## **European Parliament**

2019-2024



## Committee on Foreign Affairs

2021/0297(COD)

1.3.2022

## **OPINION**


of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

for the Committee on International Trade

on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on applying a generalised scheme of tariff preferences and repealing Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council (COM(2021)0579 – C9-0364/2021 – 2021/0297(COD))

Rapporteur for opinion: Maria Arena

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## SHORT JUSTIFICATION

The European Union (EU) has granted trade preferences to developing countries through the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) since 1971, as part of its common commercial policy and in accordance with the general provisions governing the EU's external action. The GSP assists developing countries with integrating in the world economy, reducing poverty, and supporting sustainable development through the promotion of core human and labour rights, environmental protection, and good governance.

The GSP consists of three arrangements:

- Standard GSP: for low and lower-middle income countries, providing for a reduction or full removal of customs duties on two thirds of EU tariff lines.
- GSP+: the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, which reduces tariffs to 0% for broadly the same tariff lines as Standard GSP. It is granted to vulnerable low and lower-middle income countries that implement 27 international conventions related to human rights, labour rights, protection of the environment and good governance.
- EBA (Everything But Arms): the special arrangement for least developed countries (LDCs), providing them with duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market for all products except arms and ammunition.

The current scheme will apply until 31 December 2023.

The Commission's mid-term evaluation and the supporting expert study concluded that the current framework has been largely effective and delivering on its objectives. The GSP has had a positive economic impact - the imports to the EU from the beneficiary countries have increased. However, the GSP does not achieve its full potential when it comes to improving living standards, environmental standards or incentivising the beneficiary countries to improve the respect for human rights and other core rights and obligations related to sustainable development.

The Commission published the proposal for a new regulation for the period 2024 -2034 on 22 September 2021. The proposal retains broadly the features of the current GSP regulation. It strengthens the current GSP in aspects that are of particular relevance for AFET, such as extending the list of conventions that need to be complied with additional human rights and good governance instruments, introduces improvements in the monitoring of compliance with GSP+ requirements and boosts involvement of civil society in the implementation of the GSP. It further introduces a new urgent withdrawal procedure in cases of grave violations of international human rights standards.

However, there are areas where the AFET rapporteur would like to further strengthen the proposal and make it more effective, including:

- an ex-ante human rights impact assessment before the granting of standard GSP and GSP+ in order to identify risks of human rights violations and abuses by sector in the country.

- Extending positive conditionality to standard GSP.
- Reinforcing the Annex VI on core conventions.
- Reinforcing transparency and effectiveness of the monitoring process and strengthening the involvement of both international and domestic civil society.
- Promoting, through this instrument, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human rights and OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct and the compliance of beneficiary countries' legislation with the EU due diligence toolbox, in particular with the EU regulation no 2368/2002 of 20 December 2002 implementing the Kimberley Process certification scheme for the international trade in rough diamonds, the EU regulation 2017/821 of 17 May 2017 laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas as well as the regulation 995/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 laying down the obligations of operators who place timber and timber products on the market.
- Reinforcing complaints mechanism by formalising the Single Entry Point in the proposal and making it open to Human Rights Defenders and civil society organisations.
- Clarifying the possibility of sectoral withdrawal of preferences in function of occurrence of serious and systematic human rights violations in a particular sector.

## **AMENDMENTS**

The Committee on Foreign Affairs calls on the Committee on International Trade, as the committee responsible, to take into account the following amendments:

## Amendment 1

Proposal for a regulation Recital 8 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(8 a) Before granting any preferential regime to a country, the Commission should conduct and publish an ex-ante human rights and environmental impact assessment in order to identify, assess, and indicate measures to prevent, mitigate, address and combat any risk of human rights or environmental violations.

## Amendment 2

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## Proposal for a regulation Recital 9

Text proposed by the Commission

(9) The standard GSP arrangement should be granted to all those developing countries which share a common development need and are in a similar stage of economic development. There is no definition of 'developing country' at the level of the WTO, and it is left to preference granting countries to determine the list of GSP-eligible developing countries. Countries which have successfully completed their transition from centralised to market economies, and are today powerful economies with a strong position in international trade, such as China, Hong Kong, Macao and Russia, should not be considered as developing countries in the context of the GSP, and should, therefore, be removed from the list of eligible countries. Countries which are classified by the World Bank as highincome or upper-middle income countries have per capita income levels allowing them to attain higher levels of diversification without the scheme's tariff preferences. They are at a different stage of economic development and do not, therefore, share the same development, trade and financial needs as lower income or more vulnerable developing countries. In order to prevent unjustified discrimination, they need to be treated differently; therefore, they do not benefit from the standard GSP arrangement. Furthermore, the use of tariff preferences provided under the scheme by high-income or upper-middle income countries would increase the competitive pressure on exports from poorer, more vulnerable countries and, therefore, could impose unjustifiable burdens on those more vulnerable developing countries. The standard GSP arrangement should take account of the fact that the development,

#### Amendment

(9) The standard GSP arrangement should be granted to all those developing countries which share a common development need and are in a similar stage of economic development and have signed and have committed to ratifying the core international conventions mentioned in Annex VI within five years upon the application of the arrangement. There is no definition of 'developing country' at the level of the WTO, and it is left to preference granting countries to determine the list of GSP-eligible developing countries. Countries which have successfully completed their transition from centralised to market economies, and are today powerful economies with a strong position in international trade, such as China, Hong Kong, Macao and Russia, should not be considered as developing countries in the context of the GSP, and should, therefore, be removed from the list of eligible countries. Countries which are classified by the World Bank as high-income or upper-middle income countries have per capita income levels allowing them to attain higher levels of diversification without the scheme's tariff preferences. They are at a different stage of economic development and do not, therefore, share the same development, trade and financial needs as lower income or more vulnerable developing countries. In order to prevent unjustified discrimination, they need to be treated differently; therefore, they do not benefit from the standard GSP arrangement. Furthermore, the use of tariff preferences provided under the scheme by high-income or upper-middle income countries would increase the competitive pressure on exports from poorer, more vulnerable countries and, therefore, could

trade and financial needs are subject to change and ensure that the arrangement remains open if the situation of a country changes. impose unjustifiable burdens on those more vulnerable developing countries. The standard GSP arrangement should take account of the fact that the development, trade and financial needs are subject to change and ensure that the arrangement remains open if the situation of a country changes.

