Procedure : 2019/0814(NLE)
Document stages in plenary
Document selected : A9-0031/2019

Texts tabled :

A9-0031/2019

Debates :

Votes :

PV 26/11/2019 - 8.4

Texts adopted :

P9_TA(2019)0062

<Date>{13/11/2019}14.11.2019</Date>
<NoDocSe>A9-0031/2019</NoDocSe>
PDF 183kWORD 62k

<TitreType>REPORT</TitreType>

<Titre>on the nomination of François-Roger Cazala as a Member of the Court of Auditors</Titre>

<DocRef>(C9-0121/2019 – 2019/0814(NLE))</DocRef>


<Commission>{CONT}Committee on Budgetary Control</Commission>

Rapporteur: <Depute>Isabel García Muñoz</Depute>

PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION
 ANNEX 1: CURRICULUM VITÆ OF FRANÇOIS-ROGER CAZALA
 ANNEX 2: ANSWERS BY FRANÇOIS-ROGER CAZALA TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE
 PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

on the nomination of François-Roger Cazala as a Member of the Court of Auditors

(C9-0121/2019 – 2019/0814(NLE))

(Consultation)

 

The European Parliament,

 having regard to Article 286(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C9-0121/2019),

 having regard to Rule 129 of its Rules of Procedure,

 having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A9-0031/2019),

A. whereas Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control proceeded to evaluate the credentials of the nominee, in particular in view of the requirements laid down in Article 286(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;

B. whereas at its meeting of 12 November 2019 the Committee on Budgetary Control heard the Council’s nominee for membership of the Court of Auditors;

1. Delivers a favourable opinion on the Council’s nomination of François-Roger Cazala as a Member of the Court of Auditors;

2. Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Council and, for information, to the Court of Auditors, the other institutions of the European Union and the audit institutions of the Member States.

 


 

ANNEX 1: CURRICULUM VITÆ OF FRANÇOIS-ROGER CAZALA

Training:

 

‘Sciences Po’ – Paris Institute of Political Studies

Paris I University: BA in law

Ecole Nationale d’Administration (class of 1981)

Certified Government Audit Professional (Institute of Internal Auditors/IIA)

Career: Auditor (1981-1985), Appellate Judge (Conseiller référendaire) (1985-1999), then Councillor (Conseiller-Maître) at France’s Court of Auditors since 1999

 

1981 – 1985 France’s Court of Auditors

1986 – 1988 Technical adviser to the Minister responsible for the civil service and planning (H. de Charrette); duties: statutory matters, the senior civil service, ENA

1988 – 1989   France’s Court of Auditors

1989 – 1992  Seconded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Economic Directorate, Deputy-Director for International Environmental Affairs)

1992 – 1995 French Embassy in Germany, Second Counsellor (German domestic policy)

1995 Head of the Office of the Minister of the Environment (Corinne Lepage)

1996 – 1998 France’s Court of Auditors (Auditing sectors: Prime Minister’s Office, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

1998 – 2008 Seconded as Principal Administrator of the OECD’s SIGMA programme, a joint OECD-EU, chiefly EU-funded, initiative supporting public administration reform processes in Central and Eastern European countries, and in the countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Responsibilities included public finance, external auditing (setting up internal auditing and oversight agencies and equivalent bodies)

September 2008 France’s Court of Auditors, Councillor at the Third Chamber (auditing sectors: education, research, universities, culture and communication)

April 2011 France’s Court of Auditors, Councillor at the Third Chamber and Chair of the Transport Section

January 2018 France’s Court of Auditors, Councillor at the First Chamber and Chair of the Economic Development and Public Financial Sector Section

 

Other activities

 

1981 – 1987 Lecturer at ‘Sciences Po’ – Paris Institute of Political Studies

1981 – 1987 Member of or rapporteur for various interdepartmental committees and working groups on issues pertaining to public administration

1981 – 1987  Member of or rapporteur for various interdepartmental committees and working groups on issues pertaining to public administration

1996 – 1998 Chief Rapporteur for the Financial Committee of Agence France-Presse

1996 – 1998  Secretary-General of the Association of Judges and Former Judges of the Court of Auditors

2008 – 2012 Member of the Board of the Association of Judges and Former Judges of France’s Court of Auditors

2009 – 2012 Member of the following international organisations’ audit teams: EUMETSAT (Darmstadt), UNODC (Vienna), director of the external audit of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO)

2012 – 2013 Co-Chair of the working group on implementing professional standards in financial jurisdictions

Since 2014 representative of the Court of Auditors on the High Council of Statutory Auditors

Since 2016  Member and then Vice-Chair of the College of Auditors of the European Stability Mechanism

 

Languages:

 

German – fluent Reading, speaking, written,

English – fluent Reading, speaking, written,

Italian: basic

 

 


 

ANNEX 2: ANSWERS BY FRANÇOIS-ROGER CAZALA TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE

Professional experience

1. Please list your professional experience in public finance be it in budgetary planning, budget implementation or management or budget control or auditing.

