

8.9.2021

A9-0259/1

**Amendment 1**

**Anna Fotyga**

on behalf of the ECR Group

**Report**

**A9-0259/2021**

**Andrius Kubilius**

Direction of EU-Russia political relations  
(2021/2042(INI))

**Proposal for a recommendation**

**Citation 8 a (new)**

*Proposal for a recommendation*

*Amendment*

– *having regard to the joint  
declaration of the International Crimea  
Platform of 23 August 2021;*

Or. en

8.9.2021

A9-0259/2

**Amendment 2**

**Anna Fotyga**

on behalf of the ECR Group

**Report**

**A9-0259/2021**

**Andrius Kubilius**

Direction of EU-Russia political relations  
(2021/2042(INI))

**Proposal for a recommendation**

**Recital O**

*Proposal for a recommendation*

O. whereas the 2020 Russian constitutional reforms revised the history of World War II, cleansing Soviet history and naming Russia as a successor of the Soviet Union, introduced the right to intervene internationally in defence of Russian compatriots and outlawed discussions about returning **Russian** lands to foreign countries;

*Amendment*

O. whereas the 2020 Russian constitutional reforms revised the history of World War II, cleansing Soviet history and naming Russia as a successor of the Soviet Union, introduced the right to intervene internationally in defence of Russian compatriots and outlawed discussions about returning lands ***claimed by Russia*** to foreign countries;

Or. en

8.9.2021

A9-0259/3

**Amendment 3**

**Anna Fotyga**

on behalf of the ECR Group

**Report**

**Andrius Kubilius**

Direction of EU-Russia political relations  
(2021/2042(INI))

**A9-0259/2021**

**Proposal for a recommendation**

**Recital S**

*Proposal for a recommendation*

S. whereas Russia remains engaged in several parts of the world, including the Western Balkans, Central Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa *and* Latin America; whereas the Russian Government uses paramilitary units (the ‘Wagner Group’) to support dictatorial regimes around the world and undermine the EU and the international community’s efforts to mitigate conflicts, build peace and ensure stability; whereas the Western Balkans region, which includes potential new EU member states, is characterised by a strong Russian presence, particularly in Serbia; whereas in 2016 in Montenegro, the Russian military intelligence agency (GRU) was involved in attempts to overthrow the country’s parliament, to assassinate the prime minister and to install a pro-Russian and anti-NATO government, to prevent Montenegro’s accession to NATO;

*Amendment*

S. whereas Russia remains engaged in several parts of the world, including the Western Balkans, Central Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America *and the Arctic*; whereas the Russian Government uses paramilitary units (the ‘Wagner Group’) to support dictatorial regimes around the world and undermine the EU and the international community’s efforts to mitigate conflicts, build peace and ensure stability; whereas the Western Balkans region, which includes potential new EU member states, is characterised by a strong Russian presence, particularly in Serbia; whereas in 2016 in Montenegro, the Russian military intelligence agency (GRU) was involved in attempts to overthrow the country’s parliament, to assassinate the prime minister and to install a pro-Russian and anti-NATO government, to prevent Montenegro’s accession to NATO;

Or. en

8.9.2021

A9-0259/4

**Amendment 4**

**Anna Fotyga**

on behalf of the ECR Group

**Report**

**Andrius Kubilius**

Direction of EU-Russia political relations  
(2021/2042(INI))

**A9-0259/2021**

**Proposal for a recommendation**

**Recital T**

*Proposal for a recommendation*

T. whereas, as far as the EU is concerned, the Kremlin's regime allegedly involved Russian active-duty intelligence officers in two ammunition depot explosions in 2014 in which two Czech citizens were killed and extensive material damage was caused; whereas the same GRU agents were also responsible for the attempted murder of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in the United Kingdom in 2018 using a military-grade Novichok nerve agent; whereas GRU agents were also charged with the attempted murder of Emilian Gebrev, the owner of an arms factory, and two other people in Bulgaria in 2015; whereas illegal actions by the Kremlin regime on the territory of Czechia, Bulgaria and many other Member States, the United Kingdom and EaP countries constitute a critical violation of their sovereignty; whereas the Kremlin regime is non-cooperative in investigating those crimes and is sheltering key suspects;

*Amendment*

T. whereas, as far as the EU is concerned, the Kremlin's regime allegedly involved Russian active-duty intelligence officers in two ammunition depot explosions in 2014 in which two Czech citizens were killed and extensive material damage was caused; whereas the same GRU agents were also responsible for the attempted murder of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in the United Kingdom in 2018 using a military-grade Novichok nerve agent; whereas GRU agents were also charged with the attempted murder of Emilian Gebrev, the owner of an arms factory, and two other people in Bulgaria in 2015, **as well as Zelimkhan Khangoshvili, assassinated in Berlin in 2019 by Russian operatives**; whereas illegal actions by the Kremlin regime on the territory of Czechia, Bulgaria and many other Member States, the United Kingdom and EaP countries constitute a critical violation of their sovereignty; whereas the Kremlin regime is non-cooperative in investigating those crimes and is sheltering key suspects;

