



2023/2104(INL)

21.2.2024

AMENDMENTS

1 - 134

Draft report

Ana Collado Jiménez, Niklas Nienäß

(PE758.177v02-00)

Permanent system for the allocation of seats in the European Parliament
((2023/2104(INL))

Amendment 1
Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution
Citation 6

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

- *having regard to its legislative resolution of 3 May 2022 on the proposal for a Council Regulation on the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, repealing Council Decision (76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom) and the Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage annexed to that Decision ('resolution of 3 May 2022 on the reform of the electoral law of the European Union'),* *deleted*

Or. en

Amendment 2
Antonio Maria Rinaldi, Gerolf Annemans, Gilles Lebreton

Motion for a resolution
Citation 6

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

- *having regard to its legislative resolution of 3 May 2022 on the proposal for a Council Regulation on the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, repealing Council Decision (76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom) and the Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage annexed to that Decision ('resolution of 3 May 2022 on the reform of the electoral law of the European Union'),* *deleted*

Or. en

Amendment 3

Charles Goerens, Sandro Gozi, Max Orville, Alin Mituța

Motion for a resolution

Citation 6 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

- *having regard to its resolutions of 9 June 2022 on the call for a Convention for the revision of the Treaties, and of 22 November 2023 on proposals of the European Parliament for the amendment of the Treaties,*

Or. en

Amendment 4

Charles Goerens, Sandro Gozi, Max Orville, Alin Mituța

Motion for a resolution

Citation 6 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

- *having regard to the European Council Conclusions of 14 and 15 December 2023,*

Or. en

Amendment 5

Charles Goerens, Sandro Gozi, Max Orville, Alin Mituța

Motion for a resolution

Citation 6 c (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

- *having regard to the Enlargement Package adopted by the European Commission on 8 November 2023,*

Amendment 6

Charles Goerens, Sandro Gozi, Max Orville, Alin Mituța

Motion for a resolution

Citation 6 d (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

– *having regard to its resolution of 28 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement,*

Amendment 7

Antonio Maria Rinaldi, Gerolf Annemans, Gilles Lebreton

Motion for a resolution

Recital A

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

A. whereas the European Parliament is the only institution of the Union where citizens are directly represented; whereas the citizens' well founded expectation to be fairly represented in this institution is a matter of democratic legitimacy;

A. whereas the European Parliament is the only institution of the Union where citizens are directly represented; whereas the citizens' well founded expectation to be fairly represented in this institution is a matter of democratic legitimacy; ***whereas, in any event, the European Parliament cannot be compared to a national parliament in terms of representativeness;***

Amendment 8

Loránt Vincze, Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution

Recital A a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Aa. whereas representation of the interests of citizens from the Member States concerns both indirect representation in the Council of the European Union and direct representation in the European Parliament; whereas the voting system in the Council already takes into account population in the calculation for qualified majority voting; whereas this needs to be considered when deciding on the allocation of seats in the European Parliament;

Or. en

Amendment 9
Loránt Vincze, Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution
Recital A b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Ab. whereas it essential that big and smaller Member States can effectively contribute to the decisions of the European Union;

Or. en

Amendment 10
Loránt Vincze, Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

B. whereas Article 14(2) TEU states that the European Parliament shall be composed of representatives of the Union's citizens;

B. whereas Article 14(2) TEU states that the European Parliament shall be composed of representatives of the Union's citizens; *whereas according to this paragraph the seats of the Parliament are to be distributed among Member States*

with a minimum and maximum number of seats per Member State; whereas Article 14 does not refer to any alternative distribution of seats to that among Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 11

Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution

Recital D

Motion for a resolution

D. whereas the composition of the European Parliament must respect the criteria laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 14(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), namely no more than seven hundred and fifty representatives of the Union's citizens, plus the President, representation being degressively proportional, with a minimum threshold of six members per Member State and no Member State being allocated more than ninety-six seats;

Amendment

D. whereas the composition of the European Parliament must respect the criteria laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 14(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), namely no more than seven hundred and fifty representatives of the Union's citizens, plus the President, representation being degressively proportional, with a minimum threshold of six members per Member State and no Member State being allocated more than ninety-six seats; ***whereas these are the only criteria foreseen and allowed by the Treaties;***

Or. en

Amendment 12

Loránt Vincze, Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution

Recital D a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Da. whereas in order to ensure comparability of population figures necessary to distribute seats, the same reference population data and period

should be used;

Or. en

Amendment 13

Loránt Vincze, Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution

Recital E

Motion for a resolution

E. whereas ***the basis for the calculation of the number of seats per member states is to be based on Eurostat data on these member states' resident population in accordance with a method established by means of Regulation (EU) No 1260/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council ;*** whereas the calculation includes mobile EU citizens;

Amendment

E. whereas ***since the adoption of Regulation (EU) No 1260/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council, the calculation of the number of seats per Member State has been based on Eurostat data on these member states' « usual resident population » in accordance with a method established in the regulation;*** whereas the calculation ***also*** includes ***third country citizens, stateless persons as well as*** mobile EU citizens;

Or. en

Amendment 14

Charles Goerens, Sandro Gozi, Max Orville, Alin Mituța

Motion for a resolution

Recital E

Motion for a resolution

E. whereas the basis for the calculation of the number of seats per member states is to be based on Eurostat data on these member states' resident population in accordance with a method established by means of Regulation (EU) No 1260/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council ; whereas the ***calculation includes*** mobile EU citizens;

Amendment

E. whereas the basis for the calculation of the number of seats per member states is to be based on Eurostat data on these member states' resident population in accordance with a method established by means of Regulation (EU) No 1260/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council ; whereas the ***figures include*** mobile EU citizens;

Or. en

Amendment 15
Domènec Ruiz Devesa

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

Motion for a resolution

F. whereas the European Council has repeatedly requested that Parliament propose an objective, fair, durable and transparent method to allocate the seats in the European Parliament ; ***whereas, despite considering the issue , Parliament has not put forward a proposal for such an allocation method so far***; whereas there is a renewed call for Parliament to present a proposal as European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 of 22 September 2023 establishing the composition of the European Parliament requests that by the end of 2026 and in advance of the proposal on its composition, the European Parliament should propose an objective, fair, durable and transparent seat allocation method implementing the principle of degressive proportionality, without prejudice to the institutions' prerogatives under the Treaties; whereas the European Council Decision further states that, taking into account the impact of possible future developments, such a method should safeguard a sustainable maximum number of members of the European Parliament;

Amendment

F. whereas the European Council has repeatedly requested that Parliament propose an objective, fair, durable and transparent method to allocate the seats in the European Parliament ; whereas there is a renewed call for Parliament to present a proposal as European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 of 22 September 2023 establishing the composition of the European Parliament requests that by the end of 2026 and in advance of the proposal on its composition, the European Parliament should propose an objective, fair, durable and transparent seat allocation method implementing the principle of degressive proportionality, without prejudice to the institutions' prerogatives under the Treaties; whereas the European Council Decision further states that, taking into account the impact of possible future developments, such a method should safeguard a sustainable maximum number of members of the European Parliament;

Or. en

Amendment 16
Charles Goerens, Sandro Gozi, Max Orville, Alin Mituța

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

F. whereas the European Council has ***repeatedly requested that Parliament propose*** an objective, fair, durable and ***transparent*** method to allocate the seats in the European Parliament ; whereas, despite considering the issue , Parliament has not put forward a proposal for such an allocation method so far; whereas ***there is a renewed call for Parliament to present a proposal as European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 of 22 September 2023 establishing*** the composition of the European Parliament ***requests that by the end of 2026 and in advance of the proposal on its composition, the European Parliament should propose an objective, fair, durable and transparent*** seat allocation method implementing the principle of degressive proportionality, without prejudice to the institutions' prerogatives under the Treaties; whereas the European Council Decision further states that, taking into account the impact of possible future developments, such a method should safeguard a sustainable maximum number of members of the European Parliament;

F. whereas the European Council has ***on several occasions outlined the benefits of*** an objective, fair, durable and ***clear*** method to allocate the seats in the European Parliament ; whereas, despite considering the issue, Parliament has not put forward a proposal for such an allocation method so far; whereas Parliament, ***in its legislative resolution of 15 June 2023 on*** the composition of the European Parliament, ***committed to resume works on a permanent*** seat allocation method implementing the principle of degressive proportionality, without prejudice to the institutions' prerogatives under the Treaties; whereas the European Council Decision ***(EU) 2023/2061 of 22 September 2023 establishing the Composition of the European Parliament,*** further states that, taking into account the impact of possible future developments, such a method should safeguard a sustainable maximum number of members of the European Parliament;

Or. en

Amendment 17

Antonio Maria Rinaldi, Gilles Lebreton

Motion for a resolution

Recital F

Motion for a resolution

F. whereas the European Council has repeatedly requested that Parliament propose an objective, fair, durable and transparent method to allocate the seats in the European Parliament ; whereas, despite considering the issue , Parliament has not put forward a proposal for such an allocation method so far; whereas there is a renewed call for Parliament to present a

Amendment

F. whereas the European Council has repeatedly requested that Parliament propose an objective, fair, durable and transparent method to allocate the seats in the European Parliament ; whereas, despite considering the issue , Parliament has not put forward a proposal for such an allocation method so far; whereas there is a renewed call for Parliament to present a

proposal as European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 of 22 September 2023 establishing the composition of the European Parliament requests that by the end of 2026 and in advance of the proposal on its composition, the European Parliament should propose an objective, fair, **durable** and transparent seat allocation method implementing the principle of degressive proportionality, without prejudice to the institutions' prerogatives under the Treaties; whereas the European Council Decision further states that, taking into account the impact of possible future developments, such a method should safeguard a sustainable maximum number of members of the European Parliament;

proposal as European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 of 22 September 2023 establishing the composition of the European Parliament requests that by the end of 2026 and in advance of the proposal on its composition, the European Parliament should propose an objective, fair and transparent seat allocation method implementing the principle of degressive proportionality, without prejudice to the institutions' prerogatives under the Treaties; whereas the European Council Decision further states that, taking into account the impact of possible future developments, such a method should safeguard a sustainable maximum number of members of the European Parliament;

