REPORT on the proposal for a Council directive (Euratom) setting up a Community framework for nuclear safety

3.4.2009 - (COM(2008)0790 – C6‑0026/2009 – 2008/0231(CNS)) - *

Committee on Industry, Research and Energy
Rapporteur: Gunnar Hökmark

DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

on the proposal for a Council directive (Euratom) setting up a Community framework for nuclear safety

(COM(2008)0790 – C6‑0026/2009 – 2008/0231(CNS))

(Consultation procedure)

The European Parliament,

–   having regard to the Commission proposal to the Council (COM(2008)0790),

–   having regard to Articles 31 and 32 of the Euratom Treaty, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C6‑0026/2009),

–   having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs on the proposed legal basis,

–   having regard to Rules 51 and 35 of its Rules of Procedure,

–   having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy and the opinion of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (A6-0236/2009),

1.  Approves the Commission proposal as amended;

2.  Calls on the Commission to alter its proposal accordingly, pursuant to Article 119, second paragraph, of the Euratom Treaty and to ensure that the legal requirements foreseen by the Euratom Treaty for the adoption of this proposal have been respected, notably the consultation of the group of experts in accordance with  Article 31 EA;

3.  Calls on the Council to notify Parliament if it intends to depart from the text approved by Parliament;

4.  Asks the Council to consult Parliament again if it intends to amend the Commission proposal substantially;

5.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council and Commission.

