REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on applying a generalised scheme of tariff preferences and repealing Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council
17.5.2022 - (COM(2021)0579 – C9-0364/2021– 2021/0297(COD)) - ***I
Committee on International Trade
Rapporteur: Heidi Hautala
Rapporteur(s) for the opinion (*):
Maria Arena, Committee on Foreign Affairs
(*) Associated committee(s) – Rule 57 of the Rules of Procedure
- DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION
- EXPLANATORY STATEMENT
- ANNEX: LIST OF ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT
- OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
- OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON DEVELOPMENT
- PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE
- FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE
DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION
on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on applying a generalised scheme of tariff preferences and repealing Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council
(COM(2021)0579 – C9-0364/2021– 2021/0297(COD))
(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)
The European Parliament,
– having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0579),
– having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 207(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0364/2021),
having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
– having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Development,
– having regard to the report of the Committee on International Trade (A9-0147/2022),
1. Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;
2. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.
Amendment 1
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(2) The Union's common commercial policy shall be guided by the principles and pursue the objectives set out in the general provisions on the Union's external action, laid down in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). |
(2) The external action of the Union is guided by the principles and objectives laid down in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union. The Union seeks to advance those principles and objectives in its relations with third countries. All actions and measures taken by the Union at the international level should therefore be considered, designed and implemented with a view to ensuring a coherent approach towards partner countries, and reinforcing the relevance and strength of the impact of Union's external action. For that purpose, the Union should ensure that its commercial policy is conducted in close coordination with other external policies, and that regular contact with partner countries foreseen in the framework of the various instruments of the external action duly follow up on the obligations and issues identified in the implementation of the Union's trade relations and trade-related instruments. The GSP covers more than 60 countries and 2 billion people in the world and represents one of the key instruments of the Union commercial policy to promote human rights, sustainable development and good governance. |
Amendment 2
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(5) The general objectives of the GSP are to support eradication of poverty in all its forms, in line with Agenda 2030 and Sustainable Development Goal 17.12 and to promote the sustainable development agenda, while averting harm to EU industry’s interests. The 2018 GSP Mid-term Evaluation and the 2021 supporting Study for the Impact Assessment underpinning this Regulation concluded that the GSP framework under Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 has delivered on these main objectives, which were at the core of the 2012 overhaul of Council Regulation (EC) No 732/200815. |
(5) The general objectives of the GSP are to support eradication of poverty in all its forms, in line with Agenda 2030 and Sustainable Development Goal 17.12,to promote the sustainable development agenda and to encourage exports diversification from GSP beneficiary countries, while averting harm to EU industry’s interests. The GSP has also created benefit to the EU businesses. The 2018 GSP Mid-term Evaluation and the 2021 supporting Study for the Impact Assessment underpinning this Regulation concluded that the GSP framework under Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 has delivered in part on these main objectives, which were at the core of the 2012 overhaul of Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008, together with a lack of progress on democracy and human rights.
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15 Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 of 22 July 2008 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences from 1 January 2009 and amending Regulations (EC) No 552/97, (EC) No 1933/2006 and Commission Regulations (EC) No 1100/2006 and (EC) No 964/2007 (OJ L 211, 6.8.2008, p. 1). |
15 Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 of 22 July 2008 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences from 1 January 2009 and amending Regulations (EC) No 552/97, (EC) No 1933/2006 and Commission Regulations (EC) No 1100/2006 and (EC) No 964/2007 (OJ L 211, 6.8.2008, p. 1). |
Amendment 3
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(6) Those objectives remain relevant in the current global context and they are consistent with the analysis and perspective of the recent Commission Communication Trade Policy Review “An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy”16 (‘TPR’). According to the TPR, the Union has a “strategic interest to support the enhanced integration into the world economy of vulnerable developing countries” and it “must fully use the strength provided by its openness and the attractiveness of its Single Market” to support multilateralism and to ensure adherence to universal values. For GSP specifically, the TPR notes its important role in “promoting respect for core human and labour rights” and sets the objective for the GSP “to further increase trading opportunities for developing countries to reduce poverty and create jobs based on international values and principles”. Moreover, the scheme should assist beneficiaries in recovering from the COVID-19 impact and in re-building their economies in a sustainable manner, including with respect to international human rights, labour, environmental and good governance standards. Coherence should be ensured between the GSP and its objectives and the assistance provided to beneficiary countries, in line with Union’s Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), which constitutes a key pillar of Union’s efforts to enhance the positive impact and increase effectiveness of development cooperation17. |
(6) Those objectives remain relevant in the current global context and they are consistent with the analysis and perspective of the recent Commission Communication Trade Policy Review “An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy” (‘TPR’). According to the TPR, the Union has a “strategic interest to support the enhanced integration into the world economy of vulnerable developing countries” and it “must fully use the strength provided by its openness and the attractiveness of its Single Market” to support multilateralism and to ensure adherence to universal values. For GSP specifically, the TPR notes its important role in “promoting respect for core human and labour rights” and sets the objective for the GSP “to further increase trading opportunities for developing countries to reduce poverty and create jobs based on international values and principles”. Strengthening the tools to foster the positive conditionality in relation to the international conventions, as well as pro-actively encouraging the beneficiary countries to ratify those conventions, are therefore essential elements to make sure that the additional trading opportunities provided by the GSP support to the development of the beneficiary countries in a sustainable manner. By focusing in particular on the less competitive products, the favourable tariff regime under the scheme should also support EU GSP beneficiary countries to develop a solid industrial base to foster diversification of trade flows. Moreover, the scheme should assist beneficiaries in recovering from the COVID-19 impact, reinforcing their capacity building and in re-building their economies in a sustainable manner, including with respect to international human rights, labour, environmental and good governance standards. Coherence and complementarity should be ensured between the GSP and its objectives and the assistance provided to beneficiary countries, in line with Union’s Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), which constitutes a key pillar of Union’s efforts to enhance the positive impact and increase effectiveness of development cooperation. The Union’s assistance should, given their economic vulnerability, provide targeted support to beneficiary countries in fulfilling their commitments and obligations with regard to the ratification and implementation of the international conventions under the GSP Schemes.
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16 COM(2021)0066, 18 February 2021 |
16 COM(2021)0066, 18 February 2021 |
17 Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU concerning PCD reads: “The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries”. |
17 Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU concerning PCD reads: “The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries”. |
Amendment 4
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(7) By providing preferential access to the Union market, the scheme should assist developing countries in their efforts to reduce poverty and achieve and promote good governance and sustainable development by helping them to generate additional revenue through international trade, which can then be re-invested for the benefit of their own development and, in addition, to diversify their economies. The scheme's tariff preferences should focus on those developing countries that have greater development, trade and financial needs. |
(7) By providing preferential access to the Union market, the scheme should assist developing countries in their efforts to reduce poverty and achieve and promote good governance and sustainable development by helping them to generate additional revenue through international trade, which can then be re-invested for the benefit of their own sustainable development and, in addition, to diversify their economies, productions and exports. The scheme's tariff preferences should focus on those developing countries that have greater development, trade and financial needs and support in particular opportunities for less competitive products. In doing so, the scheme would support developing countries’ transition towards upper-middle income status. |
Amendment 5
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(7a) The GSP should play an important role in promoting trade, compatible with WTO rules, in sustainably-produced goods, and targeted development and technical assistance should be designed and provided in order to ensure that beneficiary countries can also fully take part in sustainable trade. |
Amendment 6
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7 b (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(7b) Gender equality in all Union policies is firmly established in Article 8 of the TFEU and is also at the core of the UN's Agenda 2030, as enshrined in SDG 5, however trade and investment agreements tend to affect women and men differently on account of structural gender inequalities. The GSP scheme has the potential of positively contributing to female employment and empowerment. The most prominent product sections under the three EU's GSP arrangements are textile and apparel articles, accounting for up to 80% of the preferential imports under the EBA arrangement, whereas more than 80% of the world’s 60 million garment factory workers are female. |
Amendment 7
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(8) The scheme should consist of a basic arrangement (‘standard GSP arrangement’), and two special arrangements, namely the ‘special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance – GSP+’ and the ‘special arrangement for the least-developed countries - EBA’. It, therefore, continues the structure of the previous ten years, which is considered a success, as it focuses on the countries most in need and addresses the varying developmental needs of beneficiaries. |
(8) The scheme should consist of a basic arrangement (‘standard GSP arrangement’), and two special arrangements, namely the ‘special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance – GSP+’ and the ‘special arrangement for the least-developed countries - EBA’. It, therefore, continues the structure of the previous ten years, as it focuses on the countries most in need and addresses the varying developmental needs of beneficiaries, which should also include their regional integration processes. The scheme should apply to the entirety of the territory of beneficiary countries, including to special economic zones and export processing zones. |
Amendment 8
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(9) The standard GSP arrangement should be granted to all those developing countries which share a common development need and are in a similar stage of economic development. There is no definition of ‘developing country’ at the level of the WTO, and it is left to preference granting countries to determine the list of GSP-eligible developing countries. Countries which have successfully completed their transition from centralised to market economies, and are today powerful economies with a strong position in international trade, such as China, Hong Kong, Macao and Russia, should not be considered as developing countries in the context of the GSP, and should, therefore, be removed from the list of eligible countries. Countries which are classified by the World Bank as high-income or upper-middle income countries have per capita income levels allowing them to attain higher levels of diversification without the scheme's tariff preferences. They are at a different stage of economic development and do not, therefore, share the same development, trade and financial needs as lower income or more vulnerable developing countries. In order to prevent unjustified discrimination, they need to be treated differently; therefore, they do not benefit from the standard GSP arrangement. Furthermore, the use of tariff preferences provided under the scheme by high-income or upper-middle income countries would increase the competitive pressure on exports from poorer, more vulnerable countries and, therefore, could impose unjustifiable burdens on those more vulnerable developing countries. The standard GSP arrangement should take account of the fact that the development, trade and financial needs are subject to change and ensure that the arrangement remains open if the situation of a country changes. |
(9) The standard GSP arrangement should be granted to all those developing countries which share a common development need and are in a similar stage of economic development and which have committed to signing and ratifying the international conventions listed in Annex VI. If those countries fail to ratify the international conventions within five years from the application of the trade preferences, the scheme should be suspended. There is no definition of ‘developing country’ at the level of the WTO, and it is left to preference granting countries to determine the list of GSP-eligible developing countries. Countries which have successfully completed their transition from centralised to market economies, and are today powerful economies with a strong position in international trade, such as China, Hong Kong, Macao and Russia, should not be considered as developing countries in the context of the GSP, and should, therefore, be removed from the list of eligible countries. Countries which are classified by the World Bank as high-income or upper-middle income countries have per capita income levels allowing them to attain higher levels of diversification without the scheme's tariff preferences. They are at a different stage of economic development and do not, therefore, share the same development, trade and financial needs as lower income or more vulnerable developing countries. In order to prevent unjustified discrimination, they need to be treated differently; therefore, they do not benefit from the standard GSP arrangement. Furthermore, the use of tariff preferences provided under the scheme by high-income or upper-middle income countries would increase the competitive pressure on exports from poorer, more vulnerable countries and, therefore, could impose unjustifiable burdens on those more vulnerable developing countries. The standard GSP arrangement should take account of the fact that the development, trade and financial needs are subject to change and ensure that the arrangement remains open if the situation of a country changes. |
Amendment 9
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(11) The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) is based on the integral concept of sustainable development, as recognised by international conventions and instruments such as the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the 1998 International Labour Organisation (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration, the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, the ILO Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work of 2019, the Outcome Document of the UN Summit on Sustainable Development of 2015 "Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Consequently, the additional tariff preferences provided for under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be granted to those developing countries which, due to a lack of diversification, are economically vulnerable, have ratified core international conventions on human and labour rights, climate and environmental protection and good governance, and commit to ensuring the effective implementation thereof. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should help those countries to assume the additional responsibilities resulting from the ratification and effective implementation of these conventions. The list of conventions relevant for GSP should be updated to better reflect the evolution of core international instruments and standards and take a proactive approach to sustainable development in keeping with the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 203018. In this regard, the following conventions are added: the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (2015) – replacing the Kyoto Protocol; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OP-CRC-AC); ILO Convention No 81 on Labour Inspection; ILO Convention No 144 on Tripartite Consultation; and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. |
(11) The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) is based on the integral concept of sustainable development, as recognised by international conventions and instruments such as the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the 1998 International Labour Organisation (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration, the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, the ILO Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work of 2019, the Outcome Document of the UN Summit on Sustainable Development of 2015 "Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Consequently, the additional tariff preferences provided for under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be granted to those developing countries which, due to a lack of diversification, are economically vulnerable, have ratified and started implementing core international conventions on human and labour rights, climate and environmental protection and good governance, commit to ensuring the effective implementation and to collaborate on the monitoring thereof. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should help those countries to assume the additional responsibilities resulting from the ratification and effective implementation of these conventions. The list of conventions relevant for GSP should be updated to better reflect the evolution of core international instruments and standards and take a proactive approach to sustainable development in keeping with the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 203018. In this regard, the following conventions are added: the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (2015) – replacing the Kyoto Protocol; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OP-CRC-AC); ILO Convention No 81 on Labour Inspection; ILO Convention No 144 on Tripartite Consultation; the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime; the First and Second Optional Protocols to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. |
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18 United Nations (2015). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, Transforming our World: the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1), available at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld |
18 United Nations (2015). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, Transforming our World: the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1), available at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld |
Amendment 10
Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(11a) The Union has set ambitious goals to promote sustainable development in its human, social, economic and environmental dimensions, notably through the European Green Deal, the Circular Economy Action Plan, the Farm to Fork Strategy, or in the areas of sustainable corporate due diligence and de-forestation, which will trigger fundamental changes in trade patterns with relevant impacts on the GSP scheme during the next decade. The implementation of the generalized scheme of tariff preferences should integrate the current discussions on EU initiatives, which will entail for Union products and products imported into the Union from third countries significantly increased environmental, social and health production standards. |
Amendment 11
Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 b (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(11b) The EU should engage with beneficiary countries, on a common understanding and in a continuous and cooperative manner, to help them reach and implement international, social, human, and environmental standards, while taking into account the countries’ level of development. |
Amendment 12
Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 c (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(11c) By putting more emphasis on the effective implementation of the core international conventions referred to in Annex VI, and as a measure of positive transformation, the scheme should contribute to this objective and facilitate the socio-economic and environmental conditions needed to progressively achieve reciprocity in production standards by the beneficiary countries in the long term. |
Amendment 13
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(12) Countries graduating from the Least-Developed Countries (LDC) category established by the UN should be incentivised to continue on the path of sustainable development. For this purpose, the economic vulnerability criteria to qualify for the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be eased compared to Regulation (EU) No 978/2012, to facilitate access by a larger number of countries graduating from the least developed country category. |
(12) Countries graduating from the Least-Developed Countries (LDC) category established by the UN should be incentivised to continue on the path of sustainable development. For this purpose, the economic vulnerability criteria to qualify for the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be eased compared to Regulation (EU) No 978/2012, to facilitate access by a larger number of countries graduating from the least developed country category. The continued and sustained progress towards ratifying the international conventions covered by this Regulation should be closely monitored by the Commission, and EU development finance programming should be designed to duly take this objective into consideration. |
Amendment 14
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(13) Preferences should be designed to promote further economic growth and, thereby, to respond positively to the need for sustainable development. Under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the ad valorem tariffs should, therefore, be suspended for the beneficiary countries concerned. The specific duties should also be suspended, unless combined with an ad valorem duty. |
(13) Preferences should be designed to promote further sustainable growth and, thereby, to respond positively to the need for sustainable development. Targeted EU aid for trade and development finance, including blended finance and guarantees, should be provided accordingly, to help promote sustainable trade and investment towards production capacity, diversification and value addition, in particular by lower-income countries. Under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the ad valorem tariffs should, therefore, be suspended for the beneficiary countries concerned. The specific duties should also be suspended, unless combined with an ad valorem duty. |
Amendment 15
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(15) Countries that have been granted the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 should submit a new application within two years after the date of application of this Regulation. In order, however, to ensure continuity and legal certainty for economic operators, the tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance provided for in Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 are to be maintained during the period in which their application is assessed. Requests for technical and financial assistance from applicant countries related to the ratification and implementation of the conventions can be looked upon favourably. |
(15) Countries that have been granted the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 should submit a new application within two years after the date of application of this Regulation. In order, however, to ensure continuity and legal certainty for economic operators, the tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance provided for in Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 are to be maintained during the period in which their application is assessed. The Union should agree, as much as possible, to provide technical and financial assistance for applicant countries related to the ratification and implementation of the conventions. The continued and sustained progress towards ratifying and implementing the core international conventions should be closely monitored, and EU technical and financial assistance should be designed to duly take this objective into consideration. |
Amendment 16
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(15a) The application for the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development should comprise, among others, a public forward-looking plan of action detailing priority-oriented list of measures to be taken which are considered necessary to effectively implement the relevant international conventions. These measures should constitute the benchmarks for the progressive suspension of tariffs and be listed in a tariff suspension schedule, included to the plan of action. This plan of action, on which the beneficiary country should have reached a common understanding with the Commission and where appropriate the European External Action Service, should also include timeframes and identify the relevant bodies of the beneficiary country responsible for its implementation. The validity of the plans of action is subjected to the duration of this Regulation. |
Amendment 17
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(16) The Commission and where appropriate the European External Action Service should monitor the status of ratification of the international conventions on human and labour rights, environmental protection and good governance and their effective implementation, by examining the relevant information, in particular where available the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies established under those conventions. Every three years, the Commission should present to the European Parliament and the Council a report on the status of ratification of the respective conventions, the compliance of the beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions, and the status of the implementation of the conventions in practice. |
(16) The Commission and where appropriate the European External Action Service should monitor the status of ratification of the international conventions on human and labour rights, environmental protection and good governance and their effective implementation, by assessing in a transparent manner the progress made in the implementation of the plan of action, examining the relevant information, in particular where available the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies established under those conventions. This monitoring should also be based on high-level missions on the ground. In the framework of such missions, relevant stakeholders, including civil-society organisations and human rights defenders in the beneficiary countries should be consulted. Every three years, the Commission should present to the European Parliament and the Council a report on the status of ratification of the respective conventions, the compliance of the beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions, and the status of the implementation of the conventions in practice, notably on the basis of the implementation of the plan of action. In their conclusions on the monitoring, the Commission and, where appropriate, the European External Action Service should provide clear recommendations on issues and actions to be prioritised for the following period. |
Amendment 18
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(16a) EU Delegations in beneficiary countries should play a crucial role in the overall implementation of this Regulation. EU Delegations should set up focal points ensuring coordination among the several tools in support of the beneficiary country to implement the requirements of this Regulation. |
Amendment 19
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16 b (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(16b) The civil society and other relevant stakeholders should be consulted throughout the monitoring cycle based on public procedures and deadlines, and the information they submit should be duly taken into account. |
Amendment 20
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16 c (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(16c) The Commission should promote a strong sustainable development dimension in global value chains, in line with the due diligence obligations set out in the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. |
Amendment 21
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(17) For the purposes of monitoring of implementation and, where applicable, withdrawal of tariff preferences, reports from relevant monitoring bodies are essential. However, such reports may be supplemented by other information available to the Commission, including information obtained under bilateral or multilateral technical assistance programmes, and through other sources of information, provided they are accurate and reliable. This could include information from the European Parliament and the Council, governments, international organisations, civil society, social partners, or complaints received through the SEP provided they satisfy the relevant requirements. Shortcomings identified during the monitoring process may inform the Commission’s future programming of development assistance in a more targeted manner. |
(17) For the purposes of monitoring of implementation and, where applicable, subsequent granting or withdrawal of tariff preferences, reports from relevant monitoring bodies are essential. However, such reports may be, to the widest possible extent, supplemented by other information available, including information obtained under bilateral or multilateral technical assistance programmes, and through other sources of information, provided they are accurate and reliable. This could include information from the Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, governments, international organisations, civil society, social partners, representatives of the economic interests, or complaints received through the SEP provided they satisfy the relevant requirements. Shortcomings identified during the monitoring process should inform the Commission’s future programming of development assistance and the provision of technical assistance in a more targeted manner. |
Amendment 22
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(18) In July 2020, the Commission appointed the Chief Trade Enforcement Officer with the role of enforcing trade rules. In this connection, in November 2020, the Commission launched a new complaints mechanism, the Single Entry Point (‘SEP’), as part of its increased efforts to strengthen the enforcement and implementation of trade commitments. Through the SEP, the Commission receives complaints on various matters related to trade policy, including breaches of the GSP commitments. Such new system of complaints should be integrated within the framework of this Regulation. |
(18) In July 2020, the Commission appointed the Chief Trade Enforcement Officer with the role of enforcing trade rules. In this connection, in November 2020, the Commission launched a new complaints mechanism, the Single Entry Point (‘SEP’), as part of its increased efforts to strengthen the enforcement and implementation of trade commitments. Through the SEP, the Commission receives complaints on various matters related to trade policy, including breaches of the GSP commitments. The SEP is accessible to citizens, entities, trade unions, stakeholders, human rights defenders, and civil society established in the Union or in the beneficiary countries and the Commission should ensure the confidentiality of complaints including the identity of complainants and all relevant elements pertaining to the complaint. Such new system of complaints should be integrated and formalised within the framework of this Regulation. |
Amendment 23
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(21) Common Customs Tariff duties on non-sensitive products should continue to be suspended, while duties on sensitive products should enjoy a tariff reduction, in order to ensure a satisfactory utilisation rate while at the same time taking account of the situation of the corresponding Union industries. |
(21) Common Customs Tariff duties on non-sensitive products should continue to be suspended, while duties on sensitive products should enjoy a tariff reduction, in order to ensure a satisfactory utilisation rate and maximise the development effect while at the same time taking account of the situation of the corresponding Union industries. |
Amendment 24
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 22
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(22) Such a tariff reduction should be sufficiently attractive, in order to motivate traders to make use of the opportunities offered by the scheme. Therefore, the ad valorem duties should generally be reduced by a flat rate of 3,5 percentage points from the 'most favoured nation' duty rate, while such duties for textiles and textile goods should be reduced by 20 %. Specific duties should be reduced by 30 %. Where a minimum duty is specified, that minimum duty should not apply. |
(22) Tariff reductions should be sufficiently attractive, in order to motivate traders to make use of the opportunities offered by the scheme. Therefore, the ad valorem duties should generally be reduced by a flat rate of 3,5 percentage points from the 'most favoured nation' duty rate, while such duties for textiles and textile goods should be reduced by 20 %. Specific duties should be reduced by 30. Where a minimum duty is specified, that minimum duty should not apply. |
Amendment 25
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(23a) Safeguards are essential mechanisms to reduce beneficiary countries’ dependency on a few products, to focus preferences on less competitive products and to stimulate economic growth. The scheme should reinforce the Union’s financial and economic interests by providing effective and enforceable safeguards to sensitive products which should at the same time improve the diversification of their economies and the implementation of social and environmental rights in beneficiary countries. |
Amendment 26
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 24
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(24) Product graduation should be based on criteria related to sections and chapters of the Common Customs Tariff. Product graduation should apply in respect of a section or sub-section in order to reduce cases where heterogeneous products are graduated. The graduation of a section or a sub‑section (made up of chapters) for a beneficiary country should be applied when the section meets the criteria for graduation over three consecutive years, in order to increase predictability and fairness of graduation by eliminating the effect of large and exceptional variations in the import statistics. Product graduation should not apply to the beneficiary countries of the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) and the beneficiary countries of the special arrangement for the least-developed countries (EBA) as they share a very similar economic profile rendering them vulnerable because of a low, non-diversified export base. The tariff preferences provided for in this Regulation apply to products originating in the beneficiary countries in accordance with the rules of origin laid down in the Union Customs Code and the legal acts adopted in accordance with the powers conferred by that Code, in particular Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/244619. and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/244720. Regional cumulation between countries of different regional groups and extended cumulation should be granted provided that the applicant beneficiary country brings sufficient evidence that cumulation responds to its development, financing and trade needs, thus leading, amongst others, to economic growth, elimination of poverty, diversification of exports and industrialisation, and provided that it does not impact negatively on the situation of other countries, especially EBA beneficiary countries. When assessing whether granting cumulation responds to the requesting country’s development, financing and trade needs, the Commission should take into account the beneficiary country’s dependency on the supplying country and future perspectives with regard to the products in question. |
(24) Product graduation should be based on criteria related to sections and chapters of the Common Customs Tariff. Product graduation should apply in respect of a section or sub-section in order to reduce cases where heterogeneous products are graduated. The graduation of a section or a sub-section (made up of chapters) for a beneficiary country should be applied when the section meets the criteria for graduation over three consecutive years, in order to increase predictability and fairness of graduation by eliminating the effect of large and exceptional variations in the import statistics. Product graduation should not apply to the beneficiary countries of the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) and the beneficiary countries of the special arrangement for the least-developed countries (EBA) as they share a very similar economic profile rendering them vulnerable because of a low, non-diversified export base. The Commission should monitor, in cooperation with stakeholders and civil society, the development and export potential of beneficiary countries that could potentially reach the Upper Middle-Income Status. This monitoring should aim to improve the targeting of sensitive products under the product graduation mechanism, provide clear recommendations on actions to improve export diversification and ensure that tariff preferences under GSP are withdrawn from competitive products in order to provide further opportunities in the EU market for the exports of countries most in need. The tariff preferences provided for in this Regulation apply to products originating in the beneficiary countries in accordance with the rules of origin laid down in the Union Customs Code and the legal acts adopted in accordance with the powers conferred by that Code, in particular Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2446 and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/244720. Regional cumulation between countries of different regional groups and extended cumulation is an important instrument to support regional integration and should be encouraged also under this Regulation as an important dimension of sustainable development. Regional cumulation should be granted provided that the applicant beneficiary country brings sufficient evidence that cumulation responds to its development, financing and trade needs, and that it supports regional integration, thus leading, amongst others, to sustainable economic growth and elimination of poverty, diversification of exports and development of manufacturing capacity, tangible benefits to the local populations, and provided that it does not impact negatively on the situation of other countries, especially EBA beneficiary countries. When assessing whether granting cumulation responds to the requesting country’s development, financing and trade needs, the Commission should take into account the beneficiary country’s dependency on the supplying country future perspectives with regard to the products in question and impacts on regional integration. Any formal requirements and administrative burdens associated with applying for extended access to regional cumulation should be set proportionately low, to avoid discouraging GSP beneficiaries from investing in regional supply chains. |
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19 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2446 of 28 July 2015 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards detailed rules concerning certain provisions of the Union Customs Code (OJ L 343, 29.12.2015, p. 1). |
19 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2446 of 28 July 2015 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards detailed rules concerning certain provisions of the Union Customs Code (OJ L 343, 29.12.2015, p. 1). |
20 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 of 24 November 2015 laying down detailed rules for implementing certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the Union Customs Code (OJ L 343, 29.12.2015, p. 558). |
20 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 of 24 November 2015 laying down detailed rules for implementing certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the Union Customs Code (OJ L 343, 29.12.2015, p. 558–893). |
Justification
Better terms for regional cumulation should be encouraged (as outlined under recital24 and in article 33 (3)), as it will further enable GSP countries to develop their supply chains and become better integrated with the global economy. Thus, it is important that provisions on cumulation does not afford disproportionate requirements for GSP countries to cumulate their products with regional partners, as this would merely discourage investing into developing more advanced regional supply chains. The current wording asks GSP beneficiaries for"sufficient evidence that cumulation responds to its development, financing and trade needs". While it is not quite clear what this entails, the Commission should be encouraged to lower administrative burdens, and formal requirements, to an absolute minimum, to foster the best grounds for GSP partners to cumulate freely.