Or. en

Amendment 18
Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Fa. whereas any seat allocation system in the European Parliament cannot ignore the institutional framework set out in the Treaties and therefore has to be considered together with the voting system in the Council;

Or. en

Amendment 19
Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

G. whereas European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 of 22 September 2023 establishing the composition of the European Parliament for the 2024-2029 legislative term increases the size of Parliament from 705 to 720 members; whereas the Treaty currently sets an upper limit of 751 members; ***whereas the current solution used to avoid seat losses by individual member states of tapping into the remaining reserve of seats until the upper limit is reached is neither sustainable nor contributes to a more equitable allocation of seats; whereas this situation underlines the need for an agreement on an objective, fair, durable and transparent seat allocation method;***

G. whereas European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 of 22 September 2023 establishing the composition of the European Parliament for the 2024-2029 legislative term increases the size of Parliament from 705 to 720 members; whereas the Treaty currently sets an upper limit of 751 members;

Or. en

Amendment 20
Antonio Maria Rinaldi

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

Motion for a resolution

G. whereas European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 of 22 September 2023 establishing the composition of the European Parliament for the 2024-2029 legislative term increases the size of Parliament from 705 to 720 members; whereas the Treaty currently sets an upper limit of 751 members; whereas the current solution ***used to avoid*** seat losses by individual member states ***of tapping into the remaining reserve of seats until the upper limit is reached is neither sustainable nor contributes to a more equitable allocation of seats;*** whereas ***this situation underlines the need for an agreement on an objective, fair, durable and transparent seat allocation method;***

Amendment

G. whereas European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 of 22 September 2023 establishing the composition of the European Parliament for the 2024-2029 legislative term increases the size of Parliament from 705 to 720 members; whereas the Treaty currently sets an upper limit of 751 members; whereas the current solution ***avoids*** seat losses by individual member states; whereas an objective, fair, durable and transparent seat allocation method ***should not be based on a permanent mathematical calculation;*** ***whereas the minimum and maximum threshold of seats per Member State laid down in the Treaty per se alters the mathematical relationship between population and number of seats;*** whereas ***adequate consideration should be given to***

other factors, such as the contribution to the European budget of the individual states;

Or. en

Amendment 21

Charles Goerens, Sandro Gozi, Max Orville, Alin Mituța

Motion for a resolution

Recital G

Motion for a resolution

G. whereas European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 of 22 September 2023 establishing the composition of the European Parliament for the 2024-2029 legislative term increases the size of Parliament from 705 to 720 members; whereas the Treaty currently sets an upper limit of 751 members; whereas the current solution used to avoid seat losses by individual member states of tapping into the remaining reserve of seats until the upper limit is reached is *neither* sustainable *nor contributes to a more equitable allocation of seats*; whereas this situation underlines the need for *an agreement* on an objective, fair, durable and *transparent* seat allocation method;

Amendment

G. whereas European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 of 22 September 2023 establishing the composition of the European Parliament for the 2024-2029 legislative term increases the size of Parliament from 705 to 720 members; whereas the Treaty currently sets an upper limit of 751 members; whereas the current solution used to avoid seat losses by individual member states of tapping into the remaining reserve of seats until the upper limit is reached is *not* sustainable; whereas this situation underlines the need for *the reopening of discussions* on an objective, fair, durable and *clear* seat allocation method;

Or. en

Amendment 22

Domènec Ruiz Devesa

Motion for a resolution

Recital G

Motion for a resolution

G. whereas European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 of 22 September 2023 establishing the composition of the

Amendment

G. whereas European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 of 22 September 2023 establishing the composition of the

European Parliament for the 2024-2029 legislative term increases the size of Parliament from 705 to 720 members; whereas the Treaty currently sets an upper limit of 751 members; whereas the **current** solution used to avoid seat losses by individual member states of tapping into the remaining reserve of seats until the upper limit is reached is neither sustainable nor contributes to a more equitable allocation of seats; whereas this situation underlines the need for an agreement on an objective, fair, **durable** and transparent seat allocation method;

European Parliament for the 2024-2029 legislative term increases the size of Parliament from 705 to 720 members; whereas the Treaty currently sets an upper limit of 751 members; whereas the solution used to avoid seat losses by individual member states of tapping into the remaining reserve of seats until the upper limit is reached is neither sustainable nor contributes to a more equitable allocation of seats; whereas this situation underlines the need for an agreement on an objective, fair, **permanent** and transparent seat allocation method;

Or. en

Amendment 23
Gerolf Annemans, Gilles Lebreton

Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Ga. whereas the seats in the European Parliament left by the United Kingdom after Brexit have been partly redistributed among the Member States; whereas in the interest of the European tax payers it would have been preferable not to redistribute part of the seats left by the United Kingdom, but to deduct them from the total number provided for by the Treaty;

Or. en

Amendment 24
Antonio Maria Rinaldi, Gilles Lebreton

Motion for a resolution
Recital H – indent 4

Motion for a resolution

– when allocating seats in the European Parliament, consideration is to be given to demographic developments in the Member States.

Amendment

– when allocating seats in the European Parliament, consideration is to be given to demographic developments in the Member States, ***as well as to factors such as contribution to the EU budget.***

Or. en

Amendment 25

Antonio Maria Rinaldi, Gilles Lebreton

Motion for a resolution

Recital I

Motion for a resolution

I. whereas further to these principles, ***a*** future seat allocation ***method*** should be objective and transparent in terms of procedural application and data used, fair in terms of the equality of votes, ***and durable with respect to its application irrespective of variations in the populations of the Member States, the number of Member States, and the total number of EP seats;***

Amendment

I. whereas further to these principles, ***the*** future seat allocation ***methods*** should be objective and transparent in terms of procedural application and data used, fair in terms of the equality of votes;

Or. en

Amendment 26

Charles Goerens, Sandro Gozi, Max Orville, Alin Mituța

Motion for a resolution

Recital I

Motion for a resolution

I. whereas further to these principles, a future seat allocation method should be objective ***and transparent*** in terms of procedural application and data used, fair in terms of the equality of votes, and ***durable with respect to its application***

Amendment

I. whereas further to these principles, a future seat allocation method should be objective, ***and clear*** in terms of procedural application and data used, fair in terms of the equality of votes, and ***adaptable to*** variations in the populations of the

irrespective of variations in the populations of the Member States, *the number of Member States*, and the *total* number of EP seats;

Member States, and the number of EP seats
Parliament aims at using;

Or. en

Amendment 27
Domènec Ruiz Devesa

Motion for a resolution
Recital I

Motion for a resolution

I. whereas further to these principles, a future seat allocation method should be objective and transparent in terms of procedural application and data used, fair in terms of the equality of votes, and *durable* with respect to its application irrespective of variations in the populations of the Member States, the number of Member States, and the total number of EP seats;

Amendment

I. whereas further to these principles, a future seat allocation method should be objective and transparent in terms of procedural application and data used, fair in terms of the equality of votes, and *permanent* with respect to its application irrespective of variations in the populations of the Member States, the number of Member States, and the total number of EP seats;

Or. en

Amendment 28
Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution
Recital J

Motion for a resolution

J. whereas it is necessary to ensure that the allocation method is flexible enough to accommodate future EU enlargements and possible changes to applicable Union law, *and in particular to the Treaties or EU electoral law*;

Amendment

J. whereas it is necessary to ensure that the allocation method is flexible enough to accommodate future EU enlargements and possible changes to applicable Union law;

Or. en

Amendment 29

Charles Goerens, Sandro Gozi, Max Orville, Alin Mituța

Motion for a resolution

Recital J

Motion for a resolution

J. whereas it is necessary to ensure that the allocation method is flexible enough to accommodate **future EU enlargements and** possible changes to applicable Union law, and in particular to the **Treaties or** EU electoral law;

Amendment

J. whereas it is necessary to ensure that the allocation method is flexible enough to accommodate possible changes to applicable Union law, and in particular to the EU electoral law;

Or. en

Amendment 30

Antonio Maria Rinaldi, Gilles Lebreton

Motion for a resolution

Recital J

Motion for a resolution

J. whereas **it is necessary to ensure that the allocation method is flexible enough to accommodate** future EU enlargements and possible changes to applicable Union law, and in particular to the Treaties or EU electoral law;

Amendment

J. whereas, **in light of the** future EU enlargements and possible changes to applicable Union law, and in particular to the Treaties or EU electoral law, **it is not possible to establish a permanent allocation method**;

Or. en

Amendment 31

Sandro Gozi, Charles Goerens, Alin Mituța, Max Orville

Motion for a resolution

Recital J a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Ja. Whereas compliance with the principle of sincere cooperation, as

enshrined in Articles 4.3 and 13.2 TEU, involves mutual efforts towards the attainment of the Union's objectives; whereas the call on Parliament to identify a permanent system of seat allocation is not matched by similar efforts on the Council side to pursue works on Parliament's proposal for the reform of the Electoral Law;

Or. en

Amendment 32
Gerolf Annemans, Gilles Lebreton

Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Ja. whereas the establishment of a European constituency for the election of 28 members on transnational lists is not feasible, as it would alter the proportions between population and the number of seats allocated in the EP;

Or. en

Amendment 33
Charles Goerens, Sandro Gozi, Max Orville, Alin Mituța

Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Ja. whereas the perspective of enlargement imposes an in-depth reform of the Union's institutional architecture and policies that would affect the composition of the European Parliament;

Or. en

Amendment 34

Antonio Maria Rinaldi, Gerolf Annemans, Gilles Lebreton

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2

Motion for a resolution

2. **Welcomes** that European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 has tasked the Parliament with proposing an objective, fair, **durable** and transparent seat allocation method implementing the principle of degressive proportionality, without prejudice to the prerogatives of the institutions under the Treaties

Amendment

2. **Takes note of the fact** that European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 has tasked the Parliament with proposing an objective, fair and transparent seat allocation method implementing the principle of degressive proportionality, without prejudice to the prerogatives of the institutions under the Treaties; **emphasises in this regard that the competence to decide on the composition of the Parliament lies with the European Council;**

