REPORT on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (based on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy)
19.3.2015 - (2014/2220(INI))
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Rapporteur: Arnaud Danjean
MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION
on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (based on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy)
The European Parliament,
– having regard to the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (based on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy),
– having regard to the Annual Report from the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy, in particular the parts concerning the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (12094/14)),
– having regard to Articles 2 and 3 and to Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and notably to Articles 21, 24 and 36 thereof,
– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),
– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 18 December 2013,
– having regard to the conclusions of the Inter-Parliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy of 4 April 2014 and 7 November 2014,
– having regard to the European Security Strategy entitled ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003, and to the report on its implementation entitled ‘Providing Security in a Changing World’, endorsed by the European Council on 11-12 December 2008,
– having regard to the Council conclusions on the Common Security and Defence Policy of 25 November 2013 and 18 November 2014,
– having regard to the progress report of 7 July 2014 by the VP/HR and the Head of the European Defence Agency on the implementation of the European Council conclusions of December 2013,
– having regard to the joint communication by the VP/HR and the Commission on ‘The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to External Conflicts and Crises’, and the related Council conclusions of 12 May 2014,
– having regard to the Joint Communication on a Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, and to the related Council conclusions of 25 June 2013, as well as to the EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework adopted on 18 November 2014,
– having regard to the EU maritime security strategy of 24 June 2014 and the EU Maritime Security Strategy Action Plan of December 2014,
– having regard to the Council Decision of 24 June 2014 on the arrangements for the implementation by the Union of the solidarity clause,
– having regard to the Policy Framework for Systematic and Long-Term Defence Cooperation adopted on 18 November 2014,
– having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2013 entitled ‘Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector’ (COM(2013)0542) and to the implementation roadmap of 24 June 2014 (COM(2014)0387),
– having regard to Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community[1],
– having regard to Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC[2],
– having regard to its resolutions on the Common Security and Defence Policy, in particular to those of 21 November 2013 on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy[3] and on the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base[4], and of 12 September 2013 on the maritime dimension of the Common Security and Defence Policy[5] and on the EU’s military structures: state of play and future prospects[6],
– having regard to its resolution of 22 November 2012 on Cyber Security and Defence[7],
– having regard to its resolution of 3 April 2014 on the EU comprehensive approach and its implications for the coherence of EU external action[8],
– having regard to its recommendation of 13 June 2013 to the Vice‑President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, to the Council and to the Commission on the 2013 review of the organisation and the functioning of the EEAS[9] and to the Council conclusions of 17 December 2013 on the EEAS Review 2013[10],
– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations,
– having regard to Rule 132(1) of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A8-0054/2015),
Overall security context
1. Considers the security environment of the EU and of its eastern and southern neighbourhoods to be increasingly unstable and volatile due to the great number of long‑standing and newly emerging security challenges; regards the conflict in eastern Ukraine, the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, with the rise of the ISIS terrorist organisation, the Libyan crisis and the terrorist threat in Africa (in particular in the Sahel, Libya and the Horn of Africa) as direct threats to the Union’s security; considers, also, that the US ‘pivot to Asia- Pacific’ and the impact of the financial crisis on Member States’ defence budgets and capabilities serve to highlight just how necessary it is for the Union and its Member States to shoulder more responsibility for their own security and defence; insists that the EU will be able to respond effectively to the new security challenges mentioned above only if its structures and its Member States work together in a common and truly coordinated effort in the context of the CFSP/CSDP;
2. Considers that the current level of instability at the EU’s borders and in its immediate neighbourhood is unprecedented since the late 1990s, when the ESDP/CSDP was established; is concerned that the Union may not jointly be able to be a key player in addressing each of these threats and that it may all too often be reduced to relying on the initiatives of one or a few Member States, or on ad hoc alliances in which it has only a peripheral or reserve role to play;
3. Considers that the Union and its Member States must, as a matter of the utmost urgency, adapt to the new security challenges, in particular by making effective use of the existing CSDP tools, including by linking these better to the EU’s foreign affairs tools, humanitarian assistance, and development policy, by coordinating national actions and pooling resources more closely and, where appropriate, by introducing in a pragmatic and flexible manner new arrangements for the expression of European solidarity; stresses that the boundaries between external and internal security are becoming more and more blurred; calls, therefore, for enhanced coherence between external and internal instruments, and for greater cooperation and coordination among the Member States, especially in the fields of counter-terrorism, organised crime, cyberdefence and migration , under the leadership of the VP/HR;
4. Emphasises that the Union’s strength and relevance lie in its ability to mobilise resources and bring into play simultaneously a wide range of diplomatic, security, defence, economic, trade, development and humanitarian instruments, and in full compliance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter; underscores the fact that the CSDP military and civil instruments are integral components of this comprehensive approach;
From the December 2013 Council to June 2015: is the CSDP a real priority?
