Amendment


Report

Petar Vitanov
Artificial intelligence in criminal law and its use by the police and judicial authorities in criminal matters
(2020/2016(INI))

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 24

Motion for a resolution

24. Notes that predictive policing is among the AI applications used in the area of law enforcement, but warns that while predictive policing can analyse the given data sets for the identification of patterns and correlations, it cannot answer the question of causality and cannot make reliable predictions on individual behaviour, and therefore cannot constitute the sole basis for an intervention; points out that several cities in the United States have ended their use of predictive policing systems after audits; recalls that during the LIBE Committee’s mission to the United States in February 2020, Members were informed by the police departments of New York City and Cambridge, Massachusetts,
that they had phased out their predictive policing programmes due to a lack of effectiveness, discriminatory impact and practical failure, and had turned instead to community policing; notes that this has led to a decline in crime rates; opposes, therefore, the use of AI by law enforcement authorities to make behavioural predictions on individuals or groups on the basis of historical data and past behaviour, group membership, location, or any other such characteristics, thereby attempting to identify people likely to commit a crime; that they had phased out their predictive policing programmes due to a lack of effectiveness, discriminatory impact and practical failure, and had turned instead to community policing; notes that this has led to a decline in crime rates; calls, therefore, for law enforcement authorities to apply the utmost caution when using AI to make behavioural predictions on individuals or groups on the basis of historical data and past behaviour, group membership, location, or any other such characteristics, thereby attempting to identify people likely to commit a crime; highlights that these tools should only be used when all necessary safeguards are in place to eliminate enforced bias; calls on the Member States and the law enforcement authorities to constantly monitor the effects, necessity and possible negative consequences of these tools; emphasises that these tools can only be used as aids and cannot be the sole element on which the law enforcement bodies rely; calls, however, on the Commission and the Member States to support test environments and pilot projects to allow these tools to be further developed and improved in order to make them more robust and accurate;

Or. en
27. **Calls, however, for a moratorium on** the deployment of facial recognition systems **for** law enforcement purposes that **have the function of** identification, unless **strictly used for the purpose of** identification of victims of crime, **until the technical standards can be considered fully** fundamental rights **compliant**, results **derived** are non-biased and non-discriminatory, **the legal framework provides strict safeguards against misuse and strict democratic control and oversight, and there is empirical evidence of the necessity and proportionality for the deployment of such technologies; notes that where the above criteria are not**

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27. **Considers that the technical standards for** the deployment of facial recognition systems **by** law enforcement authorities for the purpose of identification **should be further improved to ensure** fundamental rights **compliance, in particular to ensure the results are non-biased and non-discriminatory; calls on the Commission and the Member States to be extremely cautious when authorising law enforcement bodies to use facial recognition applications and to require prior judicial authorisation; stresses that democratic oversight and control should be further strengthened with a view to ensuring that** such technologies are only
fulfilled, the systems should not be used or deployed; used when necessary and proportionate; highlights, in particular, the important role of facial recognition systems in identifying victims;

Or. en
Amendment 3

Report
Petar Vitanov
Artificial intelligence in criminal law and its use by the police and judicial authorities in criminal matters (2020/2016(INI))

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31

31. Expresses strong concern over research projects financed under Horizon 2020 that deploy artificial intelligence on external borders, such as the iBorderCtrl project, a ‘smart lie-detection system’ profiling travellers on the basis of a computer-automated interview taken by the traveller’s webcam before the trip, and an artificial intelligence-based analysis of 38 microgestures, tested in Hungary, Latvia and Greece; calls on the Commission, therefore, to implement, through legislative and non-legislative means, and if necessary through infringement proceedings, a ban on any processing of biometric data, including facial images, for law

31. Expresses strong concern over research projects financed under Horizon 2020 that deploy artificial intelligence on external borders, such as the iBorderCtrl project, a ‘smart lie-detection system’ profiling travellers on the basis of a computer-automated interview taken by the traveller’s webcam before the trip, and an artificial intelligence-based analysis of 38 microgestures, tested in Hungary, Latvia and Greece; calls on the Commission, therefore, to implement, through legislative and non-legislative means, and if necessary through infringement proceedings, a ban on the processing of biometric data, including facial images, for law

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enforcement purposes that leads to mass surveillance in publicly accessible spaces; calls further on the Commission to stop funding biometric research or deployment or programmes that are likely to result in indiscriminate mass surveillance in public spaces; highlights, in this context, that special attention should be paid, and a strict framework applied, to the use of drones in police operations; enforcement purposes that leads to mass surveillance in publicly accessible spaces, unless and in as far as its use is strictly necessary for very specific objectives such as a targeted search for victims of crime or the prevention of a terrorist attack or another imminent threat to the life or physical integrity of a person; stresses that there must be prior judicial authorisation and that the processing of such data must be limited in place and time; calls further on the Commission to stop funding biometric research or deployment or programmes that contribute or lead to indiscriminate mass surveillance, which is not consistent with the conditions laid down in applicable Union and national law; highlights, in this context, that special attention should be paid, and a strict framework applied, to the use of drones in police operations;