Or. en

Amendment 35

Charles Goerens, Sandro Gozi, Max Orville, Alin Mituța

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2

Motion for a resolution

2. **Welcomes that European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 has tasked the Parliament with proposing** an objective, fair, durable and **transparent** seat allocation method implementing the principle of degressive proportionality, without prejudice to the prerogatives of the institutions under the Treaties

Amendment

2. **Recalls that** Parliament, **in its legislative resolutions of 15 June and of 13 September 2023 has committed to resume works on** an objective, fair, durable and **clear** seat allocation method implementing the principle of degressive proportionality, without prejudice to the prerogatives of the institutions under the Treaties

Or. en

Amendment 36

Niklas Nienäß

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2

Motion for a resolution

2. Welcomes that European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 **has tasked the** Parliament **with proposing** an objective, fair, durable and transparent seat allocation method implementing the principle of degressive proportionality, without prejudice to the prerogatives of the institutions under the Treaties

Amendment

2. Welcomes that European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 **included that** Parliament **shall propose** an objective, fair, durable and transparent seat allocation method implementing the principle of degressive proportionality, without prejudice to the prerogatives of the institutions under the Treaties;

Or. en

Amendment 37

Pascal Durand

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2

Motion for a resolution

2. Welcomes that European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 has **tasked** the Parliament **with proposing** an objective, fair, durable and transparent seat allocation method implementing the principle of degressive proportionality, without prejudice to the prerogatives of the institutions under the Treaties

Amendment

2. Welcomes that European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 has **requested** the Parliament **to propose** an objective, fair, durable and transparent seat allocation method implementing the principle of degressive proportionality, without prejudice to the prerogatives of the institutions under the Treaties

Or. en

Amendment 38

Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 2 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

2a. *Underlines that this discussion needs to take place at an inter-institutional level and should therefore involve the Council and the European Commission;*

Or. en

Amendment 39

Antonio Maria Rinaldi, Gilles Lebreton

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 3

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

3. *Points out that Treaty requirements together with political realities have led to ad hoc negotiated agreements on the composition of the European Parliament every mandate; observes that the reason for the politicisation is the aim of every Member State to minimise seat losses and maximise seat gains in absolute or relative terms; emphasises that in the last two decisions concerning the allocation of seats, seats were allocated that became available after the United Kingdom left the EU; highlights that, in the long-term, this strategy is not sustainable, given the Treaty limitation of a maximum of 751 seats and the potentially distortive effects of a political solution, rendering an agreement on an equitable allocation in the future more difficult;*

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 40

Rainer Wieland

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 3

Motion for a resolution

3. Points out that Treaty requirements together with political realities have led to ad hoc negotiated agreements on the composition of the European Parliament every mandate; observes that the reason for the politicisation is the aim of every Member State to minimise seat losses and maximise seat gains in absolute or relative terms; emphasises that in the last two decisions concerning the allocation of seats, seats were allocated that became available after the United Kingdom left the EU; highlights that, in the long-term, this strategy is not sustainable, given the Treaty limitation of a maximum of 751 seats and the potentially distortive effects of a political solution, rendering an agreement on an equitable allocation in the future more difficult;

Amendment

3. Points out that Treaty requirements together with political realities have led to ad hoc negotiated agreements on the composition of the European Parliament every mandate; observes that the reason for the politicisation is the aim of every Member State to minimise seat losses and maximise seat gains in absolute or relative terms; ***deplores, in this context, antagonistic voting in plenary, which the countries concerned see as a loss of appreciation and which could be instrumentalised at domestic level for nationalist debates;*** emphasises that in the last two decisions concerning the allocation of seats, seats were allocated that became available after the United Kingdom left the EU; highlights that, in the long-term, this strategy is not sustainable, given the Treaty limitation of a maximum of 751 seats and the potentially distortive effects of a political solution, rendering an agreement on an equitable allocation in the future more difficult;

Or. de

Amendment 41

Loránt Vincze, Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 3

Motion for a resolution

3. Points out that Treaty requirements together with political realities have led to ad hoc negotiated agreements on the composition of the European Parliament every mandate; observes that the reason for the ***politicisation*** is the aim of every Member State to minimise seat losses and maximise seat gains in absolute or relative

Amendment

3. Points out that Treaty requirements together with political realities have led to ad hoc negotiated agreements on the composition of the European Parliament every mandate; observes that the reason for the ***politically sensitive nature of seat distribution*** is the aim of every Member State to minimise seat losses and maximise

terms; emphasises that in the last two decisions concerning the *allocation of seats*, seats were allocated that became available after the United Kingdom left the EU; highlights that, in the long-term, this strategy is not sustainable, given the Treaty limitation of a maximum of 751 seats and the potentially distortive effects of a political solution, rendering an agreement on an equitable allocation in the future more difficult;

seat gains in absolute or relative terms *and to ensure their citizens adequate representation in the Parliament also in view of QMV calculations in the Council*; emphasises that in the last two decisions concerning the *composition of the European Parliament* seats were allocated that became available after the United Kingdom left the EU; highlights that, in the long-term, this strategy is not sustainable, given the Treaty limitation of a maximum of 751 seats and the potentially distortive effects of a political solution, rendering an agreement on an equitable allocation in the future more difficult;

Or. en

Amendment 42

Sandro Gozi, Charles Goerens, Alin Mituța, Max Orville

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 3

Motion for a resolution

3. Points out that Treaty *requirements* together with political realities have led to ad hoc negotiated agreements on the composition of the European Parliament every mandate; observes that the *reason for the politicisation is the aim of every Member State* to minimise seat losses and maximise seat gains in absolute or relative terms; emphasises that in the last two decisions concerning the allocation of seats, seats were allocated that became available after the United Kingdom left the EU; highlights that, in the long-term, this strategy is not sustainable, given the Treaty limitation of a maximum of 751 seats and the *potentially distortive effects of a political solution, rendering an agreement on an equitable allocation in the future more difficult*;

Amendment

3. Points out that *the decision-making procedure established by the Treaty*, together with political realities, have led to ad hoc negotiated agreements on the composition of the European Parliament every mandate; observes that the *unanimity vote requirement in the European Council gives Member States incentives* to minimise seat losses and maximise seat gains in absolute or relative terms; emphasises that in the last two decisions concerning the allocation of seats, seats were allocated that became available after the United Kingdom left the EU; highlights that, in the long-term, this strategy is not sustainable, given the Treaty limitation of a maximum of 751 seats and the *request of Parliament to allocate 28 seats to a Union-wide constituency*;

Or. en

Amendment 43
Domènec Ruiz Devesa

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

3a. Whereas the proposal on the allocation of seats for the European Parliament composition for the 2029-2034 legislative term shall include a reserve of 28 additional seats for members elected in an Union-wide constituency in line with Parliament's proposal on the Electoral Law as adopted on 3 May 2022; points out that, in line with that proposal, those seats can only be taken up after the elections following the entry into force of a revised Electoral Law including the necessary provisions for the Union-wide constituency;

Or. en

Amendment 44
Charles Goerens, Sandro Gozi, Max Orville, Alin Mituța

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

3a. Recalls that, in its legislative resolution of 22 November 2023 on proposals of the European Parliament for the amendment of the Treaties, Parliament has proposed amendments to Article 14(2) underlines that these amendments aim at making the composition of the European Parliament Parliament's competence, subject to the Council's consent, and at overcoming unanimity voting in the procedures regulating the European Parliament's

composition;

Or. en

Amendment 45

Charles Goerens, Sandro Gozi, Max Orville, Alin Mituța

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 4

Motion for a resolution

4. Stresses that a seat allocation method offers great potential for providing in the future a permanent system to allocate the seats of the European Parliament in an objective, fair, durable and ***transparent way;***

Amendment

4. Stresses that a seat allocation method offers great potential for providing in the future a permanent system to allocate the seats of the European Parliament in an objective, fair, durable and ***clear way; regrets that, in absence of Treaty changes, the adoption of said allocation method requires an unanimous vote of the European Council;***

Or. en

Amendment 46

Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 4

Motion for a resolution

4. Stresses that a seat allocation method offers ***great*** potential for providing in the future a permanent system to allocate the seats of the European Parliament in an objective, fair, durable and transparent way;

Amendment

4. Stresses that a seat allocation method offers potential for providing in the future a permanent system to allocate the seats of the European Parliament in an objective, fair, durable and transparent way, ***in so far as it takes in consideration the voting system in the Council;***

Or. en

Amendment 47

Antonio Maria Rinaldi, Gilles Lebreton

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 4

Motion for a resolution

4. Stresses that a seat allocation method ***offers great potential for*** providing in the future a permanent system to allocate the seats of the European Parliament in an objective, fair, durable and transparent way;

Amendment

4. Stresses that, ***rebus sic stantibus, establishing*** a seat allocation method providing in the future a permanent system to allocate the seats of the European Parliament in an objective, fair, durable and transparent way ***is not possible***;

Or. en

Amendment 48

Domènec Ruiz Devesa

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 4

Motion for a resolution

4. Stresses that a seat allocation method offers great potential for providing in the future a permanent system to allocate the seats of the European Parliament in an objective, fair, durable and transparent way;

Amendment

4. Stresses that a ***permanent and stable*** seat allocation method offers great potential for providing in the future a permanent system to allocate the seats of the European Parliament in an objective, fair, durable and transparent way;

Or. en

Amendment 49

Antonio Maria Rinaldi, Gilles Lebreton

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5

Motion for a resolution

5. ***Stresses that in choosing the most suitable formula, priority needs to be given to objective and evidence-based criteria; further believes that changes to***

deleted

Amendment

the relevant Treaty provisions can be considered;

Or. en

Amendment 50
Loránt Vincze

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

Motion for a resolution

5. Stresses that in choosing the most suitable formula, priority needs to be given to objective and *evidence-based* criteria; *further believes that changes to the relevant Treaty provisions can be considered;*

Amendment

5. Stresses that in choosing the most suitable formula, priority needs to be given to objective and *fair* criteria *but also to political viability ensuring adequate representation for Member States of all sizes; is of the opinion that in order for a formula to be politically acceptable in any given time period it should also be as close as possible to the existing seat distribution; points out that this is currently the case with the so-called « power compromise » previously considered but not adopted by the Parliament;*