## Amendment 3

## Proposal for a regulation Recital 11

Text proposed by the Commission

(11)The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) is based on the integral concept of sustainable development, as recognised by international conventions and instruments such as the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the 1998 International Labour Organisation (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration, the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, the ILO Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work of 2019, the Outcome Document of the UN Summit on Sustainable Development of 2015 "Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Consequently, the additional tariff preferences provided for under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be granted to those developing countries which, due to a lack of diversification, are economically vulnerable, have ratified core international conventions on human and

### Amendment

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labour rights, climate and environmental protection and good governance, and commit to ensuring the effective implementation thereof. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should help those countries to assume the additional responsibilities resulting from the ratification and effective implementation of these conventions. The list of conventions relevant for GSP should be updated to better reflect the evolution of core international instruments and standards and take a proactive approach to sustainable development in keeping with the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2030<sup>18</sup>. In this regard, the following conventions are added: the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (2015) – replacing the Kyoto Protocol; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OP-CRC-AC); ILO Convention No 81 on Labour Inspection; ILO Convention No 144 on Tripartite Consultation; and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

conventions on human and labour rights, climate and environmental protection and good governance, and commit to pursuing the effective implementation thereof, including but not limited to a public, ambitious and time-bound plan of action, adopted in accordance with this **Regulation**. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should help those countries to assume the additional responsibilities resulting from the ratification and effective implementation of these conventions. The list of conventions relevant for GSP should be updated to better reflect the evolution of core international instruments and standards and take a proactive approach to sustainable development in keeping with the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2030<sup>18</sup>. In this regard, the following conventions are added: the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (2015) – replacing the Kyoto Protocol; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OP-CRC-AC); the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; ILO Convention No 81 on Labour Inspection; ILO Convention No 144 on Tripartite Consultation; and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

## **Amendment 4**

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> United Nations (2015). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, Transforming our World: the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1), available at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post 2015/transformingourworld

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> United Nations (2015). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, Transforming our World: the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1), available at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post 2015/transformingourworld

## Proposal for a regulation Recital 16

Text proposed by the Commission

(16)The Commission and where appropriate the European External Action Service should monitor the status of ratification of the international conventions on human and labour rights, environmental protection and good governance and their effective implementation, by examining the relevant information, in particular where available the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies established under those conventions. Every three years, the Commission should present to the European Parliament and the Council a report on the status of ratification of the respective conventions, the compliance of the beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions, and the status of the implementation of the conventions in practice.

## **Amendment 5**

## Proposal for a regulation Recital 16 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

## Amendment

The Commission and where (16)appropriate the European External Action Service should monitor the status of ratification of the international conventions on human and labour rights, environmental protection and good governance and their effective implementation, by examining the relevant information, in particular where available the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies established under those conventions. Every two years, the Commission should present to the European Parliament and the Council a report on the status of ratification of the respective conventions, the compliance of the beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions, and the status of the implementation of the conventions in practice.

## Amendment

(16a) The Commission should, for reasons of consistency of Union policies, encourage beneficiary countries to adhere to higher social and environmental standards and to promote a strong sustainable development dimension in global value chains, in line with the due diligence obligations set out in the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.

## Justification

The GSP regulation needs to be coherent with the EU's human rights and environmental due

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diligence tools as recalled in the European Parliament resolution of 5 July 2016 on implementation of the 2010 recommendations on social and environmental standards, human rights and corporate responsibility (2015/2038(INI).

### Amendment 6

## Proposal for a regulation Recital 18

Text proposed by the Commission

(18)In July 2020, the Commission appointed the Chief Trade Enforcement Officer with the role of enforcing trade rules. In this connection, in November 2020, the Commission launched a new complaints mechanism, the Single Entry Point ('SEP'), as part of its increased efforts to strengthen the enforcement and implementation of trade commitments. Through the SEP, the Commission receives complaints on various matters related to trade policy, including breaches of the GSP commitments. Such new system of complaints should be integrated within the framework of this Regulation.

## Amendment

In July 2020, the Commission (18)appointed the Chief Trade Enforcement Officer with the role of enforcing trade rules. In this connection, in November 2020, the Commission launched a new complaints mechanism, the Single Entry Point ('SEP'), as part of its increased efforts to strengthen the enforcement and implementation of trade commitments. Through the SEP, the Commission receives complaints on various matters related to trade policy, including breaches of the GSP commitments. Such new system of complaints should be integrated within the framework of this Regulation and should be accessible to civil society organisations and human rights defenders, both from the Union and the beneficiary countries.

