REPORT on a strategy for the future settlement of the institutional aspects of Regulatory Agencies

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

ANNEX - LIST OF EUROPEAN UNION AGENCIES AND SUMMARY OF EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT'S RESPONSIBILITIES

OPINION of the Committee on Budgets (*) (16.7.2008)

OPINION of the Committee on Budgetary Control (16.7.2008)

OPINION of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (23.7.2008)

OPINION of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (17.7.2008)

RESULT OF FINAL VOTE IN COMMITTEE

17.9.2008 - (2008/2103(INI))

Committee on Constitutional Affairs
Rapporteur: Georgios Papastamkos
Rapporteur for opinion (*):
Jutta Haug, Committee on Budgets
(*) Associated committee – Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

Procedure : 2008/2103(INI)

Document stages in plenary

Document selected :

A6-0354/2008

Texts tabled :

A6-0354/2008

Debates :

Votes :

PV 21/10/2008 - 8.19
Explanations of votes

Texts adopted :

P6_TA(2008)0495

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT
ANNEX - LIST OF EUROPEAN UNION AGENCIES AND SUMMARY OF EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT'S RESPONSIBILITIES
OPINION of the Committee on Budgets (*)
OPINION of the Committee on Budgetary Control
OPINION of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
OPINION of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy
RESULT OF FINAL VOTE IN COMMITTEE

on a strategy for the future settlement of the institutional aspects of regulatory agencies

(2008/2103(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 11 March 2008 entitled 'European Agencies - the way forward' (COM(2008)0135),

– having regard to its resolution of 13 January 2004 on the Communication from the Commission: 'The operating framework for the European Regulatory Agencies'[1],

– having regard to the draft interinstitutional agreement of 25 February 2005 on the operating framework for the European regulatory agencies (COM(2005)0059),

– having regard to the oral question with debate submitted jointly to the Council by the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and the Committee on Budgets, and to the answer given by the Council in plenary on 15 November 2005 (O-0093/05),

– having regard to its resolution of 1 December 2005 on the draft interinstitutional agreement presented by the Commission on the operating framework for the European regulatory agencies[2],

– having regard to the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 17 April 2008,

– having regard to the letter of 7 May 2008 from the President of the Commission to the President of the European Parliament and to the President-in-Office of the Council on setting up an interinstitutional working group at political level,

– having regard to Rule 45 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and the opinions of the Committee on Budgets, the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A6‑0354/2008),

A. whereas the efforts of the Parliament and the Commission to establish a legally binding framework for the operation of the European regulatory agencies have proved fruitless,

B. whereas the draft interinstitutional agreement of 2005 has made no substantial progress owing to the Council's institutional and political opposition, and whereas the Commission decided to withdraw the proposal for an interinstitutional agreement and to replace it with an invitation to take part in an interinstitutional dialogue, which will result in a common approach,

C. whereas, although at first sight the regulatory agencies appear to be 'micro-institutions', they nevertheless have a 'macro-impact' at the level of European governance,

D. whereas there is still a need to define at least the fundamental structural characteristics of the regulatory agencies, in so far as they have become an accepted para-institutional component of the European Union,

E. whereas the Commission proposes the setting-up of an interinstitutional working group to draw up a common framework for the regulatory agencies and to define the competence of each of the institutions of the European Union vis-à-vis those agencies,

F. whereas the Commission is to carry out a horizontal evaluation of the regulatory agencies by 2009-2010 and is to submit a report on the conclusions of that evaluation as soon as possible to Parliament and the Council,

G. whereas the Commission's decision not to propose setting up any new agencies until the interinstitutional working group has completed its work is to be welcomed,

H. whereas the Commission should not depart from the guiding principles of the draft interinstitutional agreement of 2005 concerning amendments to the basic instruments governing the existing regulatory agencies, so that they are consistent with the new approach,

I. whereas there is already a common regulatory framework[3] for executive agencies which are entrusted with the management of Community programmes for a specific period of time,

General considerations

1. Considers that the Commission's proposal is a commendable initiative and is prepared to take part in the proceedings of the interinstitutional working group through its representatives, but considers that the 'common approach' falls short of its expectations of achieving an interinstitutional agreement; notes that this does not rule out the development of other forms of understanding as an outcome of the work of the working group;

2. Appeals to the Council, in its capacity also as one arm of the budgetary authority, to make a constructive contribution to the proceedings of this working group;

3. Calls on the Council and the Commission to draw up jointly with Parliament the work programme for the interinstitutional working group, as soon as possible, so that it can begin its work in autumn 2008;

4. Considers that the work programme of the interinstitutional working group should, inter alia, encompass the following points:

– a statement of the areas on which the horizontal evaluation to be carried out by the Commission by the end of 2009 is to focus,

– the setting of objective criteria for assessing the need for the agencies, taking into account possible alternative solutions,

– an assessment, regularly and in a coordinated and coherent manner, of the work and the performance of the agencies, including an external assessment, in particular by means of cost-benefit analyses,

– evaluation of whether the agency option is more cost-effective than having the relevant tasks performed by the Commission departments themselves,

– assessment of possible benefits lost through having certain activities performed by the regulatory agencies instead of by the Commission's departments,

– the taking of measures to increase the transparency of the agencies, in particular through approximation of their fundamental structural characteristics,

– the setting of boundaries in relation to the independence and supervision of the agencies, particularly the nature and extent of the Commission's responsibility for their activities, taking account of the fact that the degree of accountability of the Commission cannot exceed the degree to which it exerts actual influence over the activities of the agencies as such,

– appointment of representatives to the supervisory bodies for the agencies from the Council and the Commission and interviewing of candidates by the competent parliamentary committee,

– appointment of the executive bodies of the agencies, in particular their director, and defining the role of Parliament in this respect,

– the need for a standard approach among the agencies with regard to the presentation of their activities during the financial year in question, and of their accounts and reports on budgetary and financial management,

– a standard requirement for directors of all agencies to draw up and sign a statement of assurance, including reservations where necessary,

– a harmonised model applicable to all agencies and satellite bodies clearly distinguishing between

- an annual report intended for a general readership on the body's operations, work and achievements,

- financial statements and a report on the implementation of the budget,

- an activity report along the lines of the activity reports of the Directors-General of the Commission,

- a declaration of assurance signed by the body's director, together with any reservations or observations which the director considers it appropriate to draw to the attention of the discharge authority,