Or. en

Amendment 51
Rainer Wieland

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

Motion for a resolution

5. Stresses that in choosing the most suitable formula, priority needs to be given to objective and evidence-based criteria; further believes that changes to the relevant Treaty provisions can be considered;

Amendment

5. Stresses that in choosing the most suitable formula, priority needs to be given to objective and evidence-based criteria *and remains convinced that the calculation method and its underlying principles should be as simple as possible and easy for citizens to understand;*

further believes that changes to the relevant Treaty provisions can be considered;

Or. de

Amendment 52
Leila Chaibi

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

Motion for a resolution

5. Stresses that in choosing the most suitable formula, priority needs to be given to objective and evidence-based criteria; further believes that changes to the relevant Treaty provisions can be considered;

Amendment

5. Stresses that in choosing the most suitable formula, priority needs to be given to objective and evidence-based criteria, ***based on reliable data in terms of population, in order to ensure that the principle of degressive proportionality is applied in a sustainable and transparent way***; further believes that changes to the relevant Treaty provisions can be considered;

Or. en

Amendment 53
Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

Motion for a resolution

5. Stresses that in choosing the most suitable formula, priority needs to be given to objective and evidence-based criteria; ***further believes that changes to the relevant Treaty provisions can be considered***;

Amendment

5. Stresses that in choosing the most suitable formula, priority needs to be given to objective and evidence-based criteria, ***having in mind that this is a constitutional debate that seriously impacts the overall balance of the institutional system as laid down in the Treaties***;

Or. en

Amendment 54

Charles Goerens, Sandro Gozi, Max Orville, Alin Mituța

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5

Motion for a resolution

5. Stresses that in choosing the most suitable *formula*, priority needs to be given to objective and evidence-based criteria; ***further believes that changes to the relevant Treaty provisions can be considered;***

Amendment

5. Stresses that in choosing the most suitable ***seat allocation system***, priority needs to be given to objective and evidence-based criteria ;

Or. en

Amendment 55

Loránt Vincze

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 5 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

5a. believes that changes to the relevant Treaty provisions can be considered;

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 56

Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 6

Motion for a resolution

6. ***Strongly*** believes that expert advice for a permanent system of allocation is ***readily*** available; stresses that, given existing political realities, finding the most suitable system, while reflecting on adaptations and alternatives, is key;

Amendment

6. Believes that expert advice for a permanent system of allocation is available ***although it continues to ignore the implications of the voting system in the Council as per the representation of small and medium size Member States in the***

EU decision making framework ; stresses that, given existing political realities, finding the most suitable system, while reflecting on adaptations and alternatives, is key;

Or. en

Amendment 57
Antonio Maria Rinaldi, Gilles Lebreton

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

Motion for a resolution

6. ***Strongly believes that*** expert advice for ***a permanent*** system of allocation ***is readily available***; stresses that, given existing political realities, finding ***the most*** suitable system, while reflecting on adaptations and alternatives, is ***key***;

Amendment

6. ***Welcomes*** expert advice for ***determining a*** system of allocation; stresses that, given existing political realities, finding ***a*** suitable system, while reflecting on adaptations and alternatives, is ***not possible***;

Or. en

Amendment 58
Helmut Scholz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

6a. Calls on the European Council to also consult COSAC before deciding on a new seat allocation system; underlines the importance of ensuring full transparency as well as compatibility with the Member states' constitutional frameworks;

Or. en

Amendment 59

Charles Goerens, Sandro Gozi, Max Orville, Alin Mituța

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 7

Motion for a resolution

7. Notes that the Treaty on European Union Art. 14 (2) lays down a number of **numerical** criteria for the allocation of seats among Member States, by imposing minimum and maximum limits for the number of seats allocated and by setting the number of MEPs overall; further notes that the Treaty also specifies that the allocation of seats shall be degressively proportional; underlines that any **formula** must comply with these criteria;

Amendment

7. Notes that the Treaty on European Union Art. 14 (2) lays down a number of criteria for the allocation of seats among Member States, by imposing minimum and maximum limits for the number of seats allocated and by setting the number of MEPs overall; further notes that the Treaty also specifies that the allocation of seats shall be degressively proportional; underlines that any **seat allocation system** must comply with these criteria;

Or. en

Amendment 60

Antonio Maria Rinaldi, Gilles Lebreton

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8

Motion for a resolution

8. Underlines that any method chosen should be transparent; **continues. therefore. to support using Eurostat data as the official source of population figures for the calculations, which is publicly available; fully** supports that **the same** population figures are used as basis for the calculations on the EP composition and the qualified majority in Council;

Amendment

8. Underlines that any method chosen should be transparent; supports that population figures are used as basis for the calculations on the EP composition and the qualified majority in Council;

Or. en

Amendment 61

Loránt Vincze

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8

Motion for a resolution

8. Underlines that any method chosen should be transparent; continues. therefore. to support using Eurostat data as the official source of population figures for the calculations, which is publicly available; ***fully supports that the same population figures are used as basis for the calculations on the EP composition and the qualified majority in Council;***

Amendment

8. Underlines that any method chosen should be transparent; continues. therefore. to support using Eurostat data as the official source of population figures for the calculations, which is publicly available;

Or. en

Amendment 62

Helmut Scholz

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8

Motion for a resolution

8. Underlines that any method chosen should ***be*** transparent; continues. therefore. to support using Eurostat data as the official source of population figures for the calculations, which is publicly available; fully supports that the same population figures are used as basis for the calculations on the EP composition and the qualified majority in Council;

Amendment

8. Underlines that any method chosen should ***make use of*** transparent ***and reliable data that is publicly accessible;*** continues, therefore, to support using Eurostat data as the official source of population figures for the calculations, which is publicly available; fully supports that the same population figures are used as basis for the calculations on the EP composition and the qualified majority in Council;

Or. en

Amendment 63

Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8

Motion for a resolution

8. Underlines that any method chosen should be transparent; continues. therefore. to support using Eurostat data as the official source of population figures for the calculations, which is publicly available; **fully supports** that the **same** population figures are used as basis for the calculations on the EP composition and the qualified majority in Council;

Amendment

8. Underlines that any method chosen should be transparent; continues. therefore. to support using Eurostat data as the official source of population figures for the calculations, which is publicly available; **considers** that the **reference criteria for the calculation of the number of seats per Member State should be the resident population of a given Member State entitled to vote in the European elections.**

Or. en

Amendment 64

Charles Goerens, Sandro Gozi, Max Orville, Alin Mituța

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8

Motion for a resolution

8. **Underlines that any method chosen should be transparent;** continues. **therefore.** to support using Eurostat data as the official source of population figures for the calculations, which is publicly available; fully supports that the same population figures are used as basis for the calculations on the EP composition and the qualified majority in Council;

Amendment

8. Continues to support using Eurostat data as the official source of population figures for the calculations, which is publicly available; fully supports that the same population figures are used as basis for the calculations on the EP composition and the qualified majority in Council;

Or. en

Amendment 65

Loránt Vincze

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

8a. Points out that the reference population data to be used for the

Amendment

purposes of distribution of seats in the European Parliament is not established in secondary EU legislation but that for consistency reasons, historically the same reference data was chosen to be used as for calculating the qualified majority voting in the Council, which is enshrined in Regulation (EU) No 1260/2013;

Or. en

Amendment 66
Loránt Vincze

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

8b. *Points out that Regulation (EU) No 1260/2013 also includes third country residents - whom in line with article 14 (2) TEU are not represented in the European Parliament - but also EU mobile citizens - who habitually are counted in the member state of residence as citizens and included on electoral rolls for the European Parliament elections; considers that for the purposes of calculating the number of seats per member State and in order to ensure consistency with the Treaties and avoid double counting of mobile citizens, the EU should rely on the number of citizens of a given country;*

Or. en

Amendment 67
Loránt Vincze

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 c (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

8c. *Points out that in the recent past reference Eurostat data has been used both 2 and 3 years prior to the elections; considers that there should be consistency in choosing the reference period; considers that in view of allowing Member States sufficient time to prepare for elections, the reference date should be the 1st of January 2 years prior to the year of elections;*

Or. en

Amendment 68
Loránt Vincze, Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

Motion for a resolution

9. Points out that *the method chosen should be understandable, avoiding a level of complexity that citizens cannot understand;*

Amendment

9. Points out that *in order to represent member States of all sizes in a way that is adequate and fair is a complex task; considers therefore that complexity of a formula is not a disadvantage; stresses that transparency of a calculation method should in no case be equated with the quality of being easily explainable to people with various levels of grasp of mathematical concepts; considers rather that transparency means that one single rule applies to the distribution of all seats, which citizens can check;*

Or. en

Amendment 69
Rainer Wieland

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

9. Points out that the method chosen should be understandable, avoiding a level of complexity that citizens cannot understand;

9. Points out that the method chosen should be understandable, avoiding a level of complexity that citizens cannot understand, *or else a new kind of 'democratic deficit' could arise*;

Or. de

Amendment 70
Pascal Durand

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

Motion for a resolution

9. Points out that the method chosen should be understandable, *avoiding a level of complexity that citizens cannot understand*;

Amendment

9. Points out that the method chosen should be understandable;

Or. en

Amendment 71
Antonio Maria Rinaldi, Gilles Lebreton

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

Motion for a resolution

9. Points out that *the method* chosen should be understandable, avoiding a level of complexity that citizens cannot understand;

Amendment

9. Points out that *future methods* chosen should be understandable, avoiding a level of complexity that citizens cannot understand;

Or. en

Amendment 72
Charles Goerens, Sandro Gozi, Max Orville, Alin Mituța

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

Motion for a resolution

9. Points out that the method chosen should be ***understandable, avoiding a level of complexity that citizens cannot understand***;

Amendment

9. Points out that the method chosen should be ***straightforward, unambiguous, and accessible to EU citizens*** ;

Or. en

Amendment 73
Helmut Scholz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

Motion for a resolution

10. Notes that degressive proportionality is assessed on the basis of the representation ratio of the citizens of a given Member State, meaning the ratio of the population of a Member State relative to its number of seats before rounding; observes that degressive proportionality entails that the ratio varies for the various Member States; further notes that the larger the population, the higher the entitlement to a number of seats for a specific Member State, while the ratio population to MEP also increases; notes and accepts that degressive proportionality entails an underrepresentation of citizens from Member States with a larger population and an overrepresentation of citizens of Member States with a smaller population; believes that this principle is justified given the current EU institutional framework;