## Amendment 7

## Proposal for a regulation Recital 26

Text proposed by the Commission

(26) Orderly international migration can bring important benefits to the countries of origin and destination of migrants and contribute to their sustainable development needs. Increasing coherence between trade, development and migration policies is key to ensure that the benefits of migration accrue mutually to both the origin and destination countries. In this respect, it is

## Amendment

(26) Orderly international migration can bring important benefits to the countries of origin and destination of migrants and contribute to their sustainable development needs. Increasing coherence between trade, development and migration policies is key to ensure that the benefits of migration accrue mutually to both the origin and destination countries. In this respect, it is

essential for both origin and destination countries to address common challenges, such as, stepping up cooperation on readmission of own nationals and their sustainable reintegration in the country of origin, in particular in order to avoid a constant drain in active population in the countries of origin, with the ensuing long-term consequences on development, and to ensure that migrants are treated with dignity.

essential for both origin and destination countries to address common challenges, such as, stepping up cooperation on readmission of own nationals and their sustainable reintegration in the country of origin, in particular in order to avoid a constant drain in active population in the countries of origin, with the ensuing long-term consequences on development, and to ensure that migrants are treated with dignity *and that their human rights are fully respected*.

#### Amendment 8

## Proposal for a regulation Recital 27

Text proposed by the Commission

(27) Return, readmission and reintegration are a common challenge for the Union and its partners. In particular, every State has the obligation to readmit its own nationals under international customary law, and multilateral international conventions such as the Convention on International Civil Aviation signed in Chicago on 7 December 1944. Improving sustainable reintegration and capacity building would significantly strengthen the local development in the partner countries.

Amendment

deleted

## Amendment 9

Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 11 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(11 a) 'serious and systematic violation' means widespread and systematic human rights violations or abuses that are of serious concern, as regards the objectives of the common foreign and security policy

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set out in Article 21 TEU, which includes but is not limited to the following:

i. genocide;

ii. crimes against humanity;

iii. torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;

iv. slavery or forced labour;

v. extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings;

vi. enforced disappearance of persons;

vii. arbitrary arrests or detentions;

viii. trafficking in human beings, including people-smuggling;

ix. sexual and gender-based violence;

x. other violations of the laws and customs of war;

xi. violations or abuses of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association;

xii. violations or abuses of freedom of opinion and expression;

xiii. violations or abuses of freedom of religion or belief;

Indicators to determine whether such serious and systematic violations have occurred should be clear and include, amongst others:

- (i) rulings and opinions by international human rights courts, courts, arbitration panels and tribunals or other judicial authorities and mechanisms;
- (ii) establishment and findings of commissions of inquiry, fact-finding missions, special rapporteurs, or other monitoring mechanisms by the UN Human Rights Council or General Assembly or by other regional intergovernmental bodies;
- (iii) findings by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Special Procedures, or other UN independent human rights experts;

(iv) reports by the Advisory Body and civil society organisations.

## **Amendment 10**

Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 11 b (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(11 b) 'human rights due diligence obligations' refers to the responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights and to protect against human rights abuse by business as set in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) in 2011. The responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights refers to internationally recognized human rights understood, at a minimum, as those expressed in the International Bill of Human Rights and the principles concerning fundamental rights set out in the International Labour Organization's Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.

## **Amendment 11**

Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 11 c (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(11 c) 'civil society organisation' means a wide range of actors with multiple roles and mandates, which may vary over time and across institutions and countries, and includes all non-State, not-for-profit independent and non-violent structures, through which people organise the pursuit of shared objectives and ideals, including political, cultural, religious, environmental, social or economic, and which operate at local, national, regional

or international levels, and which comprise urban and rural, indigenous, formal and informal organisations;

## **Amendment 12**

Proposal for a regulation Article 3 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

## Article 3 a

Human rights and environmental impact assessmentBefore granting any preferential regime to a country, the Commission should conduct and publish an ex-ante human rights and environmental impact assessment in order to identify, assess, and indicate measures to prevent, mitigate, address and combat any risk of human rights or environmental violations.

#### Amendment 13

Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b a) the results of an ex ante human rights and environmental impact assessment carried out by the Commission pursuant to article 3 paragraph a (new) show a considerable risk of negative impact on human rights or on the environment in the beneficiary country, and proposed measures to prevent, address and combat it are insufficient or have not been accepted by the beneficiary country's government;

## **Amendment 14**

## Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b a) there is sufficient ground to consider that serious and systematic shortcomings and violations of the conditions set out in Article 19.1 points (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) exist;

## **Amendment 15**

Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point b c (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b c) it has not signed nor ratified the conventions listed in Annex VI within five years upon the application of the preferences;

## **Amendment 16**

Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point b d (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b d) it has adopted domestic legislative and administrative measures that manifestly aim to undermine the effective implementation of the due diligence requirements under Union law, and in particular Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council<sup>1a</sup>, Regulation (EU) 995/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council<sup>1b</sup> and Council Regulation (EC) 2368/2002<sup>1c</sup>;

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1a</sup> Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union

importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas (OJ L 130, 19.5.2017, p. 1).

<sup>1b</sup> Regulation (EU) 995/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 laying down the obligations of operators who place timber and timber products on the market (OJ L 295, 12.11.2010, p.23).

1c Council Regulation (EC) No 2368/2002 of 20 December 2002 implementing the Kimberley Process certification scheme for the international trade in rough diamonds (OJ L 358, 31.12.2002, p. 28).