– definition of the principles for determining whether and to what extent fees and payments should be a source of funding for agencies,

– provision of a rolling review of the need for existing agencies, and the establishment of criteria to determine when a regulatory agency has achieved its purpose and can be wound up;

5. Regrets the absence of a general strategy for the creation of EU agencies; notes that new agencies are being created on a case-by-case basis, leading to an non-transparent patchwork of regulatory agencies, executive agencies and other Community bodies each constituting a sui generis creation;

6. Notes the Commission's position that the setting-up of the regulatory agencies, which is sometimes carried out with the collaboration of Parliament, is an expression of cooperation between the Member States, and the functioning of such agencies consists in the interlinking and exercise of responsibilities, which, if conferred exclusively on the EU institutions, would give rise to objections concerning centralisation;

7. Calls on the Council and the Commission to work jointly with Parliament to produce a clear, common and coherent framework for the future position of the agencies in the scheme of EU governance;

8. Is of the view that the transparency of the regulatory agencies must be ensured, in particular as regards their functioning, the disclosure and accessibility of information, and the programming and accountability of their actions;

9. Believes that the priority of the 'common framework' for interinstitutional understanding should be to rationalise the operation and maximise the added value of the regulatory agencies by creating greater transparency, visible democratic control and improved efficiency;

10. Considers it indispensable to adopt minimum common principles and rules concerning the structure, operation and control of all the regulatory agencies, irrespective of their nature;

11. Considers that participation in the activity of the regulatory agencies will have to be ensured by formally structuring the processes of consultation and dialogue with the stakeholders;

12. Considers that the structural and operational diversity of the agencies raises serious questions concerning regulatory parameters, good governance and institutional relations in terms of centralisation and decentralisation;

13. Advocates that the principles of good administration must be ensured by a common approach regarding personnel selection processes, budgeting and resource administration, efficient management and performance evaluation;

14. Will examine whether the Commission's undertaking to defer any proposal to set up new regulatory agencies should also cover the two proposals currently in abeyance in the fields of energy and telecommunications;

15. Stresses the need to establish parliamentary control over the formation and operation of regulatory agencies, which should consist principally in:

– submission to Parliament of the annual report by the agencies themselves,

– possibly inviting the director of each agency to appear before the competent parliamentary committee during the appointment process and,

– Parliament granting discharge for the execution of the budgets of those agencies which receive Community funding;

16. Urges the Commission to submit the conclusions of the horizontal evaluation of the regulatory agencies promptly, before the end of the 2009-2010 period, so that the conclusions can be taken into account by the interinstitutional working group;

17. Asks the Commission to devise benchmarks in order to compare those results and to lay down clear rules for ending the mandate of agencies in the event of poor performance;

18. Calls on the President and the Conference of Presidents to give priority to the question of the composition of the working group proposed by the Commission and considers it appropriate that Parliament be represented in that group by the chairs or rapporteurs of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, the Committee on Budgets and two other committees with practical experience of oversight of the work of regulatory agencies;

19. Reiterates the call by both Parliament and the Commission in the draft interinstitutional agreement of 2005 to incorporate a decision on an agency's seat into the basic act;

Budgetary considerations

20. Wishes to reiterate the importance of securing, on a systematic basis, at interinstitutional level the application of the procedure laid down in Point 47 of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 17 May 2006 on budgetary discipline and sound financial management[4] (IIA of 17 May 2006) and stresses the need to ensure appropriate follow up of the Joint Statement of 13 July 2007 by the Parliament, the Council and the Commission on decentralised agencies;

21. Is convinced that a detailed procedure for the application of that provision is an absolute necessity; considers that such a procedure might provide a possible opportunity to house some of the important aspects of the blocked draft interinstitutional agreement of 2005, perhaps in combination with some adaptations of the Framework Financial Regulation for agencies[5];

22. Concludes that, if evaluation exercises indicate that cost-effectiveness and efficiency of decentralised administration are not guaranteed, the European Union should not shy away from reversing the current tendency for outsourcing Commission tasks and should establish clear rules for terminating the mandate of decentralised agencies;

23. Supports the Commission's intention not to propose any new decentralised agencies until the evaluation process is completed, especially against the background that margins in the current Multiannual Financial Framework would make it extremely difficult, for the time being, to finance any new Community body without serious re-programming;

24. Considers, from the budgetary point of view, the following items key issues for the agenda of the interinstitutional working group on the future of EU agencies:

Establishment of an Agencies' definition

25. Recalls, in this respect, the definition of an "agency" established in the Trialogue of 7 March 2007, when it was agreed that for the purpose of applying Point 47 of the IIA of 17 May 2006 the definition of an "agency" would be determined by whether the body in question was set up pursuant to Article 185 of the Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities[6] (Financial Regulation);

26. Would like to emphasise the importance it attributes to a clear and coherent general terminology with regard to agencies that should be established for common usage; recalls that "regulatory agencies" are merely a sub-group of decentralised agencies;

New agencies - Link between legislative procedures and budgetary prerogatives

27. Considers it important to discuss problems of calendar as well as legal and procedural aspects that could arise in the event that a timely agreement on the financing of a new agency, pursuant to Point 47 of the IIA of 17 May 2006, is not reached in parallel with the decisions taken by the legislator; considers it equally essential to reflect on some procedural safeguards in order to ensure the full involvement of the budgetary authority in all questions which have a budgetary impact, such as the extension of agencies' task lists;

28. Recalls that as early as 2005 Parliament called for compulsory cost-benefit assessments before a new agency was proposed which should, in particular, concentrate on the question whether "the agency option (including the likely costs of monitoring and coordination) is more cost-effective than having the relevant tasks performed by the Commission departments themselves," but also on issues such as the mandate and working methods of the agency or its degree of independence from the Commission as it is often of particular interest to the legislator;

Existing agencies - Monitoring

29. Underlines the need for a regular and coordinated evaluation and control exercise - avoiding duplication and overlapping - to assess the added value of already existing decentralised agencies which no longer fall under the scope of Point 47 of the IIA of 17 May 2006; sees this as a follow-up to the work previously undertaken that resulted in the joint statement on Community agencies agreed at the Trialogue of 18 April 2007 "to regularly evaluate the existing Community agencies, focusing particularly on their cost-benefit and giving detailed explanation of the criteria used for the selection of the agencies to be evaluated";

30. Notes that the analysis performed should respond to some basic cost-benefit questions and could be carried out in accordance, inter alia, with the following criteria:

– Relevance: to what extent were the objectives foreseen by the founding regulation of an agency relevant for the level of public spending authorised in the budget?