Amendment

10. Notes that degressive proportionality is assessed on the basis of the representation ratio of the citizens of a given Member State, meaning the ratio of the population of a Member State relative to its number of seats before rounding; observes that degressive proportionality entails that the ratio varies for the various Member States; further notes that the larger the population, the higher the entitlement to a number of seats for a specific Member State, while the ratio population to MEP also increases; notes and accepts that degressive proportionality entails an underrepresentation of citizens from Member States with a larger population and an overrepresentation of citizens of Member States with a smaller population; believes that this principle is justified given the current EU institutional framework; ***stresses that under the current EU institutional framework the risk of increased electoral inequality could increase with enlargement; stresses that such a development could undermine the Parliament's democratic legitimacy; points out that decoupling the representation of Member states from the representation of European political***

parties through the introduction of an additional Union-wide constituency could provide a solution to this dilemma; notes that such a solution could include calculating the total seat entitlement of each European political party based on its EU-wide vote share and subsequently allocating overhang mandates so that the total seat number of each European political party equals the calculated entitlement; notes that ensuring full proportional completion would require a substantive share of Parliament's seats to be reserved for the Union-wide constituency; notes that such an overhaul of the electoral framework would require changes to the Treaties and therefore urges the Member states to consider such a solution during the upcoming Convention for the revision of the Treaties in accordance with Article 48 TEU;

Or. en

Amendment 74

Antonio Maria Rinaldi, Gilles Lebreton

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10

Motion for a resolution

10. Notes that degressive proportionality is assessed on the basis of the representation ratio of the citizens of a given Member State, meaning the ratio of the population of a Member State relative to its number of seats before rounding; observes that degressive proportionality entails that the ratio varies for the various Member States; further notes that the larger the population, the higher the entitlement to a number of seats for a specific Member State, while the ratio population to MEP also increases; notes *and accepts* that degressive proportionality entails an

Amendment

10. Notes that degressive proportionality is assessed on the basis of the representation ratio of the citizens of a given Member State, meaning the ratio of the population of a Member State relative to its number of seats before rounding; observes that degressive proportionality entails that the ratio varies for the various Member States; further notes that the larger the population, the higher the entitlement to a number of seats for a specific Member State, while the ratio population to MEP also increases; notes that degressive proportionality entails an

underrepresentation of citizens from Member States with a larger population and an overrepresentation of citizens of Member States with a smaller population; believes that this principle *is* justified *given* the current EU institutional framework;

underrepresentation of citizens from Member States with a larger population and an overrepresentation of citizens of Member States with a smaller population; believes that this principle *can be* justified *under* the current EU institutional framework, *but it alters per se the mathematical relationship between the population and the number of seats in the European parliament; believes that an objective, fair, durable and transparent seat allocation method cannot be established under the current framework;*

Or. en

Amendment 75 **Rainer Wieland**

Motion for a resolution **Paragraph 10**

Motion for a resolution

10. Notes that degressive proportionality is assessed on the basis of the representation ratio of the citizens of a given Member State, meaning the ratio of the population of a Member State relative to its number of seats before rounding; observes that degressive proportionality entails that the ratio varies for the various Member States; further notes that the larger the population, the higher the entitlement to a number of seats for a specific Member State, while the ratio population to MEP also increases; notes and accepts that degressive proportionality entails an underrepresentation of citizens from Member States with a larger population and an overrepresentation of citizens of Member States with a smaller population; believes that this principle is justified given the current EU institutional framework;

Amendment

10. Notes that degressive proportionality is assessed on the basis of the representation ratio of the citizens of a given Member State, meaning the ratio of the population of a Member State relative to its number of seats before rounding; observes that degressive proportionality entails that the ratio varies for the various Member States; further notes that the larger the population, the higher the entitlement to a number of seats for a specific Member State, while the ratio population to MEP also increases; notes and accepts that degressive proportionality entails an underrepresentation of citizens from Member States with a larger population and an overrepresentation of citizens of Member States with a smaller population; *recognises, however, that through rounding and with the distribution of the last seats in the system, smaller fractions can occur owing to the laws of mathematics;* believes that this principle is

justified given the current EU institutional framework;

Or. de

Amendment 76
Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

Motion for a resolution

10. Notes that degressive proportionality is assessed on the basis of the representation ratio of the citizens of a given Member State, meaning the ratio of the population of a Member State relative to its number of seats before rounding; observes that degressive proportionality entails that the ratio varies for the various Member States; further notes that the larger the population, the higher the entitlement to a number of seats for a specific Member State, while the ratio population to MEP also increases; notes and accepts that degressive proportionality entails an underrepresentation of citizens from Member States with a larger population and an overrepresentation of citizens of Member States with a smaller population; **believes** that this principle is justified given the current EU institutional framework;

Amendment

10. Notes that degressive proportionality is assessed on the basis of the representation ratio of the citizens of a given Member State, meaning the ratio of the population of a Member State relative to its number of seats before rounding; observes that degressive proportionality entails that the ratio varies for the various Member States; further notes that the larger the population, the higher the entitlement to a number of seats for a specific Member State, while the ratio population to MEP also increases; notes and accepts that degressive proportionality entails an underrepresentation of citizens from Member States with a larger population and an overrepresentation of citizens of Member States with a smaller population; **underlines** that this principle is justified given the current EU institutional framework;

Or. en

Amendment 77
Rainer Wieland

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

10. Notes that degressive proportionality is assessed on the basis of the representation ratio of the citizens of a given Member State, meaning the ratio of the population of a Member State relative to its number of seats before rounding; observes that degressive proportionality entails that the ratio varies for the various Member States; further notes that the larger the population, the higher the entitlement to a number of seats for a specific Member State, while the ratio population to MEP also increases; notes and accepts that degressive proportionality entails an underrepresentation of citizens from Member States with a larger population and an overrepresentation of citizens of Member States with a smaller population; believes that this principle is justified given the current EU institutional framework;

10. Notes that degressive proportionality is assessed on the basis of the representation ratio of the citizens of a given Member State, meaning the ratio of the population of a Member State relative to its number of seats before rounding; observes that degressive proportionality entails that the ratio varies for the various Member States; further notes that the larger the population, the higher the entitlement to a number of seats for a specific Member State, while the ratio population to MEP also increases; notes and accepts that degressive proportionality entails an underrepresentation of citizens from Member States with a larger population and an overrepresentation of citizens of Member States with a smaller population; believes that this principle is justified given the current EU institutional framework;

Or. de

Amendment 78
Gerolf Annemans, Gilles Lebreton

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

10a. Underlines that the establishment of a European constituency for the election of 28 members on transnational lists is not feasible, as it would alter the proportions between population and the number of seats allocated in the EP, undermining the determination of an objective, fair, durable and transparent method of seat allocation and its effectiveness; expresses therefore its opposition to this proposal;

Or. en

Amendment 79

Niklas Nienäß

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11

Motion for a resolution

11. Is of the opinion that a permanent system based on a formula needs to be durable and therefore flexible enough to account for changes in population figures, for future enlargements and for possible changes of applicable legislative provisions, such as the electoral law or treaty changes;

Amendment

11. Is of the opinion that a permanent system based on a formula needs to be durable and therefore flexible enough to account for changes in population figures, for future enlargements and for possible changes of applicable legislative provisions, such as the electoral law or treaty changes; ***outlines that in case of an agreement on transnational lists, the seats allocated through transnational lists will be distributed additionally to those allocated through the proposed formula, while adaptations of the formula can be made to enable the integration of allocated seats through transnational lists;***

Or. en

Amendment 80

Rainer Wieland

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11

Motion for a resolution

11. Is of the opinion that a permanent system based on a formula needs to be durable and therefore flexible enough to account for changes in population figures, for future enlargements and for possible changes of applicable legislative provisions, such as the electoral law or treaty changes;

Amendment

11. Is of the opinion that a permanent system based on a formula needs to be durable and therefore flexible enough to account for changes in population figures, for future enlargements and for possible changes of applicable legislative provisions, such as the electoral law or treaty changes; ***points out that when new countries have joined the EU in the past, the current upper limit of 751 members has been exceeded for a limited period of***

time;

Or. de

Amendment 81
Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

Motion for a resolution

11. Is of the opinion that a permanent system based on a formula needs to be durable and therefore flexible enough to account for changes in population figures, for future enlargements **and for possible changes of applicable legislative provisions, such as the electoral law or treaty changes;**

Amendment

11. Is of the opinion that a permanent system based on a formula needs to be durable and therefore flexible enough to account for changes in population figures, for future enlargements;

Or. en

Amendment 82
Charles Goerens, Sandro Gozi, Max Orville, Alin Mituța

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

Motion for a resolution

11. Is of the opinion that a permanent **system based on a formula** needs to be durable and therefore **flexible enough to account for** changes in population figures, **for future enlargements and for possible** changes of applicable legislative provisions, such as the electoral law **or treaty changes;**

Amendment

11. Is of the opinion that a permanent **allocation mechanism** needs to be durable and therefore **adaptable to** changes in population figures, **and to** changes of applicable legislative provisions, such as the electoral law ;

Or. en

Amendment 83

Antonio Maria Rinaldi, Gilles Lebreton

**Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11**

Motion for a resolution

11. Is of the opinion that a permanent system based on a formula ***needs to be durable and therefore flexible enough to account for changes in population figures, for*** future enlargements and for possible changes of applicable legislative provisions, such as the electoral law or treaty changes;

Amendment

11. Is of the opinion that a permanent system based on a formula ***cannot be established today, also in light of the*** future enlargements and for possible changes of applicable legislative provisions, such as the electoral law or treaty changes;

Or. en

**Amendment 84
Leila Chaibi**

**Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)**

Motion for a resolution

11a. Considers that, pending possible enlargement, the number of seats provided for in the Treaties should be used to its full, whatever the formula chosen, in order to preserve as much as possible the current seats per Member State;

