its role as a co-legislator is fully recognised, thanks to the general application of the existing codecision procedure, which is elevated to the rank of the ordinary legislative procedure, but also thanks to an increase in Parliament's participation in special legislative procedures. In future the public will clearly be able to see that European legislative acts are adopted by the chamber which represents them and by the chamber which represents States; in parallel, in the field of international agreements its approval will also be required as a general rule;

                  -  it acquires a concurrent right of initiative for revision of the Treaties and participates in that procedure through its involvement in the Convention convened to prepare the revision (its approval is required for the Council to decide not to convene the Convention);

             -  its budgetary powers, which it shares with the Council on an equal footing, now extend to all Union expenditure;

             -  its powers of political scrutiny are enhanced, particularly by means of the election of the President of the Commission;

             -  various decisions which are of great importance in the life of the Union and which hitherto have rested solely with the Council are now also subject to approval by Parliament: the decision to initiate enhanced cooperation; the use of the flexibility clause enabling the Union to take measures not provided for in the Treaties in order to attain ends for which they do provide; decisions on the use of the general ‘bridging clauses’ (‘passerelles’) substituting qualified majority voting for unanimous voting or replacing special legislative procedures with the ordinary legislative procedure; certain decisions making it possible to extend the scope of legal bases provided for in the Treaties, such as those concerning the European Public Prosecutor's Office or judicial cooperation in criminal matters;

             -  even in the field of the common foreign and security policy, where it has no decision-making powers, the European Parliament acquires a general right to be informed and consulted.

(2)               In conclusion it may be said that, although it might have been possible to go further in certain areas, the European Parliament acquires powers of codecision in virtually all areas of Union policy. Basically, this is a matter of putting into practice the twofold legitimacy of the EU as a Union of States and of citizens, which, despite the lack of any explicit recognition of its importance in the new Treaties, is the basis for the European integration process. The Treaty of Lisbon thus undeniably represents a significant enhancement of the democratic dimension of the Union.

(3)    The number of Members of the European Parliament is limited to 751[27]. The amended TEU does not state how the seats are to be distributed among Member States, but instructs the European Council, acting on the initiative of the European Parliament and with its assent, to decide, before the 2009 elections, what its composition should be, on the basis of the principle of 'degressively proportional' representation, with a minimum of six and a maximum of 96 seats per Member State (the Convention proposed a minimum of four and no maximum). This solution will make it possible to respond more flexibly to the future development of the EU, whilst preserving the interests of each Member State, although the raising of the minimum number of seats to 6 will ultimately give rise to problems.

6.2.   European Council

The European Council is recognised as an autonomous institution whose role is to impart political impetus: the TEU expressly states that it is not to perform any legislative functions[28]. The most important innovation introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, taking its cue, moreover, from the Constitution, is the abolition of the six-month rotating Presidency and its replacement with a President elected by the members of the European Council for a term of 30 months, which may be renewed once. The President's duties will be to prepare and direct the work of the European Council and represent the Union externally in order to raise the Union's profile and improve the continuity and consistency of its representation, both internal and external. Provisions are included to prevent the President from exercising executive powers and to avoid any conflicts with the President of the Commission or the Vice-President/High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Only practice will show whether these provisions are adequate.

6.3.   Council

         (1)        One of the key issues of the reform process was that of the procedure for voting within the Council when it acts by a qualified majority. The failure of the Brussels summit in December 2003 was partly due to differences of opinion between Member States on this subject. In the view of one of the rapporteurs, the introduction of population as a criterion for both the distribution of seats in the European Parliament and votes in the Council may not guarantee a balanced system, and he expressed himself in favour of the weighted votes system for the Council. However, since the Dimitrakopoulos-Leinen report[29], the European Parliament had opted by a large majority for the double majority system. This is why, since the beginning of the 2004 Intergovernmental Conference, the European Parliament had insisted that a solution could only be acceptable to it if it adhered to the principle of a double majority (of Member States and the population), in order to draw attention to the twofold legitimacy underpinning the development of the Union – that conferred by the Member States and that conferred by the citizens – and that the new procedure must make decision-making easier than the system provided for in the Nice Treaty.

 (2)    It was indeed the double majority system proposed by the Convention that was finally adopted instead of weighting of votes. It may reasonably be considered that, although the thresholds have been set higher than proposed by the Convention (the new Treaty now requiring 55% of States rather than 50%, and 65% of the population rather than 60%), the new system will make decision-making easier, as, in many combinations, the weighting system required far higher population thresholds for the adoption of a decision, and because, in many cases, the fact that at least four Member States will be required to form a blocking minority will have the effect of considerably reducing the 65% population threshold[30].

 (3)    Unfortunately, the addition of mechanisms serving to delay the entry into force of the new system and to grant supposed safeguards to certain Member States which fear that the new system will weaken their position has meant that the progress made in terms of transparency and clarity of the system, on the other hand, leaves much to be desired. Admittedly, the logic of the double majority is far easier to understand than any weighting of votes, but there is a risk that the public may regard the thresholds which have been adopted as rather arbitrary, and above all, the combination of different, complementary criteria greatly reduces the gains in terms of simplification and comprehension of the system.

 (4)    In order to overcome Poland's opposition to the introduction of the system agreed in 2004, the 2007 IGC added additional mechanisms. Firstly, the agreement reached provides for the entry into force of the system to be delayed until November 2014. Accordingly, the Nice system will continue to apply until that date. Secondly, a protocol annexed to the new Treaty stipulates that, until 31 March 2017, whenever a decision must be adopted by a qualified majority at the request of a Member State the voting system laid down in the Nice Treaty which is currently in force will still apply. Finally, the 2007 IGC also reached agreement to strengthen the kind of revised Ioannina compromise for a transitional period which had already been adopted in 2004 (Declaration No 7 to the Final Act of the IGC): under the terms of the 2004 declaration, if members of the Council representing at least three-quarters of the number of Member States or of the population required to block a decision indicate their opposition to the adoption of a Council act by a qualified majority, the Council will continue to debate the subject with a view to reaching wider agreement within a reasonable period. This agreement, which in 2004 was set to run until 2014, will now apply for the period from 1 November 2014 to 31 March 2017. As from that date, the thresholds needed to trigger the mechanism have been reduced to 55% of the Member States or the Union population necessary to block a decision. This agreement was formalised in a draft decision which the European Council approved and which will take effect on the date on which the new Treaty enters into force. In its 2004 version, this decision was to remain in force at least until 2014, when the Council could revoke it (acting by a qualified majority, which is now the general rule for Council decisions); in its 2007 version, under the terms of a new protocol, it will remain in force for an indefinite period and may only be revoked or modified following a discussion in the European Council, which must then take a favourable decision by consensus.

 (5)    Although the abandonment of the compromise arrived at by the Convention and the postponement of the implementation of the decisions taken in 2004 is regrettable, it should be borne in mind that the solution ultimately adopted was chosen after a heated discussion among the Member States, the purpose of which was not always entirely clear: the impact of a few percentage points more or less on the relative degree of influence of each Member State in the voting system obscured the fact that in reality divisions between all the 'large' Member States on the one hand and all the 'small' Member States on the other hardly ever emerge. Often, the same action was intended to pursue contradictory objectives simultaneously, such as preserving a State's own opportunities to block decisions whilst attempting to reduce the scope for others to do so. And above all, the whole of this debate was carried on without considering that ultimately the dynamics of Community negotiations are such that votes are very rarely taken. Political realities being what they are, however, Parliament can accept the agreement reached between the Heads of State and of Government, albeit without concealing its disappointments.

  (6)   Whatever the method by which decisions are taken, it must be applicable. Hence the importance of the question of the scope of qualified majority voting. The Treaty of Lisbon makes significant progress in this regard: there are some 44 new cases in which qualified majority voting is to apply in various fields (cf. Annex 2). On the other hand, unanimity is still required in 72 cases[31]. Whilst the general thrust of the changes can only be regarded as very positive, it is regrettable that the opportunity was not taken to do more in certain cases.

  (7)    Another major improvement made by the Treaty of Lisbon in terms of transparency is the requirement for meetings of the various configurations of the Council to be divided into two parts, depending on whether the Council is acting in a legislative capacity or in other ways, with the corollary that, when it deliberates or votes on legislative acts, the Council meets in public. Although the Member States did not accept the Convention's proposal that a genuinely separate Legislative Council should be created, it may be considered that the essential aspect of this proposal, which was that meetings should be held in public and that the Council's legislative work should be transparent, has been preserved.

  (8)   As regards the configurations and functioning of the Council, the main novelty is the creation of an autonomous Foreign Affairs Council, to be chaired by the High Representative. This and the General Affairs Council are the only two configurations of the Council whose existence is provided for by the new Treaty, which leaves it to the European Council to decide by a qualified majority on the creation of other configurations.

  (9)   The efforts to modify the existing system of rotating Presidencies of the Council in order to raise the profile and enhance the consistency and continuity of its work have had somewhat mixed results: the Member States departed from the Convention's proposal, ultimately adopting the principle of equal rotation within a system of team Presidencies determined by a decision of the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, and it is not possible to make out in advance exactly what the real benefits of this will be[32]. Only the Foreign Affairs Council (and the European Council) will have a stable presidency.

6.4. Commission

    (1)  Another of the institutional questions which were at the centre of debate was the composition of the Commission. The solution ultimately opted for, with its implementation deferred, departed from the Convention's proposal, but it corresponds more closely with political reality and may be considered positive: it makes it possible to respect the new Member States' aspiration to be represented in the Commission during the first years after their accession, whilst providing, after a reasonable lapse of time (2014), for the vital reduction in the number of Commissioners (to 2/3 of the number of Member States, which - in a 27-member EU - would already mean that there were fewer Commissioners than at present). Based on a rotation system which preserves equality between Member States (and which must reflect the demographic and geographical make-up of the Union), this solution will thus make it possible to keep the size of the Commission within acceptable limits. The frequency of the period when any given Member State will not be represented by a Commissioner will be once in every three terms.

  (2)   The Treaty of Lisbon also makes important progress regarding the appointment of the President of the Commission, who is in future to be elected by the European Parliament on a proposal from the European Council, acting by a qualified majority. This is a further step in the process of imparting political legitimacy to the Commission, particularly as the European Council is required to take account of the results of the elections to the European Parliament and hold ‘appropriate consultations’ before designating its candidate. Afterwards, the whole Commission, the President, the High Representative, who is appointed by means of a special procedure (see below), and the Commissioners, selected by the Council in agreement with the President-designate, will require a vote of approval en bloc by the European Parliament[33]. This procedure as a whole should make it clear to public opinion that the Commission is a political executive which needs Parliament's confidence, and not just a group of 'anonymous and unaccountable bureaucrats', as some claim.

  (3)   The enhanced role of the President of the Commission should also be noted, particularly as regards the internal organisation of the Commission and the right to demand the resignation of a Commissioner, which should improve the efficiency of the Commission.

6.5.     Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

  (1)   One of the main institutional innovations of the Treaty of Lisbon is the creation of the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (merging in a single post the pre-existing posts of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Commissioner responsible for external relations). This innovation corresponds to the objective of ensuring that all the external actions of the EU are consistent and have a high profile. Institutionally, the High Representative will wear two 'hats': he or she will be responsible for conducting the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, for which purpose he or she will chair the Foreign Affairs Council, present proposals and implement Council decisions, while at the same time he or she will be a Vice-President of the Commission, taking on that institution's responsibilities in the field of external relations and coordinating all aspects of the EU's external action. He or she will be assisted by a European External Action Service composed of officials from the Commission, the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers and national diplomatic services, which is to be set up by a decision of the Council after consulting the European Parliament and obtaining the approval of the Commission.  

  (2)   Thus the High Representative will be a Vice-President of the Commission, but he or she will have a special status, reflected in the procedures for his or her appointment and the possible ending of his or her tenure: he or she will be appointed by the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, with the agreement of the President of the Commission; he or she may be dismissed by the European Council using the same procedure, and must resign if the President of the Commission asks him or her to do so. As a member of the Commission, his or her appointment must also be approved by the European Parliament when it votes on the investiture of the Commission as a whole, and if the Commission resigns en bloc following a motion of censure by the European Parliament, this also applies to him or her[34].

(3)      These provisions essentially correspond to what the European Parliament had long been calling for: the High Representative will indeed be able to increase the coherence and efficiency of the Union's international action, promote the emergence of a genuine common foreign policy and raise the Union's international profile by giving it a 'face'. The threefold political accountability of the High Representative, to the European Parliament, the Council and the President of the Commission, is positive. But potential conflicts between the High Representative and the President of the Commission or the President of the European Council remain possible, and his or her hybrid status may give rise to conflicts of loyalty between the Council and Commission.

6.6.     The Court of Justice of the European Union

           The Treaty of Lisbon also enhances the role of the Union's judicial wing, which it calls the 'Court of Justice of the European Union', comprising the 'Court of Justice', the 'General Court' and possible 'specialised courts', instituted by a regulation[35]. Although there are no major changes in the composition and organisation of the Court of Justice and the General Court (Court of First Instance), a preliminary stage is introduced into the procedure for appointing judges and advocates-general: before being appointed by the Member States, the candidates nominated by the governments will be heard by a committee with a remit to assess the candidates' suitability to perform their duties. This committee will have seven members (former Members of the Court of Justice or national supreme courts and jurist with acknowledged expertise), including one proposed by Parliament.

           In future, acts of the European Council and of the agencies will be subject to judicial review to ensure their legality. The conditions for the admissibility of complaints by natural and legal persons about regulatory acts are eased. There will be no restrictions on the bringing of actions against acts adopted in the field of judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation, except as regards reviewing the validity and proportionality of police operations and the exercise by States of their responsibilities for maintaining public order and internal security. Finally, although the acts adopted in the field of the common foreign and security policy cannot in themselves be the subject of legal proceedings, the Court nonetheless has jurisdiction to consider the legality of European decisions providing for restrictive measures against legal and natural persons. It may also rule whether a measure falls within the scope of the CFSP or is covered by other Union competences.

6.7      Other institutions and advisory bodies

           (1)       The provisions concerning the European Central Bank (elevated to the rank of an institution of the Union) and the Court of Auditors remain virtually unchanged, although one innovation by comparison with the Constitution is that these two institutions now appear in the list of institutions included in the new Article 13 of the amended TEU. Moreover, it may be noted that the members of the Bank's Executive Board are in future to be appointed by the Council acting by a qualified majority and no longer unanimously.

           (2)       As regards the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions acquires the right to bring an action on grounds of a violation of the principle of subsidiarity by a legislative act for the adoption of which the Treaty of Lisbon requires it to be consulted.

* * *

           It may thus be concluded that, despite certain aspects with regard to which it is not possible to judge in advance how effective the proposed changes will be, the Treaty of Lisbon succeeds in clarifying and enhancing the capacity of the institutions whilst preserving the 'Community method' and the institutional balance, which should enable the Union to respond to the new situation arising from enlargement and assert itself in the international arena.  

7.        Acts and procedures: a more coherent, precise and comprehensible system

7.1.     The new Treaty brings about significant progress in terms of simplification and rationalisation of decision-making procedures and instruments for action. The gains as regards the efficiency of procedures and their democratic legitimacy are obvious. Unfortunately, at the same time the Member States decided to abandon the changes in terminology introduced by the Constitution, which were important in order to enable citizens to understand more clearly who decides what in the Union and how. Parliament can only criticise this backward step, which entails a significant loss of transparency.

7.2      The typology of legal instruments is left essentially unchanged, with one minor simplification: five types of legal instrument are provided for: regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions.

The distinction drawn in the Constitution between legislative acts and implementing acts is retained, which is very welcome, but the terminology used in the Constitutional Treaty for legislative acts, law and framework law, has been abandoned, which runs counter to the goal of transparency. Henceforth, there will be legislative acts which are called regulations or directives or decisions, and implementing acts which are also called regulations, directives or decisions. The idea of a clear hierarchy of instruments has thus gone by the board.

The terms provided for in the Constitution were simple and clear, and the designation 'European' added to each category would have enabled the public to understand precisely what was meant, since the terms correspond to the terminology used in most Member States (a law is a set of rules emanating from parliament, a regulation is a set of rules adopted by the executive or a local administration), putting an end to the confusion and terminological imprecision which have prevailed until now. Instead, the terms regulations and directives will be retained for legislative acts, but will also be used to describe non-legislative acts, with the addition of the adjective ‘implementing’ (or ‘delegated’) to distinguish them from legislative acts. The result is thus the retention of language which is both obscure, being likely to make ordinary citizens think first of a bureaucratic, non-transparent authority, and misleading, the most glaring paradox (at least for those countries which use this terminology) being that of calling a legislative act a 'regulation'!

7.3.     Despite the terminological problems outlined above, the new Treaty also establishes a hierarchy of instruments. The supremacy of legislative acts over executive acts is clearly stipulated. And although the general rule is that implementation of European decisions is a matter for the Member States, the Commission is clearly recognised as the European executive, with the duty to take the necessary measures to implement legislative acts at European level, whilst the Council only exceptionally assumes executive responsibilities, in those cases where the new Treaty expressly so determines, or when legislative acts, stating due reasons, so specify.

7.4.     The creation of a category of delegated regulations, which involve power being delegated by the legislative authority (the European Parliament and the Council) to the Commission, will make the Union's action more efficient, as there will be no need for the legislature to concern itself with technical details which can be dealt with more quickly and appropriately by the executive; delegation of powers is accompanied by the requisite guarantees of scrutiny by the legislative authority (in particular by means of two mechanisms which make it possible either to block the adoption of a measure by the Commission or to revoke the delegation of powers), and complete equality between the European Parliament and the Council is ensured[36].

           We are thus faced with a hierarchy of instruments in which regulations, directives and decisions (not defined any more closely) are legislative acts, implementing regulations and directives are acts adopted by the executive to implement legislative acts, whilst decisions can also be either eminently political acts (the decision by the Council to use a 'bridging clause', for example) or individual implementing acts.

7.5.     The new legislative procedures: the Treaty of Lisbon clearly places the emphasis on the ordinary legislative procedure (which corresponds to the existing codecision procedure); this is the legislative procedure par excellence, to which the other types of legislative procedure are conceived as exceptions (‘special legislative procedures’) which must be explicitly provided for in the Treaties. The main features of the ordinary legislative procedure are as follows: the power of initiative rests with the Commission (except in the case of certain matters relating to the area of freedom, security and justice, where the Commission shares it with at least one-quarter of the Member States), there is codecision involving the European Parliament and the Council (some small changes which have been made to the old codecision procedure are intended precisely to stress the complete equality between the two institutions), and the Council adopts its decision by a qualified majority.

7.6.     The scope of the ordinary legislative procedure has been substantially expanded: some 50 new legal bases (bringing the total to 86), some of which are of enormous importance, such as those concerning the area of freedom, security and justice, policy on agriculture and fisheries, the European research area, the definition of implementing powers (hitherto governed by the framework decision on comitology) or the current Financial Regulation (cf. Annex 3). In all these fields, the Council can no longer decide by itself, but only in agreement with Parliament.

7.7.     Regrettably, there are still too many cases in which special legislative procedures apply, whereby one institution adopts an act with the participation of the other institution - which may range from consent to mere consultation - and in some cases it is difficult to see the choice of this type of procedure as anything but the result of concessions made during the negotiations at the Intergovernmental Conferences. There are three cases in which the European Parliament may enact legislative acts (regulations) with the consent of the Council. In contrast, there are 28 cases in which provision is made for Council legislative acts[37]. The legislative act containing the annual budget is subject to a special procedure for joint decision-making by the European Parliament and the Council (cf. point 8 below).

7.8.     Despite these exceptions, the Treaty of Lisbon undeniably represents distinct progress in terms of the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of European law-making. This progress is accompanied by similar advances regarding the adoption of the international agreements concluded by the Union, thanks to the extension of the application of the qualified majority voting procedure in the Council and the requirement that the consent of the European Parliament should be obtained (for example on agreements implementing the common commercial policy).

8.        The Union's finances

8.1.     One of the questions which gave rise to most debate, both at the Convention and at the 2004 Intergovernmental Conference, was reform of the Union's system of finance, particularly the budgetary procedure. It was a matter of institutionalising a system which in future would make it possible to finance the Union adequately, transparently and democratically, and particularly for the European Parliament to consolidate its powers as an arm of the budgetary authority by giving it a decisive say on the whole of the EU budget, including expenditure hitherto classified as 'compulsory', such as expenditure on the common agricultural policy and the common fisheries policy. The final result, although positive overall, to some extent represented a change of emphasis by the 2004 Intergovernmental Conference, which did not entirely accept the Convention's proposals. By contrast, this subject was never discussed during the 2007 negotiations.

8.2.     The Convention had proposed a three-stage model which was simple and balanced:

            -  the Council would continue to decide unanimously (with the subsequent approval of the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional rules) on the essential features and on the own-resources ceiling[38]; the EP would only have the power to deliver an opinion;

            -  the European Parliament and the Council would decide jointly on the Financial Perspective, which would be constitutionalised under the name 'multiannual financial framework' (the Council would decide by a qualified majority as from the first financial framework after the entry into force of the Constitution);

            -  the two institutions would decide jointly on the annual budget: after a first reading in each institution, which could lead to the convening of a conciliation committee, Parliament would have the last word in the event of disagreement, provided that it could muster a very large majority in favour of its position; otherwise, the Council's position would prevail.