The bulk of my career has been devoted to public finance. I started as an auditor at the Court of Auditors after I finished my studies, upon leaving the École Nationale d’Administration. The first five years were principally dedicated to overseeing the finances of local authorities, which were then under the Court of Auditors’ purview, and those of the telecommunications administration sector.

After a two-year stint in the office of a minister, I returned to France’s Court of Auditors to work in the department auditing the accounts of the Prime Minister’s staff while also cooperating on the Court’s ongoing work overseeing the execution of the national budget.

I then spent six years away from France’s Court of Auditors, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including three years in Germany. I returned after a brief stint as head of the office of the Minister of the Environment, to whom I also served as budget adviser.

Over the next three years, I audited a major unsuccessful real estate project (the Quai Branly International Conference Centre), development policy and volunteer activities for development policy, as well as various other organisations.

I was subsequently seconded to the OECD as part of the Sigma programme, a joint OECD-EU initiative, mainly funded by the EU. The programme’s purpose was and still is to provide or help provide technical assistance in public administration to the EU’s candidate countries and, increasingly, for the countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy. This work was carried out with a view to fostering reforms aimed at establishing systems underpinned by not only concepts of the rule of law but also transparency and efficiency. Originally recruited to cover the field of supreme audit institutions – which the Copenhagen criteria consider to be one of the foundations of the rule of law – my responsibilities quickly expanded to other areas of public finance: budgetary issues, management of pre-accession funds and public internal financial control systems.

This experience was particularly rewarding both in terms of getting to know new for budgeting, financial auditing and auditing public accounts, as well as public financial management in general, as well gaining familiarity with foreign administrative practices. As in the Sigma programme, I was called upon to cooperate very closely with the staff at the European Commission, both those responsible for the enlargement process and neighbourhood policy, as well as those responsible for substantive issues (DG Budget, DG Agri etc.). Working in Sigma’s public finance department also naturally gave rise to very close relations with the European Court of Auditors, which prioritised both building trust and working relationships with the supreme audit institutions at the new or future Member States and providing them with assistance to ensure that they were up to Western professional standards. I have thus regularly liaised with the European Court of Auditors.

This has undoubtedly been one of the most rewarding experiences of my career.

I returned to France’s Court of Auditors a little over 10 years ago and was first assigned for a period of two years to the Chamber responsible for education, higher education, research and cultural policy. I was then appointed Chair of the section responsible for transport, business and public policy in this important and lucrative branch of the economy. I have been in this position for a little over seven years.

For the past two years I have been Chair of the section overseeing the financing of the economy and state-owned financial enterprises.

Over this period I have also been directly involved in certifying the national accounts, a responsibility that has been entrusted to the Court since 2009, as well as in ongoing training for auditors overseeing execution of the national budget, in drafting the report on the economic and financial perspectives, in cross-cutting work on public finances (such as the report on the implementation of accrual accounting) in the public administration sector and in the 10-year assessment of the implementation of the Organic Budget Law (LOLF).

2. What have been your most significant achievements in your professional career?

My secondment to the OECD’s SIGMA programme enabled me to work side-by-side with candidate countries for accession to the European Union in the field of public finance and oversight thereof. This has led to my active involvement in major processes of administrative and organisational reform in some of these countries and in the drafting of laws and regulations that have established their impressive democratic public finance institutions. In most cases, this fundamental legislative work has gone hand in hand with a contribution towards more practical achievements in helping to effect these changes, such as the drafting of policy papers for the relevant institutions (chiefly ministries of finance and supreme audit institutions) involved in these often cumbersome and complicated processes.