Amendment

Or. en

**Amendment 85
Antonio Maria Rinaldi, Gilles Lebreton**

**Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12**

Motion for a resolution

12. Stresses that ***a*** fair method must

Amendment

12. Stresses that ***any future*** fair method

include elements that balance the interests of citizens from all Member States, while also respecting the overall balance of the institutional system as laid down in the Treaties when it comes to the indirect decision-making power of Union citizens, represented by MEPs in the European Parliament and by their governments in the Council;

must include elements that balance the interests of citizens from all Member States, ***such as the contribution to the EU budget from each Member State***, while also respecting the overall balance of the institutional system as laid down in the Treaties when it comes to the indirect decision-making power of Union citizens, represented by MEPs in the European Parliament and by their governments in the Council;

Or. en

Amendment 86

Charles Goerens, Sandro Gozi, Max Orville, Alin Mituța

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution

12. Stresses that a fair method must ***include elements that balance the interests*** of citizens from all Member States, while also respecting the overall balance of the institutional system as laid down in the Treaties when it comes to the indirect decision-making power of Union citizens, represented by MEPs in the European Parliament and by their governments in the Council;

Amendment

12. Stresses that a fair method must ***ensure the fair representation*** of citizens from all Member States, while also respecting the overall balance of the institutional system as laid down in the Treaties when it comes to the indirect decision-making power of Union citizens, represented by MEPs in the European Parliament and by their governments in the Council;

Or. en

Amendment 87

Gerolf Annemans, Gilles Lebreton

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 12 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

12a. Calls in the interest of the European tax payers for reflection on the

Amendment

need to maintain the current upper limit of 751 seats provided for by the Treaty; considers, in this regard, that it would have been preferable not to redistribute part of the seats left by the United Kingdom, but to deduct them from the total number provided for by the Treaty; calls for reducing the number of seats in the European Parliament;

Or. en

Amendment 88
Loránt Vincze, Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

12a. Recalls that the Treaties do not refer to any alternative distribution of seats than that among Member States; stresses therefore that any distribution based on other considerations, such as making an allocation for so-called transnational lists would go against the letter and the spirit of the Treaties;

Or. en

Amendment 89
Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

12a. Underlines that the overall balance of the institutional framework as laid down in the Treaties when it comes to the decision-making power does not allow for seat allocation in the European Parliament based on direct

Amendment 90

Charles Goerens, Sandro Gozi, Max Orville, Alin Mituța

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 13

Motion for a resolution

13. Notes that the definition of degressive proportionality, as recognised by the European Parliament¹ and the European Council², does not imply a particular method for seat allocation in the EP, ***but that, mathematically, there are an infinite number of options to choose from;***

¹ Legislative resolutions of 15 June 2023 on the composition of the European Parliament and of 13 September 2023 on the draft European Council decision establishing the composition of the European Parliament (00013/2023 – C9-0319/2023 – 2023/0900(NLE))

² European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 of 22 September 2023 establishing the composition of the European Parliament

Amendment

13. Notes that the definition of degressive proportionality, as recognised by the European Parliament¹ and the European Council², does not imply a particular method for seat allocation in the EP;

¹ Legislative resolutions of 15 June 2023 on the composition of the European Parliament and of 13 September 2023 on the draft European Council decision establishing the composition of the European Parliament (00013/2023 – C9-0319/2023 – 2023/0900(NLE))

² European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 of 22 September 2023 establishing the composition of the European Parliament

Amendment 91

Charles Goerens, Sandro Gozi, Max Orville, Alin Mituța

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 14

Motion for a resolution

14. Points to the existence of a vast number³ of previous recommendations

Amendment

14. Points to the existence of a vast number³ of previous recommendations

concerning *the formula*;

concerning *a potential models of permanent seat allocation system* ;

³ These formulas include the Cambridge Compromise, the Power method, the Parabolic method, the D'Hondt method, the 0.5 DPL method and the FPS method.

³ These formulas include the Cambridge Compromise, the Power method, the Parabolic method, the D'Hondt method, the 0.5 DPL method and the FPS method.

Or. en

Amendment 92
Rainer Wieland

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

Motion for a resolution

15. Observes that previous recommendations for seat allocation comprised several elements; notes that these included a fixed base number of seats for all Member States and an allocation of remaining seats in proportion to respective population figures with a cap of 96 seats; stresses that these recommendations, such as the so-called 'Cambridge Compromise', have been criticised for not respecting Treaty criteria, such as degressive proportionality, in certain circumstances;

Amendment

15. Observes that previous recommendations for seat allocation comprised several elements; notes that these included a fixed base number of seats for all Member States and an allocation of remaining seats in proportion to respective population figures with a cap of 96 seats; stresses that these recommendations, such as the so-called 'Cambridge Compromise', have been criticised for not respecting Treaty criteria, such as degressive proportionality, in certain circumstances, ***and can only be understood by a minority of citizens***;

Or. de

Amendment 93
Charles Goerens, Sandro Gozi, Max Orville, Alin Mituța

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

Motion for a resolution

15. Observes that previous

Amendment

15. Observes that previous

recommendations for seat allocation comprised several elements; notes that these included a fixed base number of seats for all Member States and an allocation of remaining seats in proportion to respective population figures with a cap of 96 seats; stresses that these recommendations, such as the so-called ‘Cambridge Compromise’, have been criticised for **not respecting** Treaty **criteria**, such as degressive proportionality, in certain circumstances;

recommendations for seat allocation comprised several elements; notes that these included a fixed base number of seats for all Member States, and an allocation of remaining seats in proportion to respective population figures with **a minimum of six and** a cap of 96 seats; stresses that these recommendations, such as the so-called ‘Cambridge Compromise’, have been criticised for **breaching** Treaty **requirements**, such as degressive proportionality, in certain circumstances

Or. en

Amendment 94
Rainer Wieland

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

16. Further notes that the ‘Cambridge Compromise’ has been criticised for neglecting the interests of citizens of medium-sized Member States, entailing seat losses for these countries; recalls that in order to counterbalance this tendency of the ‘Cambridge Compromise’, an extensive reform of the qualified voting mechanism currently in force in the Council; regretfully acknowledges that, , due to high political hurdles, such as Treaty change, these reforms were never pursued;

deleted

Or. de

Amendment 95
Sandro Gozi, Charles Goerens, Alin Mituța, Max Orville

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution

16. Further notes that the ‘Cambridge Compromise’ has been criticised for ***neglecting the interests of citizens*** of medium-sized Member States, entailing seat losses for these countries; ***recalls that in order to counterbalance this tendency of the ‘Cambridge Compromise’, an extensive reform of the qualified voting mechanism currently in force in the Council; regretfully acknowledges that, , due to high political hurdles, such as Treaty change, these reforms were never pursued;***

Amendment

16. Further notes that the ‘Cambridge Compromise’ has been criticised for ***overlooking the fair representation*** of medium-sized Member States, entailing ***considerable*** seat losses for these countries;

Or. en

Amendment 96
Domènec Ruiz Devesa

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution

16. Further notes that the ‘Cambridge Compromise’ has been criticised for neglecting the interests of citizens of medium-sized Member States, entailing seat losses for these countries; recalls that in order to counterbalance this tendency of the ‘Cambridge Compromise’, an extensive reform of the qualified voting mechanism currently in force in the Council; regretfully acknowledges that, , due to high political hurdles, such as Treaty change, these reforms were never pursued;

Amendment

16. Further notes that the ‘Cambridge Compromise’ has been criticised for neglecting the interests of citizens of medium-sized Member States, entailing seat losses for these countries; recalls that in order to counterbalance this tendency of the ‘Cambridge Compromise’, an extensive reform of the qualified voting mechanism currently in force in the Council ***should be implemented;*** regretfully acknowledges that, , due to high political hurdles, such as Treaty change, these reforms were never pursued;

Or. en

Amendment 97
Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution

16. Further notes that the ‘Cambridge Compromise’ ***has been criticised for neglecting*** the interests of citizens of medium-sized Member States, entailing seat losses for these countries; recalls that in order to counterbalance this tendency of the ‘Cambridge Compromise’, an extensive reform of the qualified voting mechanism currently in force in the Council; regretfully acknowledges that, , due to high political hurdles, such as Treaty change, these reforms were never pursued;

Amendment

16. Further notes that the ‘Cambridge Compromise’ ***neglects*** the interests of citizens of medium-sized Member States, entailing seat losses for these countries; recalls that in order to counterbalance this tendency of the ‘Cambridge Compromise’, an extensive reform of the qualified voting mechanism currently in force in the Council; regretfully acknowledges that, , due to high political hurdles, such as Treaty change, these reforms were never pursued;

Or. en

Amendment 98
Loránt Vincze

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

16a. Notes that in terms of mathematical formulas studied, when comparing the "Cambridge compromise" with the "Power compromise" it could be said that the latter better compensates small and medium sized countries for the voting system in the Council and in terms of the curve is smoother across the entire range, in particular at the upper end; points out also that a distribution based on the power compromise is particularly close to the one that Parliament adopted for the 2024-2029 legislature;

Or. en

Amendment 99

Niklas Nienäß

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 16 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

16a. Acknowledges previous criticism regarding the D'Hondt method of allocation for highly prioritising majority formation and operability, instead of proportionality and fairness; ^{1a}

1a

[https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/637966/EPRS_BRI\(2019\)637966_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/637966/EPRS_BRI(2019)637966_EN.pdf)

Or. en

Amendment 100

Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

17. Stresses the need for any method ***chosen to maintain*** the advantages of the known formulas, while minimising their disadvantages; ***points out that ‘base seat’ elements of the seat allocation system can be used to ensure the democratic representation of citizens from smaller Member States, while the proportional elements ensure that the larger a Member State’s population , the greater the number of seats allocated to it; highlights that seats allocated in proportion to the square root of the population of Member States contribute to ensuring that degressive proportionality is achieved and the citizens of small and medium-sized***

17. Stresses the need for any ***contemplated*** method ***to consider*** the advantages of the known formulas, while minimising their disadvantages; believes that such allocation system should be ***thoroughly discussed and*** proposed in the ***next parliamentary term;***

