REPORT on remuneration of directors of listed companies and remuneration policies in the financial services sector
24.6.2010 - (2010/2009(INI))
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
Rapporteur: Saïd El Khadraoui
MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION
on remuneration of directors of listed companies and remuneration policies in the financial services sector
The European Parliament,
– having regard to the Commission Recommendation of 30 April 2009 on remuneration policies in the financial services sector (C(2009) 3159),
– having regard to the Commission Recommendation of 30 April 2009 complementing Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC as regards the regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies (C(2009) 3177),
– having regard the Commission proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as regards capital requirements for the trading book and for re-securitisations, and the supervisory review of remuneration policies (COM(2009)0362),
– having regard to the Financial Stability Forum's (FSB) Principles for Sound Compensation Practices of 2 April 2009 and the accompanying Implementation Standards of 25 September 2009,
– having regard to the Committee of European Banking Supervisors' (CEBS) High-level Principles for Remuneration Policies of 20 April 2009,
– having regard to the CEBS report on national implementation of CEBS High-level Principles for Remuneration Policies of 11 June 2010,
– having regard to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision's Compensation Principles and Standards Assessment Methodology of January 2010,
– having regard to the OECD's paper of February 2010 on Corporate governance and the financial crisis - conclusions and emerging good practices to enhance implementation of the Principles,
– having regard to its resolution of 18 May 2010 on deontological questions related to companies management[1],
– having regard to the Commission Green Paper of 2 June 2010 on corporate governance in financial institutions and remuneration policies (COM(2010)284),
– having regard to the Commission report of 2 June 2010 on the application by Member States of the EU of the Commission 2009/385/EC Recommendation (2009 Recommendation of directors' remuneration) complementing Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC as regards the regime for remuneration of directors of listed companies (COM(2010)285),
– having regard to the Commission report of 2 June 2010 on the application by Member States of the EU of the Commission 2009/384/EC Recommendation on remuneration policies in the financial services sector (COM(2010)286),
– having regard to Rule 48 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and the opinion of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (A7‑0208/2010),
A. whereas, in the financial sector and in some listed companies, remuneration policies for categories of staff whose professional activity has a material impact on the company’s risk profile have been such as to encourage transactions seeking short-term profits, with increasingly risky business models being developed to that end, to the detriment of workers, savers and investors, and sustainable growth in general,
B. whereas the Commission's Green Paper on corporate governance in financial institutions and remuneration policies stresses that the lack of effective control mechanisms contributed significantly to excessive risk-taking on the part of financial institutions, and that corporate governance should take account of the stability of the financial system, which depends on the actions of many players,
C. whereas inappropriate remuneration structures of some financial institutions that incentivise excessive and imprudent risk-taking played a role in the accumulation of risks that led to the current financial, economic and social crisis, and are therefore a major issue of concern for policy-makers and regulators,
D. whereas financial institutions must take into account, as part of their corporate social responsibility, the social environment in which the institution operates, as well as the interests of all of parties involved, such as its clients, shareholders and employees, in an integrated manner,
E. whereas numerous initiatives have been launched at the global, European and national levels to address the issue of problematic remuneration practices, and whereas a globally coordinated approach is essential in order not only to guarantee a level playing field, but also to ensure the global competitiveness of Europe and to promote sustainable and fair competition between market places,
F. whereas the FSB Principles for Sound Compensation Practices, which were endorsed by the G20 leaders, set out five elements for sound remuneration practices, and having regard to the importance of promoting simultaneous implementation of these principles,
G. whereas the agreed principles and measures already taken in respect of remuneration policy should be continually reviewed and, where necessary, adapted in order to create uniform conditions throughout Europe and secure the global competitiveness of the European finance industry,
H. whereas several scientific studies, as well as practical experience, have demonstrated the limited impact of non-binding recommendations on remuneration policies, which underlines the need to put in place a stronger instrument in order to ensure respect for the principles,