Amendment 27
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 25
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(25) The reasons for temporary withdrawal of the arrangements under the scheme should include serious and systematic violations of the principles laid down in international conventions concerning core human rights (including certain principles of international humanitarian law enshrined in those conventions), labour rights, climate and environmental protection, and good governance,so as to promote the objectives of those conventions. Tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be temporarily withdrawn if the beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertaking to maintain the ratification and effective implementation of those conventions or to comply with the reporting requirements imposed by the respective conventions, or if the beneficiary country does not cooperate with the Union's monitoring procedures as set out in this Regulation. The temporary withdrawal should continue until the reasons justifying it no longer apply. In situations characterised by an exceptional gravity of the violations, the Commission should have the power to respond rapidly by adopting measures within a shorter timeline. Under the Union’s zero tolerance approach for child labour the reasons for temporary withdrawal should include exports of goods made by internationally prohibited child labour, as well as forced labour including slavery and prison labour, as identified in the relevant Conventions in Annex VI. |
(25) The reasons for temporary withdrawal of the arrangements under the scheme should include serious and systematic violations of the principles laid down in international conventions concerning core human rights (including certain principles of international humanitarian law enshrined in those conventions), labour rights, climate and environmental protection, and good governance, so as to promote the objectives of those conventions. In determining whether such serious and systematic violations exist, the Commission should take into account all available assessments, comments, decisions, recommendations and conclusions of the relevant monitoring bodies and substantiated concerns expressed by the European Parliament, the Council, international organisations, and civil society including trade unions, or acting upon a complaint. Tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be temporarily withdrawn if the beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertaking to maintain the ratification and effective implementation of those conventions or to comply with the reporting requirements imposed by the respective conventions, or to maintain the effective implementation of the plan of action provided in its request to benefit from the arrangement or if the beneficiary country does not cooperate with the Union's monitoring procedures as set out in this Regulation. The temporary withdrawal should be used as a last resort provided other avenues for dialogue and engagement have been explored. The temporary withdrawal should continue until the reasons justifying it no longer apply. In situations characterised by an exceptional gravity of the violations, the Commission should have the power to respond rapidly by adopting measures within a shorter timeline. Under the Union’s zero tolerance approach for child labour the reasons for temporary withdrawal should include exports of goods made by internationally prohibited child labour, as well as forced labour including slavery and prison labour, as identified in the relevant Conventions in Annex VI. However, the eradication of child labour is a long-term process, especially in countries where no alternatives such as decent working conditions, free schooling and a social safety net are available. In applying article 19.1(b), the Commission should consider whether the beneficiary country has adopted in cooperation with the International Labour Organisation framework policies and roadmaps aiming at decreasing child labour and whether the monitoring thereof shows concrete progress and actions towards full compliance with ILO conventions. The Commission may support the beneficiary countries towards this goal by means of technical assistance, capacity building and other financial aid. |
Amendment 28
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 25 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(25a) In determining whether there are systematic and serious violations the Commission should take into account the following non exhaustive list of situations: genocide; crimes against humanity; torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; slavery or forced labour; extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings; enforced disappearance of persons; arbitrary arrests or detentions; trafficking in human beings, including people-smuggling; sexual and gender-based violence; other violations of the laws and customs of war; violations or abuses of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association; violations or abuses of freedom of opinion and expression; violations or abuses of freedom of religion or belief; furthermore, the Commission should take into account failure to comply with obligations with regard to nationally determined contributions in the framework of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change |
Amendment 29
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 25 b (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(25b) Temporary withdrawal of the arrangements should be considered as a last-resort measure. Related decisions can be accompanied by an analysis of the socio-economic impact of the withdrawal with a view to minimising negative effects on the beneficiary country’s populations while maximising the leverage on its government. Whenever the record of compliance with the relevant obligations set out in this Regulation seriously deteriorates, the Commission and the EEAS should step up dialogue with the beneficiary countries and launch a process of enhanced engagement where countries commit to actions through the implementation of targeted roadmaps leading to discernible progress generally in the short term or, whenever issues are more complex and sensitive, over the medium term. After the launch and during the overall duration of the withdrawal procedure, beneficiary countries should be given the possibility to start engaging anytime. If the Commission considers that there is sufficient evidence that a beneficiary country is seriously and systematically violating the principles laid down in the conventions listed in Annex VI, it should immediately initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal. Where violations are of exceptional gravity, the Commission should activate the rapid response mechanism. Whenever the enhanced engagement is extended into a second year, the Commission should add the country onto a public list, with a view to providing predictability and maximising leverage |
Amendment 30
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 26
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(26) Orderly international migration can bring important benefits to the countries of origin and destination of migrants and contribute to their sustainable development needs. Increasing coherence between trade, development and migration policies is key to ensure that the benefits of migration accrue mutually to both the origin and destination countries. In this respect, it is essential for both origin and destination countries to address common challenges, such as, stepping up cooperation on readmission of own nationals and their sustainable reintegration in the country of origin, in particular in order to avoid a constant drain in active population in the countries of origin, with the ensuing long-term consequences on development, and to ensure that migrants are treated with dignity. |
deleted |
Amendment 31
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 26 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(26a) A more coordinated, holistic and structured approach to migration could bring important benefits to the countries of origin, transit and destination of migrants. A coordinated approach to migration is key to ensure that the benefits of migration accrue. Comprehensive partnerships should be built to address the root causes of forced migration and achieve the targets and objectives of the UN Sustainable Development Goals. This approach and relevant actions should be implemented in full respect of international law, including international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law, Union and national competences, and should be in line with principles enshrined in the Global Compacts on Refugees and on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. The Union should favour a constructive and mutually beneficial engagement on all aspects of migration, including mobility partnerships readmission and reintegration. Improving sustainable reintegration of returning migrants and their families, and monitoring thereof, including through capacity building would significantly strengthen mutually beneficial engagement with partner countries. |
Amendment 32
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(27) Return, readmission and reintegration are a common challenge for the Union and its partners. In particular, every State has the obligation to readmit its own nationals under international customary law, and multilateral international conventions such as the Convention on International Civil Aviation signed in Chicago on 7 December 1944. Improving sustainable reintegration and capacity building would significantly strengthen the local development in the partner countries. |
deleted |
Amendment 33
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 36
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(36) The Commission should report regularly to the European Parliament and to the Council on the effects of the scheme under this Regulation through the relevant institutional committees. By 1 January 2030, the Commission should report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the mid-term application of this Regulation and assess the need to review the scheme. The report is necessary to analyse the impact of the scheme on the development, trade and financial needs of beneficiaries as well as on bilateral trade and on the Union's tariff income, with particular attention to the sustainable development goals. |
(36) The Commission should report regularly to the European Parliament and to the Council on the effects of the scheme under this Regulation through the relevant institutional committees. By 1 January 2029, the Commission should report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the mid-term application of this Regulation and assess the need to review the scheme. The report is necessary to analyse the impact of the scheme on the development, poverty eradication, economic diversification, trade and financial needs of beneficiaries, with special regard to be given to the product scope of the Regulation, including in relation to the issue of sustainable products, and to any relevant development concerning conditionalities, as well as on bilateral trade, the impact on EU producers, and on the Union's tariff income, with particular attention to the sustainable development goals. |
Amendment 34
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – point 9 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(9a) ‘sensitive products’ means goods that due to the level of utilisation rate by standard GSP beneficiary countries could negatively impact the ability and capacity of Union producers to manufacture or process the same goods in the long-run; |
Amendment 35
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – point 10 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(10a) ‘plan of action’ means a forward looking and priority-oriented list of measures, including legislative measures, to be adopted and actions to be taken by a beneficiary country necessary to effectively implement the core international conventions referred to in Annex VI, and based on, inter alia, available information and in particular the most recent conclusions of the monitoring bodies of the conventions; the plan of action shall also provide for a timeframe for each listed measure and action and identify as precisely as possible the relevant institution or structure responsible in the beneficiary country for its implementation and oversight. Each listed measure and action, or set thereof, constitute the benchmarks for the progressive suspension of tariffs, as agreed in the tariff suspension schedule included to the plan of action. |
Amendment 36
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – point 10 b (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(10b) ‘enhanced engagement’ means a dialogue aiming to facilitate and incentivise countries benefitting from the arrangements referred to Article 1 paragraph 2 to make progress on critical areas with regard to the relevant international conventions and whereby the countries and the Commission reach a common understanding on concrete priority actions and sustainable solutions to address serious shortcomings in respect of the conventions; |
Amendment 37
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – point 10 c (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(10c) ‘list of issues’ means a non-exhaustive list of the salient issues that exist in a beneficiary country and that affect successful implementation of the international conventions relevant to the GSP+ arrangement and of the plan of action, as identified by the monitoring bodies, including as provided by relevant stakeholders and civil society organisations, and based on the conclusions outlined in the report referred to in Article 14 and relative to the preceding monitoring cycle; |
Amendment 38
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – point 11
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(11) ‘effective implementation’ means the integral implementation of the undertakings and obligations undertaken under the international conventions listed in Annex VI, thus ensuring fulfilment of the principles, objectives and rights guaranteed in these conventions in the beneficiary country’s entire territory;
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(11) ‘effective implementation’ means the integral implementation of the undertakings and obligations undertaken under the international conventions listed in Annex VI, thus ensuring fulfilment of the principles, objectives and rights guaranteed in these conventions in the beneficiary country’s entire territory, including in its special economic zones and export processing zones; |
Amendment 39
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – point 11 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(11a) ‘‘serious and systematic violation’ means widespread and systematic violations or abuses related to the international conventions of Annex VI, as defined and determined within the framework of those conventions |
Amendment 40
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – point 11 b (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(11b) ‘human rights due diligence obligations’ means the responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights and to protect against human rights abuse by business. The responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights refers to internationally recognized human rights – understood, at a minimum, as those expressed in the International Bill of Human Rights and the principles concerning fundamental rights set out in the International Labour Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at War; |
Amendment 41
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – point 12
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(12) ‘complaint’ means a complaint submitted to the Commission through the Single Entry Point. |
(12) ‘complaint’ means a complaint submitted to the Commission through the Single Entry Point by citizens, entities, trade unions, stakeholders or civil society from the Union or the beneficiary countries covered by the schemes referred to in Article 1 paragraph 2 and relating to conditions and reasons referred to in Articles 9 and 19, the confidentiality of which shall be ensured including with regard to the identity of the complainant. |
Amendment 42
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – point 12 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(12a) “directly competing products” means a product which, after or prior to an industrial transformation, can be compared to another product. |
Amendment 43
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(ba) there is sufficient ground to consider that serious and systematic infringements and violations of the conditions set out in Article 19.1 points (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) exist. |
Amendment 44
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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1a. Countries that benefit from the standard arrangement referred to in paragraph 1 shall ratify the conventions listed in Annex VI, within five years upon the application of the preferences. |
Amendment 45
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 b (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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1b. EU development finance programming under the Neighborhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument - Global Europe established by Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council in support of countries benefitting from the special arrangement referred to in paragraph 1 shall prioritize ratification of the conventions listed in Annex VI. |
Amendment 46
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
2. By 1 January of each year following the entry into force of this Regulation the Commission shall review Annex I. To provide a standard GSP beneficiary country and economic operators with time for orderly adaptation to the change of the country's status under the scheme: |
2. With regard to the economic criteria referred to in Article 4 paragraph 1 (a) and (b), by 1 January of each year following the entry into force of this Regulation the Commission shall monitor and review Annex I with regard to beneficiary countries that have reached Upper Middle-Income status. To provide a standard GSP beneficiary country and economic operators with time for orderly adaptation to the change of the country's status under the scheme: |
Amendment 47
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 2
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
2. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex III in order to incorporate changes made necessary by amendments to the Combined Nomenclature. |
2. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex III in order to: |
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(a) incorporate changes made necessary by amendments to the Combined Nomenclature; |
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(b) modify the classification of products as sensitive or non-sensitive. |
Amendment 48
Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph -1 (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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- 1. The Commission shall monitor, in cooperation with stakeholders and civil society, the development and export potential of beneficiary countries that could potentially graduate to the Upper Middle-Income Status. |
Amendment 49
Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 3
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
3. The Commission shall, every three years, review the list referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article and adopt an implementing act, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), in order to suspend or to re-establish the tariff preferences referred to in Article 7. That implementing act shall apply as of 1 January of the year following its entry in force. |
3. The Commission shall, every three years, review the list referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article and adopt an implementing act, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), in order to suspend or to re-establish the tariff preferences referred to in Article 7. That implementing act shall apply after 6 months following its entry in force. |
Amendment 50
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – point b
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(b) it has ratified all the conventions listed in Annex VI (the 'relevant conventions') and the Commission has not identified, based on available information, in particular the most recent available conclusions of the monitoring bodies under those conventions, a serious failure to effectively implement any of those conventions; |
(b) it has ratified all the conventions listed in Annex VI (the 'relevant conventions') and the Commission has not identified, based on available information, in particular the most recent available conclusions of the monitoring bodies under those conventions as well as information submitted by civil society organisations and social partners, a serious failure to effectively implement any of those conventions; |
Amendment 51
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – point d
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
d) it gives a binding undertaking to maintain ratification of the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof, accompanied by a plan of action for the effective implementation of the relevant conventions; |
(d) it gives a binding commitment to maintain ratification of the relevant conventions and to pursue and ensure the effective implementation thereof, accompanied by a time-bound plan of action of steps and measures that are necessary to effectively implement the conventions referred to in Annex VI; the beneficiary country and the Commission shall reach a common understanding on this plan of action, which shall thereafter be made public. |
Amendment 52
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point b
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(b) the Commission considers, based on examination of the request, that the requesting country fulfils the conditions laid down in Article 9. |
(b) the Commission considers, based on examination of the request, including but not limited to the plan of action and whether the country has started implementing it, that the requesting country fulfils the conditions laid down in Article 9. |
Amendment 53
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 2
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
2. The requesting country shall submit its request to the Commission in writing. The request shall provide comprehensive information concerning the ratification of the relevant conventions and shall include the binding undertakings referred to in Article 9, pointes (d), (e), and (f). |
2. The requesting country shall submit its request to the Commission in writing. The request shall provide comprehensive information concerning the ratification and state of implementation of the relevant conventions and shall include the binding undertakings referred to in Article 9, pointes (d), (e), and (f), including a finalised plan of action. |
Amendment 54
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 4
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
4. After examining the request, the Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I in order to grant a requesting country the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance by including that country in the list of GSP+ beneficiary countries. |
4. While examining the request, the formal views expressed by the European Parliament and the Council, and by civil society and other stakeholders as referred to Article 35a, shall be duly taken into account. After examining the request, the Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I in order to grant a requesting country the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance by including that country in the list of GSP+ beneficiary countries. |
Amendment 55
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 5
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
5. Where a GSP+ beneficiary country no longer fulfils the conditions referred to in Article 9, points (a) or (c) or withdraws any of its binding undertakings referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e), and (f), the Commission is empowered to adopt a delegated act in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I in order toremove that countryfrom the GSP+ arrangement. |
5. Where a GSP+ beneficiary country no longer fulfils the conditions referred to in Article 9, points (a) or (c) or withdraws any of its binding undertakings referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e), and (f), including outstanding issues related to the implementation of its plan of action, the Commission is empowered to adopt a delegated act in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I in order toremove that countryfrom the GSP+ arrangement. |
Amendment 56
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
1. The Common Customs Tariff ad valorem duties on all products listed in Annex III and Annex VII, which originate in a GSP+ beneficiary country, shall be suspended. |
1. The Common Customs Tariff ad valorem duties on all products listed in Annex III and Annex VII, which originate in a GSP+ beneficiary country, shall be suspended according to a tariff suspension schedule, as referred in Article 2.10 a (new). |
Amendment 57
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 2
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
2. Common Customs Tariff specific duties on products referred to in paragraph 1 shall be suspended entirely, except for products for which the Common Customs Tariff duties include ad valorem duties. For products with Combined Nomenclature code 1704 10 90, the specific duty shall be limited to 16 % of the customs value. |
2. Common Customs Tariff specific duties on products referred to in paragraph 1 shall be suspended according to a tariff suspension schedule, as referred in Article 2.10 a(new), except for products for which the Common Customs Tariff duties include ad valorem duties. For products with Combined Nomenclature code 1704 10 90, the specific duty shall be limited to 16 % of the customs value. |
(
Amendment 58
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
1. As of the date of the granting of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the Commission shall, with regard to each of the GSP+ beneficiary countries, keep under review and monitor the status of ratification of the relevant conventions and their effective implementation, as well as the cooperation of the GSP+ beneficiary country with the relevant monitoring bodies. In doing so, the Commission shall examine all relevant information, in particular the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies. |
1. As of the date of the granting of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the Commission shall, with regard to each of the GSP+ beneficiary countries, keep under review and monitor the status of ratification of the relevant conventions and their effective implementation, as well as the cooperation of the GSP+ beneficiary country with the relevant monitoring bodies. In doing so, the Commission shall assess in a transparent manner and based on objective criteria the progress made by the GSP+ beneficiary countries in implementing their respective plans of action, and examine all relevant information, in particular the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies, as well as duly substantiated information submitted by individual citizens, private sector actors, civil society organisations, representatives of trade unions, other relevant stakeholders and any complaints received. The Commission and the EEAS shall hold regular contacts with local and international civil society to assess the beneficiary countries’ implementation commitments. A cycle of three years for the review, monitoring and assessment (hereinafter monitoring cycle) is hereby established. |
Amendment 59
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 2
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
2. A GSP+ beneficiary country shall cooperate with the Commission and provide all information necessary to assess its respect of the binding undertakings referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e), and (f) and its situation as regards Article 9, points (b) and (c). |
2. A GSP+ beneficiary country shall cooperate with the Commission and provide all information necessary to assess its respect of the binding undertakings referred to in Article 9, points (d) including the implementation of its plan of action, (e), and (f) and its situation as regards Article 9, points (b) and (c) |
(Amendment 60
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 2 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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2a. The Commission, where applicable jointly with the EEAS, shall carry out at least one high-level monitoring mission per monitoring cycle to the beneficiary countries in order to assess progress on the ground, in line with, inter alia, the plans of action. In the framework of those missions, the Commission shall consult civil society and other stakeholders referred to in Article 35a in accordance with the procedures and deadlines that the Commission had adopted and published for such consultation. The Commission shall keep the European Parliament and the Council informed of the preparation and outcome of those missions. |
(Amendment 61
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 2 b (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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2b. At the beginning of each monitoring cycle, the Commission shall send a relevant list of issues to each GSP+ beneficiary country outlining implementation issues that need to be addressed during the cycle. The lists of issues shall be made publicly available. |
Amendment 62
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 2 c (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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2c. The plans of action and the Commission and European External Action Service’s recommendations on priority implementation actions shall be taken into account in implemeting the Instrument under Regulation (EU) 2021/947, including with a view to provide specific technical assistance, expertise and advice to support GSP+ beneficiary countries in attaining and complying with their international commitments. |
Amendment 63
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 2 d (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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2d. At the end of each monitoring cycle, the Commission shall assess which benchmarks have been met by the GSP+ beneficiary country with regard to the effective implementation of the relevant conventions, and take appropriate measures for the suspension of tariff duties, in line with Article 12. |
Amendment 64
Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 1
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
1. By 1 January 2027, and every three years thereafter, the Commission shall present to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the status of ratification of the relevant conventions, the compliance of the GSP+ beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions and the status of the effective implementation thereof. |
1. By 1 January 2027, and every three years thereafter, the Commission shall present to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the status of ratification of the relevant conventions, the compliance of the GSP+ beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions and the status of the effective implementation thereof, also based on the assessment of the implementation of the plans of action. |
Amendment 65
Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point b
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(b) the Commission's and where appropriate the European External Action Service’s conclusions on whether each GSP+ beneficiary country respects its binding undertakings to comply with reporting obligations, to cooperate with relevant monitoring bodies in accordance with the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof; |