#### Amendment 17

Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

### Amendment

1 a. The Commission and, where applicable, the European External Action Service, shall make sure that countries that benefit from the standard arrangement referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article have ratified the conventions listed in Annex VI within the five years upon the application of the preferences;

## **Amendment 18**

Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 b (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

## Amendment

1 b. The Commission shall encourage beneficiary countries to adopt measures in line with the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, such as the adoption of National Action Plans and in line with their commitment ensure the ratification of the

conventions listed in Annex VI. It shall be possible to finance assistance programs under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, established by Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

## Amendment 19

## Proposal for a regulation Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

(b) it has ratified all the conventions listed in Annex VI (the 'relevant conventions') and the Commission has not identified, based on available information, in particular the most recent available conclusions of the monitoring bodies under those conventions, a serious failure to effectively implement any of those conventions:

### Amendment

(b) it has ratified and started to implement all the conventions listed in Annex VI (the 'relevant conventions') and the Commission has not identified, based on available information, in particular the most recent available conclusions of the monitoring bodies under those conventions as well as information submitted by the Advisory Body or the civil society organisations, a serious failure to effectively implement any of those conventions;

## **Amendment 20**

## Proposal for a regulation Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point d

Text proposed by the Commission

(d) it gives a binding undertaking to maintain ratification of the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof, accompanied by a plan of action for the effective implementation of the relevant conventions;

#### Amendment

(d) it gives a binding undertaking to ratify and ensure effective implementation of the relevant conventions by an ambitious and public time-bound plan of action of measures that are necessary to effectively implement the relevant conventions, setting out a roadmap with clear benchmarks and deadlines, and that shall be approved by the Commission in consultation with the European Parliament. The beneficiary country and

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the Commission should reach a common understanding on the plan of action, which shall thereafter be made public. The plan of action shall serve as a basis for the report referred to in Article 14;

## **Amendment 21**

Proposal for a regulation Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point d a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(d a) it has not adopted domestic legislative and administrative measures that manifestly aim to undermine the effective implementation of the due diligence requirements under Union law, and in particular Regulations (EU) 2017/821, (EU) 995/2010 and (EC) 2368/2002 and has adopted a National Action Plan for the implementation on Business and Human Rights, in conformity with the Guidance on National Action Plans of the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights;

## **Amendment 22**

Proposal for a regulation Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point f a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(f a) the results of an ex ante human rights and environmental impact assessment carried out by the Commission pursuant to article 3 paragraph a (new) do not show a considerable risk of negative impact on human rights or on the environment in the beneficiary country, or proposed measures to prevent and address it are sufficient and have been accepted by the beneficiary country's government;

## **Amendment 23**

## Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

(b) the Commission considers, based on examination of the request, that the requesting country fulfils the conditions laid down in Article 9.

### Amendment

(b) the Commission considers, based on examination of the request, including but not limited to the plan of action as indicated in article 9 paragraph 1 (d), as well as on the results of the human rights impact assessment referred to in Article 3, paragraph a (new), that the requesting country fulfils the conditions laid down in Article 9.

#### Amendment 24

## Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

2. The requesting country shall submit its request to the Commission in writing. The request shall provide comprehensive information concerning the ratification of the relevant conventions and shall include the binding undertakings referred to in Article 9, *pointes* (d), (e), and (f).

### Amendment

2. The requesting country shall submit its request to the Commission in writing. The request shall provide comprehensive information concerning the ratification *and implementation* of the relevant conventions and shall include the binding undertakings referred to in Article 9, *points* (d), (e), and (f), *including a finalised plan of action*.

## Amendment 25

# Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 4

Text proposed by the Commission

4. After examining the request, the Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I in order to grant a requesting country the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development

## Amendment

4. While examining the request, the European Commission shall consult the European Parliament and the Council and the advisory body referred to in Article 13a (new). After examining the request, the Commission is empowered to

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and good governance by including that country in the list of GSP+ beneficiary countries.

adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I in order to grant a requesting country the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance by including that country in the list of GSP+beneficiary countries.

## Amendment 26

## Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

1. The Common Customs Tariff ad valorem duties on all products listed in Annex III and Annex VII, which originate in a GSP+ beneficiary country, shall be suspended.

### Amendment

1. The Common Customs Tariff ad valorem duties on all products listed in Annex III and Annex VII, which originate in a GSP+ beneficiary country, shall be suspended *according to the tariff suspension schedule referred to in Article* 9(2).

## Amendment 27

## Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

As of the date of the granting of the 1. tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the Commission shall, with regard to each of the GSP+ beneficiary countries, keep under review and monitor the status of ratification of the relevant conventions and their effective implementation, as well as the cooperation of the GSP+ beneficiary country with the relevant monitoring bodies. In doing so, the Commission shall examine all relevant information, *in particular* the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies.

### Amendment

As of the date of the granting of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the Commission shall, with regard to each of the GSP+ beneficiary countries, keep under review and monitor the status of ratification of the relevant conventions and their effective implementation, as well as the cooperation of the GSP+ beneficiary country with the relevant monitoring bodies. In doing so, the Commission shall assess the progress made by the GSP+ beneficiary countries in implementing their plans of action, as well as examine all relevant information, including the conclusions and

recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies as well as duly substantiated information submitted by individual citizens, private sector actors, civil society organisations, representatives of trade unions and other relevant stakeholders. The information may also be submitted via the Single Entry Point, which shall be accessible to stakeholders from both the Union and GSP+ beneficiary countries. The Commission, including through the EEAS and the delegations, should hold regular contacts with local and international civil society to assess the beneficiary countries' implementation of the conventions listed in annex VI. A cycle of 3 years for the review, monitoring and assessment (hereinafter monitoring cycle) is hereby established. During the application period and monitoring cycle, the Commission shall also enquire the views of the European Parliament expressed by its competent committees and through the relevant resolutions adopted during plenaries.

## **Amendment 28**

# Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

2. A GSP+ beneficiary country shall cooperate with the Commission and provide all information necessary to assess its respect of the binding undertakings referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e), and (f) and its situation as regards Article 9, points (b) and (c).