I. whereas the Commission report states that notwithstanding the momentum towards substantial reform in the area of remuneration policies provided by the crisis, only 16 Member States have fully or partially applied the Commission Recommendation,
General remarks
1. Welcomes the initiatives taken by the Commission and the FSB on remuneration policies in the financial sector and listed companies in general; takes the view, however, that the financial undertaking's size, and thus its activity's contribution to the systemic risk, should be taken proportionally into account when imposing additional regulation in matters of remuneration policy and capital requirements on financial institutions;
2. Notes the proposals in the report on the capital requirements directives for binding principles on remuneration policies in the financial sector;
Effective governance of compensation
3. Stresses that supervisory authorities should decide whether a financial institution or a listed company should have a remuneration committee; they should do so in a way that is appropriate to its size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of its activities; takes the view that where the supervisor has deemed it appropriate, remuneration policy should be determined by the remuneration committee, which must be independent and accountable to shareholders and supervisors, and should work closely with the firm's risk committee in the evaluation of the incentives created by the compensation system;
4. Stresses that a remuneration committee must have access to the subject matter of contracts, with contracts under the scrutiny of this committee designed in a way that makes it possible to punish acts of gross negligence by payment deductions. Gross negligence occurs when due diligence in particular is not respected, in which case the remuneration committee must ensure that the deduction is not merely symbolic in nature, but contributes substantially to paying for the damage caused. Furthermore, financial institutions should be urged to make use of a malus, i.e. a return of performance-related compensation as a result of the discovery of poor performance;
5. Believes that the chair and the voting members of the remuneration committee must be members of the management body who do not perform any executive functions in the financial institution or the listed company concerned. Takes the view that directors and board members should avoid simultaneously sitting on the boards of other companies if there is a potential for any conflict of interest occurring;
6. Is of the opinion that, where appropriate, shareholders should be given the opportunity to contribute towards the determination of sustainable remuneration policies, and could for this purpose be given the opportunity to express their views on remuneration policies by means of a non-binding vote on the remuneration report at the company’s general meeting;
7. Stresses that non-executive board members' compensation should only consist in fixed pay and should not include performance- or share-based pay;
8. Underlines that members engaged in risk control should be independent from the business units they control, have appropriate authority and be compensated independently of the performance of these business units;
Effective alignment of compensation with prudent risk-taking
9. Underlines that remuneration should be adjusted for all types of risks, symmetrical with risk outcomes, and sensitive to the time horizon of current and potential risks that have an impact on the overall performance and stability of the firm;
10. Points out that directors should not be driven by personal financial interest in their management of listed companies; considers that the personal financial interest of directors linked to variable remuneration is in many case in conflict with the long-term interest of the company, including the interests of its employees and stakeholders;
11. Believes that compensation systems should be proportionate to the size, internal organisation and complexity of financial institutions and should reflect the diversity between different financial sectors such as banking, insurance and fund management;
12. Stresses that the operational risk management arrangements of senior management, risk takers and control functions should be reviewed by, and subject to thorough checks by, the supervisor; considers that such procedures should also apply to staff whose total remuneration, including pension provisions, takes them into the same bracket as these categories as staff;
13. Considers that the levels of variable remuneration should be based on predetermined and measurable performance criteria, which should promote the long-term sustainability of the company;
14. Stresses that performance-related remuneration should link the size of the bonus pool to the overall performance and capital base of the firm, while an employee's individual performance-related remuneration should be based on a combined assessment of the performance of the individual, that of the business unit concerned and the overall results of the institution;
15. Considers that the personal financial interest of directors linked to variable remuneration is, in many cases, in conflict with the long-term interests of the company; stresses that policy on the remuneration of directors and other staff who bear responsibility for risky decisions should be consistent with a balanced and properly functioning system of risk management, and that there should be an appropriate ratio between fixed and variable pay; calls urgently for the introduction, across the board, of measures for the reduction, or indeed the withdrawal, of the variable pay of categories of staff whose performance is responsible for a deterioration in their company’s results;