Amendment  1 Proposal for a directive Recital 6
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(6) While each Member State is free to decide on its energy mix, after a period of reflection, interest in the construction of new plants has grown and some Member States decided to licence new plants. Furthermore, requests for nuclear power plant life extensions are expected to be presented by licence holders in the years to come.	(6) Each Member State is free to decide on its energy mix.
Justification
It is important to uphold the principle that the Member States are free to decide over their energy mix. It is moreover equally important to point out that this Directive does not intend to create incentives for Member States to include nuclear power in their energy mix. Therefore, the essence of the deleted parts of recital 6 should be moved to recital 7, in order to create this distinction.
Amendment  2 Proposal for a directive Recital 7
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(7) For this purpose best practices should be developed to guide the regulatory bodies in their decisions on the lifetime extension of nuclear installations.	(7) Nuclear security is a matter of Community interest, which should be taken into consideration in the event of decisions on licensing new plants and/or extending the lifetime of nuclear installations. For this purpose best practices should be developed to guide the regulatory bodies and Member States when deciding whether or not to license new plants as well as in their decisions on the lifetime extension of nuclear installations.
Justification
Nuclear security is a matter of common interest in the Community and should therefore constitute the reason for developing a best practice, not the fact that some Member States want to licence new plants. Moreover is it suitable to mention that this best practice could act as guideline for the Member States too, and not only the regulatory bodies.
Amendment  3 Proposal for a directive Recital 9
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(9) The continuous improvement of nuclear safety requires that the management systems established and the licence holders ensure the high level of safety for the general public.	(9) The continuous improvement of nuclear safety requires that the management systems established and the licence holders and waste managers ensure the highest possible level of safety for the general public.
Justification
Safety standards of potential new and existing nuclear facilities must be the highest, corresponding to the technological, regulatory and operational state of the art in the Union. The same basic principle should also apply during the management of nuclear waste.
Amendment  4 Proposal for a directive Recital 10
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(10) Fundamentals and requirements set by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) constitute a framework of practices on which national safety requirements should be based. Member States have made considerable contributions to the improvement of those fundamentals and requirements.	(10) Fundamentals, requirements and guidelines set by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) constitute a set of rules and a framework of practices on which national safety requirements should be based. Member States have made considerable contributions to the improvement of those fundamentals, requirements and guidelines. Those rules should reflect best international practice as regards safety requirements and therefore constitute a good basis for Community legislation. They cannot be introduced into Community law by simple reference to the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1 (2006) in this Directive. An Annex containing the Fundamental Safety Principles should therefore be added to this Directive.
Justification
As such, being sole recommendations without binding status, IAEA safety principles cannot be introduced into Community law by simple reference to the IAEA Safety Standards Series in this Directive. An Annex containing the Fundamental Safety Principles should be added to the Directive. This approach presents the clear advantage of an increased certainty of regulation at Community level and would convey the legal basis to implement those principles.
Amendment  5 Proposal for a directive Recital 13
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(13) The provision of information to the public in an accurate and timely manner about important nuclear safety matters should be based on high level of transparency on issues relating to the safety of nuclear installations.	(13) The provision of information to nuclear industry workers and the public in an accurate and timely manner about important nuclear safety matters should be based on high level of transparency on issues relating to the safety of nuclear installations.
Justification
The amendment is consistent with art. 30 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community which provides that basic standards are to be laid down within the Community for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionising radiations, as well as with the EU Directives on information and consultation of workers.
Amendment  6 Proposal for a directive Recital 13 a (new)
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
	(13a) In order to ensure access to information, public participation and transparency, Member States should take all the appropriate measures to implement the obligations laid down in international conventions that already provide for the necessary requirements in national, international, or trans- boundary contexts, such as the Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters (Aarhus Convention, 25 June 1998)1.
	---------------------------------------------------------------1 OJ L 124, 17.5.2005, p. 1; OJ L 164, 16.6.2006, p. 17 and Regulation (EC) 1367/2006, OJ L 264, 25.09.2006, p. 13.
Justification
In relation to the transparency provisions in article 5 of the current proposal.
Amendment  7 Proposal for a directive Recital 15
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(15) In order to ensure the effective implementation of safety requirements for nuclear installations, Member States should establish regulatory bodies as independent authorities. Regulatory bodies should be provided with adequate competence and resources in order to be able to discharge their duties.	(15) In order to ensure the effective regulation of nuclear installations, Member States should establish regulatory bodies as authorities independent from interests that could unduly affect decisions on nuclear safety issues. Regulatory bodies should be provided with adequate competence and resources in order to be able to discharge their duties.
Justification
In relation to the amendment 20 on article 4 - paragraph 1, introduced by the Rapporteur on the independence of the regulatory body.
Amendment  8 Proposal for a directive Recital 19
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(19) The regulatory bodies charged with the safety of nuclear installations in the Member States should mainly cooperate through the European High Level Group on Nuclear Safety and Waste Management which has developed ten principles for the regulation of nuclear safety. The European High Level Group on Nuclear Safety and Waste Management should contribute to the Community nuclear safety framework with the aim of continuously improving it.	(19) The regulatory bodies charged with the supervision of the nuclear installations in the Member States should mainly cooperate through the European High Level Group on Nuclear Safety and Waste Management. The High Level Group has developed ten principles for the regulation of nuclear safety which are important in the context of this Directive. The European High Level Group on Nuclear Safety and Waste Management should contribute to the Community nuclear safety framework with the aim of continuously improving it.
Amendment  9 Proposal for a directive Article 1 – paragraph 1
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
1. This Directive aims at achieving, maintaining and continuously improving nuclear safety in the Community and to enhance the role of the national regulatory bodies.	1. This Directive aims at creating a Community framework for nuclear safety in the European Union. It sets out a foundation for legislation and regulatory arrangements in the Member States concerning nuclear safety and aims at achieving, maintaining and continuously improving nuclear safety in the Community and to enhance the role of the national regulatory bodies.
Justification
The aim of the Directive should be defined more clearly. Its aim is to create a single Community framework. This is addressed directly in the amendment.
Amendment  10 Proposal for a directive Article 1 – paragraph 2
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
2. It shall apply to the design, siting, construction, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear installations, for which consideration of safety is required under the legislative and regulatory framework of the Member State concerned.	2. It shall apply to the design, siting, construction, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear installations, for which consideration of safety shall be required under the legislative and regulatory framework of the Member State concerned.
Justification
As the Directive aims at establishing a common framework with the inclusion of the IAEA's safety principles in an annex, it is relevant to underline that what is written in this Directive shall be applied by the Member States.
Amendment  11 Proposal for a directive Article 1 – paragraph 2
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
2. It shall apply to the design, siting, construction, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear installations, for which consideration of safety is required under the legislative and regulatory framework of the Member State concerned.	2. It shall apply to the design, siting, construction, maintenance, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of nuclear installations and to work carried out by subcontractors used by operators, for which consideration of safety is required under the legislative and regulatory framework of the Member State concerned.
Justification
A group of workers that is a potential risk factor and is potentially exposed to health and safety risk in nuclear installation are workers involved in activities like repairs, maintenance and cleaning of nuclear installations. Such activity is very often contracted out, and sub-sub contracted. These workers are the least trained and informed, and not integrated in the health and safety procedures of the operator. The Directive needs to make clear that all those involved have a high responsibility for safety and the safety culture.
Amendment  12 Proposal for a directive Article 2 – point 1
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(1) "nuclear installation” means a nuclear fuel fabrication plant, research reactor (including subcritical and critical assemblies), nuclear power plant, spent fuel storage facility, enrichment plant or reprocessing facility;	(1) "nuclear installation” means a nuclear fuel fabrication plant, research reactor (including subcritical and critical assemblies), nuclear power plant, spent fuel and radioactive waste storage facility, enrichment plant or reprocessing facility, including facilities for handling and treatment of radioactive substances generated during the operation of an installation;
Amendment  13 Proposal for a directive Article 2 – point 3
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(3) “radioactive material” means any material containing one or more radionuclides the activity or concentration thereof cannot be disregarded as far as radiation protection is concerned;	(3) “radioactive substance” means any material containing one or more radionuclides the activity or concentration thereof cannot be disregarded as far as radiation protection is concerned;
Justification
The term “radioactive substance” is used in EU Directive 96/29/Euratom laying down basic safety standards for the protection of health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionising radiation.
Amendment  14 Proposal for a directive Article 2 – point 8
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(8) ”regulatory body" means any body or bodies authorised by the Member State to grant in that Member State licences and to supervise the siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation or decommissioning of nuclear installations;	(8) ”regulatory body" means an authority or a system of authorities designated by a Member State as having the legal authority to conduct the regulatory process, including the issue of authorisations, and thereby the regulation of nuclear, radiation, radioactive waste and transport safety;
Justification
Responsibilities should be clearly assigned to the Regulatory body in charge of regulating and controlling safety aspects of nuclear installations. This process is distinct from licensing schemes as such, under the responsibility of competent national or governmental authorities.
Amendment  15 Proposal for a directive Article 2 – point 9
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(9) "licence" means any authorisation granted by the regulatory body to the applicant to confer the responsibility for the siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation or decommissioning of nuclear installations;	(9) "licence" means any authorisation granted by a government or a national authority approved by that government to the applicant to confer the responsibility for the siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation or decommissioning of nuclear installations;
Justification
See justification of article 2 - point (8).
Amendment  16 Proposal for a directive Article 2 – point 10
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(10) “new power reactors” mean nuclear power reactors licensed to operate after the entry into force of this Directive.	(10) “new power reactors” mean nuclear power reactors licensed for construction after the entry into force of this Directive.
Justification
As regards the provision of article 6.2, the issue is to determine when new requirements, especially on safety design aspect, can be introduced. The authorisation to operate comes at the end of the regulatory process, once the construction is completed and revision of safety dossier can hardly be envisaged.
Amendment  17 Proposal for a directive Article 3 – title
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
Responsibility and framework for the safety of nuclear installations	Legal framework for the safety of nuclear installations
Justification
As it stands the amended article 3 is a reorganisation from articles 3, 4, 8 and 10 of the proposal and concerns the obligation for MS to adopt a legislative and regulatory framework ensuring the regulation and the supervision of nuclear installations. This includes: (i) an appropriate regulatory framework, notably providing for national safety requirements, licensing system and regulatory inspections, and the right for MS to impose more stringent safety measures; (ii) a priority given to safety policies; (iii) a peer review of the regulatory framework and regulatory body in place.
Amendment  18 Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 1
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
1. The prime responsibility for the safety of nuclear installations shall rest with the holder of the license under the control of the regulatory body. The safety measures and controls to be implemented in a nuclear installation shall be decided only by the regulatory body and applied by the licence holder.	deleted
The licence holder shall have the prime responsibility for safety throughout the lifetime of the nuclear installations until its release from regulatory control. This responsibility of the licence holder cannot be delegated.
(See provisions introduced in article 7 - paragraph 1 (new )).
Amendment  19 Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 2
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
2. Member States shall establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory framework to govern the safety of nuclear installations. This shall include national safety requirements, a system of licensing and control of nuclear installations and the prohibition of their operation without a licence and a system of regulatory supervision including the necessary enforcement.	1. Member States shall establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory framework, based on EU and international best available practices, to govern the safety of nuclear installations. This shall include national safety requirements, a system of licensing and control of nuclear installations and the prohibition of their operation without a licence and a system of regulatory supervision, through suspension, modification or revocation of licences including the necessary enforcement.
Justification
See justification of amendment 11 on article 3 - title.
Amendment  20 Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 2 a (new)
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
	2a. Member States shall ensure that legislation is put in place to provide for withdrawal of the operating licence of a nuclear installation in cases of serious breaches of the conditions of a licence.
(New amendment partly redrafted from article 8 - paragraph 2)
Justification
See justification of amendment 11 to article 3 - title.
Amendment  21 Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 2 b (new)
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
	2b. Member States shall ensure that all organisations engaged in activities directly related to nuclear installations shall establish policies that give due priority to nuclear safety.
Justification
See justification of amendment 11 on article 3 - title.
Amendment  22 Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 2 c (new)
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
	2c. Member States shall ensure that at least every ten years the regulatory body and the national regulatory system is submitted to an international peer review aimed at continuously improving the regulatory infrastructure.
	Member States shall notify the results of the international peer review to the Commission.
(New amendment partly redrafted from article 4 - paragraph 5)
Justification
International peer reviews enable MS and their regulatory bodies to exchange best regulatory practices and develop a common understanding of international and EC requirements. This would participate to enhancing the harmonisation of safety requirements at EC level and the continuous improvement of nuclear safety in the Community. As such, the Commission should be kept informed of the results of the peer reviews.
Amendment  23 Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 2 d (new)
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
	2d. Member States may lay down more stringent safety measures than those laid down in this Directive.
(New amendment entirely taken from article 10)
Justification
See justification of amendment 11 on article 3 - title.
Amendment  24 Proposal for a directive Article 4 – title
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
Regulatory bodies	Designation and responsibilities of the regulatory bodies
Justification
This reorganised article 4 is dedicated to the regulatory body, its tasks, resources and competences. In particular, the independence of the regulatory body as regards governments and nuclear industry policy should be clearly strengthened and further developed.
Amendment  25 Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph – -1 (new)
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
	-1. Member States shall designate a national regulatory body responsible for regulating, supervising and assessing the safety of nuclear installations.
Justification
See justification of amendment 18 on article 4 - title.
Amendment  26 Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
1. Member States shall ensure that the regulatory body is effectively independent of all organisations whose task is to promote, operate nuclear installations or justify societal benefits and free from any influence that may affect the safety.	1. Member States shall ensure the effective independence of the regulatory body. For this purpose, Member States shall ensure that, when carrying out the tasks conferred upon it by this Directive:
	(a) the regulatory body is legally distinct and functionally independent from any other public or private entity, and, in particular from those whose task is to promote, operate nuclear installations or justify societal benefits, and free from any influence that may affect safety;
	(b) that the staff of the regulatory body and the persons responsible for its management act independently from any market interest and shall not seek or take instructions from any government or other public or private entity, when carrying out its regulatory duties.
	This requirement is without prejudice to close cooperation, as appropriate, with other relevant national authorities.
Justification
While endorsing the rapporteur´s insistence on the independence of the regulatory body, this should be ensured during all its activities and solely to when it performs "regulatory duties".
Amendment  27 Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 2
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
2. The regulatory body shall be provided with adequate authority, competence and financial and human resources to fulfil its responsibilities and discharge its duties. It shall supervise and regulate the safety of nuclear installations and ensure the implementation of safety requirements, condition and safety regulations.	2. Member States shall ensure that the regulatory body has adequate authority, competence and financial and human resources to fulfil its responsibilities and discharge its duties. The regulatory body shall supervise and regulate the safety of nuclear installations and ensure that the applicable safety requirements and licensing conditions are met.
Justification
See justification of amendment 18 on article 4 - title.
Amendment  28 Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 3
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
3. The regulatory body shall grant licenses and monitor their application on siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation or decommissioning of nuclear installations.	deleted
Justification
See justification of amendment 8 on article 2 - point (8) and provisions introduced in amendment 23 on article 4 - paragraph 3 a (new).
Amendment  29 Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 3 a (new)
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
	3a. Member States shall ensure that the regulatory body carries out nuclear safety assessments, investigations and controls and, where necessary, enforcement actions shall be carried out by the regulatory body in nuclear installations throughout their lifetime, including during decommissioning.
(New amendment partly redrafted from article 8 - paragraph 1)
Justification
See justification of amendment 18 on article 4 - title.
Amendment  30 Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 3 b (new)
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
	3b. Member States shall ensure that the regulatory body is empowered to order the suspension of operations of any nuclear installations in cases where safety is not guaranteed.
(New amendment partly redrafted from article 8 - paragraph 3)
Justification
See justification of amendment18 on article 4 - title.
Amendment  31 Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 4