(b) the Commission's and where appropriate the European External Action Service’s conclusions, on whether each GSP+ beneficiary country respects its binding undertakings to comply with reporting obligations, to cooperate with relevant monitoring bodies in accordance with the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof, including through an assessment of the implementation of its plan of action. |
The report may include any information from any source the Commission considers appropriate. |
The report may include any information from any source the Commission considers appropriate including from civil society organisations, business organisations and trade unions. The report shall also pay attention to the economic impact of imports under the GSP+ on EU producers, particularly in cases where products are highly competitive. |
Amendment 66
Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 3
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
3. In drawing their conclusions concerning effective implementation of the relevant conventions, the Commission and where appropriate the European External Action Service shall assess the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies, as well as, without prejudice to other sources, information submitted by the European Parliament or the Council as well as third parties, including governments and international organisations, civil society, and social partners. |
3. In drawing their conclusions concerning effective implementation of the relevant conventions, the Commission and where appropriate the European External Action Service shall assess the implementation of the plans of action, also based on the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies, as well as, without prejudice to other sources, information submitted by the European Parliament or the Council as well as third parties, including governments and international organisations, civil society, and social partners. The Commission and, where applicable, the European External Action Service shall provide recommendations on issues and actions to be prioritised in the following monitoring cycle, including on the provision of technical assistance and development support, as appropriate. In case of major shortcomings in implementing the plans of action, the report shall indicate which measures are required in order to continue the implementation of the conditions laid down in Article 9(d). |
Amendment 67
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
1. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance shall be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products originating in a GSP+ beneficiary country, where that country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), or the GSP+ beneficiary country has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c). |
1. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance shall be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products, including certain sectors, originating in a GSP+ beneficiary country, where that country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), including in the event of major shortcomings in implementing the plan of action referred to in Article 9 point (d) are identified, with a lack of concrete actions in time and in law, or the GSP+ beneficiary country has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c). |
Amendment 68
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 3
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
3. Where, either on the basis of the conclusions of the report referred to in Article 14 or on the basis of the evidence available, including evidence submitted through a complaint, the Commission has a reasonable doubt that a particular GSP+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), or has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c), it shall, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for the temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council thereof. |
3. Where, either on the basis of the conclusions and of the GSP+ beneficiary country’s follow up to recommendations and priority actions as provided by the report referred to in Article 14 or on the basis of the evidence available, including evidence submitted through a complaint, or on the basis of information submitted by the European Parliament, notably in the framework of the dialogue foreseen in Article 35b, or by the Council, the Commission has a reasonable doubt that a particular GSP+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), including with regard to the implementation of its plan of action, or has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c), it shall in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for the temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the adoption of that implementing act and of the follow-up it has given to the information submitted by the European Parliament or the Council. |
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In its assessment of whether the GSP+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings referred to in Article 9 point (d), the Commission shall in particular take into account whether the relevant monitoring bodies, treaty and supervisory mechanisms have signalled a potentially serious failure to effectively implement the relevant conventions, based on indicators such as: |
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- the establishment of commissions of inquiry, fact-finding missions, country special rapporteurs, or other monitoring mechanisms by the UN Human Rights Council or General Assembly or the ILO Governing Body; |
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- findings by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Special Procedures or other UN independent human rights experts; |
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- relevant procedures in the framework of the ILO Committee of Application of Standards, such as the introduction of a special paragraph; |
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- rulings and opinions by international human rights courts; |
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- reports by prominent local and international human rights groups; |
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- relevant indicators for the effective implementation of multilateral environmental and good governance conventions. |
Amendment 69
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 3 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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3a. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament, the Council and the civil society and stakeholders as referred to in article 35a about the complaints received, and inform them, as well as the complainant, where it considers that the complaint does not provide sufficient evidence in relation to the indicators referred to in this article. |
Amendment 70
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 5
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
5. The Commission shall provide the GSP+ beneficiary country concerned with every opportunity to cooperate during the period referred to in paragraph 4, point (b). |
5. The Commission shall provide the GSP+ beneficiary country concerned with every opportunity to cooperate and engage with a view to addressing the violations of its binding undertakings as referred to in paragraph 3 during the period referred to in paragraph 4, point (b). |
Amendment 71
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 6
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
6. The Commission shall seek all information it considers necessary including, inter alia, the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies. In drawing its conclusions, the Commission shall assess all relevant information. |
6. The Commission shall seek all information it considers necessary including, inter alia, the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies and information provided by the European Parliament and the Council, as well as by civil society, business organisations and trade unions. In drawing its conclusions, the Commission shall assess all relevant information. |
Amendment 72
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 7
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
7. Within three months after expiry of the period specified in the notice, the Commission shall decide: |
7. Within three months after expiry of the period specified in the notice, the Commission shall decide: |
(a) to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure; |
(a) to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure, either because the grounds for the reasonable doubt are not confirmed in the assessment referred to in paragraph 6, or because the GSP+ beneficiary country has engaged and is committed to address the violations of its binding undertakings as referred to in paragraph 3; |
(b) to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. |
(b) to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. |
Amendment 73
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 8
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
8. Where the Commission considers that the findings do not justify temporary withdrawal, it shall adopt an implementing act to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). That implementing act shall be based inter alia on evidence received. |
8. Where the Commission considers, based on the elements referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6, that a temporary withdrawal is not justified, it shall adopt an implementing act to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). That implementing act shall be based inter alia on evidence received. |
Amendment 74
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 9
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
9. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b). In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, when appropriate, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country. |
9. Where the Commission considers, based on the outcome of the cooperation and engagement and the findings referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6, and after consulting the European Parliament, the Council and the civil society and stakeholders referred to in Article 35a, that a temporary withdrawal is justified for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b). The Commission shall publicly state the grounds for withdrawing preferences and shall set benchmarks that the beneficiary country should meet for the preferences to be reinstated. The delegated act adopted by the Commission may, when appropriate and especially when considering a partial withdrawal, be accompanied by an analysis on the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country, notably its impact on human rights, on the most vulnerable parts of the population, and on women’s employment and empowerment, with a view to minimising the negative impact on the GSP+ beneficiary country’s populations while maximising the leverage on its government. |
Amendment 75
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 10
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
10. Where the Commission decides on temporary withdrawal, such delegated act shall become applicable six months after its adoption. |
10. Where the Commission decides on temporary withdrawal, such delegated act shall become applicable one month after its adoption. |
Amendment 76
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 10 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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10a. During the application of a temporary withdrawal, the Commission shall continue the dialogue with the beneficiary country, including in the framework referred to in Article 18a, aiming at remedying the reasons for the withdrawal referred to in paragraph 3. The Commission shall regularly assess the effects of the withdrawal on remedying the violations, including in the report referred to in Article 14. To that purpose, the Commission shall regularly consult with the society and the stakeholders as referred to in Article 35a. |
Amendment 77
Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 1
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
1. An eligible country shall benefit from the tariff preferences provided under the special arrangement for the least-developed countries referred to in Article 1(2), point (c), if that country is identified by the United Nations as a least-developed country. |
1. An eligible country shall benefit from the tariff preferences provided under the special arrangement for the least-developed countries referred to in Article 1(2), point (c), if that country is identified by the United Nations as a least-developed country and if the country is compliant with the conditions referred to in Article 19 paragraph 1. |
Amendment 78
Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 1 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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1a. The Commission and, where applicable the EEAS, shall make sure that countries that benefit from the special arrangement referred to in paragraph 1 make continued and sustained progress towards ratifying the conventions listed in Annex VI. |
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In implementing the Instrument under Regulation (EU) 2021/947, priority shall be given to support to countries benefitting from the special arrangement referred to in paragraph 1 aiming to make progress towards the ratification of the conventions listed in Annex VI. |
Amendment 79
Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
Where an EBA beneficiary country no longer fulfils the conditions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I in order to remove the country from the EBA arrangement following a transitional period of three years as from the date on which the EBA beneficiary country no longer fulfils the conditions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article. |
Where an EBA beneficiary country no longer fulfils the economic criteria referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I in order to remove the country from the EBA arrangement following a transitional period of three years as from the date on which the EBA beneficiary country no longer fulfils the economic criteria referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article. |
Amendment 80
Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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Article 18a |
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General review of the status of the country in the framework of the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) shall be conducted yearly within the framework of a cooperation, partnership or association agreement that the Union has concluded with a beneficiary country. For that purpose, the Commission, and where relevant the European External Action Service, and the beneficiary country shall review the issues pertaining to the conditions referred to in Article 19(1), including in relation to any complaints received by the Commission. The Commission, and where relevant the European External Action Service, and the beneficiary country shall also review the status of the ratification of the conventions listed in Annex VI as referred to in Article 4(1a) and progress made towards ratification of the conventions listed in Annex VI as referred to in Article 17(1a). The Commission and the EEAS shall also cooperate with the beneficiary countries with a view to making progress towards the full implementation of the Three Pillars of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. |
Amendment 81
Proposal for a regulation
Chapter V – Title
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
Temporary withdrawal provisions common to all arrangements |
Enhanced engagement and temporary withdrawal provisions common to all arrangements |
Amendment 82
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
1. The preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) may be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products originating in a beneficiary country, for any of the following reasons: |
1. The preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) may be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products, including certain sectors, originating in a beneficiary country, for any of the following reasons: |
(a) serious and systematic violation of principles laid down in the conventions listed in Annex VI; |
(a) serious and systematic violation of principles laid down in the conventions listed in Annex VI; |
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(aa) failure to abide by the obligation to ratify these conventions, as referred to in Article 4.1 (b); |
(b) export of goods made by internationally prohibited child labour and forced labour, including slavery and prison labour; |
(b) export of goods made by internationally prohibited child labour and forced labour, including slavery and prison labour; |
(c) serious shortcomings in customs controls on the export or transit of drugs (illicit substances or precursors), or related to the obligation to readmit the beneficiary country’s own nationals or serious failure to comply with international conventions on antiterrorism or anti-money laundering; |
(c) serious shortcomings in customs controls on the export or transit of drugs (illicit substances or precursors), or serious failure to comply with international conventions on antiterrorism and anto-money laundering; |
(d) serious and systematic unfair trading practices including those affecting the supply of raw materials, which have an adverse effect on the Union industry and which have not been addressed by the beneficiary country. For those unfair trading practices, which are prohibited or actionable under the WTO Agreements, the application of this Article shall be based on a previous determination to that effect by the competent WTO body; |
(d) serious and systematic unfair trading practices including those affecting the supply of raw materials, or as identified in the framework of an investigation concluded under Regulation 2015/1843, which have an adverse effect on the Union industry and which have not been addressed by the beneficiary country. For those unfair trading practices, which are prohibited or actionable under the WTO Agreements, the application of this Article shall be based on a previous determination to that effect by the competent WTO body; |
(e) serious and systematic infringement of the objectives adopted by Regional Fishery Organisations or any international arrangements to which the Union is a party concerning the conservation and management of fishery resources. |
(e) serious and systematic infringement of the objectives adopted by Regional Fishery Organisations or any international arrangements to which the Union is a party concerning the conservation and management of fishery resources, or serious violations of the principles of decent work in fisheries as laid down in ILO Convention No 188 (2007); |
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The temporary withdrawal of the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) shall be considered as a last resort option when all other means to address the serious and systematic violations have failed. |
Amendment 83
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 a (new)
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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1a. For the purpose of applying point (a) of paragraph (1), the Commission shall in particular take into account whether the relevant monitoring bodies, treaty and supervisory mechanisms have signalled potentially serious and systematic violations of the principles of the relevant conventions, based on such indicators as: |
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- the establishment of commissions of inquiry, fact-finding missions, country special rapporteurs, or other monitoring mechanisms by the UN Human Rights Council or General Assembly or the ILO Governing Body; |
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- findings by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Special Procedures or other UN independent human rights experts; |
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- relevant procedures in the framework of the ILO Committee of Application of Standards, such as the introduction of a special paragraph; |
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- rulings and opinions by international human rights courts; |
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- reports by prominent local and international human rights groups; |
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- relevant indicators for the effective implementation of multilateral environmental and good governance conventions. |
Amendment 84
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 2 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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2a. The Commission shall publish a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union and notify the beneficiary country, the European Parliament and the Council, if the violations of principles of the international conventions listed in Annex VI so require, based on available assessments, comments, decisions, recommendations and the conclusions of the relevant monitoring bodies, or based on substantiated concerns expressed by the European Parliament, the Council, international organisations, and civil society including trade unions, or acting upon a complaint. |
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Starting from the date of the notification and for the duration of one year, the beneficiary country and the Commission shall enter into an enhanced engagement, whereby the beneficiary country commits to adopt time-bound roadmaps providing for concrete actions and sustainable solutions to the serious violations identified. |
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In the cases where the violations have reached the stage of serious and systematic violations, the Commission shall immediately initiate the procedure for the temporary withdrawal, as referred to in Article 19.4. |
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The Commission shall regularly consult with the European Parliament and the Council during the enhanced engagement process and consult with the civil society and stakeholders as referred to in Article 35a. |
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In implementing the Instrument under Regulation (EU) 2021/947, support shall be provided to beneficiary countries in implementing the roadmaps. |
Amendment 85
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 2 b (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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2b. If considered necessary, the enhanced engagement may be prolonged by another year. The Commission shall publish a list of countries with which enhanced engagement has been prolonged beyond one year and shall regularly update the list as necessary. The roadmaps referred to in paragraph 2a shall be made public. |
Amendment 86
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 3
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
3. Where the Commission, acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative, considers that there are sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the adoption of that implementing act. |
3. Where the Commission acting upon a complaint, on the basis of information submitted by the European Parliament, notably in the framework of the dialogue foreseen in Article 35b, or by the Council, or on its own initiative, considers that there are sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) because the beneficiary country has failed to deliver on its roadmap referred to Article 19(2a), or more generally on the enhanced engagement, or on the basis of other reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the adoption of that implementing act and of the follow-up it has given to the information submitted by the European Parliament or the Council. |
Amendment 87
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 3 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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3a. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament, the Council and the civil society and stakeholders as referred to in Article 35a about the complaints received, and inform them, as well as the complainant, where it considers that the complaint does not provide sufficient evidence in relation to the indicators referred to in this Article. |
Amendment 88
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 4
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
4. The Commission shall publish a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union announcing the initiation of a temporary withdrawal procedure, and shall notify the beneficiary country concerned thereof. The notice shall: |
4. The Commission shall publish a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union announcing the initiation of a temporary withdrawal procedure, and shall notify the beneficiary country concerned thereof, and inform the European Parliament and the Council. The notice shall: |
(a) provide sufficient grounds in relation to the implementing act to initiate a temporary withdrawal procedure, referred to in paragraph 3; |
(a) provide sufficient grounds in relation to the implementing act to initiate a temporary withdrawal procedure, referred to in paragraph 3; |
(b) state that the Commission will monitor and evaluate the situation in the beneficiary country concerned during the monitoring and evaluation period referred to in Paragraph 5. |
(b) state that the Commission will continue to pursue dialogue in the framework of the enhanced engagement and monitor and evaluate the situation in the beneficiary country concerned during the monitoring and evaluation period referred to in Paragraph 5. |
Amendment 89
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 5
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
5. The Commission shall provide the beneficiary country concerned with every opportunity to cooperate during the monitoring and evaluation period of six months from the date of publication of the notice. |
5. The Commission shall carry out monitoring and evaluation during a period of six months from the publication of the notice referred to in paragraph 4. The Commission shall provide the beneficiary country concerned with every opportunity to start engaging and cooperate any time during that period. |
Amendment 90
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 6
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
6. The Commission shall seek all information it considers necessary, inter alia, the available assessments, comments, decisions, recommendations and conclusions of the relevant monitoring bodies, and relevant information from other sources, including evidence submitted through a complaint or provided by third parties , as appropriate. In drawing its conclusions, the Commission shall assess all relevant information. |
6. The Commission shall seek all information it considers necessary, inter alia, the available assessments, comments, decisions, recommendations and conclusions of the relevant monitoring bodies, and relevant information from other sources, including from civil society organisations, business organisations and trade unions, and evidence submitted through a complaint or provided by third parties, as appropriate, as well as information provided by the European Parliament and the Council. |
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In drawing its conclusions, the Commission shall assess all relevant information and consider the progress made by the beneficiary country in delivering on its roadmap in the framework of the enhanced engagement referred to in Article 19.2a. |
Amendment 91
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 7
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
7. Within three months from the expiry of the period referred to in paragraph 5, the Commission shall submit a report on its findings and conclusions to the beneficiary country concerned. The beneficiary country has the right to submit its comments on the report. The period for comments shall not exceed one month. |
7. Within one month from the expiry of the period referred to in paragraph 5, and after consulting the civil society and stakeholders as referred to in Article 35a, the Commission shall submit a report on its findings and conclusions to the beneficiary country concerned. The Commission shall present the report to the European Parliament and to the Council. The beneficiary country has the right to submit its comments on the report. The period for comments shall not exceed one month. |
Amendment 92
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 8 – introductory part
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
8. Within six months from the expiry of the period referred to in paragraph 4, point (b), the Commission shall decide: |
8. Within two months from the expiry of the period referred to in paragraph 4, point (b), the Commission shall decide: |
(a) to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure; |
(a) to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure; |
(b) to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2). |
(b) to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2). |
Amendment 93
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 9
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
9. Where the Commission considers that the findings do not justify temporary withdrawal, it shall adopt an implementing act, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), on the termination of the temporary withdrawal procedure. |
9. Where the Commission considers, based on the elements referred to in paragraph 6 and 7, that a temporary withdrawal is not justified, it shall adopt an implementing act, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), on the termination of the temporary withdrawal procedure. |
Amendment 94
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 10
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
10. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II, in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2). In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, where appropriate, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country. |
10. Where the Commission considers, based on the elements referred to in paragraph 6 and 7, that temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article is justified, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II, in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2). The Commission shall publicly state the grounds for withdrawing preferences and set benchmarks that the beneficiary country should meet for the preferences to be reinstated. The delegated act adopted by the Commission may, where appropriate and especially when considering a partial withdrawal, be accompanied by an analysis on the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country, notably its impacts on human rights, on the most vulnerable parts of the population, and on women’s employment and empowerment, with a view to minimising the negative socio-economic impact on the beneficiary country’s populations while maximising the leverage on its government. |
Amendment 95
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 12
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
12. Where the Commission decides on temporary withdrawal, such delegated act shall become applicable six months after its adoption. |
12. Where the Commission decides on temporary withdrawal, such delegated act shall become applicable one month after its adoption. |
Amendment 96
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 12 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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12a. During the application of a temporary withdrawal, the Commission shall continue the dialogue with the beneficiary country, including in the framework referred to in Article 18a, aiming at remedying the reasons for the withdrawal referred to in paragraph 1. The Commission shall regularly assess the effects of the withdrawal on remedying the violations, and to that purpose shall consult with the civil society and the stakeholders referred to in Article 35a. |
Amendment 97
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 16
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