Member States are democratically represented; believes that the combination of these elements can be converted into a mathematical formula and used as the basis of the most suitable allocation system; believes that such allocation system should be proposed and adopted in the form of a political decision;

Or. en

Amendment 101
Rainer Wieland

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution

17. Stresses the need for any method chosen to maintain the advantages of the known formulas, while minimising their disadvantages; points out that ‘base seat’ elements of the seat allocation system can be used to ensure the democratic representation of citizens from smaller Member States, while the proportional elements ensure that the larger a Member State’s population , the greater the number of seats allocated to it; ***highlights that seats allocated in proportion to the square root of the population of Member States contribute to ensuring that degressive proportionality is achieved and the citizens of small and medium-sized Member States are democratically represented; believes that the combination of these elements can be converted into a mathematical formula and used as the basis of the most suitable allocation system; believes that such allocation system should be proposed and adopted in the form of a political decision;***

Amendment

17. Stresses the need for any method chosen to maintain the advantages of the known formulas, while minimising their disadvantages; points out that ‘base seat’ elements of the seat allocation system can be used to ensure the democratic representation of citizens from smaller Member States, while the proportional elements ensure that the larger a Member State’s population , the greater the number of seats allocated to it; ***points out that a fair method could also be to use the Council’s ‘double majority’ principle as a key element for a formula for Parliament;***

Or. de

Amendment 102

Charles Goerens, Sandro Gozi, Max Orville, Alin Mituța

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution

17. Stresses the need for any method chosen to maintain the advantages of the known formulas, while minimising their disadvantages; points out that ‘base seat’ elements of the seat allocation system can be used to ensure the democratic representation of citizens from smaller Member States, while the proportional elements ensure that the larger a Member State’s population , the greater the number of seats allocated to it; highlights that seats allocated in proportion to the square root of the population of Member States contribute to ensuring that degressive proportionality is achieved and the citizens of small and medium-sized Member States are democratically represented; ***believes that the combination of these elements can be converted into a mathematical formula and used as the basis of the most suitable allocation system; believes that such allocation system should be proposed and adopted in the form of a political decision;***

Amendment

17. Stresses the need for any method chosen to maintain the advantages of the known formulas, while minimising their disadvantages; points out that ‘base seat’ elements of the seat allocation system can be used to ensure the democratic representation of citizens from smaller Member States, while the proportional elements ensure that the larger a Member State’s population , the greater the number of seats allocated to it; highlights that seats allocated in proportion to the square root of the population of Member States contribute to ensuring that degressive proportionality is achieved and the citizens of small and medium-sized Member States are democratically represented;

Or. en

Amendment 103

Antonio Maria Rinaldi, Gilles Lebreton

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution

17. Stresses the need for any method chosen to maintain the advantages of the known formulas, while minimising their disadvantages; points out that ‘base seat’ elements of the seat allocation system can

Amendment

17. Stresses the need for any method chosen ***in the future*** to maintain the advantages of the known formulas, while minimising their disadvantages; points out that ‘base seat’ elements of the seat

be used to ensure the democratic representation of citizens from smaller Member States, while the proportional elements ensure that the larger a Member State's population, the greater the number of seats allocated to it; highlights that seats allocated in proportion to the square root of the population of Member States contribute to ensuring that degressive proportionality is achieved and the citizens of small and medium-sized Member States are democratically represented; believes that ***the combination of these elements can be converted into a mathematical formula and used as the basis of the most suitable allocation system; believes that such*** allocation system should be proposed and adopted in the form of a political decision;

allocation system can be used to ensure the democratic representation of citizens from smaller Member States, while the proportional elements ensure that the larger a Member State's population, the greater the number of seats allocated to it; highlights that seats allocated in proportion to the square root of the population of Member States contribute to ensuring that degressive proportionality is achieved and the citizens of small and medium-sized Member States are democratically represented; believes that ***an*** allocation system should be proposed ***for the term 2029-2034*** and adopted in the form of a political decision;

Or. en

Amendment 104

Charles Goerens, Sandro Gozi, Max Orville, Alin Mituța

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

17a. Recalls the European Council decision of December 2023 to formally open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, to grant candidate status to Georgia, calling for the acceleration of the accession process of Western Balkans, of North Macedonia, other than to monitor the compliance with the membership criteria of Bosnia Herzegovina; recalls that the perspective of enlargement imposes an in-depth reform of the Union's institutional architecture and policies;

Or. en

Amendment 105

Sandro Gozi, Charles Goerens, Alin Mituța, Max Orville

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

17a. Highlights as well the benefits of the “Power compromise” or “Power law” model, comprising of a number of base seats attributed equally to all Member States; of a divisor ensuring that the sum of seats does not exceed a pre-established number; and of a power parameter, which yields a degressively proportional allocation of seats;

Or. en

Amendment 106

Charles Goerens, Sandro Gozi, Max Orville, Alin Mituța

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

17b. Stresses that, irrespectively of the identification of a permanent mechanism of allocation of seats for the composition of the European Parliament 2029-2034, any reassessment of the number of seats of the European Parliament, and of the requirements necessary to ensure a representative and democratic composition in an enlarged Union, shall be carefully reviewed in the context of the upcoming process of revision of the Treaties, triggered by Parliament through its report of 23 November 2023;

Or. en

Amendment 107

Sandro Gozi, Charles Goerens, Alin Mituța, Max Orville

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

17b. Underlines that the “Power Compromise” ensures that the resulting composition respects the minimum and maximum allocation of seats established by the Treaties, the representativeness of medium-sized countries, and the principle of degressive proportionality;

Or. en

Amendment 108

Sandro Gozi, Charles Goerens, Alin Mituța, Max Orville

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17 c (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

17c. Is of the view that the adoption of any allocation system should be part of a package deal including the proposal for a reform of the European Electoral law of May 2022;

Or. en

Amendment 109

Sandro Gozi, Charles Goerens, Alin Mituța, Max Orville

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17 d (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

17d. Highlights that maintaining the number of seats of the European Parliament at 751 in an enlarged Union of potentially more than thirty Member

States would dramatically broaden electoral inequality and cause distortions in the representation of Union citizens; Believes that the number of seats should be increased in the context of future enlargements, while ensuring that the European Parliament remains at a workable size;

Or. en

Amendment 110

Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 18

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

18. *Proposes that the new seat allocation system should be applied for the allocation of seats among Member States from the parliamentary term following the next parliamentary term after the adoption of this resolution ;*

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 111

Antonio Maria Rinaldi, Gilles Lebreton

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 18

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

18. Proposes that the new seat allocation system should be applied for the allocation of seats among Member States **from** the parliamentary term following the next parliamentary term after the adoption of this resolution ;

18. Proposes that the new seat allocation system should be applied for the allocation of seats among Member States **for** the parliamentary term following the next parliamentary term after the adoption of this resolution ;

Or. en

Amendment 112

Charles Goerens, Sandro Gozi, Max Orville, Alin Mituța

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 18

Motion for a resolution

18. ***Proposes that the new seat allocation system should be applied for the allocation of seats among Member States from the parliamentary term following the next parliamentary term after the adoption of this resolution ;***

Amendment

18. ***Calls on the newly elected Parliament to pursue works on a proposal for a seat allocation system, ,applicable to the allocation of seats among Member States for the following parliamentary term;***

Or. en

Amendment 113

Domènec Ruiz Devesa

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 18 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

18a. Suggests that the body in charge of applying the mathematical formula should be the statistical office of the European Union, Eurostat;

Or. en

Amendment 114

Domènec Ruiz Devesa

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 18 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

18b. Proposes that the European Parliament should commit to propose to the European Council the results of the

formula as applied by Eurostat;

Or. en

Amendment 115
Domènec Ruiz Devesa

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 c (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

18c. Calls to adopt an interinstitutional agreement between Parliament and the European Council so that the European Council agrees to accept Parliament's proposal on the basis of the results of the formula for the allocation of seats applied by Eurostat;

Or. en

Amendment 116
Antonio Maria Rinaldi, Gilles Lebreton

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

19. Believes that the seat allocation system will make it easier for the European Parliament to swiftly adopt its proposal to the European Council concerning the composition of the European Parliament; resolves to make this seat allocation system the basis of its proposal to the European Council; points out that Parliament's consent is required on the European Council decision on the composition of the European Parliament; further resolves not to give its consent to the European Council decision, if that decision deviates from the allocation resulting from the application of

deleted

allocation system proposed by Parliament;

Or. en

Amendment 117

Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 19

Motion for a resolution

19. Believes that the seat allocation system will *make it easier for* the European Parliament *to swiftly adopt its proposal* to the European Council concerning *the composition of the European Parliament; resolves to make this seat allocation system the basis of its proposal to the European Council; points out that Parliament's consent is required on the European Council decision on the composition of the European Parliament; further resolves not to give its consent to the European Council decision, if that decision deviates from the allocation resulting from the application of allocation system proposed by Parliament;*

Amendment

19. Believes that the seat allocation system will *not set aside political considerations and therefore will not mean an "automatic" or predefined proposal of* the European Parliament to the European Council concerning *its* composition;

Or. en

Amendment 118

Charles Goerens, Sandro Gozi, Max Orville, Alin Mituța

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 19

Motion for a resolution

19. Believes that the seat allocation system will make it easier for the European Parliament to swiftly adopt its proposal to the European Council concerning the composition of the European Parliament; *resolves to make this seat allocation*

Amendment

19. Believes that the seat allocation system will make it easier for the European Parliament to swiftly adopt its proposal to the European Council concerning the composition of the European Parliament; points out that Parliament's consent is

system the basis of its proposal to the European Council; points out that Parliament's consent is required on the European Council decision on the composition of the European Parliament; *further resolves not to give its consent to the European Council decision, if that decision deviates from the allocation resulting from the application of allocation system proposed by Parliament;*

required on the European Council decision on the composition of the European Parliament;

Or. en

Amendment 119
Loránt Vincze, Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

Motion for a resolution

19. Believes that the seat allocation system *will* make it easier for the European Parliament to swiftly adopt its proposal to the European Council concerning the composition of the European Parliament; resolves to make this seat allocation system the basis of its proposal to the European Council; points out that Parliament's consent is required on the European Council decision on the composition of the European Parliament; further resolves not to give its consent to the European Council decision, if that decision deviates from the allocation resulting from the application of allocation system proposed by Parliament;

Amendment

19. Believes that the seat allocation system *could* make it easier for the European Parliament to swiftly adopt its proposal to the European Council concerning the composition of the European Parliament; resolves to make this seat allocation system the basis of its proposal to the European Council; points out that Parliament's consent is required on the European Council decision on the composition of the European Parliament; further resolves not to give its consent to the European Council decision, if that decision deviates from the allocation resulting from the application of allocation system proposed by Parliament;

Or. en

Amendment 120
Loránt Vincze, Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

19a. Considers it democratically legitimate for the next European Parliament legislature to decide on the use of a particular formula based on the considerations from this resolution;

Or. en

Amendment 121
Loránt Vincze, Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

19b. Commits itself to discuss its proposals for a seat distribution formula with the Council, the EU institution responsible with the adoption of the decision on the European Parliament's composition;

Or. en

Amendment 122
Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

20. Instructs its President to forward this **legislative resolution and the proposal annexed hereto** to the European Council and the Commission, and to the parliaments and governments of the Member States.