16. Is of the opinion that not only quantitative measures, but also quality-linked performance criteria and human judgement should be taken into consideration in order to determine the level of variable compensation;
17. Considers that guaranteed bonuses should not be part of the compensation plans;
18. Is of the opinion, not only for ethical reasons but also in the interests of social justice and economic sustainability, that the difference between the highest and the lowest remuneration in a company should be reasonable;
19. Stresses that firms should establish an internal procedure, approved by the supervisor, to address conflicts which may occur between their risk management and operational units;
20. Underlines the need to extend these principles to the remuneration of all employees whose professional activities have a material impact on the risk profile of the company they work for, including senior management, risk-takers, control functions and those staff whose total remuneration, including pension provisions, takes them into the same bracket;
21. Stresses that directors’ and officers’ liability insurance designed to protect companies’ directors, officers and senior managers against claims arising from risky or negligent decisions and actions taken whilst managing their business are not in line with sustainable risk management in the field of remuneration;
Balanced structure of the remuneration package
22. Stresses that there must be an appropriate balance between variable and fixed remuneration;
23. Suggests that variable remuneration should be paid only if it is sustainable in the light of the financial situation and capital base of the institution, and justified in the light of the long-term performance of the firm; considers that for financial institutions, the competent supervision authority should have the right to limit the overall amount of variable remuneration in order to strengthen equity capital;
24. Underlines that a substantial proportion of the variable remuneration component should be deferred over a sufficient period; the size of the proportion and the length of the deferral period should be established in accordance with the business cycle, the nature of the business, its risks and the activities of the staff member in question; remuneration payable under deferred arrangements should become a vested right no faster than that payable on a pro-rata basis; at least 40% of the variable remuneration component should be deferred; in the case of a variable remuneration component of a particularly high amount, at least 60% of the amount should be deferred and the deferral period should be no less than 5 years;
25. Believes that a substantial proportion of variable compensation should be awarded in non-cash instruments such as subordinated debt, contingent capital, shares or share-linked instruments, as long as these instruments create incentives aligned with long-term value creation and the time horizons of risk;
26. Considers that remuneration policies should apply to total remuneration, including pensions and salaries, to avoid 'bonus arbitrage'; believes, furthermore, that 'pension bonuses' should be awarded in non-cash instruments such as subordinated debt, contingent capital, shares or share-linked instruments in order to align long-term incentives;
27. Suggests setting an upper limit of the equivalent of two years of the fixed component of directors' pay on severance pay ('golden parachutes') in cases of early termination, and banning severance pay in cases of non-performance or voluntary departure;
28. Calls for equality between men and women to be taken into account in determining pay policies;
29. Reiterates the need to punish all forms of discrimination in companies, particularly in the determination of remuneration policies, in career development and in the process of recruiting directors;
Effective supervisory oversight and involvement by stakeholders
30. Believes that firms should disclose clear, comprehensive and timely information about their compensation practices and that supervisory authorities should have access to all the information they need to evaluate compliance with the applicable principles;
31. Calls for state enterprises, like other companies, to exercise complete transparency concerning their pay and bonus policies;
32. Calls, too, for the publication of details of companies’ pension and supplementary pension arrangements, including those of state enterprises;
33. Calls on the Commission to reinforce its recommendations of 30 April 2009 on pay structure and risk alignment as required by the principles established by the Financial Stability Board and endorsed by the G20 in September 2009;
34. Calls on the Commission to adopt strong binding principles on remuneration policies in the financial sector, building on the proposals for banking in the report on the CRD, and a disclosure-driven regime based on a comply-or-explain procedure for listed companies which do not respect these principles;
35. Urges supervisors in the financial sector to implement the Compensation Principles and Standards Assessment Methodology proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in January 2010;