16. Where the Commission considers that there is sufficient evidence to justify temporary withdrawal for the reason set out in paragraph 1, point (a) and the exceptional gravity of the violations calls for a rapid response in view of the specific circumstances in the beneficiary country, it shall initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with paragraphs (3) to (15). However, the period referred to in paragraph 4, point (b) is reduced to 2 months and the deadline referred to in paragraph 8 is reduced to 5 months. |
16. Where the Commission considers that there is sufficient evidence to justify temporary withdrawal for the reason set out in paragraph 1, point (a) and the exceptional gravity of the violations calls for a rapid response in view of the specific circumstances in the beneficiary country, it shall initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with paragraphs (3) to (15). However, the period referred to in paragraph 5 is reduced to 1 months, the deadline referred to in paragraph 8 is reduced to 3 months. |
Amendment 98
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 17
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
17. Where the Commission decides on temporary withdrawal pursuant to paragraph 16 of this Article, such delegated act is adopted in accordance with Article 37 and shall apply one month from its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
17. Where the Commission decides on temporary withdrawal pursuant to paragraph 16 of this Article, such delegated act is adopted in accordance with Article 37 and shall apply 15 days from its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
Amendment 99
Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 2
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
2. An investigation shall be initiated upon request by a Member State, by any legal person or any association not having legal personality, acting on behalf of Union producers, or on the Commission's own initiative if it is apparent to the Commission that there is sufficient prima facie evidence, as determined on the basis of factors referred to in Article 23, to justify such initiation. The request to initiate an investigation shall contain evidence that the conditions for imposing the safeguard measure set out in Article 22(1) are met. The request shall be submitted to the Commission. The Commission shall, as far as possible, examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the request, to determine whether there is sufficient prima facie evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation. |
2. An investigation shall be initiated upon request by a Member State, by the European Parliament, by any legal person or any association not having legal personality, acting on behalf of Union producers, or on the Commission's own initiative if it is apparent to the Commission that there is sufficient prima facie evidence, as determined on the basis of factors referred to in Article 23, to justify such initiation. The request to initiate an investigation shall contain evidence that the conditions for imposing the safeguard measure set out in Article 22(1) are met. The request shall be submitted to the Commission. The Commission shall, as far as possible, examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the request, to determine whether there is sufficient prima facie evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation. |
Amendment 100
Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 4
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
4. An investigation, including the procedural steps referred to in Articles 25, 26 and 27, shall be concluded within 12 months from its initiation. |
4. An investigation, including the procedural steps referred to in Articles 25, 26 and 27, shall be concluded within 9 months from its initiation. |
Amendment 101
Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 4 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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4a. The Commission shall adopt public guidelines providing all the relevant information to support Union producers in requesting an initiation of a safeguard investigation, including with regard to the kind of information that is to be provided with a view to determining the existence of serious difficulties to Union producers, or a threat thereof, as referred to Article 22 paragraph 1 and Article 23. |
Amendment 102
Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 4 b (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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4b. The Commission shall make available standard questionnaires and forms in all EU official languages that Union producers may submit to the Commission in order to provide evidence that serious difficulties or threat thereof exist. |
Amendment 103
Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 4 c (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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4c. With a view to accessing the relevant information and documents in a less costly and more time-saving manner the SME Trade Defence Helpdesk established under Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 shall be made available for safeguard investigations under this Regulation. |
Amendment 104
Proposal for a regulation
Article 26
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
Where the facts as finally established show that the conditions set out in Article 22(1) are met, the Commission shall adopt an implementing act to reintroduce the Common Customs Tariff duties in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 39(3). That implementing act shall enter into force within one month from the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
Where the facts as finally established show that the conditions set out in Article 22(1) are met, the Commission shall adopt an implementing act to reintroduce the Common Customs Tariff duties in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). That implementing act shall enter into force within one month from the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
Amendment 105
Proposal for a regulation
Article 27
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
Where the facts as finally established show that the conditions set out in Article 22(1) are not met, the Commission shall adopt an implementing act terminating the investigation in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 39(3). That implementing act shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. If no implementing act is published within the period referred to in Article 24(4), the investigation shall be deemed terminated and any implementing acts adopted pursuant to Article 25 shall automatically expire. Any Common Customs Tariff duties collected as a result of those implementing acts shall be refunded. |
Where the facts as finally established show that the conditions set out in Article 22(1) are not met, the Commission shall adopt an implementing act terminating the investigation in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). That implementing act shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. If no implementing act is published within the period referred to in Article 24(4), the investigation shall be deemed terminated and any implementing acts adopted pursuant to Article 25 shall automatically expire. Any Common Customs Tariff duties collected as a result of those implementing acts shall be refunded. |
Amendment 106
Proposal for a regulation
Article 28
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
Common Customs Tariff duties shall be wholly or partially reintroduced for as long as necessary to counteract the deterioration in the economic or financial situation of Union producers, or for as long as the threat of such deterioration persists. The period of reintroduction shall not exceed three years, unless it is extended in duly justified circumstances. |
Common Customs Tariff duties shall be wholly or partially reintroduced for as long as necessary to counteract the deterioration in the economic or financial situation of Union producers, or for as long as the threat of such deterioration persists. The period of reintroduction shall not exceed four years, unless it is extended in duly justified circumstances. |
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Whenever there is sufficient prima facie evidence that the lifting of the general safeguard measures would likely result in a continuation or recurrence of serious difficulties for EU producers, the Commission shall consider such a review justified for the purpose of further extending the measures. |
Amendment 107
Proposal for a regulation
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
1. Without prejudice to Section I of this Chapter, on 1 January of each year, the Commission, on its own initiative and in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), shall adopt an implementing act in order to remove the tariff preferences referred to in Articles 7 and 12 with respect to the products from GSP sections S-11a and S-11b or to products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes 2207 10 00, 2207 20 00, 2909 19 10, 3814 00 90, 3820 00 00, 38249956, 38249957, 38249992, 38248400, 38248500, 38248600, 38248700, 38248800, 38249993, and 38249996 where imports of such products, originate in a beneficiary country and their total value: |
1. Without prejudice to Section I of this Chapter, on 1 January of each year, the Commission, on its own initiative and in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), shall adopt an implementing act in order to remove the tariff preferences referred to in Articles7, 12 and 18 with respect to the products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes 100610, 100620, 100630 where imports of such products, originate in a beneficiary country and their total value |
(a) for products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes 2207 10 00, 2207 20 00, 2909 19 10, 3814 00 90, 3820 00 00, and 38249956, 38249957, 38249992, 38248400, 38248500, 38248600, 38248700, 38248800, 38249993, and 38249996 exceeds the share referred to in point 1 of Annex IV of the value of Union imports of the same products from all countries and territories listed in Annex I, columns A and B, during a calendar year |
(a) exceeds the share referred to in point 3a of Annex IV of the value of Union imports of the same products from all countries and territories listed in Annex I, columns C, during a calendar year |
(b) for products under GSP sections S-11a and S-11b exceeds the share referred to in point 3 of Annex IV of the value of Union imports of products in GSP sections S-11a and S-11b from all countries and territories listed in Annex I, columns A and B, during a calendar year. |
deleted |
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to EBA beneficiary countries, nor shall it apply to countries with a share for the relevant products referred to in paragraph 1 not exceeding 6 % of total Union imports of the same products. |
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to countries with a share for the relevant products referred to in paragraph 1 not exceeding 6 % of total Union imports of the same products. |
3. The removal of the tariff preferences shall become applicable two months after the date of publication of the Commission's act to that effect in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
3. The removal of the tariff preferences shall become applicable two months after the date of publication of the Commission's act to that effect in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
Amendment 108
Proposal for a regulation
Article 29 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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Article 29a |
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1. Without prejudice to Section I of this Chapter, on 1 January of each year, the Commission, on its own initiative and in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), shall adopt an implementing act in order to remove the tariff preferences referred to in Articles 7 and 12 with respect to the products from GSP sections S-11a, S-11b or to products falling under Combined Nomenclature code 1701 where imports of such products, originate in a beneficiary country and their total value: |
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(a) for products under GSP sections S-11a and S-11b exceeds the share referred to in point 3 of Annex IV of the value of Union imports of products in GSP sections S-11a and S-11b from all countries and territories listed in Annex I, columns C, during a calendar year. |
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(b) for products falling under Combined Nomenclature code 1701 the share referred to in point 3a of Annex IV of the value of Union imports of the same products from all countries and territories listed in Annex I, column C, during a calendar year |
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2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to EBA beneficiary countries, nor shall it apply to countries with a share for the relevant products referred to in paragraph 1 not exceeding 6 % of total Union imports of the same products. |
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3. The removal of the tariff preferences shall become applicable two months after the date of publication of the Commission's act to that effect in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
Amendment 109
Proposal for a regulation
Article 30 – paragraph 1
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
Without prejudice to Section I of this Chapter, where imports of products listed in Annex I to the TFEU cause, or threaten to cause, serious disturbance to Union markets, in particular to one or more of the outermost regions, or those markets' regulatory mechanisms, the Commission, on its own initiative or at the request of a Member State, after consulting the committee for the relevant agriculture or fisheries common market organisation, shall adopt an implementing act in order to suspend the preferential arrangements in respect of the products concerned in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 39(3). |
Without prejudice to Section I of this Chapter, where imports of products listed in Annex I to the TFEU, such as rice and sugar, cause, or threaten to cause, serious disturbance to Union markets, in particular to one or more of the outermost regions, or those markets' regulatory mechanisms, the Commission, on its own initiative or at the request of a Member State, after consulting the committee for the relevant agriculture or fisheries common market organisation, shall adopt an implementing act in order to suspend the preferential arrangements in respect of the products concerned in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). |
Amendment 110
Proposal for a regulation
Article 32 – paragraph 2
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
2. Where Section I of this Chapter is applied to products in Chapters 1 to 24 of the Common Customs Tariff as laid down by Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87, originating in beneficiary countries, the period referred to in Article 24(4) of this Regulation shall be reduced to two months in the following cases: |
2. Where Section I of this Chapter is applied to products in Chapters 1 to 24 of the Common Customs Tariff as laid down by Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87, originating in beneficiary countries, the period referred to in Article 24(4) of this Regulation shall be reduced to two months in the following cases: |
(a) when the beneficiary country concerned does not ensure compliance with the rules of origin or does not provide the administrative cooperation referred to in Article 21; |
(a) when the beneficiary country concerned does not ensure compliance with the rules of origin or does not provide the administrative cooperation referred to in Article 21; |
(b) when Imports of products from Chapters 1 to 24 of the Common Customs Tariff as laid down by Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87, under the preferential arrangements granted under this Regulation massively exceed the usual levels of exports from the beneficiary country concerned. |
(b) when the evidence provided by Union producers allows the Commission to determine that Imports of products from Chapters 1 to 24 of the Common Customs Tariff as laid down by Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87, under the preferential arrangements granted under this Regulation massively exceed the usual levels of exports from the beneficiary country concerned. The Commission shall clarify which criteria shall be satisfied in order to meet the requirement of “massively exceeding levels”. |
Amendment 111
Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 3 - point d (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(d) the cumulation brings a positive impact on regional integration. |
Amendment 112
Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 4
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
4. When assessing if the request is justified in view of specific trade, development and financing needs of the beneficiary country, in particular on the basis of information provided by that country, the Commission shall take into account the level of dependency of the beneficiary country on integrated production with the third countries concerned by the request, the impact of such dependency for the beneficiary country, the relevance of sectors with such integrated production for the economy of the beneficiary country and future development perspectives with regard to the products in question. |
4. When assessing if the request is justified in view of specific trade, development and financing needs of the beneficiary country, in particular on the basis of information provided by that country, the Commission shall take into account the level of dependency of the beneficiary country on integrated production with the third countries concerned by the request, the impact of such dependency on the beneficiary country’s sustainable development, the relevance of sectors with such integrated production for the economy of the beneficiary country and future development perspectives with regard to the products in question, including by taking into account any positive impact on poverty eradication, economic diversification and positive impacts on the local populations, and the overall impacts on regional integration. |
Amendment 113
Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 5
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
5. Before the Commission reaches its decision on a request, it shall give the beneficiary country the opportunity to present its views. |
5. Before the Commission reaches its decision on a request, it shall give the beneficiary country, and other impacted countries notably EBA beneficiaries, the opportunity to present their views. |
Amendment 114
Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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Article 33a |
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Pursuant to the EU Aid for Trade Strategy and development funding instruments, it shall be ensured that the Instrument under Regulation (EU) 2021/947 , including blended finance and guarantees, supports the beneficiary countries in fully utilising the preferences granted by this Regulation, promoting their production capacity, economic and export diversification, notably with regards to sustainable products, value addition and inclusive sustainability. |
Amendment 115
Proposal for a regulation
Article 35 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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Article 35a |
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The Commission shall hold a regular dialogue with representatives of the civil society and stakeholders in order to review, monitor and assess the implementation of this Regulation, including with regard to the binding undertakings referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f) and the plans of action submitted in the framework of applications to the GSP+ Scheme. Whenever relevant, the Commission shall adopt public procedures and deadlines for the consultation of civil society and stakeholders. |
Amendment 116
Proposal for a regulation
Article 35 b (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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Article 35b |
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In order to enhance the dialogue between the institutions of the Union, in particular the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, and to ensure greater transparency and accountability, the European Parliament may invite the Commission and, where appropriate, the Council, to appear before the competent committee to discuss in particular the list of issues referred to in article 13 (2b), the application of this Regulation and the need for a temporary withdrawal of preferential arrangements under Article 15 and Article 19. |
Amendment 117
Proposal for a regulation
Article 40
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
By 1 January 2027 and every three years thereafter, the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the effects of the scheme covering the most recent three-year period and all of the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2). |
By 1 January 2027 and every three years thereafter, the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the effects of the scheme and the progress made against achieving the objectives and the conditionalities of this Regulation covering the most recent three-year period and all of the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2). The report shall contain the description of the impact and the use of trade preferences, and it shall focus on development and export potential of the most competitive GSP beneficiary countries, in particular those Standard GSP countries that are closer to graduating to Upper-Middle Income status, including with regards to impact on EU industry regarding competitive products. |
By 1 January 2030, the Commission shall submit, to the European Parliament and to the Council, a report on the application of this Regulation. Such a report may, where appropriate, be accompanied by a legislative proposal. |
By 1 January 2029, the Commission shall submit, to the European Parliament and to the Council, a report on the application of this Regulation. Such a report shall in particular: |
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assess the appropriateness of the product scope against the objectives of development, poverty eradication and economic diversification and in relation to the broader objectives and implementation of the European Green Deal, in line with the evolution of the Union’s normative environment, as well as the opportunity to introduce arrangements in order to facilitate trade in sustainable products as established in relevant EU legislation with the beneficiary countries. |
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assess the implication of the amendments to the ILO’s Declaration on Fundamental principles and Rights at Work, in particular with a view to possibly including occupational safety and health as a fundamental principle and with a view to amending Annex VI accordingly. |
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assess the effectiveness of safeguards. |
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The report shall, where appropriate, be accompanied by a legislative proposal |
Amendment 118
Proposal for a regulation
Annex IV
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
Modalities for the application of Article 8 |
Modalities for the application of Article 8, Article 29 and Article 29a |
1. Article 8 shall apply when the percentage share referred to in paragraph 1 of that Article exceeds 47 %. |
1. Article 8 shall apply when the percentage share referred to in paragraph 1 of that Article exceeds 47 %. |
2. Article 8 shall apply for each of the GSP sections S-2a, S-3 and S-5 of Annex III, when the percentage share referred to in paragraph 1 of that Article exceeds 17,5 %. |
2. Article 8 shall apply for each of the GSP sections S-2a, S-3 and S-5 of Annex III, when the percentage share referred to in paragraph 1 of that Article exceeds 17,5 % |
3. Article 8 shall apply for each of the GSP sections S-11a and S-11b of Annex III, when the percentage share referred to in paragraph 1 of that Article exceeds 37 %. |
3. Article 8 and 29a shall apply for each of the GSP sections S-11a and S-11b of Annex III, when the percentage share referred to in paragraph 1 of that Article exceeds 37 %. |
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3a. Article 29 and 29a shall apply for products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes 100610, 100620, 100630, and 1701 when the percentage share referred to in paragraph 1 of those Articles exceeds 10 %. |
Amendment 119
Proposal for a regulation
Annex VI ‑ new
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
ANNEX VI |
ANNEX VI |
Conventions referred to in Articles 9 and 19(1), point (a) |
Conventions referred to in Articles 9 and 19(1), point (a) |
Core human and labour rights UN/ILO Conventions |
Core human and labour rights UN/ILO Conventions |
1. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) |
1. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) |
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1a. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) |
2. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965) |
2. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965) |
3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) |
3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) |
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3a. First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) |
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3b. Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty (1989) |
4. International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (1966) |
4. International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (1966) |
5. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979) |
5. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979) |
6. Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) |
6. Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) |
7. Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) |
7. Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) |
8. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (2000) |
8. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (2000) |
9. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2007) |
9. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2007) |
10. Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, No 29 (1930) |
10. Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, No 29 (1930) |
11. Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, No 87 (1948) |
11. Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, No 87 (1948) |
12. Convention on Labour Inspection No 81 (1947) |
12. Convention on Labour Inspection No 81 (1947) |
13. Convention concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively, No 98 (1949) |
13. Convention concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively, No 98 (1949) |
14. Convention concerning Equal Remuneration of Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value, No 100 (1951) |
14. Convention concerning Equal Remuneration of Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value, No 100 (1951) |
15. Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, No 105 (1957) |
15. Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, No 105 (1957) |
16. Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, No 111 (1958) |
16. Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, No 111 (1958) |
17. Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, No 138 (1973) |
17. Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, No 138 (1973) |
18. Convention on Tripartite Consultations No 144 (1976) |
18. Convention on Tripartite Consultations No 144 (1976) |
19. Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, No 182 (1999) |
19. Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, No 182 (1999) |
Conventions related to the climate, environment and to good governance principles |
Conventions related to the climate, environment and to good governance principles |
20. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (1973) |
20. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (1973) |
21. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987) |
21. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987) |
22.Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (1989) |
22.Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (1989) |
23.Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) |
23.Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) |
24.The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992) |
24.The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992) |
25.Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (2000) |
25.Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (2000) |
26.Stockholm Convention on persistent Organic Pollutants (2001) |
26.Stockholm Convention on persistent Organic Pollutants (2001) |
27.The Paris Agreement on Climate Change (2015) |
27.The Paris Agreement on Climate Change (2015) |
28.United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) |
28.United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) |
29.United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) |
29.United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) |
30. United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988) |
30. United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988) |
31. United Nations Convention against Corruption (2004) |
31. United Nations Convention against Corruption (2004) |
32. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (2000) |
32. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (2000) |
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT
Since 1971, the EU has granted autonomous trade preferences to developing countries under its Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP) and based on the WTO ‘Enabling Clause’. The primary aims of the GSP are poverty eradication, promotion of sustainable development, diversification of beneficiary economies and better integration of the beneficiary countries in the world economy. The GSP covers more than 60 countries and 2 billion people in the world. The current GSP Regulation expires at the end of 2023. The Commission proposal for GSP 2024-2033 maintains a large part of the current GSP, introducing few new elements. The GSP division into three different schemes is maintained; Standard GSP, the GSP+, and the Everything but Arms (EBA) that is automatically granted for Least Developed Countries.
The Commission’s Impact Assessment identified certain shortcomings in the current GSP Regulation. The GSP's potential to contribute to sustainable development and good governance in beneficiary countries has not been fully exploited. The GSP does not reach a sufficient impact on human rights, labour rights, good governance, and sustainable development. With regards to the GSP+ specifically, an underlying issue has been insufficient information on the GSP+ monitoring process.
Moreover, the GSP's potential for contributing to poverty eradication is not fully exploited. Some beneficiary countries, notably those most in need, have very limited utilization rate of GSP preferences, and limited export diversification. Export diversification is closely linked to the level of exploitation of GSP benefits but also dependent on the broader integration of the GSP opportunities into beneficiary country’s domestic policies.
To reach the full potential of the GSP in relation to impact on sustainable development the Rapporteur views that further clarity on the monitoring process of the GSP+ arrangement is required. Increasing clarity on the steps, benchmarks and objectives of the monitoring process would contribute to improving the leverage of the scheme. At the same time, it would provide stakeholders, including business and civil society, as well as the beneficiary country governments increased predictability. Improvements to transparency of the monitoring process equally would contribute to increased and sustained leverage for effective implementation of the international conventions and subsequently for reaching an increased impact towards sustainable development.
The Rapporteur welcomes the proposal on a mandatory Plan of Action to be submitted upon application to the GSP+ Scheme and considers that it should become the main benchmarking tool guiding the achievement of the effective implementation of the international conventions.