8.3.      This meant that the Member States would continue to hold the key to determining the amount and nature of the Union's revenue, that the two arms of the budgetary authority would have to agree on the programming of expenditure and that, in the event of disagreement on the annual budget, the European Parliament could have the last word on overall expenditure (the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure being dropped), albeit within the limits of the ceilings imposed by the financial framework. In practice, the two institutions would thus have been strongly encouraged to reconcile their views.

8.4.      A large number of the Member States were unhappy with this balanced system, and throughout the 2004 Intergovernmental Conference proposals were submitted which in some cases even represented a serious assault on the European Parliament's existing powers in this field and ran the risk of destroying the idea of financial democracy in the Union. Thanks particularly to the efforts of the representatives of the European Parliament and the Italian and Irish Presidencies, a compromise was found which preserves Parliament's key rights in this field. This compromise was not called into question in 2007. The only changes made to this chapter stem from the regrettable decision to abandon the terminology for legislative acts provided for in the Constitution[39]:

          -   the Convention's proposals on own resources were accepted;

         -    the financial framework must always be adopted by the two institutions, but the Council will take decisions unanimously until the European Council, also acting unanimously, rules that the Council may decide by a qualified majority;

        -     the annual budget is also adopted jointly by the European Parliament and the Council, but in the event of disagreement between the two institutions the procedure must begin again with the submission by the Commission of a new draft budget[40].

8.5.     As has already been said, this solution preserves the European Parliament's most important budgetary powers: Parliament is given a decisive voice on the whole of budget, in view of the abolition of the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure. But the retention of the unanimity requirement for the adoption of the multiannual financial framework will seriously complicate future negotiations on the subject and provide less encouragement for the budgetary conciliation between the institutions which was the rationale underlying the Convention's proposal.

9.        Progress on sectoral policies

           The provisions dealing with changes to Union policies are, with the exception of the general rules governing external action and the provisions on the CFSP, which form part of the TEU, contained in the TFEU. Part III incorporates the provisions dealing with the 'Internal policies and actions of the Union', Part IV those dealing with 'The association of the overseas countries and territories', and Part V those dealing with 'The external action of the Union'. The new Treaty essentially confines itself to incorporating procedural changes into the provisions of the current Treaties concerning the definition and implementation of sectoral policies, particularly the legal bases for the Union's action in each field. The view might perhaps be taken that many of these provisions could have been simplified or adjusted in the light of the changes which have occurred since they were drafted. But the fact is that the mandate which the European Council conferred on the Convention at the time did not empower it to revise these provisions in depth, the 2004 IGC did not undertake any such revision, and, when negotiations were resumed in 2007, the political climate was not conducive to any fresh consideration of this very complex issue.

           Accordingly, the changes made to the provisions governing Union policies are essentially the result of the structural, institutional and procedural revisions introduced by the new Treaty, concerning, for example, the abolition of the 'pillars', the definition of the Union's competences, the institutions, the decision-making procedures and legal instruments. As regards the substance of the policies per se, there are few new developments, the area of freedom, security and justice (essentially the former third pillar) and external relations, particularly the common foreign and security policy, being the fields where the changes are most sensitive. As regards the other sectoral policies, the changes mainly concern the procedures applicable and the breakdown of legal bases between legislative and non-legislative acts, which in itself may already constitute a guarantee of greater efficiency, democratic legitimacy and transparency of the Union's action in view of the positive nature of the changes which we have analysed above. It is true that, in the Constitution, some new legal bases seemed to recognise what were apparently new competencies, but these were essentially areas in which the Union was already taking action through the use of other articles, including Article 308. The main purpose of the new legal bases, therefore, was to clarify the way in which the Union exercises those competences (for example in the areas of energy, health, space, sport, tourism, etc.). These new provisions have been retained with some changes. In addition, two important innovations have been incorporated concerning the fight against climate change and energy solidarity, two areas which have a very direct bearing on the lives of European citizens and in which Union action can have a clear added value. But these are new objectives, rather than new competences. It should also be noted that an initial chapter has been introduced which lists the horizontal or cross-cutting clauses which apply across the board to all policies. We shall review the main aspects of these changes, with the aim of determining whether they enable the Union to act more efficiently and democratically in the field in question.

9.1.     Area of freedom, security and justice

(1)       In the internal policy sphere, the provisions dealing with the area of freedom, security and justice are those where the greatest changes are to be found, with, in particular, the pillar structure being discontinued and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation (which, up to now, have come under the third pillar) being brought under the 'Community' method through the extension of the ordinary legislative procedure and qualified majority voting. This was already the case under the Constitutional Treaty, but the Treaty of Lisbon has made further substantial changes in an area which is now central to the European integration process.

           Despite the ‘Communitisation’ of the former third pillar, specific institutional arrangements nonetheless continue to apply: the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning are defined by the European Council (by consensus), without Parliament being involved in any way; the right of legislative initiative in connection with judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation is shared between the Commission and one-quarter of the Member States (rather than a single Member State as is currently the case); and the national parliaments are given a larger role, particularly as regards monitoring compliance with the subsidiarity principle (one-quarter of national parliaments required to trigger the early warning procedure, rather than one-third), the assessment of the implementation of Union policies in this area and scrutiny of the work of Eurojust and Europol.

(2)       The policy objectives in this area are clarified and defined more precisely. Union action is the area is explicitly made subject to respect for fundamental rights. Access to justice is enshrined as a general objective. Mutual recognition of the various systems and the approximation of laws are recognised as two parallel means of implementing policies.

           Policies on border checks, asylum and immigration are recognised as common policies of the Union, governed by the principles of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility among Member States.

           The new Treaty also marks a major step forward in the areas of judicial cooperation in both civil and criminal matters and of police cooperation, mainly through the application of the ordinary legislative procedure.

(3)       Judicial cooperation in civil matters is extended to all matters having cross-border implications and is based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and decisions in extrajudicial cases, with the ordinary legislative procedure applying to any measures for the approximation of laws, with the exception of measures concerning family law, in which case unanimity is the rule (Council regulation, with Parliament merely being consulted). However, the Council may itself, after consulting Parliament, decide unanimously to extend the ordinary legislative procedure to cover some aspects of family law with cross-border implications, if no national parliament objects.

(4)       The major innovation as regards judicial cooperation in criminal matters is that the ordinary legislative procedure (qualified majority) is to be used for the approximation of laws covering both procedural matters (minimum rules to facilitate mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions, etc.) and substantive criminal law, with minimum rules concerning the definition of some serious crimes with cross-border dimensions listed in the TFEU and sanctions. The new Treaty even provides that the Council may, acting unanimously, with Parliament’s consent, identify other aspects of criminal laws procedure and other areas of crime to which the ordinary legislative procedure may apply.

           Some Member States were strongly opposed to this, despite the guarantee that European legislation in this area must respect the fundamental aspects of the Member States’ legal systems. Therefore, in order to secure agreement, the 2004 Intergovernmental Conference had made provision for an ‘emergency brake’ mechanism, which was reworked during the 2007 negotiations. This mechanism provides Member States which are having problems in this area with all the guarantees they require, without completely ruling out any further progress: should a Member State consider that a legislative proposal jeopardises ‘fundamental aspects of its criminal justice system’, it can ask for the matter to be referred to the European Council. That body has four months in which, to take a consensus decision to refer the matter back to the Council, so that the procedure can continue. If the dispute cannot be settled during that four-month period, enhanced cooperation will automatically be initiated in the matter concerned, on the basis of the legislative proposal in question, if nine Member States are in favour.

(5)       Parliament can also welcome the fact that the new Treaty incorporates the Convention’s proposal to establish a European Public Prosecutor’s Office, which has responsibility for combating offences damaging to the Union’s financial interests and may prosecute the perpetrators of such offences, despite strong opposition from several delegations during the 2004 IGC. The stipulation in the Constitution that the Council European regulation establishing the office must be adopted unanimously once Parliament has given its consent has been retained, but the 2007 negotiations led to the introduction of a clause symmetrical to that referred to in the previous paragraph, which might be termed an ‘emergency accelerator’: if unanimity cannot be secured in the Council, a group of at least nine Member States may ask for the proposal to be referred to the European Council; if that body reaches a consensus, it refers the proposal back to the Council so that the procedure can continue; if no consensus has emerged in the European Council after four months, a group of at least nine Member States may request the automatic transition to enhanced cooperation.

           Moreover, a 'bridging clause' ('passerelle') provides for the possible extension of the office's responsibilities to cover action to combat serious crimes with a cross-border dimension, by means of a European decision adopted unanimously by the Council after Parliament has given its consent.

(6)       Lastly, the ordinary legislative procedure has also been introduced for police cooperation, although unanimity continues to be the rule for operational cooperation and intervention by the competent authorities of one Member State on the territory of another. As in the case of the European Public Prosecutor's Office, the 2007 IGC added an 'emergency accelerator', which, in the event of an impasse, clears the way for enhanced cooperation if at least nine Member States request it.

(7)       In conclusion, it should also be borne in mind that, primarily at the instigation of the United Kingdom, whose special position in the area of Justice and Home Affairs was already recognised (as was Ireland's and, to a different extent, Denmark's[41]), special provisions consolidating that special status have been incorporated into the new Treaty by means of protocols. In return for its agreement, the United Kingdom demanded changes to the two protocols recognising the specific position of the United Kingdom and Ireland (which in some ways has no choice but to fall into line with the United Kingdom, given the substance of the specific agreements concluded between the two Member States in this area) on the development of the area of freedom, security and justice and, in particular, on the measures to build on the Schengen acquis.

           The position of these two Member States is the result of special factors: they are islands, they have no identity card system for their residents and they have a system of common law.

           As a result, the derogations already granted to the United Kingdom and Ireland in the area of immigration, asylum and visa policy and judicial cooperation in civil matters has been extended to cover judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation[42]. As regards the Schengen acquis, in which the Council had agreed that the United Kingdom and Ireland would participate on a case-by-case basis, provided that they also participated in the measures to build on the relevant parts of the acquis, the two Member States will not now be required to participate in these measures if they do not wish to. However, they may be excluded from all or part of the Schengen area in question if the Council, the European Council or, in the final analysis, the Commission so decides[43].

           Moreover, as regards the transition to the new legal arrangements governing acts under the former third pillar, in particular the stipulation that they should be subject to judicial review by the Court of Justice and scrutiny by the Commission, the United Kingdom has secured an addition to the protocol on the transitional provisions specifying that measures in the areas of cooperation on criminal matters and police cooperation adopted prior to the entry into force of the new Treaty will be exempt from that requirement for a period of up to five years (or until the acts in question are amended under new procedures). Prior to the expiry of that five-year period, the United Kingdom may go as far as to opt not to accept the new arrangements governing such acts, in which case all existing acts in the area in question will cease to apply to the United Kingdom, which may even be required to bear the direct financial consequences 'necessarily and avoidably incurred as a result of the cessation of its participation in those acts' if the Council so decides[44].

9.2. Other internal policies

(1)       Aside from the introduction of a few new legal bases for 'new' - or more clearly defined - competences, the changes which the new Treaty makes to the other sectoral policies stem mainly from the establishment of codecision (and thus qualified majority voting) as the ordinary legislative procedure and the breakdown between legislative and executive acts as now defined.

(2)       Some of the most striking changes are to be found in the fields of agricultural policy and fisheries policy, where the ordinary legislative procedure will apply for the adoption of legislative acts laying down rules for the common organisation of agricultural markets and the other provisions required for the pursuit of the common agricultural and fisheries policies (under the current arrangements, Parliament is merely consulted). This means that the shaping of the main lines of the common agricultural and fisheries policies will become a matter to be decided by Parliament as well, and no longer just by agricultural ministers. However, the setting of prices, levies, aid and quantitative limitations and the allocation of fishing quotas are to be dealt with by means of executive acts (implementing regulations or decisions) adopted by the Council.

(3)       A new strand, space policy, has been added to research and technological development policy. The framework programme will now be enacted by a legislative act adopted by a qualified majority. Parallel to that, a European research area within which researchers, scientific knowledge and technologies may move freely will be established under regulations adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure. A European space programme may also be adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure.

(4)       The objectives set out in the new title on energy include ensuring the functioning of the energy market and security of energy supply and promoting energy efficiency and the development of renewable forms of energy. The new Treaty places a limit on legislative action by the Union, which must not affect a Member State's right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply. Furthermore, although the ordinary legislative procedure and qualified majority voting are the rule in this area, the IGC stipulated that any measures primarily of a fiscal nature must be taken by means of a Council law adopted unanimously after Parliament has been consulted. However, the Council, acting unanimously, may take a decision making the ordinary legislative procedure applicable to those areas. Finally, in the light of the public debate which has been conducted over the last two years, the 2007 IGC added a specific reference to solidarity among the Member States in the area of energy, as advocated by the EP.

(5)       At the 2007 IGC, the Member States also agreed to add a specific reference to the fight against climate change, thus endowing the Union with a more specific legal basis which will enable it to enact binding measures in this area.

(6)       In the area of public health, the new Treaty adds 'early warning of and combating serious cross-border threats to health' to 'the fight against the major health scourges' among the support measures to be taken by the Union. The Union must also, among other things, lay down measures setting high standards of quality and safety for medical products and measures to protect public health in connection with tobacco and alcohol abuse. It should be emphasised that the new Treaty stipulates that Union action in this area must respect the responsibilities of the Member States for the definition of their health policy, including the management of health services and medical care and the allocation of the resources assigned to them.

(7)       It is regrettable that the text finally agreed does not contain more substantial changes in the social policy field, particularly as regards the extension of qualified majority voting (no change by comparison with the current situation). It would, however, be wrong to say that the Treaty of Lisbon represents a step backwards in this area. On the contrary, some advances can be identified. Thus, aside from classifying social policy among the shared competences and explicitly indicating that the Union can take measures to coordinate the Member States' social policies, the new Treaty achieves progress in the following areas:

           –    inclusion of 'full employment' and 'social progress' among the Union's objectives;

           –    introduction, among the 'General implementing provisions' (in Part I of the TFEU), of a general 'social clause' stipulating that, when defining and implementing all policies, the Union must take into account 'requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education, training and protection of human health';

           –    the establishment of a legal basis enabling services of general economic interest to be recognised and safeguarded; in addition, the 2007 IGC added a protocol on services of general interest which defines the specific nature of such services and makes clear that nothing in the Treaties in any way affects the competence of Member States to provide 'non-economic services of general interest', i.e. public services in the strict sense of the term;

           –    explicit recognition in the TFEU of the role played by the 'social partners', particularly the Tripartite Social Summit for Growth and Employment, which is to contribute to social dialogue.

(8)      Lastly, the ordinary legislative procedure will apply to social security measures covering employed and self-employed migrant workers' entitlement to benefits. This will be combined with another 'emergency brake' mechanism, to apply in cases where a Member State considers such measures 'would affect important aspects of its social security system, including its scope, cost or financial structure, or would affect the financial balance of that system'. It may then request that the matter be referred to the European Council (thus automatically suspending the legislative procedure). The European Council must then within a period of four months either refer the matter back to the Council, thus enabling the procedure to continue, or ask the Commission to submit a new proposal. In that event, as in the event of a failure to act, the act originally proposed is declared not to have been adopted.

(9)      The reform Treaty likewise does not make any changes to the situation as regards taxation, where unanimity remains the general rule. The IGC failed to agree even to the relatively limited number of cases in which the Convention proposed that the ordinary legislative procedure (i.e. qualified majority voting) should apply in connection with administrative cooperation measures and action to combat tax fraud and evasion (subject to the Council unanimously establishing that the proposed measures related to these issues).

(10)    Another area that came in for much discussion, but in which the changes are relatively minor, is that of economic governance. However, the coordination of economic and employment policies has been confirmed as a Union competence (although the IGC amended the Convention text to place the emphasis on the fact that the Member States coordinate their policies according to arrangements determined within the Union), in conjunction with a slight strengthening of the Commission's position, and the provisions specific to Member States whose currency is the euro have been fleshed out. For example, the Council decision on the adoption of the euro by new Member States (proposed by the Commission) must be preceded by a recommendation from a qualified majority of the Member States whose currency is already the euro.

           Furthermore, the operating procedures of the Eurogroup are set out in a protocol attached to the new Treaty. The new Treaty also contains a Declaration on the Stability and Growth Pact. The pact was the subject of heated discussions among some delegations at the 2004 IGC, resulting in the adoption of changes to the Convention text which, inter alia, have reduced the importance of the Commission's proposed role in the excessive deficits procedure (with the recommendations addressed by the Council to the Member State concerned being adopted on the basis of a Commission recommendation, as is currently the case, rather than a proposal, as the Convention was proposing).

9.3. Common foreign and security policy

(1)      Major changes, in particular institutional changes, have also been made in the area of the Union's external action. However, this is also an area in which the Treaty of Lisbon departs substantially from the text of the Constitutional Treaty as regards its structure.

The 2004 IGC had followed the Convention in maintaining the structural unity of all the provisions governing the EU's external action, bringing them all together, with the exception of the two articles defining general principles, which were incorporated in Part I, in Title V of Part III of the Constitution, under the heading 'External action of the Union'. The Treaty of Lisbon, conversely, has brought together in Title V of the TEU the general provisions governing the external action of the Union and all the provisions governing the CFSP, including those dealing with defence, whilst incorporating in Part I of the TFEU the remaining provisions governing the other areas of external action (common commercial policy, cooperation with third countries, humanitarian aid, etc.). The fact that the two Treaties have the same legal value – as they each point out in their opening articles[45] – would seem to safeguard the progress achieved by means of the abolition of the pillar structure and minimise any reduction in the coherence of these provisions and the danger that the intergovernmental method employed in connection with the CFSP may 'contaminate' the more 'Communitised' arrangements used in other areas of external relations. However, constant efforts to interpret all the provisions of the two Treaties will be needed to safeguard this progress and ward off these dangers. Long live clarity!

In contrast, the Treaty of Lisbon has retained, if not in formal then at least in substantive terms, the main institutional innovation brought about by the Constitutional Treaty: it creates the office of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, replacing that of Minister of Foreign Affairs established by the Constitution, whilst retaining practically intact the relevant duties and responsibilities (see above, point 6.5.). This High Representative, who wears two institutional hats and who has the task of conducting the common foreign and security policy and coordinating all aspects of the Union's external relations, represents the new Treaty's main innovation in the area of the Union's external relations. Parliament hopes that this new post will help to make the Union's external action more coherent and effective, but much will depend on the way relations develop between the High Representative, the President of the Commission and the new, elected President of the Council.

As regards the common foreign and security policy, which is still, fundamentally, an area of intergovernmental action in which the role of the European Council is preponderant, unanimity remains the rule, with qualified majority voting applicable only to the implementation of decisions taken by the European Council (or proposals submitted by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy at the request of the European Council) or the Council. Even here, provision has been made for an 'emergency brake' in cases where a Member State opposes the adoption of a decision by a qualified majority on 'vital political grounds'. A number of proposals submitted at the 2004 IGC sought to broaden the application of qualified majority voting, but none, whether put forward by the Convention (qualified majority voting for proposals submitted by the High Representative with the support of the Commission), or by the Italian Presidency (qualified majority voting for all proposals from the High Representative), could overcome the opposition of a number of Member States. However, the new Treaty retains the specific CFSP 'bridging clause' provided for in the Constitution, which stipulates that the European Council, acting unanimously, may decide that qualified majority voting is to be applied in other cases (but not its decisions with military implications or in the area of defence). It is clear that there will be serious obstacles to the application of that bridging clause.

For its part, Parliament acquires an across-the-board right to be informed, and in some cases consulted, to exercise scrutiny (questions, debates) and to adopt the CFSP budget. The jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy is restricted to demarcation between the CFSP and the other areas of EU action and to judicial review of the legality of European decisions which give rise to restrictive measures vis-à-vis individuals.

In short, however regrettable it may be that no further progress has been made, in particular as regards qualified majority voting, realistically it must be borne in mind that, at the current stage of the European integration process, foreign policy is so central to the hard core of national competences that a genuine common external policy is inconceivable as long as the Member States fail to demonstrate the collective political will required to reach agreement. The major development under the new Treaty is the establishment of institutional arrangements to encourage the Member States to take concerted action in an effort to define a common approach to international problems, where this is necessary, and to consult one another before taking unilateral action which might be harmful to shared interests.

(2)      The greatest advances brought about by the new Treaty are to be found in the specific area of common security policy, where the 2004 IGC made major changes which went even further than those which had been proposed by the Convention and which were taken over, virtually en bloc, in the 2007 negotiations.

