REPORT on the analysis of options to move beyond 20% greenhouse gas emission reductions and assessing the risk of carbon leakage

1.6.2011 - (2011/2012(INI))

Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety
Rapporteur: Bas Eickhout
Rapporteur for the opinion (*): Romana Jordan Cizelj, Committee on Industry, Research and Energy
(*) Associated committee - Rule 50 of the Rules of Procedure

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the analysis of options to move beyond 20% greenhouse gas emission reductions and assessing the risk of carbon leakage

(2011/2012(INI))

The European Parliament,

–   having regard to the Commission Communication ‘Analysis of options to move beyond 20% greenhouse gas emission reductions and assessing the risk of carbon leakage’ (COM(2010)0265) and the accompanying document (SEC(2010)0650),

–   having regard to the Commission Communication ‘A Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050’ (COM(2011)0112), and the statement that ‘The EU already has legislation in place that ensures a 20% cut in greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 compared with 1990 levels. It maintains its conditional offer of a 30% reduction, provided there are comparable reductions by other developed countries and appropriate contributions from developing countries.’,

–   having regard to the Commission Communication on an Energy Efficiency Plan 2011 (COM(2011)0109),

–   having regard to its previous resolutions regarding climate change, in particular its resolution of 25 November 2010 on the climate change conference in Cancun (COP16)[1] where the Parliament called for a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 30%, compared to 1990 levels, by 2020,

–   having regard to Commission Regulation (EU) No 1031/2010 of 12 November 2010 on the timing, administration and other aspects of auctioning of greenhouse gas emission allowances[2] pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and the Council establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowances trading within the Community[3],

–   having regard to the Council Conclusions of June 2010 agreeing that the Commission should ‘conduct more detailed analysis on the policy options and costs and benefits, including at Member State level, as appropriate’,

–   having regard to the EU climate and energy package,

–   having regard to the draft Commission Regulation determining, pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, certain restrictions applicable to the use of international credits from projects involving industrial gases,

–   having regard to Rule 48 of its Rules of Procedure,

–   having regard to the report of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety and the opinion of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A7-0219/2011),

A. whereas the EU’s and the global climate objective is to limit climate change to 2°C above the pre-industrial level; whereas the climate package adopted in December 2008 represents a first step towards ensuring EU action in line with this objective; whereas countries representing some 80% of global emissions have pledged to reduce emissions, although the Parties to the UNFCCC acknowledged in Cancun that current pledges are insufficient to meet the 2°C objective,

B.  whereas the main purpose of the climate and energy package is that of reducing emission in the most cost-effective way,

C. whereas, according to the European Environmental Agency, the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions were 17.3% lower in 2009 than in 1990; stresses, however, that around one third of this can be accounted for by the effect of the economic crisis,

D. whereas the International Energy Agency has estimated that the EU’s share of global emissions was 13% in 2010 and will be 9% in 2030,

E.  whereas the global carbon budget that is likely to meet the 2°C objective is about 800 billion tonnes of CO2 between 2005 and 2050; whereas the EU’s share of the global population in 2050 is projected at 5.7%,

F.  whereas the Commission Roadmap for moving to a competitive low-carbon economy in 2050 demonstrates that of the current 20% target, more than half could be achieved through non-domestic offsets,

G. whereas Article 1 of the Emissions Trading Directive (2003/87/EC) ‘establishes a scheme for GHG allowance trading within the Community in order to promote reductions of GHG emissions in a cost-effective and economically efficient manner.’,

H. whereas, due to the economic crisis, emissions from sectors in the EU emissions trading system (ETS) have been considerably lower than projected, and below the level of initial allocation, but the investment ability of these sectors has also been reduced at the same time,

I.   whereas the current lower carbon price will have a significant impact on operational and investment decisions and is to be kept under close examination as if sustained, this would reduce the revenues from auctioning allowances for financing climate action in the EU and in developing countries,

J.   whereas, the Commission Roadmap for moving to a competitive low-carbon economy in 2050 implies that stepping up to 30% will have a positive effect on Member States’ revenue from auctioning of allowances if the 2020 goals on renewable energy and energy efficiency is fulfilled as confirmed by the Heads of State on 4 February 2011,

K. whereas, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), scenarios show that global energy-related carbon emissions are likely to increase by 21% over the 2008 levels by 2035 if countries implement the commitments they made in the Copenhagen Accord in a cautious manner, which would then make it impossible to limit further global warming to 2°C; whereas non-OECD countries are deemed to account for all of the projected increase in world emissions[4],

L.  whereas, according to the Commission, stepping up efforts to 30% compared to 1990 levels while the other countries retain their low pledges would have a limited incremental impact on the EU’s energy intensive industry, as long as adequate energy efficiency measures are deployed and the special measures for industry stay in place where needed,

M.  whereas in the absence of a global agreement assuring a level playing field, a part of European industry could be still exposed to unfair competition, unless special measures for sectors exposed to carbon leakage were maintained,

N. whereas the International Energy Agency (IEA) has estimated that in the period 2008-2030 global demand for fossil fuels will increase by 40%, particularly in emerging and developing countries, where CO2 emissions will increase by around 45% by 2030,

O. whereas the upheavals in North Africa and the Middle East clearly show that dependence on fossil fuels, and particularly oil, has resulted in compromises in EU policy towards oil supplying countries like Libya that are not sustainable in the long term, which makes reducing dependence on fossils fuels a matter of urgency from an external policy perspective as well,

P.  whereas at negotiating level the EU has undertaken to increase its target for greenhouse gas emissions reduction to 30%, provided that a global international agreement can be reached under which all industrialised countries undertake to make equivalent commitments in terms of the effort required of their respective economies and the burdens imposed on their production sectors,

Q. whereas action by the EU alone will not be enough to combat climate change,

R.  whereas some emerging and developing countries have put forward ambitious targets since the EU targets were set in 2007 and 2008, e.g. Brazil’s emission’s reduction target of 36%-39% compared to business as usual, Mexico’s target of a 30% drop compared to business as usual, the Maldives’ objective to be carbon neutral by 2020, or Costa Rica’s to be carbon neutral by 2021,

S.  whereas some industrialised countries, such as Norway, Japan and Switzerland, have also put forward ambitious targets,

T.  whereas, in the context of the international negotiations, the Climate Change Conference in Cancun (COP16) last December failed to make tangible progress as regards binding short or medium-term commitments by all the industrialised and emerging economies,

U. whereas without a global agreement and the cooperation of major CO2 producers (USA, China, India) the EU cannot succeed in having any influence at all on the climate changes currently occurring,

V. whereas future EU climate diplomacy activities conducted by the European External Action Service should focus on firm engagement with third countries, build effective cooperation mechanisms with international partners and agree on binding climate objectives with third countries to combat climate change,

W. whereas taking into consideration that to best address climate change mitigation, the reduction of emissions from non-CO2 gases needs to be addressed at the same time, which could be achieved with the existing tools and technologies and implemented in the coming decade for a public price that in orders of magnitude is lower than current carbon prices,

1.  Welcomes the 2010 Commission Communication concluding that stepping up to a 30% target, which would be more consistent with the developed countries’ target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions at the high end of the 25-40% range for 2020, would be technically feasible and economically affordable; notes that according to the Commission Communication ‘A Roadmap for moving to a competitive low-carbon economy in 2050’, the EU could decrease its emissions internally by 25% or more by 2020 by fully implementing renewable energy and the energy efficiency target; notes however that the roadmap does not set a new target and stresses that attention needs to be paid to the economic and social consequences in the Member States;

2.  Welcomes the roadmap for moving to a competitive low-carbon economy in 2050 setting long-term targets reconfirming the EU’s objective of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95% by 2050 in order to keep climate change below 2°C; takes note of the 2050 Roadmap, which concludes that 80% of the reduction by 2050 has to be provided internally within the EU and that a linear reduction makes economic sense;

3.  Calls for the Commission to come forward, as soon as possible and before the end of 2011, with proposals to achieve a 25% internal greenhouse gas reduction by 2020 consistent with a cost effective pathway to the 2050 objective as outlined in the 2050 Roadmap, and to move to a 30% overall target for 2020;

Analysis of the 20 % target today

4.  Emphasises that, according to climate science, limiting climate change to an average of 2°C does not guarantee avoiding significant adverse climate impacts, but overshooting 2°C is likely to multiply adverse impacts and increase the likelihood of reaching tipping points where temperature levels begin to force the release of naturally trapped carbon from sinks such as forests and permafrost, and limit the ability of nature to absorb carbon in the oceans;

5.  Recalls that, according to the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, to have a 50% chance of limiting climate change to 2°C, industrialised countries need to reduce their emissions by 25-40% by 2020; points out that the EU’s current target is not in line with its 2°C objective; considers that, in accordance with the findings of the IPCC in its Fourth Assessment Report and more recent studies, developed countries as a group should reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 25-40% below 1990 levels by 2020 while developing countries as a group should achieve a substantial deviation below the currently predicted emissions growth rate, in the order of 15-30% by 2020;[5]

6.  Recalls that the EU, with little more than 10% of global emissions, will not be able to tackle climate change on its own;

7.  Points out that, since the establishment of the 20-20-20 Strategy in 2007 and the adoption of the climate and energy package in 2008, there have been very positive developments at international level and some industrialised countries, and more notably emerging and developing countries, have put forward ambitious targets that in some areas even exceed the European Union’s call for a possible international agreement;

8.  Points out, on the other hand, that the obligations put forward by third countries to date generally fall short of what is required and in no way suffice to meet the 2°C objective, which is why international developments justify an intermediate step;