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
4. Regulatory bodies shall ensure that licence holders have at their disposal appropriate staff in terms of numbers and qualifications.	deleted
(See provisions reintroduced inarticle 7 - paragraph 3).
Amendment  32 Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 5
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
5. At least every ten years the regulatory body shall submit itself and the national regulatory system to an international peer review aimed at continuously improving the regulatory infrastructure.	deleted
(See provisions reintroduced in article 3 - paragraph 2 c (new), on the legal framework established by Member States).
Amendment  33 Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 5 a (new)
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
	5a. Regulatory bodies of the Member States shall exchange best regulatory practice and develop a common understanding of internationally accepted nuclear safety requirements.
Justification
This should result in the harmonisation of safety requirements and of the framework for regulatory processes within the European Union.
Amendment  34 Proposal for a directive Article 5
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
Member States shall inform the public about the procedures and the results of the surveillance activities on nuclear safety. They shall also ensure that the regulatory bodies effectively inform the public in the fields of their competence. Access to information shall be ensured, in accordance with relevant national and international obligations.	Member States shall inform the public and the Commission about the procedures and the results of the surveillance activities on nuclear safety and shall inform the public immediately in the event of any incident. They shall also ensure that the regulatory bodies effectively inform the public in the fields of their competence. Access to information shall be ensured, in accordance with relevant national and international obligations.
Amendment  35 +(Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
1. Member States shall respect the IAEA safety fundamentals (IAEA Safety Fundamentals: Fundamental safety principles, IAEA Safety Standard Series No. SF-1 (2006)). They shall observe the obligations and requirements incorporated in the Convention on Nuclear safety (IAEA INFCIRC 449 of 5 July 1994).	1. For the siting, design, construction, operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities, Member States shall apply those parts of the IAEA safety fundamentals (IAEA Safety Fundamentals: Fundamental safety principles, IAEA Safety Standard Series No. SF-1 (2006)), which are relevant to the creation of a Community framework for nuclear safety, as specified in the Annex. They shall apply the obligations and requirements incorporated in the Convention on Nuclear Safety1.
	________________________________________________________________1OJ L 318, 11.12.1999, p. 20 and OJ L 172, 6.5.2004, p. 7.
Justification
See Recital 10. The Reference to a non binding act in the directive has not the effect making it binding. In order to render binding the content of the Safety Fundamental Principles, its terms should be set forth as part of the binding act. An annex containing the provisions of the Safety Fundamentals would enable to: ( i) be consistent with the Joint Practical Guide of the EP, the Council, and the Commission for persons involved in the drafting of legislation within the Community institutions; (ii) ensure the legal certainty of the text with a 'static' reference to the IAEA principles as above.
Amendment  36 Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
They shall in particular ensure that the applicable principles laid down in the IAEA safety fundamentals are implemented to ensure a high level of safety in nuclear installations, including inter alia effective arrangements against potential radiological hazards, accident prevention and response, ageing management, long term management of all produced radioactive materials and information of the population and the authorities of neighbouring States.	deleted
Justification
See justification of amendment 28 to article 6 - paragraph 1 - subparagraph 1.
Amendment  37 Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 2
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
2. As regards the safety of new nuclear power reactors Member States shall aim to develop additional safety requirements, in line with the continuous improvement of safety on the basis of the safety levels developed by the Western European Nuclear Regulators' Association (WENRA) and in close collaboration with the European High Level Group on Nuclear Safety and Waste Management.	2. For the licensing of construction of new nuclear power reactors Member States shall aim to develop additional safety requirements, reflecting the continuous improvement of the operating experience of existing reactors, insight gained from safety analyses for operating plants, state of the art methodologies and technology and results of safety research.
Justification
As the technologies and safety standards improve, the safety requirements for nuclear installations must continuously increase. The level of safety in nuclear installations shall work as "a race to the top" in order to, at any time, obtain the best possible security. The reference to the safety levels developed by WENRA, as regard new nuclear reactor, cannot be inserted in the core of the Directive since common safety reference levels for future reactors are not mature yet. The EC cannot commit MS to implement them.
Amendment  38 Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 2 a (new)
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
	2a. The Commission shall ensure that all third countries that wish to enter or are in the process of negotiating their accession to the EU will comply, as a minimum, with the standards set out in this Directive and the principles in the Annex, as set by the IAEA.
Justification
It is imperative to ensure that neighbouring countries to the EU follow at least the same standards of nuclear safety as the results of nuclear accidents are always transboundary.
Amendment  39 Proposal for a directive Article 7 – title
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
Obligations of licence holders	Responsibilities of licence holders
Justification
This article, redrafted and reorganised, is dedicated to the responsibilities of the holder of the license: Member States shall ensure that the prime responsibility for the safety of a nuclear installation rests with the holder of the licence, and that shall take the appropriate measures to ensure that the licence holder meets its responsibility.
Amendment  40 Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph – -1 (new)
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
	-1. Member States shall ensure that the prime responsibility for the safety of nuclear installations, throughout the lifetime of the nuclear installations, shall rest with the holder of the licence. This responsibility of the licence holder cannot be delegated.
(New amendment partly redrafted from article 3 - paragraph 1 and 2)
Amendment  41 Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 1
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
1. Licence holders shall design, construct, operate and decommission their nuclear installations in accordance with the provisions set out in Article 6(1) and (2).	1. Member States shall ensure that licence holders are responsible for the design, construction, operation and decommissioning of their nuclear installations in accordance with the provisions set out in Article 6.
Justification
The Directive should be addressed to the Member States and not to the licence holders.
Amendment  42 Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 2
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
2. Licence holders shall establish and implement management systems which shall be regularly verified by the regulatory body.	2. Member States shall ensure that licence holders establish and implement management systems which are regularly verified by the regulatory body.
Amendment  43 Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 3
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
3. Licence holders shall allocate adequate financial and human resources to fulfil their obligations.	3. Member States shall ensure that licence holders allocate adequate financial and human resources to fulfil their obligations. The staff of licence holders shall be adequately qualified for all activities of importance for nuclear safety.
Amendment  44 Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 3 a (new)
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
	3a. Member States shall ensure that the regulatory body assess regularly the sufficiency and qualifications of the staff of the licence hoder, as a prerequisite for ensuring nuclear safety, on the basis of a report presented by the licence holder on the evaluation of employment issues such health and safety and the safety culture, qualifications and training, numbers of staff employed and use of subcontractors.
Justification
It is generally recognised that the human factor is an important risk in nuclear operations. While the responsibility of the licence holder is clear, reporting on the its safety culture related to the human factor can be improved. A regular report will allow for improvement. The amendment is consistent and complementary to amendment 35 of the rapporteur.
Amendment  45 Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 3 a (new)
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
	3a. The relevant regulatory authorities shall, every three years, present to the European Commission and the European social partners a report on nuclear safety and safety culture. The Commission, in consultation with the European social partners, may propose improvements to ensure nuclear safety including health protection at the highest possible level in the EU.
Justification
The Fundamental Safety principles referred to by the EC and if adopted through amendment 43 of the rapporteur, do not establish how experience is improved regarding nuclear safety, especially health and safety. Member States, regulators, the EC and the operators and workers’ representatives all benefit from a regular exchange of information and experience allowing for improvements and the establishment of a safety culture that is EU level. Social partners concerned are those in the intersectoral and sectorial social dialogue for the electricity sector.
Amendment  46 Proposal for a directive Article 8 – paragraph 1
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
1. Nuclear safety assessments, investigations, controls and, where necessary, enforcement actions shall be carried out by the regulatory body in nuclear installations throughout their lifetime, including during decommissioning.	deleted
(See provisions reintroduced in article 4 - paragraph 3 a (new)).
Amendment  47 Proposal for a directive Article 8 – paragraph 2
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
2. The regulatory body shall have the power to withdraw the operating licence in case of serious or repeated safety rules breaches in the nuclear installation.	deleted
(See provisions reintroduced in article 3 - paragraph 2 a (new)).
Amendment  48 Proposal for a directive Article 8 – paragraph 3
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
3. The regulatory body shall have the power to order the suspension of operations of any nuclear plant if it deems that safety is not fully guaranteed.	deleted
(See provisions reintroduced in article 4 - paragraph 3 b (new)).
Amendment  49 Proposal for a directive Article 9
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
Appropriate education and training opportunities for continuous theoretical and practical training in nuclear safety shall be made available by Member States separately and through trans-national cooperation.	In order to build adequate national human resources and preserve nuclear knowledge, Member States shall ensure that education and training opportunities for basic and continuous theoretical and practical training in nuclear safety, including exchange programmes, are made available by Member States and, if necessary, through transnational cooperation.
Amendment  50 Proposal for a directive Article 10
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
Article 10	deleted
Priority to safety
Member States may lay down more stringent safety measures than those laid down in this Directive.
(See provisions reintroduced in article 3 - paragraph 2 d (new.
Amendment  51 Proposal for a directive Article 11
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
Member States shall submit a report to the Commission on the implementation of this Directive by [three years after the entry into force] at the latest, and every three years thereafter. On the basis of the first report, the Commission shall present a report to the Council on progress made with the implementation of this Directive, accompanied, if appropriate, by legislative proposals.	Member States shall report to the Commission on the implementation of this Directive at the same time and frequency as for their national reports under review meetings of the Convention of the Nuclear Safety. On the basis of this report, the Commission shall present a report to the European Parliament and the Council on progress made with the implementation of this Directive, accompanied, if appropriate, by legislative proposals.
Justification
(i) It is necessary to ensure a good coordination with the reports made by Member States under the corresponding provisions of the CNS Convention.(ii)
Monitoring, reporting and transparency are paramount for the implementation of this Directive. This is crucial to ensure the association of the EP on matters under the Chapter III of the Euratom Treaty and in particular to enable the EP to be tightly informed.
Amendment  52 Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 1
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by [two years after the date referred to in Article 13] at the latest. They shall forthwith communicate to the Commission the text of those provisions and a correlation table between those provisions and this Directive.	Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by [two years after the date referred to in Article 13] at the latest. They shall forthwith communicate to the Commission the text of those provisions.
Amendment  53 Proposal for a directive Annex (new)
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
	Annex
	SAFETY OBJECTIVE
	The fundamental safety objective is to protect workers and the general public from harmful effects of ionising radiation, which may be caused by nuclear installations.
	1. To ensure the protection of workers and the general public, nuclear installations shall be operated so as to achieve the highest standards of safety that can reasonably be achieved taking into account economic and social factors.
	In addition to the measures concerning health protection, laid down in the Euratom Basic Standards (Directive 96/29/Euratom), the following measures shall be taken:
	- restriction of the likelihood of events that might lead to a loss of control over a nuclear reactor core, nuclear chain reaction, radioactive source and
	- mitigation of the consequences of such events if they were to occur.
	2. The fundamental safety objective shall be taken into account for all nuclear installations and for all stages over the lifetime of the nuclear installation.
	SAFETY PRINCIPLES
	Principle 1: Responsibility for safety
	Each Member State shall ensure that the prime responsibility for the safety of a nuclear installation rests with the holder of the relevant licence and shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that all such licence holders meet their responsibility.
	1.1 Each Member State shall ensure that the licensee has implemented provisions for:
	- establishing and maintaining the necessary competences;
	- providing adequate training and information;
	- establishing procedures and arrangements to maintain safety under all conditions;
	- verifying appropriate design and the adequate quality of nuclear installations;
	- ensuring the safe control of all radioactive material that is used, produced or stored;
	- ensuring the safe control of all radioactive waste that is generated
	to fulfil the responsibility for the safety of a nuclear installation.
	These responsibilities shall be fulfilled in accordance with applicable safety objectives and requirements as established or approved by the regulatory body, and their fulfilment shall be ensured through the implementation of a management system.
	Principle 2: Leadership and management for safety
	Effective leadership and management for safety must be established and sustained in all organisations concerned with nuclear safety.
	2.1 Leadership in safety matters shall be demonstrated at the highest levels in an organisation. An effective management system shall be implemented and maintained, integrating all elements of management so that requirements for safety are established and applied coherently with other requirements, including those relating to human performance, quality and security, and so that safety is not compromised by other requirements or demands.
	The management system also shall ensure the promotion of a safety culture, the regular assessment of safety performance and the application of lessons learned from experience.
	2.2 A safety culture that governs the attitudes and behaviour in relation to safety of all organizations and individuals concerned shall be integrated into the management system. Safety culture includes:
	- individual and collective commitment to safety on the part of the leadership, the management and personnel at all levels;
	- accountability of organisations and of individuals at all levels for safety;
	- measures to encourage a questioning and learning attitude and to discourage complacency with regard to safety.
	2.3 The management system shall recognise the entire range of interactions of individuals at all levels with technology and with organisations. To prevent safety, significant human, and organisational failures, human factors shall be taken into account and good performance and good practices shall be supported.
	Principle 3: Assessment of Safety
	Comprehensive and systematic safety assessments shall be carried out before the construction and commissioning of a nuclear installation and throughout its lifetime. A graded approach shall be used taking in account the magnitude of the potential risks arising from the nuclear installation.
	3.1 The regulatory body shall require an assessment on nuclear safety for all nuclear installations, consistent with a graded approach. This safety assessment shall involve the systematic analysis of normal operation and its effects, of the ways in which failures might occur and of the consequences of such failures. The safety assessments shall cover the safety measures necessary to control the hazard, and the design and engineered safety features shall be assessed to demonstrate that they fulfil the safety functions required of them. Where control measures or operator actions are called on to maintain safety, an initial safety assessment shall be carried out to demonstrate that the arrangements made are robust and that they can be relied on. An authorisation for a nuclear installation shall only be granted by a Member State once it has been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the regulatory body that the safety measures proposed by the licensee are adequate.
	3.2 The required safety assessment shall be repeated in whole or in part as necessary later in the conduct of operations in order to take into account changed circumstances (such as the application of new standards or scientific and technological developments), the feedback of operating experience, modifications and the effects of ageing. For operations that continue over long periods of time, assessments shall be reviewed and repeated as necessary. Continuation of such operations shall be subject to these reassessments demonstrating that the safety measures remain adequate.
	3.3 Within the required safety assessment precursors to accidents (an initiating event that could lead to accident conditions) shall be identified and analysed, and measures shall be taken to prevent the occurrence of accidents.
	3.4 To further enhance safety, processes shall be put in place for the feedback and analysis of operating experience in own and other facilities, including initiating events, accident precursors, "near misses", accidents and unauthorised acts, so that lessons may be learned, shared and acted upon.
	Principle 4: Optimisation of safety
	Member States shall ensure that nuclear installations are optimised to provide the highest level of safety that can reasonably practicable be achieved without unduly limiting their operation.
	4.1 The optimisation of safety shall require judgements to be made about the relative significance of various factors, including:
	- the likelihood of the occurrence of foreseeable events and the resulting consequences;
	- the magnitude and distribution of radiation doses received;
	- economic, social and environmental factors arising from the radiation risks.
	- The optimisation of safety also means using good practices and common sense as far as is practical in day to day activities.
	Principle 5: Prevention and mitigation
	Member States shall ensure that all practical efforts are made to prevent and mitigate nuclear incidents and accidents in its nuclear installations.
	5.1 Each Member State shall ensure, that the licensees engage all practical efforts
	- to prevent the occurrence of abnormal conditions or incidents that could lead to a loss of control;
	- to prevent the escalation of any such abnormal conditions or incidents that do occur; and
	- to mitigate any harmful consequences of an accident.
	by implementing “defence in depth”.
	5.2 The application of the defence in depth concept shall ensure that no single technical, human or organisational failure could lead to harmful effects, and that the combinations of failures that could give rise to significant harmful effects are of very low probability.
	5.3 Defence in depth shall be implemented through the combination of a number of consecutive and independent levels of protection that would all have to fail before harmful effects could be caused to workers or the general public. The levels of defence in depth shall include:
	- an adequate site selection
	- an adequate design of the nuclear installation, consisting of
	High quality of design and construction
	High reliability of components and equipment
	Control, limiting and protection systems and surveillance features;
	- an adequate organisation with
	An effective management system with a strong management commitment to safety culture
	Comprehensive operational procedures and practices
	Comprehensive accident management procedures
	Emergency preparedness arrangements
	Principle 6: Emergency preparedness and response
	Members States shall ensure that arrangements are made for emergency preparedness and response for nuclear installations accidents according to Directive 96/29/Euratom.
Justification
The IAEA Safety Fundamental Principles and the CNS also cover a different range of activities/installations than those in the proposed Directive. This Annex includes the relevant IAEA and CNS principles, adapted to the EU context, which are covered by the present proposal. In adhering to the adaptation of the IAEA Safety Fundamentals and the CNS, the clarification of Article 6.1 as proposed in another amendment needs to be linked to the Annex.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