As a result, common defence, or at least the formulation of a common defence policy, the principles for which were already approved in the Maastricht Treaty - has become a more realistic prospect[46]. This common defence policy gives the Union an operational capacity based on civil and military assets. The main changes in this connection are:

           -  revision of the 'Petersberg' tasks[47];

-  establishment of a European Defence Agency ('Agency in the area of the development of defence, research, procurement and weapons capabilities')[48];

           -  the option to establish, by means of a Council decision adopted by a qualified majority, permanent structured cooperation in the defence field among Member States which have the military capability and political will to be involved (the conditions for implementing such structured cooperation are set out in a protocol annexed to the new Treaty);

           -  a mutual aid and assistance obligation under which Member States must use all means in their power to assist a Member State that is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, in accordance with the United Nations Charter and in compliance with the NATO commitments of the Member States that are members of that organisation. The new Treaty stipulates that this obligation will not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States, which is an important guarantee for those Member States which have traditionally been 'neutral';

           -  with a view to protecting the values of the Union, the Council will be able to entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States;

           -  establishment of a start-up fund made up of contributions from the Member States, to cover military expenditure not charged to the Union budget,

           -  laying down of a procedure for rapid access to appropriations in the Union budget.

(3)      The amended TEU also contains a solidarity clause under which the Member States must provide assistance to any Member State that is the victim of terrorist attack or natural disaster, if it so requests. The arrangements for implementing this clause will be adopted by decision of the Council, on a joint proposal from the Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The Council will decide unanimously if this decision has defence implications. Parliament will be informed.

(4)      These advances are therefore significant and do not undermine the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States or the commitments of the Member States that belong to NATO. Furthermore, they are not likely to transform the Union into an aggressive military bloc, as some people seem to fear. Some people would certainly have liked to go further, particularly as far as qualified majority voting is concerned. However, in view of the fact that this in an eminently intergovernmental policy area and of the current political climate in the Union, the final outcome can be regarded as relatively positive. However, during the 2007 negotiations, under pressure from certain Member States, the wording of some provisions underwent changes which reflect an effort to provide guarantees – even where this is entirely superfluous – that in the area of the CFSP the Union will confine itself to exercising only those competences conferred on it by the Treaties. In addition, the new Treaty has been 'supplemented' with a series of equally superfluous declarations[49] which reiterate this idea, sometimes entirely unnecessarily. Although this practice is not genuinely harmful, since it merely involves reiterating in a rather obvious way the substance of the actual provisions of the Treaty, it nevertheless points to a rather negative approach to the European integration process, one which cannot help but send a wrong message to the public.

9.4. Other areas of external relations

(1)      Positive changes have been made in the area of common commercial policy. Its scope has been extended as regards trade in services and intellectual property. Parliament's role is enhanced: the ordinary legislative procedure will be used to lay down measures implementing the common commercial policy; and Parliament will receive regular reports on negotiations on international agreements, which may not be concluded without its consent. The Treaty of Lisbon also endorses what is referred to as the 'cultural exception'[50], extending it to other areas.

(2)      Lastly, as regards humanitarian aid, Parliament can welcome the establishment of a specific legal basis coming under the ordinary legislative procedure and providing for the establishment of a voluntary humanitarian aid corps.

(3)      It should also be noted that the Treaty of Lisbon retains the specific provisions governing the development of the Union's neighbourhood policy, in particular the legal basis which enables it to conclude agreements in that area with the countries concerned. However, somewhat confusingly, it incorporates those provisions in Title I ('Common provisions') of the TEU.

10. A significant degree of flexibility

Another question of fundamental importance is whether the new institutional framework is sufficiently flexible to enable the Union to adjust to changing circumstances and meet new challenges that may arise in the future.

      To find an answer to this question we need to address two issues: firstly, that of revision of the Treaties, and, secondly, that of whether the system can evolve within the confines of the current institutional framework, without the need for revision of the Treaties itself.

(1)  The new Treaty makes a number of clear improvements to the revision procedure, first and foremost among which is the granting of a right of initiative as regards revision to Parliament, on the same basis as the Member States and the Commission. It also places the Convention on an institutional footing as the body responsible for preparing revisions, in recognition of both the truly decisive role the Convention played in the drafting of the Constitution and the limitations of the intergovernmental method. Parliament, which was the first to propose that the Convention method be used, cannot but welcome this change, which will help to make the revision procedure more transparent and democratic at the same time as making it more effective.

             One particularly positive development is the fact that Parliament must give its consent should the Council decide not to convene a Convention on the grounds that the changes are not sufficiently major.

(2)  Unfortunately, the new Treaty does not live up to Parliament's expectations as regards simplifying the revision procedure. The text of Article 48 of the amended TEU does contain a simplified procedure for revising the provisions of Part III of the TFEU on the internal policies of the Union (on condition that such revision does not increase the competences allocated to the Union), but this procedure merely allows the European Council to bypass the Convention method (without requiring Parliament's consent); furthermore, unanimity and approval by all the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional provisions remain the rule. The EP and the Commission are consulted.

(3)           Revision of the Treaties will thus continue to require unanimity and ratification by all the Member States in all cases, even though, at the Convention, various proposals were put forward which enjoyed broad support in Parliament and among the national parliaments and would have made this requirement a little more flexible as regards the revision of the provisions dealing with the Union's internal policies, whilst complying with the fundamental principle that any further increase in the Union's competences would need to be unanimously approved by the Member States.

(4)  Conversely, Parliament cannot but welcome the retention of the 'bridging clauses' ('passerelles') which the Convention proposed for switches from unanimity to qualified majority voting within the Council or from special legislative procedures to the ordinary legislative procedure. The fact that this decision can only be taken unanimously by the European Council with Parliament's consent - and then only if no national parliament expresses any objections within a six-month period - provides an adequate guarantee that due respect will be shown for the rights of each Member State and that the decision will be transparent and democratically valid. In addition to these general bridging clauses, however, other specific such clauses exist, which as a rule either require the EP’s consent (broadening of the powers of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office), or give any national parliament the power to block the Council decision.

(5)  Another positive aspect of the new text is the improvements made in connection with enhanced cooperation, which may become more important in future in view of the substantial increase in the number of Member States. Whilst maintaining the conditions required to ensure the overall cohesion and institutional unity of the Union, the new Treaty extends the scope of enhanced cooperation mechanisms (which can now apply to all areas not covered by the exclusive competences of the Union, whereas under the current arrangements defence policy is excluded) and facilitates their establishment. Enhanced cooperation must bring together at least nine Member States, with the Council acting by a qualified majority except in common foreign and security policy matters, where unanimity will continue to be required (enhanced cooperation is currently banned in this area). Furthermore, the requirement that Parliament's consent should be sought (except in common foreign and security policy matters) will enhance the democratic legitimacy of the decision to establish such cooperation.

(6)  Lastly, the fact that the new Treaty has retained a ‘bridging clause’, as proposed by the Convention, allowing a switch to qualified majority voting or the ordinary legislative procedure within the enhanced cooperation mechanism, is also a satisfactory development.

(7)  It should also be noted that the Treaty of Lisbon amends the provisions governing the procedure for the enlargement of the Union, specifying that the EP and the national parliaments should be informed of any new application for accession and making explicit reference to the 'eligibility criteria approved by the European Council' (currently known as the 'Copenhagen criteria'), which must be taken into account when the Council takes its decision, unanimously as at present, after the EP has given its consent by a majority of its component Members.

(8)  Voluntary withdrawal from the Union: for the first time in the treaties establishing the European Communities and then the Union, which - with the exception of the first treaty, which established the European Coal and Steel Community - were expressly concluded for an unlimited period but which made no provision for a collective or individual withdrawal procedure, the TEU will incorporate a mechanism for 'voluntary withdrawal from the Union'. Admittedly even in the absence of any specific provisions such a move was anyway already permissible under international treaty law. However, the fact that withdrawal is now explicitly provided for in the TEU, which lays down detailed arrangements for dealing with such a situation, sends out the clear message that no Member State is obliged to continue its involvement in the European project if it no longer wishes to be involved. When taken together with the provisions on enhanced and structured cooperation, this clearly demonstrates that involvement in the Union and in the furtherance of its policies is something that must be chosen freely on the basis of a genuine political commitment.

11.      Entry into force of the new Treaty

           Since the new Treaty continues the tradition of treaties amending treaties already in force, and which will continue to exist in amended form, and since it does not seek to repeal and replace the current Treaties in their entirety, the rules governing its entry into force are those customarily applied in such cases. Accordingly, the Treaty of Lisbon itself provides (Article 6(2)) for its entry into force on 1 January 2009, if all the ratification instruments have been deposited by that date, or, failing that, on the first day of the month following the deposit of the final ratification instrument. The protocol (No 10) concerning the transitional provisions provides for any adjustments which may be required during the transitional period.

III.      Overall assessment/recommendation to approve the new Treaty

1.        In the light of the preceding analysis, the Committee on Constitutional Affairs' overall assessment of the outcome of the IGC which completed its work in October 2007 and the Treaty of Lisbon can only be resolutely positive. First and foremost, it enabled Europe to overcome the extremely worrying impasse in which it found itself. Its adoption will clear the way for a resumption of the ratification process in France and the Netherlands and will facilitate the use of the parliamentary method with a view to bringing the new text into force.

2.        Of course, the new Treaty is a compromise, one involving concessions which are difficult for Parliament to accept: the abandonment of the very idea of a Constitution and of certain provisions laid down in the Constitution; regrettable postponements of the entry into force of certain provisions and specific measures to satisfy the demands of a few Member States. This was the political price to be paid to find a way out of the crisis into which the 'no' votes in the French and Dutch referendums had plunged Europe. However, it does contain a large number of significant reforms and improvements by comparison with the current Treaties and most of the innovations introduced by the Constitution have been safeguarded.

           Above all, however, the new Treaty enhances democracy in the European Union, fosters more effective decision-making and clarifies to some extent who does what in the Union and the competences allocated to the Union, on the one hand, and to the Member States, on the other.

Additional remarks by Íñigo Méndez de Vigo, co-rapporteur

3.         The intergovernmental approach to Treaty revision has once again shown its limitations. Not a single substantive step forward has been made with respect to the Constitutional Treaty, while much has been removed. In short, the instinct was to cut rather than to create. What is more, with manifest disdain for the compromises reached, some governments have succeeded in unravelling earlier agreements and securing special exemptions or interpretations that fit in with their own interests. The prime example of this is the acceptance of the 'red lines' set out by Tony Blair's UK Government.

4.         The lack of vision and ambition shown by national leaders in the European arena has never been so obvious, and the Lisbon Treaty is a clear reflection of a feeling of diffidence towards – and even downright mistrust of – the Union and its institutions. It is therefore no surprise that many Europeans are visibly dismayed at the fate of the Constitutional Treaty – a dismay similar to that felt by Altiero Spinelli when he compared the Treaty on European Union adopted by the European Parliament with the Single Act adopted by the Council. It must be said, however, that many of the advances contained in that draft are today in force. Something similar will happen when the Lisbon Treaty enters into force: the advances brought by the Constitutional Treaty will form part of Community primary law.

5.         When that moment comes, we will need to make good use of the Treaty's institutional provisions and its potential and to flesh out its instruments in order to make the Union a more integral part of the daily lives of European citizens. Europe will need to face up to the growing strategic threats posed by terrorism and nuclear proliferation and to the new world situation created by globalisation and the technological revolution. Given the scale of the challenges facing it, Europe cannot bury its head in the sand: unless it throws its weight behind economic growth, market reform and greater competitiveness, it will be unable successfully to face up to the might of the US economy and the new winds blowing from countries such as China and India. The Union must rally around the principles and values that unite Europeans and must stand as the guardian of a social model that, for all its imperfections, has countless advantages. As Saint Augustine might say: 'taken in isolation, I am worth very little; in comparison to others, a great deal'.

6.         Europe will also need to address the issue of neighbourly relations. The Treaty of Lisbon provides us with the necessary legal basis in this area, which is closely linked with the issue of the Union's boundaries. Although no longer to be found in the Lisbon Treaty, the Constitutional Treaty's motto 'Unity in Diversity' should serve to guide the EU in its efforts to educate people about and protect our historical heritage. Europe needs to explore new forms of governance that will ensure greater public engagement with European issues, including more deliberative democracy at local level, e-democracy, participatory budgeting and arbitration to settle disputes. Furthermore, economic governance, with particular reference to relations between the Eurogroup and the European Central Bank, needs to be the focus of an in-depth debate aimed at putting an end to the dialectical skirmishes that are becoming increasingly common.

7.         We must be aware of the fact that it will be difficult for all 27 Member States to move forward together. If the Union is to achieve its goals, the European convoy cannot sail at the speed of the slowest ship. Greater use will therefore need to be made of enhanced cooperation in the future.

8.         Europe must not – and cannot – allow itself to indulge in introspection, to wallow in its own crises and expect the world simply to stop long enough for it to sort out its doubts and hesitancy. However, in order to set its house in order, Europe can now rely on the Lisbon Treaty and the advances it brings. The Treaty represents the one and only path of hope for the future, because European integration is a process that, as Paul Valéry said of poems, is 'never finished, only abandoned'. And it will be Parliament that leads the way along that path.