9.  Notes that the European Council has recognised that further reductions in the range of 80-95% by 2050 as compared to 1990 are necessary; points out that a linear trajectory between 2009 and 2050 would result in a 2020 target in the range of 34-38% as compared to 1990;

10. Reiterates that cumulative emissions are decisive for the climate system; notes that even when meeting the 2050 targets the EU would still be responsible in terms of GHG emissions for approximately double its per capita share f the global 2°C compatible carbon budget, and that delaying emissions reductions increases the cumulative share significantly;

11. Recalls that the Stern Report showed that making the majority of emissions reductions at the beginning of the commitment period is the most cost-effective method;

12. Notes that the opportunity cost of not acting now is higher than the additional EUR 11 billion required for moving to a 30% GHG reduction target by 2020;

13. Stresses that delaying global and European climate action would result in higher costs not only for achieving the 2050 target, due to stranded investment in high-carbon capital stock and slower technological learning, but also in losing an innovative leading role for the EU in research, job creation and guidance for a greener sustainable economy;

14. Points out that in 2009 the level of emissions in the European Union was already 17.3% below that in 1990, which means that a 20% target does not give a strong signal to market operators to invest in low‑CO2 and CO2‑free technologies;

15. Expresses concern that the current lack of ambition could result in low levels of investment and the relative stagnation of European economies compared to those in Asia;

16. Points out that, according to the 2010 Commission analysis, there could be up to 2.4 billion allowances in surplus in the ETS; points out that the provision allowing these allowances to be banked has enabled carbon prices to be maintained; considers, furthermore, that stable rules for the European emissions trading market are important for encouraging investment and that a Commission initiative to make registry access safe and improve market regulation would be welcome;

17. Recognises that investment in green technologies depends not only on the price signal delivered by the carbon market, but also on the implementation of consistent environmental policies aiming to develop a social and greener economy as a job creation alternative to economic decline and crisis; concludes therefore that, under the current 20% target, the role which the ETS will play in driving emission reductions and deployment of low-emission technologies in the sectors it covers cannot currently be predicted with any certainty, as the forecast range for the carbon price is quite wide, thereby risking a lock-in for carbon intensive installations and infrastructures for the coming decades;

18. Notes that, due to the low carbon price, the auction of allowances will not mobilise resources for climate investments as expected; considers that the Member States should encourage effective use of auction income during Stage 3 so as to promote R&D and innovation with a view to achieving long-term reductions in greenhouse gas emissions; believes firmly that effective coordination between the Member States, via the Commission, should make it possible for a large proportion of this income to be used for joint Community projects, enabling the EU to compete effectively with the research policies of its competitors;

19. Supports the idea of setting aside 1.4 billion allowances from the EU ETS prior to 2020 as a possible solution to maintaining the incentives in the ETS and to guarantee the level of stringency foreseen at the time of the legislative procedure; calls also for a significant number of allowances to be auctioned at EU level to support a technology accelerator and to fund a just transition mechanism for the European workforce; calls on the Commission to present a proposal on how this policy could be organised in practice;

Industrial policy aspects

20. Stresses that the economic crisis has led to a significant reduction in industrial production and economic growth, and to increased unemployment and, at the same time, to lower emissions and to a reduction in energy consumption; believes that this emissions reduction should not be interpreted as a sign that the EU is on track to meet its overall emissions reduction targets; acknowledges that although installations benefit from surplus allowances, the economic crisis may nonetheless have affected the capacity of industry to invest in further emissions reductions;

21. Observes that more and more countries worldwide have already recognised the opportunity provided by climate technologies and environmental technologies and are converting their economies accordingly; notes in this connection the competitive challenge linked to the expansion of environmental technologies in China’s new Five Year Plan;

22. Stresses that China is the world leader in the installation of windfarms, that Chinese and Indian manufacturers of wind turbines number among the top ten such manufacturers, and that China and Taiwan currently produce most of the photovoltaic panels sold on the international market; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take steps to promote the eco-efficient development and production in the EU of these technologies and of the new, innovative technologies needed to achieve the ambitious targets for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions;

Energy policy aspects

23. Agrees with the Commission’s and the IEA’s assumption that any delay in investing in emissions reductions and the relevant energy technologies would lead to higher costs at a later stage; considers that, if it is to meet the long-term target of 80-95% reductions by 2050, as confirmed once again by the European Council on 4 February 2011, the EU will have to speed up its efforts; welcomes, therefore, the Commission’s intention to draw trajectories designed to achieve long-term targets in the most cost-efficient and effective way;

24. Is deeply concerned that the EU is not on track to meet targets to reduce energy consumption by 20% as compared with the projections for 2020, owing to a lack of commitment, ambition and investment on the part of the Member States and the EU itself; endorses fully the conclusion to be drawn from the recent Commission Communications entitled ‘Energy Efficiency Plan 2011’ and ‘A Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050’ that energy-efficiency policies are key to further reducing carbon emissions; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that energy-efficiency measures – in particular in the areas of buildings, urban heating and transport – receive more funding under the next multiannual financial framework; deplores the fact that greater emphasis was not placed on energy efficiency when the European Council discussed energy priorities on 4 February 2011;

25. Draws attention to the fact that the current 20% target is based on an energy mix which in some Member States includes nuclear energy; welcomes the Commission’s decision to subject the nuclear power stations in the EU to stress testing, so that the requisite measures can be adopted to ensure their safety; believes that the decision by some Member States to shut down some existing nuclear reactors, and the increased investment in the construction of new nuclear power stations, could lead to some Member States revising the national measures adopted to achieve the current 20% target;

26. Welcomes the fact that, according to the recently submitted national renewable energy action plans, the EU could go beyond its 2020 renewable energy goals if the action plans are fully implemented and financing instruments are improved; calls on the Commission to closely monitor that implementation and to work towards creating a stable investment environment in the period to 2020 and beyond and achieving better market integration for renewable energy; calls on the Commission to analyse and, if appropriate, increase the legally binding renewable energy target after 2020;

27. Calls on the EU to make greater efforts to increase the share of renewable energies in the electricity sector and to create the conditions for intelligent networks, in order to guarantee increasingly decentralised energy production; stresses that, if this is to be achieved, more must be invested in energy infrastructure projects;

28. Notes that, owing to a number of market and regulatory barriers, many energy-saving opportunities are still not exploited in the EU; calls for targets to be set for the use of renewable energies, for product standards to be established for energy-efficient products and vehicles and for environmentally conscious public procurement to be promoted;

29. Points out that, as highlighted in the European Council conclusions of 4 February 2011, technical standards for smart grids should be adopted by the end of 2012 at the latest;

30. Emphasises the important role of smart grids and smart meters in integrating electricity from different sources, including renewable sources; welcomes the work carried out by the task force on smart meters and the standardisation mandate 441 of 12 March 2009 issued to CEN, CENELEC and ETSI concerning the development of an open architecture in the field of measuring instruments, and asks the Commission to put forward a number of recommendations and legislative proposals as soon as possible for the full use thereof, attaching particular importance to the drawing-up of standards and to the energy-saving potential of smart meters; reiterates its call to set as a policy goal that 50% of homes in Europe should be fitted with smart meters by 2015[6];

31. Stresses the imperative need to adapt ICT standardisation policy to market developments requiring interoperability, which will help to speed up work on technical standards for electric vehicles and smart grids and meters, with a view to its completion by 2012;

32. Stresses that ICTs could improve road transport and can do more to facilitate the use of safer, smarter and greener cars in Europe; emphasises the role of the Digital Agenda, which should prioritise the environmental potential of smart cars and smart roads and R&D pilot projects for V2V and V2R devices;

33. Notes that speeding up authorisation procedures and finding new ways of financing new and, in particular, energy-efficient and innovative infrastructure projects is a prerequisite if European energy and climate targets are to be achieved on schedule; stresses that new energy infrastructure projects must be consistent with the EU’s long-term energy and climate policies;

34. Welcomes the agreement on using uncommitted funds from the European Recovery Programme (energy projects) to establish a dedicated financial instrument to support sustainable energy initiatives at local and regional level; calls for close monitoring of this instrument in order to assess whether this kind of funding could serve as a model for future instruments to finance sustainable and low-carbon investments;

Research and innovation aspects

35. Points out that the political target for research spending under the EU2020 strategy of 3% of GDP is composed of a private (2%) and public (1%) expenditure share; notes that there are still specific problems in meeting the 3% target, in particular in the field of private research spending; points out that the lack of commitment in the field of research funding is hampering the development of highly energy-efficient climate-friendly technologies;

Options and tools to move beyond the 20% target

36. Recalls that, according to the Commission analysis, stepping up to the 30% reduction target with 25% domestic effort now represents an increase of EUR 11 billion as compared to 2008 projections for the absolute costs of the climate and energy package in 2020; notes the Commission’s assessment that this will raise the carbon price in the EU ETS to some EUR 30/tonne of CO2, i.e. similar to the level estimated necessary for the 20% reduction target in 2008;

37. Stresses that, in order to achieve a 30% greenhouse gas emission reduction by 2020 a high and stable carbon price is necessary to drive investment in low-carbon technology;

38. Recalls the Joint Declaration of CEOs of leading European utility companies calling for the EU to move to a 25% domestic reduction target from February 2011, and the Joint Business Declaration of October 2011 calling for a 30% reduction target in 2020. Major voices in the European industry thereby say that now is the time to act and to go beyond the 20% reduction target in 2020;

39. Recognises that the economic crisis has reduced the ability of the EU economy to invest in low carbon technologies;

40. Calls for the application of a general principle that the EU should follow the most cost-effective pathway to reducing CO2 emissions while supporting the timely deployment of promising innovative technologies and investments which are in line with the EU’s long-term climate target; believes that the subsidiarity principle has to be respected in the implementation of that principle;