The Commission's proposal for a Directive aims to restart the process of establishing a common EU framework on nuclear safety, initially launched in 2003.

The objective is to achieve an EU nuclear safety framework, based upon several operational objectives, namely enhancing the role of national regulators, reinforcing their independence and ensuring a high level of transparency on the safety of nuclear installations. This proposal integrates the principles of the main international instruments available, such as the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the safety work carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The Rapporteur particularly welcomes this proposal which contributes to reinforcing the current European legal framework so as to enhance transparency and governance of nuclear activities. The EP has consistently called[1] for the urgent need to draw up robust legislation and adopt concrete measures at Community level in the fields of nuclear safety, the management of radioactive waste and the decommissioning of nuclear plants the adoption. This is of particular importance given the significance of nuclear energy, which is produced in 15 out of 27 Member States and which meets around one-third of electricity demand in the EU. The importance played by nuclear energy is also likely to increase, in the light of the relative "renaissance" of nuclear energy - six new reactors currently under construction in four Member States - and extension of the operating lifetime of power stations, as well as being one of the key factors in achieving an independent EU energy policy and the goal of decreasing CO₂ emissions in the combat against climate change.

In this regard, the Rapporteur would highlight that although the choice to include nuclear energy in the energy mix lies with the Member States, the European Union has a key role to ensure that this source of energy is developed while being governed by constraining rules and a regulatory framework through the Euratom Treaty. It is now established, without controversy, that the Commission has competency in the field of nuclear safety under the articles 31 and 32 of Euratom Treaty with the aim of laying down "uniform safety standards to protect the health of workers and of the general public and ensure that they are applied", as confirmed by the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-29/99 Commission v Council[2].

In addition, the approach retained by the Commission paves the way to the development of a legislative corpus on harmonised standards for nuclear safety and derived legislation forming the framework for the Member States' national rules on nuclear safety. It is also vital as regards the Euratom cooperation agreements on nuclear safety, control of nuclear materials and assistance to third countries, in order to ensure that all nuclear activity is conducted in line with the highest standards of safety. Therefore, this proposal reinforces the international credibility of Euratom contribution in the field of nuclear safety.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE RAPPORTEUR:

I - Policy option:

The policy option retained by the Commission consists in the elaboration of an EC legislation that sets up a common framework built upon existing international rules already developed by the IAEA, complemented by additional requirements for new nuclear plants, with the aim of achieving, maintaining and continuously improving nuclear safety in the Community. This framework provides for safety principles as well as imposing upon Member States the requirement to adopt a legislative and regulatory framework ensuring the regulation and the supervision of nuclear installations, mainly through: the elaboration of national safety requirements, a system of licensing of nuclear installations, an independent regulatory body, a system of supervision, assessment and control of nuclear installations.

(i) The Rapporteur can generally adhere to this option: it fully respects the subsidiary principle in a field of shared competencies with Members States. In addition, it provides for sufficient flexibility in the implementation of the directive, ensuring that the safety principles are commonly defined (those referred to in the directive) and leaving with Member States the responsibility to adopt the necessary measures, as well as the freedom to adopt stronger rules.

This approach is in line with the principle of national liability for the safety of nuclear installations, prime responsibility resting with the holder of the licence under the control of an independent regulatory body.

In this regard, the Rapporteur would therefore propose a slight improvement in reordering the structure of the draft proposal, reflecting better the hierarchy of norms and responsibilities between: the definition of a national regulatory framework; the role of the independent regulatory body; the principles and requirements to adopt and the responsibility of the licence holder.

(ii) The Rapporteur is confident that at the same time the framework directive provides for real harmonisation of the safety principles: the proposal asks Member States to respect the IEAE principles and to observe the obligations of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, concluded under the aegis of the IAEA. This shows a recognition on the part of the Commission that the necessary rules already exist at the international level and are well developed. They constitute a good basis for Community legislation whose purpose therefore is to ensure its real and uniform implementation by Member States.