5. Welcomes the European Council conclusions of December 2013 which recognised the need to increase the effectiveness, visibility and impact of the CSDP, enhance the development of capabilities and strengthen Europe’s defence industry;
6. Finds regrettable, especially with regard to the increasing external instabilities, the fact that the injection of political stimulus in 2013 did not lead to enhanced cooperation and the substantial and rapid implementation of practical measures, commensurate with the declared levels of ambition; considers that at present the Union hardly possesses the requisite resources, operationally, industrially or in terms of capabilities, to contribute in a decisive way to the prevention and management of international crises and to assert its own strategic autonomy and strategic interests, in line with the values and norms enshrined in Article 21 of the Lisbon Treaty; calls on the Member States to follow through with concrete measures as a matter of urgency;
7. Welcomes the appointment of the new Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini; welcomes her first statements and her decision to chair the Foreign Affairs and Defence Council meetings, an indication of her interest in the CSDP; hopes that the stances she has taken will be reflected in a boost to the development of the CSDP; calls on the VP/HR to play a leading role in working towards the further implementation of the CSDP and the pooling and sharing of European defence capabilities; calls on the Commission to continue the work of the defence task force at Commissioner lever, under the leadership of the VP/HR, in order to guarantee political guidance and supervision;
8. Expects that by the time of the June 2015 European Council meeting, which will once again deal with defence issues, the Member States and the EU institutions will be in a position to adopt specific measures in line with the commitments made in December 2013; is satisfied by the confirmation by the heads of state that the Defence Council will take place on 16 June 2015, and calls on them to critically assess the low profile of implementation and to increase pressure on the defence bureaucracies to implement decisions taken at the highest political level in December 2013; stresses that the June 2015 European Council meeting must encourage recalcitrant Member States to invest more resources in defence, and that it must also focus its efforts on those area of crisis management in which the EU can genuinely add value;
9. Considers that the upcoming European Council meeting on defence should take decisions that will lead to the improvement of the capacity of the Union and the Member States as regards territorial defence, in total complementarity with NATO, and as regards the capacity to respond to internal security challenges, and to develop the deployable capabilities needed to ensure a meaningful contribution by the EU to crisis management, strengthen the European Defence Agency and the European Defence and Industrial Base, initiating the elaboration of a comprehensive security concept that will integrate the internal and external dimensions of security;
CSDP missions and operations
10. Is concerned that the most recent civilian and military operations under the CSDP have continued to be dogged by structural shortfalls, which have been evident now for several years, namely inefficiency as regards immediate reactions to civilian and military actions, lengthy and inflexible decision-making processes, the need for greater solidarity among Member States in funding missions, mission mandates which are unsuited to the operational environment, budgetary constraints, the problem of ‘force generation’, and logistical and financial inertia;
11. Considers the issue of financing for CSDP missions and operations to be crucial if the policy is to have a future; finds it regrettable that specific proposals have not yet emerged from the discussion initiated on this subject at the December 2013 Council meeting; calls for the Athena mechanism to be used systematically for the financing of the CSDP’s operational and mission deployment costs, in particular as regards the use of EU battlegroups, accommodation infrastructure for forces, expenses relating to the establishment of points of entry for troops into theatres of operations and security stocks of food and fuel where necessary; calls, also, for the same mechanism to be used to manage financing received from Member States on a bilateral basis, and from third countries and international organisations, so that they can participate in the financing of a given operation and, in duly justified cases, support the participation by third countries in EU crisis response operations and missions;
12. Encourages further efforts to be made to speed up the provision of financing for civilian missions and to simplify decision-making procedures and implementation; Is of the opinion, in this connection, that the Commission should introduce, by means of delegated acts and in accordance with Article 210 of the Financial Regulation, specific procurement rules governing crisis management measures under the CSDP in order to facilitate the rapid and flexible conduct of operations;