41. Stresses that a comprehensive range of measures, such as incentives for additional investment, growth-oriented fiscal policy and public procurement, is necessary to ensure that economic growth and the reduction of both unemployment and greenhouse gas emissions reinforce each other; points to Council Directive 2003/96/EC on the taxation of energy products and electricity which already allows for certain exemptions or reductions in the tax level; inter alia because of competitiveness or environmental considerations;

42.  Calls upon the Commission to regularly analyse and ensure that the cost-effective sharing of the additional effort between ETS and non-ETS sectors remains the same as under the climate package; calls therefore for Member States to enhance their efforts in innovative investments and the implementation of provisions in existing energy savings directives to achieve more ambitious targets;

43. Concurs with the Commission’s analysis that moving to a 30% reduction target with cost-efficient effort sharing between ETS and non-ETS, and a 25% domestic effort (the rest with offsets), would correspond to an ETS cap reduction of 1.4 billion allowances;

44. Notes the option of implementing the change in the ETS by cancelling allowances assigned for auctioning; stresses however that a stable and predictable EU ETS is essential to investment decisions; notes furthermore that this option would eventually require adjustment through a review of the Emissions Trading Directive;

45. Calls for the EU ETS to ensure both long-term investment security and make provision for flexibility mechanisms in the event of economic downturns (e.g. to avoid over-allocations);

46 Stresses the need to curb CO2 emissions in the transport sector through the provision of standardised European infrastructures for electric vehicles and more incentives to use sustainable second-generation biofuel as an alternative to fossil fuels; calls for the use of public transport to be increased;

47. Recognises that some of the most cost-effective reduction potential is found in Member States that are currently below the EU average for GDP per capita, and that public intervention to facilitate financing of initial investments is likely to be necessary to achieve reductions in the non-ETS sectors; stresses the need for EU financial mechanisms to be revised to trigger cost-effective GHG reductions in the EU;

48. Considers that public financing mechanisms should also be available to facilitate a transition to a cleaner energy mix in Member States; such financing should be conditional on a genuine, demonstrable transition to significantly cleaner energy production;

49. Stresses the need to develop a policy structure that makes climate policy an opportunity for industry instead of a threat, and that climate policy is an integral part of resource efficiency and innovation policy;

50. Notes that improving resource efficiency and reducing dependency on raw materials would lead to significant energy efficiency gains and lower CO2 emissions;

51. Stresses again that improvements in energy and resource efficiency, in particular, offer a considerable negative-cost emission reduction potential, and that a substantial number of climate protection measures consequently exist which could pay for themselves simply thanks to the lower energy costs associated with them; calls for the adoption of ambitious implementing measures under the Eco-design Directive to be speeded up and a dynamic revision of the minimum requirements to be ensured; calls for the Commission to review the methodology and the Directive to allow setting requirements close to or at the level of current best available techniques following a ‘top-runner’ approach; stresses furthermore that a communication strategy must be developed to provide both businesses and consumers with comprehensive information;

52. Calls for specific targets, that are not linked to ETS or the effort sharing, for EU land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF), ensuring the permanence of emission reductions and the environmental integrity of the sector’s contribution to emissions reductions as well as accurate monitoring and accounting; calls for the Commission to further clarify the impact of land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) emissions in the EU’s and Member States’ GHG commitments and to report on this issue to Parliament, in preparation for COP17 in Durban in November 2011;

53. Highlights the potential for agriculture to make a major contribution to tackling climate change and, in particular, the potential for using agricultural waste in the production of sustainable energy, thereby creating an additional revenue stream for farmers; believes that the future CAP should be a tool to help Member States reach environmental and climate-change targets and that it should help farmers exploit the benefits offered by green growth; believes that the greening component of the CAP must be a part of the direct payment arrangements under the first pillar, in order to avoid complicated administrative procedures, ensure that farmers’ environmental commitments are incentivised and secure uniform implementation across Member States;

54. Considers it is of utmost importance that EU agricultural policy instruments incorporate incentives for reducing the climate impacts of agriculture, including through support under the first pillar;

55. Acknowledges the loss of potential revenues from surplus assigned amount units (AAUs) from the Kyoto Protocol first commitment period to protect the environmental integrity of a post 2013 climate regime and calls for this to be addressed in the context of the future financial framework;

56. Calls upon the Commission and Member States to ensure that the full revenues from auctioning of EU ETS credits are earmarked for further investments in mitigation and adaptation measures and used effectively to improve energy and resource efficiency in society, and in particular in the energy and industry sectors concerned, instead of being withdrawn to the general budget of the Member States;

57. Reaffirms that at least 50% of auctioning revenues should be reinvested in innovative and sustainable technologies;

58. Urges the Commission to actively monitor the spending of auctioning revenues by Member States and report on this on an annual basis to Parliament;

59. Takes the view that in order to reduce emissions globally, the ETS will be a fully effective tool provided that it is adopted by all the major world economies and backed up by other tools (such as voluntary agreements, tax measures, etc.), to be considered on the basis of national priorities and capacities;

60. Reiterates that it is vital to bridge the gap between the voluntary nature of the international commitments undertaken by non-EU countries and the recognition of a legally binding international system;

61. Takes into account that the Commission Communication on a Roadmap for moving towards a competitive low carbon economy in 2050 emphasises the need to remain attentive to the risk of carbon leakage in order to ensure a level playing field;

62. Reiterates that EU reduction targets need to be primarily achieved within the EU; recalls that the use of international offsets replaces investment in the EU economy and delays domestic reductions in the EU; calls upon the Commission and Member States to complement the current system of production-based direct emission accounting with consumption-based accounting, analysing whether emissions have indeed been reduced instead of exported; calls upon the Commission to come forward with a proposal, as changing consumption patterns and resource efficiency are the real answer to mitigating climate change;

63. Takes into account that Member States, in the Council Conclusions of 14 March 2011, reiterated the importance of ensuring the continuation of existing flexible mechanisms, while improving them, and establishing new sectoral or other scaled-up market-based mechanisms at the Durban Climate Conference in order to enhance the cost-effectiveness of, and to promote, mitigation actions while contributing to sustainable development;

64. Calls for additional quality criteria for the use of international offsets within the EU, through the introduction of stringent project quality standards guaranteeing respect for human rights and reliable, verifiable and real additional emissions reductions that also support sustainable development in developing countries;

65. Calls on the Commission to propose immediately how the Union can best complement its actions for climate change mitigation with efforts aimed at reducing non-CO2 gases, such as the HFCs which are the fastest growing climate pollutant in the world and HFC23; calls on the Commission to promote the initiative to bring HFC production into the Montreal Protocol and to conclude bilateral agreements with third countries for mitigating HFC23, with a view to phasing down non-CO2 gases and mitigating HFC-23, in a cost-effective manner, for a public price that in orders of magnitude is lower than current carbon prices;

66. Calls on the Commission, in the context of its actions to mitigate climate change, to develop fast-action regulating strategies with a view to accelerating the phasing-out of hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), and to recovering and destroying stratospheric ozone depleting GHGs in discarded products and equipment;

67. Calls on the Commission, in the context of its actions to mitigate climate change, to develop fast-action strategies with a view to reducing emissions of black carbon, giving priority to emissions that affect regions of snow and ice, including the Arctic;

68. Calls on the Commission, in the context of its actions to mitigate climate change, to develop fast-action regulating strategies with a view to reducing pollutant gases that lead to the formation of tropospheric (lower atmosphere) ozone, a significant GHG;

Energy measures

69. Calls for energy efficiency to be the priority in future climate-policy measures; acknowledges that, according to the Commission’s 2050 Roadmap, if the EU delivers on its current policies, in particular achieving the energy-efficiency objective of 20% by 2020, this would enable it to reduce its emissions internally by 25% or more by 2020; notes that, according to the Commission’s analysis, this reduction level would still be on the cost-effective path towards the long-term target of a 80-95% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions over 1990 levels and that a less ambitious approach would result in significantly higher overall costs over the entire period;

70. Stresses that the latest developments at international level have clearly demonstrated that it is even more imperative than ever to meet the 20% energy efficiency target; proposes that the target be met with the help of a mix of instruments including EU and national measures, such as tax incentives, loans on specially favourable terms, indirect subsidies, changes to rent law, guidelines in connection with public invitations to tender and the laying down of standards; reiterates its call for mandatory energy efficiency targets for Member States and calls for the 20% target to be translated as quickly as possible into targets for the Member States and for these to be laid down in a legally binding way; recognises that, pursuant to the subsidiarity principle, Member States must, however, be allowed room for manoeuvre in choosing the means they will use;

71. Calls on the Commission to establish an effective legal framework to ensure that Member States implement fully their energy savings target commitments by 2020, by introducing a requirement that National Energy Efficiency Action Plans (NEEAPs) must be approved by the Commission, or by means of other measures; calls on the Commission to facilitate and monitor the implementation of NEEAPs and to consider infringement proceedings, when necessary, in the event of non-compliance; recalls, in that connection, its resolution of 15 December 2010 on Revision of the Energy Efficiency Action Plan[7];