The Rapporteur also shares the view that the standards, methods and guidance of the IAEA constitute a sound framework of the best recognised practises at international level, from which most national requirements are derived. Their introduction into EC law is aimed at ensuring the fulfilment of the obligations at EU level, and to give the Commission the necessary tools to control and sanction the respect of those rules and to ensure the compliance of national legislations with the Directive's provisions.

II - Credibility of the process of harmonisation of safety rules:

(i) The Rapporteur is concerned about ensuring a real independency of the regulatory body.

The fundamental added value of the proposed Directive is the enhancement of the role of the regulatory body in national legislation. The Rapporteur considers that its role should be better defined and its independence increased. This would ensure its legitimacy by giving it powers to take all necessary urgent measures, including the suspension of activity of a nuclear plant (see the redrafted article 4).

(ii) The legal certainty of the regulation at EU level

Fundamentals, Requirements and Guidance set by the IAEA constitute a set of rules and a framework of practices upon which Community legislation and national safety requirements should be based. In particular, the Commission recognises that the 10 Fundamental principles published by the IAEA in 2006 constitute a unified set of principles and the basis upon which to establish Member States’ safety requirements. As such, being sole recommendations without binding status, the Rapporteur considers however that they cannot be introduced into Community law by simple reference to the IAEA Safety Standards Series in this Directive. The Rapporteur would therefore advocate that an Annex containing the Fundamental safety principles should be added to the Directive. This approach presents the clear advantage of an increased certainty of regulation at Community level and would convey the legal basis to implement those principles and would make effective the harmonisation at EU level.

As regards the obligations stemming from the CNS Convention, the Rapporteur welcomes the direct reference in the Directive to the obligations concluded by Member States.

The role given to WENRA and the High level Group with a view to aligning and further developing additional safety requirements for "new reactors" is unclear. The Rapporteur is less concerned by the status of those ad-hoc groups (WENRA being an informal association of nuclear regulatory authorities) than by the fact that safety levels and standards for future technologies are not mature yet. The Directive can hardly prejudge the results of this process and commit Member States to implement them. The Rapporteur sees this process as a source of legal uncertainty. In line with the principle of subsidiarity, the Rapporteur would preferably advocate encouraging Member States to pursue the continuous improvement of safety standards. As they take into account the best practices available and best experience gained as well as reflecting technological developments and improvements, the harmonisation will constitute a “race to the top”, since the levels of safety standards increase and improvements are perpetually implemented.

III - Transparency

(i) It is necessary to reinforce the current legal framework to enhance transparency and public acceptance.

The Rapporteur supports the reference to the relevant international conventions. In this field too, a set of prescriptions have been developed so as to ensure access to information, public participation and transparency in national, international or transboundary contexts, such as the Aarhus Convention or the Espoo Convention. In asking Member States to implement their obligations, the Directive gives the Commission the tools to ensure that Member States effectively organise the transparency of the decision-making process and of the results of controls in the safety field.

(ii) The Rapporteur considers that monitoring, reporting and transparency are the essential elements for the framework directive.

The Rapporteur underlines the need to ensure the association of the EP on matters under provisions of the Euratom Treaty and in particular to give the EP the tools to be kept well informed and to follow the activity in the field of nuclear safety.

The EP should be adequately informed by the Commission regarding the regular reports on the implementation of the Directive produced under Art. 11 whose frequency should be aligned with the requirements of the Convention of Nuclear Safety and its review process.

Both reports as well as peer reviews contribute to identify areas of best practices and to enhance the continuous improvement of nuclear safety in the Community. The EP must be a part of this process.

For all the above-mentioned reasons, the Rapporteur proposes to amend the Commission's proposal.

• [1]  The Maldeikis Report on Assessing Euratom 50 Years of European nuclear energy (A6-0129/2007, dated 02.04.2007); Reul Report on Conventional energy sources and energy technology (A6-0348/2007, dated 24.10.2007).
• [2]  Case C-29/99 Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Union ECR 2002, p. I-11221.

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AFFAIRS ON THE LEGAL BASIS

1.4.2009

Mrs Angelika Niebler

Chair

Committee on Industry, Research and Energy

BRUSSELS

Subject:           Opinion on the legal basis of the proposal for a Council Directive (EURATOM) setting up a Community framework for nuclear safety (COM(2008)0790 – C6‑0026/2009 – 2008/0231(CNS))

Dear Mrs Niebler,

The Legal Affairs Committee has decided to take up the question of the legal basis of the above-mentioned Commission proposal on its own initiative pursuant to Rule 35(3) of the Rules of Procedure.

The committee considered the above question at its meeting of 31 March 2009.

The Industry Committee is currently dealing with the proposal for a Council decision setting up a Community framework for nuclear safety, for which the Rapporteur is Mr Hökmark. The Environment Committee has given an opinion (rapporteur: Ms Harms). In her draft opinion, Ms Harms had suggested adding the legal basis of Article 175(1) EC to the existing legal bases of Articles 31 and 32 EURATOM.

Background to the proposed legislation

This is the third attempt in a decade to introduce new rules on nuclear safety (the two previous proposals of 2002 and 2003 were withdrawn).

The aim of the 2002 proposal was "to define the basic obligations and general principles on the safety of nuclear installations", which "will at a later stage be complemented by the establishment of common standards and control mechanisms (...)”. In the 2003 revision the requirement for introducing basic obligations and common standards was removed and replaced by Community mechanisms to ensure adherence to common nuclear safety principles, notably including a Community verification scheme.  In this latest proposal no such mechanisms are provided for, and there will be no Community verification. Instead, the draft directive will only enforce the requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS).

The legal basis proposed by the Commission consists of Articles 31 and 32 of the Euratom Treaty. The question arises as to whether Article 175(1) of the EC Treaty should be added, thereby giving Parliament the benefit of the codecision procedure. In the alternative, it has also been argued that Article 203 EURATOM should be used in conjunction with or instead of Articles 31 and 32 in order to cover the technological aspects of nuclear safety and the environmental aspects.

The legal bases under consideration

For the sake of convenience, the relevant Treaty provisions are set out below.

Article 31 EURATOM

The basic standards shall be worked out by the Commission after it has obtained the opinion of a group of persons appointed by the Scientific and Technical Committee from among scientific experts, and in particular public health experts, in the Member States. The Commission shall obtain the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on these basic standards.

After consulting the European Parliament the Council shall, on a proposal from the Commission, which shall forward to it the opinions obtained from these Committees, establish the basic standards; the Council shall act by a qualified majority.

Article 32 EURATOM

At the request of the Commission or of a Member State, the basic standards may be revised or supplemented in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 31.

The Commission shall examine any request made by a Member State.

The expression "basic standards" is defined in Article 30 EURATOM as follows:

Article 30 EURATOM

Basic standards shall be laid down within the Community for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionizing radiations.

The expression ‘basic standards’ means:

		a.        maximum permissible doses compatible with adequate safety;

		b.        maximum permissible levels of exposure and contamination;

		c.        the fundamental principles governing the health surveillance of workers.

It should be noted that these provisions are located in Chapter 3 of Title II of the EURATOM Treaty, Health and Safety.

The suggestion has been made that Article 175(1) EC be added as a legal basis:

Article 175(1)

1. The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, shall decide what action is to be taken by the Community in order to achieve the objectives referred to in Article 174.

Article 174, to which Article 175(1) refers, provides as follows:

Article 174

1. Community policy on the environment shall contribute to pursuit of the following objectives:

— preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment,

— protecting human health,

— prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources,

— promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems.

2. Community policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the Community. It shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay.

In this context, harmonisation measures answering environmental protection requirements shall include, where appropriate, a safeguard clause allowing Member States to take provisional measures, for non-economic environmental reasons, subject to a Community inspection procedure.

3. In preparing its policy on the environment, the Community shall take account of:

— available scientific and technical data,

— environmental conditions in the various regions of the Community,

— the potential benefits and costs of action or lack of action,

— the economic and social development of the Community as a whole and the balanced development of its regions.

4. Within their respective spheres of competence, the Community and the Member States shall cooperate with third countries and with the competent international organisations. The arrangements for Community cooperation may be the subject of agreements between the Community and the third parties concerned, which shall be negotiated and concluded in accordance with Article 300.

The previous subparagraph shall be without prejudice to Member States' competence to negotiate in international bodies and to conclude international agreements.

Article 203 EURATOM

If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, take the appropriate measures.

Bases for the analysis

It is important to make it clear why the choice of legal basis is important. On the one hand, as the Court of Justice has pointed out, this choice is of "constitutional significance"[1] because the Community is governed by the principle of conferral of powers. In plain terms, this means that the Community can act only where the founding Treaties empower it to do so. On the other hand, there is the problem where there is no legal basis capable of covering the Community action (where there is not "sufficient competence") or where changing the legal basis results in a change in the procedure for adoption. An eloquent example can be found in the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs Case C-314/99 Netherlands v. Commission[2], where the change in the legal basis would have meant that the act would have had to have been adopted using a different procedure than the one by which it was actually adopted.

In such a case, as Parliament's Legal Service also pointed out in the British American Tobacco case[3], an error as to the legal basis is more than a purely formal defect when it gives rise to irregularity in the procedure applicable to the adoption of the act and can result in its annulment, since it partakes in its substance, causing it to be unlawful.