– Effectiveness: what effects (impact) have been achieved by the activity of the agency?

– Efficiency (cost-effectiveness): how economically have the various inputs been converted into output and results? Were the (expected) effects achieved at a reasonable cost, in particular with regard to the staff deployed and the internal organisation?

31. Points out that, given the agencies' overall budgetary impact, the Commission has to demonstrate convincingly that European governance via the agencies is the most cost-effective, efficient and appropriate option to implement European policies at present and in the near future;

General common framework

32. Insists on the need to establish minimum common standards with regard, amongst other things, to the role and political responsibility of the Commission in relation to the agency, the support to be granted by host countries and the timely and transparent decision on the seat of an agency which could be referred to in the agencies' founding regulations;

33. Recalls that the agencies' actions need to be governed by clear lines of accountability, in line with the provisions of the Financial Regulation; highlights the agencies' obligations concerning the discharge procedure;

34. Considers it, in addition, of the highest importance to try to define some common rules for the presentation of the agencies' budgets with the aim of making budgetary indicators, such as implementation rates of the agencies or the individual shares making up their revenue and expenditure, more transparent and comparable; believes that the general presentation of the subsidy to agencies in the EU budget might need to be adapted to the tasks and the roles of the new generation of agencies;

35. Points out that, according to the figures provided by the Commission in its Communication, there are currently 29 regulatory agencies, which employ some 3 800 staff, with an annual budget of around EUR 1 100 million, including a Community contribution of around EUR 559 million;

36. Insists that the auditing/discharge process must be proportionate to the overall budget of the agencies; notes in particular that the resources available to the European Court of Auditors have not increased in line with the number of agencies in recent years;

37. Reiterates the wish expressed in paragraph 7 of its resolutions of 22 April 2008 concerning discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the agencies that the performance of the agencies be regularly (and on an ad hoc basis) audited by the European Court of Auditors or another independent auditor; considers that this should not be limited to traditional elements of financial management and the proper use of public money, but should also cover administrative efficiency and effectiveness and should include a rating of the financial management of each agency;

38. Is of the opinion that all agencies should, together with their establishment plan, give an overview of their permanent and temporary staff and national experts, as well as indicate any changes in relation to the previous two years;

39. Draws attention to the European Court of Auditors' special report No 5/2008 on the sound financial management of agencies with particular reference to performance audits;

40. Calls on the Commission to merge the administrative functions of the smaller agencies in order to create the critical mass required to enable the agencies to satisfactorily comply with current rules on public procurement and with the Financial Regulation and the Staff Regulations[7];

41. Urges the Commission to undertake a critical examination of the agencies' budget requests since the majority of the agencies do not utilise the funds requested;

42. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments of the Member States.

[1] OJ C 92 E, 16.4.2004, p. 119.
[2] OJ C 285 E, 22.11.2006, p. 123.
[3] Council Regulation (EC) No 58/2003 of 19 December 2002 laying down the statute for executive agencies to be entrusted with certain tasks in the management of Community programmes (OJ L 11, 16.1.2003, p. 1).
[4] OJ C 139, 14.6.2006, p. 1.
[5] Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2343/2002 of 23 December 2002 on the framework Financial Regulation for the bodies referred to in Article 185 of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities (OJ L 357, 31.12.2002, p. 72).
[6] OJ L 248, 16.9.2002, p. 1.
[7] Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No 259/68 of 29 February 1968 laying down the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Communities and instituting special measures temporarily applicable to officials of the Commission (OJ L 56, 4.3.1968, p. 1).

Introductory remarks

There has been a significant increase in recent times in the number of regulatory agencies at both European and national level. There are similarities but also differences between the two levels of reference. The structural and operational diversity of these agencies at European and at national level raises serious questions concerning regulatory parameters, good governance and institutional relations in terms of centralisation – decentralisation. One of the fundamental differences between the national and European regulatory agencies consists in the extent of parliamentary legitimisation, which for the former is enhanced and for the latter deficient.

The European Parliament has repeatedly considered the institutional, financial (see in this respect the opinions of the associated Committees on Budgets and Budgetary Control) and procedural questions raised by the operation of the European agencies. Following the Council's refusal to accept a legally binding instrument and the rejection of the proposal to conclude an interinstitutional agreement (letter of 22 June 2007 from the President-in-Office of the Council to the President of the European Parliament), the Commission used its right of initiative to present an alternative proposal. Specifically, the Commission decided to withdraw the draft interinstitutional agreement, proposing instead to set up an interinstitutional working group tasked with drawing up a common framework for the regulatory agencies and defining the competence of each of the European institutions vis-à-vis those agencies.

Categorisation of the European regulatory agencies

The European institutional landscape comprises a large number of decentralised or quasi-autonomous bodies grouped together under the heading 'regulatory agencies'. The 29 European agencies (see the attached annex with the detailed list of European regulatory agencies) constitute what at first sight appear to be 'micro-institutions' but which, in essence, have an obvious 'macro-impact'.

The European agencies are divided into two categories: 'regulatory' and 'executive'. The task of the former is determined on a case by case basis on their own legal basis, i.e. their own sectoral regulatory framework (it should be noted that 12 of the 23 agencies whose authority is enshrined in the EC Treaty, take Article 308 as their legal basis). The executive agencies are entrusted with a specific task which principally consists in assisting with the management of Community programmes pursuant to Council Regulation No 58/2003 of 19 December 2002, i.e. in accordance with a common legal basis.

For both categories of agency, the question arises of the need for an interim review of their work and performance. The usefulness of setting up and operating a regulatory agency can only be assessed on a case by case basis. The nature of the responsibilities conferred on these agencies, their needs in terms of human resources and the extent to which it is desirable to confer decision-making powers on them should be subject to a cost-benefit analysis, including an external assessment.

Any discussion about setting up new agencies, including the two proposals currently in abeyance, presupposes positive, measurable and transparent assessment of already existing agencies in terms of administrative and financial governance. In any event, setting up new agencies should be scheduled for after the expiry of the current financial period, i.e. after 2013, taking account of the conclusions of the 2009-2010 horizontal evaluation.