72. Emphasises that energy savings achieved by means of improved energy efficiency offer the most cost-effective means of securing additional CO2 reductions; draws attention to the untapped potential in the areas of life cycle energy performance of buildings, in particular existing buildings, the transport sector (including air transport), public procurement, the manufacture of energy-intensive products and energy production, transformation and transmission, including district heating and cooling; reiterates that concrete measures in these areas are essential and draws attention to the relevant proposals included in the Bendtsen and Kolarska-Bobińska reports; urges that energy-saving measures must be implemented first and foremost at national, regional and local level and that a communication strategy must be developed for EU projects so as to provide both undertakings and consumers with full information; underlines the potential in introducing a scheme for energy saving obligations for the energy industry, as suggested in the Commission’s Energy Efficiency Plan, which has already had a positive effect in some Member States;

73. Draws attention to the energy saving potential of SMEs, as today only some 24% of European SMEs are actively implementing measures to reduce their environmental impact; stresses that while there is at least one financial consultant available for each SME, they receive no such advice on energy saving and energy efficiency, and would need the assistance of an environmental and energy expert as well;

74. Points out that, according to the Commission, nearly EUR 8 billion in EU energy-efficiency funding remains unclaimed; welcomes, therefore, the Commission’s intention to facilitate and promote the use of the Structural Funds for energy-related building refurbishment projects; awaits concrete initiatives, including as regards the funding provisions;

75. Stresses that tightening the EU’s climate targets would entail substantially increased effort and investment as regards the development and swift deployment of sustainable and low-carbon technologies, smart grids and energy-related research; considers it crucial that adequate financing for the SET-Plan should be ensured beyond 2013; stresses that an energy strategy with the ambition to meet climate targets beyond 20% must be based on all climate-friendly energy technologies;

76. Notes that the Commission has identified investment needs of EUR 1 trillion in the area of energy generation capacity and the upgrading of the EU’s energy transmission and distribution infrastructures by 2020, to be financed mainly through energy tariffs; calls for these investments to be made, with a view to completing an interconnected internal energy market ensuring security of supply, improving the integration of renewable energies in the European energy system, while taking into consideration the specific nature of each country’s energy mix, increasing energy efficiency and enabling consumers to benefit from new technologies; emphasises, however, that in raising the necessary finance, the polluter pays principle must prevail, taking due account of the needs of low income consumers suffering from energy poverty; stresses the need for electricity interconnectors between Member States in order to exploit fully the massive investments being made, in particular in renewable energy, in a number of countries;

77. Considers that shutting down nuclear power plants will lead to an increase in greenhouse gas emissions; recognises that this element should be taken into account when analysing the options to move beyond 20% greenhouse gas emission reductions;

78. Considers that, to secure long-term investments in renewable energy, the EU should adopt a trajectory for binding renewable energy targets after 2020; calls on the Commission to put forward a proposal for setting such targets;

Industrial policy measures

79. Takes into account that the Commission’s Communication on a Roadmap for moving towards a competitive low carbon economy in 2050 emphasises the need to safeguard the competitiveness of European industry (i.e. implement a cost-effective path to maximise benefits for EU manufacturing and to maximise benefits for EU);

80. Considers that sectoral approaches combined with economy-wide caps in industrialised countries can help reconcile climate action with competitiveness and economic growth; stresses the importance of adopting a holistic, horizontal, sectoral approach to industrial emissions as an added value in connection with international negotiations and European CO2 targets;

81. Considers that integrating sectoral approaches into the EU ETS would increase overall economic efficiency in all participating countries; stresses that it is worth considering the benefits of extending sectoral approaches to cover further sectors and countries;

82. Acknowledges the increasing attention being paid to carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies – as a transitional stage on the road to a long-term fossil-free power supply – in reducing carbon emissions, and not just in the energy sector, while noting that to be economically viable, the investment in CCS would require substantially higher carbon prices by comparison with today’s levels; stresses that social acceptance is necessary for a comprehensive evaluation of possible CCS projects; highlights the fact that, according to the IEA CCS roadmap, in 2030 half of all CCS projects will be in the industrial manufacturing sector; points out that fulfilling the criteria which new coal-fired power stations are required to meet in accordance with the climate and energy package provisions on CCS, should be a precondition for starting construction of gas-fired power stations; points out that implementing these technologies should not serve to reduce the competitiveness of European industry;

83. Notes that as far as the future of hard coal and lignite is concerned, CCS technology should not be considered the only option for retaining coal use in the EU economy, and that other low-emission coal technologies should also be developed and introduced;

Research and innovation measures

84. Stresses that the development and deployment of breakthrough technologies are the key to fighting climate change and, at the same time, convincing the EU’s partners worldwide that emissions reductions are feasible without losing competitiveness and jobs; considers it essential that Europe should lead by example by substantially increasing expenditure devoted to research on climate-friendly and energy-efficient industrial technologies under the Research and Innovation Framework Programme, which should be properly aligned with the strategic energy technologies set out in the SET-Plan; calls furthermore for regional and cohesion funds to be allocated to improving energy efficiency in the building and household sector in order to boost innovation, as well as to life-long-learning programmes; stresses the need for Europe to assume a leading role in research into climate and energy-efficient technologies and to develop close scientific cooperation in the field with international partners, such as the BRIC countries and the United States;

85. Attaches particular importance to coordination between European patent-protection mechanisms in the field of energy saving and renewables in order to facilitate access to valuable intellectual property which remains untapped; stresses the need to activate the planned European patent as a matter of priority in the fields of energy saving and renewables;

86. Considers that by smoothing the transition towards a low-carbon economy and paving the way for a global carbon market, sectoral approaches, combined with economy-wide caps in industrialised countries, might also be part of a post-2012 international framework for climate action;

87. Welcomes the Commission’s intention to gear climate policies towards long-term trajectories and supports the idea of intermediate targets, for example for 2030; is convinced that realistic medium and long-term objectives provide clearer incentives for investors to engage in sustainable investments;

88. Points out that the EU needs to step up its efforts from 2020 onwards and that in this respect it could make sense to identify an intermediate target for 2030, for example; calls on the Commission to develop specific instruments to achieve these goals in the most cost-effective way;

Co-benefits and impacts

89. Is convinced that the advantage of acting earlier contributes to significant long-term benefits for Europe’s competitiveness, by shaping appropriate expectations and maintaining a strong position in a rapidly growing global market for clean technologies;

90. Notes the conclusions of the study entitled ‘A New Growth Path for Europe’, and commissioned by the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, which suggests that raising the EU’s CO2 reduction target to 30% could, by 2020, increase the growth rate of the European economy by up to 0.6% per year, create up to 6 million jobs and significantly boost European investment;

91. Notes that European eco-industries employ approximately 3.4 million (FTE) people, points out that, according to recent studies, raising the EU climate target to 30% could foster up to 6 million additional jobs in Europe provided smart use is made of auctioning revenues or carbon taxes; recognises the job creation and competitiveness effects associated with the transition to a low carbon economy in the long term, but notes however that care should be taken to use public subsidies in an optimally effective manner;

92. Notes that in the EU analysis of options for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the case is not how to create more ‘green jobs’ by subsidising non-efficient (after carbon pricing is taken into consideration) installations for renewables but how to create ‘defendable jobs’ which will stand up to the competition test posed by the emerging global players; states that where the relevant equipment for some renewable sources is increasingly manufactured in China and India, Europe should now invest more in energy efficiency, which will strengthen local economies by supporting local jobs that cannot leak to third countries with lower costs of production;

93. Concurs with the European Commission’s Roadmap for moving to a competitive low-carbon economy in 2050 when it states that ‘the creation and preservation of jobs will depend on the EU’s ability to lead in terms of the development of new low carbon technologies through increased education, training, programmes to foster acceptability of new technologies, R&D and entrepreneurship, as well as favourable economic framework conditions for investments’;

94. Notes the lack of a thorough assessment of the impacts on employment caused by the low carbon transition which would primarily entail a shift of jobs across sectors, and that there is a need to identify better the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of such a transition;

95. Considers that moving to a more ambitious climate target can have a positive impact on job creation, and calls on the Commission to take appropriate measures through, inter alia, structural funds or the Globalisation Fund to facilitate structural change and labour-force retraining in communities with a large-scale loss of high carbon employment and also to ensure new growth sectors have sufficient access to appropriately skilled labour;

96. Emphasises the size of co-benefits related to improved air quality, estimated by the Commission at between EUR 6.3 billion and EUR 22 billion per year in 2020 without taking into account co-benefits related to reduced costs from illnesses; notes that, according to additional analysis, the health and air pollution co-benefits of a move to a 30% target increase this to a range of between EUR 6.3 billion and EUR 35.8 billion, with the higher end being achieved when reduction efforts are domestic;

97. Draws attention to the fact that, in addition to developing new climate technologies, disseminating them is decisive; calls on the Commission to take action in this field too, for example by creating new financing arrangements;

98. Notes that despite a temporary fall in energy consumption in 2009, more energy will be used in future as the economies of the Member States recover, so that the dependence on energy imports will continue to grow;

99. Notes that, according to the Commission’s assessment, setting a higher reduction target would lead to a reduction in oil and gas imports of up to EUR 40 billion by 2020 at an assumed oil price of USD 88 per barrel in 2020; welcomes the fact that the EU’s dependence on energy imports could thus be reduced by up to 56%; considers that this oil price estimate is likely to be very conservative, as the International Energy Agency (2010) predicts an oil price of USD 108 by 2020;

100.    Recognises that, while serving as an incentive to develop low-carbon technologies, tightening the ETS reduction target would lead to a further increase in electricity prices and – if not accompanied by ambitious energy efficiency measures – in electricity costs, which would be a major concern for EU industries and for consumers; considers that, according to the recent Eurobarometer survey, stable and secure energy prices are a major concern for the public; points out that the ETS Directive allows Member States to offset higher electricity prices for electro-intensive industries by granting State aid;

