Amendment 1
Antonio Maria Rinaldi, Gerolf Annemans, Laura Huhtasaari, Gunnar Beck, Jaak Madison
on behalf of the ID Group

Report
Danuta Maria Hübner
Assessment of the implementation of Article 50 TEU
(2020/2136(INI))

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas Article 50 TEU, by providing explicitly for withdrawal under EU law, establishes the only procedure under which a Member State may lawfully withdraw from the EU;

Amendment
D. whereas Article 50 TEU, by providing explicitly for withdrawal under EU law, establishes the only procedure enshrined in the Treaties under which a Member State may lawfully withdraw from the EU; whereas the principles and rules of international law, with particular reference to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, are applicable;

Or. en
Amendment 2
Antonio Maria Rinaldi, Gerolf Annemans, Laura Huhtasaari, Gunnar Beck, Jaak Madison
on behalf of the ID Group

Report Danuta Maria Hübner
Assessment of the implementation of Article 50 TEU (2020/2136(INI))

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution

16. Believes, nevertheless, that the withdrawal process was characterised, on the part of the UK, by protracted uncertainty from the outset, until the end of the negotiations, which was reflected among others in the gap of time between the referendum and withdrawal notification under Article 50 TEU; believes that this uncertainty impacted citizens and economic operators, in particular those on the island of Ireland; considers that raising the spectre of a no-deal withdrawal endangered the prospects of an orderly withdrawal;

Amendment

16. Believes, nevertheless, that the withdrawal process was characterised by a climate of uncertainty from the outset, until the end of the negotiations, which was reflected among others in the gap of time between the referendum and withdrawal notification under Article 50 TEU; believes that this uncertainty impacted citizens and economic operators, in particular those on the island of Ireland; considers, however, that in this respect, the decision as to when to transmit the formal notification is at the exclusive discretion of the withdrawing state; stresses, moreover, that assessing whether and how the decision to leave the EU conforms with the constitutional rules of the withdrawing state is the exclusive competence of the latter;
Amendment 3
Antonio Maria Rinaldi, Gerolf Annemans, Laura Huhtasaari, Gunnar Beck, Jaak Madison
on behalf of the ID Group

Report
Danuta Maria Hübner
Assessment of the implementation of Article 50 TEU (2020/2136(INI))

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

24. Notes that the TEU does not specify any substantive requirements regarding the framework for the future relationship between the withdrawing Member State and the Union and its link with the withdrawal arrangements; recalls however that, according to Article 50(2) TEU, the withdrawal agreement is to take account of the framework for the withdrawing state’s future relationship with the Union; considers, in this regard, that there is a need for a stricter parallel approach between the negotiation of the withdrawal agreement and the negotiation on future trade relations with the withdrawing state, in accordance with Article 50(2) TEU; notes the obstacles to the negotiation sequence imposed by the EU and the delays in resolving withdrawal-related issues due to the absence of a common vision for future relations; affirms, furthermore, the importance of establishing transitional measures based on the principle of sincere cooperation, with conditions set in the interest of both parties, as well as European citizens, and which are clearly defined and limited in time and subject to fair and effective enforcement mechanisms;
Amendment 4
Gunnar Beck, Laura Huhtasaari, Gilles Lebreton, Jaak Madison, Gerolf Annemans
on behalf of the ID Group

Report
Danuta Maria Hübner
Assessment of the implementation of Article 50 TEU
(2020/2136(INI))

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

Motion for a resolution

27. Considers that Article 50 TEU strikes a *good* balance between ensuring a *legally sound* withdrawal process and safeguarding the *political* flexibility necessary for adaptation to the specific circumstances; *notes however, the lack of detail in the provisions* of Article 50 TEU on the following aspects:

- the formal requirements for the notification of the intention to leave and the explicit possibility of its revocation,

- the appropriate framework for the extension of the two-year period set out under Article 50(3) TEU, allowing for flexibility in the negotiations while respecting the principle of sincere cooperation,

- the implications of the obligation to take into account the framework for the future relationship,

- the application of the provisions of Article 218 TFEU, in particular on the role of the European Parliament and of the Court of Justice of the European

Amendment

27. Considers that Article 50 TEU strikes a balance between ensuring a withdrawal process and safeguarding the flexibility necessary for adaptation to the specific circumstances; *believes that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties includes the necessary rules to remedy some of the challenges identified in the exercise* of Article 50 TEU;
Union,

– possible transitional arrangements;

Or. en
41. **Reiterates that, until a withdrawal agreement enters into force or, failing that, until either the two-year period or the extended period mentioned in Article 50(3) TEU has elapsed, the withdrawing state remains a Member State, enjoys all of the ensuing rights and is under all the obligations derived from the Treaties without exception, including the principle of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 4(3) TEU and the obligation to hold elections to the European Parliament, appoint its representatives to the institutions and bodies of the Union, ensure full protection of citizens’ rights and respect its financial obligations;**

41. **Believes that a Member State should be considered a third country from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in Article 50(2) TEU, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period, in accordance with Article 50(3) TEU;**
48. Believes that it is the responsibility and role of the Union and its Member States to do more to preserve the European integration process, protect European values and principles, including the principle of sincere cooperation, and prevent the repetition of a withdrawal from the EU; regrets, in this context, the restraint and limited engagement of the European Parliament and its committees in the run-up to the UK referendum, which left UK citizens, who were EU citizens at the time, without full access to information on the functioning of the EU and the implications of the withdrawal; emphasises that safeguards should be established to ensure that the public debate preceding the triggering of Article 50 TEU by a Member State allows for citizens concerned to make an informed decision; calls for the Member States and the EU to consistently provide wide-reaching information to EU citizens on the functioning of the European Union, its areas of action, its decision-making processes, the rights of EU citizens and the consequences of leaving the EU; considers that the Conference on the Future of Europe could provide an opportunity for an enhanced, open and frank dialogue with citizens and civil society on the European Union and a reflection focusing on fully understanding all the critical aspects of the European project that led the UK to withdraw from the EU; encourages the Commission to come forward with a proposal to allow European political parties to finance referendum campaigns related to the implementation of the TEU or the TFEU;
how it should evolve; encourages the Commission to come forward with a proposal to allow European political parties to finance referendum campaigns related to the implementation of the TEU or the TFEU;

Or. en