



**2021/0297(COD)**

15.12.2021

# **AMENDMENTS**

## **26 - 140**

**Draft opinion**

**Maria Arena**

(PE700.536v01-00)

Applying a generalized scheme of tariff preferences and repealing Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council

Proposal for a regulation

(COM(2021)0579 – C9-0364/2021 – 2021/0297(COD))



**Amendment 26**  
**Miguel Urbán Crespo**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 5**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(5) The general objectives of the GSP **are** to support eradication of poverty in all its forms, in line with Agenda 2030 and Sustainable Development Goal 17.12 and to promote the sustainable development agenda, **while averting harm to EU industry's interests. The 2018 GSP Mid-term Evaluation and the 2021 supporting Study for the Impact Assessment underpinning this Regulation concluded that the GSP framework under Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 has delivered on these main objectives, which were at the core of the 2012 overhaul of Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008<sup>15</sup>.**

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<sup>15</sup> Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 of 22 July 2008 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences from 1 January 2009 and amending Regulations (EC) No 552/97, (EC) No 1933/2006 and Commission Regulations (EC) No 1100/2006 and (EC) No 964/2007 (OJ L 211, 6.8.2008, p. 1).

*Amendment*

(5) The general objectives of the GSP **should be** to support eradication of poverty in all its forms, in line with Agenda 2030 and Sustainable Development Goal 17.12 and to promote the sustainable development agenda. **Trade relations conducted by the EU and its Member States must not undermine, either directly or indirectly, the promotion and protection of human rights and the role of civil society in developing countries. Existing arrangements are encouraging increased dependence on the export of raw materials, thereby intensifying the pressure on land and water resources while accelerating deforestation and the reduction of biodiversity.**

Or. es

**Amendment 27**  
**Miguel Urbán Crespo**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 6**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(6) Those objectives remain relevant in

*Amendment*

(6) Those objectives remain relevant in

the current global context and they are consistent with the analysis and perspective of the recent Commission Communication Trade Policy Review “An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy”<sup>16</sup>(‘TPR’). According to the TPR, the Union has a “strategic interest to support the enhanced integration into the world economy of vulnerable developing countries” and it “must fully use the strength provided by its openness and the attractiveness of its Single Market” to support multilateralism and to ensure adherence to universal values. For GSP specifically, the TPR notes its important role in “promoting respect for core human and labour rights” and sets the objective for the GSP “to further increase trading opportunities for developing countries to reduce poverty and create jobs based on international values and principles”. Moreover, the scheme should assist beneficiaries in recovering from the COVID-19 impact and in re-building their economies in a sustainable manner, including with respect to international human rights, labour, environmental and good governance standards. Coherence should be ensured between the GSP and its objectives and the assistance provided to beneficiary countries, in line with Union’s Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), which constitutes a key pillar of Union’s efforts to enhance the positive impact and increase effectiveness of development cooperation<sup>17</sup>.

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<sup>16</sup> COM(2021) 66 final, 18 February 2021

<sup>17</sup> Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU concerning PCD

the current global context and they are consistent with the analysis and perspective of the recent Commission Communication ‘Trade Policy Review: An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy’.<sup>16</sup> According to the TPR, the Union has a “strategic interest to support the enhanced integration into the world economy of vulnerable developing countries” and it “must fully use the strength provided by its openness and the attractiveness of its Single Market” to support multilateralism and to ensure adherence to universal values. For GSP specifically, the TPR notes its important role in “promoting respect for core human and labour rights” and sets the objective for the GSP “to further increase trading opportunities for developing countries to reduce poverty and create jobs based on international values and principles”. Moreover, the scheme should assist beneficiaries in recovering from the COVID-19 impact and in re-building their economies in a sustainable manner, including with respect to international human rights, labour, environmental and good governance standards. Coherence should be ensured between the GSP and its objectives and the assistance provided to beneficiary countries, in line with Union’s Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), which constitutes a key pillar of Union’s efforts to enhance the positive impact and increase effectiveness of development cooperation<sup>17</sup>. ***It is a matter of concern that, in a number of countries benefiting from the GSP, no concrete and substantial improvements have been observed in terms of human and social rights and it is even being alleged that GSP-assisted production is encouraging land grabbing and infringements of labour and human rights.***

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<sup>16</sup> COM(2021) 66 final, 18 February 2021

<sup>17</sup> Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU concerning PCD

reads: “The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries”.

reads: "the Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries".