101.    Emphasises that the co-benefits of emissions reductions occur particularly for emissions reductions achieved inside the EU and where there is a strong emphasis in the short and medium-term on increased energy efficiency investment;

102.    Reiterates that EU reduction targets need to be primarily achieved within the EU; reiterates that costs related to emissions reductions represent investments in the EU economy; recalls its endorsement of the view that sectoral mechanisms should be sought for more advanced developing countries for the period beyond 2012 while CDM should remain available to LDC countries; calls for any new international sectoral offset crediting mechanisms to ensure environmental integrity and incorporate climate benefit beyond the 15-30% deviation from business as usual;

103.    Considers that a move to a 30% climate target for 2020 and setting long-term targets would restore and give more emphasis to the incentives for innovation;

104.    Stresses that climate-friendly innovation in Europe is necessary to maintain a strong position in a rapidly growing global market for low-carbon technologies and that this would allow the EU to be more competitive with larger market players; emphasises the need to ensure the market deployment and commercialisation of innovation output in Europe; takes the view, therefore, that proper financial instruments should be available to support the introduction of successful technologies on the EU market; warns against the risks associated with ‘green jobs leakage’, as delays in the creation of an inclusive and sustainable European economy would divert investments and jobs in green sectors to other regions;

105.    Is concerned that a shift in sustainable technology innovation away from Europe to other parts of the world is already occurring, which may turn Europe into a net importer of these technologies and related finished products; states that, according to recent surveys, out of the 50 companies identified as clean technology leaders, 24 were based in Asia, 22 in the United States, three in Europe, and one in Canada; stresses that, according to the Ernst &Young 2010 barometer, China and the US are the most attractive regions of the world for the development of renewable energy sources;·

106.    Emphasises the potential increase in European competitiveness, through innovation and increased investment, which could result from a transformation to a sustainable economy; highlights the fact that greater EU mitigation efforts would create cost advantages for the EU’s international competitors in a number of sectors and, at the same time, lead to competitive margins for EU companies in the area of climate technologies; considers that, for the EU’s competitors in the sectors concerned, signing up to an international agreement would mean giving up those cost advantages, whereas the EU’s competitive margin would be likely to remain unaffected;

107.    Stresses that Europe’s mitigation policy is effective in promoting a greener restructuring of its production system;

108. Highlights the need for the EU and the Member States to incorporate policies on climate, energy, industry and technology into an organic, comprehensive framework; within that framework, all economic and social stakeholders will have to play their role and efforts should be required not only of the industrial sector (and ETS sectors in particular) but also of other sectors such as transport and construction, and of civil society as a whole;

109. Considers that the Commission’s Communication on a Roadmap for moving towards a competitive low carbon economy in 2050 emphasises that the development of sectoral policy options will have to go into greater depth on costs, trade-offs and uncertainties.[8];

110.    Concludes that stepping up to a 30% target would have benefits for EU citizens and the European economy, if and when conditions are right, and in particular in the event of a global agreement;

Assessing the risk of carbon leakage

111.    Notes that the Commission has fully acknowledged that the best protection against the risk of carbon leakage would be effective global action[9] and that there is a need to remain vigilant in order to maintain a strong industrial base in Europe[10];

112.    Notes that some installations in energy-intensive sectors could end up with unused allowances at the end of the second ETS period in 2012, which could then be carried over to the 2013-2020 phase, mitigating the impact of the benchmarks in place for emission trading after 2012;

113.    Notes the concern with regards to carbon leakage under the current ETS while at the same time unused free allowances have been monetised by energy-intensive sectors;

114.    Recognises that the burden of industries covered by the EU-ETS will increase in the 2013-2020 phase, as a result of the Commission decision on benchmarking, the cross-sectoral correction factor and because of higher electicity prices;

115.    Notes that installations representing a very large majority of the non-power sector emissions covered by the ETS have been granted free allocation up to a product specific benchmark equivalent to 10% of the most efficient installations at European level, on the basis of high pre-recession production levels for the entire period up to 2020;

116.    Points out that, under the proposed benchmarking provisions, a share of the emissions certificates will still have to be purchased by those industrial installations which are not going to meet the benchmark, generating costs for EU companies facing international competition that their global competitors do not have to contend with; notes that, owing to the flexible architecture of the ETS, companies will be able to carry over unused allowances from the second to the third phase;

117.    Believes that ETS benchmarking should also take into account what sources of energy are available in a Member State and allow for adjustments as energy mixes and sourcing options change;

118.    Remains concerned about the large potential for windfall profits with free allocated allowances and the ongoing uncertainty and discussion on the ETS undermining public acceptance of the EU’s climate policy; calls for the submission of a new, comprehensive forecast assessing the risk of displacement of CO2 emissions for each Member State;

119.    Emphasises that, to mitigate the potential risk of carbon leakage even further, ETS auctioning revenues could be earmarked for capital intensive investments in breakthrough technologies in energy-intensive sectors;

120.    Emphasises that there is no single solution for industrial sectors that are vulnerable to carbon leakage, and that the nature of the product or the structure of the market are essential criteria for choosing between the tools available (free allocation of allowances, State aid or border adjustment measures);

121.    Stresses that for any potential future border adjustment measures or inclusion of imports in the ETS, these need to secure a full level playing field for European companies and recognition by the EU’s trading partners;

122.    Calls for the Commission to be particularly vigilant for any leakage of energy production outside the EU ETS, paying attention to Member States with interconnections to countries outside the EU;

123.    Stresses that to achieve the reduction target whilst guaranteeing fair competition, the EU should promote international multi-sector agreements for the branches of industry in which the risk of carbon leakage is greatest, e.g. steel, cement, and aluminium;

124.    Calls on the Commission to assess the risk of shifting emissions, and thus production, not only for energy-intensive industry but also for other important economic sectors;

125.    Supports investigating in the future revision of the EU ETS after 2020 the possibility of applying a more targeted approach to any use of offsets, and restricting the use of CDM credits generated in energy-intensive sectors in countries other than the least developed countries, initially through measures such as the application of a multiplier, for instance requiring two CDM credits to be surrendered per tonne emitted in the ETS; welcomes in this context the decision taken in January 2011 to prohibit the use of international credits from projects involving industrial gases as from May 2013 in the EU ETS and expects Member States to refrain from using such credits for compliance for targets under the Effort Sharing Decision;

126.    Recognises the need to assess and act against risks that, in the absence of sufficient global effort, domestic action leads to a shift in market share towards less efficient installations elsewhere, thereby resulting in increased emissions globally; emphasises that the more major trading partners implement their high-end climate pledges, the lower the risk of carbon leakage; notes in this respect that China’s 12th five year plan demonstrates a significant step towards implementation of policies that would be in line with the IPCC 4AR range;

Further opportunities and challenges

127.    Considers that potential changes in labour and energy costs as a result of EU climate change policies should not lead to social dumping or carbon leakage, and calls on the Commission to investigate any such risks; calls also, for this reason, on other developed or developing countries to undertake to make appropriate or comparable efforts;

128.    Calls on the Commission to support, on the one hand, measures to meet labour market requirements arising from the change to a low-carbon economy and, on the other, restructuring measures covering workers who become available in the new sectors;

129.    Takes the view that cohesion funds must be used more effectively to promote renewable energies, energy efficiency and low-carbon energy technologies;

130.    Stresses that according to the IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2010 the 2°C goal can only be achieved if current commitments are vigorously implemented in the period to 2020 and by much stronger action thereafter; calls, therefore, on the Commission, the Council and the European Council to push for more rapid, internationally coordinated implementation of the abolition of fossil-fuel subsidies agreed by the G20 and to present corresponding proposals at EU level;

131.    Recalls, in this context, the Commission’s Communication on the EU2020 strategy calling for a shift in the tax burden from labour to energy; welcomes the announcement in the annual growth survey of a proposal to adapt the European framework for energy taxation in line with the EU energy and climate objectives;

132.    Recalls that progress on a global scale is the only way to solve the problem of climate change, and the EU must continue to engage its partners with strengthened diplomatic efforts including increased personnel; calls on the Commission in this regard to work towards a structural overhaul of EU climate diplomacy which, through the involvement of the new European External Action Service and the High Representative, should seek to present a clearer EU profile on climate policy, bringing a new dynamic to the international climate negotiations and encouraging partners throughout the world also to introduce binding reductions in emissions;

133.Emphasises that the European Union must maintain and even reinforce the necessary pressure on third countries to deliver their share of global greenhouse gas reductions in the future; notes that a higher GHG reduction target within the EU will strengthen even further the EU’s position and bargaining power in the UNFCCC negotiations and stimulate the discussions on an international climate change agreement; emphasises that the EU has, on many previous occasions, managed to get other countries to raise their environmental requirements by taking the lead in introducing legislation; points out that EU action in these cases has shown that it is possible to combine high environmental requirements with economic growth;

134.    Calls on the Commission to take the following practical measures:

· assess the effects of domestic emissions-reduction policies on employment, including job opportunities, and promote the improvement of low-carbon literacy, energy-related reskilling and upskilling needs and education and training, in particular for SMEs,

· analyse to what extent Member States meet their commitment to spend at least 50% of the auction revenues on mitigation and adaptation measures, and propose measures, if necessary,

· analyse the impact of the EU’s increased emissions reduction targets at Member State level, as indicated in the Environment Council Conclusions of 14 March 2011,

· provide proper financing for the SET-Plan,

· promote the efficient use of the Structural and Cohesion Funds by the Member States, in particular for energy-efficiency measures, whilst taking full account of the principle that such investments must be regional and reduce economic and social disparities within the EU,