#### Amendment

2. A GSP+ beneficiary country shall cooperate with the Commission and provide all information necessary to assess its respect of the binding undertakings referred to in Article 9, points (d) *including the implementation of its plan of action*, (e), and (f) and its situation as regards Article 9, points (b) and (c).

### Amendment 29

Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 2 a (new)

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## Text proposed by the Commission

## Amendment

2 a. The Commission, where applicable jointly with the EEAS, shall carry out at least one high-level monitoring mission per monitoring cycle to the beneficiary countries in order to assess progress on the ground, including in line with the plans of action. In the framework of the mission, relevant stakeholders, including civil society organizations and human rights defenders in the beneficiary countries shall be duly consulted.

## **Amendment 30**

Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 2 b (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

## Amendment

2 b. At the beginning of each monitoring cycle, the Commission shall send a list of issues to all GSP+ beneficiary countries outlining implementation issues that need to be addressed during the cycle. The lists of issues shall be made publicly available.

## **Amendment 31**

Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 2 c (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

## Amendment

2 c. The plans of action and the recommendations of the Commission and European External Action Service on priority implementation actions shall be taken into account in the EU development finance programming in order to support GSP+ beneficiary countries in attaining their commitments.

### Amendment 32

## Proposal for a regulation Article 13 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Article 13 a

Advisory Body

- 1. The Commission shall be assisted in reviewing, monitoring and assessing the binding undertakings referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f) by an advisory body composed of stakeholders' representatives.
- 2. The Commission shall consult with the advisory body in regards to the plans of action submitted by the GSP+ beneficiary countries in view of their application to the GSP+ scheme; to that purpose, the participation to the advisory body shall be extended to stakeholders in the beneficiary countries. The Commission shall also consult with and report to the advisory body when assessing the implementation of the plans of action during each monitoring cycle and more generally throughout the cycle as regularly as necessary, including ahead of and after monitoring missions.
- 3. The advisory body shall also monitor possible measures by GSP+ beneficiary countries' legislation underminingthe due diligence requirements under Union law, and in particular Regulations (EU) No 2017/821, (EU) No 995/2010 and (EC) No 2368/2002.

### Amendment 33

## Proposal for a regulation Article 14 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1. By 1 January 2027, and every *three* 

1. By 1 January 2027, and every *two* 

 years thereafter, the Commission shall present to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the status of ratification of the relevant conventions, the compliance of the GSP+ beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions and the status of the effective implementation thereof.

years thereafter, the Commission shall present to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the status of ratification of the relevant conventions, the compliance of the GSP+ beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions and the status of the effective implementation thereof, which includes scorecards that are being evaluated with the beneficiary countries and are also based on but not limited to the assessment of the implementation of the plans of action.

## **Amendment 34**

## Proposal for a regulation Article 14 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

(b) the Commission's and where appropriate the European External Action Service's conclusions on whether each GSP+ beneficiary country respects its binding undertakings to comply with reporting obligations, to cooperate with relevant monitoring bodies in accordance with the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof

Amendment

(b) the Commission's and where appropriate the European External Action Service's conclusions on whether each GSP+ beneficiary country respects its binding undertakings to comply with reporting obligations, to cooperate with relevant monitoring bodies in accordance with the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof, including through an assessment of the implementation of its plan of action, and

### Amendment 35

Proposal for a regulation Article 14 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b a) a copy of the scorecard that the Commission has evaluated with the beneficiary country

## **Amendment 36**

## Proposal for a regulation Article 14 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

The report may include any information from any source the Commission considers appropriate.

## Amendment

The report may include any information from any source the Commission considers appropriate, *including from civil society organizations and social partners*.

## Amendment 37

## Proposal for a regulation Article 14 – paragraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission

3. In drawing their conclusions concerning effective implementation of the relevant conventions, the Commission and where appropriate the European External Action Service shall assess the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies, as well as, without prejudice to other sources, information submitted by the European Parliament or the Council as well as third parties, including governments and international organisations, civil society, and social partners.

### Amendment

3. In drawing their conclusions concerning effective implementation of the relevant conventions, the Commission and where appropriate the European External Action Service shall assess the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies. It shall also request the opinion of the European Parliament and the Council, and shall assess, without prejudice to other sources, information submitted by third parties, including complaints submitted through the Single Entry Point, such as governments and international organisations, civil society, and social partners.

## **Amendment 38**

## Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

1. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance shall be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products originating in a GSP+ beneficiary country, where that country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred

#### Amendment

1. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance shall be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products originating in a GSP+ beneficiary country, where that country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred

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to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), or the GSP+ beneficiary country has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c).

to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), including in case of major shortcomings in implementing or of systemic failure to implement the plan of action referred to in Article 9 point (d) are identified, or the GSP+ beneficiary country has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c).

#### Amendment 39

## Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission

3. Where, either on the basis of the conclusions of the report referred to in Article 14 or on the basis of the evidence available, including evidence submitted through a complaint, the Commission has a reasonable doubt that a particular GSP+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), or has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c), it shall, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for the temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council thereof.

### Amendment

At the request of the European **Parliament or** where, either on the basis of the conclusions of the report referred to in Article 14 or on the basis of the evidence available, including evidence submitted by the European Parliament through its competent committees and through the relevant resolutions adopted during plenaries, and evidence submitted through a complaint, the Commission has a reasonable doubt that a particular GSP+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), including with regards to implementation of its plan of action or has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c), it shall, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for the temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council

### thereof.

#### Amendment 40

## Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 5

Text proposed by the Commission

5. The Commission shall provide the GSP+ beneficiary country concerned with every opportunity to cooperate during the period referred to in paragraph 4, point (b).