36. Calls on the Commission and Member States to promote a common international structure for disclosure of the number of individuals in pay brackets from EUR 1 million upwards, to include the main elements of salary, bonus, long-term award and pension contribution;
37. Invites the Commission to consider the roles of both internal and external auditors as part of ensuring the full spectrum of effective corporate governance;
38. Calls on the Commission to investigate strengthening the roles of non-executive directors, including ensuring that firms provide on-going training and independent remuneration packages that reflect the independent role of non-executive directors, as well as providing the powers to supervisors to conduct ‘approved persons’ interviews;
39. Calls on the Commission to clarify in its legislative proposals the role of the supervisory authorities in remuneration policy;
40. Stresses that variable remuneration should not be paid through vehicles or methods that facilitate the avoidance of payment of income taxes on this remuneration;
41. Calls for it to be ensured that, when remuneration is being regulated, this is not done to the detriment of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Treaties, in particular the right of the social partners – in accordance with national laws and practices – to conclude and enforce collective agreements;
42. Calls on the Commission to set up an EU crisis management framework in order to avoid a new financial crisis, taking into account initiatives taken by international bodies such as the G20 and the IMF;
43. Calls on the Commission to encourage the Member States to remind listed companies and financial services companies of their social responsibility, their tarnished image and the need to set a good example in a prosperous international society;
44. Considers that continuing to do business or maintain branches in non-cooperative countries is contrary to the long-term interests of companies generally, and calls for the development of a European strategy to combat tax havens in order to implement the pronouncements made by the G20 in London and Pittsburgh;
45. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the EU and national regulatory authorities.
- [1] Texts adopted, P7_TA(2010)0165.
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT
The financial and economic crisis we find ourselves in was caused inter alia by excessive risk taking by a very wide variety of firms in the financial sector. Investment banks, banks, hedge funds were all involved not just in building up excessive risks at the level of individual firms but even more so in the aggregate build up of systemic risk.
The decisions to take on these risks were driven by the boards and CEOs who ran these firms and the employees who worked for them. Their motivation for doing this was simple:
- The higher the risks a firm takes, the greater the profitability is likely to be.
- The greater the profitability of a firm, the greater the compensation paid.
However, the level of overall compensation paid did not vary significantly as profits diminished, as demonstrated by the Attorney General for the State of New York, Andrew Cuomo; indeed, there is always the taxpayers to bail out.
This makes that employees in the financial sector get the upside, in the form of bonuses, of the excessive risks they load on to the firms they work for. Their personal downside is limited to being fired, the equivalent of zero compensation. The downside instead falls within and outside of the firms they work for.
To make sure such a crisis will not happen again and to make change these illogic reasoning, the rapporteur is convinced the incentive structures faced by the individual employee should be looked at. Therefore, steps have to be taken to decrease the risks taken and to redesign the incentive structure. Only in this way, the profits of the financial institutions and the compensations paid to the board members and CEOs could be reduced till an acceptable level.
Several national initiatives have been taken since the start of the crisis in order to moderate some remuneration policies and some bonuses excesses and this under different forms (code of conduct tax measures, salary caps, strengthen of corporate governance rules etc). The rapporteur welcomes these initiatives and considers them as useful. However, in order to avoid a non-coordinated approach and to create a level playing field, the rapporteur is of the opinion that a European initiative has to be taken on remuneration policy in the financial sector and listed companies.
For these reasons, a coordinated European action on remuneration of directors in the financial sector and in listed companies is needed.
To face this challenge, the rapporteur is convinced of the need of a mix of measures on 3 levels: the sector itself has to be prevented from taking so many risks, the employee upside has to be limited and the employee downside has to be increased.
Therefore, the rapporteur welcomes the initiatives proposed by the G 20, the Larosière report and by the European Commission taken up in its two recommendations, (Commission Recommendation of 30 April 2009 on remuneration policies in the financial services sector (C(2009) 3159), and the Commission Recommendation of 30 April 2009 complementing Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC as regards the regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies (C(2009) 3177), in which the European Commission has given its views on remuneration policy of directors in financial institutions and in stock exchange listed companies.