• [1]  Entry into force: 23 July 1951.
• [2]  Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
• [3]  The following countries have joined the first six: Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1973, Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986, Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia in 2004, and Bulgaria and Romania in 2007.
• [4]  Entry into force: 1 January 1958.
• [5]  Luxembourg Treaty of 17 February 1986, which came into force on 1 July 1987.
• [6]  Signed on 7 February 1992, came into force on 1 November 1993.
• [7]  Signed on 2 October 1997, came into force on 1 May 1999.
• [8]  Signed on 26 February 2001, came into force on 1 February 2003.
• [9]  Signed in Rome on 29 October 2004 and would have entered into force on 1 November 2006 (cf. Article IV - 447) if all the instruments of ratification had been deposited by that date.
• [10]  Signed in Lisbon on 13 December 2007.
• [11]  Resolutions on the preparations for the IGCs and assessing their outcomes:
  - Single European Act
  . resolution of 14 February 1984: Spinelli report and draft Treaty (OJ C 77, 19.3.1984, p. 33)
  . resolutions of 16 January 1986: Planas report (OJ C 36, 17.2.1986, p. 144)
               and 17 April 1986 (OJ C 120, 20.5.1986, p. 96)
  - Maastricht Treaty
  . resolutions on the report by D. Martin of
                 14 March 1990 (OJ C 96, 17.4.1990, p. 114),
                 11 July 1990 (OJ C 231, 17.9.1990, p. 97)
                 and 22 November 1990 (OJ C 324, 24.12.1990, p. 219)
  . resolution of 7 April 1992: D. Martin report (OJ C 125, 18.5.1992, p. 81)
  - Treaty of Amsterdam
  . resolutions of 17 May 1995: D. Martin/Bourlanges report (OJ C 151, 19.6.1995, p. 56)
                 and 13 March 1996: Dury/Maij-Weggen report (OJ C 96, 1.4.1996, p. 77)
  . resolution of 19 November 1997: Méndez de Vigo/Tsatsos report (OJ C 371, 8.12.1997, p. 99)
  - Treaty of Nice
  . resolutions on the Dimitrakopoulos/Leinen report of 18 November 1999 (OJ C 189, 7.7.2000, p. 222),
                 3 February 2000 (OJ C 309, 27.10.2000, p. 85)
                 and 13 April 2000 (OJ C 40, 7.2.2001, p. 409)
  . resolution of 31 May 2001: Méndez de Vigo/Seguro report (OJ C 47E, 21.2.2002, p. 108).
  - Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
  . resolution of 24 September 2003: Gil Robles/Tsatsos report (OJ C 77 E, 26.3.2004, p. 253)
  . resolution of 12 January 2005: Corbett/Mendez de Vigo report (OJ C 247 E, 6.10.2005, p. 88).
• [12]  OJ C 80, 10.3.2001, pp. 85 and 86.
• [13]  Mention need be made here only of the Rome ‘Assises’ involving the national parliaments (Conference of the Parliaments of the European Community, held from 27 to 30 November 1990), the interinstitutional conferences held in parallel with the IGCs on Economic and Monetary Union and Political Union, which culminated in the drafting of the Maastricht Treaty, the participation by Parliament representatives in the work of the Reflection Group prior to the Amsterdam IGC, followed by their involvement in the proceedings of the IGC itself, and, finally, their involvement as observers in the group set up to prepare the Nice IGC.
• [14]  Resolution of 25 October 2000 (report by Olivier Duhamel on the constitutionalisation of the Treaties), confirmed by the resolution of 31 May 2001 (Méndez de Vigo/Seguro report on the assessment of the Treaty of Nice and the future of the European Union).
• [15]  The idea of adopting such a Charter, which later became Part II of the Constitution, was first put forward by the German Council Presidency, which secured its acceptance by the Cologne European Council of 3 and 4 June 1999. The method of drafting the Charter was also laid down at that European Council meeting, then clarified at the following meeting held in Tampere on 15 and 16 October 1999. It was decided to establish a ‘body’ - subsequently termed ‘Convention’ - bringing together the four component parts of the Convention on the Future of Europe, but without the involvement of the applicant States.
• [16]  SN 300/1/01 REV 1, Annex 1, p. 19.
• [17]  .    Resolution of 16 March 2000: Duff/Voggenhuber report on the drafting of a European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights (OJ C 377, 29.12.2000, p. 329)
  .       Decision of 14 November 2000: Duff/Voggenhuber report on approval of the draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ C 223, 8.8.2001, p. 74)
  .       Resolution of 23 October 2002: Duff report on the impact of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union and its future status (OJ C 300E, 11.12.2003, p. 432)
  .       Resolution of 29 November 2001: Leinen/Méndez de Vigo report on the Laeken European Council and the future of the Union (OJ C 153, 27.6.2002, p. 310(E))
  .       Resolution of 25 October 2001: Poos report on the reform of the Council (OJ C 112, 9.5.2002, p. 317(E))
  .       Resolution of 14 March 2002: Carnero González report on the legal personality of the European Union (OJ C 47, 27.2.2003, p. 594(E))
  .       Resolution of 7 February 2002: Napolitano report on relations between the European Parliament and the national parliaments in European integration (OJ C 284, 21.11.2002, p. 322(E))
  .       Resolution of 16 May 2002: Lamassoure report on the division of competences between the European Union and the Member States (OJ C 180, 31.7.2003, p. 493(E))
  .       Resolution of 17 December 2002: Bourlanges report on the typology of acts and the hierarchy of legislation in the European Union (OJ C 31, 5.2.2004, p. 126)
  .       Resolution of 14 January 2003: Napolitano report on the role of regional and local authorities in European integration (OJ C 38E, 12.2.2004, p. 167)
  .       Resolution of 24 September 2003 on the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and the European Parliament’s opinion on the convening of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) (OJ C 77E, 26.3.2004, p. 255).
• [18]  A fourth took place on 3 and 4 December 2007, after the political agreement on the Treaty of Lisbon had already been reached.
• [19]  Name given to the two representatives from each Member State and from the EP and the Commission who took part in this preparatory phase of the talks. Parliament's 'sherpas' were Klaus Welle, the Head of President Hans-Gert Pöttering's Cabinet, and José Luís Pacheco, a member of the secretariat of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs.
• [20]  Draft report by Carlos Carnero González on the insertion in Parliament's Rules of Procedure of a Rule 202a concerning the use by Parliament of the symbols of the European Union, PE 398.505v3-00.
• [21]  The Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC/Euratom) will not be affected by the new Treaty, however, and will thus remain in force in parallel, although some of its provisions are altered by the Protocol amending the Euratom Treaty in order to bring them into line with the new text. However, Germany, Ireland and Austria have expressed the wish, in Declaration No 54 annexed to the Final Act of the IGC, that an Intergovernmental Conference should be convened as quickly as possible to revise the Euratom Treaty.
  Moreover, it should be pointed out that the new Treaty incorporates an excessive number of protocols, annexes and declarations: 12 protocols (most of those annexed to the Treaties in force have simply been brought into line with the constitutional text), amongst which could be cited those on the Schengen acquis, the role of the national parliaments, the subsidiarity and proportionality principles, the transitional provisions concerning the institutions, permanent structured cooperation in the area of defence, etc.), two annexes (already in existence, setting out the list of agricultural products and the list of overseas countries and territories) and 65 declarations. Since they have the same legal force as the Treaty, these protocols must also be ratified by all the Member States. The same is not true of the declarations, which are not legally binding, but which may be used as aids to interpreting the Treaties.
• [22]  Although it could be argued that the European Union as such has international legal personality, even though this is not conferred on it by the Treaties.
• [23]  Due note should be taken of the deletion, further to a French proposal, of the reference in that article to fair competition, the basis, according to the text of the Constitution, for the internal market. That deletion was justified to the extent that ‘fair competition’ represents only one of the means to establish that internal market, the Union’s actual objective. Moreover, that deletion has no legal implications concerning the role of competition, as demonstrated by the Protocol (No 6) on the internal market and competition.
• [24]  A principle which, at all events, could already be derived from the first part of paragraph 2 of Article 5 of the TEU.
• [25]  The draft Treaty submitted in July 2007 also moved the definition of citizenship to the TFEU and only determined efforts on the part of Parliament’s representatives to the IGC ensured that recognition of European citizenship has after all been incorporated into the opening provisions of the TEU, which is as it should be, since that Treaty makes repeated reference to 'citizens'.
• [26]  Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.
• [27]  More exactly 750 'plus the President', to employ the wording of Article 14 of the TEU. Apart from this last-minute addition made to placate Italy, the rules governing the composition of the EP and the procedure for determining that composition are identical to those set out in the Constitution. The June 2007 European Council asked the EP to submit, in time for the October European Council, a proposal for the redistribution of seats in the EP in accordance with the new rules, which Parliament then did by adopting the resolution contained in the Lamassoure-Severin report (Parliament resolution of 11 October 2007 on the composition of the European Parliament, P6_TA-PROV(2007)0429). In that report, the EP endeavoured to propose a redistribution which was more consistent with the concept of degressive proportionality laid down in the new Treaty and which did not involve any further loss of seats for any Member State beyond what had already been agreed in the Accession Treaty for Bulgaria and Romania. Italy was not satisfied with that proposal and ultimately secured agreement that the Treaty should make provision for an additional seat, in a departure from the principle of digressive proportionality, in order to maintain its parity with the United Kingdom. A declaration (No 4) annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon states that 'the additional seat in the European Parliament shall be allocated to Italy'. Naturally enough, the new distribution of seats will take effect only once the Treaty has entered into force and the decision provided for in Article 9c has been formally adopted.
• [28]  Although the role assigned to the European Council in operating an 'emergency brake' in connection with certain decisions concerning social security and judicial cooperation in criminal matters may mean that, even if it does not directly perform legislative functions (it does not participate in the adoption of legally binding rules) it may at least interfere in a virtually decisive manner in a legislative procedure - cf. below, points 9.1. and 9.2.
• [29]  Parliament resolution of 18 November 1999 on the preparation of the reform of the Treaties and the forthcoming Intergovernmental Conference (OJ C 189, 7.7.2000, p. 222).
• [30]  The fact that the IGC introduced the requirement that at least four Member States should vote against a proposal in order to form a blocking minority means that in some circumstances a decision could be adopted with the support of far less than 62% of the population, which is the threshold set for the population criterion in the Nice Treaty: thus a decision opposed, for example, by Germany, France and the United Kingdom would nonetheless be adopted, even though its proponents represented only just over 58% of the population, as these three Member States cannot by themselves form a blocking minority even though between them they represent more than 41% of the population of the EU (in its current 27-member form). Moreover, it is necessary to bear in mind that at present the vagaries of the various possible combinations whereby it is possible to attain the minimum number of weighted votes required for a qualified majority has the effect that in many cases the required percentage of the population is substantially greater.
  On the other hand, raising the threshold for the number of Member States will not, in practice, have any effect, since it only made sense in a Union with 25 Member States, as was the case in 2004: 55% of Member States instead of half (50%) meant that in the 25-member EU 14 Member States would be required to vote in favour instead of 13, without the additional requirement formulated by the IGC that the majority must include at least 15 Member States; the number of Member States required to prevent a decision from being adopted will now be 12 instead of 13. However, in a Union of 27 55% of Member States in any case equals 15. Moreover, in practice, the possible increase in the risks of blockage due to this increase is certainly not very great. In reality, decisions are never taken with the Member States divided into two antagonistic blocs of virtually identical proportions.
• [31]  In that respect, the new Treaty incorporates practically all the changes provided for in the Constitution. The only exceptions concern the agreement on accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, which will have to be adopted unanimously (QMV under the Constitution), and the creation of a new legal basis for the introduction of rules governing the processing of personal data under the CFSP (Article 39 of the TEU). Although, according to the most generous interpretation, this involves nothing more than the establishment of joint rules to govern the exercise of a competence which rests solely with the Member States (everything covered by the Union's competence in the area of the protection of personal data is governed by Article 16 of the TFEU), it is regrettable that Parliament should not be involved in this procedure and that no explicit reference should have been made to legal review by the Court of Justice.
• [32]  A declaration (No 9) annexed to the Treaty sets out the political agreement reached among the Member States on a decision providing for the establishment of Presidency teams from three Member States for periods of 18 months. Those Member States would divide up the task of chairing the various sectoral configurations of the Council, either for rotating six-month periods (as at present) or for the whole 18-month period.
• [33]  It may be noted that the 2004 IGC did not accept the Convention's proposal that the government of each Member State should submit a list of three names from which the President would choose the Commissioner proposed by the Member State. Also, it is regrettable that the 2004 IGC did not accept the Commission's proposal that the investiture of the Commission should conclude with the vote by the European Parliament, which is politically highly symbolic, but added a stage to the procedure, which is now to conclude with the appointment of the Commission by the European Council, acting by a qualified majority.
• [34]  The transition to the new institutional situation resulting from the creation of the office of High Representative gave rise to a number of problems in the final days of the negotiations, with the EP endeavouring to safeguard its full prerogatives under two possible scenarios, either that of a temporary appointment immediately after the entry into force of the Treaty (scheduled for 1 January 2009), or the appointment of the new High Representative when the next Commission is constituted, in November 2009, following the European elections. A declaration (No 12) adopted at the Lisbon European Council guarantees Parliament’s rights.
• [35]  Adopted by Parliament and the Council by means of the ordinary legislative procedure, either on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Court of Justice, or at the request of the Court of Justice and after consulting the Commission.
• [36]  Each of the two arms of the legislative authority may revoke the delegation decision at any time; in addition, a delegated regulation proposed by the Commission can enter into force only if neither of the two institutions makes objections within the time limit provided for by the law or framework law delegating the power of regulation. These scrutiny arrangements are not exhaustive, moreover.
• [37]  In 22 of these cases, the Council decides unanimously (in five cases with the approval of the European Parliament, in 17 after mere consultation); in six cases it decides by a qualified majority (in one case with the approval of the European Parliament, in five cases after mere consultation) - cf. Annex 4.
• [38]  The Convention, on the other hand, proposed that the measures for the implementation of the own-resources system should be adopted by a Council law adopted by a qualified majority, with the approval of Parliament.
• [39]  The law establishing the system of and ceilings for own resources thus becomes a regulation, just like the law laying down implementing measures for that system; the law establishing the multiannual financial framework also becomes a regulation, whilst the budget, which was to be adopted by means of a law, now becomes simply 'the budget’, with the form of the legislative act which is to adopt it not specified. However, Article 314 of the TFEU states that it is adopted by means of a special legislative procedure, which makes it a legislative act pursuant to Article 289(3) TFEU.
• [40]  This is the general rule. In one specific case Parliament can continue to impose its standpoint, through a very large majority. But this is a fairly theoretical possibility.
• [41]  The special position of the United Kingdom and Ireland derives from the two protocols referred to in the two following footnotes, whilst that of Denmark, which has remained largely unchanged, derives from the Protocol on the position of Denmark.
• [42]  Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland on the area of freedom, security and justice.
• [43]  Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union.
• [44]  Article 10 of the Protocol (No 11) on the transitional provisions.
• [45]  Article 1, third paragraph, of the TEU and Article 1a(2) of the TFEU.
• [46]  The decision to establish, in time, a common defence will be taken by the European Council, acting unanimously, and will require the approval of all the Member States in accordance with their constitutional procedures.
• [47]  To add operations relating to disarmament, military advice, post-conflict stabilisation and the fight against terrorism, including in the territory of third countries, to the existing humanitarian and rescue tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.
• [48]  Whose main responsibility is to promote the rationalisation of the military capabilities of the Member States, the coordination of defence technology research and more effective military spending.
• [49]  One example is Declaration No 13, which emphasises that the provisions concerning the CFSP 'do not affect' the responsibilities of the Member States, as they currently exist 'for the formulation and conduct of their foreign policy' and that the provisions governing the common security and defence policy do not prejudice the specific character of their national security and defence policies. A further example is provided by Declaration No 14, which states that nothing in the new Treaty affects the representation of the Member States in international organisations, including a Member State's membership of the United Nations Security Council. Particularly unjustified, not to say partially incorrect, is the second paragraph of that declaration, which states that the provisions covering the CFSP 'do not give new powers to the Commission to initiate decisions nor do they increase the role of the European Parliament'.
• [50]  The Convention had proposed that the Council should act unanimously for the negotiation and conclusion of agreements in the field of trade in cultural and audiovisual services, where these risk prejudicing the Union's cultural and linguistic diversity. The 2004 IGC extended this 'exception' to cover the trade in social, education and health services where such agreements risk seriously disturbing the national organisation of such services and prejudicing the responsibility of Member States to deliver them. The Council shall also act unanimously where agreements in the fields of trade in services in general and the commercial aspects of intellectual property include provisions for which unanimity is required for the adoption of internal rules.

ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ 1: Компетенциите на Съюза The TFEU also refers to the common foreign and security policy and the coordination of economic and employment policies, which, because of their specific nature, do not come under any of the three categories in this table. The areas of competence underlined in each of the columns are areas for which there are currently no specific provisions in the Treaties but in which the Union has already taken action, in particular using the provisions relating to the internal market or Article 308 TEC.

Type of competence	Exclusive (full list)[2]	Shared (non-exhaustive list)[3]	Complementary (full list)
Definition	Only the Union can adopt legally binding acts; the Member States cannot intervene unless authorised to do so by the Union, or to implement measures taken by the latter.	The Union and the Member States can adopt legally binding acts, the Member States being able to do so insofar as the Union has not done so.	The Union can intervene only to support action by Member States (primarily through financial contributions); it may legislate but not harmonise national legislation and regulations.
Subjects	Customs Union   Establishing competition rules required for operation of the internal market   Monetary policy for Member States whose currency is the euro   Conservation of the biological resources of the sea under the fisheries policy   Common commercial policy	Internal market Social policy Economic, social and territorial cohesion Agriculture and fisheries (excluding conservation of the biological resources of the sea) Environment Consumer protection Transport TransEuropean networks Energy Area of freedom, security and justice Common safety concerns in the public health sphere Research and technological development Space policy Development cooperation	Protection and improvement of human health   Industry   Culture   Tourism   Education   Youth   Sport   Vocational training   Civil protection   Administrative cooperation

• [1]  The TFEU also refers to the common foreign and security policy and the coordination of economic and employment policies, which, because of their specific nature, do not come under any of the three categories in this table. The areas of competence underlined in each of the columns are areas for which there are currently no specific provisions in the Treaties but in which the Union has already taken action, in particular using the provisions relating to the internal market or Article 308 TEC.
• [2]  In addition to these competences, the Union also high as an exclusive competence for the conclusion of international agreements when this is provided for in a legislative act of the Union, when it is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence or when it is likely to affect common rules or adversely affect their scope.
• [3]  Although the TFEU deals with the policies indicated in italics in this column in the article relating to shared competences, they are sectors in which Union action does not have the effect of preventing the exercise of national competences.
   

ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ 2: Гласуване с квалифицирано мнозинство

I -  Existing legal bases which move to qualified majority voting

[the numbers of the articles in the TEU and TFEU indicated first refer to those given in the Treaty of Lisbon; the numbers in [...] are those the articles will have in a future consolidated version of the Treaties (in accordance with the table annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon); the current procedure is indicated in brackets in italics]

1.   Art. 9 [16], paragraph 3, TEU and Art. 201b [236], paragraph (b), TFEU: Order of Presidencies of the Council – decision of European Council, without a Commission proposal (Art. 203 TEC – Council decides unanimously)

2.   Art. 42 [48] TFEU: free movement of workers, social benefits – ordinary legislative procedure[1] (Art. 42 TEC: codecision – Council acts unanimously) 

3.   Art. 47 [53], paragraph 1, TFEU: freedom of establishment, taking-up and pursuit of activities as self-employed persons – ordinary legislative procedure when the implementation of the relevant directives involves a change in the legislative principles in a Member State (Art. 47, paragraph 2, TEC: codecision – Council acts unanimously)

4.   Art. 61 G [74] TFEU: administrative cooperation in the area of freedom, security and justice – Council regulation, consultation of EP (Art. 66 TEC and Art. 34, paragraph 1, TEU: procedure laid down in Art. 67, paragraphs 1 and 2, TEC: unanimity in Council after consulting EP – Council may decide unanimously, after consulting EP, to move to qualified majority voting) 

5.   Art. 62 [77], paragraph 2, TFEU: border checks – ordinary legislative procedure (Art. 62 TEC: procedure laid down in Art. 67 TEC: unanimity in Council after consulting EP – Council may decide unanimously, after consulting EP, to move to qualified majority voting)

6.   Art. 63 [78] TFEU: asylum and protection of refugees and displaced persons – ordinary legislative procedure (Art. 63, paragraphs 1 and 2, TEC: procedure laid down in Art. 67, paragraph 5, TEC: unanimity and consultation of EP on certain aspects – Council may decide unanimously, after consulting EP, to move to qualified majority voting)

7.   Art. 63a [79] TFEU: immigration – ordinary legislative procedure (Art. 63, paragraphs 3 and 4, TEC: procedure laid down in Art. 67 TEC: unanimity in Council after consulting EP – Council may decide unanimously, after consulting EP, to move to qualified majority voting)

8.   Art. 65 [81], paragraph 2, TFEU: judicial cooperation in civil matters (excluding family law)[2] (Art. 65 TEC: procedure laid down in Art. 67 TEC: unanimity in the Council and simple consultation of EP, with the possibility of a switch to codecision on the basis of a Council decision taken unanimously after consulting EP)

9.   Art. 69 A [82], paragraphs 1 and 2, TFEU: judicial cooperation in criminal matters – ordinary legislative procedure[3] (Art. 31, paragraph 1, points (a), (b), (c), (d), TEU – unanimity in Council and simple consultation of EP) 

10. Art. 69 B [83], paragraphs 1 and 2, TFEU: approximation of criminal laws, offences and sanctions[4] (Art. 31, paragraph 1, point (e), TEU – unanimity in Council and simple consultation of EP)

11. Art. 69 D [85] TFEU: Eurojust – ordinary legislative procedure (Art. 31, paragraph 2, TEU – unanimity in Council and simple consultation of EP)

12. Art. 69 F [87], paragraph 2, TFEU: non-operational police cooperation – ordinary legislative procedure (Art. 30, paragraph 1, TEU – unanimity in Council and simple consultation of EP)

13. Art. 69 G [88], paragraph 2, TFEU: Europol – ordinary legislative procedure (Art. 30, paragraph 2, TEU – unanimity in Council and simple consultation of EP) 

14. Art. 71 [91], paragraph 1, TFEU: common transport policy (including cases covered by paragraph 3) – ordinary legislative procedure (Art. 71, paragraph 2, TEC – Council acts unanimously after consulting EP only in the case of the exceptions set out in paragraph 2)

15. Art. 107 [129], paragraph 3, TFEU: amendment of certain provisions of the Statute of the ESCB – ordinary legislative procedure (Commission proposal with consultation of the ECB or ECB recommendation with consultation of the Commission) (Art. 107.5 TEC – in the case of the Commission proposal, the Council acts unanimously after consulting the ECB; in all cases the EP is required to give its assent; in the case of a recommendation from the ECB, the Council acts by qualified majority after consulting the Commission)

16. Art. 151 [167], paragraph 5, TFEU: measures to encourage culture – ordinary legislative procedure (Council recommendations also by qualified majority) (Art.151, paragraph 5, TEC – codecision with unanimity in the Council; recommendations: Council acts unanimously on the basis of a Commission proposal)

17. Art. 161 [177] TFEU: Structural and Cohesion Funds (Art. 161 TEC: unanimity in the Council and assent of EP)

18. Art. 225 A [257] TFEU: creation of specialised courts (Art. 225A TEC: unanimity in Council and simple consultation of EP)

19. Art. 245 [281] TFEU: modification of the Statute of the Court of Justice, except Title I and Article 64 (Art. 245 TEC: unanimity in Council and simple consultation of EP)

20. Art. 245b [283], paragraph 2, TFEU: appointment of members of the Executive Board of the ECB – decision of European Council, on recommendation from Council, consultation of EP and of the Governing Council of the ECB (Art. 112 TEC – Heads of State or Government by common accord, remainder identical)

21. Art. 249 B [290], paragraph 2, and Art. 249 C [291], paragraph 3, TFEU: procedures for monitoring the exercise of implementing powers by the Commission (current comitology decision) – ordinary legislative procedure (Art. 202 TEC – unanimous Council decision after consulting EP)

II - New legal bases subject to qualified majority voting

1.   Art. 9 B [15], paragraph 5, TEU: election of the President of the European Council by the European Council

2.   Art. 9 E [18], paragraph 1, TEU, appointment of the High Representative by the European Council, with the agreement of the President of the Commission

3.   Art. 15b [31], paragraph 2(b), TEU: initiatives by the /High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy at the request of the European Council – Council decision

4.   Art. 16 [14] TFEU: principles and conditions for the operation of services of general economic interest – ordinary legislative procedure

5.   Art. 20 [23] TFEU: measures to facilitate diplomatic and consulate protection – Council directive, consultation of EP

6.   Art. 21 [24] TFEU: citizens' initiative for a European law – ordinary legislative procedure

7.   Art. 28 D [45], paragraph 2, TEU: statute and seat of the European Defence Agency – Council decision without Commission proposal

8.   Art. 28 E [46], paragraph 2, TEU: establishing permanent structured cooperation in the area of defence – Council decision without Commission proposal, consultation of /High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

9.   Art. 28 E [46], paragraph 3, TEU: admission of a Member State to permanent structured cooperation in the area of defence – Council decision (only participating Member States may vote) without Commission proposal, consultation of Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

10. Art. 28 E [46], paragraph 4, TEU: suspension of a Member State from permanent structured cooperation in the area of defence – Council decision (only participating Member States may vote) without Commission proposal

11. Art. 49 A [50], paragraph 2, TEU: agreement on the withdrawal of a Member State – Council decision on a proposal from the negotiator of the agreement (in principle the Commission), with consent of EP

12. Article 61 C [70] TFEU: measures to assess the implementation of the area of freedom, security and justice, after simple information of EP and national parliaments

13. Art. 69 C [84] TFEU: incentive measures to support crime prevention – ordinary legislative procedure

14. Art. 97a [118], first paragraph, TFEU: intellectual property – ordinary legislative procedure

15. Art. 115 C [138], paragraphs 1 and 2, TFEU: Member States whose currency is the euro, common position and unified representation in international forums – Council decision, consultation of ECB

16. Art. 149 [165], paragraph 4, TFEU: sport – ordinary legislative procedure

17. Article 152 [168], paragraph 4, point (c), TFEU: measures to tackle common safety concerns in the public health sphere[5]

18. Article 152 [168], paragraph 5, TFEU: incentive measures to protect human health and in particular to combat the major cross-border health scourges and tackle tobacco and alcohol abuse[6]

19. Art. 172a [189], paragraph 2, TFEU: space policy – ordinary legislative procedure

20. Art. 176 A [194], paragraph 2, TFEU: energy – ordinary legislative procedure[7]

21. Art. 176 B [195], paragraph 2, TFEU: tourism – ordinary legislative procedure

22. Art. 176 C [196], paragraph 2, TFEU: civil protection[8]

23. Art. 176 D [197], paragraph 2, TFEU: administrative cooperation – ordinary legislative procedure

24. Art. 188 J [214], paragraphs 3 and 5, TFEU: humanitarian aid[9] and creation of European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps

25. Art. 201b [236], point (a): list of Council configurations – European Council decision (without Commission proposal)

26. Art. 254a [298], paragraph 2, TFEU: administration of the European Union

27. Art. 256a [300], paragraph 5, TFEU: review of rules governing the nature and composition of the CoR and ESC – Council decision

28. Art. 269 [311], fourth paragraph, TFEU: measures implementing the own resources system – Council regulation, after EP consent (special legislative procedure, but no reference to unanimity)

• [1]  This procedure has an 'emergency brake' mechanism: where a Member State considers that the measures concerned 'would affect fundamental aspects of its social security system, including its scope, cost or financial structure, or would affect the financial balance of that system', it may request that the matter be referred to the European Council (thus automatically suspending the legislative procedure). The European Council must then within a period of four months either refer the matter back to the Council, thus enabling the procedure to continue, or ask the Commission to submit a new proposal.
• [2]  Points (e), (g) and (h) of paragraph 2 of that article contain new legal bases; the other points were already covered by Article 65 TEC. Paragraph 3 of that same Article 65 [81] TFEU makes provision for the Council to adopt a decision determining which aspects of family law with cross-border implications may be the subject of acts adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure.
• [3]  This procedure has an 'emergency brake' mechanism: where a Member State considers that the measures concerned 'would affect fundamental aspects of its criminal justice system, it may request that
  the matter be referred to the European Council and the procedure suspended. The European Council must, within four months, either refer the matter back to the Council so that the procedure continues, or request the Commission or the group of Member States from which the initiative originates to submit a new proposal. If, within the four months, either no action has been taken by the European Council or if, within 12 months the new legislative procedure has not been completed, enhanced cooperation in the relevant area will automatically go ahead if at least nine Member States are in favour.
• [4]  Ibidem.
• [5]    Measures covered by points (c) and (d) are new, whereas the measures covered by points (a) and (b) were already provided for in Article 152 TEC and came under the codecision procedure.
• [6]    The legal bases referred to in this paragraph are completely new, except for that covering incentive measures for the protection of human health, which was provided for in Article 152 TEC.
• [7]    The Union already takes measures in the energy sphere now, either on the basis of provisions that already require qualified majority voting, or on the basis of Article 308 TEC.
• [8]    Measures are already being taken in this sphere under Article 308 TEC.
• [9]    Measures are already being taken in this sphere under Article 179 TEC (by qualified majority), or under Article 308 TEC (unanimity).