#### Amendment

5. The Commission shall provide the GSP+ beneficiary country concerned with every opportunity to cooperate and engage with a view to addressing the violations of its binding undertakings as referred to in paragraph 3 during the period referred to in paragraph 4, point (b).

#### Amendment 41

## Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 6

Text proposed by the Commission

6. The Commission shall seek all information it considers necessary including, inter alia, the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies. In drawing its conclusions, the Commission shall assess all relevant information

## Amendment

6. The Commission shall seek all information it considers necessary including, inter alia, the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies. In drawing its conclusions, the Commission shall assess all relevant information, including from civil society organisations and social partners.

### Amendment 42

## Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 8

Text proposed by the Commission

8. Where the Commission considers *that the findings do not justify* temporary withdrawal, it shall adopt an implementing act to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure in accordance with the advisory

### Amendment

8. Where the Commission considers, based on the elements referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6, that a temporary withdrawal is not justified, it shall adopt an implementing act to terminate the

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procedure referred to in Article 39(2). That implementing act shall be based inter alia on evidence received.

temporary withdrawal procedure in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). That implementing act shall be based inter alia on evidence received.

## **Amendment 43**

## Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 9

Text proposed by the Commission

9. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b). *In adopting* the delegated act the Commission may, when appropriate, consider the socioeconomic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country.

### Amendment

9 Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b). The Commission shall clearly and publicly state the grounds for withdrawing preferences and set clear benchmarks that the beneficiary country should meet for the preferences to be reinstated; such benchmarks may also guide a phased approach, including the progressive withdrawal or reinstatement of part of the benefits against clear benchmarks and conditions.

## **Amendment 44**

### Proposal for a regulation

Article 15 – paragraph 10 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

## Amendment

10 a. During the application of a temporary withdrawal, the Commission shall continue the dialogue with the beneficiary country, including in the

framework referred to in Article 18a, aiming at remedying the reasons for the withdrawal referred to in paragraph 3. The Commission shall regularly assess the effects of the withdrawal on remedying the violations, including in the report referred to in Article 14, as well as on the human rights and socio-economic situation of the population concerned. The Commission shall regularly consult with the advisory body referred to in Article 13a throughout the procedure.

#### Amendment 45

Proposal for a regulation Article 17 – paragraph 1 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

## Amendment

1 a. The Commission and, where applicable the EEAS, shall make sure that countries that benefit from the special arrangement referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article make continued and sustained progress towards ratifying the conventions listed in Annex VI.

EU development finance programming shall prioritise support to countries benefitting from the special arrangement referred to in paragraph 1 aiming to make progress towards the ratification of the conventions listed in Annex VI.

## Amendment 46

Proposal for a regulation Chapter V – title

Text proposed by the Commission

Temporary withdrawal provisions common to all arrangements

Amendment

**Enhanced engagement and** temporary withdrawal provisions common to all arrangements

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### Amendment 47

## Proposal for a regulation Article 18 a(new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Article 18 a (new)

In the framework of a Cooperation, Partnership or Association Agreement the EU has concluded with a beneficiary country, a general review of the status of the country in the framework of the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) shall be conducted yearly and in consultation with the European Parliament. To that purpose, the Commission, and where relevant the European External Action Service, and the beneficiary country shall review the issues pertaining to the conditions referred to in Article 19(1), including in relation to any complaints received by the Commission. The Commission, where relevant the European External Action Service, and the beneficiary country shall also review the status of the ratification of the conventions listed in Annex VI as referred to in Article4(1) point (c) and progress towards ratification of the conventions listed in Annex VI as referred to in Article 17(1a).

## **Amendment 48**

Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Text proposed by the Commission

1. The preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) may be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or *of* certain products originating in a beneficiary country, for any of the following reasons:

Amendment

1. The preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) may be withdrawn temporarily, *fully or partly*, in respect of all or certain products *or economic sectors*, originating in a beneficiary country, for any of the

## following reasons:

### Amendment 49

Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(a a) the beneficiary country fails to show effective implementation of the plan of action;

## Amendment 50

Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b a) when the Commission, acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative, considers that there may be sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article1 (2) on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 19 a) or b), the Commission may before publishing the notice referred § 4 art 19 enhance its engagement with the partner country and negotiate a dedicated and timebound action plan to remedy the violations including through a full cooperation with the UN human rights and labour rights monitoring mechanisms;

## **Amendment 51**

Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point b b (new)

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## Text proposed by the Commission

### Amendment

(b b) when the Commission decides to withdraw a preferential arrangement to a beneficiary country in a particular economic sector, in application of article 19 (a and b) the commission may publish a list of companies, EU importers and local suppliers, that may still benefit from preferences. This list should be established based on the evidence provided by companies that they fully implemented their human rights due diligence obligations and that they have a supply chain free from human rights violations;

## Amendment 52

## Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point c

Text proposed by the Commission

(c) serious shortcomings in customs controls on the export or transit of drugs (illicit substances or precursors), or *related to the obligation to readmit the beneficiary country's own nationals or* serious failure to comply with international conventions on antiterrorism or anti-money laundering;

## Amendment

(c) serious shortcomings in customs controls on the export or transit of drugs (illicit substances or precursors), or serious failure to comply with international conventions on antiterrorism or anti-money laundering;

## Amendment 53

Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 1 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

#### Amendment

1 a. For the purpose of applying point 1 (a), the Commission will in particular take into account whether the relevant monitoring bodies, treaty mechanisms and supervisory mechanisms have signalled

potentially serious and systematic violations of the principles of the relevant conventions, based on such indicators as:

- the establishment of commission of inquiries, fact-finding missions, country special rapporteurs, or other monitoring mechanisms by the UN Human Rights Council or General Assembly;
- findings by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Special Procedures or other UN independent human rights experts;
- reports of the ILO Committee of Application of Standards;
- rulings and opinions by international human rights courts;
- reports by Advisory Body and civil society organisations.