· introduce innovative financing mechanisms (such as revolving schemes),

· earmark additional funds for weaker and disadvantaged regions to cover measures in non-ETS sectors (buildings, transport, agriculture),

· give priority to climate and energy research under the Eighth Research Framework Programme, including energy efficiency, and to research into the causes of climate change and adaptation to it,

· analyse what impact a unilateral move by the EU beyond 20% greenhouse gas emissions reductions could have on other countries’ willingness to join an international agreement,

· investigate the potential impact in terms of green jobs’ leakage and reduced investments and competitiveness in green sectors;

135.    Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

• [1]  Text adopted, P7_TA(2010)0442.
• [2]  OJ L 302, 18.11.2010, p. 1.
• [3]  OJ L 275, 25.10.2003, p. 32.
• [4]  Report of the International Energy Agency (IEA) of 9 November 2010, entitled ‘World Energy Outlook 2010’.
• [5]  Environment Council Conclusions of 14 March 2011.
• [6]  European Parliament resolution of 5 May 2010 on a new Digital Agenda for Europe: 2015.eu (2009/2225(INI)).
• [7]  Texts adopted, P7_TA-PROV(2010)0485.
• [8]  Roadmap 2050, p. 6
• [9]  COM(2011)0112, p. 9
• [10]  COM(2011)0112, p. 9

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

Introduction

The threat to humanity posed by climate change is not decreasing, and the impacts of 2°C warming are rather worse than previously thought. Although it is not possible to pin extreme weather events to global warming, it is very likely that climate change exacerbates the frequency and intensity of the extremes.

The inability of the international community to come to a comprehensive binding international climate treaty in Copenhagen does not mean countries are not taking action. Results from Cancun meeting prove that countries are taking action and negotiations have gained new momentum. Europe is now 17.3% below 1990 carbon emissions.[1] The European Environmental Agency anticipates emissions to stabilise below 2008 levels, even with economic recovery, and without further measures.[2]

European countries face critical choices to preserve their future prosperity and security. Moving to a domestic greenhouse gas reduction target which is in line with the EU's climate objectives can be combined with healthier economy, increase in green jobs and innovation.

EU ETS effectiveness

Without significant tightening of the cap, the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) risks becoming redundant in driving investments in green technologies and innovation. Commission analysis[3] has shown that under the 20% climate target, the surplus of allowances in the ETS will correspond to around 2.4 billion banked allowances and unused international credits in 2020. This surplus leads to an inefficient price signal and will also significantly reduce revenues from auctioning that could be used to stimulate climate technologies and investments in energy savings, thereby creating millions of additional jobs.

The Rapporteur´s proposal

In this light, your Rapporteur calls for the Commission to come forward with proposals to increase Europe's climate ambition to a 30% greenhouse gas reduction for 2020 as soon as possible, and at least before the end of 2011.

The approach suggested is rather moderate in the Rapporteur’s view. Your Rapporteur considers that a move to 40% greenhouse gas reduction would be more appropriate from the point of view of science and the objective of maintaining climate change to 2°C, let alone 1.5°C, an objective also recognised under the UNFCCC. Your Rapporteur has also refrained from calling for full domestic achievement of the EU climate target, although this would increase benefits for European citizens through improved European air quality and drive investments into the EU economy.

• [1]  EEA, October 2010
• [2]  COM(2010) 569 final, Progress towards achieving the Kyoto objectives, p.5
• [3]  SEC(2010) 650, p. 34

OPINION of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (*) (12.5.2011)

for the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety

on analysis of options to move beyond 20% greenhouse gas emission reductions and assessing the risk of carbon leakage
(2011/2012(INI))

Rapporteur(*): Romana Jordan Cizelj

(*) Procedure with associated committees – Rule 50 of the Rules of Procedure

SUGGESTIONS

The Committee on Industry, Research and Energy calls on the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:

A.  whereas according to International Energy Agency (IEA) scenarios global energy-related carbon emissions are likely to increase by 21% over 2008 levels by 2035 if countries implement their commitments made in the Copenhagen Accord in a cautious manner, which would then make it impossible to limit further global warming to 2°C; whereas non-OECD countries are deemed to account for all of the projected increase in world emissions[1],

B.   whereas according to IEA figures the EU accounts for only 13% of global CO₂ emissions,

C.  whereas in accordance with the ETS directive the ETS scheme should promote reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective and economically efficient manner;

Analysis of the 20% target today

Industrial policy aspects

1.   Stresses that the economic crisis has led to a significant reduction in industrial production and economic growth and to increased unemployment and, at the same time, to lower emissions and to a reduction in energy consumption; believes that this emissions reduction should not be interpreted as a sign that the EU is on track to meet its overall emissions reduction targets; acknowledges that although installations benefit from surplus allowances, the economic crisis may nonetheless have affected the capacity of industry to invest in further emissions reduction;

2.   Stresses that China is the world leader in the installation of windfarms, that Chinese and Indian manufacturers of wind turbines number among the top ten such manufacturers, and that China and Taiwan currently produce most of the photovoltaic panels sold on the international market; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take steps to promote the eco-efficient development and production in the EU of these technologies and of the new, innovative technologies needed to achieve the ambitious targets for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions;

3.   Notes that according to the information received from various industrial sectors there are clear indications that existing EU climate policy provisions, such as the ETS, are already leading to a relocation of production, and is concerned that higher carbon prices would exacerbate this trend;

Energy policy aspects

4.   Agrees with the Commission's and the IEA’s assumption that any delay in investing in emissions reductions and the relevant energy technologies would lead to higher costs at a later stage; considers that, if it is to meet the long-term target of 80-95% reductions by 2050, as confirmed once again by the European Council on 4 February 2011,the EU will have to speed up its efforts; welcomes, therefore, the Commission’s intention to draw trajectories designed to achieve long-term targets in the most cost-efficient and effective way;

5.   Is deeply concerned that the EU is not on track to meet targets to reduce energy consumption by 20% as compared with the projections for 2020, owing to a lack of commitment, ambition and investment on the part of the Member States and the EU itself; fully endorses the conclusion to be drawn from the recent Commission communications entitled ‘Energy Efficiency Plan 2011’ and ‘A Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050’ that energy-efficiency policies are key to further reducing carbon emissions; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that energy-efficiency measures - in particular in the areas of buildings, urban heating and transport - receive more funding under the next multiannual financial framework; deplores the fact that greater emphasis was not placed on energy efficiency when the European Council discussed energy priorities on 4 February 2011;

6.   Draws attention to the fact that the current 20% target is based on an energy mix which in some Member States includes nuclear energy; welcomes the Commission’s decision to subject the nuclear power stations in the EU to stress testing, so that the requisite measures can be adopted to ensure their safety; believes that the decision by some Member States to shut down some existing nuclear reactors, and the increased investment in the construction of new nuclear power stations, could lead to some Member States revising the national measures adopted to achieve the current 20% target;

7.   Welcomes the fact that according to the recently submitted national renewable energy action plans the EU could go beyond its 2020 renewable energy goals if the action plans are fully implemented and financing instruments are improved; calls on the Commission to closely monitor that implementation and to work towards creating a stable investment environment in the period to 2020 and beyond and achieving better market integration for renewable energy; calls on the Commission to analyse and, if appropriate, increase the legally binding renewable energy target after 2020;

8.  Calls on the EU to make greater efforts to increase the share of renewable energies in the electricity sector and to create the conditions for intelligent networks, in order to guarantee increasingly decentralised energy production; stresses that, if this is to be achieved, more must be invested in energy infrastructure projects;

9.   Notes that owing to a number of market and regulatory barriers many energy-saving opportunities are still not exploited in the EU; calls for targets to be set for the use of renewable energies, for product standards to be established for energy-efficient products and vehicles and for environmentally conscious public procurement to be promoted;

10. Emphasises the important role of smart grids and smart meters in integrating electricity from different sources, including renewable sources; welcomes the work carried out by the task force on smart meters and standardisation mandate 441 of 12 March 2009 issued to CEN, CENELEC and ETSI concerning the development of an open architecture in the field of measuring instruments, and asks the Commission to put forward a number of recommendations and legislative proposals as soon as possible for the full use thereof, attaching particular importance to the drawing-up of standards and to the energy-saving potential of smart meters; reiterates its call to set as a policy goal that 50% of homes in Europe should be fitted with smart meters by 2015[2];

11. Stresses that ICTs could improve road transport and can do more to facilitate the use of safer, smarter and greener cars in Europe; emphasises the role of the Digital Agenda, which should prioritise the environmental potential of smart cars and smart roads and R&D pilot projects for V2V and V2R devices;

12. Points out that, as highlighted in the European Council conclusions of 4 February 2011, technical standards for smart grids should be adopted by the end of 2012 at the latest;

13. Stresses the imperative need to adapt ICT standardisation policy to market developments requiring interoperability, which will help to speed up work on technical standards for electric vehicles and smart grids and meters, with a view to its completion by 2012;

14. Notes that speeding up authorisation procedures and finding new ways of financing new and, in particular, energy-efficient and innovative infrastructure projects is a prerequisite if European energy and climate targets are to be achieved on schedule; stresses that new energy infrastructure projects must be consistent with the EU's long-term energy and climate policies;

15. Welcomes the agreement on using uncommitted funds from the European Recovery Programme (energy projects) to establish a dedicated financial instrument to support sustainable energy initiatives at local and regional level; calls for close monitoring of this instrument in order to assess whether this kind of funding could serve as model for future instruments to finance sustainable and low-carbon investments;