ПРИЛОЖЕНЕ 3: Законодателни актове - обикновена законодателна процедура

This annex lists the legal bases to which the ordinary legislative procedure established by the Treaty of Lisbon will apply (this ordinary legislative procedure corresponds more or less to the procedure currently laid down in Article 251 TEC, i.e. the codecision procedure).

The subject areas underlined are those for which the legal basis is completely new, or where there has been a change in procedure so that the relevant measures are now subject to the 'codecision'/ordinary legislative procedure.

The numbers of the articles in the TEU and TFEU refer to those given in the Treaty of Lisbon; the numbers in [...] are those the articles will have in a future consolidated version of the Treaties (in accordance with the table annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon).

The corresponding articles of the Treaty now in force are indicated in italics and, in cases where the Treaty of Lisbon modifies the procedure, an indication is also given of the procedure that currently applies.

1.   Services of general economic interest (Article 16 [14] TFEU) (Article 16 TEC)

2.   Procedures for the right of access to documents (Article 16 A [15], paragraph 3, TFEU) (Article 255, paragraph 2)

3.   Data protection (Article 16 B [16], paragraph 2, TFEU) (Article 286, paragraph 2)

4.   Measures to combat discrimination on grounds of nationality (Article 16 D [18] TFEU) (Article 12 TEC)

5.   Basic principles for anti-discrimination incentive measures (Article 16 E [19], paragraph 2, TFEU) (Article 13.2 TEC)

6.   Measures to facilitate the exercise of the right of every citizen of the Union to move and reside freely in the territory of Member States (Article 18 [21], paragraph 2, TFEU) (Article 18, paragraph 2, TEC)

7.   Citizens' initiative (Article 21 [24] TFEU)

8.   Customs cooperation (Article 27a [33] TFEU) (Article 135 TEC)

9.   Application of competition rules to the common agricultural policy (Art. 36 [42], which refers to Article 43, paragraph 2, TFEU) (Article 36 TEC: qualified majority in Council and simple consultation of EP)

10. Legislation concerning the common agricultural policy (Article 37 [43], paragraph 2, TFEU) (Article 37, paragraph 2: qualified majority in Council and simple consultation of EP)

11. Free movement of workers (Article 40 [46] TFEU) (Article 40 TEC)

12. Internal market – social security measures for Community migrant workers[1] (Article 42 [48] TFEU) (Article 42 TEC: codecision – the Council acts unanimously)

13. Right of establishment (Article 44 [50], paragraph 1, TFEU) (Article 44 TEC)

14. Exclusion in a Member State of certain activities from the application of provisions on the right of establishment (Article 45 [51], second paragraph, TFEU) (Article 45, second paragraph, TEC: qualified majority in the Council without participation of EP)

15. Coordination of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States providing for special treatment for foreign nationals with regard to the right of establishment (Article 46 [52], paragraph 2, TFEU) (Article 46, paragraph 2, TEC)

16. Coordination of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the taking-up and pursuit of activities as self-employed persons and the mutual recognition of qualifications (Article 47 [53], paragraph 1, TFEU) (Article 47 TEC: codecision – Council acts unanimously when this involves a change in Member State legislation)

17. Extending provisions on freedom to provide services to service providers who are nationals of a third State and who are established within the Union. (Article 49 [56], second paragraph, TFEU) (Article 49, second paragraph, TEC: qualified majority in the Council without participation of EP)

18. Liberalisation of services in specific sectors (Article 52 [59], paragraph 1, TFEU) (Article 52, paragraph 1, TEC: qualified majority in Council and simple consultation of EP)

19. Services (Article 55 [62] TFEU) (Article 55 TEC)

20. Adoption of other measures on the movement of capital to and from third countries (Article 57 [64], paragraph 2, TFEU) (Article 57, paragraph 2, first sentence, TEC: qualified majority in the Council without participation of EP)

21. Administrative measures relating to capital movements in connection with preventing and combating crime and terrorism (Article 61 H [75] TFEU) (Article 60 TEC)

22. Visas, border checks, free movement of nationals of non-member countries, management of external frontiers, absence of controls at internal frontiers (Article 62 [77], paragraph 2, TFEU) (Article 62 TEC: procedure laid down in Article 67 TEC: unanimity in the Council and simple consultation of EP, with possible switch to codecision following a Council decision taken unanimously after consulting EP)

23. Asylum, temporary protection or subsidiary protection for nationals of third countries (Article 63 [78], paragraph 2, TFEU) (Article 63, paragraphs 1 and 2, and Article 64, paragraph 2, TEC: procedure laid down in Article 67 TEC: unanimity in the Council and simple consultation of EP, with possible switch to codecision following a Council decision taken unanimously after consulting EP)

24. Immigration and combating trafficking in persons (Article 63a [79], paragraph 2, TFEU) (Article 63, paragraphs 3 and 4, TEC: procedure laid down in Article 67 TEC: unanimity in the Council and simple consultation of EP, with possible switch to codecision following a Council decision taken unanimously after consulting EP)

25. Incentive measures for the integration of nationals of third countries (Article 63a [79], paragraph 4, TFEU)

26. Judicial cooperation in civil matters (excluding family law)[2] (Article 65 [81], paragraph 2, TFEU) (Article 65 TEC: procedure laid down in Article 67 TEC: unanimity in the Council and simple consultation of EP, with possible switch to codecision following a Council decision taken unanimously after consulting EP)

27. Judicial cooperation in criminal matters – procedures, cooperation, training, settlement of conflicts, minimum rules for recognition of judgments (Article 69 A [82], paragraphs 1 and 2, TFEU)[3] (Article 31 TEU: unanimity in Council and simple consultation of EP)

28. Minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension (Article 69 B [83], paragraphs 1 and, possibly, 2, TFEU)¹ (Article 31 TEU: procedure laid down in Articles 34, paragraph 2, and 39, paragraph 1, TEU: unanimity in Council and simple consultation of EP)

29. Measures to support crime prevention (Article 69 C [84] TFEU)

30. Eurojust (Article 69 D [85], paragraph 1, second subparagraph, TFEU) (Article 31 TEU: procedure laid down in Articles 34, paragraph 2, and 39, paragraph 1, TEU: unanimity in Council and simple consultation of EP)

31. Arrangements for involving the European Parliament and national parliaments in the evaluation of Eurojust's activities (Article 69 D [85], paragraph 1, third subparagraph, TFEU)

32. Police cooperation (certain aspects) (Article 69 F [87], paragraph 2 TFEU) (Article 30 TEU: procedure laid down in articles 34, paragraph 2 and 39, paragraph 1, TEU: unanimity in Council and simple consultation of EP)

33. Europol (Article 69 G [88], paragraph 2, first subparagraph, TFEU) (Article 30 TEU: procedure laid down in articles 34, paragraph 2 and 39, paragraph 1, TEU: unanimity in Council and simple consultation of EP)

34. Procedures for scrutiny of Europol's activities by EP and national parliaments (Article 69 G [88] paragraph 2, second subparagraph, TFEU)

35. Implementation of the common transport policy (Article 71 [91], paragraph 1, TFEU) (Article 71 TEC)

36. Sea and air transport (Article 80 [100], paragraph 2, TFEU) (Article 80, paragraph 2, TEC)

37. Measures for the approximation of national provisions which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market to promote the objectives of Article 22a [26] (Article 94 [114], paragraph 1, TFEU) (Article 95, paragraph 1, TEC)

38. Measures to eliminate distortions in the internal market (Article 96 [116] TFEU) (Article 96 TEC: qualified majority in the Council without participation of EP)

39. Intellectual property except language arrangements for the European intellectual property rights (Article 97a [118], first paragraph, TFEU)[4]

40. Multilateral surveillance (Article 99 [121], paragraph 6, TFEU) (Article 99, paragraph 5, TEC: cooperation procedure)

41. Modification of the Protocol on the Statutes of the ESCB and ECB (Article 107 [129] paragraph 3, TFEU) (Article 107, paragraph 5, TEC: unanimity in the Council or, depending on the case, qualified majority after assent of EP)

42. Measures necessary for the use of the euro (Article 111a [133], TFEU) (Article 123, paragraph 4, TEC)

43. Incentive measures for employment (Article 129 [149] TFEU) (Article 129 TEC)

44. Social policy (Article 137 [153], paragraphs 1, except points (c), (d), (f) and (g), and 2[5], first, second and last subparagraphs, TFEU) (Article 137, paragraphs 1 and 2 TEC)

45. Social policy (equal opportunities, equal treatment and equal pay) (Article 141 [157], paragraph 3, TFEU) (Article 141, paragraph 3, TEC)

46. European Social Fund (Article 148 [164] TFEU) (Article 148 TEC)

47. Education (excluding recommendations) (Article 149 [165], paragraph 4, point (a), TFEU) (Article 149, paragraph 4, TEC)

48. Sport (Article 149 [165], paragraphs 2, point (g), and 4, TFEU)

49. Professional training (Article 150 [166], paragraph 4, TFEU) (Article 150, paragraph 4, TCE)

50. Culture (excluding recommendations) (Article 151 [167], paragraph 5, first indent, TFEU) (Article 151 TEC: codecision – Council acts unanimously)

51. Public health – measures to tackle common safety concerns in the health sphere[6] (Article 152 [168], paragraph 4, TFEU) (Article 152, paragraph 4, TEC)

52. Public health – incentive measures to protect human health and in particular to combat the major cross-border health scourges, and measures to tackle tobacco and alcohol abuse (Article 152 [168], paragraph 5, TFEU[7])

53. Consumer protection (Article 153 [169], paragraph 3, TFEU) (Article 153, paragraph 4, TEC)

54. Trans-European networks (Article 156 [172] TFEU) (Article 156 TEC)

55. Industry (Article 157 [173], paragraph 3, TFEU) (Article 157, paragraph 3, TEC)

56. Measures in the area of economic and social cohesion (Article 159 [175], third paragraph, TFEU) (Article 159 TEC)

57. Structural Funds (Article 161 [177], first paragraph, TFEU) (Article 161 TEC: Currently: unanimity in the Council and assent of EP)

58. Cohesion Fund (Article 161 [177], second paragraph TFEU) (Article 161 TEC: currently: unanimity in the Council and assent of EP; as from 2007: qualified majority in the Council and assent of EP)

59. European Regional Development Fund (Article 162 [178] TFEU) (Article 162 TEC)

60. Framework Programme for Research (Article 166 [182], paragraph 1, TFEU) (Article 166, paragraph 1, TEC).

61. Implementation of European research area (Article 166 [182], paragraph 5, TFEU)

62. Implementation of the Framework Programme for Research: rules for the participation of undertakings and dissemination of research results (Articles 167 [183] and 172 [188], second paragraph, TFEU) (Article 167 TEC)

63. Supplementary research programmes for some Member States (Articles 168 [184] and 172 [188], second paragraph, TFEU) (Article 168 TEC)

64. Participation in research programmes undertaken by several Member States (Articles 169 [185] and 172 [188], second paragraph, TFEU) (Article 169 TEC)

65. Space policy (Article 172a [189] TFEU)

66. Environment (Community measures to achieve environmental objectives except measures of a fiscal nature) (Article 175 [192], paragraph 1, TFEU) (Article 175, paragraph 1, TEC)

67. Environment Action Programme (Article 175 [192], paragraph 3, TFEU) (Article 175, paragraph 3, TEC)

68. Energy, excluding measures of a fiscal nature (Article 176 A [194], second paragraph, TFEU)[8]

69. Tourism - measures to complement the action of the Member States in the tourism sector (Article 176 B [195], second paragraph, TFEU)

70. Civil protection against natural and man-made disasters¹ (Article 176 C [196], second paragraph, TFEU)

71. Administrative cooperation in implementing Union law by Member States (Article 176 D [197], second paragraph, TFEU)

72. Commercial policy - implementing measures (Article 188 C [207], second paragraph, TFEU) (Article 133 TEC: qualified majority in the Council without consultation of EP)

73. Development cooperation (Article 188 E [209], paragraph 1, TFEU) (Article 179 TEC)

74. Economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries (Article 188 H [212], second paragraph, TFEU) (Article 181 A TEC: qualified majority in the Council and simple consultation of EP)

75. General framework for humanitarian operations (Article 188 J [214], paragraph 3, TFEU)

76. European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps (Article 188 J [214], paragraph 5, TFEU)

77. Regulations governing political parties and their funding (Article 191 [224] TFEU) (Article 191 TEC)

78. Creation of specialised courts (Article 225 A [257] TFEU) (Article 225A TEC: unanimity in the Council and simple consultation of EP)

79. Modification of Statute of Court of Justice, except Title I and Article 64 (Article 245 [281] TFEU) (Article 245 TEC: unanimity in the Council and simple consultation of EP)

80. Procedures for monitoring the exercise of implementing powers (Article 249 C [291], paragraph 3, TFEU) (Article 202 TEC: unanimity in the Council and simple consultation of EP)

81. European Administration (Article 254a [298], second paragraph, TFEU)

82. Adoption of financial rules (Article 279 [322], paragraph 1, TFEU) (Article 279, paragraph 1, TEC: unanimity in the Council after consultation of EP, then, as from 2007, qualified majority in the Council)

83. Fight against fraud affecting the Union's financial interests (Article 280 [325], paragraph 4, TFEU) (Article 280, paragraph 4, TEC)

84. Staff Regulations of officials and Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the Union (Article 283 [336] TFEU) (Article 283 TEC: qualified majority in the Council and simple consultation of EP)

85. Statistic (Article 285 [338], paragraph 1, TFEU) (Article 285, paragraph 1, TEC)

• [1]    With an 'emergency brake' mechanism: where a Member State considers that the measures concerned 'would affect fundamental aspects of its social security system, including its scope, cost or financial structure, or would affect the financial balance of that system', it may request that the matter be referred to the European Council (thus automatically suspending the legislative procedure). The European Council must then within a period of four months either refer the matter back to the Council, thus enabling the procedure to continue, or ask the Commission to submit a new proposal.
• [2]    Points (e), (g) and (h) of paragraph 2 of this article contain new legal bases; the other points were already covered by Article 65 TEC. Paragraph 3 of the same Article 81 TFEU also allows the Council to adopt a decision determining those aspects of family law with cross-border implications which may be the subject of acts adopted by the ordinary legislative procedure.
• [3]    An 'emergency brake' mechanism is provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of these articles whereby if a Member State considers that the measures concerned would affect fundamental aspects of its criminal justice system, it may request that the matter be referred to the European Council and the procedure suspended. The European Council must, within four months, either refer the matter back to the Council so that the procedure continues, or request the Commission or the group of Member States from which the initiative originates to submit a new proposal. If, within the four months, either no action has been taken by the European Council or if, within 12 months the new legislative procedure has not been completed, enhanced cooperation in the relevant area will automatically go ahead if at least nine Member States are in favour.
• [4]    In the absence of a specific legal basis, the Union has hitherto taken action in this area on the basis of Article 308 TEC: Unanimity in the Council and simple consultation of EP.
• [5]    In the areas covered by these points, the legislation is adopted by the Council unanimously, after consulting the EP. However, the second subparagraph of paragraph 2 contains a bridging clause whereby the Council may decide, unanimously, that the ordinary legislative procedure will be applied to points (d), (f) and (g) of paragraph 1.
• [6]    The measures provided for in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 4 of this article were already provided for in Article 152 TEC. The measures provided for in points (c) and (d) are new.
• [7]    All the legal bases provided for in this paragraph are new, with the exception of that for incentive measures for the protection of human health, which was already covered by Article 152 TEC.
• [8]    In the absence of a specific legal basis, the Union has hitherto taken action in this area on the basis of Article 308 TEC: unanimity in the Council and simple consultation of EP.

ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ 4: Законодателни актове - специални законодателни процедури

This annex lists the legal bases for special procedures.

The numbers of the articles in the TEU and TFEU refer to those given in the Treaty of Lisbon; the numbers in [...] are those the articles will have in a future consolidated version of the Treaties (in accordance with the table annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon).

Where there are corresponding articles in the current Treaties, these are indicated in italics, and in cases where there has been a change in procedure the procedure currently in force also appears in italics.

I -  Ad hoc procedures

1.   Annual budget - joint decision of EP and Council (Article 272 [314] TFEU) (Article 272 TEC: ad hoc procedure)

II - European Parliament acts

2.   Statute for Members of the European Parliament (Article 190 [223], paragraph 2, TFEU): adoption by EP, on its own initiative, after obtaining consent of Council (unanimously as regards taxation regime) and after consulting Commission (Article 190, paragraph 5, TEC)

3.   Provisions governing the exercise of the right of inquiry (Article 193 [226], third paragraph, TFEU): adoption by EP, on its own initiative, after obtaining consent of Council and Commission (Article 193 TEC: common accord)

4.   Statute of European Ombudsman (Article 195 [228], paragraph 4, TFEU): adoption by EP, on its own initiative, after obtaining consent of Council and Commission (Article 195, paragraph 4, TEC)

III -     Council acts

A.  Unanimity and consent of European Parliament

5.   Measures to combat discrimination (Article 16 E [19], paragraph 1, TFEU) (Article 13, paragraph 1, TEC: simple consultation of EP)

6.   Extension of citizenship-related rights (Article 22 [25] TFEU) - national ratification required (Article 22 TEC)

7.   European Public Prosecutor's Office (Article 69 E [86], paragraph 1, TFEU)

8.   Uniform electoral procedure (Article 190 [223], paragraph 1, TFEU): on initiative from and after consent of EP - national ratification required (Article 190, paragraph 4, TEC)

9.   Multiannual financial framework (Article 270a [312], paragraph 2, TFEU) Not mentioned in the treaties. Currently governed by an Interinstitutional Agreement

B.  Unanimity and consultation of European Parliament

10. Art. 6 TEU (with Art. 188 N [218], paragraphs 6 and 8): accession to the ECHR – Council decision on a proposal from the negotiator of the agreement (in principle the Commission), with consent of EP

11. Measures concerning social security or social protection (Article 18 [21], paragraph 3, TFEU) (Article 18, paragraph 3, TEC)

12. Citizenship: right to vote and stand for election in Member State of residence in municipal and European elections (Article 19 [22] TFEU) (Article 19 TEC)

13. Adoption of measures which constitute a step backwards in Union law as regards the liberalisation of the movement of capital to or from third countries (Article 57 [64], paragraph 3, TFEU) (Article 57, paragraph 2 in fine, TEC: Unanimity in the Council without consultation of EP)

14. Measures concerning passports, identity cards and residence permits (Article 62 [77], paragraph 3, TFEU)

15. Judicial cooperation in civil matters concerning measures relating to family law with cross-border implications[1] (Article 65 [81], paragraph 3, TFEU) (Article 67, paragraph 5, second indent, TEC)

16. Operational police cooperation (Article 69 F [87], paragraph 3, TFEU) (Article 30, paragraph 1, point (a): procedure laid down in Articles 34, paragraph 2, and 39, paragraph 1, TEU)

17. Interventions by the authority of a Member State on the territory of another Member State (Article 69 H [89] TFEU) (Article 32 TEU: procedure laid down in Articles 34, paragraph 2, and 39, paragraph 1, TEU)

18. Harmonisation of turnover taxes and indirect taxation (Article 93 [113] TFEU) (Article 93 TEC)

19. Approximation of provisions with a direct impact on the internal market (Article 95 [115] TFEU) (Article 94 TEC)

20. Language arrangements for European intellectual property rights (Article 97 a [118] TFEU)

21. Replacing the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure (Article 104 [126], paragraph 14, TFEU) (Article 104, paragraph 14, TEC)

22. Specific tasks of European Central Bank concerning prudential supervision (Article 105 [127], paragraph 6, TFEU) (Article 105, paragraph 6, TEC: Unanimity in the Council after consultation of ECB and assent of EP)

23. Social policy: social security and social protection of workers, protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated, representation and collective defence, conditions of employment for third-country nationals[2] (Article 137 [153], paragraphs 1, points (c), (d), (f) and (g), and 2, point (b), TFEU) (Article 137, paragraphs 1, points (c),( d), (f) and (g), and 2, point (b), second paragraph, TEC)

24. Environment: provisions of a fiscal nature, town and country planning, management of water resources, land use and the supply and diversification of energy resources (Article 175 [192], paragraph 2, TFEU) (Article 175, paragraph 2, TEC)

25. Energy: fiscal measures (Article 176 A [194], paragraph 3, TFEU)

26. Association of overseas countries and territories with the Union - rules and procedure (Article 187 [203] TFEU - with consultation of EP) (Article 187 TEC - without consultation of EP)

27. Jurisdiction of the Court in the area of intellectual property (Article 229 A [262] TFEU) (Article 229A TEC: unanimity in the Council and simple consultation of EP, plus national ratification)

28. Modification of the Protocol on the Statute of the European Investment Bank (Article 266 [308], third paragraph, TFEU) (Article 266, third paragraph, TEC)

29. Union own resources - ceiling and creation of new resources (Article 269 [311], third paragraph, TFEU) - national ratification required (Article 269 TEC)

C.  Qualified majority and consent of EP

30. Implementing measures of the Union’s own resources system (Article 269 [311], paragraph 4, TFEU)

D.  Qualified majority and consultation of EP

31. Measures to facilitate diplomatic protection (Article 20 [23] TFEU - adoption of directives under special legislative procedure) (Article 20 TEC - agreement between the Member States: intergovernmental cooperation)

32. Research: specific programmes implementing framework programme (Article 166 [182], paragraph 4, TFEU) (Article 166, paragraph 4 TEC)

33. Outermost regions (Article 299 [349], second paragraph, TFEU) (Article 299, paragraph 2, second subparagraph, TEC)

• [1]    The Council may take a unanimous decision, after consulting the EP, to switch to the ordinary legislative procedure (second subparagraph of paragraph 3 of Article 65 [81] TFEU).
• [2]    The Council may take a unanimous decision, after consulting the EP, to switch to the ordinary legislative procedure for points (d), (f) and (g) (second subparagraph of paragraph 2 of Article 137 [153] TFEU).