I have conducted a great many peer reviews in these institutions, which have given rise to practical recommendations to help improve and update their working procedures. I attempted to pay due account, as far as possible, to the national specificities of these countries and their administrative and organisational cultures with a view to avoid preaching abstract doctrine without any real connection to the reality of practice on the ground and the history of these countries. This is by no means easy, and not always possible, but I was at least aware of the need for an approach that is neither ideological nor technocratic on such matters. I was also aware that any outsider is confronted not with an isolated institution or procedure but rather with a system involving multiple interactions and with wider consequences. I had to take into account, or at least to identify, the consequences of the desired reforms on other stakeholders or other procedures within the system in question (for instance, when an internal audit system is set up in a given organisation, a parallel internal oversight system is also required, and recommendations made on the independence of staff entrusted with certain functions only make sense if they work in the civil service, in which certain jobs must be afforded special protections).

I could also mention achievements in other areas:

- Drafting, together with a colleague, a local public finance manual at the beginning of my career;

- The legislative work carried out during my time in the office of the minister responsible for the civil service, which included measures to simplify and streamline certain statutory provisions, clarification of the rules applicable to civil service strikes and a major reform of the recruitment and training of senior civil servants;

- Co-chairing a working group to define and summarise the professional standards applicable to France’s Court of Auditors and the regional audit chambers. In addition to the ISSAI international standards already applied, the aim was to set common standards for these various control bodies and to clarify and deepen them in the areas of performance auditing and jurisdictional activities.

3. What has been your professional experience of international multicultural and multilinguistic organisations or institutions based outside your home country?

I believe I have extensive experience in dealing with these types of organisations, in carrying out three types of functions:

 - directly as the OECD’s Principal Administrator at the above-mentioned SIGMA programme, from 1998 to 2008;

 - also directly as an external auditor, a position I have held on an ad hoc basis with international organisations for which France’s Court of Auditors is the statutory auditor, namely EUMETSAT in Darmstadt, the divisions of the United Nations General Secretariat in Vienna, and then as leader of the audit team of the secretariat of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Implementation Organisation (CTBTO/OTICE) in Vienna;

 - indirectly during my time at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs liaising with international organisations in my field of activity (in particular UN organisations such as WMO and UNEP   to name just a few).

4. Have you been granted discharge for the management duties you carried out previously, if such a procedure applies?

No such procedure has applied to any of the duties I have had.

5. Which of your previous professional positions were a result of a political nomination?

None. My duties in ministerial offices have been of a purely technical and administrative nature.

6. What are the three most important decisions to which you have been party in your professional life?

I will focus on recent developments at France’s Court of Auditors.

In 2014, as Chair of the Transport division, I was entrusted with planning and coordinating the report on high-speed rail in France. This work shone a spotlight on whether the economic, financial and environmental case was justified for high-speed rail lines and the exponential growth in France’s network over the last thirty years, an issue that had hitherto been kept out of the public eye somewhat. The report highlighted the network’s falling profitability, the fact that its proactive development strategy had led to poor choices in terms of planning and financing the maintenance of the conventional network (both its infrastructure and rolling stock), the rising competition from other means of transport, and its uncertain economic and ecological results. In so doing, it helped to dispel a theoretical vision of the development of high-speed rail, which could only lead to a financial deadlock without providing added value proportionate to the cost of this mode of transport. The report called for a substantial renewal of policy in this area, which was finally reflected in the major reform of the rail sector France undertook in 2018.

In 2017 I participated directly as shadow reporter on France’s Court of Auditors’ work on ‘the state as a shareholder’, namely the government’s behaviour as a holder of shares in companies. This was the first ‘panoramic’ review of this theme and shed light on practices in this field by demonstrating that they were seldom the product of good economic sense and an asset management-based approach. It began by considering the composition of the state’s portfolio of holdings, which was smaller in the past due to privatisations but which remained extremely diverse, disparate even, and appeared to follow no coherent logic. The same applied to articles of association and rules of governance, which often appeared outdated (in the transport sector or public broadcasting for instance). This work has had a significant impact and has led to various reforms such as the overhaul of the articles of association of both railway companies and broadcasting companies (entailing a shift to the status of ordinary commercial company with ‘standard’ methods of governance).

In 2012-2013, I was called on to coordinate an investigation into relations between the state and motorway concession companies. This work highlighted the great imbalance in the current relationship between the concession licensor – the state – and the concession holders. It showed that the concession-holders had been allowed to raise tolls in exchange for improvements or increases in capacity which were in fact debateable (constituting normal maintenance or work to improve commercial attractiveness that the concessionaire would have done anyway, or for amounts dwarfed by the financial benefits of higher tolls). In general, the state’s technical capacity to monitor the implementation of motorway concessions seemed to be weaker than it had previously been. The content of this report was used both at the political level to achieve a rebalancing of contractual relations, and at the administrative and legal level to undertake an in-depth investigation into motorway companies’ compliance with competition rules.