The position of the European regulatory agencies in the European institutional landscape

The operation of the European regulatory agencies is closely linked to the various levels of European governance but also the European strategy to improve legislation.

The conceptual approach and modus operandi of the regulatory agencies in the EU are diverse in nature. The excessive increase in the number of regulatory agencies has undoubtedly resulted in inflated European regulatory intervention, the fragmentation of and a lack of transparency in European policies and, by extension, has made operational coordination more difficult. The Commission itself in its communication to the European Parliament and the Council 'European agencies – the way forward' (COM(2008)135 final, Brussels, 11 March 2008) recognises the need 'to have clarity about their role, and about the mechanisms to ensure the accountability of these public bodies' (page 2).

What is required is a minimum total of common principles and rules relating to the structure, operation and control of the regulatory agencies so that they integrate harmoniously within the framework of fundamental principles which derive from the Treaties.

There is in fact a multiplicity of structures. While the management board usually consists of at least one representative of each Member State, the executive director of the agency is, in the majority of cases, appointed by the management board on a proposal from the Commission, in other cases by the Commission on a proposal by the management board, or by the Council on the basis of a list of candidates which is drawn up either by the management board or by the Commission. In this respect, it would be useful to draw up common interinstitutional guidelines to enable the EU institutions to collaborate, while strictly respecting each other's tasks and competences.

It would also be useful not only to adopt a framework designed to harmonise the operation of the European regulatory agencies but also to effect that on the basis of democratic principles. This is why Parliament has called on the Council on several occasions to make a constructive contribution to developing a common understanding and a congruent approach to policy by the European regulatory agencies, which occupy an important place in the chain of institutional mechanisms of the EU.

The sui generis legal nature of the European regulatory agencies

The particular legal nature of the regulatory agencies consists in the fact that they are assigned competences which resemble not only the regulatory role played by the administration (particularly in the case of legally binding decisions in respect of third parties) but also the role of the judicial authorities in imposing penalties. In fact, a distinction is made between agencies which take legally binding decisions, those which provide technical and/or scientific expertise and agencies of an operational nature (COM(2008)135 final, page 8). Furthermore, the agencies are organisationally and financially autonomous and their members often have guarantees of personal and/or operational independence. The aforementioned points prevent the agencies being classified in the traditional legal categories despite the fact that they already constitute an accepted para-institutional component of the EU. In the present case, the European regulatory agencies, in particular those governed by the EC Treaty, are ‘executive bodies’. It should be clarified that the term ‘regulatory’ does not imply that the agencies have the authority to take regulatory measures with general effect; they only have the power to issue individual decisions within the framework of clearly defined Community legislation in order to safeguard the principle of institutional balance laid down by Article 7 of the EC Treaty. The Court of Justice has issued a judgment on this subject (the Meroni doctrine, Case 98/80, Romano). Moreover, the Community legislator retains the power, on the Commission's initiative, to judge in each case during the normal codecision legislative procedure, whether it is appropriate to set up a specific regulatory agency by publishing a specific regulatory act to govern the organisation, operation and relations of that agency with the institutions and other bodies concerned. The Community legislator likewise retains the power to decide whether it is appropriate to retain a particular agency or not.

The question of transparency and democratic control

Given that the European regulatory agencies are in large measure decentralised or independent services, there must be particular emphasis on transparency and democratic control of their formation and operation. Otherwise, the proliferation of regulatory or executive formations which have or claim exclusive competence to regulate crucial areas of social activities is at risk of reducing the importance of and supplanting the representative institutions of the EU and hugely inflating bureaucracy. The proposed approach – a common approach as far as possible – to the structure and operation of the agencies concerned seeks to restrict bureaucratic rigidity so that they can play their regulatory role correctly and effectively and can be supervised and so that the current requirements for auditing and accountability can, at least partially, be satisfied.

The establishment of parliamentary control over the structure and the work of the regulatory agencies is consistent with the classic democratic principle requiring political responsibility of any body wielding executive power. The possibility of the European Parliament assigning political responsibility to the agencies concerned touches on a core principle of representative democracy, which consists in examining the legality and expediency of the choices made by the executive power. A common framework for an interinstitutional approach should provide for institutional communication between the European Parliament and the regulatory agencies, which should principally consist in the submission of an annual report by each agency to the European Parliament, the possibility of inviting the director of the agency to appear before the competent European Parliament committee during the appointment procedure and, finally, the granting of discharge by Parliament for the execution of the budgets of those agencies which receive Community funding. The areas subject to parliamentary control could be defined more clearly and more effectively. Provision could be made, for example, for mandatory debate of the annual reports of the European regulatory agencies in the plenary of the European Parliament, making the information available to the public through that procedure.

Towards a common framework for interinstitutional control

Your rapporteur considers that the Commission’s proposal ‘Towards a common framework’ for interinstitutional dialogue, which will lead to a ‘common approach’, falls short of the European Parliament’s expectations of achieving an interinstitutional agreement. Furthermore, it considers the common approach to be an interim step towards the adoption of a legally binding text. Nevertheless, it appreciates the Commission's wish to find a way out of a situation of protracted interinstitutional inertia. The operating framework for the European regulatory agencies submitted by the Commission (COM(2008)0135) could undoubtedly be more complete. However, it is possible to consider it as a constructive starting point for dialogue. Furthermore, your rapporteur welcomes the setting up of an interinstitutional working group which will carry out a collective policy review of the experience gained from the activities of the regulatory agencies and whose mandate will be to clarify their position in the multilevel system of European governance. Moreover, your rapporteur believes that the priority of seeking a ‘common framework’ for an interinstitutional understanding and approach lies in maximising the added value of the regulatory agencies in the European structures of governance in general by creating greater transparency, visible democratic control and improved efficiency.