13. Calls for the establishment of a pre-financing mechanism to help Member States that wish to participate in a CSDP mission to meet the costs thereof, thereby making it easier for them to decide whether to launch a mission;
14. Stresses that the EU’s contribution to international security, crisis management and peacekeeping, through the EU’s civilian and military missions and operations, is an important component of the Union’s comprehensive approach; notes that too many of the civilian and military missions launched by the EU since 2009 have been aimed at enhancing the Union’s crisis response profile rather than taking strategic measures on the basis of in-depth analysis and planning; believes that these missions – of which the personnel’s professionalism and dedication in the field should be highlighted and praised – should be genuine, effective policy tools that are used in a responsible manner, forming part of an overall action strategy, especially in the EU’s neighbourhood; supports the ongoing review of the crisis management structures within the EEAS; calls on the VP/HR to make existing structures much more efficient so that they can respond faster and in a more appropriate manner to emerging crises, inter alia by reducing the number of parallel structures;
15. Considers that an important aspect of successful missions is staff who are adequate and qualified in terms of training, skills and leadership;
16. Questions, for example, the relevance of deploying and maintaining a mission on the Libyan border, (EUBAM Libya) an institutional and security context in which it has never been able to address the basic aims identified therein; calls for a reassessment of the needs as regards Libya in light of the worrying recent developments in order to adequately address security concerns, including in connection with ongoing anti-terrorism efforts in Mali and the Sahel region;
17. Considers that an evaluation of the efficiency of the 17 ongoing EU Missions abroad should be conducted;
18. Finds it regrettable, similarly, given the situation in the Gaza Strip, that the Council discussions about the EU Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah) have so far not yielded any results; calls for the reactivation of this mission and for its remit, staffing and resources to be reviewed so that it can play a part in monitoring the borders between the Gaza Strip and Egypt and Israel;
19. Welcomes the EU’s comprehensive engagement in the Horn of Africa, including through the CSDP missions and operations EUTM Somalia, EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUCAP Nestor; notes, in this connection, that the activity of EUCAP Nestor takes place in a complex institutional and operational environment, with the presence of a host of international actors, including the EU; invites the Council and the EEAS, in this connection, to rationalise the mission’s objectives;
20. Hopes that the two civilian missions launched this year – the Council mission for the reform of the civil security sector in Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) and the mission to support the internal security forces in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) – will effectively fulfil their mandates and focus on clearly identified, measurable and long-term objectives;
21. Notes that since June 2013 a warehouse facility has existed for the rapid deployment of resources for CSDP civilian missions; considers that if this facility is to be used effectively, it should be placed at the service of the relevant heads of mission to meet the needs which they identify, rather than operating on the basis of Commission decisions; calls for the preparation of annual activity reports for the warehouse, so that the added value it offers in terms of expediting the deployment of civilian missions can be properly assessed;
22. Welcomes the research being conducted with a view to the establishment of a shared services centre to pool resources for CSDP civilian missions and provide for the more efficient deployment of the missions; calls for the establishment of a shared services centre; considers that the most effective solution would be to have a single institutional structure inside the EEAS that centralises and rationalises services for civilian missions (human resources, IT, logistics, etc.), which are currently dispersed within the individual missions;
23. Notes that CSDP military operations increasingly tend to be armed forces training missions ( EUTM Mali and EUTM Somalia); praises the decision to carry out such operations but insists that the mandate of each mission be adapted to the circumstances of each individual situation; considers that the units formed must be totally operational, that is, with offensive capacity; finds it regrettable that missions with an executive remit are rarely envisaged nowadays; considers that, given the persistent threats in the EU’s neighbourhood, the Union cannot allow itself to focus exclusively on instruments geared towards a post-crisis scenario or towards supporting a crisis exit, but rather it must be capable of intervention across the full spectrum of crisis management, in line with the Charter of the United Nations;