The Rapporteur proposes to supplement the Plan of Action proposed by the Commission with further details, deadlines and a disclosure requirement. Furthermore an advisory body consisting of stakeholders should be established to assist the Commission in assessing the Plans of Action and in the monitoring effort related to beneficiary country commitments.
To ensure an enhanced contribution to sustainable development and poverty eradication under the Standard GSP and EBA schemes, the Rapporteur regards it central to strengthen the positive conditionality in relation to the international conventions, encouraging the Standard GSP and EBA beneficiary countries to ratify the conventions. Ratification is key since it implies monitoring of compliance, thereby providing stronger assurances that the additional trading opportunities provided by the GSP support the development of the beneficiary countries in a sustainable manner.
The Rapporteur introduces more structure and detail also in the monitoring process of Standard GSP and EBA countries, notably with a view to formalising the existing practice of conducting an “enhanced engagement” whenever the situation with respecting the principles of the international conventions reaches a critical level. While withdrawal of preferences should remain a last resort decision, stronger dialogue and monitoring are the tools for enhancing and sustaining leverage towards beneficiaries while tapping on the potential that stakeholders provide when working in cooperation for increased positive impact and solving compliance issues.
The EU has introduced and will introduce legislation over the coming years to increase private sector sustainability and accountability. Beneficiary countries will benefit from working towards a conducive environment for responsible and sustainable business conduct. This will support beneficiary countries in meeting the raised EU sustainability and accountability standards. There is a close link between the state duty to protect human rights and companies’ duty to respect human rights as outlined in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP), unanimously adopted in 2011. For this purpose, adopting a National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights is introduced by the Rapporteur as a necessary condition for GSP+ and Standard GSP schemes while also encouraging the EBA beneficiaries to this end.
It is the firm belief of the Rapporteur that a close link between the GSP and EU development assistance needs to be established to ensure policy coherence and an improved impact of the GSP for sustainable development. GSP Regulation commitments may be place a notable burden on the beneficiary countries’ administrative capacity. The EU development assistance support to beneficiaries should prioritize supporting the effective implementation of the international conventions (GSP+) and ratification process of those conventions (Standard GSP, EBA), as well as the road map commitments of beneficiary governments under enhanced engagement.
With a view to a full utilization of the GSP preferences EU development assistance tools should support beneficiaries in promoting production capacity, economic and export diversification, value addition and inclusive sustainability. This supports beneficiaries in integrating the opportunities provided by GSP benefits more broadly in domestic policies.
Increased positive conditionality of the Standard GSP will improve the contribution to the stated aims of the GSP while diminishing the gap between Standard GSP and the GSP+ arrangement. This is conducive to encouraging Standard GSP beneficiaries (which fulfil the so called vulnerability criteria) to make the necessary efforts required for the ratification and effective implementation of the international conventions towards applying to GSP+, which provides more attractive benefits.
The EU Green Deal provides an overarching framework for EU policies. In this context, the Rapporteur’ view is that the GSP should provide additional incentives for trade in sustainable products. While the volume of exports of sustainable products to the EU is limited, this is a sector that may experience notable growth over the period of the forthcoming GSP Regulation, also in light of future policy and regulatory evolutions and which beneficiary countries should benefit from.
Regarding safeguards, the Rapporteur views that the Commission’s proposal is satisfactory. The Rapporteur supports keeping the rule of applying the General Safeguard measures to all schemes and the Automatic Safeguards to Standard GSP and GSP+. Thereby the Rapporteur has not proposed any changes to the product or geographical scope of safeguards.
The product graduation mechanism applies only to Standard GSP. The rapporteur sees the Commission’s approach as justifiable. A possible extension of product graduation to the GSP+ scheme would diminish incentives to apply to the scheme while currently several new requirements for GSP+ applicants are being proposed. Extending the product graduation mechanism to LDCs and vulnerable developing countries would be a drastic signal causing reputational damage to the EU. The Rapporteur is also supportive of the proposed modification of the vulnerability criteria for the GSP+ Scheme.
Until now the launch of the withdrawal process has been operating as a “one-way street”. Withdrawal should be seen as the very last option. Every effort should be made to avoid a withdrawal of preferences, which necessarily negatively impacts the economy of a beneficiary country and is likely to adversely affect the most vulnerable population. For this purpose the Rapporteur proposes to include an Enhanced Engagement process in the Regulation, with specific steps for avoiding a withdrawal scenario. The Rapporteur proposes to bring additional clarity to the threshold for what constitutes a “serious and systematic violation” of the international conventions consequently leading to launching an investigation for withdrawal.
The Rapporteur also proposes a specific engagement strategy for the post-withdrawal phase in view of moving towards a reinstatement of the preferences.
ANNEX: LIST OF ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT
In line with EP Bureau Decision of 12 September 2016 on the implementation of the Inter-Institutional Agreement on the Transparency Register, and with Article 4 (6) of the Code of conduct for members of the European parliament with respect to financial interests and conflicts of interest (Annex I of EP Rules of Procedure), the rapporteur wishes to list outside interests which have been consulted on matters pertaining to the subject of the report :
Name |
title |
organisation |
Stuart Newman |
Legal Advisor, Sustainable Trade & Customs |
Amfori |
Stephanie Luong |
Vice President, Public Affairs |
Amfori |
Ambassador Mahbub Hassan Saleh |
Head of Mission of the People's Republic of Bangladesh to the European Union |
Government of Bangladesh |
Federico Facchin |
Policy Advisor |
Copa-Cogeca |
San Bilal |
Head of the Economic Transformation and Trade Programme |
European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) |
Commissioner Jutta Urpilainen |
Commissioner for International Partnerships |
European Commission |
DG INTPA |
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European Commission |
DG TRADE |
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European Commission |
EEAS |
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European Commission |
DG EMPL |
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European Commission |
Virginia Enssle |
Project and Policy Officer |
Fair Trade Advocacy |
Josetta Nousjoki |
Advocacy Manager |
Fair Trade Advocacy |
Luca Boniolo |
Sustainability Policy Manager |
Federation of the European Sporting goods Industry (FESI) |
Youri Mercier |
Deputy Secretary General |
Federation of the European Sporting goods Industry (FESI) |
Radboud Reijn |
Coordinator |
GSP NGOPlatform |
Claudio Francavilla |
EU advocate |
Human Rights Watch |
Jude Kirton Darling |
Deputy General Secretary |
IndustriALL |
Espeth Hathaway |
Policy advisor |
IndustriALL |
Eline Blot |
Junior Policy Analyst for the Global Challenges and SDGs programme |
Institute for European Environmental Policy |
Ingrid van Laerhoven |
Director Government Affairs International Trade & Customs EMEA |
Nike |
Ambassador Zaheer Aslam Janjua |
Head of Mission of Pakistan to the European Union |
Government of Pakistan |
Mr Abdul Razak Dawood |
Advisor to Prime Minister, on Commerce and Investment |
Government of Pakistan |
Dr. Shireen M Mazari |
Minister for Human Rights of Pakistan |
Government of Pakistan |
Saleha Asif |
CEO |
Pakistan Textile Council |
Isabelle Durand |
Deputy Secretary General |
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) |
Ambassador Dilyor Khakimov |
Ambassador of the Republic of Uzbekistan to the Mission to the European Union |
Government of Uzbekistan |
Mr. Kadambay Sultanov |
Ambassador of the Republic of Uzbekistan to Finland |
Government of Uzbekistan |
Pakistani CSOs, think tanks and business organisations |
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OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1.3.2022)
for the Committee on International Trade
on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on applying a generalised scheme of tariff preferences and repealing Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council
(COM(2021)0579 – C9‑0364/2021 – 2021/0297(COD))
Rapporteur for opinion: Maria Arena
SHORT JUSTIFICATION
The European Union (EU) has granted trade preferences to developing countries through the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) since 1971, as part of its common commercial policy and in accordance with the general provisions governing the EU's external action. The GSP assists developing countries with integrating in the world economy, reducing poverty, and supporting sustainable development through the promotion of core human and labour rights, environmental protection, and good governance.
The GSP consists of three arrangements:
• Standard GSP: for low and lower-middle income countries, providing for a reduction or full removal of customs duties on two thirds of EU tariff lines.
• GSP+: the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, which reduces tariffs to 0% for broadly the same tariff lines as Standard GSP. It is granted to vulnerable low and lower-middle income countries that implement 27 international conventions related to human rights, labour rights, protection of the environment and good governance.
• EBA (Everything But Arms): the special arrangement for least developed countries (LDCs), providing them with duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market for all products except arms and ammunition.
The current scheme will apply until 31 December 2023.
The Commission’s mid-term evaluation and the supporting expert study concluded that the current framework has been largely effective and delivering on its objectives. The GSP has had a positive economic impact - the imports to the EU from the beneficiary countries have increased. However, the GSP does not achieve its full potential when it comes to improving living standards, environmental standards or incentivising the beneficiary countries to improve the respect for human rights and other core rights and obligations related to sustainable development.
The Commission published the proposal for a new regulation for the period 2024 -2034 on 22 September 2021. The proposal retains broadly the features of the current GSP regulation. It strengthens the current GSP in aspects that are of particular relevance for AFET, such as extending the list of conventions that need to be complied with additional human rights and good governance instruments, introduces improvements in the monitoring of compliance with GSP+ requirements and boosts involvement of civil society in the implementation of the GSP. It further introduces a new urgent withdrawal procedure in cases of grave violations of international human rights standards.
However, there are areas where the AFET rapporteur would like to further strengthen the proposal and make it more effective, including:
- an ex-ante human rights impact assessment before the granting of standard GSP and GSP+ in order to identify risks of human rights violations and abuses by sector in the country.
- Extending positive conditionality to standard GSP.
- Reinforcing the Annex VI on core conventions.
- Reinforcing transparency and effectiveness of the monitoring process and strengthening the involvement of both international and domestic civil society.
- Promoting, through this instrument, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human rights and OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct and the compliance of beneficiary countries’ legislation with the EU due diligence toolbox, in particular with the EU regulation no 2368/2002 of 20 December 2002 implementing the Kimberley Process certification scheme for the international trade in rough diamonds, the EU regulation 2017/821 of 17 May 2017 laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas as well as the regulation 995/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 laying down the obligations of operators who place timber and timber products on the market.
- Reinforcing complaints mechanism by formalising the Single Entry Point in the proposal and making it open to Human Rights Defenders and civil society organisations.
- Clarifying the possibility of sectoral withdrawal of preferences in function of occurrence of serious and systematic human rights violations in a particular sector.
AMENDMENTS
The Committee on Foreign Affairs calls on the Committee on International Trade, as the committee responsible, to take into account the following amendments:
Amendment 1
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(8 a) Before granting any preferential regime to a country, the Commission should conduct and publish an ex-ante human rights and environmental impact assessment in order to identify, assess, and indicate measures to prevent, mitigate, address and combat any risk of human rights or environmental violations. |
Amendment 2
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(9) The standard GSP arrangement should be granted to all those developing countries which share a common development need and are in a similar stage of economic development. There is no definition of ‘developing country’ at the level of the WTO, and it is left to preference granting countries to determine the list of GSP-eligible developing countries. Countries which have successfully completed their transition from centralised to market economies, and are today powerful economies with a strong position in international trade, such as China, Hong Kong, Macao and Russia, should not be considered as developing countries in the context of the GSP, and should, therefore, be removed from the list of eligible countries. Countries which are classified by the World Bank as high-income or upper-middle income countries have per capita income levels allowing them to attain higher levels of diversification without the scheme's tariff preferences. They are at a different stage of economic development and do not, therefore, share the same development, trade and financial needs as lower income or more vulnerable developing countries. In order to prevent unjustified discrimination, they need to be treated differently; therefore, they do not benefit from the standard GSP arrangement. Furthermore, the use of tariff preferences provided under the scheme by high-income or upper-middle income countries would increase the competitive pressure on exports from poorer, more vulnerable countries and, therefore, could impose unjustifiable burdens on those more vulnerable developing countries. The standard GSP arrangement should take account of the fact that the development, trade and financial needs are subject to change and ensure that the arrangement remains open if the situation of a country changes. |
(9) The standard GSP arrangement should be granted to all those developing countries which share a common development need and are in a similar stage of economic development and have signed and have committed to ratifying the core international conventions mentioned in Annex VI within five years upon the application of the arrangement. There is no definition of ‘developing country’ at the level of the WTO, and it is left to preference granting countries to determine the list of GSP-eligible developing countries. Countries which have successfully completed their transition from centralised to market economies, and are today powerful economies with a strong position in international trade, such as China, Hong Kong, Macao and Russia, should not be considered as developing countries in the context of the GSP, and should, therefore, be removed from the list of eligible countries. Countries which are classified by the World Bank as high-income or upper-middle income countries have per capita income levels allowing them to attain higher levels of diversification without the scheme's tariff preferences. They are at a different stage of economic development and do not, therefore, share the same development, trade and financial needs as lower income or more vulnerable developing countries. In order to prevent unjustified discrimination, they need to be treated differently; therefore, they do not benefit from the standard GSP arrangement. Furthermore, the use of tariff preferences provided under the scheme by high-income or upper-middle income countries would increase the competitive pressure on exports from poorer, more vulnerable countries and, therefore, could impose unjustifiable burdens on those more vulnerable developing countries. The standard GSP arrangement should take account of the fact that the development, trade and financial needs are subject to change and ensure that the arrangement remains open if the situation of a country changes. |
Amendment 3
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(11) The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) is based on the integral concept of sustainable development, as recognised by international conventions and instruments such as the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the 1998 International Labour Organisation (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration, the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, the ILO Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work of 2019, the Outcome Document of the UN Summit on Sustainable Development of 2015 "Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Consequently, the additional tariff preferences provided for under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be granted to those developing countries which, due to a lack of diversification, are economically vulnerable, have ratified core international conventions on human and labour rights, climate and environmental protection and good governance, and commit to ensuring the effective implementation thereof. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should help those countries to assume the additional responsibilities resulting from the ratification and effective implementation of these conventions. The list of conventions relevant for GSP should be updated to better reflect the evolution of core international instruments and standards and take a proactive approach to sustainable development in keeping with the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 203018 . In this regard, the following conventions are added: the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (2015) – replacing the Kyoto Protocol; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OP-CRC-AC); ILO Convention No 81 on Labour Inspection; ILO Convention No 144 on Tripartite Consultation; and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. |
(11) The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) is based on the integral concept of sustainable development, as recognised by international conventions and instruments such as the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the 1998 International Labour Organisation (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration, the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, the ILO Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work of 2019, the Outcome Document of the UN Summit on Sustainable Development of 2015 "Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Consequently, the additional tariff preferences provided for under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be granted to those developing countries which, due to a lack of diversification, are economically vulnerable, have ratified and started implementing core international conventions on human and labour rights, climate and environmental protection and good governance, and commit to pursuing the effective implementation thereof, including but not limited to a public, ambitious and time-bound plan of action, adopted in accordance with this Regulation. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should help those countries to assume the additional responsibilities resulting from the ratification and effective implementation of these conventions. The list of conventions relevant for GSP should be updated to better reflect the evolution of core international instruments and standards and take a proactive approach to sustainable development in keeping with the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 203018. In this regard, the following conventions are added: the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (2015) – replacing the Kyoto Protocol; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OP-CRC-AC); the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; ILO Convention No 81 on Labour Inspection; ILO Convention No 144 on Tripartite Consultation; and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. |
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18 United Nations (2015). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, Transforming our World: the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1), available at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld |
18 United Nations (2015). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, Transforming our World: the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1), available at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld |
Amendment 4
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(16) The Commission and where appropriate the European External Action Service should monitor the status of ratification of the international conventions on human and labour rights, environmental protection and good governance and their effective implementation, by examining the relevant information, in particular where available the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies established under those conventions. Every three years, the Commission should present to the European Parliament and the Council a report on the status of ratification of the respective conventions, the compliance of the beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions, and the status of the implementation of the conventions in practice. |
(16) The Commission and where appropriate the European External Action Service should monitor the status of ratification of the international conventions on human and labour rights, environmental protection and good governance and their effective implementation, by examining the relevant information, in particular where available the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies established under those conventions. Every two years, the Commission should present to the European Parliament and the Council a report on the status of ratification of the respective conventions, the compliance of the beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions, and the status of the implementation of the conventions in practice. |
Amendment 5
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(16a) The Commission should, for reasons of consistency of Union policies, encourage beneficiary countries to adhere to higher social and environmental standards and to promote a strong sustainable development dimension in global value chains, in line with the due diligence obligations set out in the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. |
Justification
The GSP regulation needs to be coherent with the EU’s human rights and environmental due diligence tools as recalled in the European Parliament resolution of 5 July 2016 on implementation of the 2010 recommendations on social and environmental standards, human rights and corporate responsibility (2015/2038(INI).