(source: Directorate General for Internal Policies, Legislative Coordination and Conciliation Unit)

Regulatory agency	Year of creation	Codecision at the time of creation/ revision	Seat	Specialised committee responsible	Nominees on the Board	Hearing before the nomination of the Executive Director
European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop)	1975	No/No	Thessaloniki	EMPL*	-	No
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (EUROFOUND)	1975	No/No	Dublin	EMPL*	-	No
European Environment Agency (EEA)	1990	No/Yes	Copenhagen	ENVI*	2	No
European Training Foundation (ETF)	1990	No/Yes (ongoing)	Turin	EMPL*	-	No
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA)	1993	No/Yes	Lisbon	LIBE*	2	Yes
European Medicines Agency (EMEA)	1993	No/Yes	London	ENVI*	2	Yes
Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM)	1993	No/No	Alicante	JURI*	-	No
European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OSHA)	1994	No/No	Bilbao	EMPL*	-	No
Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO)	1994	No/No	Angers	AGRI*	-	No
Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union (CdT)	1994	No/No	Luxembourg	-	-	No

European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR)	2000	No/No	Thessaloniki	AFET	-	No
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)	2002	Yes	Parma	ENVI*	Parliament consulted on the 14 members appointed by the Council	Yes
European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA)	2002	Yes	Lisbon	TRAN	-	No
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)	2002	Yes	Cologne	TRAN	-	No
European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA)	2004	Yes	Heraklion	ITRE	-	Yes
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)	2004	Yes	Stockholm	ENVI*	2	Yes
European Railway Agency (ERA)	2004	Yes	Lille - Valenciennes	TRAN	-	Yes
European GNSS Supervisory Authority (GSA)	2004	No/No	Brussels (provisional)	ITRE	-	No
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (Frontex)	2004	No/Yes	Warsaw	LIBE	-	No
Community Fisheries Control Agency (CFCA)	2005	No	Vigo	PECH	-	No
European Institute for Gender Equality	2006	Yes	Vilnius	FEMM	-	Yes
European Chemicals Agency (ECHA)	2006	Yes	Helsinki	ENVI	2	Yes
European Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), replacing the EUMC	2007	No	Vienna	LIBE	-	Yes

Common Foreign and Security Policy Agencies (second pillar):

Decentralised Agency	Year of creation	Seat	Committeeresponsible
European Union Institute for security studies (ISS)	2001	Paris	AFET/SEDE
European Union Satellite Centre (EUCS)	2002	Madrid	AFET/SEDE
European Defence Agency (EDA)	2004	Brussels	AFET/SEDE

Police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters agencies (Third pillar):

Decentralised Agency	Year of Creation	Seat	Committeeresponsible
European Police Office (Europol)	1992	The Hague	LIBE*
European Police College (CEPOL)	2000	Bramshill	LIBE*
European Union's Judicial Cooperation Unit (Eurojust)	2002	The Hague	LIBE*

* Committee responsible as set out in Annex VI to the Rules of Procedure.

for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs

on a strategy for the future settlement of the institutional aspects of Regulatory Agencies
(2008/2103(INI))

Rapporteur for opinion (*): Jutta Haug

(*) Associated committee - Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

SUGGESTIONS

The Committee on Budgets calls on the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:

Introduction

1. Welcomes the Commission's intention to stimulate an interinstitutional dialogue on the future of European Union agencies and their place in European governance; is convinced that the time has come to decide on the general direction European governance should take and considers an interinstitutional working group a viable structure for the constructive and output oriented debate that is necessary for this purpose; underlines that all major actors from the institutional and legislative sphere as well as representatives of the budgetary authority have to participate in this working group to guarantee satisfactory results;

2. Welcomes the Commission's intention to launch a thorough horizontal evaluation of the regulatory agencies, examining the real implications of their creation and operation in the Union; believes that, in that framework, coherent evaluation rules need to be established;

3. Recalls that the EU agencies have been set up in successive waves in order to meet specific needs on a case-by-case basis and that they were thus created in an uncoordinated manner without a common framework; notes, however, that none of the efforts made over the past few years to establish some common rules and principles to be applied to all agencies have been very successful; regrets the time lost and calls on the Council to join all other institutions in making every possible effort to achieve progress in this area;

4. Is ready to consider the Member States' concerns regarding the draft Interinstitutional Agreement on the operating framework for the European regulatory agencies (IIA), presented by the Commission in 2005 and aiming at establishing a horizontal framework for the creation, structure, operation, evaluation and control of European decentralised agencies, so as to establish an appropriate instrument that could apply successfully to all such agencies;

5. Considers, therefore, the Commission's decision to withdraw its proposal for this IIA a pragmatic step that might at the same time create an opportunity to search for other solutions which need to be found as a matter of urgency; is convinced that, for the sake of transparency, some kind of a horizontal framework is necessary for the agencies, despite their variation in character;

6. Could also envisage the development of instruments other than an IIA in order to better define the roles of the European institutions and the necessary procedures for setting up new decentralised agencies or dealing with already existing ones;

7. Wishes to reiterate the importance of securing on a systematic basis at interinstitutional level the application of the procedure laid down in Point 47 of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 17 May 2006 on budgetary discipline and sound financial management[1] (IIA of 17 May 2006) and stresses the need to ensure appropriate follow up of the Joint Statement of 13 July 2007 by the Parliament, the Council and the Commission on decentralised agencies;

8. Is convinced that a detailed procedure for the application of that provision is an absolute necessity; considers that such a procedure might provide a possible opportunity to house some of the important aspects of the blocked draft IIA, perhaps in combination with some adaptations to the Framework Financial Regulation for agencies;

9. Insists that, in addition, for the agencies already in existence, regular evaluation has to be carried out, in a coordinated and coherent manner, on whether the agency option is more cost-effective than having the relevant tasks performed by the Commission departments themselves;

10. Concludes that, if evaluation exercises indicate that cost-effectiveness and efficiency of decentralised administration are not guaranteed, the European Union should not shy away from reversing the current tendency for outsourcing Commission tasks and should establish clear rules for terminating the mandate of decentralised agencies;

11. Supports the Commission's intention not to propose any new decentralised agencies until the evaluation process is completed, especially against the background that margins of the current Multiannual Financial Framework would make it extremely difficult, for the time being, to finance any new Community body without serious re-programming;

12. Considers, from the budgetary point of view, the following items key issues for the agenda of the interinstitutional working group on the future of EU agencies:

Establishment of an Agencies' definition

13. Recalls, in this respect, the definition of an "agency" established in the Trialogue of 7 March 2007, when it was agreed that for the purpose of applying Point 47 of the IIA of 17 May 2006 the definition of an "agency" would be determined by whether the body in question was set up according to Article 185 of the Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities[2] (Financial Regulation);

14. Would like to emphasise the importance it attributes to a clear and coherent general terminology with regard to agencies that should be established for common usage; recalls that "regulatory agencies" are just a sub-group of decentralised agencies;