24. Is dismayed by the persistent problems of force generation encountered around the launch of military missions; notes that, with the exception of EUTM Mali, to which 23 Member States are making an effective contribution, all current EU military operations involve no more than six Member States; encourages Member States to contribute more forces to operations, when the national capabilities that are required are available; stresses the need for a common and cooperative approach in dealing with force generation problems; welcomes the contributions made by third countries that reflect the vitality of partnerships forged under the CSDP; calls on Member States to show a greater willingness as regards EU military operations and to contribute accordingly from the resources and capacities they possess for such involvement;
25. Considers, given the fact that Union missions – both civilian (EUCAP) and military (EUTM) – are focusing on training, that a structural policy for putting such missions on a long-term footing with efficient mandates and objectives that are adequate in terms of dealing with the situations with which they are confronted, through the provision of financial and material assistance, should to be introduced; considers that such a new policy, as part of the Union’s cooperation and development efforts, would serves as a means of furthering the work being done under the ‘Train and Equip’ and ‘E2I’ initiatives which aim to enhance the capabilities of third countries (in terms of equipment, weaponry, infrastructure and salaries) so that their armed forces are properly operational; encourages the Commission, in this connection, to explore innovative sources of financing;
26. Notes the intention of the November 2013 Council to enhance the modularity and flexibility of the EU battlegroups so that they can be deployed for crisis management tasks of all types; notes, however, that the only progress made to date in this respect has been the very limited step of proposing that the Athena mechanism should cover the strategic transport of battlegroups into theatres of operations; recognises that the lack of a constructive attitude among all Member States has served as a political and operational impediment to the deployment of battlegroups;
27. Welcomes the positive message issued by the last informal Council meeting on defence about exploring the potential of Article 44 TEU; finds it regrettable, however, that, due to divisions on the subject, no progress has been made in determining how the provisions of Article 44 could be applied; believes that the implementation of Article 44 would enable the Union to act in a considerably more flexible and expeditious manner, thus enhancing its ability to address the threats surrounding it; urges those Member States which are not interested in participating in CSDP operations or which lack the means to do so to take a constructive stance by allowing others to act if they so wish;
28. Calls, furthermore, on the VP/HR to explore the potential of other relevant articles in the Lisbon Treaty, in particular those which relate to the start-up fund (Article 41 TEU), permanent enhanced cooperation (Article 46 TEU), the solidarity clause (Article 222 TFEU) and the mutual defence clause (Article 42 TEU);
29. Calls for serious consideration to be given to the possible use – with arrangements to ensure the necessary modularity – of multilateral HQ structures which are established and have proved their effectiveness on the ground, such as Eurocorps in Strasbourg;
30. Expresses its surprise that there is still no common EU strategy to tackle new challenges to EU security; welcomes the Council’s intention and the commitment by the VP/HR to initiate a process of strategic reflection on the challenges and opportunities for the foreign and security policy; recalls that this process aims at developing a new common European security strategy to determine the new geostrategic scenarios, threats and global challenges that have emerged, and at defining the actions that the EU may take in response thereto, notably in the framework of the CFSP and CSDP; calls, furthermore, on the VP/HR to initiate a wide-reaching process to develop an even more ambitious white paper on European security and defence in order to streamline the EU’s strategic ambitions and capability development processes; awaits the forthcoming communication by the VP/HR intended to assess the impacts of changes on the global environment and identify resulting challenges and opportunities for the EU;
31. Welcomes the adoption on 18 November 2014 of the EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework, setting out five priorities for cyberdefence in the context of the CSDP and clarifying the role of different actors; welcomes the framework’s goal of supporting the development of national cyberdefence capabilities and strengthening the protection of communication networks used for CSDP instruments; underlines the importance of achieving a common level of cybersecurity among the Member States in order to make adequate progress as regards cooperation in cyberdefence, and to strengthen our capabilities as regards cyberattacks and cyberterrorism, and hopes that this action plan will mark the beginning of a move towards the more systematic integration of cyberdefence in Member States’ national security strategies, and an awareness of the importance of cyberdefence issues among the institutions of the EU; calls furthermore, for a coherent European strategy to secure critical (digital) infrastructure against cyberattacks, while also protecting and promoting citizens’ digital rights and freedoms; recalls the need for more clarity and a proper legal framework, given the difficulties of attributing cyberattacks and the need for a proportionate and necessary response in all contexts;