## **Amendment 54**

Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 2 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

## Amendment

2 a. When in particular the seriousness of the violations of principles of the international conventions listed in Annex VI so requires, based on available assessments, comments, decisions, recommendations and the conclusions of the relevant monitoring bodies, or based on duly substantiated concerns expressed by the European Parliament, the Council, international organisations, and civil society including trade unions, or acting upon a complaint, the Commission shall notify the beneficiary country.

Starting from the date of the notification and during one year, the beneficiary country and the Commission shall enter into an enhanced engagement, where the country commits to adopt time-bound roadmaps providing for concrete actions

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and sustainable solutions to the serious and systematic violations as identified.

The Commission shall regularly consult with the advisory body referred to in Article 13a during the enhanced engagement process.

## **Amendment 55**

Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 2 b (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

### Amendment

2 b. If considered necessary, the enhanced engagement may be prolonged by up to another year. The Commission shall publish a list of countries with which enhanced engagement has been prolonged beyond one year and shall regularly update the list as necessary. The roadmaps referred to in paragraph 2a shall be made public.

### Amendment 56

## Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission

3. Where the Commission, acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative. considers that there *are* sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the adoption of that implementing act.

## Amendment

Parliament or where the Commission, acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative, considers that there may be sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) because the beneficiary country has failed to deliver in the framework of the enhanced engagement or on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory

procedure referred to in Article 39(2). The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the adoption of that implementing act.

### Amendment 57

Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 3 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

### Amendment

3 a. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council about the complaints received. The Commission shall inform the complainant, the European Parliament and the Council where it decides that the complaint does not provide sufficient evidence in relation to the indicators referred to in this article.

### Amendment 58

Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 4 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission

(b) state that the Commission will monitor and evaluate the situation in the beneficiary country concerned during the monitoring and evaluation period referred to in Paragraph 5.

## Amendment

(b) state that the Commission will continue to pursue dialogue in the framework of the enhanced engagement and monitor and evaluate the situation in the beneficiary country concerned during the monitoring and evaluation period referred to in Paragraph 5.

## Amendment 59

Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 5

Text proposed by the Commission

5. The Commission shall provide the beneficiary country concerned with every

Amendment

5. The Commission shall provide the beneficiary country concerned with every

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opportunity to cooperate during the monitoring and evaluation period of six months from the date of publication of the notice opportunity to *start engaging with and* cooperate *at any time* during the monitoring and evaluation period of six months from the date of publication of the notice.

## Amendment 60

## Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 6

Text proposed by the Commission

6. The Commission shall seek all information it considers necessary, inter alia, the available assessments, comments, decisions, recommendations and conclusions of the relevant monitoring bodies, and relevant information from other sources, including evidence submitted through a complaint or provided by third parties, as appropriate. In drawing its conclusions, the Commission shall assess all relevant information

### Amendment

6. The Commission shall seek all information it considers necessary, inter alia, the available assessments, comments, decisions, recommendations and conclusions of the relevant monitoring bodies, and relevant information from other sources, including evidence submitted through a complaint or provided by third parties, as appropriate. In drawing its conclusions, the Commission shall assess all relevant information and consider the progress made by the country in delivering on its roadmap in the framework of the enhanced engagement as referred to in paragraph 2a.

## Amendment 61

## Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 7

Text proposed by the Commission

7. Within three months from the expiry of the period referred to in paragraph 5, the Commission shall submit a report on its findings and conclusions to the beneficiary country concerned. The beneficiary country has the right to submit its comments on the report. The period for comments shall not exceed one month

## Amendment

7. Within three months from the expiry of the period referred to in paragraph 5, and after consultation of the advisory body referred to in Article 13(a), the Commission shall submit a report on its findings and conclusions to the beneficiary country concerned. The beneficiary country has the right to submit its comments on the report. The period for comments shall not exceed one month.

## **Amendment 62**

## Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 9

Text proposed by the Commission

9. Where the Commission considers *that the findings do not justify* temporary withdrawal, it shall adopt an implementing act, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), on the termination of the temporary withdrawal procedure.

## Amendment

9. Where the Commission considers, based on the elements referred to in paragraph 6, that a temporary withdrawal is not justified, it shall adopt an implementing act, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), on the termination of the temporary withdrawal procedure.

## **Amendment 63**

## Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 10

Text proposed by the Commission

10. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II, in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2). In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, where appropriate, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country.

#### Amendment

10. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II, in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2).

## **Amendment 64**

Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 12 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

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12 a. During the application of a temporary withdrawal, the Commission shall continue the dialogue with the beneficiary country, including in the framework referred to in Article 18a, aiming at remedying the reasons for the withdrawal referred to in paragraph 1. The Commission shall regularly assess the effects of the withdrawal on remedying the violations, and shall consult with the advisory body referred to in Article 13a.

#### Amendment 65

## Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 16

Text proposed by the Commission

16. Where the Commission considers that there is sufficient evidence to justify temporary withdrawal for the reason set out in paragraph 1, point (a) and the exceptional gravity of the violations calls for a rapid response in view of the specific circumstances in the beneficiary country, it shall initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with paragraphs (3) to (15). However, the period referred to in paragraph 4, point (b) is reduced to 2 months and the deadline referred to in paragraph 8 is reduced to 5 months.