Independence

7. The Treaty stipulates that the Members of the Court of Auditors must be ‘completely independent’ in the performance of their duties. How would you act on this obligation in the discharge of your prospective duties?

The duties I have performed at the French Court of Auditors since the beginning of my professional career and the status of magistrate that they imply must also be performed with independence. In accordance with the Court’s procedures, particularly the principle of collegiality and professionalism, reflected in compliance with specific standards, I have always been afforded full independence in the scheduling of work, the performance of audits, the drafting of reports (choice of observations, formulation of recommendations) and my participation in decisions to publish them or not (as well as the form in which to publish).

This independence encompasses notions including objectivity, neutrality and impartiality. If ever the Court’s activity leads me to consider that my independence and the above-mentioned concepts are likely to be called into question, I will inform the Court’s authorities (who may also take such an initiative) and take me off a case, whatever the nature of my intervention or however far advanced my work is.

These principles and rules of conduct also applicable to work at the European Court of Auditors and, if appointed, I will only be following and implementing procedures I am fully familiar with, with due account for the specific characteristics of a European institution. In this connection, I also believe it important to note that Members of the Court must also demonstrate their independence from the institutions of their Member State of origin, and that the greatest possible neutrality must be maintained in relation to the positions or interests expressed by the French authorities.

Lastly, Members should take pains not to do anything, notably through their public proclamations, liable to raise suspicions as to their independence.

8. Do you or your close relatives (parents, brothers and sisters, legal partner and children) have any business or financial holdings or any other commitments, which might conflict with your prospective duties?

Not to my knowledge.

9. Are you prepared to disclose all your financial interests and other commitments to the President of the Court and to make them public?

This is in no way a problem for me since I already have to do this, in my capacity as:

  - a member of France’s Court of Auditors;

 - a member of the High Council of Statutory Auditors,  France’s independent administrative authority responsible for regulating and overseeing the profession of auditor, on which I have represented the Court of Auditors since the end of 2014.

10. Are you involved in any current legal proceedings? If so, please provide us with details.

I am not involved in any legal proceedings.

11. Do you have any active or executive role in politics? If so, at what level? Have you held any political position during the last 18 months? If so, please provide us with details.

I have never held political office or a political position.

12. Will you step down from any elected office or give up any active function with responsibilities in a political party if you are appointed as a Member of the Court?

As a matter of principle, I am prepared to step down from any elective office or position of responsibility within a political party. In practice, this is a not an issue since I have never held such a position and have no intention of doing so.

13. How would you deal with a major irregularity or even fraud and/or corruption case involving persons in your Member State of origin?

I do not see any difference in how I would approach such cases between those involving nationals of my Member State and those involving other individuals, whether they are serious or not. As far as I am concerned, the two scenarios are strictly the same and the same rules would apply and would be applied by me.

Performance of duties

14. What should be the main features of a sound financial management culture in any public service? How could the ECA help to enforce it?

I see the sound financial management of the public service is an essential condition for its proper functioning, its credibility and above all for citizen-taxpayers to continue to be in favour of the existence of public authorities and the exercise of their missions.

Such financial management must, however, be placed within the overall framework of the civil service system. The quality of public financial management is thus conditioned by other major components of the public governance system. It is itself a component of this system. This includes the general governance framework, responsible for such functions as ensuring effective coordination between ministerial functions and the flow of relevant information among public stakeholders. It also encompasses the system for recruiting and training civil servants, the rules applicable to them, the management of their individual careers, their personal ethics – of course – and ensuring their protection against possible abuses of authority.

In other words, the ‘right’ principles for sound public financial management will only be fully operational and implemented if the foundations of public governance are themselves firmly in place.

With regard to financial matters per se, there is, in my view, no fundamental difference between the principles underpinning good ‘private’ and ‘public’ management, with the exception that ‘public’ systems must rightly afford pride of place to the principles of legality and transparency in management. Unwavering respect for the rule of law must, I believe, be the basis of public management for the excellent reason that those whose essential task is to define, implement and oversee the rule of law must themselves be exemplary in this regard in managing their daily activities. If not, the confidence of citizens and taxpayers in the functioning and legitimacy of public institutions would be called into question. This respect for the rule of law goes hand in hand with a particular requirement for moral integrity that applies to public officials, regardless of their seniority or the nature of their duties.

The mirror image of this requirement, or rather its consequence, is the principle of transparency in government action. Citizens, taxpayers and elected officials alike must be able to constantly monitor how public resources are collected and spent. I would like to quote Article 15 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, which has become a second motto for France’s Court of Auditors:

‘Society has the right to hold any public official to account for his or her administration.’