32. Points out the imminent threat to the cyberdomain and underlines the need for resilience and readiness in the EU to respond to cybercrises, also in the context of the CSDP, and thus encourages all Member States to significantly step up without delay the development of their cyberdefence capabilities; stresses that investment is needed as regards highly skilled human capital and R&I; stresses the need for synergies and complementarities in the civilian and military domains of cybersecurity and defence in the EU; underlines the importance of stepping up cyberdefence cooperation with NATO;
33. Stresses the importance of security and defence cooperation by the EU with other international institutions, in particular the UN, NATO, the African Union and the OSCE; welcomes the statement from the NATO summit in Wales in September 2014 in which support for the development of the CSDP was reaffirmed; calls for steps to be taken to strengthen the two organisations;
Capabilities
34. Considers that national defence budgets have been reduced due to the effects of the 2008 economic and financial crisis and that the reductions have taken place without coordination between the Member States, thus jeopardising the Union’s strategic autonomy and the ability of its Member States to meet the capacity requirements of their armed forces, and with detrimental consequences as regards the Union’s responsibilities and potential as a global security provider; stresses the importance of upfront planning on strategic investment in the purchase and renovation of equipment among Member States;
35. Strongly believes that the EU has a vital interest in a secure, open and clean maritime environment that allows the free passage of goods and people, and the peaceful, legal, fair and sustainable use of the oceans’ riches; believes that the EU institutional framework – both civilian and military – should, therefore, be further developed in order to implement the European Maritime Security Strategy; notes that most of the strategic assets, critical infrastructure and capabilities are under the control of Member States and that their willingness to enhance cooperation is paramount for European security;
36. Welcomes the adoption by the Council on 18 November 2014 of a policy framework for systematic, long-term defence cooperation based on the convergence of capability planning processes and on information exchange; points out, to this end, that Member States should continue to implement the EDA’s code of conduct on pooling and sharing equipment, so as to anticipate much more effectively future capability gaps and systematise cooperation on the development of capabilities; calls on the VP/HR to provide proof of specific measures which will be taken to strengthen defence cooperation; calls on the Member States, regarding the uncoordinated increase in bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation, to engage in permanent structure cooperation (PESCO) as means for better coordination and to use EU financing for peacetime cooperation; calls on the VP/HR to deliver realistic plans for the successful launch of PESCO;
37. Welcomes the adoption by the November 2014 Council of the EDA capability development plan (CDP) setting out the 16 priorities for capability development; welcomes, also, the EDA’s work through the collaborative database (Codaba) identifying the scope for cooperation among Member States and thus paving the way for the initiation of various forms of cooperation; urges the Member States, in developing their military capabilities, to pay due regard to these tools; calls for the strict avoidance of duplication of initiatives already underway elsewhere and for greater attention to be paid to the identification of ways in which real value can be added;
38. Is surprised that there are as yet no EU-level tax incentives for cooperation and pooling; takes note of the call by the December 2013 Council for such arrangements to be explored, and finds it regrettable that, a year on, discussions have not yet produced any tangible measures in this regard; notes that the Belgian Government already grants VAT exemptions, on an ad hoc basis, for the preparatory phases of certain EDA projects (for example for satellite communications); believes that such exemptions should be applied systematically and extended to infrastructure and specific capability-related programmes, taking as a model the existing NATO mechanism or the existing EU mechanism for civilian research infrastructure; calls for the development of any other incentives that could encourage cooperation between European stakeholders;
39. Welcomes the existence of cooperation models such as the European Airlift Transport Command (EATC) and applauds the fact that this system continues to expand to include new Member States; finds it regrettable that although such a model has existed for several years, it has not yet been adapted for use with other types of defence capabilities; calls for the EATC model to be applied to other spheres of operational support as a means of addressing serious capability shortfalls;