Amendment 6
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(18) In July 2020, the Commission appointed the Chief Trade Enforcement Officer with the role of enforcing trade rules. In this connection, in November 2020, the Commission launched a new complaints mechanism, the Single Entry Point (‘SEP’), as part of its increased efforts to strengthen the enforcement and implementation of trade commitments. Through the SEP, the Commission receives complaints on various matters related to trade policy, including breaches of the GSP commitments. Such new system of complaints should be integrated within the framework of this Regulation. |
(18) In July 2020, the Commission appointed the Chief Trade Enforcement Officer with the role of enforcing trade rules. In this connection, in November 2020, the Commission launched a new complaints mechanism, the Single Entry Point (‘SEP’), as part of its increased efforts to strengthen the enforcement and implementation of trade commitments. Through the SEP, the Commission receives complaints on various matters related to trade policy, including breaches of the GSP commitments. Such new system of complaints should be integrated within the framework of this Regulation and should be accessible to civil society organisations and human rights defenders, both from the Union and the beneficiary countries. |
Amendment 7
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 26
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(26) Orderly international migration can bring important benefits to the countries of origin and destination of migrants and contribute to their sustainable development needs. Increasing coherence between trade, development and migration policies is key to ensure that the benefits of migration accrue mutually to both the origin and destination countries. In this respect, it is essential for both origin and destination countries to address common challenges, such as, stepping up cooperation on readmission of own nationals and their sustainable reintegration in the country of origin, in particular in order to avoid a constant drain in active population in the countries of origin, with the ensuing long-term consequences on development, and to ensure that migrants are treated with dignity. |
(26) Orderly international migration can bring important benefits to the countries of origin and destination of migrants and contribute to their sustainable development needs. Increasing coherence between trade, development and migration policies is key to ensure that the benefits of migration accrue mutually to both the origin and destination countries. In this respect, it is essential for both origin and destination countries to address common challenges, such as, stepping up cooperation on readmission of own nationals and their sustainable reintegration in the country of origin, in particular in order to avoid a constant drain in active population in the countries of origin, with the ensuing long-term consequences on development, and to ensure that migrants are treated with dignity and that their human rights are fully respected. |
Amendment 8
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(27) Return, readmission and reintegration are a common challenge for the Union and its partners. In particular, every State has the obligation to readmit its own nationals under international customary law, and multilateral international conventions such as the Convention on International Civil Aviation signed in Chicago on 7 December 1944. Improving sustainable reintegration and capacity building would significantly strengthen the local development in the partner countries. |
deleted |
Amendment 9
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 11 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(11 a) ‘serious and systematic violation’ means widespread and systematic human rights violations or abuses that are of serious concern, as regards the objectives of the common foreign and security policy set out in Article 21 TEU, which includes but is not limited to the following: |
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i. genocide; |
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ii. crimes against humanity; |
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iii. torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; |
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iv. slavery or forced labour; |
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v. extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings; |
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vi. enforced disappearance of persons; |
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vii. arbitrary arrests or detentions; |
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viii. trafficking in human beings, including people-smuggling; |
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ix. sexual and gender-based violence; |
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x. other violations of the laws and customs of war; |
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xi. violations or abuses of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association; |
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xii. violations or abuses of freedom of opinion and expression; |
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xiii. violations or abuses of freedom of religion or belief; |
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Indicators to determine whether such serious and systematic violations have occurred should be clear and include, amongst others: |
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(i) rulings and opinions by international human rights courts, courts, arbitration panels and tribunals or other judicial authorities and mechanisms; |
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(ii) establishment and findings of commissions of inquiry, fact-finding missions, special rapporteurs, or other monitoring mechanisms by the UN Human Rights Council or General Assembly or by other regional intergovernmental bodies; |
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(iii) findings by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Special Procedures, or other UN independent human rights experts; |
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(iv) reports by the Advisory Body and civil society organisations. |
Amendment 10
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 11 b (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(11 b) ‘human rights due diligence obligations’ refers to the responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights and to protect against human rights abuse by business as set in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) in 2011. The responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights refers to internationally recognized human rights – understood, at a minimum, as those expressed in the International Bill of Human Rights and the principles concerning fundamental rights set out in the International Labour Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. |
Amendment 11
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 11 c (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(11 c) ‘civil society organisation’ means a wide range of actors with multiple roles and mandates, which may vary over time and across institutions and countries, and includes all non-State, not-for-profit independent and non-violent structures, through which people organise the pursuit of shared objectives and ideals, including political, cultural, religious, environmental, social or economic, and which operate at local, national, regional or international levels, and which comprise urban and rural, indigenous, formal and informal organisations; |
Amendment 12
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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Article 3 a |
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Human rights and environmental impact assessmentBefore granting any preferential regime to a country, the Commission should conduct and publish an ex-ante human rights and environmental impact assessment in order to identify, assess, and indicate measures to prevent, mitigate, address and combat any risk of human rights or environmental violations. |
Amendment 13
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(b a) the results of an ex ante human rights and environmental impact assessment carried out by the Commission pursuant to article 3 paragraph a (new) show a considerable risk of negative impact on human rights or on the environment in the beneficiary country, and proposed measures to prevent, address and combat it are insufficient or have not been accepted by the beneficiary country’s government; |
Amendment 14
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(b a) there is sufficient ground to consider that serious and systematic shortcomings and violations of the conditions set out in Article 19.1 points (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) exist; |
Amendment 15
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point b c (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(b c) it has not signed nor ratified the conventions listed in Annex VI within five years upon the application of the preferences; |
Amendment 16
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point b d (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(b d) it has adopted domestic legislative and administrative measures that manifestly aim to undermine the effective implementation of the due diligence requirements under Union law, and in particular Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council1a, Regulation (EU) 995/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council1b and Council Regulation (EC) 2368/20021c; |
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1a Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas (OJ L 130, 19.5.2017, p. 1). |
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1b Regulation (EU) 995/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 laying down the obligations of operators who place timber and timber products on the market (OJ L 295, 12.11.2010, p.23). |
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1c Council Regulation (EC) No 2368/2002 of 20 December 2002 implementing the Kimberley Process certification scheme for the international trade in rough diamonds (OJ L 358, 31.12.2002, p. 28). |
Amendment 17
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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1 a. The Commission and, where applicable, the European External Action Service, shall make sure that countries that benefit from the standard arrangement referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article have ratified the conventions listed in Annex VI within the five years upon the application of the preferences; |
Amendment 18
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 b (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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1 b. The Commission shall encourage beneficiary countries to adopt measures in line with the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, such as the adoption of National Action Plans and in line with their commitment ensure the ratification of the conventions listed in Annex VI. It shall be possible to finance assistance programs under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, established by Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
Amendment 19
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point b
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(b) it has ratified all the conventions listed in Annex VI (the 'relevant conventions') and the Commission has not identified, based on available information, in particular the most recent available conclusions of the monitoring bodies under those conventions, a serious failure to effectively implement any of those conventions; |
(b) it has ratified and started to implement all the conventions listed in Annex VI (the 'relevant conventions') and the Commission has not identified, based on available information, in particular the most recent available conclusions of the monitoring bodies under those conventions as well as information submitted by the Advisory Body or the civil society organisations, a serious failure to effectively implement any of those conventions; |
Amendment 20
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point d
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(d) it gives a binding undertaking to maintain ratification of the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof, accompanied by a plan of action for the effective implementation of the relevant conventions; |
(d) it gives a binding undertaking to ratify and ensure effective implementation of the relevant conventions by an ambitious and public time-bound plan of action of measures that are necessary to effectively implement the relevant conventions, setting out a roadmap with clear benchmarks and deadlines, and that shall be approved by the Commission in consultation with the European Parliament. The beneficiary country and the Commission should reach a common understanding on the plan of action, which shall thereafter be made public. The plan of action shall serve as a basis for the report referred to in Article 14; |
Amendment 21
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point d a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(d a) it has not adopted domestic legislative and administrative measures that manifestly aim to undermine the effective implementation of the due diligence requirements under Union law, and in particular Regulations (EU) 2017/821, (EU) 995/2010 and (EC) 2368/2002 and has adopted a National Action Plan for the implementation on Business and Human Rights, in conformity with the Guidance on National Action Plans of the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights; |
Amendment 22
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point f a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(f a) the results of an ex ante human rights and environmental impact assessment carried out by the Commission pursuant to article 3 paragraph a (new) do not show a considerable risk of negative impact on human rights or on the environment in the beneficiary country, or proposed measures to prevent and address it are sufficient and have been accepted by the beneficiary country’s government; |
Amendment 23
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point b
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(b) the Commission considers, based on examination of the request, that the requesting country fulfils the conditions laid down in Article 9. |
(b) the Commission considers, based on examination of the request, including but not limited to the plan of action as indicated in article 9 paragraph 1 (d), as well as on the results of the human rights impact assessment referred to in Article 3, paragraph a (new), that the requesting country fulfils the conditions laid down in Article 9. |
Amendment 24
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 2
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
2. The requesting country shall submit its request to the Commission in writing. The request shall provide comprehensive information concerning the ratification of the relevant conventions and shall include the binding undertakings referred to in Article 9, pointes (d), (e), and (f). |
2. The requesting country shall submit its request to the Commission in writing. The request shall provide comprehensive information concerning the ratification and implementation of the relevant conventions and shall include the binding undertakings referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e), and (f), including a finalised plan of action. |
Amendment 25
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 4
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
4. After examining the request, the Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I in order to grant a requesting country the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance by including that country in the list of GSP+ beneficiary countries. |
4. While examining the request, the European Commission shall consult the European Parliament and the Council and the advisory body referred to in Article 13a (new). After examining the request, the Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I in order to grant a requesting country the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance by including that country in the list of GSP+ beneficiary countries. |
Amendment 26
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
1. The Common Customs Tariff ad valorem duties on all products listed in Annex III and Annex VII, which originate in a GSP+ beneficiary country, shall be suspended. |
1. The Common Customs Tariff ad valorem duties on all products listed in Annex III and Annex VII, which originate in a GSP+ beneficiary country, shall be suspended according to the tariff suspension schedule referred to in Article 9(2). |
Amendment 27
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
1. As of the date of the granting of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the Commission shall, with regard to each of the GSP+ beneficiary countries, keep under review and monitor the status of ratification of the relevant conventions and their effective implementation, as well as the cooperation of the GSP+ beneficiary country with the relevant monitoring bodies. In doing so, the Commission shall examine all relevant information, in particular the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies. |
1. As of the date of the granting of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the Commission shall, with regard to each of the GSP+ beneficiary countries, keep under review and monitor the status of ratification of the relevant conventions and their effective implementation, as well as the cooperation of the GSP+ beneficiary country with the relevant monitoring bodies. In doing so, the Commission shall assess the progress made by the GSP+ beneficiary countries in implementing their plans of action, as well as examine all relevant information, including the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies as well as duly substantiated information submitted by individual citizens, private sector actors, civil society organisations, representatives of trade unions and other relevant stakeholders. The information may also be submitted via the Single Entry Point, which shall be accessible to stakeholders from both the Union and GSP+ beneficiary countries. The Commission, including through the EEAS and the delegations, should hold regular contacts with local and international civil society to assess the beneficiary countries’ implementation of the conventions listed in annex VI. A cycle of 3 years for the review, monitoring and assessment (hereinafter monitoring cycle) is hereby established. During the application period and monitoring cycle, the Commission shall also enquire the views of the European Parliament expressed by its competent committees and through the relevant resolutions adopted during plenaries. |
Amendment 28
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 2
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
2. A GSP+ beneficiary country shall cooperate with the Commission and provide all information necessary to assess its respect of the binding undertakings referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e), and (f) and its situation as regards Article 9, points (b) and (c). |
2. A GSP+ beneficiary country shall cooperate with the Commission and provide all information necessary to assess its respect of the binding undertakings referred to in Article 9, points (d) including the implementation of its plan of action, (e), and (f) and its situation as regards Article 9, points (b) and (c). |
Amendment 29
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 2 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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2 a. The Commission, where applicable jointly with the EEAS, shall carry out at least one high-level monitoring mission per monitoring cycle to the beneficiary countries in order to assess progress on the ground, including in line with the plans of action. In the framework of the mission, relevant stakeholders, including civil society organizations and human rights defenders in the beneficiary countries shall be duly consulted. |
Amendment 30
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 2 b (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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2 b. At the beginning of each monitoring cycle, the Commission shall send a list of issues to all GSP+ beneficiary countries outlining implementation issues that need to be addressed during the cycle. The lists of issues shall be made publicly available. |
Amendment 31
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 2 c (new)
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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2 c. The plans of action and the recommendations of the Commission and European External Action Service on priority implementation actions shall be taken into account in the EU development finance programming in order to support GSP+ beneficiary countries in attaining their commitments. |
Amendment 32
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 a (new)
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
|
Article 13 a |
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Advisory Body |
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1. The Commission shall be assisted in reviewing, monitoring and assessing the binding undertakings referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f) by an advisory body composed of stakeholders’ representatives. |
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2. The Commission shall consult with the advisory body in regards to the plans of action submitted by the GSP+ beneficiary countries in view of their application to the GSP+ scheme; to that purpose, the participation to the advisory body shall be extended to stakeholders in the beneficiary countries. The Commission shall also consult with and report to the advisory body when assessing the implementation of the plans of action during each monitoring cycle and more generally throughout the cycle as regularly as necessary, including ahead of and after monitoring missions. |
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3. The advisory body shall also monitor possible measures by GSP+ beneficiary countries’ legislation underminingthe due diligence requirements under Union law, and in particular Regulations (EU) No 2017/821, (EU) No 995/2010 and (EC) No 2368/2002. |
Amendment 33
Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 1
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
1. By 1 January 2027, and every three years thereafter, the Commission shall present to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the status of ratification of the relevant conventions, the compliance of the GSP+ beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions and the status of the effective implementation thereof. |
1. By 1 January 2027, and every two years thereafter, the Commission shall present to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the status of ratification of the relevant conventions, the compliance of the GSP+ beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions and the status of the effective implementation thereof, which includes scorecards that are being evaluated with the beneficiary countries and are also based on but not limited to the assessment of the implementation of the plans of action. |
Amendment 34
Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(b) the Commission's and where appropriate the European External Action Service’s conclusions on whether each GSP+ beneficiary country respects its binding undertakings to comply with reporting obligations, to cooperate with relevant monitoring bodies in accordance with the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof |
(b) the Commission's and where appropriate the European External Action Service’s conclusions on whether each GSP+ beneficiary country respects its binding undertakings to comply with reporting obligations, to cooperate with relevant monitoring bodies in accordance with the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof, including through an assessment of the implementation of its plan of action, and |
Amendment 35
Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b a (new)
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
|
(b a) a copy of the scorecard that the Commission has evaluated with the beneficiary country |
Amendment 36
Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
The report may include any information from any source the Commission considers appropriate. |
The report may include any information from any source the Commission considers appropriate, including from civil society organizations and social partners. |
Amendment 37
Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 3
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
3. In drawing their conclusions concerning effective implementation of the relevant conventions, the Commission and where appropriate the European External Action Service shall assess the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies, as well as, without prejudice to other sources, information submitted by the European Parliament or the Council as well as third parties, including governments and international organisations, civil society, and social partners. |
3. In drawing their conclusions concerning effective implementation of the relevant conventions, the Commission and where appropriate the European External Action Service shall assess the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies. It shall also request the opinion of the European Parliament and the Council, and shall assess, without prejudice to other sources, information submitted by third parties, including complaints submitted through the Single Entry Point, such as governments and international organisations, civil society, and social partners. |
Amendment 38
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
1. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance shall be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products originating in a GSP+ beneficiary country, where that country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), or the GSP+ beneficiary country has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c). |
1. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance shall be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products originating in a GSP+ beneficiary country, where that country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), including in case of major shortcomings in implementing or of systemic failure to implement the plan of action referred to in Article 9 point (d) are identified, or the GSP+ beneficiary country has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c). |
Amendment 39
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 3
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
3. Where, either on the basis of the conclusions of the report referred to in Article 14 or on the basis of the evidence available, including evidence submitted through a complaint, the Commission has a reasonable doubt that a particular GSP+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), or has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c), it shall, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for the temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council thereof. |
3. At the request of the European Parliament or where, either on the basis of the conclusions of the report referred to in Article 14 or on the basis of the evidence available, including evidence submitted by the European Parliament through its competent committees and through the relevant resolutions adopted during plenaries, and evidence submitted through a complaint, the Commission has a reasonable doubt that a particular GSP+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), including with regards to implementation of its plan of action or has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c), it shall, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for the temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council thereof. |
Amendment 40
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 5
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
5. The Commission shall provide the GSP+ beneficiary country concerned with every opportunity to cooperate during the period referred to in paragraph 4, point (b). |
5. The Commission shall provide the GSP+ beneficiary country concerned with every opportunity to cooperate and engage with a view to addressing the violations of its binding undertakings as referred to in paragraph 3 during the period referred to in paragraph 4, point (b). |
Amendment 41
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 6
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
6. The Commission shall seek all information it considers necessary including, inter alia, the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies. In drawing its conclusions, the Commission shall assess all relevant information. |
6. The Commission shall seek all information it considers necessary including, inter alia, the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies. In drawing its conclusions, the Commission shall assess all relevant information, including from civil society organisations and social partners. |
Amendment 42
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 8
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
8. Where the Commission considers that the findings do not justify temporary withdrawal, it shall adopt an implementing act to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). That implementing act shall be based inter alia on evidence received. |
8. Where the Commission considers, based on the elements referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6, that a temporary withdrawal is not justified, it shall adopt an implementing act to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). That implementing act shall be based inter alia on evidence received. |
Amendment 43
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 9
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
9. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b). In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, when appropriate, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country. |
9. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b). The Commission shall clearly and publicly state the grounds for withdrawing preferences and set clear benchmarks that the beneficiary country should meet for the preferences to be reinstated; such benchmarks may also guide a phased approach, including the progressive withdrawal or reinstatement of part of the benefits against clear benchmarks and conditions. |
Amendment 44
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 10 a (new)
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
|
10 a. During the application of a temporary withdrawal, the Commission shall continue the dialogue with the beneficiary country, including in the framework referred to in Article 18a, aiming at remedying the reasons for the withdrawal referred to in paragraph 3. The Commission shall regularly assess the effects of the withdrawal on remedying the violations, including in the report referred to in Article 14, as well as on the human rights and socio-economic situation of the population concerned. The Commission shall regularly consult with the advisory body referred to in Article 13a throughout the procedure. |
Amendment 45
Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 1 a (new)
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
|
1 a. The Commission and, where applicable the EEAS, shall make sure that countries that benefit from the special arrangement referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article make continued and sustained progress towards ratifying the conventions listed in Annex VI. |
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EU development finance programming shall prioritise support to countries benefitting from the special arrangement referred to in paragraph 1 aiming to make progress towards the ratification of the conventions listed in Annex VI. |
Amendment 46
Proposal for a regulation
Chapter V – title
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
Temporary withdrawal provisions common to all arrangements |
Enhanced engagement and temporary withdrawal provisions common to all arrangements |
Amendment 47
Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 a(new)
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
|
Article 18 a (new) |
|
In the framework of a Cooperation, Partnership or Association Agreement the EU has concluded with a beneficiary country, a general review of the status of the country in the framework of the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) shall be conducted yearly and in consultation with the European Parliament. To that purpose, the Commission, and where relevant the European External Action Service, and the beneficiary country shall review the issues pertaining to the conditions referred to in Article 19(1), including in relation to any complaints received by the Commission. The Commission, where relevant the European External Action Service, and the beneficiary country shall also review the status of the ratification of the conventions listed in Annex VI as referred to in Article4(1) point (c) and progress towards ratification of the conventions listed in Annex VI as referred to in Article 17(1a). |
Amendment 48
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
1. The preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) may be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products originating in a beneficiary country, for any of the following reasons: |
1. The preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) may be withdrawn temporarily, fully or partly, in respect of all or certain products or economic sectors, originating in a beneficiary country, for any of the following reasons: |
Amendment 49
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new)
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
|
(a a) the beneficiary country fails to show effective implementation of the plan of action; |
Amendment 50
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
|
(b a) when the Commission, acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative, considers that there may be sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article1 (2) on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 19 a) or b), the Commission may before publishing the notice referred § 4 art 19 enhance its engagement with the partner country and negotiate a dedicated and timebound action plan to remedy the violations including through a full cooperation with the UN human rights and labour rights monitoring mechanisms; |
Amendment 51
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point b b (new)
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
|
(b b) when the Commission decides to withdraw a preferential arrangement to a beneficiary country in a particular economic sector, in application of article 19 (a and b) the commission may publish a list of companies, EU importers and local suppliers, that may still benefit from preferences. This list should be established based on the evidence provided by companies that they fully implemented their human rights due diligence obligations and that they have a supply chain free from human rights violations; |
Amendment 52
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point c
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(c) serious shortcomings in customs controls on the export or transit of drugs (illicit substances or precursors), or related to the obligation to readmit the beneficiary country’s own nationals or serious failure to comply with international conventions on antiterrorism or anti-money laundering; |
(c) serious shortcomings in customs controls on the export or transit of drugs (illicit substances or precursors), or serious failure to comply with international conventions on antiterrorism or anti-money laundering; |
Amendment 53
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1 a (new)
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
|
1 a. For the purpose of applying point 1 (a), the Commission will in particular take into account whether the relevant monitoring bodies, treaty mechanisms and supervisory mechanisms have signalled potentially serious and systematic violations of the principles of the relevant conventions, based on such indicators as: |
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- the establishment of commission of inquiries, fact-finding missions, country special rapporteurs, or other monitoring mechanisms by the UN Human Rights Council or General Assembly; |
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- findings by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Special Procedures or other UN independent human rights experts; |
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- reports of the ILO Committee of Application of Standards; |
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- rulings and opinions by international human rights courts; |
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- reports by Advisory Body and civil society organisations. |
Amendment 54
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 2 a (new)
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
|
2 a. When in particular the seriousness of the violations of principles of the international conventions listed in Annex VI so requires, based on available assessments, comments, decisions, recommendations and the conclusions of the relevant monitoring bodies, or based on duly substantiated concerns expressed by the European Parliament, the Council, international organisations, and civil society including trade unions, or acting upon a complaint, the Commission shall notify the beneficiary country. |
|
Starting from the date of the notification and during one year, the beneficiary country and the Commission shall enter into an enhanced engagement, where the country commits to adopt time-bound roadmaps providing for concrete actions and sustainable solutions to the serious and systematic violations as identified. |
|
The Commission shall regularly consult with the advisory body referred to in Article 13a during the enhanced engagement process. |
Amendment 55
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 2 b (new)
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
|
2 b. If considered necessary, the enhanced engagement may be prolonged by up to another year. The Commission shall publish a list of countries with which enhanced engagement has been prolonged beyond one year and shall regularly update the list as necessary. The roadmaps referred to in paragraph 2a shall be made public. |
Amendment 56
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 3
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
3. Where the Commission, acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative, considers that there are sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the adoption of that implementing act. |
3. At the request of the European Parliament or where the Commission, acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative, considers that there may be sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) because the beneficiary country has failed to deliver in the framework of the enhanced engagement or on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the adoption of that implementing act. |
Amendment 57
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 3 a (new)
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
|
3 a. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council about the complaints received. The Commission shall inform the complainant, the European Parliament and the Council where it decides that the complaint does not provide sufficient evidence in relation to the indicators referred to in this article. |
Amendment 58
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 4 – point b
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(b) state that the Commission will monitor and evaluate the situation in the beneficiary country concerned during the monitoring and evaluation period referred to in Paragraph 5. |
(b) state that the Commission will continue to pursue dialogue in the framework of the enhanced engagement and monitor and evaluate the situation in the beneficiary country concerned during the monitoring and evaluation period referred to in Paragraph 5. |
Amendment 59
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 5
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
5. The Commission shall provide the beneficiary country concerned with every opportunity to cooperate during the monitoring and evaluation period of six months from the date of publication of the notice. |
5. The Commission shall provide the beneficiary country concerned with every opportunity to start engaging with and cooperate at any time during the monitoring and evaluation period of six months from the date of publication of the notice. |
Amendment 60
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 6
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
6. The Commission shall seek all information it considers necessary, inter alia, the available assessments, comments, decisions, recommendations and conclusions of the relevant monitoring bodies, and relevant information from other sources, including evidence submitted through a complaint or provided by third parties , as appropriate. In drawing its conclusions, the Commission shall assess all relevant information. |
6. The Commission shall seek all information it considers necessary, inter alia, the available assessments, comments, decisions, recommendations and conclusions of the relevant monitoring bodies, and relevant information from other sources, including evidence submitted through a complaint or provided by third parties , as appropriate. In drawing its conclusions, the Commission shall assess all relevant information and consider the progress made by the country in delivering on its roadmap in the framework of the enhanced engagement as referred to in paragraph 2a. |
Amendment 61
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 7
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
7. Within three months from the expiry of the period referred to in paragraph 5, the Commission shall submit a report on its findings and conclusions to the beneficiary country concerned. The beneficiary country has the right to submit its comments on the report. The period for comments shall not exceed one month. |
7. Within three months from the expiry of the period referred to in paragraph 5, and after consultation of the advisory body referred to in Article 13(a), the Commission shall submit a report on its findings and conclusions to the beneficiary country concerned. The beneficiary country has the right to submit its comments on the report. The period for comments shall not exceed one month. |
Amendment 62
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 9
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
9. Where the Commission considers that the findings do not justify temporary withdrawal, it shall adopt an implementing act, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), on the termination of the temporary withdrawal procedure. |
9. Where the Commission considers, based on the elements referred to in paragraph 6, that a temporary withdrawal is not justified, it shall adopt an implementing act, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), on the termination of the temporary withdrawal procedure. |
Amendment 63
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 10
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
10. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II, in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2). In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, where appropriate, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country. |
10. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II, in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2). |
Amendment 64
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 12 a (new)
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
|
12 a. During the application of a temporary withdrawal, the Commission shall continue the dialogue with the beneficiary country, including in the framework referred to in Article 18a, aiming at remedying the reasons for the withdrawal referred to in paragraph 1. The Commission shall regularly assess the effects of the withdrawal on remedying the violations, and shall consult with the advisory body referred to in Article 13a. |
Amendment 65
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 16
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
16. Where the Commission considers that there is sufficient evidence to justify temporary withdrawal for the reason set out in paragraph 1, point (a) and the exceptional gravity of the violations calls for a rapid response in view of the specific circumstances in the beneficiary country, it shall initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with paragraphs (3) to (15). However, the period referred to in paragraph 4, point (b) is reduced to 2 months and the deadline referred to in paragraph 8 is reduced to 5 months. |
16. Where the Commission considers that there is sufficient evidence to justify temporary withdrawal for the reason set out in paragraph 1, point (a) and the exceptional gravity of the violations calls for a rapid response in view of the specific circumstances in the beneficiary country, it shall initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with paragraphs (3) to (15). However, the period referred to in paragraph 4, point (b) is reduced to 1 month and the deadline referred to in paragraph 8 is reduced to 3 months. |
Amendment 66
Proposal for a regulation
Article 40 – paragraph 1
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
By 1 January 2027 and every three years thereafter, the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the effects of the scheme covering the most recent three-year period and all of the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2). |
By 1 January 2027 and every two years thereafter, the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the effects of the scheme covering the most recent two-year period and all of the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2). |
Amendment 67
Proposal for a regulation
Annex VI – paragraph 1 – row 1 a (new)
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
|
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) |
Amendment 68
Proposal for a regulation
Annex VI – paragraph 1 – row 1 b (new)
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
|
First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) |
Amendment 69
Proposal for a regulation
Annex VI – paragraph 1 – row 1 c (new)
|
|
Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
|
ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (1989) |
PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION
Title |
Applying a generalized scheme of tariff preferences and repealing Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council |
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References |
COM(2021)0579 – C9-0364/2021 – 2021/0297(COD) |
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Committee responsible Date announced in plenary |
INTA 4.10.2021 |
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Opinion by Date announced in plenary |
AFET 4.10.2021 |
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Associated committees - date announced in plenary |
20.1.2022 |
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Rapporteur for the opinion Date appointed |
Maria Arena 11.11.2021 |
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Discussed in committee |
10.12.2021 |
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|
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Date adopted |
2.2.2022 |
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Result of final vote |
+: –: 0: |
60 14 0 |
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Members present for the final vote |
Alviina Alametsä, Alexander Alexandrov Yordanov, François Alfonsi, Maria Arena, Petras Auštrevičius, Traian Băsescu, Nicolas Bay, Malin Björk, Anna Bonfrisco, Reinhard Bütikofer, Fabio Massimo Castaldo, Susanna Ceccardi, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Katalin Cseh, Tanja Fajon, Anna Fotyga, Michael Gahler, Sunčana Glavak, Raphaël Glucksmann, Klemen Grošelj, Bernard Guetta, Sandra Kalniete, Peter Kofod, Dietmar Köster, Andrius Kubilius, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, David Lega, Miriam Lexmann, Nathalie Loiseau, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Claudiu Manda, Lukas Mandl, Thierry Mariani, Pedro Marques, David McAllister, Vangelis Meimarakis, Jörg Meuthen, Francisco José Millán Mon, Javier Nart, Gheorghe-Vlad Nistor, Urmas Paet, Demetris Papadakis, Kostas Papadakis, Tonino Picula, Manu Pineda, Giuliano Pisapia, Thijs Reuten, María Soraya Rodríguez Ramos, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Isabel Santos, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Andreas Schieder, Radosław Sikorski, Jordi Solé, Sergei Stanishev, Tineke Strik, Dominik Tarczyński, Hermann Tertsch, Dragoş Tudorache, Harald Vilimsky, Idoia Villanueva Ruiz, Viola Von Cramon-Taubadel, Thomas Waitz, Witold Jan Waszczykowski, Charlie Weimers, Salima Yenbou, Željana Zovko |
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Substitutes present for the final vote |
Karsten Lucke, Marisa Matias, Paulo Rangel, Peter van Dalen, Mick Wallace, Javier Zarzalejos |
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Substitutes under Rule 209(7) present for the final vote |
Samira Rafaela |
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FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION
60 |
+ |
NI |
Fabio Massimo Castaldo |
PPE |
Alexander Alexandrov Yordanov, Traian Băsescu, Peter van Dalen, Michael Gahler, Sunčana Glavak, Sandra Kalniete, Andrius Kubilius, David Lega, Miriam Lexmann, Antonio López-Istúriz White, David McAllister, Lukas Mandl, Vangelis Meimarakis, Francisco José Millán Mon, Gheorghe-Vlad Nistor, Paulo Rangel, Radosław Sikorski, Javier Zarzalejos, Željana Zovko |
Renew |
Petras Auštrevičius, Katalin Cseh, Klemen Grošelj, Bernard Guetta, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Javier Nart, Urmas Paet, Samira Rafaela, María Soraya Rodríguez Ramos, Dragoş Tudorache |
S&D |
Maria Arena, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Tanja Fajon, Raphaël Glucksmann, Dietmar Köster, Karsten Lucke, Claudiu Manda, Pedro Marques, Demetris Papadakis, Tonino Picula, Giuliano Pisapia, Thijs Reuten, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Isabel Santos, Andreas Schieder, Sergei Stanishev |
The Left |
Malin Björk, Marisa Matias, Manu Pineda, Idoia Villanueva Ruiz, Mick Wallace |
Verts/ALE |
Alviina Alametsä, François Alfonsi, Reinhard Bütikofer, Jordi Solé, Tineke Strik, Viola Von Cramon-Taubadel, Thomas Waitz, Salima Yenbou |
14 |
- |
ECR |
Anna Fotyga, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Dominik Tarczyński, Hermann Tertsch, Witold Jan Waszczykowski, Charlie Weimers |
ID |
Nicolas Bay, Anna Bonfrisco, Susanna Ceccardi, Peter Kofod, Thierry Mariani, Jörg Meuthen, Harald Vilimsky |
NI |
Kostas Papadakis |
0 |
0 |
|
|
Key to symbols:
+ : in favour
- : against
0 : abstention
OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON DEVELOPMENT (8.03.2022)
for the Committee on International Trade
on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on applying a generalised scheme of tariff preferences and repealing Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council
(COM(2021)0579 – C9‑0364/2021 – 2021/0297(COD))
Rapporteur for opinion: Anna‑Michelle Asimakopoulou
PA_Legam
SHORT JUSTIFICATION
The GSP is one of the EU’s key trade instruments for supporting developing countries in their efforts to promote sustainable development, reduce poverty and ensure respect for human rights.