## **Amendment 66**

## Proposal for a regulation Article 40 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

By 1 January 2027 and every *three* years thereafter, the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the effects of the scheme covering the most recent *three-year* period and all of the preferential

### Amendment

16. Where the Commission considers that there is sufficient evidence to justify temporary withdrawal for the reason set out in paragraph 1, point (a) and the exceptional gravity of the violations calls for a rapid response in view of the specific circumstances in the beneficiary country, it shall initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with paragraphs (3) to (15). However, the period referred to in paragraph 4, point (b) is reduced to *I month* and the deadline referred to in paragraph 8 is reduced to *3* months.

## Amendment

By 1 January 2027 and every *two* years thereafter, the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the effects of the scheme covering the most recent *two-year* period and all of the preferential

arrangements referred to in Article 1(2).

arrangements referred to in Article 1(2).

Amendment 67

Proposal for a regulation Annex VI – paragraph 1 – row 1 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998)

**Amendment 68** 

Proposal for a regulation Annex VI – paragraph 1 – row 1 b (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)

**Amendment 69** 

Proposal for a regulation Annex VI – paragraph 1 – row 1 c (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (1989)

## PROCEDURE - COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

Title	Applying a generalized scheme of tariff preferences and repealing Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council
References	COM(2021)0579 – C9-0364/2021 – 2021/0297(COD)
Committee responsible Date announced in plenary	INTA 4.10.2021
Opinion by Date announced in plenary	AFET 4.10.2021
Associated committees - date announced in plenary	20.1.2022
Rapporteur for the opinion Date appointed	Maria Arena 11.11.2021
Discussed in committee	10.12.2021
Date adopted	2.2.2022
Result of final vote	+: 60 -: 14 0: 0
Members present for the final vote	Alviina Alametsä, Alexander Alexandrov Yordanov, François Alfonsi, Maria Arena, Petras Auštrevičius, Traian Băsescu, Nicolas Bay, Malin Björk, Anna Bonfrisco, Reinhard Bütikofer, Fabio Massimo Castaldo, Susanna Ceccardi, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Katalin Cseh, Tanja Fajon, Anna Fotyga, Michael Gahler, Sunčana Glavak, Raphaël Glucksmann, Klemen Grošelj, Bernard Guetta, Sandra Kalniete, Peter Kofod, Dietmar Köster, Andrius Kubilius, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, David Lega, Miriam Lexmann, Nathalie Loiseau, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Claudiu Manda, Lukas Mandl, Thierry Mariani, Pedro Marques, David McAllister, Vangelis Meimarakis, Jörg Meuthen, Francisco José Millán Mon, Javier Nart, Gheorghe-Vlad Nistor, Urmas Paet, Demetris Papadakis, Kostas Papadakis, Tonino Picula, Manu Pineda, Giuliano Pisapia, Thijs Reuten, María Soraya Rodríguez Ramos, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Isabel Santos, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Andreas Schieder, Radosław Sikorski, Jordi Solé, Sergei Stanishev, Tineke Strik, Dominik Tarczyński, Hermann Tertsch, Dragoş Tudorache, Harald Vilimsky, Idoia Villanueva Ruiz, Viola Von Cramon-Taubadel, Thomas Waitz, Witold Jan Waszczykowski, Charlie Weimers, Salima Yenbou, Željana Zovko
Substitutes present for the final vote	Karsten Lucke, Marisa Matias, Paulo Rangel, Peter van Dalen, Mick Wallace, Javier Zarzalejos
Substitutes under Rule 209(7) present for the final vote	Samira Rafaela

## FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

60	+
NI	Fabio Massimo Castaldo
PPE	Alexander Alexandrov Yordanov, Traian Băsescu, Peter van Dalen, Michael Gahler, Sunčana Glavak, Sandra Kalniete, Andrius Kubilius, David Lega, Miriam Lexmann, Antonio López-Istúriz White, David McAllister, Lukas Mandl, Vangelis Meimarakis, Francisco José Millán Mon, Gheorghe-Vlad Nistor, Paulo Rangel, Radosław Sikorski, Javier Zarzalejos, Željana Zovko
Renew	Petras Auštrevičius, Katalin Cseh, Klemen Grošelj, Bernard Guetta, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Javier Nart, Urmas Paet, Samira Rafaela, María Soraya Rodríguez Ramos, Dragoş Tudorache
S&D	Maria Arena, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Tanja Fajon, Raphaël Glucksmann, Dietmar Köster, Karsten Lucke, Claudiu Manda, Pedro Marques, Demetris Papadakis, Tonino Picula, Giuliano Pisapia, Thijs Reuten, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Isabel Santos, Andreas Schieder, Sergei Stanishev
The Left	Malin Björk, Marisa Matias, Manu Pineda, Idoia Villanueva Ruiz, Mick Wallace
Verts/ALE	Alviina Alametsä, François Alfonsi, Reinhard Bütikofer, Jordi Solé, Tineke Strik, Viola Von Cramon- Taubadel, Thomas Waitz, Salima Yenbou

14	-
ECR	Anna Fotyga, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Dominik Tarczyński, Hermann Tertsch, Witold Jan Waszczykowski, Charlie Weimers
ID	Nicolas Bay, Anna Bonfrisco, Susanna Ceccardi, Peter Kofod, Thierry Mariani, Jörg Meuthen, Harald Vilimsky
NI	Kostas Papadakis

0	0

Key to symbols: + : in favour - : against 0 : abstention