40. Notes that minimal progress has been made on projects for pooling and sharing; welcomes the advances that have been made on air-to-air refuelling with the acquisition of a fleet of multirole tanker transport aircraft; finds it regrettable that very few Member States have so far participated in the project, and calls on those Member States which lack capability in this regard to become involved; takes the view that Member States should pursue the pooling and sharing of projects, focusing on the 16 capability areas they have identified with the EDA and the Military Staff of the European Union (EUMS) through the CSDP;
41. Notes the Council’s intention to develop projects for stepping up EU capabilities including, inter alia, remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS) and governmental satellite communications; notes that a regulatory framework is needed for the initial integration by 2016 of RPAS into Europe’s air traffic system, taking due account of civilian and military requirements, as well as the need to comply with international law; calls on the Commission to outline how the Horizon 2020 funds for civil-military research can be used for the insertion of RPAS into European airspace;
42. Welcomes the progress made on EU satellite services (Galileo, Copernicus, EGNOS); considers that such space services, particularly Copernicus, should be put on an operational footing to help meet the high-resolution satellite imaging needs of CSDP missions and operations; welcomes the launch of the Ariane 6 project; finds it regrettable that, for technical and commercial reasons, the Union still buys Russian launch equipment, despite its aim of achieving a certain level of strategic autonomy, and highlights, therefore, the need to make progress on developing technologies that have both civilian and military uses and which will safeguard our independence;
43. Calls for the Union to encourage Member States to meet NATO capacity targets, which require a minimum level of defence spending of 2 % of GDP and a minimum 20 % share of the defence budget for major equipment needs, including for research and development;
The defence industry
44. Welcomes the Commission proposal aimed at improving SME access to the defence markets, which are highly specific at present for various reasons, namely: public purchasing is virtually the sole source of demand, the number of companies in the marketplace is limited, products spend a long time in development and then in service, and certain technologies are strategic in nature;
45. Takes note of the Commission communication of July 2013 entitled ‘Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector’ and of the roadmap of June 2014 on the implementation thereof along with its proposals, in particular on improved implementation of the single market directives 2009/81/EC and 2009/43/EC, without prejudice to Member States’ sovereign rights as established under Article 346 TFEU;
46. Believes that all the measures in question depend on the prior joint determination of what falls within the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) so that potential beneficiary companies or strategic activities can be targeted, with due regard for the capacity differences between the Member States’ defence industries; takes the view that this definition could be based, in particular, on a number of criteria, such as the development within the EU of equipment and technology, control by companies of the property and utilisation rights for the equipment and technology they develop, and the assurance in the event of foreign ownership that foreign owners do not have excessive voting rights, which would jeopardise control by companies over their activities; highlights the need to define the EU’s critical defence assets (i.e. key industrial capacities and critical technologies);
47. Recalls that with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU’s industrial, space and research policies extend to the defence remit; points out that Union programmes in other areas such as internal and border security, disaster management and development offer a significant prospect of jointly developing capabilities relevant to those policies and to the conduct of CSDP missions; calls on the Commission to establish permanent procedures for cooperation between the Commission, the EEAS, the EDA and the Member States in the fields of the common market, industry, space, research and development; calls on the Commission to create a permanent link between EU bodies and agencies in the areas of internal security (Frontex, Europol, ENISA) and external security and defence (European Defence Agency, EEAS);
48. Notes the Commission’s proposals for the better implementation of Directives 2009/81/EC (defence and security procurement) and 2009/43/EC (transfers of defence-related products within the internal market); considers it necessary to determine also what qualifies as equipment and technology of high strategic value and is covered by neither by Directive 2009/81/EC (equipment for essential security interests) nor Directive 2004/18/EC (equipment the use of which is related, but not specific, to the field of defence); believes that EU companies operating in this sector need specific legal and financial arrangements allowing them to be competitive, thereby safeguarding the strategic autonomy of the EU;