The rapporteur points out that GSP is primarily a development tool, and that any proposals to extend the Positive Conditionality, currently applied exclusively to GSP+ beneficiaries as part of the special incentive arrangements, would be counterproductive to this fundamental principle.
Plans of Action
The new GSP provides for GSP+ beneficiaries to submit an accompanying Plan of Action as part of their binding undertakings to maintain ratification of the relevant conventions and to ensure their effective implementation.
The Plans of Action will help to ensure timely and effective implementation of the relevant conventions, a process that can be aided by the input of third-party stakeholders. This will only be possible if the concluded Plans of Action are publicly available.
It is therefore necessary to include a specific requirement for the publication of finalised Plans of Actions. This will aid their enforcement, and can contribute to the wider aims of improving transparency surrounding the monitoring and evaluation procedures associated with the special incentive arrangements provided to GSP+ beneficiaries.
Rapid Response Mechanism
The new GSP provides for a Rapid Response Mechanism that can be activated in cases of exceptionally grave violations, for which a reaction is deemed urgent.
The introduction of this mechanism takes note of the fact that all previous withdrawal of preferences under GSP have taken up to two years to conclude.
Given the exceptional circumstances and degree of urgency under which this mechanism is intended to be used, the current seven- month timeframe is insufficiently rapid and should therefore be further reduced.
AMENDMENTS
The Committee on Development calls on the Committee on International Trade, as the committee responsible, to take into account the following amendments:
Amendment 1
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(1) Since 1971, the Community has granted trade preferences to developing countries under its Generalised Scheme of Preferences (‘GSP’). |
(1) Since 1971, the Community has granted trade preferences to developing countries under its Generalised Scheme of Preferences (‘GSP’), which is one of the Union’s key trade instruments. |
Amendment 2
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(6) Those objectives remain relevant in the current global context and they are consistent with the analysis and perspective of the recent Commission Communication Trade Policy Review “An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy”16 (‘TPR’). According to the TPR, the Union has a “strategic interest to support the enhanced integration into the world economy of vulnerable developing countries” and it “must fully use the strength provided by its openness and the attractiveness of its Single Market” to support multilateralism and to ensure adherence to universal values. For GSP specifically, the TPR notes its important role in “promoting respect for core human and labour rights” and sets the objective for the GSP “to further increase trading opportunities for developing countries to reduce poverty and create jobs based on international values and principles”. Moreover, the scheme should assist beneficiaries in recovering from the COVID-19 impact and in re-building their economies in a sustainable manner, including with respect to international human rights, labour, environmental and good governance standards. Coherence should be ensured between the GSP and its objectives and the assistance provided to beneficiary countries, in line with Union’s Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), which constitutes a key pillar of Union’s efforts to enhance the positive impact and increase effectiveness of development cooperation17 . |
(6) Those objectives remain relevant in the current global context and they are consistent with the analysis and perspective of the recent Commission Communication Trade Policy Review “An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy”16 (‘TPR’). According to the TPR, the Union has a “strategic interest to support the enhanced integration into the world economy of vulnerable developing countries” and it “must fully use the strength provided by its openness and the attractiveness of its Single Market” to support multilateralism and to ensure adherence to universal values. For GSP specifically, the TPR notes its important role in “promoting respect for core human and labour rights” and sets the objective for the GSP “to further increase trading opportunities for developing countries to reduce poverty and create jobs based on international values and principles”. Moreover, the scheme should assist beneficiaries in recovering from the COVID-19 impact, reinforcing their capacity building and in re-building their economies in a sustainable manner, including with respect to international human rights, labour, environmental and good governance standards. Coherence should be ensured between the GSP and its objectives and the assistance provided to beneficiary countries, in line with Union’s Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), which constitutes a key pillar of Union’s efforts to enhance the positive impact and increase effectiveness of development cooperation17. The continued and sustained progress towards ratifying and implementing the core international conventions should be closely monitored, and Union development finance programming should be designed to duly take that objective into consideration. Such support should, as a priority, target countries benefiting from the special arrangements, given their economic vulnerability. In addition, NDICI-Global Europe should assist countries of the GSP scheme in raising their human rights and environmental standards in line with the obligations enshrined in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. |
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16 COM(2021) 66 final, 18 February 2021 |
16 COM(2021) 66 final, 18 February 2021 |
17 Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU concerning PCD reads: “The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries”. |
17 Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU concerning PCD reads: “The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries”. |
Amendment 3
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(9) The standard GSP arrangement should be granted to all those developing countries which share a common development need and are in a similar stage of economic development. There is no definition of ‘developing country’ at the level of the WTO, and it is left to preference granting countries to determine the list of GSP-eligible developing countries. Countries which have successfully completed their transition from centralised to market economies, and are today powerful economies with a strong position in international trade, such as China, Hong Kong, Macao and Russia, should not be considered as developing countries in the context of the GSP, and should, therefore, be removed from the list of eligible countries. Countries which are classified by the World Bank as high-income or upper-middle income countries have per capita income levels allowing them to attain higher levels of diversification without the scheme's tariff preferences. They are at a different stage of economic development and do not, therefore, share the same development, trade and financial needs as lower income or more vulnerable developing countries. In order to prevent unjustified discrimination, they need to be treated differently; therefore, they do not benefit from the standard GSP arrangement. Furthermore, the use of tariff preferences provided under the scheme by high-income or upper-middle income countries would increase the competitive pressure on exports from poorer, more vulnerable countries and, therefore, could impose unjustifiable burdens on those more vulnerable developing countries. The standard GSP arrangement should take account of the fact that the development, trade and financial needs are subject to change and ensure that the arrangement remains open if the situation of a country changes. |
(9) The standard GSP arrangement should be granted to all those developing countries which share a common development need and are in a similar stage of economic development and which have committed to signing and ratifying the international conventions referred to in Annex VI. Countries should have a transitional period of five years from the date of entry into force of that decision to comply with ratifications. There is no definition of ‘developing country’ at the level of the WTO, and it is left to preference granting countries to determine the list of GSP-eligible developing countries. Countries which have successfully completed their transition from centralised to market economies, and are today powerful economies with a strong position in international trade, such as China, Hong Kong, Macao and Russia, should not be considered as developing countries in the context of the GSP, and should, therefore, be removed from the list of eligible countries. Countries which are classified by the World Bank as high-income or upper-middle income countries have per capita income levels allowing them to attain higher levels of diversification without the scheme's tariff preferences. They are at a different stage of economic development and do not, therefore, share the same development, trade and financial needs as lower income or more vulnerable developing countries. In order to prevent unjustified discrimination, they need to be treated differently; therefore, they do not benefit from the standard GSP arrangement. Furthermore, the use of tariff preferences provided under the scheme by high-income or upper-middle income countries would increase the competitive pressure on exports from poorer, more vulnerable countries and, therefore, could impose unjustifiable burdens on those more vulnerable developing countries. The standard GSP arrangement should take account of the fact that the development, trade and financial needs are subject to change and ensure that the arrangement remains open if the situation of a country changes. |
Amendment 4
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(11) The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) is based on the integral concept of sustainable development, as recognised by international conventions and instruments such as the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the 1998 International Labour Organisation (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration, the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, the ILO Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work of 2019, the Outcome Document of the UN Summit on Sustainable Development of 2015 "Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Consequently, the additional tariff preferences provided for under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be granted to those developing countries which, due to a lack of diversification, are economically vulnerable, have ratified core international conventions on human and labour rights, climate and environmental protection and good governance, and commit to ensuring the effective implementation thereof. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should help those countries to assume the additional responsibilities resulting from the ratification and effective implementation of these conventions. The list of conventions relevant for GSP should be updated to better reflect the evolution of core international instruments and standards and take a proactive approach to sustainable development in keeping with the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 203018 . In this regard, the following conventions are added: the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (2015) – replacing the Kyoto Protocol; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OP-CRC-AC); ILO Convention No 81 on Labour Inspection; ILO Convention No 144 on Tripartite Consultation; and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. |
(11) The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) is based on the integral concept of sustainable development, as recognised by international conventions and instruments such as the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the 1998 International Labour Organisation (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration, the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, the ILO Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work of 2019, the Outcome Document of the UN Summit on Sustainable Development of 2015 "Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Consequently, the additional tariff preferences provided for under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be granted to those developing countries which, due to a lack of diversification, are economically vulnerable, have ratified and started implementing core international conventions on human and labour rights, climate and environmental protection and good governance, and commit to pursuing the effective implementation thereof, including through a public, ambitious and time-bound plan of action, adopted in accordance with this Regulation. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should help those countries to assume the additional responsibilities resulting from the ratification and effective implementation of these conventions. The list of conventions relevant for GSP should be updated to better reflect the evolution of core international instruments and standards and take a proactive approach to sustainable development in keeping with the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 203018 . In this regard, the following conventions are added: the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (2015) – replacing the Kyoto Protocol; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OP-CRC-AC); ILO Convention No 81 on Labour Inspection; ILO Convention No 144 on Tripartite Consultation; the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime; the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; Voluntary Guidelines for Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests (VGGT) and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP) and its principles on Free Prior and Informed Consent. |
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18 United Nations (2015). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, Transforming our World: the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1), available at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld |
18 United Nations (2015). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, Transforming our World: the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1), available at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld |
Amendment 5
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(15a) The application of the special incentive arrangement should comprise a public plan of action detailing priority-oriented list of measures to be taken which are considered necessary to effectively implement the international conventions. That plan of action should also include deadlines and identify the relevant bodies of the beneficiary country responsible for its implementation. Progress made in the implementation of the plan of action should feed into the monitoring process and failure to effectively implement the plan of action should be taken into consideration in the assessment of temporary withdrawals under the scheme; |
Amendment 6
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(16a) Civil society organisations and other relevant stakeholders should be consulted at all stages of the monitoring cycle, and the information they submit should be duly taken into account. For that purpose, an advisory body composed of representatives of such organisations and stakeholders should be set up, to assist the Commission in reviewing, monitoring and assessing the progress made by the beneficiary countries. |
Amendment 7
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(17) For the purposes of monitoring of implementation and, where applicable, withdrawal of tariff preferences, reports from relevant monitoring bodies are essential. However, such reports may be supplemented by other information available to the Commission, including information obtained under bilateral or multilateral technical assistance programmes, and through other sources of information, provided they are accurate and reliable. This could include information from the European Parliament and the Council, governments, international organisations, civil society, social partners, or complaints received through the SEP provided they satisfy the relevant requirements. Shortcomings identified during the monitoring process may inform the Commission’s future programming of development assistance in a more targeted manner. |
(17) For the purposes of monitoring of implementation and, where applicable, withdrawal of tariff preferences, reports from relevant monitoring bodies are essential. However, such reports may be supplemented by other information available to the Commission, including information obtained under bilateral or multilateral technical assistance programmes, and through other sources of information, provided they are accurate and reliable. This could include information from the European Parliament and the Council, governments, international organisations, civil society, human rights organisations, social partners, or complaints received through the SEP provided they satisfy the relevant requirements. Shortcomings identified during the monitoring process may inform the Commission’s future programming of development assistance in a more targeted manner. |
Amendment 8
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(18) In July 2020, the Commission appointed the Chief Trade Enforcement Officer with the role of enforcing trade rules. In this connection, in November 2020, the Commission launched a new complaints mechanism, the Single Entry Point (‘SEP’), as part of its increased efforts to strengthen the enforcement and implementation of trade commitments. Through the SEP, the Commission receives complaints on various matters related to trade policy, including breaches of the GSP commitments. Such new system of complaints should be integrated within the framework of this Regulation. |
(18) In July 2020, the Commission appointed the Chief Trade Enforcement Officer with the role of enforcing trade rules. In this connection, in November 2020, the Commission launched a new complaints mechanism, the Single Entry Point (‘SEP’), as part of its increased efforts to strengthen the enforcement and implementation of trade commitments. Through the SEP, the Commission receives complaints on various matters related to trade policy, including breaches of the GSP commitments. Such new system of complaints should be integrated within the framework of this Regulation and should be accessible to civil society organisations. |
Amendment 9
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 29
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(29) In order to achieve a balance between the need for better targeting, greater coherence and transparency on the one hand, and better promoting sustainable development and good governance through a unilateral trade preference scheme on the other hand, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in respect of amendments to the Annexes to this Regulation and temporary withdrawals of tariff preferences due to serious and systematic violations of the principles set out in the relevant conventions with respect to human and labour rights, climate and environmental protection, and good governance and other relevant grounds set out in this Regulation, as well as procedural rules regarding the submission of applications for the tariff preferences granted under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the conduct of a temporary withdrawal and safeguard investigations in order to establish uniform and detailed technical arrangements. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making21 . In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States' experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts. In order to provide a stable framework for economic operators, the power to adopt an act in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in respect of repealing a decision on temporary withdrawal under the urgent procedure before that decision to temporarily withdraw tariff preferences becomes applicable, where the reasons justifying temporary withdrawal no longer apply. The Commission should also be empowered to adopt delegated acts to postpone the date of application of an act imposing the temporary withdrawal, or to modify its scope, for reasons related to a global sanitary emergency or other exceptional circumstances. |
(29) In order to achieve a balance between the need for better targeting, greater coherence and transparency on the one hand, and better promoting sustainable development and good governance through a unilateral trade preference scheme on the other hand, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in respect of amendments to the Annexes to this Regulation and temporary withdrawals of tariff preferences due to violations of the principles set out in the relevant conventions with respect to human and labour rights, climate and environmental protection, and good governance and other relevant grounds set out in this Regulation, as well as procedural rules regarding the submission of applications for the tariff preferences granted under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the conduct of a temporary withdrawal and safeguard investigations in order to establish uniform and detailed technical arrangements. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making21 . In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States' experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts. In order to provide a stable framework for economic operators, the power to adopt an act in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in respect of repealing a decision on temporary withdrawal under the urgent procedure before that decision to temporarily withdraw tariff preferences becomes applicable, where the reasons justifying temporary withdrawal no longer apply. The Commission should also be empowered to adopt delegated acts to postpone the date of application of an act imposing the temporary withdrawal, or to modify its scope, for reasons related to a global sanitary emergency or other exceptional circumstances. |
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21 OJ L 123, 12.5.2016, p. 1. |
21 OJ L 123, 12.5.2016, p. 1. |
Amendment 10
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 10 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(10a) ‘plan of action’ means a priority-oriented list of measures, including legislative measures, to be adopted and actions to be taken by a beneficiary country which are considered necessary to effectively implement the core international conventions referred to in Annex VI; |
Amendment 11
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 10 b (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(10b) ‘enhanced engagement’ means a dialogue aiming to facilitate and incentivise countries benefitting from the arrangements referred to Article 1(2) to effectively implement the conventions; |
Amendment 12
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 10 c (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(10c) ‘list of issues’ means a list of objectives to effectively implement the core international conventions relevant to the GSP+ arrangement, as identified by the monitoring bodies and any information submitted by third parties, including civil society, human rights defenders and trade unions; |
Amendment 13
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 12
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(12) ‘complaint’ means a complaint submitted to the Commission through the Single Entry Point. |
(12) ‘complaint’ means a complaint submitted to the Commission through the Single Entry Point by third parties, including stakeholders or civil society organisations established in the Union or in the beneficiary countries covered by the schemes referred to Article 1(2) and relating to conditions and reasons referred to Articles 9 and 19; |
Justification
The reliance on the Single-Entry Point complaint mechanism should be opened to third country stakeholders, including human rights defenders, which is currently not the case.
Amendment 14
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(ba) there is sufficient ground to consider that shortcomings and violations of the conditions set out in Article 19(1) points (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) exist. |
Justification
Harnessing conditionalities linked to the GSP standard regime is necessary to promote effectively social and environmental standards through trade.