Or. en

8.9.2021

A9-0259/5

## **Amendment 5**

**Anna Fotyga**

on behalf of the ECR Group

## **Report**

**Andrius Kubilius**

Direction of EU-Russia political relations  
(2021/2042(INI))

**A9-0259/2021**

## **Proposal for a recommendation**

**Recital AE**

### *Proposal for a recommendation*

AE. whereas over the past two decades, there have been a number of attempted or successful assassinations of regime opponents and independent journalists, either within Russia itself or on foreign soil, including those of Anna Politkovskaya, Boris Nemtsov, Alexander Litvinenko, Sergei and Yulia Skripal, Sergei Protazanov, Pyotr Verzilov, Vladimir Kara-Murza, Alexei Navalny and others; whereas the organisers of those crimes remain unidentified and unindicted because the ongoing repression of social dissent is reinforced by the impunity of police and security forces and by the unwillingness of the judiciary to persecute the real perpetrators of those crimes; whereas representatives of the opposition are systematically subjected to verbal attacks, ad hominem campaigns and dehumanisation by the government or pro-government media; whereas the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's report on the murder of Boris Nemtsov concluded that 'the main issue for addressing impunity is not the capabilities of the Russian law enforcement, but political will'; whereas the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's report also notes that a full investigation into the assassination 'would be a first step to address the climate of impunity' in Russia;

### *Amendment*

AE. whereas over the past two decades, there have been a number of attempted or successful assassinations of regime opponents and independent journalists, either within Russia itself or on foreign soil, including those of Anna Politkovskaya, Boris Nemtsov, Alexander Litvinenko, Sergei and Yulia Skripal, Sergei Protazanov, Pyotr Verzilov, Vladimir Kara-Murza, Alexei Navalny, ***Zelimkhan Khangoshvili*** and others; whereas the organisers of those crimes remain unidentified and unindicted because the ongoing repression of social dissent is reinforced by the impunity of police and security forces and by the unwillingness of the judiciary to persecute the real perpetrators of those crimes; whereas representatives of the opposition are systematically subjected to verbal attacks, ad hominem campaigns and dehumanisation by the government or pro-government media; whereas the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's report on the murder of Boris Nemtsov concluded that 'the main issue for addressing impunity is not the capabilities of the Russian law enforcement, but political will'; whereas the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's report also notes that a full investigation into the assassination 'would be a first step to address the climate of impunity' in

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Russia;

Or. en

8.9.2021

A9-0259/6

**Amendment 6**

**Anna Fotyga**

on behalf of the ECR Group

**Report**

**Andrius Kubilius**

Direction of EU-Russia political relations  
(2021/2042(INI))

**A9-0259/2021**

**Proposal for a recommendation**

**Recital AL**

*Proposal for a recommendation*

AL. whereas the LGBTI+ community in various parts of the Russian Federation faces extensive discrimination, including harassment, torture, imprisonment and killings and whereas the situation is particularly dangerous in Chechnya, which in 2017 started its purge of LGBTI+ people, detaining and torturing dozens and killing at least two, leading to many people seeking safe refuge abroad; whereas existing laws prohibit any public discussion on ‘non-traditional sexual relationships’; whereas following illegal constitutional changes, legislation that negatively affects LGBTI+ people’s rights, ***including the rights to marry and raise children***, has been adopted;

*Amendment*

AL. whereas the LGBTI+ community in various parts of the Russian Federation faces extensive discrimination, including harassment, torture, imprisonment and killings and whereas the situation is particularly dangerous in Chechnya, which in 2017 started its purge of LGBTI+ people, detaining and torturing dozens and killing at least two, leading to many people seeking safe refuge abroad; whereas existing laws prohibit any public discussion on ‘non-traditional sexual relationships’; whereas following illegal constitutional changes, legislation that negatively affects LGBTI+ people’s rights has been adopted;

Or. en

8.9.2021

A9-0259/7

**Amendment 7**

**Anna Fotyga**

on behalf of the ECR Group

**Report**

**Andrius Kubilius**

Direction of EU-Russia political relations  
(2021/2042(INI))

**A9-0259/2021**

**Proposal for a recommendation**

**Recital AP**

*Proposal for a recommendation*

AP. whereas the updated EU strategy should take into account different scenarios, possible developments and clear responses to Russia's infringements of international law and human rights, including effective instruments against Russia's interference and spreading of disinformation, as well as instruments for selective engagement, where *possible*; whereas Parliament has also asked the Council to immediately start preparations and adopt an EU strategy for future relations with a democratic Russia, including a broad offer of incentives and conditions to strengthen domestic tendencies towards freedom and democracy;

*Amendment*

AP. whereas the updated EU strategy should take into account different scenarios, possible developments and clear responses to Russia's infringements of international law and human rights, including effective instruments against Russia's interference and spreading of disinformation, as well as instruments for *limited* selective engagement, where *absolutely necessary, without compromising the principles of sovereignty and security and the values on which they are based*; whereas Parliament has also asked the Council to immediately start preparations and adopt an EU strategy for future relations with a democratic Russia, including a broad offer of incentives and conditions to strengthen domestic tendencies towards freedom and democracy;