49. Notes the Council’s intention to implement European security of supply arrangements under which the Member States would engage in mutual assistance, responding rapidly to their corresponding defence requirements; is awaiting a Commission roadmap setting out the relevant implementation options for these arrangements and the green paper due to be published on controlling foreign investments in strategic defence companies; welcomes the adoption of the EDA’s enhanced framework arrangement for security of supply between Member States as an important voluntary, legally non-binding, mechanism for the Member States to enhance mutual support and assistance on security of supply; calls on the EDA and the Commission to develop jointly additional means and initiatives to promote EU-wide security of supply and support Member States in implementing the new framework arrangement;
50. Calls on the Commission to clearly identify and mobilise EU financial means and instruments aimed at assisting in the establishment of a European Common Defence Industry Market;
51. Welcomes the adoption of the changes to the Wassenaar regime’s export control lists with regard to surveillance and intrusion technologies which have recently also been implemented at EU level; stresses, however, that more is needed in order to prevent the uncontrolled production and export of technologies that can be used to attack the EU’s critical infrastructure and violate human rights; calls, therefore, on the Commission to come forward as soon as possible with a proposal for the revision of the dual-use export regulation;
52. Believes that no government can embark alone on genuinely large-scale research and technology (R&T) programmes; recalls the Council declaration of December 2008 on strengthening capabilities and the commitment by the Member States to achieve the collective target of 2 % of our defence spending on research funding; calls on the VP/HR and the head of the EDA to provide data on the current situation in this regard; welcomes, therefore, the Commission’s proposals for developing synergies between civilian and defence-related research; highlights, in this connection, the fact that the Horizon 2020 security research programme offers considerable possibilities for the development of capacities in this regard; calls on the Commission and the Member States to support the research mission which provides assistance to the Union’s external policies, including technological development in the area of dual-use technologies to enhance interoperability between civil protection and military forces, as stated in the specific programme establishing Horizon 2020; calls on the Commission and the Member States to include corresponding research activities in the annual work programmes; welcomes, also, the initiation of ‘preparatory actions’ and hopes that, in the realm of the CSDP, the next step will be funding, under the forthcoming multiannual financial framework, for a relevant research strand; highlights the importance of implementing a pilot project on CSDP research, to be conducted jointly by the Commission and the EDA, as proposed by Parliament in the 2015 budget in view of the agency implementing Union objectives and the Union’s budget; finds it regrettable, in this connection, that the Commission did not provide Parliament with an assessment of the potential of Article 185 TFEU, as requested in Parliament’s resolution of 21 November 2013 on the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base;
53. Calls, at the same time, for the utmost vigilance to be exercised, be it in relation to governance issues, intellectual property rights or the co-financing of, and rules for participation in, the preparatory action for defence; calls on the Member States to be fully involved in the decision-making process with a view to avoiding bureaucratic excesses and for it to be ensured that the programmes included address the strategic needs of the CSDP and the Member States;
54. Recalls the highly sensitive and strategic nature of defence research, for both industrial competitiveness and the strategic autonomy of the EU, and calls for the adoption of an appropriate intellectual property policy in connection with security and defence in order to protect the results of research; awaits proposals from the Commission, and also from the defence industries, on this point;
55. Notes the Commission’s proposals for promoting the introduction of common standards and certification procedures for defence equipment; awaits the EDA and Commission roadmap for the development of industrial standards for the defence sector, and the EDA and EASA options for improving the mutual recognition of military certification in the EU; finds regrettable the reluctance of European standardisation organisations to deliver standardisation seals for defence products;
56. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary-General of NATO, the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Chairman-in-Office of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Chair of the Assembly of the African Union and the Secretary-General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
- [1] OJ L 146, 10.6.2009, p. 1.