For more than two centuries, this sentence has perfectly encapsulated the meaning of transparency in government action and the accountability it entails. It could be adopted by all supreme audit institutions, which all play the essential role of ensuring the practical fulfilment of this obligation.

Aside from these overriding principles, which are very specific to the public sector, there are other more ‘day-to-day’ principles or rules on which the sound financial management of public services must be based.

I will of course mention the principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness that should inspire any astute manager.

But management can only be effective in a context that includes:

- A clear and relevant definition of the objectives to be achieved and assessed;

- Sufficient administrative capacity to achieve these objectives (and the opportunity to put it into practice efficiently and expeditiously, which is not always necessarily the case in highly centralised systems);

- A simple and robust internal oversight system, with clearly defined and displayed responsibilities, relevant hierarchical or functional lines of authority that are recognised as such by all the staff concerned;

- The right instruments, procedures and bodies to provide reasonable assurance that these various components are in place and can be effectively implemented: a suitable chart of accounts, comprehensive, clear and useful financial information (budget, accounts and notes), sound and well-defined internal procedures, an appropriate and accountable governance structure, professional and independent internal and external audit systems.

15. Under the Treaty, the Court is required to assist Parliament in exercising its powers of control over the implementation of the budget. How would you further improve the cooperation between the Court and the European Parliament (in particular, its Committee on Budgetary Control) to enhance both the public oversight of the general spending and its value for money?

I could only give a precise and reasoned answer to this question after having personally experienced these relationships and their possible points for improvement.

I note, however, that the relationship between the Court of Auditors and Parliament is defined in a brief but clear manner by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular Article 287 thereof, which provides that the Court of Auditors shall assist the European Parliament and the Council in exercising their powers of control over the implementation of the EU budget. I do not think I am mistaken in saying that Parliament, and above all its Committee on Budgetary Control, has used this provision as actively as possible and that the Court has always considered that it was its purpose to respond to the best of its ability to requests made pursuant to it.

Better cooperation and communication can no doubt be achieved, however.

The French Court of Auditors has found this, although in a situation that was far from equivalent to the relationship between the European Parliament and the European Court of Auditors: procedures have gradually been put in place, contacts of all kinds have multiplied, areas of mutual interest have been identified and a system for collaboration has been established that, although it can certainly still be improved, is robust.

I imagine, although I would have to see for myself in practice, that cooperation could be improved by concentrating on the following specific aspects:

  - completing work punctually and within a timeframe that allows Parliament to make the best possible use of it;

   - choosing topics of oversight of interest to Parliament;

  - ensuring reports are as clear and readable as possible and drafting practical and specific recommendations;

  - maintaining and developing of day-to-day working relationships that allow for better mutual understanding of the wishes of and constraints specific to each institution

16. What do you think is the added value of performance audit? What added value do you think performance auditing brings and how should the findings be incorporated in management procedures?

For performance audits to be able add value, it must first be ensured that the basic financial data are complete and accurate, which means that financial and regularity audits need to be conducted with sufficient professionalism.

It is, however, clear that performance audits bring considerable added value to anyone reading or using the work of a supreme audit institution.

 This is first and foremost the case of taxpayer-citizens, who are thus able to consult and scrutinise the results of public, political and administrative action. The conclusions of performance audits thus make an effective contribution to public debate as well as providing objective subject matter for it.

 This is of course the case for parliamentary bodies, the European Parliament for example, which receives, via performance audits, objective data with which to assess the results of the policies, programmes and actions it has approved or is asked to approve, and can thus debate these issues with the proper documentation. It is therefore also able to hold the politics or administrators responsible for these policies, programmes and actions to account for their performance. In principle, they therefore have a lever with which to influence these activities if the need arises.

 This is ultimately the case for the executive authorities themselves, which are thus provided with analyses that they often cannot carry out themselves due to a lack of time and resources – and sometimes of ideas – which if they did attempt themselves they would in any case be open to charges of bias and a lack of independence. The results of performance audits, provided they are accepted and used in good faith by public officials, should help to improve public policies, make them more relevant and ensure they are implemented more effectively. These results can also help identify good practices that would be greatly beneficial to all the public administrations concerned. Such practices would be of great use to processes of improving public management, which must be a priority and permanent objective of any supreme audit institution.