On structure of directors' remuneration, the Recommendation invites Member States to:
- set a limit (2 years maximum of fixed component of directors' pay) on severance pay (golden parachutes) and to ban severance pay in case of failure;
- require a balance between fixed and variable pay and link variable pay to predetermined and measurable performance criteria to strengthen the link between performance and pay;
- promote the long term sustainability of companies through a balance between long and short term performance criteria of directors' remuneration, deferment of variable pay, a minimum vesting period for stock options and shares (at least three years); retention of part of shares until the end of employment;
- allow companies to reclaim variable pay paid on the basis of data, which proved to be manifestly misstated ('clawback').
On the process of determining Directors' remuneration, the Recommendation invites Member States to:
- extend certain disclosure requirements contained in the existing Recommendation to improve shareholder oversight of remuneration policies;
- ensure that shareholders, in particular institutional investors, attend general meetings where appropriate and make considered use of their votes regarding directors´ remuneration;
- provide that non-executives should not receive share options as part of their remuneration to avoid conflict of interests;
- strengthen the role and operation of the remuneration committee through new principles on
(i) the composition of remuneration committees;
(ii) the obligation for the members of the remuneration committee to be present at the general meeting where the remuneration policy is discussed in order to provide explanations to shareholders;
(iii) avoiding conflicts of remuneration consultants.
However, these proposals are only a first cautious step. Practice demonstrated indeed the rather limited impact of recommendations on the remuneration policy in the financial sector and in listed companies. Therefore, in order to make a real change, the rapporteur is convinced we should go further. The rapporteur request the European Commission to set up strong binding principles on remuneration policies in the financial sector as supported by the rapporteur on the CRD and a name and shame procedure for listed companies not respecting these principles; requests the European Commission further to make an impact assessment/ study on the feasibility of setting up a European bonus tax as well as a European banking tax;
To make such a following step, focus should be concretely put on the principles developed by the FSB being, an effective governance of compensation, an effective alignment of compensation with prudent risk-taking; a balanced structure of the remuneration package; and finally an effective supervisory oversight and engagement by stakeholders.
In order to get a real governance of the compensation package, more attention should be paid to the composition of the remuneration committee and a stronger role should be given to this committee in determining the remuneration policy and proposing it to the supervisor. This should be done in close cooperation with the risk managers and after receiving the advice of the shareholders. In the opinion of rapporteur it should be clear that non executive directors only get paid a fixed remuneration.
Further, the rapporteur is of the opinion that, the operational risk scheme has to be supervised and pre -approved by a strong independent regulator. Further, the rapporteur fully supports the approach taken in draft report on the proposal of the capital requirement directive to increase the capital requirements in case higher risks are taken. Quality linked elements should be taken into consideration in order to determine the level of the variable compensation; he proposes therefore to take into consideration 'social added value of companies performance' as one essential criterion, as well as sustainable criteria when applicable; given its risk sensitivity, the amount of a variable remuneration should be determined according to the achievement of long term objectives, which should be clearly defined in advance; the rapporteur is further the opinion all this principles should be applied to the remuneration of everybody whose professional activities have a material impact on the risk profile of the company they work for.
In line with these principles and to limit the employee upside, the rapporteur is of the opinion a cap should be put on the bonus, namely in particular an individual's bonus must not make up more than 50% of their total annual remuneration.
The rapporteur underlines the fact that profits and losses are realized over different periods of time, and variable compensation payments should be deferred accordingly over a sufficient period; the size of the deferred proportion and the length of the deferral period should be established in accordance with the business cycle, the nature of the business, its risks and the activities of the member of staff in question. The rapporteur is in favour of at least 50% of the variable remuneration being paid under the form of chair options as long as these instruments create incentives aligned with long-term value creation and the time horizons of risk, while awards in shares or share-linked instruments should be subject to an appropriate share retention policy.