ПИСМО ОТ КОМИСИЯТА ПО РЕГИОНАЛНО РАЗВИТИЕ

Писмо от 23 януари 2008 г. от г-н Gerardo Galeote, председател на Комисията по регионално развитие до г-н Jo Leinen, председател на Комисията по конституционни въпроси

Г-н Jo Leinen

Председател

Комисия по конституционни въпроси

Относно:      Договора от Лисабон

Уважаеми г-н Leinen,

Предвид ограниченото време комисията по регионално развитие няма да има възможност да приеме становище по споменатия по-горе документ, който, при все това, според нас е от съществено значение за регионалното развитие. По тази причина и от името на комисията бих желал да ви уведомя за позицията на комисията.

Договорът от Лисабон въвежда няколко важни изменения, които, при ратификация, ще имат пряко въздействие върху дейността на комисията по регионално развитие. Той ще позволи на Съюза да осъществява напредък към по-демократично, по-ефективно и по-прозрачно бъдеще върху една обновена обща основа. Особено ценно в това отношение е затвърдяването на регионалното измерение в процеса на оформяне на политиката на ЕС и вземането на решения.

В резултат на това нашата комисия отправя към комисията по конституционни въпроси искането да вземе предвид следните аспекти в своя доклад (2007/2286(INI), докладчици - Richard Corbett и Íñigo Méndez de Vigo):

Комисията по регионално развитие:

1. оценява и одобрява факта, че Договорът от Лисабон съдържа ключови аспекти, свързани с регионалното развитие, като признаването на културното и езиково разнообразие в качеството на цел на ЕС, обновеното определение на принципа на субсидиарност, отчитането на въздействието на законодателството на Общността върху местните и регионални органи на управление, както и приемането на принципа на консултация с местните и регионални органи;

2. приветства инициативата за въвеждане на понятието „териториално сближаване“ и признаването му за цел на ЕС; отбелязва, че териториалното сближаване се цитира като област на поделена компетентност между Съюза и държавите-членки; одобрява освен това факта, че член 158 от Договора за енергийната харта, в който се определя политиката на сближаване, ще бъде изменен, така че да включва нов параграф, с който се признава специалният статут на крайно отдалечените региони;

3. приветства разширяването на обхвата на гласуването с квалифицирано мнозинство и процедурата за съвместно решение по отношение например на общия регламент за структурните фондове; счита, че тези елементи непременно ще увеличат способността на парламентарните комисии с отговорности в областта на структурната и кохезионната политика да влияят върху политиката;

4. приветства специалното внимание, което се обръща на селските райони, на районите, засегнати от индустриалния преход, както и на регионите, които са засегнати от сериозни и постоянни неблагоприятни природни или демографски условия, като най-северните региони с много ниска гъстота на населението и островните, трансграничните и планинските региони;

5. отправя искане към съответните органи за пълно прилагане на разпоредбите относно участието на националните и регионални парламенти със законодателни правомощия относно процедурата за ранно предупреждение, разработена, за да гарантира спазването на принципа на субсидиарност; отбелязва, че разпоредбата, с която на националните парламенти и на Комитета на регионите се позволява да предприемат правни действия в случай на нарушение на принципа на субсидиарност може да доведе до промяна в отношенията най-вече между Европейската комисия и държавите-членки;

6. счита,че успешното прилагане на Договора от Лисабон и новите разпоредби, създадени в областта на регионалното развитие и кохезионната политика, вървят рамо до рамо с подобрен диалог между институциите на ЕС и регионалните сдружения.

(заключителен израз и подпис)

СТАНОВИЩЕ на комисията по външни работи (22.1.2008)

на вниманието на комисията по конституционни въпроси

относно Договора от Лисабон
(2007/2286(INI))

Докладчик по становище: Andrew Duff

ПРЕДЛОЖЕНИЯ

Комисията по външни работи приканва водещата комисия по конституционни въпроси да включи в предложението за резолюция, което ще приеме, следните предложения:

1.   отбелязва, че по отношение на външната дейност на Съюза, Договорът от Лисабон въвежда основни структурни изменения в сравнение с Договора за създаване на Конституция за Европа (2004 г.), като разграничава Дял V от Договора за Европейски съюз, съдържащ общите разпоредби относно външната дейност на Съюза, конкретни разпоредби относно Общата външна политика и политиката за сигурност (ОВППС) и разпоредби, касаещи общата политика за сигурност и отбрана (ЕПСО), от част пета от Договора за функционирането на Европейския съюз, съдържащ общи разпоредби относно външната дейност на Съюза, общата търговска политика, сътрудничеството с трети страни и хуманитарната помощ, ограничителни мерки, международни споразумения, отношения с международни организации и трети страни и делегации на ЕС, както и клаузата за солидарност;

2.   следователно изтъква, че двата изменени договора имат еднаква правна стойност, и съветва те винаги да бъдат тълкувани заедно в името на последователността и разбирането;

Същност

3.  отбелязва, че независимо от структурните различия в областта на външната политика и политиката на сигурност и отбрана, Договорът от Лисабон е сходен в своята същност с Договора за създаване на Конституция за Европа от 2004 г. и че, по-специално по отношение на международните отношения на Съюза, новият Договор представлява голям напредък по отношение на договореностите, които са в сила понастоящем;

4.   следователно горещо приветства новия Договор, който засилва авторитета на Съюза в международен аспект и повишава неговия капацитет да действа ефективно по световните въпроси; изтъква, че Договорът от Лисабон:

–    би разяснил компетенциите на Съюза и би дефинирал и увеличил обхвата на неговите ценности и цели, като: "в отношенията си с останалата част от света Съюзът утвърждава и насърчава своите ценности и интереси и допринася за защитата на своите граждани. Той допринася за мира, сигурността, устойчивото развитие на планетата, солидарността и взаимното уважение между народите, свободната и справедлива търговия, премахването на бедността и защитата на правата на човека и в частност, тези на детето, както и за стриктното спазване и развитието на международното право, а именно зачитането на принципите на устава на Обединените нации"[1]

–    би превърнал Хартата за основните права на ЕС в задължителна и би позволил на Съюза да се присъедини към Европейската конвенция за защита на правата на човека и основните свободи (ЕКЗПЧОС)[2];

–    би потвърдил, че критериите от Копенхаген трябва да се вземат предвид при бъдещите разширявания;

–    би осигурил ясна правна основа за политиката за добросъседство;

–    би утвърдил единна правосубектност за Съюза като цяло;

–    би задължил държавите-членки да се допитват една до друга и да проявяват взаимна солидарност;

–    би въвел скромен елемент на гласуване с квалифицирано мнозинство при вземане на решения от Съвета в областта на ОВППС, заедно с възможността за конструктивно въздържане[3];

–    би позволил допълнително разгръщане на гласуването с квалифицирано мнозинство в бъдеще (за решения, които са извън полето на отбраната), когато Европейският съвет единодушно вземе решение за това;

–    би улеснил засиленото сътрудничество (на поне девет държави-членки) в областта на ОВППС;

–    би създал длъжността постоянен председател на Европейския съвет, който ще поеме външното представителство на Съюза в ОВППС на своето равнище и в това си качество;

–    би създал значимата длъжност Върховен представител на Съюза по въпросите на външните работи и политиката на сигурност, който ще бъде заместник-председател на Европейската комисия, както и председател на Съвета на министрите на външните работи, и който ще ръководи ОПВВС и ЕПСО, ще допринася за развитие на политиката и ще гарантира последователността на външната дейност на Съюза;

–    би създал, със съгласието на Комисията и след консултация с Парламента, Европейска служба за външна дейност (EEAS), която да бъде в помощ на Върховния представител и която ще бъде съставена от Комисията, секретариата на Съвета и националните дипломатически служби;

–    би засилил бюджетните правомощия на Европейския парламент за всички разходи в ЕС, в това число Европейската служба за външна дейност, като постави наравно Парламента и Съвета;

–    би дал на Парламента правото на съвместно вземане на решения в областта на общата търговска политика;

–    би разширил прилагането на гласуването с квалифицирано мнозинство в правото на Съвета и Парламента на одобрение на всички международни споразумения, сключени от ЕС в области, за които се прилагат обикновените законодателни процедури или когато специалната законодателна процедура изисква одобрението на Парламента за вътрешните работи;

–    би предоставил нова правна основа за политиките или инструментите по отношение на неотложната финансова помощ за трети страни, хуманитарна помощ, санкции срещу недържавни образувания, политиката за космическото пространство, осигуряването но енергийните доставки, борбата срещу изменението на климата, предотвратяването на международния тероризъм и защитата на личните данни;

5.   приветства, наред с това, основната реформа на общата политика на сигурност и отбрана, която включва:

–    ангажиране на гражданския и военен капацитет на всички държави-членки[4] , в това число многонационалните сили, в ЕПСО, с възможност за предоставяне на пълномощия на група от държави-членки за изпълнение на задачите;

–    предвиждане на постоянно структурирано сътрудничество в областта на отбраната между тези държави-членки, които имат военен и политически капацитет, които се заемат с най-отговорните мисии;

–    ангажиране с прогресивното подобряване на военния капацитет;

–    увеличаване на ролята на Европейска агенция за отбрана;

–    задължение за държавите-членки да оказват помощ на друга нападната държава-членка (без да се накърнява неутралитета на определени държави-членки или членството в НАТО на други);

–    допълване на целите ( „Задачите от Петерсберг”), с цел те да включат борбата срещу тероризма;

–    наблягане върху взаимна солидарност в случай на терористична заплаха, нападение или природно бедствие;

6.   отбелязва със съжаление въпреки това, че някои държави-членки явно трябваше да положат усилия по време на МПК: а) за да направят строго разграничение между ОВВПС и ЕПСО от една страна, и други аспекти на външните дейности на Съюза, от друга; б) за да намалят практическите последици от решението, взето на теория, за разработване на общи политики и обединяване на ресурси в тази област; и в) за да извършат строго ограничаване на политическата роля на Комисията и Парламента и съдебната роля на Съда на Европейските Общности[5];

7.   изразява съжаление поради факта, че Обединеното кралство и Полша направиха опит да ограничат приложимостта на Хартата на основните права;

8.   изразява съжаление особено във връзка с член 25а от Договора за ЕС, който предвижда обработката на личните данни в областта на политиката на сигурността да се регулира от правила, установени единствено от Съвета без участието на Парламента или надзор от страна на съдилищата на ЕС;

9.   отбелязва в тази връзка Декларация № 13 на Междуправителствената конференция, в която ясно се заявява, че разпоредбите на ОВППС не засягат настоящите отговорности на държавите-членки при формулирането и провеждането на тяхната външна политика, нито тяхното национално представителство в трети страни и международни организации − особено основните отговорности на членовете на Съвета за сигурност на ООН;

10. отбелязва освен това Декларация № 14, в която се заявява, че ОВППС няма да засегне съществуващите правно основание, отговорности и правомощия на всяка държава-членка във връзка с нейната външна политика; изразява силно съжаление относно заявлението, което е едновременно неоснователно и подвеждащо, че новите разпоредби за ОВППС не предоставят нови правомощия на Комисията да инициира решения и не засилват ролята на Парламента;

11. отбелязва също така Декларация № 24, която се стреми да намали последиците от решението за повишаване на правния статут на Съюза в международното право;

Прилагане

12. отбелязва, че съгласно Декларация № 12 ще бъдат осъществени „подходящи контакти” с Парламента относно назначаването от Европейския съвет, със съгласието на председателя на Комисията, на първия Върховен представител, който ще встъпи в длъжност при очакваното влизане в сила на Договора, на 1 януари 2009 г.; настоява, че духът на член 9д от Договора за ЕС следва да бъде напълно приложен в случая на това временно назначаване (при което, съгласно член 9г, параграф 7 от Договора за ЕС, Парламентът по принцип би имал право на съгласие относно назначаването на цялата Комисия, включително на Върховния представител); следователно информира, че очаква да бъде изцяло консултиран относно това първо назначаване;

13. настоява върху необходимостта от условия за установяване на възможно най-тясно сътрудничество между председателя на Европейския съвет, председателя на Комисията и Върховния представител, и от взаимно зачитане на изпълняваните от тях различни функции;

14. приветства член 21 от Договора за ЕС, в който се предвижда, че Върховният представител ще „се консултира с Европейския парламент относно основните аспекти и основните решения” в областта на ОВППС и ЕПСО и да „го информира относно развитието на тези политики” и да гарантира, че възгледите на Парламента са надлежно взети под внимание; освен това се задължава да използва в пълна степен консултативните си правомощия и да разработи засилен и систематичен контрол при формулирането и прилагането на политиките и операциите на ЕС в областта на външната политика, сигурността и отбраната, като използва в пълна степен бюджетните си правомощия; отбелязва, наред с това, по-големите възможности за Парламента да осъществява демократичен контрол върху дейностите на Върховния представител в качеството му на заместник-председател на Комисията;

15. в тази връзка настоятелно призовава за това Междуинституционалното споразумение от 20 ноември 2002 г. относно достъпа на Европейския парламент до чувствителна информация на Съвета в областта на политиката на сигурност и отбрана да се преразгледа в светлината на новия Договор;

16. подчертава важността на това да се гарантира демократична отчетност и прозрачност на дейностите на Европейската агенция по отбрана;

17. в светлината на новия потенциал на ОВППС и ЕПСО, предоставен от Договора от Лисабон, желае да насърчи по-тясно сътрудничество между съответните комисии на Европейския парламент и на националните парламенти, включително парламентарни наблюдатели от страни членки на НАТО, които не членуват в ЕС, заедно с членове от Парламентарната асамблея на НАТО; освен това предлага разпускането на Парламентарната асамблея на Западноевропейския съюз при влизането в сила на Договора от Лисабон;

18. изразява съжаление относно ненужно сложните разпоредби, предвидени в член 28 от Договора за ЕС относно бързото финансиране на дейности в областта на ЕПСО извън бюджета на ЕС; настоява за пълното прилагане на Междуинституционалното споразумение относно бюджетната дисциплина и доброто финансово управление от 17 май 2006 г. и на предвидения в него структуриран диалог между Съвета и Парламента;

19. по отношение на създаването на Европейска служба за външна дейност:

–    отбелязва, че съгласно член 13а, параграф 3 от Договора за ЕС, Парламентът има право да бъде консултиран относно създаването на Европейска служба за външна дейност (EEAS) и припомня, че вече е в процес на изготвяне на доклад относно този въпрос;

–    отбелязва, че съгласно Декларация № 15, подготовката за създаване на Европейската служба за външна дейност трябва да започне веднага след подписването на Договора; призовава Съвета да включи Парламента в подготвителните дейности; също така призовава Съвета, Комисията и държавите-членки да внесат своите предложения най-късно до м. юли 2008 г.;

–    подчертава необходимостта Европейската служба за външна дейност да се превърне в професионална и постоянна дипломатическа служба, която е в състояние ефективно да допринася за постигането на целите на ЕС в областта на външната дейност и ефективно да подпомага работата на Върховния представител;

–    подчертава необходимостта Европейската служба за външна дейност да бъде органично свързана с Комисията, подобно на съществуващите делегации в областта на външната дейност, и да бъде финансирана от бюджета на ЕС;

–    припомня на Комисията, че Европейската служба за външна дейност може да се създаде единствено с нейно съгласие.

ПРОЦЕДУРА

Заглавие	Договор за изменение на Договора за Европейски съюз и Договора за създаване на Европейската общност
Позовавания	2008/2286(INI)
Водеща комисия	AFCO
Становище, изказано от                  Дата на обявяване в заседание	AFET 13.12.2007
Докладчик по становище                               Дата на назначаване	Andrew Duff 27.11.2007
Разглеждане в комисия	18.12.2007		22.1.2008
Дата на приемане	22.1.2008
Резултат от окончателното гласуване	+: –: 0:	41 5 2
Членове, присъствали на окончателното гласуване	Christopher Beazley, Bastiaan Belder, André Brie, Elmar Brok, Colm Burke, Michael Gahler, Jas Gawronski, Bronisław Geremek, Ana Maria Gomes, Alfred Gomolka, Klaus Hänsch, Richard Howitt, Jana Hybášková, Anna Ibrisagic, Jelko Kacin, Metin Kazak, Helmut Kuhne, Vytautas Landsbergis, Johannes Lebech, Emilio Menéndez del Valle, Francisco José Millán Mon, Pasqualina Napoletano, Raimon Obiols i Germà, Vural Öger, Cem Özdemir, Ioan Mircea Paşcu, Alojz Peterle, João de Deus Pinheiro, Mirosław Mariusz Piotrowski, Samuli Pohjamo, Michel Rocard, Raül Romeva i Rueda, Libor Rouček, José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, György Schöpflin, Marek Siwiec, István Szent-Iványi, Konrad Szymański, Charles Tannock, Inese Vaidere, Geoffrey Van Orden, Zbigniew Zaleski, Josef Zieleniec
Заместник(ци), присъствал(и) на окончателното гласуване	Irena Belohorská, Giulietto Chiesa, Andrew Duff, Árpád Duka-Zólyomi, Evgeni Kirilov, Jo Leinen, Peter Liese, Sarah Ludford, Nickolay Mladenov, Antolín Sánchez Presedo

• [1]  Член 2, параграф 5 от Договора за ЕС.
• [2]  За разлика от Договора за създаване на Конституция за Европа от 2004 г., споразумението за присъединяване към Европейската конвенция за защита на правата на човека и основните свободи сега ще се налага да бъде прието с единодушие.
• [3]  По отношение на ОВППС, гласуването с квалифицирано мнозинство в случаите на член 15б, параграф 2, член 28, параграф 3, член 28г, параграф 2 и член 28д, параграфи 2 и 3 от Договора за ЕС.
• [4]  С изключение на Дания.
• [5]  Съдът на Европейските общности има роля при наблюдението на разграничаването между въпроси , които се отнасят до ОВППС и такива, които не се отнасят до ОВППС (член 25б от Договора за ЕС), при разглеждането на законосъобразността на санкции (член 240а от Договора за функционирането на Европейския съюз) и при даването на становища относно съвместимостта на международни споразумения (член 188н от Договора за функционирането на Европейския съюз).