New agencies - Link between legislative procedures and budgetary prerogatives

15. Considers it important to discuss problems of calendar as well as legal and procedural aspects that could arise in the event that a timely agreement on the financing of a new agency, pursuant to Point 47 of the IIA of 17 May 2006, is not reached in parallel with the decisions taken by the legislator; considers it equally essential to reflect on some procedural safeguards in order to ensure the full involvement of the budgetary authority in all questions which have a budgetary impact such as the extension of agencies' task lists;

16. Recalls that as early as 2005 Parliament called for compulsory cost-benefit assessments before a new agency was proposed which should, in particular, concentrate on the question whether "the agency option (including the likely costs of monitoring and coordination) is more cost-effective than having the relevant tasks performed by the Commission departments themselves" but also on issues such as the mandate and working methods of the agency or its degree of independence from the Commission as it is often of particular interest to the legislator;

Existing agencies - Monitoring

17. Underlines the need for a regular and coordinated evaluation and control exercise - avoiding duplication and overlapping - to assess the added value of already existing decentralised agencies which no longer fall under the scope of Point 47 of the IIA of 17 May 2006; sees this as a follow-up to the work previously undertaken that resulted in the joint statement on Community agencies agreed at the Trialogue of 18 April 2007 "to regularly evaluate the existing Community agencies, focusing particularly on their cost-benefit and giving detailed explanation of the criteria used for the selection of the agencies to be evaluated";

18. Notes that the analysis performed should respond to some basic cost-benefit questions and could be carried out, amongst others, in accordance with the following criteria:

- Relevance: To what extent were the objectives foreseen by the founding regulation of an agency relevant for the level of public spending authorised in the budget?

- Effectiveness: Which effects (impact) have been obtained by the activity of the agency?

- Efficiency (cost-effectiveness): How economically have the various inputs been converted into outputs and results? Were the (expected) effects obtained at a reasonable cost, in particular with regard to the staff deployed and to the internal organisation?

19. Points out that, given the agencies' overall budgetary impact, the Commission has to demonstrate convincingly that European governance via the agencies is the most cost-effective, efficient and appropriate option to implement European policies at present and in the near future;

General common framework

20. Insists on the need to establish minimum common standards with regard, amongst other things, to the role and political responsibility of the Commission in relation to the agency, the support to be granted by host countries and the timely and transparent decision on the seat of an agency which could be referred to in the agencies' founding regulations;

21. Recalls that the agencies' actions need to be governed by clear lines of accountability, in line with the provisions of the Financial Regulation; highlights the agencies' obligations concerning the discharge procedure;

22. Considers it, in addition, of the highest importance to try to define some common rules for the presentation of the agencies' budgets with the aim of making budgetary indicators, such as implementation rates of the agencies or the individual shares making up their revenue and expenditure, more transparent and comparable; believes that the general presentation of the subsidy to agencies in the EU budget might need to be adapted to tasks and roles of the new generation of agencies.

RESULT OF FINAL VOTE IN COMMITTEE

Date adopted	16.7.2008
Result of final vote	+: –: 0:	36 0 0
Members present for the final vote	Laima Liucija Andrikienė, Richard James Ashworth, Reimer Böge, Simon Busuttil, Valdis Dombrovskis, James Elles, Hynek Fajmon, Salvador Garriga Polledo, Ingeborg Gräßle, Ville Itälä, Alain Lamassoure, Margaritis Schinas, László Surján, Herbert Bösch, Brigitte Douay, Vicente Miguel Garcés Ramón, Louis Grech, Catherine Guy-Quint, Jutta Haug, Vladimír Maňka, Cătălin-Ioan Nechifor, Gary Titley, Ralf Walter, Daniel Dăianu, Nathalie Griesbeck, Anne E. Jensen, Jan Mulder, Kyösti Virrankoski, Helga Trüpel, , José Albino Silva Peneda,,Esko Seppänen, Sergej Kozlík
Substitute(s) present for the final vote	Michael Gahler, Juan Andrés Naranjo Escobar, Bárbara Dührkop Dührkop, Thijs Berman
Substitute(s) under Rule 178(2) present for the final vote

[1] OJ C 139, 14.6.2006, p. 1.
[2] OJ L 248, 16.9.2002, p. 1.

for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs

on a strategy for the future settlement of the institutional aspects of Regulatory Agencies
(2008/2103(INI))

Draftswoman: Edit Herczog

SUGGESTIONS

The Committee on Budgetary Control calls on the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:

1. Recalls that in 2005 the Commission proposed an interinstitutional agreement intended to create a horizontal framework for the creation, structure, operation, evaluation and control of European regulatory agencies;

2. Notes that despite general support from Parliament, negotiations with the Council on this draft agreement stalled during 2006, with doubts raised as to whether the use of an interinstitutional agreement was legally appropriate;

3. Agrees that the establishment of agencies has not been accompanied by an overall vision of the role of agencies in the EU, and that the lack of such an overall vision has made it more difficult for agencies to work effectively;

4. Stresses that the importance of agencies in the EU's administrative framework calls for a common understanding between the EU institutions of the purpose and role of agencies, which, at the present time, is lacking;

5. Notes the Commission's intention, pending a decision on its proposal for an interinstitutional working group on the future governance of agencies, to:

· withdraw its proposal for an interinstitutional agreement;

· undertake a horizontal evaluation of the regulatory agencies by the end of 2009, and to report as soon as possible to Parliament and the Council on the results;

· propose no new regulatory agencies until this evaluation has been completed;

· undertake a review of its own internal systems governing relations with agencies, as well as the methodology for conducting impact assessments of agencies;

6. Points out that, according to the figures provided by the Commission in its Communication, there are currently 29 regulatory agencies, which employ some 3 800 staff, with an annual budget of around EUR 1 100 million, including a Community contribution of around EUR 559 million;

7. Insists that the auditing/discharge process must be proportionate to the overall budget of the agencies; notes in particular that the resources available to the European Court of Auditors have not increased in line with the number of agencies in recent years;

8. Reiterates the wish expressed in paragraph 7 of its discharge resolutions on the agencies of 22 April 2008 that the performance of the agencies be regularly (and on an ad hoc basis) audited by the European Court of Auditors or another independent auditor; considers that this should not be limited to traditional elements of financial management and the proper use of public money, but should also cover administrative efficiency and effectiveness and should include a rating of the financial management of each agency;

9. Is of the opinion that all agencies should give, together with their establishment plan, an overview of their permanent and temporary staff and national experts, together with changes in relation to the previous two years;