Amendment 15
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point b b (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(bb) it has not signed or ratified the conventions listed in Annex VI within five years of the application of the preferences, |
Amendment 16
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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1a. Union development finance programming shall support countries benefitting from the standard arrangement referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article aiming to ratify and implement the conventions listed in Annex VI. |
Justification
Enhanced social and environmental conditionality to benefit from preferential trade preferences should be embedded into the technical and financial assistance projects under the NDICI-Global Europe instrument.
Amendment 17
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 b (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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1b. The Commission shall regularly consult with the advisory body referred to in Article 13a during the monitoring process. |
Amendment 18
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point b
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(b) it has ratified all the conventions listed in Annex VI (the 'relevant conventions') and the Commission has not identified, based on available information, in particular the most recent available conclusions of the monitoring bodies under those conventions, a serious failure to effectively implement any of those conventions; |
(b) it has ratified all the conventions listed in Annex VI (the 'relevant conventions') and the Commission has not identified, based on available information, in particular the most recent available conclusions of the monitoring bodies under those conventions, including information provided by civil society organisations, human rights defenders and trade unions, a failure to effectively implement any of those conventions; |
Justification
The monitoring process linked to the effective implementation of Conventions should be harnessed through a better involvement of the civil society, human right defenders and trade unions.
Amendment 19
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point b
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(b) it has ratified all the conventions listed in Annex VI (the 'relevant conventions') and the Commission has not identified, based on available information, in particular the most recent available conclusions of the monitoring bodies under those conventions, a serious failure to effectively implement any of those conventions; |
(b) it has ratified, and is implementing, all the conventions listed in Annex VI (the 'relevant conventions') and the Commission has not identified, based on available information, in particular the most recent available conclusions of the monitoring bodies under those conventions, a serious failure to effectively implement any of those conventions; |
Amendment 20
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(ba) it has adopted a National Action Plan for the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, in conformity with the Guidance on National Action Plans of the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights; |
Amendment 21
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point d
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(d) it gives a binding undertaking to maintain ratification of the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof, accompanied by a plan of action for the effective implementation of the relevant conventions; |
(d) it gives a binding undertaking to maintain ratification of the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof, accompanied by a plan of action, for each listed objective, the plan of action with a timeframe, benchmarks and shall identify the relevant institution or structure responsible for its implementation and oversight; |
Amendment 22
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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1a. The plan of action referred to in point (d) shall be made publicly available after having been jointly agreed between the Union and the GSP beneficiary; |
Amendment 23
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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Article 9a |
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Union development finance programming shall prioritise support to countries benefitting from the special arrangement referred to in Article 9 aiming towards the ratification and the effective implementation of the conventions listed in Annex VI. |
Justification
Enhanced social and environmental conditionality to benefit from preferential trade preferences should be embedded into the technical and financial assistance projects under the NDICI-Global Europe instrument. Given their vulnerability and lack of economic diversification, EU development finance should prioritise support to countries benefiting from the special arrangements.
Amendment 24
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 2
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
2. The requesting country shall submit its request to the Commission in writing. The request shall provide comprehensive information concerning the ratification of the relevant conventions and shall include the binding undertakings referred to in Article 9, pointes (d), (e), and (f). |
2. The requesting country shall submit its request to the Commission in writing. The request shall provide comprehensive information concerning the ratification and the implementation of the relevant conventions and shall include the binding undertakings referred to in Article 9, pointes (d), (e), and (f). |
Amendment 25
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 2 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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2a. The plans of action and the recommendations of the Commission and European External Action Service on priority implementation actions shall be taken into account in the Union development finance programming in order to support GSP+ beneficiary countries in attaining their commitments. |
Amendment 26
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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Article 13a |
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Advisory Body |
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The Commission shall be assisted in reviewing, monitoring and assessing the binding undertakings referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f) by an advisory body composed of CSOs and stakeholders’ representatives from the Union and the GSP+ beneficiary countries throughout the monitoring cycle. |
Justification
To harness the monitoring process, a permanent advisory body composed of CSOs and stakeholders representatives from the EU and GSP+ beneficiary countries should assist the Commission in its monitoring role.
Amendment 27
Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 1
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
1. By 1 January 2027, and every three years thereafter, the Commission shall present to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the status of ratification of the relevant conventions, the compliance of the GSP+ beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions and the status of the effective implementation thereof. |
1. By 1 January 2026, and every two years thereafter, the Commission shall present to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the status of ratification of the relevant conventions, the compliance of the GSP+ beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions and the status of the effective implementation thereof. |
Amendment 28
Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
The report may include any information from any source the Commission considers appropriate. |
The report may include any information from any source the Commission considers appropriate, in particular in cooperation with civil society organisations. |
Amendment 29
Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 3
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
3. In drawing their conclusions concerning effective implementation of the relevant conventions, the Commission and where appropriate the European External Action Service shall assess the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies, as well as, without prejudice to other sources, information submitted by the European Parliament or the Council as well as third parties, including governments and international organisations, civil society, and social partners. |
3. In drawing their conclusions concerning effective implementation of the relevant conventions, the Commission and where appropriate the European External Action Service shall assess the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies, as well as, without prejudice to other sources, information submitted by the European Parliament or the Council as well as third parties, including governments and international organisations, civil society organisations, human rights organisations and social partners. |
Amendment 30
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 3
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
3. Where, either on the basis of the conclusions of the report referred to in Article 14 or on the basis of the evidence available, including evidence submitted through a complaint, the Commission has a reasonable doubt that a particular GSP+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), or has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c), it shall, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for the temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council thereof. |
3. Where, either on the basis of the conclusions of the report referred to in Article 14 or on the basis of the evidence available, including evidence submitted through a complaint, the Commission has a reasonable doubt that a particular GSP+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), including with regards to the implementation of its plan of action or has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c), it shall, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for the temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council thereof. |
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In its assessment of whether the GSP+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings referred to in Article 9(d), the Commission will in particular take into account whether the relevant monitoring bodies, treaty mechanisms and supervisory mechanisms have signalled potentially failure to effectively implement the relevant conventions of Annex VI, based on a set of identified indicators to report on progress. |
Amendment 31
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 3 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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3a. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament, the Council and the advisory body referred to in Article 13a about the complaints received. The Commission shall inform the complainant, the European Parliament, the Council and the advisory body referred to in Article 13a where it decides that the complaint does not provide sufficient evidence in relation to the indicators referred to in this Article. |
Amendment 32
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 6
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
6. The Commission shall seek all information it considers necessary including, inter alia, the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies. In drawing its conclusions, the Commission shall assess all relevant information. |
6. The Commission shall seek all information it considers necessary including, inter alia, the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies. In drawing its conclusions, the Commission shall assess all relevant information, including from civil society organisations, human rights defenders and social partners. |
Amendment 33
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 9
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
9. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b). In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, when appropriate, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country. |
9. Where the Commission considers, based on the outcome of the cooperation and engagement and the findings referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Article, and after consulting the advisory body referred to in Article 13a, that temporary withdrawal is justified for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b). The Commission shall clearly and publicly state the grounds for withdrawing preferences and set clear benchmarks that the beneficiary country should meet for the preferences to be reinstated. In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, when appropriate, consider the human rights and socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country, including with regard to impacts on women’s employment and empowerment and accordingly, consider a partial withdrawal, with a view to minimising the negative socio-economic impact on the GSP+ beneficiary country's population while maximising the leverage on its government. |
Amendment 34
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 10 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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10a. During the application of a temporary withdrawal, the Commission shall continue the dialogue with the beneficiary country, including in the framework referred to in Article 18a, aiming at remedying the reasons for the withdrawal referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article. The Commission shall regularly assess the effects of the withdrawal on remedying the violations, including in the report referred to in Article 14. The Commission shall regularly consult with the advisory body referred to in Article 13a. |
Amendment 35
Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 1 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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1a. The Commission and, where applicable, the European External Action Service, shall make sure that countries that benefit from the special arrangement referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall ratify the conventions listed in Annex VI and plan their effective implementation. |
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Union development finance programming shall prioritise support to countries benefitting from the special arrangement referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article aiming towards the ratification and the effective implementation of the conventions listed in Annex VI. |
Justification
Enhanced social and environmental conditionality to benefit from preferential trade preferences should be embedded into the technical and financial assistance projects under the NDICI-Global Europe instrument. Given their status of Least Developed Countries, EU development finance should prioritise support to countries benefiting from the special arrangements.
Amendment 36
Proposal for a regulation
Chapter V – title
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
Temporary withdrawal provisions common to all arrangements |
Enhanced engagement and temporary withdrawal provisions common to all arrangements |
Amendment 37
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph -1 (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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-1. In the framework of a Cooperation, Partnership or Association Agreement the Union has concluded with a beneficiary country, a general review of the status of the country in the framework of the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) shall be conducted yearly and in consultation with the European Parliament. To that end, the Commission, the European External Action Service where relevant, and the beneficiary country shall review the issues pertaining to the conditions referred to in Article 19(1), including in relation to any complaints received by the Commission. The Commission, the European External Action Service where relevant, and the beneficiary country shall also review the status of the ratification of the conventions listed in Annex VI as referred to in Article 4(1)(c) and progress towards ratification and effective implementation of the conventions listed in Annex VI as referred to in Article 17(1a). |
Justification
Preferential trade arrangements shall all be linked to the effective implementation of the social, environmental and good governance standards set in the Conventions listed in Annex VI. To this effect, a formal monitoring mechanism shall apply to the whole GSP Scheme.
Amendment 38
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
1. The preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) may be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products originating in a beneficiary country, for any of the following reasons: |
1. The preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) may be withdrawn temporarily, fully or partly, in respect of all or of certain products originating in, or of all or some economic sectors of a beneficiary country, for any of the following reasons: |
Justification
Considering that the withdrawal of trade preferences can impact negatively upon the most vulnerable, targeted sanctions should be considered, in line with the broader EU sanction regime targeting individuals and specific entities or the yellow card procedure.
Amendment 39
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point a
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(a) serious and systematic violation of principles laid down in the conventions listed in Annex VI; |
(a) violation of and failure to implement effectively the principles laid down in the conventions listed in Annex VI; |
Justification
To avoid a double standard policy in terms of human rights, environment and good governance, and with the view to creating a level playing field between the three GSP regimes, preferential trade arrangements shall all be linked to the effective implementation of the social, environmental and good governance standards set in the Conventions listed in Annex VI.
Amendment 40
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point c
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
(c) serious shortcomings in customs controls on the export or transit of drugs (illicit substances or precursors), or related to the obligation to readmit the beneficiary country’s own nationals or serious failure to comply with international conventions on antiterrorism or anti-money laundering; |
(c) serious shortcomings in customs controls on the export or transit of drugs (illicit substances or precursors), or serious failure to comply with international conventions on antiterrorism or anti-money laundering; |
Amendment 41
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point e a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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(ea) For the purpose of applying point 1(a), the Commission will in particular take into account whether the relevant monitoring bodies, treaty mechanisms and supervisory mechanisms have signalled potentially violations of the principles of the relevant conventions of Annex VI, based on a set of identified indicators. |
Amendment 42
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 2 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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2a. When the violations of principles of the international conventions listed in Annex VI so require, based on available assessments, comments, decisions, recommendations and the conclusions of the relevant monitoring bodies, or based on duly substantiated concerns expressed by the European Parliament, the Council, international organisations, and civil society organisations including trade unions and human rights defenders, or acting upon a complaint, the Commission shall notify the beneficiary country. |
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For a period of one year starting from the date of the notification, the beneficiary country and the Commission shall enter into an enhanced engagement, where the country commits to adopt time-bound roadmaps providing for concrete actions and sustainable solutions to the violations as identified. Once adopted, the roadmap should be made public. |
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The Commission shall regularly consult with the advisory body referred to in Article 13a during the enhanced engagement process. |
Amendment 43
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 3
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
3. Where the Commission, acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative, considers that there are sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the adoption of that implementing act. |
3. Where the Commission, acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative, considers that there are sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) because the beneficiary country has failed to deliver in the framework of the enhanced engagement or on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the adoption of that implementing act. |
Amendment 44
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 3 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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3a. Where the Commission, acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative, considers that there are sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) because the beneficiary country has failed to deliver in the framework of the enhanced engagement or on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the adoption of that implementing act. |
Amendment 45
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 10
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
10. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II, in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2). In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, where appropriate, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country. |
10. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II, in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2). In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, where appropriate, consider the socio-economic effect, including with regard to impacts on women’s employment and empowerment, of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country and accordingly, consider a partial withdrawal, with a view to minimising the negative socio-economic impact on the GSP+ beneficiary country's population while maximising the leverage on its government. |
Amendment 46
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 12 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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12a. During the application of a temporary withdrawal, the Commission shall continue the dialogue with the beneficiary country, including in the framework referred to in Article 18a, aiming at remedying the reasons for the withdrawal referred to in paragraph 1. The Commission shall regularly assess the effects of the withdrawal on remedying the violations, and shall consult with the advisory body referred to in Article 13a. |
Amendment 47
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 16
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
16. Where the Commission considers that there is sufficient evidence to justify temporary withdrawal for the reason set out in paragraph 1, point (a) and the exceptional gravity of the violations calls for a rapid response in view of the specific circumstances in the beneficiary country, it shall initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with paragraphs (3) to (15). However, the period referred to in paragraph 4, point (b) is reduced to 2 months and the deadline referred to in paragraph 8 is reduced to 5 months. |
16. Where the Commission considers that there is sufficient evidence to justify temporary withdrawal for the reason set out in paragraph 1, point (a) and the exceptional gravity of the violations calls for a rapid response in view of the specific circumstances in the beneficiary country, it shall initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal under the rapid response mechanism in accordance with paragraphs (3) to (15). However, the period referred to in paragraph 4, point (b) is reduced to 1 months and the deadline referred to in paragraph 8 is reduced to 3 months. |
Amendment 48
Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 2
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
2. An investigation shall be initiated upon request by a Member State, by any legal person or any association not having legal personality, acting on behalf of Union producers, or on the Commission's own initiative if it is apparent to the Commission that there is sufficient prima facie evidence, as determined on the basis of factors referred to in Article 23, to justify such initiation. The request to initiate an investigation shall contain evidence that the conditions for imposing the safeguard measure set out in Article 22(1) are met. The request shall be submitted to the Commission. The Commission shall, as far as possible, examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the request, to determine whether there is sufficient prima facie evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation. |
2. An investigation shall be initiated upon request by a Member State, by the European Parliament, by any legal person or any association not having legal personality, acting on behalf of Union producers, or on the Commission's own initiative if it is apparent to the Commission that there is sufficient prima facie evidence, as determined on the basis of factors referred to in Article 23, to justify such initiation. The request to initiate an investigation shall contain evidence that the conditions for imposing the safeguard measure set out in Article 22(1) are met. The request shall be submitted to the Commission. The Commission shall, as far as possible, examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the request, to determine whether there is sufficient prima facie evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation. |
Amendment 49
Proposal for a regulation
Annex VI – subheading 1 a (new)
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Text proposed by the Commission |
Amendment |
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UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People and its principles on Free Prior and Informed Consent (UNDRIP) (2007) |
Amendment 50
Proposal for a regulation
Annex VI – paragraph 1 b (new)
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Amendment |
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Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) |
Amendment 51
Proposal for a regulation
Annex VI – paragraph 1 c (new)
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Amendment |
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VGGT - Voluntary Guidelines for Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests (2012). |
PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION
Title |
Applying a generalized scheme of tariff preferences and repealing Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council |
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References |
COM(2021)0579 – C9-0364/2021 – 2021/0297(COD) |
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Committee responsible Date announced in plenary |
INTA 4.10.2021 |
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|
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Opinion by Date announced in plenary |
DEVE 4.10.2021 |
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Rapporteur for the opinion Date appointed |
Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou 22.9.2021 |
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Date adopted |
28.2.2022 |
|
|
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Result of final vote |
+: –: 0: |
24 2 0 |
||
PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION
Title |
Applying a generalized scheme of tariff preferences and repealing Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council |
|||
References |
COM(2021)0579 – C9-0364/2021 – 2021/0297(COD) |
|||
Committee responsible Date announced in plenary |
INTA 4.10.2021 |
|
|
|
Opinion by Date announced in plenary |
DEVE 4.10.2021 |
|||
Rapporteur for the opinion Date appointed |
Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou 22.9.2021 |
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Date adopted |
28.2.2022 |
|
|
|
Result of final vote |
+: –: 0: |
24 2 0 |
||
Members present for the final vote |
Barry Andrews, Eric Andrieu, Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou, Hildegard Bentele, Dominique Bilde, Udo Bullmann, Catherine Chabaud, Antoni Comín i Oliveres, Ryszard Czarnecki, Gianna Gancia, Charles Goerens, Mónica Silvana González, Pierrette Herzberger-Fofana, György Hölvényi, Rasa Juknevičienė, Beata Kempa, Karsten Lucke, Pierfrancesco Majorino, Erik Marquardt, Janina Ochojska, Christian Sagartz, Tomas Tobé, Miguel Urbán Crespo, Bernhard Zimniok |
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Substitutes present for the final vote |
María Soraya Rodríguez Ramos, Caroline Roose |
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FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION
24 |
+ |
ECR |
Ryszard Czarnecki, Beata Kempa |
ID |
Gianna Gancia |
NI |
Antoni Comín i Oliveres, |
PPE |
Anna‑Michelle Asimakopoulou, Hildegard Bentele, György Hölvényi, Rasa Juknevičienė, Janina Ochojska, Christian Sagartz, Tomas Tobé |
Renew |
Barry Andrews, Catherine Chabaud, Charles Goerens, María Soraya Rodríguez Ramos |
S&D |
Eric Andrieu, Udo Bullmann, Mónica Silvana González, Karsten Lucke, Pierfrancesco Majorino |
The Left |
Miguel Urbán Crespo |
Verts/ALE |
Pierrette Herzberger‑Fofana, Erik Marquardt, Caroline Roose |
2 |
- |
ID |
Dominique Bilde, Bernhard Zimniok |
0 |
0 |
|
|
Key to symbols:
+ : in favour
- : against
0 : abstention
PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE
Title |
Applying a generalized scheme of tariff preferences and repealing Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council |
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References |
COM(2021)0579 – C9-0364/2021 – 2021/0297(COD) |
|||
Date submitted to Parliament |
23.9.2021 |
|
|
|
Committee responsible Date announced in plenary |
INTA 4.10.2021 |
|
|
|
Committees asked for opinions Date announced in plenary |
AFET 4.10.2021 |
DEVE 4.10.2021 |
|
|
Associated committees Date announced in plenary |
AFET 20.1.2022 |
|
|
|
Rapporteurs Date appointed |
Heidi Hautala 3.12.2020 |
|
|
|
Discussed in committee |
9.11.2021 |
25.1.2022 |
28.2.2022 |
|
Date adopted |
3.5.2022 |
|
|
|
Result of final vote |
+: –: 0: |
33 0 8 |
||
Members present for the final vote |
Barry Andrews, Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou, Tiziana Beghin, Geert Bourgeois, Saskia Bricmont, Markus Buchheit, Udo Bullmann, Jordi Cañas, Daniel Caspary, Arnaud Danjean, Paolo De Castro, Emmanouil Fragkos, Raphaël Glucksmann, Markéta Gregorová, Roman Haider, Christophe Hansen, Heidi Hautala, Danuta Maria Hübner, Herve Juvin, Bernd Lange, Margarida Marques, Gabriel Mato, Sara Matthieu, Emmanuel Maurel, Samira Rafaela, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Massimiliano Salini, Ernő Schaller-Baross, Helmut Scholz, Sven Simon, Dominik Tarczyński, Mihai Tudose, Kathleen Van Brempt, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Jörgen Warborn, Iuliu Winkler, Jan Zahradil, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez |
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Substitutes present for the final vote |
Marco Campomenosi, Agnes Jongerius, Morten Løkkegaard |
|||
PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE
Title |
Applying a generalized scheme of tariff preferences and repealing Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council |
|||
References |
COM(2021)0579 – C9-0364/2021 – 2021/0297(COD) |
|||
Date submitted to Parliament |
23.9.2021 |
|
|
|
Committee responsible Date announced in plenary |
INTA 4.10.2021 |
|
|
|
Committees asked for opinions Date announced in plenary |
AFET 4.10.2021 |
DEVE 4.10.2021 |
|
|
Associated committees Date announced in plenary |
AFET 20.1.2022 |
|
|
|
Rapporteurs Date appointed |
Heidi Hautala 3.12.2020 |
|
|
|
Discussed in committee |
9.11.2021 |
25.1.2022 |
28.2.2022 |
|
Date adopted |
3.5.2022 |
|
|
|
Result of final vote |
+: –: 0: |
33 0 8 |
||
Date tabled |
17.5.2022 |
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FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE
33 |
+ |
ID |
Markus Buchheit, Marco Campomenosi, Roman Haider, Herve Juvin |
NI |
Tiziana Beghin |
PPE |
Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou, Daniel Caspary, Arnaud Danjean, Danuta Maria Hübner, Gabriel Mato, Massimiliano Salini, Sven Simon, Iuliu Winkler, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez |
Renew |
Barry Andrews, Jordi Cañas, Morten Løkkegaard, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne |
S&D |
Udo Bullmann, Paolo De Castro, Raphaël Glucksmann, Agnes Jongerius, Bernd Lange, Margarida Marques, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Mihai Tudose, Kathleen Van Brempt |
The Left |
Emmanuel Maurel, Helmut Scholz |
Verts/ALE |
Saskia Bricmont, Markéta Gregorová, Heidi Hautala, Sara Matthieu |
0 |
- |
|
|
8 |
0 |
ECR |
Geert Bourgeois, Emmanouil Fragkos, Dominik Tarczyński, Jan Zahradil |
NI |
Ernő Schaller-Baross |
PPE |
Christophe Hansen, Jörgen Warborn |
Renew |
Samira Rafaela |
Key to symbols:
+ : in favour
- : against
0 : abstention