- [2] OJ L 216, 20.8.2009, p. 76.
- [3] Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0513.
- [4] Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0514.
- [5] Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0380.
- [6] Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0381.
- [7] Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0457.
- [8] Texts adopted, P7_TA(2014)0286.
- [9] Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0278.
- [10] http://eeas.europa.eu/library/publications/2013/3/2013_eeas_review_en.pdf
MINORITY OPINION
on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (based on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (2014/2220(INI))
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Rapporteur: Arnaud Danjean
Minority Opinion tabled by GUE/NGL MEPs Sabine Lösing, Takis Hadjigeorgiou
The report regrets that missions with an executive remit are rarely envisaged and calls for more robust interventions. The report demands enhanced development of armament cooperation, pooling and sharing, increased investment in defence and to adopt the same capacity targets as NATO (min. 2% of GDP for defence spending).
We object to the report since it:
• does not reflect EU's negative and escalating role regarding the current conflicts in the southern and eastern EU- neighbourhood
• promotes European-level tax incentives for defence and security projects, military use of Galileo, advocates EU-funded military drone-project (RPAS), fosters the Military Industrial Complex (MIC), demands the implementation of EU-wide security-supply-regime
• supports the merge of civilian and military research in order to use civilian capabilities for military purposes, supports an own research section to fund military research
• blackmails that the economic crises leads to defence cuts which are jeopardising the Union’s strategic autonomy and create a lack of military capabilities
• supports and promotes the extension of ATHENA mechanism for financing EU’s military missions beyond parliamentary control
• presses for the deployment of EU battlegroups for all types of crisis-management
We demand:
- radical (including CBRN) disarmament on EU and global levels;
- no military funding from EU-budget
- all activities strictly within UN Charter, International Law;
- civilian EU, strict civil peaceful approaches to conflict solutions, separation of civil and military;
- strict separation of EU from NATO
RESULT OF FINAL VOTE IN COMMITTEE
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Date adopted |
9.3.2015 |
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Result of final vote |
+: –: 0: |
45 18 0 |
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Members present for the final vote |
Lars Adaktusson, Michèle Alliot-Marie, Francisco Assis, Petras Auštrevičius, Amjad Bashir, Bas Belder, Goffredo Maria Bettini, Elmar Brok, Klaus Buchner, James Carver, Fabio Massimo Castaldo, Lorenzo Cesa, Aymeric Chauprade, Andi Cristea, Arnaud Danjean, Mark Demesmaeker, Georgios Epitideios, Eugen Freund, Michael Gahler, Richard Howitt, Sandra Kalniete, Manolis Kefalogiannis, Tunne Kelam, Afzal Khan, Janusz Korwin-Mikke, Eduard Kukan, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Arne Lietz, Barbara Lochbihler, Sabine Lösing, Andrejs Mamikins, Ramona Nicole Mănescu, David McAllister, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, Tamás Meszerics, Francisco José Millán Mon, Javier Nart, Pier Antonio Panzeri, Demetris Papadakis, Kati Piri, Andrej Plenković, Cristian Dan Preda, Jozo Radoš, Alyn Smith, Jaromír Štětina, Eleni Theocharous, László Tőkés, Ivo Vajgl, Johannes Cornelis van Baalen, Geoffrey Van Orden, Hilde Vautmans, Boris Zala |
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Substitutes present for the final vote |
Nicolas Bay, Reinhard Bütikofer, Ana Gomes, Andrzej Grzyb, Gabrielius Landsbergis, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Antonio López-Istúriz White, David Martin, Helmut Scholz, Janusz Zemke |
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Substitutes under Rule 200(2) present for the final vote |
Eric Andrieu |
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