СТАНОВИЩЕ на комисията по развитие (15.1.2008)

на вниманието на комисията по конституционни въпроси

относно Договора от Лисабон
(2007/2286(INI))

Докладчик по становище: Thijs Berman

ПРЕДЛОЖЕНИЯ

Комисията по развитие приканва водещата комисия по конституционни въпроси да включи в предложението за резолюция, което ще приеме, следните предложения:

1.   Отбелязва, че в член 9 В, параграф 6, от Договора от Лисабон (новия договор) се посочва, че „Съветът по външни отношения разработва външната дейност на Съюза в съответствие със стратегическите насоки, определени от Европейския съвет, и осигурява съгласуваност в неговите действия”, и че в член 9 Д, параграф 4, се посочва, че заместник-председателят на Комисията / върховният представител на Съюза по въпросите на външните работи и политиката на сигурност „осигурява съгласуваност на външната дейност на Съюза”;

2.   Приветства факта, че в член 10 а, параграф 2, от новия договор, в глава V, дял I, сред целите на външната дейност на Съюза изрично се споменава „устойчивото развитие в икономическо и социално отношение, и в областта на опазването на околната среда, в развиващите се страни, с основна цел премахване на бедността”, както и подпомагането на „население, страни и региони, пострадали от природни или причинени от човека бедствия”;

3.   Приветства факта, че в Договора за функционирането на Европейския съюз (ДФЕС), част пета (Външна дейност на Съюза), дял III (Сътрудничество с трети страни и хуманитарна помощ), сътрудничеството за развитие се разглежда като самостоятелна област на политиката, на равна основа с другите области;

4.   Също така приветства факта, че в Договора за функционирането на Европейския съюз (ДФЕС) (член 188 Й) хуманитарната помощ се признава за пълноправна политика на Съюза, като има предвид, че Съюзът е сред водещите донори на хуманитарна помощ в света; отбелязва, че на основата на това признаване и след много плодотворен съвместен преглед на въпроса, на 18 декември 2007 г., трите институции приеха Европейски консенсус относно хуманитарната помощ;

5.   Приветства факта, че в ДФЕС (член 188 Г) като основна цел на политиката за развитие на Съюза се признава „намаляването и, в дългосрочен план, изкореняването на бедността“; настоява, че тази първостепенна цел трябва да бъде поставена в контекста на постигането на целите за развитие на хилядолетието, вследствие на ангажимента на международната общественост, поет по време на Срещата на хилядолетието на ООН, проведена през 2000 г.;

6.   Приветства факта, че новият договор съдържа задължителни разпоредби за защита правата на децата във вътрешните и външните цели на Европейския съюз;

7.   Приветства факта, че в ДФЕС (член 188 Г) се изисква политиката на Съюза и на държавите-членки в областта на сътрудничеството с цел развитие да „се допълват и подсилват взаимно“, като от държавите-членки и от Съюза се изисква да се стремят към по-висока степен на координация на донорите и по-добро разделение на труда, което ще допринесе за по-голяма ефективност на помощта;

8.   Изразява надежда, че това изискване за взаимно допълване на Съюза и държавите-членки ще внесе по-голяма яснота относно ролите на Комисията и на държавите-членки, за което се призовава в партньорския преглед на ОИСР / КПР от м. юни 2007 г., като същевременно ще доведе до силна обща политика за развитие, която ще бъде в състояние по-добре да координира политиките на отделните държави-членки и да избягва припокриването между държавите-членки и Комисията, като така ще се подобри ефективността на разходите и на помощта;

9.   Също така отбелязва, че по силата на член 188 Г от ДФЕС „Съюзът взема предвид целите на сътрудничеството за развитие при осъществяване на политиките, които биха могли да засегнат развиващите се страни“; подчертава, че само ако последователността на политиките за развитие бъде разглеждана като въпрос от първостепенна важност, Съюзът ще бъде в състояние да изпълни целите за развитие, както и да постигне ценностите на Европейския съюз, посочени в новия договор; подчертава, че средносрочният преглед през 2008 г. на Общата селскостопанска политика следва да доведе до конкретни и решителни стъпки за постигането на пълна съгласуваност с целите на политиката на ЕС за развитие, като например бързото поетапно премахване на всички субсидии, които нарушават търговията;

10. Настоява, че за да се гарантира последователност на политиките за развитие, на административно равнище съществува трайна нужда от конкретна Генерална дирекция „Развитие“, която да носи отговорност за определянето на политиката, предоставянето на политически консултации и управлението на политиката на ЕС, насочена към сътрудничество с цел развитие, и, на политическо ниво, от член на Европейската комисия, който да отговаря конкретно за политиката на ЕС за развитие във всички развиващи се страни и да бъде в състояние да насърчава интересите на политиката на ЕС за развитие в рамките на Колегиума на членовете на Европейската комисия, както и по отношение на Съвета;

11. Приканва Комисията да коригира съществуващите несъответствия в структурата и компетенциите на своите генерални дирекции, както по отношение на политиките, така и по отношение на бюджета; призовава Генерална дирекция „Развитие“ да отговаря изцяло за сътрудничеството с цел развитие на ЕС, включително за сътрудничеството с развиващи се страни, които не са част от АКТБ, както и за включването на „EuropeAid“ в рамките на Генерална дирекция „Развитие“;

12. Призовава Комисията и Съвета, имайки предвид, че голяма част от настоящите и бъдещите външни отношения на ЕС са свързани със сътрудничеството за развитие, да гарантират, че специалистите в областта на развитието от Генерална дирекция „Развитие“ и министерствата на държавите-членки са адекватно представени както в процеса по създаване на проекта за службата за външна дейност, така и в самата служба;

13. Приветства разширяването на обхвата на обикновената законодателна процедура (съвместно вземане на решения), като подчертава, че това трябва да означава, че Парламентът ще се ползва с действително и ефективно право на демократичен контрол над всички аспекти на политиката на Съюза в областта на сътрудничеството с цел развитие;

14. Подчертава, че Парламентът трябва да се структурира и организира по възможно най-ефикасен начин, така че да бъде в състояние да упражнява ефективен контрол над прилагането на законодателството, което въвежда в сила разпоредбите на новия договор;

15. Изразява съжаление, че както Съветът, така и Комисията в миналото са проявявали нежелание да признаят правата на Парламента за упражняване на пълен контрол; приветства въведените неотдавна подобрения, в резултат на междуинституционалното споразумение относно комитологията, като първа стъпка в тази посока;

16. Призовава, в това отношение, за разширяване на областите, спрямо които е приложима процедурата по регулиране с контрол;

17. Приветства заличаването в новия договор на член 179, параграф 3, от Договора за създаване на Европейската общност, който изключва Европейския фонд за развитие (ЕФР) от приложното поле на този договор, като отбелязва, че това открива пътя пред включването на ЕФР в бюджета на Съюза, без да е необходимо преразглеждане на договора; призовава Съвета и Комисията да включат ЕФР в бюджета на Съюза по време на средносрочния преглед през 2008/2009 г., като това ще повиши демократичната легитимност на важна част от политиката на ЕС за развитие и нейния бюджет.

РЕЗУЛТАТ ОТ ОКОНЧАТЕЛНОТО ГЛАСУВАНЕ В КОМИСИЯ

Дата на приемане	14.1.2008
Резултат от окончателното гласуване	+: –: 0:	25 0 0
Членове, присъствали на окончателното гласуване	Margrete Auken, Alessandro Battilocchio, Thijs Berman, Josep Borrell Fontelles, Danutė Budreikaitė, Marie-Arlette Carlotti, Thierry Cornillet, Corina Creţu, Beniamino Donnici, Alain Hutchinson, Romana Jordan Cizelj, Madeleine Jouye de Grandmaison, Filip Kaczmarek, Glenys Kinnock, Maria Martens, Gay Mitchell, José Javier Pomés Ruiz, Frithjof Schmidt, Jürgen Schröder, Johan Van Hecke, Anna Záborská
Заместник(ци), присъствал(и) на окончателното гласуване	Fiona Hall, Manolis Mavrommatis
Заместник(ци) (чл. 178, пар. 2), присъствал(и) на окончателното гласуване	Colm Burke, Michael Gahler

СТАНОВИЩЕ на комисията по международна търговия (14.1.2008)

на вниманието на комисията по конституционни въпроси

относно Договора от Лисабон
(2007/2286(INI))

Докладчик по становище: Carlos Carnero González

ПРЕДЛОЖЕНИЯ

Комисията по международна търговия приканва водещата комисия по конституционни въпроси да включи в предложението за резолюция, което ще приеме, следните предложения:

1.   счита, че в сравнение със съществуващите договори Договорът от Лисабон представлява значителна крачка напред към Обща търговска политика (ОТП);

2.   изтъква, че двата изменени договора имат една и съща правна стойност и подчертава, че в интерес на последователността, ефикасността, прозрачността и демокрацията те следва винаги да се тълкуват по един и същи начин;

3.   приветства обстоятелството, че Договорът от Лисабон поддържа подобренията, направени в Проекта на договор за създаване на Конституция за Европа по отношение на разпоредбите, свързани с Общата търговска политика, и в частност следното:

а)   признаването на Общата търговска политика като изключителна компетентност на ЕС, което означава пълно и сравнимо участие на всички институции на ЕС във вземането на решения по нея;

б)   разширяването на обхвата на Общата търговска политика до търговията с услуги и всички области, свързани с търговията, включително търговските аспекти на интелектуалната собственост и преките чуждестранни инвестиции;

в)   признаването на намаляването на бариерите (различни от митническите бариери) като една от целите на Общата търговска политика (член 188б от Договора от Лисабон/член 131 от Договора за ЕО);

г)    прилагането на обикновената законодателна процедура (т.е. гласуване с квалифицирано мнозинство и съвместно вземане на решения с Парламента) за законодателни актове, свързани с Общата търговска политика;

д)   откритите заседания на Съвета при разискване и приемане на законодателство на ЕС и по-конкретно на законодателство, свързано с Общата търговска политика;

е)   обстоятелството, че поради прилагането на обикновената законодателна процедура сега съгласието на Парламента става задължително като общо правило за всички сключени споразумения по Общата търговска политика, независимо дали се изискват или не мерки за изпълнение;

ж)  прилагането на процедура на одобрение преди ратифицирането на споразумения, отнасящи се предимно до външната търговия.

4.     приветства факта, че що се отнася до преговорите и сключването на международни договори в рамките на Общата търговска политика, Договорът от Лисабон предвижда Комисията да има правно задължение да информира Парламента относно напредъка на преговорите наравно със специалния Комитет по член 188н от Договора от Лисабон (член 133 от Договора за ЕО) на Съвета;

5.     изрично осъжда факта, че Договорът от Лисабон не дава на Парламента правото да одобрява мандата на Комисията за договаряне на търговски споразумения и подчертава дисбаланса - по отношение на ролята и правомощията на Парламента - между вътрешните и външните компетенции в рамките на Общата търговска политика;

6.     следователно призовава Комисията да включва далновидни социални и екологични клаузи и стандарти в двустранните и регионални търговски споразумения; и подчертава, че споразуменията за свободна търговия следва да се подписват само при наличие на споразумение за партньорство и сътрудничество;

7.     приветства категоричното изискване Общата търговска политика да служи на принципите и целите на външната дейност на ЕС, наред с другото на опазването на неговите основни интереси, подкрепата за демокрацията и принципа на правовата държава, насърчаването на устойчивото развитие;

8.     приветства създаването на поста „под двойна шапка“ на Върховен представител на Съюза по въпросите на външните работи и политиката на сигурност, който гарантира последователността и съгласуваността на цялата външна дейност на Съюза; счита, че следването на целите на търговската политика допринася за глобалната взаимозависимост, международната стабилност и сигурност;

9.     отбелязва в това отношение, че външната дейност на Съюза обхваща също така и Общата търговска политика, и че Върховният представител следва да осигури не само подходящия баланс между междуправителствения характер на Общата външна политика и политика на сигурност и наднационалния характер на Общата търговска политика, но също така да гарантира, че междуправителственият характер на Общата външна политика и политика на сигурност няма да окаже влияние върху Общата търговска политика;

10.    отбелязва, че договарянето и сключването на споразумения в областта на преките чуждестранни инвестиции, услугите и търговските аспекти на интелектуалната собственост подлежат на същите изисквания за гласуване, както и вътрешното законодателство; отбелязва също изискването за единодушие, при определени условия, по отношение на услугите в сферата на културата, както и аудиовизуалните, социалните, образователните и здравните услуги, които вече няма да бъдат области на смесена компетентност;

11.   призовава Европейския съвет, Съвета и Комисията да разгледат възможността за договаряне на ново Междуинституционално споразумение, което да предостави на Парламента същностно определение на неговата роля и участието му във всеки етап, който води до сключване на международно споразумение;

12.   призовава Комисията да предостави на Парламента цялата информация по отношение на Общата търговска политика и преговорите във връзка с търговски споразумения или договарянето на тези части от други споразумения, които са свързани с търговията, в това число всички предложения и проектопредложения за договаряне на мандати и/или директиви, като предостави достатъчно време на Европейския парламент, както и на националните парламенти да изразят своите становища, и на Комисията, която надлежно да вземе предвид тези становища;

13.    призовава Комисията, с оглед на прозрачността на дейността на Комитета по член 188н от Договора от Лисабон (член 133 от Договора за ЕО), да предостави на разположение на комисията по международна търговия на Европейския парламент цялата документация;

14.    призовава Комисията, в бъдещото законодателство по отношение на прилагането на търговската политика, да се въздържи от това да прави промени в съдържанието на основните законодателни актове или уточнения, които оказват влияние върху политическата воля, изразена в тях; следователно подчертава, че ролята на Парламента в областта на Общата търговска политика е много важна за гарантирането на демократичната легитимност и отчетност;

15.    призовава Съвета да предостави на Парламента дневния ред на Съвета по външни отношения; и изисква представителите на Парламента да имат пълноправно участие във всички заседания на КОРЕПЕР II, на които се разискват въпроси, попадащи в обхвата на обикновената законодателна процедура;

16.    призовава бъдещия Върховен представител на Съюза по въпросите на външните работи и политиката на сигурност и заместник-председател на Комисията да разгледа съвместно с Парламента подходящи начини за цялостно информиране и консултиране с Парламента относно външната дейност на Съюза.

РЕЗУЛТАТ ОТ ОКОНЧАТЕЛНОТО ГЛАСУВАНЕ В КОМИСИЯ

Дата на приемане	14.01.2008 г.
Резултат от окончателното гласуване	+: –: 0:	13 1 0
Членове, присъствали на окончателното гласуване	Francisco Assis; Carlos Carnero González; Françoise Castex; Christofer Fjellner; Ignasi Guardans Cambó, Helmuth Markov; David Martin; Georgios Papastamkos; Tokia Saïfi; Iuliu Winkler; Corien Wortmann-Kool
Заместник(ци), присъствал(и) на окончателното гласуване	Harlem Désir, Pia Elda Locatelli, Carl Schlyter
Заместник(ци) (чл. 178, пар. 2), присъствал(и) на окончателното гласуване

СТАНОВИЩЕ на комисията по бюджети (23.1.2008)

на вниманието на комисията по конституционни въпроси

относно Договора от Лисабон
(2007/2286(INI))

Докладчик по становище: Costas Botopoulos

ПРЕДЛОЖЕНИЯ

Комисията по бюджети приканва водещата комисия по конституционни въпроси да включи в предложението за резолюция, което ще приеме, следните предложения:

1.   посочва, че с Договора от Лисабон се въвеждат три съществени изменения в бюджетната и финансовата сфера:

а)   придава се правнообвързваща сила на Многогодишната финансова рамка (МФР), която се разглежда специално в Договора, който определя нейния срок като не по-кратък от пет години; от съществено значение е и фактът, че Парламентът получава по закон правото на одобрение на МФР, дори и формално да не може да определя разпоредбите на МФР, необходими за гладкото протичане на годишната бюджетна процедура, какъвто е случаят сега с Междуинституционалното споразумение относно бюджетната дисциплина и доброто финансово управление,

б)   отменя се сегашното разграничение в бюджетната процедура между „задължителни“ и „незадължителни“ разходи, като се гарантира пълна равнопоставеност между Парламента и Съвета,

в)   въвежда се нова и опростена бюджетна процедура, предвиждаща едно единствено четене, последвано от свикване на помирителен комитет, чиято цел е постигане – в рамките на един кратък срок от двадесет и един дни - на съгласие между Парламента и Съвета, което подлежи на одобрение от двете направления на бюджетния орган, като Парламентът има право на окончателно одобрение на бюджета, ако постигнатото съгласие бъде отхвърлено от Съвета,

г)    институциите на ЕС формално се задължават да гарантират бюджетната дисциплина, когато приемат какъвто и да било акт с възможни значителни последствия за бюджета,

д)   предвижда се прилагане на процедурата по съвместно вземане на решения при приемането на Финансовия регламент и правилата за неговото изпълнение;

2.   приветства гореспоменатите изменения като допринасящи за една по-голяма демократичност и рационалност на бюджетната процедура като цяло и отбелязва също така, че те ще доведат до установяването на съвсем нови взаимоотношения между двете направления на бюджетния орган;

3.   изразява съжаление относно факта, че ролята на Парламента по отношение на системата на собствените ресурси на EС не е разширена; счита, че изискването за одобрение от страна на Парламента на съответните мерки за изпълнение, които се приемат от Съвета с квалифицирано мнозинство, би могло да представлява напредък към една по-демократична и ефективна процедура, имайки предвид обаче, че обхватът на мерките за изпълнение е ограничен до обхвата, определен в решението относно собствените ресурси;

4.   препоръчва Междуинституционалното споразумение от 17 май 2006 г. относно бюджетната дисциплина и доброто финансово управление да бъде изменено в съответствие с новата бюджетна процедура, както е предвидено в точка 4 от споразумението;

5.   възнамерява да изготви доклад по собствена инициатива относно новата бюджетна процедура, в който да направи задълбочен анализ и реална оценка на въздействието й върху вътрешната организация на Парламента и да защити бюджетните си прерогативи на междуинституционално ниво; счита, че след приемането на този доклад, водещата комисия ще бъде в състояние да предложи необходимите изменения на Правилника за дейността на ЕП, включително и на Приложение ІV, като вземе предвид всички последствия, произтичащи от приемането на Договора и въздействието му върху реформата на Парламента;

6.   счита, че оценката на бюджетните и финансови последствия от Договора от Лисабон следва да бъде също така една възможност за Парламента да даде своя принос в текущия дебат за прегледа на бюджета на ЕС.

РЕЗУЛТАТ ОТ ОКОНЧАТЕЛНОТО ГЛАСУВАНЕ В КОМИСИЯ

Дата на приемане	23.1.2008
Резултат от окончателното гласуване	+: –: 0:	28
Членове, присъствали на окончателното гласуване	Reimer Böge, Konstantinos Botopoulos, Simon Busuttil, Daniel Daianu, Gérard Deprez, Brigitte Douay, Hynek Fajmon, Ingeborg Gräßle, Catherine Guy-Quint, Jutta Haug, Monica Maria Iacob-Ridzi, Anne E. Jensen, Wiesław Stefan Kuc, Janusz Lewandowski, Vladimír Maňka, Jan Mulder, Catalin Nechifor, Gérard Onesta, Margaritis Schinas, Nina Škottová, Theodor Stolojan, László Surján, Gary Titley, Kyösti Virrankoski, Ralf Walter
Заместник(ци), присъствал(и) на окончателното гласуване	Thijs Berman, Esther De Lange, Hans-Peter Martin
Заместник(ци) (чл. 178, пар. 2), присъствал(и) на окончателното гласуване

СТАНОВИЩЕ на комисията по промишленост, изследвания и енергетика (19.12.2007)

на вниманието на комисията по конституционни въпроси

относно Договора от Лисабон
(2007/2286(INI))

Докладчик по становище: Ján Hudacký

ПРЕДЛОЖЕНИЯ

Комисията по промишленост, изследвания и енергетика приканва водещата комисия по конституционни въпроси да включи в предложението за резолюция, което ще приеме, следните предложения:

Общи

1.  отново изразява дългогодишната си позиция, че следва да се състави консолидиран текст на Договорите, след като настоящият Договор за реформа бъде ратифициран от държавите-членки;

2.  счита, че Протокол № 6 относно вътрешния пазар и конкуренцията следва да се прилага предпазливо и че разпоредбата на Договора „Съюзът, при необходимост, предприема действия съгласно разпоредбите на Договорите“ следва да се изясни чрез позоваване на останалите разпоредби на Договорите и на достиженията на правото на Общността;

Промишленост

3.  счита, че в областта на промишлеността измененията на действащите разпоредби на Договора за ЕО няма да навредят на съществуващата структура на стопанските интереси и инвестиционните решения, защото:

а)  промишлеността попада в кръга на компетентността на ЕС за подпомагане, координиране или допълване на действията на държавите-членки, докато определянето и насърчаването на промишлената политика е от компетентността на държавите-членки,

б) с цел развитие на промишления сектор се определят насоки на равнище на Общността, наред с общи показатели и способи за периодична оценка и наблюдение на промишлените политики и се насърчава обменът на добри практики между държавите-членки,

в)   разпоредбата „изключение на всякакво хармонизиране на законовите и подзаконовите разпоредби на държавите-членки“ не означава непременно край на общия подход по отношение на промишлеността,

г)    Европейският парламент оценява ангажираността на Европейския съюз за засилване на икономическото, социалното и териториалното му сближаване чрез особеното внимание, отделяно на селските региони и регионите, засегнати от промишлен преход;

д)   Европейският парламент вече няма да участва в процеса на вземане на решения в случаите, когато се счита, че са необходими координирани действия; Парламентът само ще бъде информиран.

Научноизследователска и развойна дейност

4.  отбелязва, че изменените членове 163, 165 и 166 от Договора за ЕО следва да бъдат разглеждани като подобрения, защото укрепват научната и технологичната основа чрез създаването на Европейско научноизследователско пространство, в което изследователи, научни познания и технологии се движат свободно, което дава възможност за свободно презгранично сътрудничество между изследователите, като същевременно насърчава конкурентоспособността на Съюза, особено в областта на промишлеността;

5.  отбелязва два потенциално спорни въпроса между Европейския парламент и Съвета, при което последният е подкрепян от Комисията:

а)   международните споразумения вече няма да се уреждат по обичайната процедура по член 300;

б)   запазването на членове 171 и 172 ще означава продължаване на процедурата на консултация при създаване на агенции, като по този начин се ограничава прерогативът на Парламента за пълноправно участие в създаването на агенции.