20. Instructs its President to forward this **working document** to the European Council and the Commission, and to the parliaments and governments of the Member States.

Or. en

Amendment 123
Loránt Vincze, Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

Motion for a resolution

20. Instructs its President to forward this legislative resolution **and the proposal annexed hereto** to the European Council and the Commission, and to the parliaments and governments of the Member States.

Amendment

20. Instructs its President to forward this legislative resolution to the European Council and the Commission, and to the parliaments and governments of the Member States.

Or. en

Amendment 124
Charles Goerens, Sandro Gozi, Max Orville, Alin Mituța

Motion for a resolution
Annex I

Motion for a resolution

[...]

deleted

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 125
Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution
Annex I

Motion for a resolution

[...]

deleted

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 126
Loránt Vincze

Motion for a resolution
Annex I

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

[...]

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 127
Domènec Ruiz Devesa

Motion for a resolution
Annex I – title

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

establishing a seat allocation method for the composition of the European Parliament

establishing a **permanent** seat allocation method for the composition of the European Parliament

Or. en

Amendment 128
Antonio Maria Rinaldi, Gilles Lebreton

Motion for a resolution
Annex I – Article 2 – paragraph 1

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Article 2

deleted

The total population of the Member States is calculated by the Commission (Eurostat) on the basis of data provided by the Member States, in accordance with a method established by means of Regulation (EU) No 1260/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council³.

³ Regulation (EU) No 1260/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 2013 on European demographic statistics (OJ L 330, 10.12.2013, p. 39).

Or. en

Amendment 129
Leila Chaibi

Motion for a resolution
Annex I – Article 3 – point 1 – introductory part

Motion for a resolution

1. The number of representatives in the European Parliament elected from the parliamentary term following the next parliamentary term after the adoption of this decision onwards is to be calculated as follows:

Amendment

1. The number of representatives in the European Parliament elected from the parliamentary term following the next parliamentary term after the adoption of this decision onwards is to be calculated as follows:

A "power law" is used, then rounded up to the next whole number, ensuring that the minimum number of seats is 6 and the maximum number of seats is 96. Between these two values, a power law with exponent c is used to arrive at the desired total number of seats.

The main "power law" calculation is carried out first (1), then, if necessary, the calculation with adjustment to satisfy degressive proportionality (2), and finally the calculation with adjustment to satisfy the "retained seats" principle (3).

If the result of calculation (3) satisfies the degressive proportionality principle, it is retained. Otherwise, the result of calculation (2) is used [or that of calculation (1) when calculation (2) is not necessary or impossible].

(1) Main calculation using the "power law" formula: It is necessary to adjust the value of parameter c to find the desired allocation. States are ranked by

increasing population from $i = 0$ to $i = M$, the most populous state. The weight of the least populated state is set to $q_0 = 5 + \varepsilon$, where ε is a very small positive number, intended so that rounding up results in 6. To determine ε , we consider that a country with one less inhabitant than the least populated country should have exactly 5 seats. If we note p_0 the population of the least populated state, then $q_0 = 5 \times p_0 / (p_0 - 1)$. The weight of the most populous state M , whose population is p_M , is set at $q_M = 96$. Between these two values, the weight q_i of each member state whose population is p_i is set according to a power law with exponent c . $q_i = q_0 + [(p_i - p_0) / (p_M - p_0)]^c \times (q_M - q_0)$ Based on the weights q_i of the member states, the number of seats is given by $s_i = [q_i]$ where $[.]$ denotes the function rounded up to the next integer. This method guarantees a regular progression in the number of seats with the population, with a minimum at 6 and a maximum at 96, with only one parameter to adjust: the power law c , which sets the degree of concavity to be given to the distribution of seats to satisfy the constraint of the total number of seats sought. However, this method does not necessarily guarantee strict compliance with degressive proportionality, due to rounding. This situation arises when rounding effects lead to two countries with similar populations not having the same number of seats. If we note Δs the difference in the number of seats between two states and Δp the difference in population, degressive proportionality implies that the number of seats grows proportionally less quickly than the population, i.e. $\Delta s < s \times \Delta p / p$. If the relative difference in population between two states $\Delta p / p$ is small, this may mean that the two states have exactly the same number of seats.

(2) Adjustment to the "power law" formula to satisfy degressive

proportionality : If the result of the main calculation with the "power law" formula leads to degressive proportionality not being strictly respected, i.e. the population per seat p_i / s_i decreases as the population of the states increases, an algorithm for adjusting the number of seats per member state is applied. Starting with the least populated member state, the number of seats of the country with the next highest population is determined using either the result of the power law, if it respects degressive proportionality, or the maximum number of seats allowed respecting degressive proportionality, if it does not. If we denote s_i the number of seats obtained by gross application of the power law, the adjusted number of seats verifying degressive proportionality s_i^{PD} is given by : $s_i^{PD} = \min[s_i, \text{rounded down}(s_i - 1 \times p_i / p_i - 1)]$ This algorithm guarantees that degressive proportionality is respected. However, it is not always possible to arrive at any total number of seats, even by adjusting the parameter c of the power law [in this case, the result taken into account is that of the main calculation (1), which remains the result closest possible to degressive proportionality with the number of seats chosen].

(3) Adjustment to the "Power Law" formula to satisfy the "retained seats" principle: The aim of this adjustment method is to apply the formula while seeking to maintain at least the same number of seats for each member state compared with the current situation. The number of seats allocated is the current number, replaced by the result of applying the power law, with the correction to satisfy degressive proportionality only if the latter result is higher. This method of application may sometimes be impossible to achieve, and the result obtained may not respect degressive proportionality. In such cases, the result of calculation (2) or calculation (1) is used.

Amendment 130
Niklas Nienäß

Motion for a resolution
Annex I – Article 3 – point 1 - paragraph 1

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

$$f = \frac{0,1 * \sum^{EP}}{\sum^M} + \frac{0,5 * \sum^{EP}}{\sum^{p_i}} * p_i + \frac{0,4 * \sum^{EP}}{\sum^{\sqrt{p_i}}} * \wedge$$

Whereas

- \sum^{EP} represents the total number of seats in the European Parliament,
- \sum^M represents the total number of Member States in the Union,
- p_i represents the population of Member State i ,
- \sum^{p_i} represents the sum of all Member States' population,
- $\sqrt{p_i}$ represents the square root of the population of Member State i ,
- $\sum^{\sqrt{p_i}}$ represents the sum of square roots of all Member States' population,
- "S" represents the total allocated seats for a Member State.

Amendment 131
Antonio Maria Rinaldi, Gilles Lebreton

Motion for a resolution
Annex I – Article 3 – point 1 – introductory part

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

1. The number of representatives in the European Parliament elected **from** the parliamentary term following the next parliamentary term after the adoption of

1. The number of representatives in the European Parliament elected **for** the parliamentary term following the next parliamentary term after the adoption of

this decision onwards is to be calculated as follows:

this decision onwards is to be calculated as follows:

Or. en

Amendment 132
Domènec Ruiz Devesa

Motion for a resolution
Annex I – Article 3 – point 1 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

1a. In addition, subject to the entry into force of Council Regulation (xx/yy) on the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, repealing Council Decision (76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom) and the Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage annexed to that Decision, in the first elections following that event, 28 representatives in the European Parliament are elected in a Union-wide constituency, as provided for in that Regulation

Or. en

Amendment 133
Leila Chaibi

Motion for a resolution
Annex I – Article 4 – paragraph 1

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Sufficiently far in advance of the beginning of the parliamentary term following the next parliamentary term after the adoption of this decision, the European Parliament shall submit to the European Council, in accordance with Article 14(2) TEU, a proposal for an updated allocation of seats

Sufficiently far in advance of the beginning of the parliamentary term following the next parliamentary term after the adoption of this decision, the European Parliament shall submit to the European Council, in accordance with Article 14(2) TEU, a proposal for an updated allocation of seats

in the European Parliament calculated in accordance with the formula laid down in Article 3.

in the European Parliament calculated in accordance with the formula laid down in Article 3.

In order to provide the European Parliament and the European Council with a tool to aid political decision-making, Eurostat sends them, 18 months before the end of the legislature, the calculations and simulations carried out on the basis of the mathematical formula.

Or. en

Amendment 134
Domènec Ruiz Devesa

Motion for a resolution
Annex I – Article 4 – paragraph 1

Motion for a resolution

Sufficiently far in advance of the beginning of the parliamentary term following the next parliamentary term after the adoption of this decision, the European Parliament shall submit to the European Council, in accordance with Article 14(2) TEU, a proposal for an updated allocation of seats in the European Parliament calculated in accordance with the formula laid down in Article 3.

Amendment

Sufficiently far in advance of the beginning of the parliamentary term following the next parliamentary term after the adoption of this decision, the European Parliament shall submit to the European Council, in accordance with Article 14(2) TEU, a proposal for an updated allocation of seats in the European Parliament calculated **by Eurostat** in accordance with the formula laid down in Article 3.

Or. en