The rapporteur is further convinced of the need to tax higher the financial institutions the directors of which are paid a compensation package above a certain level; invites therefore the European Commission to examine this suggestion; he invites the European Commission further to impose a financial fee to financial institutions to feed a kind of insurance fund to avoid new financial crisis.
In order to increase the transparency on the remuneration policy in the financial sector and in listed companies, the rapporteur is convinced of the need of a strong annual remuneration report. By this report firms should disclose clear, comprehensive and timely information about their compensation practices to facilitate the constructive engagement by all stakeholders, and that supervisory authorities should have access to all information they need to evaluate the conformance of practice to the Principles.
OPINION of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (2.6.2010)
for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
on remuneration of directors of listed companies and remuneration policies in the financial services sector
(2010/2009(INI))
Rapporteur: Ole Christensen
SUGGESTIONS
The Committee on Employment and Social Affairs calls on the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:
A. whereas, in the financial sector and in some listed companies, remuneration policies for categories of staff whose professional activity has a material impact on the company’s risk profile have been such as to encourage transactions seeking short-term profits, with increasingly risky business models being developed to that end, to the detriment of workers, savers and investors, and sustainable growth in general,
B. whereas the Commission presented recommendations on remuneration policies in the financial services sector and for listed companies on 30 April 2009, and whereas the Council and Parliament are currently amending the Capital Requirements Directives so as to incorporate, inter alia, financial supervision of remuneration policy,
C. whereas the agreed principles and measures already taken in respect of remuneration policy should be continually reviewed and, where necessary, adapted in order to create uniform conditions throughout Europe and secure the global competitiveness of the European finance industry,
1. Calls on the Commission to reinforce its recommendations of 30 April 2009 on pay structure and risk alignment as required by the principles established by the Financial Stability Board and endorsed by the G20 in September 2009;
2. Urges supervisors in the financial sector to implement the Compensation Principles and Standards Assessment Methodology proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in January 2010;
3. Considers that the personal financial interest of directors linked to variable remuneration is, in many cases, in conflict with the long-term interests of the company; stresses that policy on the remuneration of directors and other staff who bear responsibility for risky decisions should be consistent with a balanced and properly functioning system of risk management, and that there should be an appropriate ratio between fixed and variable pay; calls urgently for the introduction, across the board, of measures for the reduction, or indeed withdrawal, of the variable pay of categories of staff whose performance is responsible for a deterioration in their company’s results;
4. Suggests including corporate social responsibility targets in the long-term criteria justifying the payment of deferred variable remuneration; stresses that variable remuneration should be calculated in accordance with pre-determined measurable criteria geared to securing corporate policy sustainability; insists that such remuneration must be determined exclusively by the longer-term performance – including social and environmental aspects of performance – of the company concerned; also calls for the payment of a large portion of variable remuneration to be deferred for several years to ensure that longer-term risks are also taken into account;
5. Considers that continuing to do business or maintain branches in non-cooperative countries is contrary to the long-term interests of companies generally, and calls for the development of a European strategy to combat tax havens in order to implement the pronouncements made by the G20 in London and Pittsburgh;
6. Is of the opinion, not only for ethical reasons but also in the interests of social justice and economic sustainability, that the difference between the highest and the lowest remuneration in a company should be reasonable;
7. Calls for a specific framework for the granting of end-of-contract bonuses; supports, in accordance with the Commission’s recommendations of 30 April 2009, the setting of a ceiling on end-of-contract allowances for company directors, or indeed a ban on the payment of such allowances where a contract is terminated on grounds of the company’s inadequate performance;
8. Calls for complete transparency, at both national and international level, towards shareholders, employees and third parties, with regard to remuneration policies for directors and urges the Commission to explore the possibilities of standardising such regular disclosure;
9. Calls for state enterprises, like other companies, to exercise complete transparency concerning their pay and bonus policies;
10. Calls, too, for the publication of details of companies’ pension and supplementary pension arrangements, including those of state enterprises;
11. Calls for the determination of pay policies to take account of equality between men and women;
12. Calls for a ban on the use of stock options or similar instruments as variable components of remuneration; considers that stock-option plans are not an appropriate remuneration tool, as stock options give only a bonus and not a malus in case of failure; believes, further, that all remuneration should be subject to a bonus/malus principle based on symmetrical rules;
13. Considers that share-based variable remuneration is not an appropriate form of incentive because share prices are particularly volatile and there is a risk of encouraging short-term financial strategies;
14. Calls for the setting-up, in companies of a significant size, of internal and independent remuneration committees, which should work in cooperation with works councils and whose opinions should be published;
15. Calls on the Commission to encourage Member States to remind listed companies and financial services companies of their social responsibility, their tarnished image and the need to set a good example in a prosperous international society;
16. the need to punish all forms of discrimination in companies, particularly in the determination of remuneration policies, in career development and in the process of recruiting directors;
17. Calls for it to be ensured that the regulation of remuneration is not to the detriment of the right of management and labour to engage in collective bargaining.