Or. en



8.9.2021

A9-0259/8

## Amendment 8

Anna Fotyga

on behalf of the ECR Group

## Report

Andrius Kubilius

Direction of EU-Russia political relations  
(2021/2042(INI))

A9-0259/2021

## Proposal for a recommendation

### Recital AQ

#### *Proposal for a recommendation*

AQ. whereas the five EU guiding principles for relations with Russia have contained further aggression against Ukraine by the Kremlin regime, but are silent with respect to containing President Putin's repression against the people of Russia; whereas the five EU guiding principles for relations with Russia remain valid as a functional framework, but must be paired with an actual strategy aiming to achieve the EU's goals in its relations with Russia, including *inter alia* by deterring **the Kremlin from** further aggression against its neighbours and by making the consequences for military actions in foreign countries more serious, including actions by proxies and mercenaries; whereas given that there are no prospects for significant positive developments with the current Russian leadership, the five principles should be complemented in order to contain President Putin's repression of the Russian people and the Kremlin's broader destabilising activities;

#### *Amendment*

AQ. whereas the five EU guiding principles for relations with Russia have contained further aggression against Ukraine by the Kremlin regime, but are silent with respect to containing President Putin's repression against the people of Russia; whereas the five EU guiding principles for relations with Russia remain valid as a functional framework, but must be paired with an actual strategy aiming to achieve the EU's goals in its relations with Russia, including *inter alia* by **countering the Kremlin's current hostile policies and** deterring further aggression against its neighbours and by making the consequences for military actions in foreign countries more serious, including actions by proxies and mercenaries; whereas given that there are no prospects for significant positive developments with the current Russian leadership, the five principles should be complemented in order to contain President Putin's repression of the Russian people and the Kremlin's broader destabilising activities;

Or. en

8.9.2021

A9-0259/9

## Amendment 9

Anna Fotyga

on behalf of the ECR Group

## Report

Andrius Kubilius

Direction of EU-Russia political relations  
(2021/2042(INI))

A9-0259/2021

## Proposal for a recommendation

### Paragraph 1 (a)

#### *Proposal for a recommendation*

(a) the EU ***must fundamentally*** reform its foreign policy in order to credibly demonstrate that it is capable of making decisions and taking action in the field of foreign policy, including by extending the competences of the European External Action Service and the VP/HR acting on behalf of the EU, and in order to ***make sure the policy leads to more autonomy and clear responsibilities, the repeal of unanimity in foreign policy matters,*** clearer communication and leadership by Member States, while safeguarding unity and intra-European solidarity; moreover, the EU should strengthen its role as a global player, as well as the capacities of the EU institutions, in order not to allow Russia to continue the so-called bilateralisation of relations with the EU, ***as Brussels should be the only capital where key decisions about EU-Russia relations are taken;***

#### *Amendment*

(a) the EU ***should consider a*** reform of its foreign policy in order to credibly demonstrate that it is capable of making decisions and taking action in the field of foreign policy, including by extending the competences of the European External Action Service and the VP/HR acting on behalf of the EU, and in order to ***develop more effective responses to the increasing challenges from the Kremlin, and*** clearer communication and leadership by Member States, while safeguarding unity and intra-European solidarity, ***which have been successfully upheld since 2014;*** moreover, the EU should strengthen its role as a global player, as well as the capacities of the EU institutions, in order not to allow Russia to continue the so-called bilateralisation of relations with the EU; ***this, however, requires a change in the EU's policy towards Russia, which so far has often been based on false assumptions and an inadequate knowledge of the realities of Russian goals, politics and history, as demonstrated by the VP/HR's last visit to Moscow, despite warnings from Member States and Members of the European Parliament;***

Or. en

8.9.2021

A9-0259/10

**Amendment 10**

**Anna Fotyga**

on behalf of the ECR Group

**Report**

**Andrius Kubilius**

Direction of EU-Russia political relations  
(2021/2042(INI))

**A9-0259/2021**

**Proposal for a recommendation**

**Paragraph 1 (b)**

*Proposal for a recommendation*

(b) the EU, together with NATO and international partners, should deter Russia in order to maintain peace and stability in Europe and beyond, including by strengthening its own defence capabilities and by pressing the Russian authorities not to interfere in the EU's Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods; in particular, the EU should demand – including before EU and international organisations such as the OSCE or the UN – that Russia commits to the resolution of the ongoing conflicts and to the prevention of any future conflicts, starting by returning the occupied and illegally annexed territories in the EaP region according to their internationally recognised borders and by respecting countries' EU, Euro-Atlantic and democratic choices;

*Amendment*

(b) the EU, together with NATO and international partners, should deter Russia in order to maintain peace and stability in Europe and beyond, including by strengthening its own defence capabilities and by pressing the Russian authorities not to interfere in the EU's Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods ***in a harmful and destructive way***; in particular, the EU should demand – including before EU and international organisations such as the OSCE or the UN – that Russia commits to the resolution of the ongoing conflicts and to the prevention of any future conflicts, starting by returning the occupied and illegally annexed territories in the EaP region according to their internationally recognised borders and by respecting countries' EU, Euro-Atlantic and democratic choices;

Or. en