It is for these reasons that the Court of Justice set forth a consistent set of criteria that have to be borne in mind when considering the appropriateness of a given legal basis:

(1) The choice of the legal basis for a measure must rest on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review.

(2) Those factors include in particular the aim and the content of the measure.

(3) The fact that an institution wishes to participate more fully in the adoption of a given measure, the work carried out in other respects in the sphere of action covered by the measure and the context in which the measure was adopted are irrelevant[4].

In order to analyse the aim and the content of the proposed measure, it is necessary to examine the original Commission proposal, taking into account amendments proposed in the main committee and in the opinion of the Environment Committee.

Aim and content of the proposed legislation

According to the explanatory memorandum to the Commission proposal[5], the aim and content of the proposal for a directive are as follows:

“The present draft Directive setting up a Community framework on Nuclear Safety aims at re-starting the process of establishing a common EU framework on nuclear safety, by updating and replacing the Commission proposal for a Council (Euratom) Directive setting out basic obligations and general principles on the safety of nuclear installations[6], included in the initial Nuclear Safety Package.

The renewed interest in nuclear power expressed by a number of Member States, with the perspective of numerous life extensions and construction of new plants, makes the timing of this revised proposal particularly appropriate. It is evident that the effects of radiological incidents do not stop at borders, with potential consequences both for the health of workers and citizens, but also wide ranging economic implications for the energy generating industry. Enacting in binding Community legislation internationally endorsed nuclear safety principles would ensure an additional level of guarantee for the public in the EU at large, by providing legal certainty.

(omissis)

Its basic approach is that a set of common principles in the field of nuclear safety, already included in the CNS, are regulated at Community level, supplemented with additional safety requirements for new nuclear power reactors, which Member States are encouraged to develop in line with the principle of continuous improvement of safety, on the basis of the safety levels developed by WENRA and in close collaboration with the European High Level Group on Nuclear Safety and Waste Management (HLG). Based on the ten principles for the regulation of nuclear safety adopted by it, the group will become the focal point for cooperation between the regulatory bodies charged with the safety of nuclear installations in the Member States and will contribute to the development of the EU nuclear safety framework.

The general objective of the proposal is to achieve, maintain and continuously improve nuclear safety in the Community and to enhance the role of the regulatory bodies. Its scope of application is the design, siting, construction, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear installations, for which consideration of safety is required under the legislative and regulatory framework of the Member State concerned. The right of each Member State to decide to use nuclear energy or not is recognised and fully respected.

By means of this Community nuclear safety framework, several operational objectives are envisaged to be achieved, namely enhancing the role of national regulators, prime responsibility of the licence holder for safety under the control of the regulatory body, reinforcing the independence of the regulatory body, ensuring a high level of transparency on issues related to the safety of nuclear installations, implementation of management systems, regular safety supervision, availability of nuclear safety expertise, priority to safety.”

The enacting terms and recitals of the proposed directive

In this section, attention will be drawn to any provisions specifically referring to environmental aspects.

Article 1 sets out the objective and scope of the directive, namely “achieving, maintaining and continuously improving nuclear safety in the Community and to enhance the role of the national regulatory bodies”. It is to apply to “the design, siting, construction, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear installations, for which consideration of safety is required under the legislative and regulatory framework of the Member State concerned”. The directive is stated to be without prejudice to Council Directive 96/29/Euratom of 13 May 1996 laying down basic safety standards for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionising radiation[7], which, as recital 3 makes clear, establishes the basic safety standards. This article also states that each Member State is free to decide whether or not to operate a civil nuclear programme of its own.

Article 2 sets out the definitions. Attention is drawn to the fact that it defines “nuclear safety” as “the achievement of proper operating conditions through measures taken with a view to the prevention of accidents or mitigation of accident consequences, resulting in protection of workers, general public and the air, water and soil from undue radiation hazards arising from nuclear installations” (emphasis supplied).

Article 3 provides that prime responsibility for the safety of nuclear installations lies with the licence holder and that Member States are to establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory framework (national safety requirements, a system of licensing and control and a system of regulatory supervision).

Article 4 deals with regulatory bodies (with independence, authority, competence and sufficient funding and personnel), which are to grant licences and have monitoring functions. The regulatory bodies and national regulatory systems are to be subject to international peer review every ten years.

Article 5 treats of transparency (public information).

Article 6 provides that the Member States are to respect the IAEA safety fundamentals so as to ensure “a high level of safety in nuclear installations, including inter alia effective arrangements against potential radiological hazards, accident prevention and response, ageing management, long term management of all produced radioactive materials and information of the population and the authorities of neighbouring States”. They are also to develop additional safety requirements on the basis of the safety requirements developed by the WENRA.

Article 7 sets out the obligations of licence holders and Article 8 deals with supervision.

Article 9 provides for education and training.

Article 10 states that Member States may lay down more stringent safety measures.

Articles 11, 12, 13 and 14 deal respectively with reporting, transposition, entry into force and the addressees of the directive.

The preamble to the directive contains no specific reference to environment protection, although recital 5 does refer to effective defences against radiological risks and accidents which could have radiological consequences, which could be construed as covering threats to the environment. The remaining recitals justify the provisions of the enacting terms, while referring to Article 2(b) EURATOM (according to which the Community is to establish uniform safety standards to protect the health of workers and of the general public and ensure that they are applied) and Article 30 (quoted above). The main ground for the directive is set out in Recital 5: “Although the system of radiation protection established by the existing basic safety standards, taking into account the current scientific knowledge, ensures a high level of protection for the health of the population, it should be further supplemented to ensure that a high level of safety of nuclear installations is maintained, developed and continuously improved. Keeping up a high level of safety from design to decommissioning is a sine qua non condition in order to fully attain the objectives of health protection set out in Article 2(b) of the Treaty. For this purpose effective defences against radiological risks should be maintained and accidents which could have radiological consequences should be prevented.”

The main change proposed in the Industry Committee’s draft report (PR\764148EN.doc; rapporteur: Gunnar Hökmark) is to add an annex setting out the relevant IAE fundamental principles “redrafted to adapt its provisions to Member States’ obligations” on the ground that they “They cannot be introduced into Community law by simple reference to the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1 (2006) in this Directive” (Amendment 1 to recital 10). It is noted that these principles often reflect environment protection concerns, for example: safe control of all radioactive waste, radioactive waste management, radioactive risk management (expressed in general terms, taking account of environmental factors, protection of present and future generations – people and the environment, harmful effects to the environment, etc.). More specifically, principle 8 has a long passage on the environment which is worth quoting in extenso: “Whereas the effects of radiation exposure on human health are relatively well understood, albeit with uncertainties, the effects of radiation on the environment have been less thoroughly investigated. The present system of radiation protection generally provides appropriate protection of ecosystems in the human environment against harmful effects of radiation exposure. The general intent of the measures taken for the purposes of environmental protection has been to protect ecosystems against radiation exposure that would have adverse consequences for populations of a species (as distinct from individual organisms).”

None of the other amendments contained in the Industry Committee’s draft report contain any direct reference to environment protection as such. The same is true of the Environment Committee’s opinion (AD/775321EN.doc); rapporteur: Rebecca Harms).

It would appear from this analysis that the centre of gravity of the proposed directive is nuclear safety in general terms, its aim being to supplement the basic standards laid down in Council Directive 96/29/Euratom in order to ensure that a high level of safety of nuclear installations is maintained, developed and continuously improved. It is clear from the explicit reference in Article 2 to the environment and to ecosystems in the annex proposed by the Industry Committee that, for the purposes of the directive, nuclear safety must be construed also in terms of environment protection and not only in terms of protection of the health of workers and the general public. This having been said, however, the main thrust of the instrument is to supplement the existing system of radiation standards laid down by Directive 96/29/Euratom for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionising radiation and none of the provisions set out in the proposed directive are designed to deal specifically with protection against threats to the environment. Indeed, the proposed directive (including the proposed annex) boils down simply to requiring the Member States to respect IAEA safety principles without specifying how they should do so in technical terms and to set out the responsibilities and tasks of licence holders and regulators. It does not embody any provision relating to technological aspects of nuclear safety. The use of the term “principles” says it all.

This having been said, however, if, say, the Community were to develop principle 8 in specific legislation relating to the protection of ecosystems in the human environment against harmful effects of radiation exposure, there would be little doubt that the proper legal basis would be Article 175(1) of the EC Treaty.

The proper legal basis

The Commission justifies its choice of legal basis as follows:

“The legal basis for this proposal is Article 31 of the Euratom Treaty, in connection with Article 32 thereof. Article 31 defines the procedure for the adoption of the basic safety standards provided for in Article 30 for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionising radiation. Article 32 explicitly states that the basic standards might be supplemented in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 31.”[8]

The following doubts have been raised by various Members about the proposed legal basis.

Article 31 EURATOM is to be found in Chapter 3, entitled “Health and Safety”. Further, the EURATOM preamble specifies that signatory States are "anxious to create the conditions of safety necessary to eliminate hazards to the life and health of the public".

It is argued that the standards to be adopted under this provision relate to “the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionizing radiations” (Article 30). In fact, Article 30 establishes only the basis for a system of radiation protection by defining maximum permissible doses and levels of exposures and contamination. It is further maintained that it appears from the judgment in Case C-29/99 Commission v. Council [2002] ECR I-11221 that the Member States have exclusive competence over the technological aspects of nuclear safety. Yet the proposal and, even more so, the Rapporteur's suggestions (the annex covering safety principles) cover the technological aspects of nuclear safety, which, it is alleged, clearly go beyond the limits of the Community competence under EURATOM.