RESULT OF FINAL VOTE IN COMMITTEE
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Date adopted |
2.6.2010 |
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Result of final vote |
+: –: 0: |
44 3 0 |
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Members present for the final vote |
Regina Bastos, Edit Bauer, Jean-Luc Bennahmias, Mara Bizzotto, Milan Cabrnoch, David Casa, Alejandro Cercas, Ole Christensen, Derek Roland Clark, Sergio Gaetano Cofferati, Marije Cornelissen, Frédéric Daerden, Karima Delli, Proinsias De Rossa, Frank Engel, Sari Essayah, Richard Falbr, Ilda Figueiredo, Pascale Gruny, Marian Harkin, Roger Helmer, Nadja Hirsch, Liisa Jaakonsaari, Danuta Jazłowiecka, Martin Kastler, Ádám Kósa, Jean Lambert, Patrick Le Hyaric, Olle Ludvigsson, Elizabeth Lynne, Thomas Mann, Elisabeth Morin-Chartier, Csaba Őry, Siiri Oviir, Konstantinos Poupakis, Sylvana Rapti, Licia Ronzulli, Jutta Steinruck, Traian Ungureanu |
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Substitute(s) present for the final vote |
Georges Bach, Françoise Castex, Jürgen Creutzmann, Marielle Gallo, Joe Higgins, Franz Obermayr, Evelyn Regner, Birgit Sippel, Emilie Turunen, Cecilia Wikström |
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Substitute(s) under Rule 187(2) present for the final vote |
Rosa Estaràs Ferragut, Oldřich Vlasák |
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RESULT OF FINAL VOTE IN COMMITTEE
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Date adopted |
22.6.2010 |
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Result of final vote |
+: –: 0: |
40 2 3 |
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Members present for the final vote |
Burkhard Balz, Slavi Binev, Godfrey Bloom, Sharon Bowles, Pascal Canfin, Nikolaos Chountis, George Sabin Cutaş, Rachida Dati, Leonardo Domenici, Diogo Feio, Elisa Ferreira, Vicky Ford, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Jean-Paul Gauzès, Sven Giegold, Enikő Győri, Othmar Karas, Wolf Klinz, Jürgen Klute, Rodi Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou, Astrid Lulling, Hans-Peter Martin, Arlene McCarthy, Íñigo Méndez de Vigo, Sławomir Witold Nitras, Ivari Padar, Alfredo Pallone, Anni Podimata, Antolín Sánchez Presedo, Olle Schmidt, Edward Scicluna, Peter Simon, Theodor Dumitru Stolojan, Ivo Strejček, Kay Swinburne, Ramon Tremosa i Balcells, Corien Wortmann-Kool |
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Substitute(s) present for the final vote |
Elena Băsescu, David Casa, Saïd El Khadraoui, Sari Essayah, Carl Haglund, Iliana Ivanova, Syed Kamall, Philippe Lamberts, Olle Ludvigsson |
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