Research and innovation aspects

16. Points out that the political target for research spending under the EU2020 strategy of 3% of GDP is composed of a private (2%) and public (1%) expenditure share; notes that there are still specific problems in meeting the 3% target, in particular in the field of private research spending; points out that the lack of commitment in the field of research funding is hampering the development of highly energy-efficient climate-friendly technologies;

17. Deplores the fact that, by subsidising energy prices and applying no restrictions or quotas on CO₂ emissions, certain countries outside the EU are gaining comparative competitive advantages; stresses that, because their CO₂ emissions are unrestricted and thus cheaper, these countries might be less willing to join a multilateral global agreement to fight global warming;

Options and tools to move beyond the 20% target

18. Calls for the application of a general principle that the EU should follow the most cost-effective pathway to reduce CO₂ emissions while supporting the timely deployment of promising innovative technologies and investments which are in line with the EU’s long-term climate target; believes that the subsidiarity principle has to be respected in the implementation of that principle;

Energy measures

19. Calls for energy efficiency to be the priority in future climate-policy measures; acknowledges that, according to the Commission’s 2050 Roadmap, if the EU delivers on its current policies, in particular achieving the energy-efficiency objective of 20% by 2020, this would enable it to reduce its emissions internally by 25% or more by 2020; notes that according to the Commission analysis this reduction level would still be on the cost-effective path towards the long-term target of a 80-95% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions over 1990 levels and that a less ambitious approach would result in significantly higher overall costs over the entire period;

20. Calls on the Commission to establish an effective legal framework to ensure that Member States fully implement their energy savings target commitments by 2020, by introducing a requirement that National Energy Efficiency Action Plans (NEEAPs) must be approved by the Commission, or by means of other measures; calls on the Commission to facilitate and monitor the implementation of NEEAPs and to consider infringement proceedings, when necessary, in the event of non-compliance; in that connection, recalls its resolution of 15 December 2010 on Revision of the Energy Efficiency Action Plan[3];

21. Considers that sectoral approaches combined with economy-wide caps in industrialised countries can contribute to reconciling climate action with competitiveness and economic growth; stresses the importance of adopting a holistic, horizontal, sectoral approach to industrial emissions as an added value in connection with international negotiations and European CO₂ targets;

22. Emphasises that energy savings achieved by means of improved energy efficiency offer the most cost-effective means of securing additional CO₂ reductions; draws attention to the untapped potential in the areas of life cycle energy performance of buildings, in particular existing buildings, the transport sector (including air transport), public procurement, the manufacture of energy-intensive products and energy production, transformation and transmission, including district heating and cooling; reiterates that concrete measures in these areas are essential and draws attention to the relevant proposals included in the Bendtsen and Kolarska-Bobińska reports; urges that energy-saving measures must be implemented first and foremost at national, regional and local level and that a communication strategy must be developed for EU projects so as to provide both undertakings and consumers with full information; underlines the potential in introducing a scheme for energy saving obligations for the energy industry, as suggested in the Commission’s Energy Efficiency Plan, which has already had a positive effect in some Member States;

23. Draws attention to the energy saving potential of SMEs, as today only some 24% of European SMEs are actively implementing measures to reduce their environmental impact; stresses that while there is at least one financial consultant available for each SME, they receive no such an advice on energy saving and energy efficiency, and would need the assistance of an environmental and energy expert as well;

24. Points out that according to the Commission nearly €8 billion in EU energy-efficiency funding remains unclaimed; welcomes, therefore, the Commission's intention to facilitate and promote the use of the Structural Funds for energy-related building refurbishment projects; awaits concrete initiatives, including as regards the funding provisions;

25. Stresses that tightening the EU's climate targets would entail substantially increased effort and investment as regards the development and swift deployment of sustainable and low-carbon technologies, smart grids and energy-related research; considers it crucial that adequate financing for the SET-Plan should be ensured beyond 2013; stresses that an energy strategy with the ambition to meet climate targets beyond 20% must be based on all climate-friendly energy technologies;

26. Notes that the Commission has identified investment needs of €1 trillion in the area of energy generation capacity and the upgrading of the EU's energy transmission and distribution infrastructures by 2020, mainly to be financed through energy tariffs; calls for these investments to be made, with a view to completing an interconnected internal energy market ensuring security of supply, improving the integration of renewable energies in the European energy system, while taking into consideration the specific nature of each country’s energy mix; increasing energy efficiency and enabling consumers to benefit from new technologies; stresses the need for electricity interconnectors between Member States in order to fully exploit the massive investments being made, in particular in renewable energy, in a number of countries;

Industrial policy measures

27. Calls for the EU ETS to ensure both long-term investment security and make provision for flexibility mechanisms in the event of economic downturns (e.g. to avoid over-allocations);

28. Considers that integrating sectoral approaches into the EU ETS would increase overall economic efficiency in all participating countries; stresses that it is worth considering the benefits of extending sectoral approaches to cover further sectors and countries;

29. Acknowledges the increasing attention given to carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies, as a transitional stage on the road to a long-term fossil-free power supply, in reducing carbon emissions, not only in the energy sector, while noting that, in order to be economically viable, the investment in CCS would require substantially higher carbon prices by comparison with today’s levels; stresses that social acceptance is necessary for a comprehensive evaluation of possible CCS projects; highlights the fact that, according to the IEA CCS roadmap, in 2030 half of all CCS projects will be in the industrial manufacturing sector; points out that fulfilling the criteria which new coal-fired power stations are required to meet in accordance with the climate and energy package provisions on CCS should be a precondition for starting construction of gas-fired power stations; points out that implementing these technologies should not serve to reduce the competitiveness of European industry;

30. Calls on the Commission immediately to propose ways in which the EU can best complement its climate-change mitigation measures with efforts to reduce emissions of non-CO₂ gases, such as the HFCs which are the fastest growing climate pollutant in the world and HFC23; calls on the Commission to promote the initiative to bring HFC production into the Montreal Protocol and to conclude bilateral agreements with third countries on mitigating the impact of HFC23, with a view to reducing emissions of non-CO₂ gases and mitigating the impact of HFC23 in a cost-effective manner, at a cost to the public orders of magnitude lower than current carbon prices;

31. Notes the contribution made by nuclear energy to reducing CO₂ emissions, since closing nuclear power plants operating in the EU would lead to a 50% increase in emissions;

32. Notes that as far as the future of hard coal and lignite is concerned, CCS technology should not be considered the only option for retaining coal use in the EU economy, and that other low-emission coal technologies should also be developed and introduced;

Research and innovation measures

33. Stresses that the development and deployment of breakthrough technologies hold the key to fighting climate change and, at the same time, convincing the EU's partners worldwide that emissions reductions are feasible without losing competitiveness and jobs; considers it essential that Europe should lead by example by substantially increasing expenditure devoted to research on climate-friendly and energy-efficient industrial technologies under the Research and Innovation Framework Programme, which should be properly aligned with the strategic energy technologies set out in the SET-Plan; stresses the need for Europe to assume a leading role in research into climate and energy-efficient technologies and to develop close scientific cooperation in the field with international partners, such as the BRIC countries and the United States;

34. Highlights the potential for agriculture to make a major contribution to tackling climate change and, in particular, the potential for using agricultural waste in the production of sustainable energy, thereby creating an additional revenue stream for farmers; believes that the future CAP should be a tool to help Member States reach environmental and climate-change targets and that it should help farmers exploit the benefits offered by green growth; believes that the greening component of the CAP must be a part of the direct payment arrangements under the first pillar, in order to avoid complicated administrative procedures, ensure that farmers' environmental commitments are incentivised and secure uniform implementation across Member States;

35. Attaches particular importance to coordination between European patent-protection mechanisms in the field of energy saving and renewables in order to facilitate access to valuable intellectual property which remains untapped; stresses the need to activate the planned European patent as a matter of priority in the fields of energy saving and renewables;

36. Stresses the need to curb CO₂ emissions in the transport sector through the provision of standardised European infrastructures for electric vehicles and more incentives to use sustainable second-generation biofuel as an alternative to fossil fuels;

37. Considers that by smoothing the transition towards a low-carbon economy and paving the way for a global carbon market, sectoral approaches, combined with economy-wide caps in industrialised countries, might also be part of a post-2012 international framework for climate action;

38. Welcomes the Commission's intention to gear climate policies towards long-term trajectories and supports the idea of intermediate targets, for example for 2030; is convinced that realistic medium- and long-term objectives provide for clearer incentives for investors to engage in sustainable investments, and that setting higher targets within the current 2020 framework might be too ambitious from an investment perspective;

Co-benefits and impacts

39. Notes that, according to the Commission's assessment, setting a higher reduction target would lead to a reduction in oil and gas imports of up to EUR 40 billion by 2020 at an assumed oil price of US$ 88 per barrel in 2020; welcomes the fact that the EU's dependence on energy imports could thus be reduced by up to 56%;

40. Recognises that while serving as an incentive to develop low-carbon technologies, tightening the ETS reduction target would lead to a further increase in electricity prices and - if not accompanied by ambitious energy efficiency measures - in electricity costs, which would be a major concern for EU industries and for consumers; considers that according to the recent Eurobarometer survey stable and secure energy prices are a major concern for the public; points out that the ETS directive allows Member States to offset higher electricity prices for electro-intensive industries by granting State aid;

41. Emphasises the potential increase in European competitiveness, through innovation and increased investment, which could result from a transformation to a sustainable economy; highlights the fact that greater EU mitigation efforts would create cost advantages for the EU’s international competitors in a number of sectors and, at the same time, lead to competitive margins for EU companies in the area of climate technologies; considers that for the EU's competitors in the sectors concerned signing up to an international agreement would mean giving up those cost advantages, whereas the EU’s competitive margin would be likely to remain unaffected;