Or. es

**Amendment 28**  
**Miguel Urbán Crespo**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 8**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(8) The scheme should consist of a basic arrangement (‘standard GSP arrangement’), and two special arrangements, namely the ‘special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance – GSP+’ and the ‘special arrangement for the least-developed countries - EBA’. It, *therefore, continues the structure of the previous ten years, which is considered a success, as it focuses on the countries most in need and addresses the varying developmental needs of beneficiaries.*

*Amendment*

(8) The scheme should consist of a basic arrangement (‘standard GSP arrangement’), and two special arrangements, namely the ‘special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance – GSP+’ and the ‘special arrangement for the least-developed countries - EBA’. *It is deplorable that these instruments have become a means of political leverage applied by the European Union and its Member States to garner the support of third countries for various items on their international agendas. There is no doubt that the European Union should promote different trading models based on equality between partners.*

Or. es

**Amendment 29**  
**Miguel Urbán Crespo**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 8 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*(8a) Before according any preferential arrangements to a country, the Commission must first conduct a human*

*rights and environmental impact assessment and publish the findings order to identify, evaluate and determine measures to prevent, mitigate and address any risks to human rights possibly arising from the granting of preferences. These assessments should be carried out by independent experts, in consultation with members of civil society, including representatives of communities affected by the granting of trade preferences.*

Or. es

**Amendment 30**  
**Hannah Neumann**  
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 8 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*(8 a) Before granting any preferential regime to a country, the Commission should conduct and publish an ex-ante human rights and environmental impact assessment in order to identify, assess, and indicate measures to prevent, mitigate and address any risk of human rights violations which the granting of preferences may contribute to;*

Or. en

**Amendment 31**  
**Hannah Neumann**  
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 9**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

(9) The standard GSP arrangement should be granted to all those developing

(9) The standard GSP arrangement should be granted to all those developing

countries which share a common development need and are in a similar stage of economic development. There is no definition of ‘developing country’ at the level of the WTO, and it is left to preference granting countries to determine the list of GSP-eligible developing countries. Countries which have successfully completed their transition from centralised to market economies, and are today powerful economies with a strong position in international trade, such as China, Hong Kong, Macao and Russia, should not be considered as developing countries in the context of the GSP, and should, therefore, be removed from the list of eligible countries. Countries which are classified by the World Bank as high-income or upper-middle income countries have per capita income levels allowing them to attain higher levels of diversification without the scheme's tariff preferences. They are at a different stage of economic development and do not, therefore, share the same development, trade and financial needs as lower income or more vulnerable developing countries. In order to prevent unjustified discrimination, they need to be treated differently; therefore, they do not benefit from the standard GSP arrangement. Furthermore, the use of tariff preferences provided under the scheme by high-income or upper-middle income countries would increase the competitive pressure on exports from poorer, more vulnerable countries and, therefore, could impose unjustifiable burdens on those more vulnerable developing countries. The standard GSP arrangement should take account of the fact that the development, trade and financial needs are subject to change and ensure that the arrangement remains open if the situation of a country changes.

countries which share a common development need and are in a similar stage of economic development ***and have committed to ratifying the core international conventions mentioned in Annex VI within five years upon the application of the arrangement.*** There is no definition of ‘developing country’ at the level of the WTO, and it is left to preference granting countries to determine the list of GSP-eligible developing countries. Countries which have successfully completed their transition from centralised to market economies, and are today powerful economies with a strong position in international trade, such as China, Hong Kong, Macao and Russia, should not be considered as developing countries in the context of the GSP, and should, therefore, be removed from the list of eligible countries. Countries which are classified by the World Bank as high-income or upper-middle income countries have per capita income levels allowing them to attain higher levels of diversification without the scheme's tariff preferences. They are at a different stage of economic development and do not, therefore, share the same development, trade and financial needs as lower income or more vulnerable developing countries. In order to prevent unjustified discrimination, they need to be treated differently; therefore, they do not benefit from the standard GSP arrangement. Furthermore, the use of tariff preferences provided under the scheme by high-income or upper-middle income countries would increase the competitive pressure on exports from poorer, more vulnerable countries and, therefore, could impose unjustifiable burdens on those more vulnerable developing countries. The standard GSP arrangement should take account of the fact that the development, trade and financial needs are subject to change and ensure that the arrangement remains open if the situation of a country changes.

**Amendment 32**  
**Miguel Urbán Crespo**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 9**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(9) The standard GSP arrangement should be granted to all those developing countries which share a common development need **and** are in a similar stage of economic development. There is no definition of ‘developing country’ at the level of the WTO, and it is left to preference granting countries to determine the list of GSP-eligible developing countries. Countries which have successfully completed their transition from centralised to market economies, and are today powerful economies with a strong position in international trade, such as China, Hong Kong, Macao and Russia, should not be considered as developing countries in the context of the GSP, and should, therefore, be removed from the list of eligible countries. Countries which are classified by the World Bank as high-income or upper-middle income countries have per capita income levels allowing them to attain higher levels of diversification without the scheme's tariff preferences. They are at a different stage of economic development and do not, therefore, share the same development, trade and financial needs as lower income or more vulnerable developing countries. In order to prevent unjustified discrimination, they need to be treated differently; therefore, they do not benefit from the standard GSP arrangement. Furthermore, the use of tariff preferences provided under the scheme by high-income or upper-middle income countries would increase the competitive pressure on exports from poorer, more vulnerable