10. Draws attention to the European Court of Auditors' special report No 5/2008 on the sound financial management of agencies with particular reference to performance audits;

11. Calls on the Commission to merge the administrative functions of the smaller agencies in order to create the critical mass required to enable the agencies satisfactorily to comply with current rules on public procurement and with the Financial Regulation and the Staff Regulations;

12. Urges the Commission to undertake a critical examination of the agencies' budget requests since the majority of the agencies do not utilise the funds requested;

13. Asks the committee responsible to take account of the above-mentioned Court of Auditors' special report before submitting its report to plenary;

14. Suggests that the matters to be considered by the proposed interinstitutional working group on the future governance of agencies should include the following:

· the need for a standard approach among the agencies with regard to the presentation of their activities during the financial year in question, and of their accounts and reports on budgetary and financial management;

· a standard requirement for all directors of agencies to draw up and sign a statement of assurance, including reservations where necessary;

· a harmonised model applicable to all agencies and satellite bodies clearly distinguishing between

- an annual report intended for a general readership on the body's operations, work and achievements;

- financial statements and a report on the implementation of the budget;

- an activity report along the lines of the activity reports of the Directors-General of the Commission;

· the need to define the principles for determining whether and to what extent fees and payments should be a source of funding for agencies;

· the need to conduct a rolling review of the need for existing agencies and to establish criteria to determine when a regulatory agency has fulfilled its purpose and can be wound up.

RESULT OF FINAL VOTE IN COMMITTEE

for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs

on a strategy for the future settlement of the institutional aspects of Regulatory Agencies
(2008/2103(INI))

Draftsman: Eoin Ryan

SUGGESTIONS

The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs calls on the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:

1. Regrets that the 2005 draft inter-institutional agreement on the operating framework for European regulatory agencies stalled at Council level; welcomes the Commission's initiative to re-launch the debate on the role of agencies within the governance structure of the European Union;

2. Highlights the important role that regulatory agencies can play as distinct and auxiliary bodies of the Community institutions and the Member States with legal personality for the continuous performance of specific tasks in areas of EU competence and intra-EU cooperation;

3. Emphasises that regulatory agencies must be established in line with uniform criteria and that their design and functioning must comply with the common principles of institutional balance, good governance and good administration;

4. Points out that the establishment of a regulatory agency must be effected by a legislative act and justified on grounds of necessity, efficacy and proportionality; points out that in regard to areas of shared competence between the European Union and the Member States, it must also be justified in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity;

5. Believes that for regulatory agencies to have a legitimate role in the European Union they must adhere to a common framework incorporating a clear mandate and an efficient administrative and executive structure; considers that the force of the acts of regulatory agencies derives from the underlying legislative act that created them and that those acts will have no legislative character unless they are subsequently adopted by the EU institutions in accordance with the appropriate legislative procedure;

6. Echoes the concern of the Commission that, in the absence of a common framework and a clearly defined mandate, regulatory agencies may stray into areas beyond their remit;

7. Highlights that the principles of good governance require that the following be fully guaranteed: independence, democratic control, transparency and the participation of stakeholders in the functioning of the regulatory agency;

8. Recalls that the independence of the functioning of regulatory agencies must be based on the following conditions: the suitability and the competence of its members, the objectivity and impartiality of their performance, the prohibition of any external instruction or recommendation, the existence of strict rules to avoid bias and conflicts of interest, the need for a very high level of loyalty and transparency, the periodical rotation of, and the possibility to remove, its members, the establishment of rules and codes together with the stakeholders, the prosecution of illegal behaviour or any other interferences, and the establishment of other appropriate mechanisms;

9. Declares that in order to ensure democratic control of the regulatory agencies effective legal, economic, political and citizens' control are required;

10. Reiterates that all agencies must be democratically accountable to the EU institutions, must be established in accordance with the Meroni judgement[1] and must at all times operate with respect for the principle of proportionality and, when their mission deals with issues in an area of shared competence, with respect for the principle of subsidiarity;

11. Considers it to be of the utmost importance to strengthen the role of Parliament in the functioning of agencies, guaranteeing its participation in the processes of appointment and removal of the members responsible as well as the exercise of regular and systematic control over the fulfilment of their remit;

12. Questions the need to establish regulatory agencies when they do not add value in areas already covered by national or other independent agencies; believes, when this is the case, that resources should, rather, be spent on strengthening national bodies and that consultation and exchange of best practice should take place in the framework of network structures or of Community forums; underlines the importance of impact assessments prior to the establishment of regulatory agencies in order to avoid overlapping functions and areas of responsibility;

13. Calls for the adoption of clear rules for the evaluation of the work of regulatory agencies; believes that cost-benefit analyses are a helpful tool for assessing the work and the performance of the agencies;

14. Is of the view that the transparency of the regulatory agencies must be ensured, in particular as regards their functioning, the disclosure and accessibility of information, and the programming and accountability of their actions;

15. Considers that participation in the activity of the regulatory agencies will have to be ensured by formally structuring the processes of consultation and dialogue with the stakeholders;

16. Advocates that the principles of good administration must be ensured by a common approach regarding personnel selection processes, budgeting and resources administration, efficient management and performance evaluation;

17. Supports the Commission's decision not to propose any new regulatory agencies until its evaluation is complete at the end of 2009; supports, however, the decision to proceed with the proposal to establish new regulatory agencies in the fields of energy and telecoms; points out that those two new agencies and the existing agencies will have to comply with the future general framework that establishes the role, structure, mandate, accountability, legitimacy and transparency of regulatory agencies; calls for an evaluation of existing agencies once an agreement on a common framework has been reached; encourages amending the basic acts governing existing regulatory agencies in order to make them consistent with such an agreed common framework;

18. Calls for cooperation among regulatory agencies within the European Union and for consideration, in the annual horizontal report on the agencies, of the possibility of consolidating those agencies with similar responsibilities so that they can function jointly, as well as abolishing those that have lost their raison d'être;

19. Reiterates the call of both Parliament and the Commission in the draft inter-institutional agreement of 2005 to incorporate a decision on an agency's seat into the basic act.