Of course, the degree to which the conclusions and recommendations of performance audits are considered depends fundamentally on their relevance, the robustness of their methodology and the clarity and unambiguity of their content. They must be the fruit of a professional and objective approach, which seeks not to punish formal or insignificant errors, or both, but rather to contribute to improving the efficiency of the organisation and efficiency of the civil service. There is no doubt in my mind that irregularities must be detected and reported as such, or even give rise to measures to punish those responsible, but care must also be taken not to waste scarce resources on exercises whose usefulness may prove futile.

17. How could cooperation between the Court of Auditors, the national audit institutions and the European Parliament (Committee on Budgetary Control) on auditing of the EU budget be improved?

There already is a close relationship between the European Court of Auditors and national supreme audit institutions. These relations are defined and governed by Article 287 of the TFEU. The first step in this cooperation is the existence and functioning of the Contact Committee, which brings together representatives of all the institutions concerned. The committee has proved its worth and has implemented many worthwhile practical cooperation activities benefiting all participants, particularly via its working groups on subjects of common interest. Further cooperation efforts could be foreseen, such as running parallel or joint audits in areas of common activity, such as the management of European funds at national level or a cross-border investment project co-financed by the European Union.

But there could be scope for expanding day-to-day relationships with a view to greater mutual familiarity, both at the organisational and methodological level. I am referring in particular to greater scope for the secondment of auditors from one institution to the other. We welcome colleagues from the European Court of Auditors to the French Court for a period of at least two years in principle, and in practice for a longer period. It is an experience that both parties unanimously consider very positive.

Another example of a very practical relationship is the way in which we submit our joint work. Indeed, I have first-hand knowledge of this, since I led the team that travelled to the European Court of Auditors to present the methodology and results of the aforementioned work on high-speed rail. I believe that this presentation generated a lot of interest and has contributed to the European Court’s in-depth work on high-speed networks within the European Union.

As for parliaments, both at European and national level, it is of course up to them to define the ways and means for their closer cooperation. The supreme audit institutions can certainly contribute to this on their side by, for example, drawing the attention of their contact persons at their respective parliaments to certain issues on which there may be common concerns, such as the effectiveness of the systems for managing and overseeing European funds.

18. How would you further develop the reporting of the ECA to give the European Parliament all the necessary information on the accuracy of the data provided by the Member States to the European Commission?

The ECA is not in a position to directly ask Member States to improve the reliability of the data reported to the Commission. However, ensuring that the Commission actually has relevant, accurate and complete data from the Member States is a component of the routine checks that must be made as part of an audit. Similarly, the ECA’s remit includes asking the Commission to contact the Member States to ensure the information provided is as reliable as possible (such as by means of certification by third parties, conducting audits, providing technical assistance to countries that need it, as well as by simplifying the nature and quantity of information to be requested, etc.).

Other issues

19. Will you withdraw your candidacy if Parliament’s opinion on your appointment as Member of the Court is unfavourable?

Relations between the European Parliament and the European Court of Auditors are based on the relevant provisions of the Treaties and other sources of EU law. However, they can only be effective if they are also underpinned by trust and respect. It is clear that an unfavourable opinion by Parliament on my appointment as a Member of the Court would undermine this relationship of trust and the performance of my duties from the outset. Under such conditions I would certainly withdraw my candidacy.


PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

Title

Partial renewal of members of the Court of Auditors - FR nominee

References

12533/2019 – C9-0121/2019 – 2019/0814(NLE)

Date of consultation / request for consent

1.10.2019

 

 

 

Committee responsible

 Date announced in plenary

CONT

9.10.2019

 

 

 

Rapporteurs

 Date appointed

Isabel García Muñoz

17.10.2019

 

 

 

Date adopted

12.11.2019

 

 

 

Result of final vote

+:

–:

0:

20

3

1

Members present for the final vote

Matteo Adinolfi, Olivier Chastel, Caterina Chinnici, Lefteris Christoforou, Tamás Deutsch, Martina Dlabajová, Raffaele Fitto, Luke Ming Flanagan, Daniel Freund, Isabel García Muñoz, Cristian Ghinea, Monika Hohlmeier, Tsvetelina Penkova, Markus Pieper, Sabrina Pignedoli, Angelika Winzig, Tomáš Zdechovský

Substitutes present for the final vote

Gilles Boyer, John Howarth, Andrey Novakov, Mikuláš Peksa, Sándor Rónai, Viola Von Cramon-Taubadel

Substitutes under Rule 209(7) present for the final vote

Vera Tax

Date tabled

14.11.2019

 

 

Last updated: 14 November 2019Legal notice