

2.3.2022

A9-0022/1

Amendment 1

Clare Daly

on behalf of The Left Group

Report

Sandra Kalniete

Foreign interference in all democratic processes in the EU
(2020/2268(INI))

A9-0022/2022

Motion for a resolution

Recital H a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Ha. whereas foreign disinformation often appropriates and distorts legitimate criticisms of the policies of the EU and its Member States, in particular in the field of foreign policy; whereas the preservation of the democratic character of society requires that legitimate and robust criticisms of government policy must not be stigmatised or suppressed by conflating them with foreign disinformation; whereas a failure to distinguish between actual, substantiated cases of foreign disinformation and the legitimate expression of dissenting and minority political opinions would lead the EU in an authoritarian direction;

Or. en

2.3.2022

A9-0022/2

Amendment 2

Clare Daly

on behalf of The Left Group

Report

Sandra Kalniete

Foreign interference in all democratic processes in the EU
(2020/2268(INI))

A9-0022/2022

Motion for a resolution

Recital BO

Motion for a resolution

BO. whereas the incidence of cyberattacks and cyber-enabled incidents led by hostile state and non-state actors has been increasing in recent years; whereas several cyberattacks, such as the global spear-phishing email campaigns targeting strategic vaccine storage structures and the cyberattacks against the European Medicines Agency (EMA), the European Banking Authority, the Norwegian Parliament and countless others, have been traced back to state-backed hacker groups, predominantly affiliated to the Russian and Chinese Governments;

Amendment

BO. whereas the incidence of cyberattacks and cyber-enabled incidents led by hostile state and non-state actors has been increasing in recent years; ***whereas the design and use of sophisticated malware such as Stuxnet, Duqu, Flame and other malicious software linked to US and Israeli intelligence agencies has contributed to the acceleration of a global arms race in offensive hacking capability; whereas the stockpiling of zero-day exploits by intelligence agencies, in order to enhance offensive hacking capability as opposed to engaging in the timely and transparent reporting of vulnerabilities, systematically undermines global cybersecurity; whereas the loss of control of a cache of sophisticated malware by the Equation Group, a threat actor linked to US intelligence agencies, contributed to the proliferation of cyberthreats and led to cyberattacks such as the WannaCry attack on private and public infrastructure, including national health services;*** whereas several cyberattacks, such as the global spear-phishing email campaigns targeting strategic vaccine storage structures and the cyberattacks against the European Medicines Agency (EMA), the European Banking Authority, the Norwegian Parliament and countless others, have been traced back to state-

backed hacker groups, predominantly
affiliated to the Russian and Chinese
Governments;

Or. en

2.3.2022

A9-0022/3

Amendment 3

Clare Daly

on behalf of The Left Group

Report

Sandra Kalniete

Foreign interference in all democratic processes in the EU
(2020/2268(INI))

A9-0022/2022

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 3

Motion for a resolution

3. ***Underlines*** that all measures to prevent, detect, attribute, counter and sanction foreign interference must be designed in a way that respects and promotes fundamental rights, including the ability of EU citizens to communicate in a secure, anonymous and uncensored way, without undue interference from any foreign actors;

Amendment

3. ***Acknowledges the risk to fundamental rights and the democratic character of society inherent in applying a securitarian approach to civic space and the public sphere, and in particular to dissenting and minority political opinions and the expression thereof; underlines*** that all measures to prevent, detect, attribute, counter and sanction foreign interference must be designed in a way that respects and promotes fundamental rights, including the ability of EU citizens to communicate in a secure, anonymous and uncensored way, without undue interference from any foreign actors;

Or. en

2.3.2022

A9-0022/4

Amendment 4

Clare Daly

on behalf of The Left Group

Report

Sandra Kalniete

Foreign interference in all democratic processes in the EU
(2020/2268(INI))

A9-0022/2022

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 13 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

13a. Stresses that any new legislative proposals must be accompanied by a thorough and comprehensive impact assessment, including a systematic civic space check based on international human rights standards and on the freedom of association, expression and assembly, as also reaffirmed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, in order to prevent negative effects on civic space; highlights the need, when risks are identified, to introduce the necessary safeguards and draft guidelines for the implementation of new legislation by Member States, in cooperation with civil society, which must include an assessment of the risks of discrimination and the possible impacts on fundamental rights, including freedom of association, expression and assembly;

Or. en

2.3.2022

A9-0022/5

Amendment 5

Clare Daly

on behalf of The Left Group

Report

Sandra Kalniete

Foreign interference in all democratic processes in the EU
(2020/2268(INI))

A9-0022/2022

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 54

Motion for a resolution

54. Calls for services offering social media manipulation tools and services, such as boosting the reach of accounts or content using artificial engagement or inauthentic profiles, to be regulated; underlines that this regulation needs to be based on a thorough assessment of current practices and the associated risks and should prevent these services from being used by *malicious* actors for political interference;

Amendment

54. Calls for services offering social media manipulation tools and services, such as boosting the reach of accounts or content using artificial engagement or inauthentic profiles, to be regulated; underlines that this regulation needs to be based on a thorough assessment of current practices and the associated risks and should prevent these services from being used by *EU or non-EU* actors for *any kind of* political interference;

Or. en

2.3.2022

A9-0022/6

Amendment 6

Clare Daly

on behalf of The Left Group

Report

Sandra Kalniete

Foreign interference in all democratic processes in the EU
(2020/2268(INI))

A9-0022/2022

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 123

Motion for a resolution

123. Is alarmed by the extraterritorial application of coercive measures stemming from Hong Kong's new National Security Law and China's Law on Countering Foreign Sanctions, combined with *the* extradition agreements that *China enjoys* with other countries, enabling *China* to implement large-scale deterrence actions against critical *non-Chinese nationals*, for example, in *a* recent case, against two Danish parliamentarians, and the Chinese counter-sanctions against five MEPs, Parliament's Subcommittee on Human Rights, three MPs from EU Member States, the Political and Security Committee of the Council of the EU, two European scholars and two European think tanks in Germany and Denmark respectively; calls on all Member States to resist and refuse extradition and, where appropriate, offer appropriate protection for the individuals concerned to prevent potential human rights violations;

Amendment

123. Is alarmed by the extraterritorial application of coercive measures stemming from *the national security laws of non-EU countries, such as the United States' Espionage Act of 1917*, Hong Kong's new National Security Law and China's Law on Countering Foreign Sanctions, combined with the extradition agreements that *those countries enjoy* with other countries, enabling *them* to implement large-scale deterrence actions against critical *non-nationals*, for example, in *the United States' indictment of and attempt to extradite WikiLeaks publisher Julian Assange on espionage charges for journalism carried out in the European Union*, *China's* recent case against two Danish parliamentarians, and the Chinese counter-sanctions against five MEPs, Parliament's Subcommittee on Human Rights, three MPs from EU Member States, the Political and Security Committee of the Council of the EU, two European scholars and two European think tanks in Germany and Denmark respectively; calls on all Member States to resist and refuse extradition and, where appropriate, offer appropriate protection for the individuals concerned to prevent potential human rights violations;

Or. en

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