RESULT OF FINAL VOTE IN COMMITTEE

[1] Case 9/56 Meroni v. High Authority [1957/58] ECR 133.

for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs

on a strategy for the future settlement of the institutional aspects of Regulatory Agencies
(2008/2103(INI))

Draftsman: Paul Rübig

SUGGESTIONS

The Committee on Industry, Research and Energy calls on the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:

1. Welcomes the Commission communication entitled "European agencies – The way forward" (COM(2008)0135) on a strategy for the future settlement of the institutional aspects of the regulatory agencies, in general, and its intention to re-launch inter-institutional dialogue on the future of EU agencies and their role in European governance; considers this contribution to be timid, however, and possibly ineffective in terms of achieving a clear and concrete outcome from the discussion;

2. Regrets the absence of a general strategy for the creation of EU agencies, particularly those listed in Annex I, which fall within the remit of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy; notes that new agencies are being created on a case-by-case basis, leading to an non-transparent patchwork of regulatory agencies, executive agencies and other Community bodies each constituting a sui generis creation;

3. Stresses the need to align all 29 existing regulatory agencies as well as to set out a clear strategy for new agencies or other Community bodies; calls upon the Commission to put forward a proposal for a framework regulation establishing clear horizontal rules for their creation, structure, operation, evaluation and control;

4. Insists that a mandatory impact assessment covering relevance, cost-effectiveness and efficiency has to be carried out systematically before establishing a new agency or other Community body and that the establishment of the new agency or other Community body is subject to a clear and unambiguous finding that there is added value in delegating particular tasks of the Commission to such a new agency or other Community body;

5. Suggests restructuring all budget lines concerning agencies and other Community bodies in order to enhance transparency and control; proposes evaluating the idea of grouping all budget lines in question under a single budgetary heading;

6. Calls upon the Commission to present the results of its horizontal evaluation of agencies by the end of summer 2009 at the latest; asks the Commission to devise benchmarks in order to compare those results and to lay down clear rules for ending the mandate of agencies in the event of poor performance.

ANNEX

Regulatory agencies

AGENCY	SEAT	TERM OF THE AGENCY	BUDGET Source: COM(2007)300in Mio EUR	STAFF Source: COM(2007)300	MAIN TASK	EVALUATION
ENISAEuropean Network and Information Security Agency	HeraklionGR	14. 3. 2004 - 14. 3. 2009	2008 PDB: 8.1	2008: 44	- Enhance the capability of the EU and the Member States to prevent, address and respond to network and information security problems	Retrospective evaluation: 2007 Main responsible for the evaluation: Commission
European GNSS Supervisory Authority GALILEO	To be decided	To be decided	2008 PDB: 10.5	2008: 50	Licence authority for the GALILEO concession plan- Develops the European system GNSS - Ensure safety and certification - Manage the EGNOS agreement	Main responsible for the evaluation: Authority
EECMAEuropean Electronic Communications Market Authority (under consideration)	To be decided	2009 - to be decided	To be decided	To be decided	EC proposal:- Improve consistency of regulation in the EU - Reinforce cooperation between the NRAs and the Commission - A14Create a centre of expertise for regulatory issues linked to market analysis and the provision of cross-Community services	To be decided
ACERAgency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (under consideration)	To be decided	2009 - to be decided	To be decided	To be decided	EC proposal:- review "on a case-by-case basis" decisions made by national regulators in cross-boarder issues and ensure adequate co-operation between network operators	To be decided

Executive agencies

AGENCY	SEAT	TERM OF THE AGENCY	BUDGET Source: COM(2007)300in Mio EUR	STAFF Source: COM(2007)300	MAIN TASK	EVALUATION
EACIExecutive Agency for Competitiveness and Innovation	BrusselsBE	1. 1. 2003 - 31. 12. 2015	Under the general budget: 9.9 Under the Marco Polo: 0.8	Posts authorised under the Community budget: 36	- Manage the IEE (Intelligent Energy Europe) programme- Manage the Eco-innovation initiative and the Enterprise Europe Network and the Marco Polo programme	--
ERCEuropean Research Council Executive Agency	BrusselsBE	1. 1. 2008 - 31. 12. 2017	2008: 19.9 2009: 35.6 Total 7 PC: 231,3	2008: 2202013: 389	- European funding body set up to support investor-driven frontier research	--
REAResearch Executive Agency of the European Commission	BrusselsBE	1. 1. 2008 - 31. 12. 2017	2008: 14.62009: 35.2 Total 7 PC: 251,8	2008: 2742013: 558	- Manage a large part of the 7th Framework Programme for Research, Technological Development and Demonstration Activities (FP7)	--

Other Community Bodies

AGENCY	SEAT	TERM OF THE AGENCY	BUDGETin Mio EUR	STAFF Source: COM(2007)300	MAIN TASK	EVALUATION

EITEuropean Institute of Innovation and Technology	To be decided between Austria, Hungary and Poland	start planned 2nd half 2008	Community Funding: 308.7	Will consist of several Knowledge and Innovation Communities (KICs) and a central administration of about 60 people	- Speed up knowledge-transfer to boost innovation- Promote the creation of research spin-offs and start-ups	--
JTIsJoint Technology Initiatives - FCH- Clean Sky - IMI - ENIAC - ARTEMIS - GMES	Depending on the JTI	Depending on the JTI	Depending on the JTI	Depending on the JTI	- Long-term Public-Private Partnerships- Support large-scale multinational research activities in areas of major interest to European industrial competitiveness and issues of high societal relevance	--
JU ITEREuropean Joint Undertaking for ITER & the Development of Fusion Energy	BarcelonaES	start: 19. 4. 2007	9 653 with a contribution from Euratom of 7 649	2008: 145 posts (60 permanent and 85 temporary)	- Supports projects to accelerate the development of fusion as a clean and sustainable energy	--
JU SESAR Air Traffic Management	BrusselsBE		EU contribution: 700	2008: 23 posts planned	- Develop the new generation air traffic management system capable of ensuring the safety and fluidity of air transport worldwide over the next 30 years.	--

RESULT OF FINAL VOTE IN COMMITTEE

Date adopted

Result of final vote

+:

–:

0:

Members present for the final vote

Jean-Pierre Audy, Herbert Bösch, Paulo Casaca, Jorgo Chatzimarkakis, Antonio De Blasio, Esther De Lange, Petr Duchoň, James Elles, Szabolcs Fazakas, Christofer Fjellner, Ingeborg Gräßle, Ashley Mote, Bart Staes

Substitute(s) present for the final vote

Edit Herczog, Pierre Pribetich, Paul Rübig, Margarita Starkevičiūtė, Petya Stavreva

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