Furthermore, Article 2(2) of the proposal contains a new definition of “nuclear safety”. Under this new provision, "nuclear safety", namely the object of the Directive, is defined by reference to the “protection of workers, general public and the air, water and soil from undue radiation hazards arising from nuclear installations”. Yet the protection of the environment is not covered by Article 31 EURATOM. Air, water and soil are referred to in Articles 37 and 38 EURATOM but those provisions provide no legal basis whatsoever for adopting legislative measures, just for data collection and recommendations.

Instead, it is argued, environmental protection is a (shared) competence of the European Community under Article 175 EC and hence that provision should be used as an additional legal basis. Unlike Article 31 EURATOM, which provides for mere consultation of the European Parliament, Article 175 EC requires codecision.

It is observed in this connection that the proposal no longer requires regular reporting to the European Parliament on the status of the application of the Directive and nuclear safety in the EC (unlike the previous two proposals).

It is pointed out that directives which (also) regulated nuclear installations have already been based on the EC Treaty, the most prominent example being Council Directive 85/337/EEC on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment. This was exclusively based on the EC Treaty, and more particularly the provision on environmental protection.

It is argued that, in the alternative and as a last resort, the default legal basis of Article 203 EURATOM should be used (either exclusively or as a second legal basis) to cover the technological and environmental aspects adverted to above.

Appraisal

The Commission considers that although the system of radiation protection established by the existing basic safety standards ensures a high level of protection for the health of the population, it should be further supplemented to ensure that a high level of safety of nuclear installations is maintained, developed and continuously improved. For this reason it is now submitting the present legislative proposal, under Articles 31 and 32 EURATOM.

Although the EURATOM Treaty contains no explicit legal basis on nuclear safety, the Court of Justice has held in a series of cases (Case 187/87 Saarland and Others [1988] ECR 5013; Case C-70/88 Parliament v Council [1991] ECR I-4529 and Case C-29/99 Parliament v Council [2002] ECR I-11221) that it is not appropriate, in order to define the Community's competences, to draw an artificial distinction between the protection of the health of the general public and the safety of sources of ionising radiation and that therefore the Community possesses legislative competence to establish, for the purpose of health protection, an authorisation system which must be applied by the Member States.

It is therefore considered, in the light of a detailed analysis of the aim and content of the proposed directive, that the Legal Service’s analysis that Articles 31 and 32 EURATOM constitute an appropriate legal basis and that there is no need to have recourse to Article 203 EURATOM is correct. This position is not altered by the introduction of an annex containing safety principles, since it does not alter the object of the proposed instrument.

However, the position would be altered were the Community to develop principle 8 in specific legislation relating, say, to the protection of ecosystems in the human environment against harmful effects of radiation exposure, when there would be little doubt that the proper legal basis would be Article 175(1) of the EC Treaty.

The Legal Service finds that, if it is definitely confirmed, the Commission’s apparent failure to obtain a new opinion on the basic standards from a group of persons appointed by the Scientific and Technical Committee before presenting its new proposal would constitute an infringement of an essential procedural requirement which, pursuant to Article 230 (second subparagraph) EC, constitutes a ground of review of the act thus adopted. This position seems to be correct in law. It is recommended that the main committee clarify this matter to its full satisfaction with the Commission.

Conclusion

At its meeting of 31 March 2009, while noting that the Commission’s apparent failure to obtain a new opinion on the basic standards from a group of persons appointed by the Scientific and Technical Committee before presenting its new proposal would constitute an infringement of an essential procedural requirement which, pursuant to Article 230 (second subparagraph) EC, constitutes a ground of review of the act thus adopted, the Committee on Legal Affairs accordingly decided, by 13 votes in favour, 6 votes against and no abstentions[9], to recommend that the appropriate legal basis is Articles 31 and 32 of the EURATOM Treaty.

Yours sincerely,

Giuseppe Gargani

• [1]  Opinion No 2/00 of 6 December 2001 on the Cartagna Protocol [2001] ECR.I-9713.
• [2]  [2002] ECR I-5521.
• [3]  Case C-491/2001 The Queen v Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd [2002] ECR I-11453.
• [4]  Case C-269/97 Commission v. Council [2000] ECR I-2257, paras 43 and 44.
• [5]  COM(2008) 790 final.
• [6]  COM(2003)32 final and COM(2004)526 final
• [7]  OJ L 159, 29.6.1996, p. 1.
• [8]  Explanatory memorandum, para. 3.2.
• [9]  The following were present for the final vote: Giuseppe Gargani (Chair), Rainer Wieland (Vice-Chair), Lidia Joanna Geringer de Oedenberg (Vice-Chair), Francesco Enrico Speroni (Vice-Chair), Monica Frassoni (rapporteur), Carlo Casini, Bert Doorn, Nicole Fontaine, Neena Gill, Klaus-Heiner Lehne, Véronique Mathieu, Hans-Peter Mayer, Manuel Medina Ortega, Hartmut Nassauer, Aloyzas Sakalas, Eva-Riitta Siitonen, Jacques Toubon, Diana Wallis, Jaroslav Zvěřina, Tadeusz Zwiefka.

OPINION of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (18.3.2009)

for the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy

on the proposal for a Council directive setting up a Community framework for nuclear safety
(COM(2008)0790 – C6‑0026/2009 – 2008/0231(CNS))

Rapporteur: Rebecca Harms

SHORT JUSTIFICATION

The draft Directive published states its objective is to “achieve, maintain and continuously improve nuclear safety in the Community and to enhance the role of the regulatory bodies”. However, the proposal does not seek to introduce powers that would enable it to achieve this objective, and will have no additional safety value.

The Commission proposal is the third attempt within a decade to introduce new rules on nuclear safety. The first, in November 2002, stated that:

“In order to attain the Community objectives regarding radioprotection (...), it is essential as a first stage to define the basic obligations and general principles on the safety of nuclear installations (...). This will at a later stage be complemented by the establishment of common standards and control mechanisms in order to guarantee a high level of safety (...)”.

However, what in 2002 was seen as essential now seems unimportant. In the 2003 revisions the requirement for introducing basic obligations and common standards was removed and replaced by Community mechanisms to ensure adherence to common nuclear safety principles, notably including a Community verification scheme.

However, the latest proposal for a Directive has now excluded this mechanism and there will be no Community verification. Instead the draft directive will only enforce the requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS). This requires only the publication of an annual report on the status of the nuclear sector and subjecting the report to peer review by other contracting parties of the Convention. All Member States that operate nuclear power plants are already contracting parties to the Convention. The Commission supplies no examples of where an EU Member State has failed to comply with the Convention.

The main criticism of the current draft is that it is proposing legislation only for the sake of legislating, and that it will bring no additional safety requirements. This view was even raised by the Commission’s Impact Assessment Board, which twice voiced concerns over the lack of added value of the directive.

There are real and justified concerns over nuclear safety standards and practices being deployed in the EU. As a general trend the safety margins of nuclear facilities decrease as they approach the end of their design lives. As noted ‘a large number of currently operating plants in the EU will come to the end of their originally foreseen lifetimes before 2030’.[1] Consequently, there is a real need for measures which help reduce nuclear risks.

Rather than introduce an enforcement mechanism of questionable value for an existing international convention the draft directive must propose a mechanism which will introduce and enforce common safety standards that require state of the art or best available technology, practices and regulatory regimes are introduced to all nuclear facilities in operation in the EU. Only then can EU citizens be confident that all that can be done is done, in order to reduce the risk of nuclear accidents. Unless this is achieved the directive should not be adopted.

AMENDMENTS

The Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety calls on the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following amendments in its report:

Amendment  1 Proposal for a directive Recital 12 a (new)
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
	(12a) In order to attain the Community objectives regarding nuclear safety mentioned in Article 1(1), it is essential as a first stage to define the basic obligations and general principles on the safety of nuclear installations in this framework Directive. This should at a later stage be complemented by the adoption of common standards and control mechanisms, to be developed by the Western European Nuclear Regulators' Association (WENRA) and in close collaboration with the European High Level Group on Nuclear Safety and Waste Management in consultation with the European Parliament, in order to guarantee the highest level of safety, which takes into account the latest technological developments and which can be defined as ‘state of the art’.
Justification
In order to achieve the highest level of safety of nuclear installations, this framework Directive aims at setting out basic obligations and general principles, on the basis of which common safety standards will be adopted upon review of this Directive within two years from its entry into force.
Amendment  2 Proposal for a directive Article 1 – paragraph 1
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
1. This Directive aims at achieving, maintaining and continuously improving nuclear safety in the Community and to enhance the role of the national regulatory bodies.	1. This Directive aims at achieving, maintaining and continuously improving nuclear safety in the Community and to enhance the role of the national regulatory bodies by setting out the basic obligations and general principles guaranteeing a high level of safety of nuclear installations, and creating the necessary framework for the adoption of common safety standards.
Justification
In order to achieve the highest level of safety of nuclear installations, this framework Directive aims at setting out basic obligations and general principles, on the basis of which common safety standards will be adopted upon review of this Directive within two years from its entry into force.
Amendment  3 Proposal for a directive Article 1 – paragraph 2
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
2. It shall apply to the design, siting, construction, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear installations, for which consideration of safety is required under the legislative and regulatory framework of the Member State concerned.	2. It shall apply to the design, siting, construction, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear installations, for which consideration of safety is required under the legislative and regulatory framework of the Member State concerned, EU law and the Convention on Nuclear Safety.
Justification
The effective safety can be achieved through harmonized binding measures and safety standards.
Amendment  4 Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
1. The prime responsibility for the safety of nuclear installations shall rest with the holder of the license under the control of the regulatory body. The safety measures and controls to be implemented in a nuclear installation shall be decided only by the regulatory body and applied by the licence holder.	1. The prime responsibility for the safety of nuclear installations shall rest with the holder of the license under the control of the regulatory body. The safety measures and controls to be implemented in a nuclear installation shall be decided on the basis of EU and international standards and the best available technology by the regulatory body and applied by the licence holder.
Justification
The effective safety can be achieved through harmonized binding measures and safety standards and the best available technology should be applied by each Member State.
Amendment  5 Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 2
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
2. Member States shall establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory framework to govern the safety of nuclear installations. This shall include national safety requirements, a system of licensing and control of nuclear installations and the prohibition of their operation without a licence and a system of regulatory supervision including the necessary enforcement.	2. Member States shall establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory framework, based on EU and international best available practices, to govern the safety of nuclear installations. This shall include national safety requirements, a system of licensing and control of nuclear installations and the prohibition of their operation without a licence and a system of regulatory supervision including the necessary enforcement.
Justification
In order to achieve real safety in the whole Europe, the requirements and measures for their obeying have to be harmonized and BAP should be applied by every Member State.
Amendment  6 Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
1. Member States shall ensure that the regulatory body is effectively independent of all organisations whose task is to promote, operate nuclear installations or justify societal benefits and free from any influence that may affect the safety.	1. Member States shall ensure that the regulatory body is effectively independent of all organisations whose task is to promote, design, construct, operate nuclear installations or deal with fuel enrichment, spent fuel storage or reprocessing; or justify societal benefits and free from any influence that may affect the safety.
Justification
All prerequisites for an independent decision should be ensured.
Amendment  7 Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 5
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
5. At least every ten years the regulatory body shall submit itself and the national regulatory system to an international peer review aimed at continuously improving the regulatory infrastructure.	5. At least every five years the regulatory body shall submit itself and the national regulatory system to an international peer review aimed at continuously improving the regulatory infrastructure.
Justification
Nuclear technology develops fast and 10 years is too long a period in terms of ensuring nuclear safety.
Amendment  8 Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
They shall in particular ensure that the applicable principles laid down in the IAEA safety fundamentals are implemented to ensure a high level of safety in nuclear installations, including inter alia effective arrangements against potential radiological hazards, accident prevention and response, ageing management, long term management of all produced radioactive materials and information of the population and the authorities of neighbouring States.	They shall in particular ensure that the applicable principles laid down in the IAEA safety fundamentals are implemented to ensure a high level of safety in nuclear installations, including inter alia effective arrangements against potential radiological hazards, accident prevention and response, ageing management, long term management of all produced radioactive materials and information of the population and the authorities of neighbouring and other potentially endangered States.
Justification
States that happen to be in the range of radioactive cloud or water stream resulting from a technological hazard may be more endangered (depending on meteorological conditions), than neighbouring countries.
Amendment  9 Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 2
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
2. As regards the safety of new nuclear power reactors Member States shall aim to develop additional safety requirements, in line with the continuous improvement of safety on the basis of the safety levels developed by the Western European Nuclear Regulators' Association (WENRA) and in close collaboration with the European High Level Group on Nuclear Safety and Waste Management.	2. As regards the safety of working, life-extended and new nuclear power reactors Member States shall aim to develop additional safety requirements, in line with the continuous improvement of safety on the basis of the safety levels developed by the Western European Nuclear Regulators' Association (WENRA) and in close collaboration with the European High Level Group on Nuclear Safety and Waste Management.
Justification
Safety measures should be compulsory not only for new nuclear power plants but foremost for existing and life extended plants, since they normally operate with older technology.
Amendment  10 Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 3
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
3. Licence holders shall allocate adequate financial and human resources to fulfil their obligations.	3. Licence holders shall allocate adequate financial, technical and human resources to fulfil their obligations.
Justification
The technical resources count for the accomplishment of effective nuclear safety.
Amendment  11 Proposal for a directive Article 8 – paragraph 2
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
2. The regulatory body shall have the power to withdraw the operating licence in case of serious or repeated safety rules breaches in the nuclear installation.	2. The regulatory body shall have the power to withdraw the operating licence in case of serious (as defined by IAEA regulations) or more than three repeated safety rules breaches in the nuclear installation.
Justification
In order to achieve real safety, clear rules have to be established.
Amendment  12 Proposal for a directive Article 9
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
Appropriate education and training opportunities for continuous theoretical and practical training in nuclear safety shall be made available by Member States separately and through trans-national cooperation.	Appropriate education and training opportunities for continuous theoretical and practical training in the best available nuclear safety practices shall be made available by Member States separately and through trans-national cooperation and made obligatory for licence holders.
Justification
Measures should be established to avoid human error.
Amendment  13 Proposal for a directive Article 11
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
Member States shall submit a report to the Commission on the implementation of this Directive by [three years after the entry into force] at the latest, and every three years thereafter. On the basis of the first report, the Commission shall present a report to the Council on progress made with the implementation of this Directive, accompanied, if appropriate, by legislative proposals.	Member States shall submit a report to the Commission on the measures taken to fulfil their obligations under this Directive and on the safety situation in nuclear installations located on their territory by one year after the entry into force of this Directive, and every year thereafter.
	Every two years the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of this Directive and on the nuclear safety situation in the Community, based on the reports submitted by the Member States.
Justification
In order to achieve the highest level of safety of nuclear installations, this framework Directive aims at setting out basic obligations and general principles, on the basis of which common safety standards will be adopted upon review of this Directive within two years from its entry into force.
Amendment  14 Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 1
Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by [two years after the date referred to in Article 13] at the latest. They shall forthwith communicate to the Commission the text of those provisions and a correlation table between those provisions and this Directive.	Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by [18 months after the date referred to in Article 13] at the latest. They shall forthwith communicate to the Commission the text of those provisions and a correlation table between those provisions and this Directive.
Justification
Two years for transposition and just one year for preparation of the report on the progress achieved is imbalanced timetable as there is not enough time to assess the progress on the implementation of this Directive.

PROCEDURE

Title	A Community framework for nuclear safety
References	COM(2008)0790 – C6-0026/2009 – 2008/0231(CNS)
Committee responsible	ITRE
Opinion by        Date announced in plenary	ENVI 3.2.2009
Rapporteur        Date appointed	Rebecca Harms 21.1.2009
Discussed in committee	10.2.2009
Date adopted	16.3.2009
Result of final vote	+: –: 0:	28 0 0
Members present for the final vote	Adamos Adamou, Georgs Andrejevs, Pilar Ayuso, Johannes Blokland, John Bowis, Frieda Brepoels, Martin Callanan, Mojca Drčar Murko, Jill Evans, Anne Ferreira, Elisabetta Gardini, Matthias Groote, Françoise Grossetête, Gyula Hegyi, Marie Anne Isler Béguin, Linda McAvan, Péter Olajos, Miroslav Ouzký, Dagmar Roth-Behrendt, Guido Sacconi, Carl Schlyter, Richard Seeber, María Sornosa Martínez, Thomas Ulmer, Anja Weisgerber
Substitute(s) present for the final vote	Jutta Haug, Caroline Lucas, Alojz Peterle

• [1]  European Commission 2008; Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying document to the Proposal for a Council Directive (Euratom) setting up a Community framework for Nuclear Safety Impact Assessment, SEC (2008) 2892, 26^th January 2008

PROCEDURE

Title	A Community framework for nuclear safety
References	COM(2008)0790 – C6-0026/2009 – 2008/0231(CNS)
Date of consulting Parliament	15.1.2009
Committee responsible        Date announced in plenary	ITRE 3.2.2009
Committee(s) asked for opinion(s)        Date announced in plenary	ENVI 3.2.2009
Rapporteur(s)        Date appointed	Gunnar Hökmark 17.12.2008
Legal basis disputed        Date of JURI opinion	JURI 31.3.2009
Discussed in committee	20.1.2009		19.3.2009
Date adopted	31.3.2009
Result of final vote	+: –: 0:	39 3 5
Members present for the final vote	Šarūnas Birutis, Jan Březina, Jerzy Buzek, Jorgo Chatzimarkakis, Giles Chichester, Dragoş Florin David, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Den Dover, Adam Gierek, Fiona Hall, Rebecca Harms, Erna Hennicot-Schoepges, Mary Honeyball, Ján Hudacký, Romana Jordan Cizelj, Werner Langen, Pia Elda Locatelli, Eugenijus Maldeikis, Eluned Morgan, Antonio Mussa, Angelika Niebler, Reino Paasilinna, Atanas Paparizov, Aldo Patriciello, Anni Podimata, Miloslav Ransdorf, Herbert Reul, Teresa Riera Madurell, Mechtild Rothe, Paul Rübig, Andres Tarand, Britta Thomsen, Catherine Trautmann, Claude Turmes, Nikolaos Vakalis, Adina-Ioana Vălean, Alejo Vidal-Quadras
Substitute(s) present for the final vote	Ivo Belet, Danutė Budreikaitė, Zdzisław Kazimierz Chmielewski, Juan Fraile Cantón, Robert Goebbels, Edit Herczog, Gunnar Hökmark, Bernhard Rapkay, Esko Seppänen, Lambert van Nistelrooij
Date tabled	3.4.2009