Космическо пространство

6.  изразява задоволството си от факта, че в раздела за научни изследвания и технологично развитие се добавя разпоредба относно Европейската политика за космическото пространство и в резултат на това в Договора се признава обстоятелството, че космическото пространство е също толкова важно, колкото научноизследователската и развойна дейност;

7.  приветства предоставената на Парламента и на Съвета възможност за предприемане, в рамките на процедурата на съвместно вземане на решения, на необходимите мерки, които могат да придобият формата на Европейска космическа програма; въпреки това, счита, че „изключение на всякакво хармонизиране на законовите и подзаконовите разпоредби на държавите-членки“ може да доведе до някои пречки за осъществяването на обща Европейска политика за космическото пространство;

8.  приветства също разпоредбата относно установяване на целесъобразни отношения, по-специално с Европейската космическа агенция;

Енергетика

9.  приветства обстоятелството, че занапред на енергетиката ще бъде посветена отделна глава в Договора и по този начин ще е налице правно основание в контекста на вътрешния пазар, като в същото време ще се обърне внимание на функционирането на енергийния пазар, сигурността на енергийните доставки, енергийната ефикасност и икономията на енергия, развитието на нови и възобновяеми енергийни източници, както и взаимовръзките между енергийните мрежи;

10. изразява задоволството и подкрепата си за клаузата за солидарност, която следва да се прилага, „ако възникнат сериозни трудности в доставките на определени продукти, особено в областта на енергетиката“;

11. подчертава, че макар че в бъдеще най-често ще се прилага обикновената законодателна процедура (понастоящем съвместно вземане на решения), решенията относно енергийния микс ще останат в кръга на компетентност на държавите-членки, а за фискалните мерки в тази област ще продължи да е необходимо провеждане на консултация с Парламента и единодушие в Съвета;

Договор за Европейска общност за атомна енергия

12. счита, че въпреки своите несъвършенства Договорът за Евратом за момента остава необходима правна рамка и в него не са внесени никакви по-специални промени чрез настоящия Договор за реформа; счита, въпреки това, че Протокол № 12 към Договора за реформа относно Договора за Евратом прави текста неясен и много сложен поради многобройните кръстосани позовавания и отмяната на определени членове от Договора за Евратом;

13. отбелязва, че Договорът за Евратом ще продължи да има пълно юридическо действие; обръща внимание на Протокол № 12, с който се прави опит за адаптиране на Договора за Евратом с цел отчитане на общите разпоредби, посочени в останалите договори, като например институционални и финансови разпоредби; следователно отново посочва необходимостта от консолидиран текст на Договора за Евратом;

Научноизследователски фонд за въглища и стомана

14. обръща внимание на Комисията на факта, че Протокол № 11 относно Научноизследователския фонд за въглища и стомана въвежда процедурни разпоредби, които няма да засилят участието на Европейския парламент в процеса на вземане на решения, като запазват процедурата на консултация в един сектор - научни изследвания и технологично развитие, в който Парламентът е съзаконодател, независимо от последиците от този фонд за бюджета.

РЕЗУЛТАТ ОТ ОКОНЧАТЕЛНОТО ГЛАСУВАНЕ В КОМИСИЯ

Дата на приемане	19.12.2007
Резултат от окончателното гласуване	+: –: 0:	42 5 0
Членове, присъствали на окончателното гласуване	Šarūnas Birutis, Jan Březina, Renato Brunetta, Jerzy Buzek, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Jorgo Chatzimarkakis, Giles Chichester, Dragoş Florin David, Den Dover, Lena Ek, Nicole Fontaine, Adam Gierek, Norbert Glante, Umberto Guidoni, Fiona Hall, David Hammerstein, Rebecca Harms, Mary Honeyball, Ján Hudacký, Romana Jordan Cizelj, Anne Laperrouze, Romano Maria La Russa, Pia Elda Locatelli, Angelika Niebler, Reino Paasilinna, Atanas Paparizov, Anni Podimata, Miloslav Ransdorf, Vladimír Remek, Herbert Reul, Mechtild Rothe, Paul Rübig, Andres Tarand, Britta Thomsen, Catherine Trautmann, Claude Turmes, Nikolaos Vakalis, Alejo Vidal-Quadras, Dominique Vlasto
Заместник(ци), присъствал(и) на окончателното гласуване	Danutė Budreikaitė, Joan Calabuig Rull, Edit Herczog, Lambert van Nistelrooij, Pierre Pribetich, Dirk Sterckx, Silvia-Adriana Ţicău, Vladimir Urutchev
Заместник(ци) (чл. 178, пар. 2), присъствал(и) на окончателното гласуване

СТАНОВИЩЕ на комисията по граждански свободи, правосъдие и вътрешни работи (18.12.2007)

на вниманието на комисията по конституционни въпроси

относно Договора от Лисабон
(2007/2286(INI))

Докладчик по становище: Jean-Marie Cavada

ПРЕДЛОЖЕНИЯ

Комисията по граждански свободи, правосъдие и вътрешни работи приканва водещата комисия по конституционни въпроси да включи в предложението за резолюция, което ще приеме, следните предложения:

Новият договор: дългоочакван изход от правна и институционална шизофрения в политиките, свързани с пространството на свобода, сигурност и правосъдие

1.   Приветства следните общи подобрения, които внася новият договор по отношение на политиките, свързани с пространството на свобода, сигурност и правосъдие:

а)   превръщане на отношението между основните права, посочени в Хартата за основните права на Европейския съюз, и свързаните политики на ЕС, които са необходими за гарантиране на тяхната защита и насърчаване, в юридически последователно, обвързващо и прозрачно отношение на договорно равнище. Посредством една задължителна за спазване харта законодателят в ЕС сега ще може по-последователно да провежда всички политики, които биха могли да засягат основните права на физическите лица. Това няма да се отнася само за политиките, които са изрично свързани с пространството на свобода, сигурност и правосъдие като правото на убежище или правото на справедлив съдебен процес, но и за по-общите политики, свързани със закрилата на човешкото достойнство срещу всякакви форми на дискриминация, закрилата на малцинствата, правото на прозрачност и добро управление на европейско равнище, социалните права и правото на защита на данните. Присъединяването към Европейската конвенция за правата на човека допълнително ще засили това отношение и чрез задължаване на институциите на ЕС да отговарят пред Европейския съд по правата на човека;

б)   прекратяване на шизофреничното институционално и правно положение, създадено преди петнадесет години с Договора от Маастрихт, с който се въведе паралелен временен правен режим за политиките в областта на правосъдието и вътрешните работи (т. нар. „трети стълб“). Чрез възстановяването на пълната компетентност на Съда на Европейските общности ще бъде възстановен принципът на правовата държава в области, в които този принцип все още не се прилага, а чрез приобщаването на Европейския парламент в процеса на съвместно вземане на решения значително ще се подобри демократичната легитимност на тези политики;

в)   засилване на демократичната отчетност на ЕС чрез разширяване на приложното поле на процедурата на съвместно вземане на решения („обичайна законодателна процедура“), която да се прилага по отношение на мерки в областта на полицейското и съдебно сътрудничество по наказателни дела. Следва да се приветства и обстоятелството, че ще се изисква съгласието на Парламента, когато Съветът пожелае да установи минимални норми относно „други“ специфични аспекти на наказателното производство и относно създаване от Евроюст на европейска прокуратура, и да разшири правомощията на европейския прокурор;

г)    приобщаване на Европейския парламент към сключването на международни договори от страна на ЕС. До този момент, въпреки че член 21 от Договора за ЕС предвижда допитване до Европейския парламент, Съветът никога не се е допитвал до Парламента, дори когато договорът, предмет на преговори, очевидно представлява „главен аспект на Общата външна политика и политиката на сигурност“ (както в случая със Споразумението между ЕС и САЩ за екстрадиция и правна взаимопомощ)

д)   премахване в няколко случая на принципа на единодушие в Съвета. Квалифицираното мнозинство ще улесни преговорите в институциите на ЕС и ще доведе до приемането на по-високи стандарти за защита на основните права (за разлика от това, принципът на единодушие благоприятства приемането на минимален общ знаменател и в някои случаи поставя въпроси по отношение на добавената стойност на законодателството на ЕС).

Чрез равняване на процедурите, свързани с гласуването с квалифицирано мнозинство и съвместно вземане на решения, новият договор ще улесни приемането, в последователна политическа рамка, на мерки, които понастоящем спадат отчасти към изискването за единодушие, отчасти към изискването за квалифицирано мнозинство (каквото е понастоящем положението по отношение на законната и незаконната миграция);

е)   хармонизиране на законодателните актове. Вместо „общи позиции“, „рамкови решения“, „решения“ и „конвенции“, както е посочено понастоящем в член 34 от Договора за ЕС, Европейският съюз ще приема обичайните общностни актове, регламенти, директиви и решения, уредени от общностното право, което ще доведе до друга важна промяна, а именно възможността за пряко действие на тези законодателни актове;

ж)  подобряване на прозрачността и отчетността в отношенията между институциите на ЕС и отделните граждани, гражданското общество, политическите партии и националните парламенти. В тази връзка изключително благотворен е фактът, че по отношение на политиките, свързани с пространството на свобода, сигурност и правосъдие, е установен специфичен режим, чрез който Комисията, правителствата на държавите-членки, Европейският парламент и националните парламенти ще участват в оценката на въздействието на тези политики в рамките на ЕС. По отношение на доброто управление в рамките на ЕС, Парламентът призовава Комисията и Съвета да ускорят разискванията относно практическото прилагане на плана за въвеждане на „европейски прокурор“ като главно предварително условие за осъществяване на целите, определени в първото изречение от настоящата буква.

2.   Изразява съжаление, че цената, която трябваше да бъде заплатена за тези подобрения, е:

а)   Според член 10 от Протокола относно преходните разпоредби към Договора, в срок от пет години след влизането в сила на новия договор, мерките, приети съгласно режима на третия стълб, ще останат извън контрола на Комисията и още повече на Съда на ЕО. Трудно е да се разбере защо държавите-членки са решили да продължат за такъв дълъг срок съществуването на положение, което самите те признават за несъвършено от правна гледна точка. Въпросът е как да се сведе до минимум отрицателното въздействие за гражданите на ЕС:

-  първият отговор на този въпрос се съдържа в гореспоменатия протокол, който предвижда, че при изменение на акт преходният период вече не се отнася до изменения акт. Сега институциите следва да решат дали може би не е по-добре незабавно след влизането в сила на новия договор да изменят някои от съществувалите преди това по-незадоволителни мерки по трети стълб;

-  последващо решение би могло да бъде да се отложи до периода между 1 януари и м. май 2009 г. официалното приемане на мерките, които понастоящем се основават на третия стълб и които може да засегнат основните права на гражданите. Гражданите на ЕС лесно ще проявят разбиране по повод на няколкомесечно забавяне, ако ще могат да се позовават на новите правила пред институциите на европейската съдебна система;

б)   въвеждат се в известна степен сложни нови разпоредби за обслужване на положение, при което държава-членка счита, че проект на директива би могъл да засегне основни аспекти на нейната наказателна правораздавателна система или когато не е възможно да се постигне единодушие (полицейско сътрудничество). При тези обстоятелства, въпросната държава-членка може да поиска проектът на директива да бъде представен за разглеждане от Европейския съвет. Първият мотив е напълно разбираем и дори основателен, като това би могло да се отнася и за други случаи, при които държава-членка е изправена пред риска съществено да понижи степента на защита на основните правата; вторият е по-скоро проблем на равновесие на сили.

      В тези случаи „обичайната“ законодателна процедура се спира за срок от четири месеца. В случай на несъгласие и ако най-малко девет държави-членки желаят да установят засилено сътрудничество въз основа на съответния проект на директива, ще се счита, че е дадено разрешение за установяване на засилено сътрудничество на тази основа (и по този начин няма да е необходимо съгласието на Парламента съгласно член 280 от Договора за ЕО). Въпреки това, когато се прилага обичайната процедура, е важно да се подчертае, че приемането на самата мярка все пак ще изисква съвместно вземане на решение с участието на Парламента;

в)   системата на изразяване на желание и нежелание за участие ще стане още по-сложна. Макар че новите разпоредби относно засиленото сътрудничество няма да се прилагат по отношение на мерки, които надграждат достиженията на правото от Шенген, Шенгенският режим ще бъде изменен (вж. по-долу). Освен това, другите възможности за изразяване на нежелание за участие, прилагани за мерки, които не са свързани с достиженията на правото от Шенген, като например съдебното сътрудничество по граждански дела, ще бъдат разширени и ще се прилагат по отношение на полицейското и съдебно сътрудничество (вж. измененията към протоколите от Шенген и позицията на Обединеното кралство, Ирландия и Дания);

г)    по отношение на особеното положение на Обединеното кралство и Ирландия, трябва да се припомни, че не беше извършено официално допитване до Парламента при вземането на решение през 2000 г. и 2001 г. за отделен режим за тези страни в рамките на Шенгенския режим. Понастоящем, по отношение на мерките, за които Обединеното кралство е изразило желание за участие в достиженията на правото от Шенген, то трябва да участва, а по отношение на мерките, за които е изразило нежелание за участие, не може да участва. Измененията в протокола от Шенген няма да променят това положение, а ще добавят възможност Обединеното кралство и Ирландия да откажат да участват в мярка, надграждаща достиженията на правото от Шенген, по отношение на която вече са изразили желание за участие.

      Това има вероятност да предизвика допълнително раздробяване на правилата. Няма да се извършва допитване до Парламента по отношение на участието в определена мярка и последиците за достиженията на правото от Шенген. Въпреки това, ще е необходимо фактическата мярка да бъде приета чрез съвместно вземане на решение, когато се прилага процедура по съвместно вземане на решение;

д)   освен това, Обединеното кралство и Ирландия ще могат да не участват в предложения за изменение на мерки по дял ІV, по отношение на които преди това са изразили желание за участие, и няма да са длъжни да спазват новите правила за защита на данните, приети въз основа на новата разпоредба на договора, по силата на която Обединеното кралство и Ирландия са освободени от задължение да спазват материално правните норми относно полицейското и съдебно сътрудничество по наказателни дела.

3.   Счита, че подобренията, които внася новият договор, надделяват над слабостите му. Институциите на ЕС сега следва да положат максимални усилия, за да осигурят успешното ратифициране на новия Договор от държавите-членки. Те следва също:

а)   да информират гражданите на ЕС за новите им права и за новата правна уредба в ЕС, и по същата причина да приканят държавите-членки да започнат провеждането на широкообхватни кампании за осведомяване и да въведат специфично професионално обучение за служителите в националните съдебни системи и служби за сигурност с цел предотвратяване на всякаква незаконна дискриминация между европейски граждани,

б)   да приобщят националните парламенти при определянето на следващата многогодишна програма относно пространството на свобода, сигурност и правосъдие; това приобщаване би могло най-целесъобразно да се осъществи чрез:

-  неофициални форуми (като групата „Бъдеще“, която ще заседава периодично по време на четирите председателства на Съвета през 2008 г. и 2009 г.)

-  официалното, редовно и своевременно предаване на всички подготвителни законодателни текстове от първоначалното законодателно предложение нататък, с цел избягване на дискриминация между членове на национални парламенти и между европейски граждани;

в)   да проведат през 2008 г. преговорите за приемане в началото на 2009 г. на всички необходими мерки, нужни за успешното започване на новото пространство на свобода, сигурност и правосъдие от новоизбрания Парламент от 2010 г. нататък; предвид националните и/или парламентарни резерви, изразени по отношение на редица законодателни процедури, приканва Комисията и Съвета да преразгледат, от перспективата на новите правни основания, въведени с Договора от Лисабон, и като се извърши преценка на политическия дебат, следните законодателни текстове:

Общи права

- Рамково решение относно процесуалните права (2004/0113(CNS))

- Рамково решение относно защитата на данни за целите на сигурността (подлежи на включване в преразглеждането на Директива 95/46/ЕО)(2005/0202(CNS)) (парламентарни резерви от Кралство Дания, Ирландия, Кралство Нидерландия, Кралство Швеция и Обединеното кралство).

Съдебно сътрудничество

- Рамково решение относно расизма и ксенофобията (2007/2067(CNS)) (парламентарни резерви от Кралство Швеция, Кралство Нидерландия, Кралство Дания, Ирландия и Република Латвия)

- Рамково решение относно „задочните“ решения (предстои да бъде представено)

- Рамково решение относно европейската заповед за даване на свидетелски показания (2003/0270(CNS)) (парламентарни резерви от Кралство Швеция и Кралство Дания)

- Рамково решение относно взаимното признаване на присъди (2005/0018(CNS)) (парламентарни резерви от Кралство Швеция, Кралство Нидерландия и Ирландия)

- Рамково решение относно заповедите за надзор при предварителни съдебни производства (2006/0158(CNS))

- Рамково решение относно обмяната на сведения, извлечени от криминални досиета (2005/0267(CNS)) (парламентарни резерви от Кралство Швеция, Република Финландия, Кралство Нидерландия, Ирландия, Република Гърция и Кралство Дания)

- Рамково решение относно Евроюст (предстои да бъде представено).

Полицейско сътрудничество

- Рамково решение относно борбата срещу организираната престъпност (парламентарна резерва от Кралство Швеция)

- Рамково решение относно достъпа до данни, съдържащи се във ВИС, за целите на сигурността (подлежи на включване под формата на изменение към регламента за ВИС) (2005/0232(CNS))

- Рамково решение относно достъпа до EURODAC за целите на сигурността (подлежи на включване под формата на изменение към регламента за ВИС) (2006/0310(CNS))

- Рамково решение относно Европол (все още се извършва допитване до Европейския парламент)

4.   Заявява желанието си да участва, в дух на сътрудничество с Комисията и председателството на Съвета, в преформулирането на тези предложения през 2008 г. и запазва правото си да формулира всякакви официални препоръки, необходими за усъвършенстване на вече постигнатите политически споразумения, съгласно предвиденото в член 39 от Договора за ЕС; за целта предлага от началото на 2008 г. да се създаде работна група на високо равнище, която да е компетентна открито да обсъжда подобренията, които следва да се извършат в цитираните по-горе текстове.

5.   Приветства декларацията на конференцията относно член 10 от Протокола относно преходните разпоредби (Декларация 39а) и приканва Комисията още през 2008 г. да започне работа по изменението или замяната на нормативни актове, които вече изглеждат незадоволителни или неефективни (като Конвенцията относно правната взаимопомощ по наказателни дела или други текстове, които опитът показва, че следва да се усъвършенстват);

6.   Счита, че от 2008 г. Парламентът следва редовно да бъде информиран и да се извършва допитване до него относно главните програми и споразумения, касаещи трети страни, като споразумението с Русия за създаване на пространство на свобода, сигурност и правосъдие, международната стратегия срещу трафика на хора и въпроси, свързани с трафика на наркотици и предотвратяването и борбата срещу тероризма, дори когато такова допитване не е задължително;

РЕЗУЛТАТ ОТ ОКОНЧАТЕЛНОТО ГЛАСУВАНЕ В КОМИСИЯ

Дата на приемане	18.12.2007 г.
Резултат от окончателното гласуване	+: –: 0:	41 1 0
Членове, присъствали на окончателното гласуване	Alexander Alvaro, Roberta Angelilli, Mihael Brejc, Kathalijne Maria Buitenweg, Michael Cashman, Giuseppe Castiglione, Giusto Catania, Jean-Marie Cavada, Carlos Coelho, Panayiotis Demetriou, Gérard Deprez, Agustín Díaz de Mera García Consuegra, Bárbara Dührkop Dührkop, Claudio Fava, Armando França, Urszula Gacek, Kinga Gál, Roland Gewalt, Ewa Klamt, Henrik Lax, Roselyne Lefrançois, Sarah Ludford, Viktória Mohácsi, Claude Moraes, Javier Moreno Sánchez, Rareş-Lucian Niculescu, Martine Roure, Luciana Sbarbati, Inger Segelström, Søren Bo Søndergaard, Vladimir Urutchev, Ioannis Varvitsiotis, Manfred Weber, Renate Weber, Tatjana Ždanoka
Заместник(ци), присъствал(и) на окончателното гласуване	Edit Bauer, Genowefa Grabowska, Sophia in 't Veld, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Jean Lambert, Antonio Masip Hidalgo, Bill Newton Dunn
Заместник(ци) (чл. 178, пар. 2), присъствал(и) на окончателното гласуване	Manuel Medina Ortega

РЕЗУЛТАТ ОТ ОКОНЧАТЕЛНОТО ГЛАСУВАНЕ В КОМИСИЯ

Дата на приемане	23.1.2008
Резултат от окончателното гласуване	+: –: 0:	20 6 0
Членове, присъствали на окончателното гласуване	Jim Allister, Enrique Barón Crespo, Bastiaan Belder, Jens-Peter Bonde, Richard Corbett, Brian Crowley, Jean-Luc Dehaene, Andrew Duff, Ingo Friedrich, Genowefa Grabowska, Anneli Jäätteenmäki, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Timothy Kirkhope, Jo Leinen, Íñigo Méndez de Vigo, Ashley Mote, Borut Pahor, Rihards Pīks, József Szájer, Riccardo Ventre, Johannes Voggenhuber, Dushana Zdravkova
Заместник(ци), присъствал(и) на окончателното гласуване	Konstantinos Botopoulos, Urszula Krupa, Gérard Onesta, Alexander Stubb
Заместник(ци) (член 178, параграф 2), присъствали на окончателното гласуване