42. Stresses that climate-friendly innovation in Europe is necessary to maintain a strong position in a rapidly growing global market for low-carbon technologies and that this would allow the EU to be more competitive with larger market players; emphasises the need to ensure the market deployment and commercialisation of innovation output in Europe; takes the view, therefore, that proper financial instruments should be available to support the introduction of successful technologies on the EU market; warns against the risks associated with ‘green jobs leakage’, as delays in the creation of an inclusive and sustainable European economy would divert investments and jobs in green sectors to other regions;

43. Notes that despite a temporary fall in energy consumption in 2009, more energy will be used in future as the economies of the Member States recover, so that the dependence on energy imports will continue to grow;

44. Is concerned that a shift in sustainable technology innovation away from Europe to other parts of the world is already occurring, which may turn Europe into a net importer of these technologies and related finished products; states that, according to recent surveys, out of the 50 companies identified as clean technology leaders, 24 were based in Asia, 22 in the United States, three in Europe, and one in Canada; stresses that, according to the Ernst &Young 2010 barometer, China and US are the most attractive regions of the world for the development of renewable energy sources;·

45. Notes that Europe should now invest more in energy efficiency, which will strengthen local economies by supporting local jobs that cannot leak to third countries with lower production costs;

46. Recognises the job-creation and competitiveness effects associated with the transition to a low-carbon economy, as the EU becomes a global leader in the area of renewable energy technologies and energy-efficient products and services;

Assessing the risk of carbon leakage

47. Stresses that Europe’s mitigation policy is effective in promoting a greener restructuring of its production system, but points out that, if implemented unilaterally, its environmental effectiveness might be reduced by carbon leakage[4];

48. Points out that under the proposed benchmarking provisions a share of the emissions certificates will still have to be purchased by those industrial installations which are not going to meet the benchmark, generating costs for EU companies facing international competition that their global competitors do not have to contend with; notes that, owing to the flexible architecture of the ETS, companies will be able to carry over unused allowances from the second to the third phase;

49. Believes that ETS benchmarking should also take into account what sources of energy are available in a Member State and allow for adjustments as energy mixes and sourcing options change;

50. Deplores the fact that the additional impact on electricity prices has not been sufficiently reflected in the Commission's assumptions on carbon leakage; stresses that 40% of EU electricity is used by industry, which is significantly affected by any increase in the carbon price as a result of the passing-on of costs by the electricity sector; points out, however, that the Member States can, in the context of aid schemes, use the proceeds of auctions to limit this effect;

51. Emphasises that there is no single solution for industrial sectors that are vulnerable to carbon leakage, and that the nature of the product or the structure of the market are essential criteria for choosing between the tools available (free allocation of allowances, State aid or border adjustment measures);

52. Notes that forecasts for the 2020 carbon market - as used by the Commission in its May 2010 communication on the basis of a 30% domestic reductions scenario - vary substantially, therefore calls on the Commission to submit a new projection for a carbon leakage risk assessment which takes account of such scenarios;

Further opportunities and challenges

53. Considers that potential changes in labour and energy costs as a result of EU climate change policies should not lead to social dumping or carbon leakage, and calls on the Commission to investigate any such risks; for this reason, also calls on other developed or developing countries to undertake to make appropriate or comparable efforts;

54. Calls on the Commission to support, on the one hand, measures to meet labour market requirements arising from the change to a low-carbon economy and, on the other, restructuring measures covering workers who become available in the new sectors;

55. Takes the view that cohesion funds must be used more effectively to promote renewable energies, energy efficiency and low-carbon energy technologies;

56. Stresses that increases in carbon prices will lead to further increases in electricity costs; states that every €1 increase in the carbon price results in more than €2 billion in extra costs for society in the form of electricity charges, 40% of which is accounted for by industry; calls on the Commission to consult all parties involved, with a view to proposing appropriate solutions which do not distort competition;

57. Stresses that according to the IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2010 the 2°C goal can only be achieved if current commitments are vigorously implemented in the period to 2020 and by much stronger action thereafter; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the (European) Council to push for more rapid, internationally coordinated implementation of the abolition of fossil-fuel subsidies agreed by the G20 and to present corresponding proposals at EU level;

58. Recalls, in this context, the Commission communication on the EU2020 strategy calling for a shift in the tax burden from labour to energy; welcomes the announcement in the annual growth survey of a proposal to adapt the European framework for energy taxation in line with the EU energy and climate objectives;

59. Expresses concern that imports from countries with less stringent CO₂ restrictions have been the chief contributors to a 47% increase in consumption-related CO₂ emissions in the EU between 1990 and 2006; notes that this is entirely unrelated to recent EU climate policies and the EU ETS in particular; nevertheless, asks the Commission to assess whether such trends have continued after 2006;

60. Calls on the Commission to take the following practical measures:

· assess the effects of domestic emissions-reduction policies on employment, including job opportunities, and promote the improvement of low-carbon literacy, energy-related reskilling and upskilling needs and education and training, in particular for SMEs;

· analyse to what extent Member States meet their commitment to spend at least 50% of the auction revenues on mitigation and adaptation measures and propose measures, if necessary;

· analyse the impact of the EU’s increased emissions reduction targets at Member State level, as indicated in the Environment Council Conclusions of 14 March 2011;

· provide proper financing for the SET-Plan;

· promote the efficient use of the structural and cohesion funds by the Member States, in particular for energy-efficiency measures, whilst taking full account of the principle that such investments must be regional and reduce economic and social disparities within the EU;

· introduce innovative financing mechanisms (such as revolving schemes);

· earmark additional funds for weaker and disadvantaged regions to cover measures in non-ETS sectors (buildings, transport, agriculture);

· give priority to climate and energy research under the Eighth Research Framework Programme, including energy efficiency, and to research into the causes of climate change and adaptation to it;

· to analyse what impact a unilateral move by the EU beyond 20% greenhouse gas emissions reductions could have on other countries’ willingness to join an international agreement;

· investigate the potential impact in terms of green jobs leakage and reduced investments and competitiveness in green sectors.

RESULT OF FINAL VOTE IN COMMITTEE

Date adopted	9.5.2011
Result of final vote	+: –: 0:	38 4 2
Members present for the final vote	Jean-Pierre Audy, Zigmantas Balčytis, Ivo Belet, Bendt Bendtsen, Jan Březina, Maria Da Graça Carvalho, Giles Chichester, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Lena Ek, Ioan Enciu, Adam Gierek, Norbert Glante, Fiona Hall, Romana Jordan Cizelj, Krišjānis Kariņš, Lena Kolarska-Bobińska, Philippe Lamberts, Bogdan Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, Marisa Matias, Jaroslav Paška, Herbert Reul, Teresa Riera Madurell, Jens Rohde, Paul Rübig, Amalia Sartori, Britta Thomsen, Evžen Tošenovský, Ioannis A. Tsoukalas, Niki Tzavela, Marita Ulvskog, Kathleen Van Brempt, Henri Weber
Substitute(s) present for the final vote	Matthias Groote, Françoise Grossetête, Cristina Gutiérrez-Cortines, Satu Hassi, Jolanta Emilia Hibner, Yannick Jadot, Oriol Junqueras Vies, Silvana Koch-Mehrin, Vladko Todorov Panayotov, Algirdas Saudargas, Silvia-Adriana Ţicău
Substitute(s) under Rule 187(2) present for the final vote	Alexandra Thein

• [1]  Report of the International Energy Agency (IEA) of 9 November 2010, entitled ‘World Energy Outlook 2010’.
• [2]  European Parliament resolution of 5 May 2010 on a new Digital Agenda for Europe: 2015.eu (2009/2225(INI)).
• [3]  Texts adopted, P7_TA-PROV(2010)0485.
• [4]  Conclusion of a study of 3 March 2011 by the Euro-Mediterranean Centre for Climate Change on the ‘Macroeconomic impact of EU mitigation policies beyond the 20% target’.

RESULT OF FINAL VOTE IN COMMITTEE

Date adopted	24.5.2011
Result of final vote	+: –: 0:	44 14 1
Members present for the final vote	János Áder, Elena Oana Antonescu, Kriton Arsenis, Sophie Auconie, Pilar Ayuso, Paolo Bartolozzi, Sandrine Bélier, Sergio Berlato, Milan Cabrnoch, Nessa Childers, Chris Davies, Esther de Lange, Anne Delvaux, Bas Eickhout, Edite Estrela, Jill Evans, Karl-Heinz Florenz, Elisabetta Gardini, Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy, Nick Griffin, Françoise Grossetête, Cristina Gutiérrez-Cortines, Jolanta Emilia Hibner, Dan Jørgensen, Christa Klaß, Jo Leinen, Corinne Lepage, Peter Liese, Kartika Tamara Liotard, Linda McAvan, Radvilė Morkūnaitė-Mikulėnienė, Gilles Pargneaux, Andres Perello Rodriguez, Sirpa Pietikäinen, Mario Pirillo, Pavel Poc, Vittorio Prodi, Anna Rosbach, Oreste Rossi, Dagmar Roth-Behrendt, Daciana Octavia Sârbu, Carl Schlyter, Horst Schnellhardt, Richard Seeber, Theodoros Skylakakis, Bogusław Sonik, Claudiu Ciprian Tănăsescu, Salvatore Tatarella, Åsa Westlund, Sabine Wils, Marina Yannakoudakis
Substitute(s) present for the final vote	Matthias Groote, Riikka Manner, Marisa Matias, Judith A. Merkies, James Nicholson, Marit Paulsen, Marianne Thyssen, Michail Tremopoulos