*Amendment*

(9) The standard GSP arrangement should be granted to all those developing countries which share a common development need, are in a similar stage of economic development **and have ratified and started to implement all the international conventions referred to in Annex VI**. There is no definition of ‘developing country’ at the level of the WTO, and it is left to preference granting countries to determine the list of GSP-eligible developing countries. Countries which have successfully completed their transition from centralised to market economies, and are today powerful economies with a strong position in international trade, such as China, Hong Kong, Macao and Russia, should not be considered as developing countries in the context of the GSP, and should, therefore, be removed from the list of eligible countries. Countries which are classified by the World Bank as high-income or upper-middle income countries have per capita income levels allowing them to attain higher levels of diversification without the scheme's tariff preferences. They are at a different stage of economic development and do not, therefore, share the same development, trade and financial needs as lower income or more vulnerable developing countries. In order to prevent unjustified discrimination, they need to be treated differently; therefore, they do not benefit from the standard GSP arrangement. Furthermore, the use of tariff preferences provided under the scheme by high-income or upper-middle income



countries and, therefore, could impose unjustifiable burdens on those more vulnerable developing countries. The standard GSP arrangement should take account of the fact that the development, trade and financial needs are subject to change and ensure that the arrangement remains open if the situation of a country changes.

countries would increase the competitive pressure on exports from poorer, more vulnerable countries and, therefore, could impose unjustifiable burdens on those more vulnerable developing countries. The standard GSP arrangement should take account of the fact that the development, trade and financial needs are subject to change and ensure that the arrangement remains open if the situation of a country changes.

Or. es

**Amendment 33**  
**Miguel Urbán Crespo**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 11**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(11) The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) is based on the integral concept of sustainable development, as recognised by international conventions and instruments such as the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the 1998 International Labour Organisation (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration, the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, the ILO Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work of 2019, the Outcome Document of the UN Summit on Sustainable Development of 2015 "Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Consequently, the additional tariff preferences provided for under the special

*Amendment*

(11) The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) is based on the integral concept of sustainable development, as recognised by international conventions and instruments such as the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the 1998 International Labour Organisation (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration, the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, the ILO Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work of 2019, the Outcome Document of the UN Summit on Sustainable Development of 2015 "Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Consequently, the additional tariff preferences provided for under the special

incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be granted to those developing countries which, due to a lack of diversification, are economically vulnerable, have ratified core international conventions on human and labour rights, climate and environmental protection and good governance, and commit to ensuring the effective implementation thereof. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should help those countries to assume the additional responsibilities resulting from the ratification and effective implementation of these conventions. The list of conventions relevant for GSP should be updated to better reflect the evolution of core international instruments and standards and take a proactive approach to sustainable development in keeping with the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2030<sup>18</sup>. In this regard, the following conventions are added: the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (2015) – replacing the Kyoto Protocol; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OP-CRC-AC); ILO Convention No 81 on Labour Inspection; ILO Convention No 144 on Tripartite Consultation; and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

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<sup>18</sup> United Nations (2015). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, Transforming our World: the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable

incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be granted to those developing countries which, due to a lack of diversification, are economically vulnerable, have ratified ***and started implementing*** core international conventions on human and labour rights, climate and environmental protection and good governance, and commit to ensuring the effective implementation thereof, ***including through a public, ambitious and scheduled plan of action, approved in accordance with this Regulation.*** The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should help those countries to assume the additional responsibilities resulting from the ratification and effective implementation of these conventions. The list of conventions relevant for GSP should be updated to better reflect the evolution of core international instruments and standards and take a proactive approach to sustainable development in keeping with the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2030<sup>18</sup>. In this regard, the following conventions are added: the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (2015) – replacing the Kyoto Protocol; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OP-CRC-AC); ILO Convention No 81 on Labour Inspection; ILO Convention No 144 on Tripartite Consultation; and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, ***ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.***

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<sup>18</sup> United Nations (2015). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, Transforming our World: the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable

Development (A/RES/70/1), available at:  
<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld>

Development (A/RES/70/1), available at:  
<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld>

Or. es

#### **Amendment 34**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

##### **Recital 11**

###### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(11) The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) is based on the integral concept of sustainable development, as recognised by international conventions and instruments such as the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the 1998 International Labour Organisation (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration, the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, the ILO Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work of 2019, the Outcome Document of the UN Summit on Sustainable Development of 2015 "Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Consequently, the additional tariff preferences provided for under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be granted to those developing countries which, due to a lack of diversification, are economically vulnerable, have ratified core international conventions on human and labour rights, climate and environmental

###### *Amendment*

(11) The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) is based on the integral concept of sustainable development, as recognised by international conventions and instruments such as the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the 1998 International Labour Organisation (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration, the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, the ILO Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work of 2019, the Outcome Document of the UN Summit on Sustainable Development of 2015 "Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Consequently, the additional tariff preferences provided for under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be granted to those developing countries which, due to a lack of diversification, are economically vulnerable, have ratified **and started implementing** core international conventions on human and labour rights,

protection and good governance, and commit to **ensuring** the effective implementation thereof. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should help those countries to assume the additional responsibilities resulting from the ratification and effective implementation of these conventions. The list of conventions relevant for GSP should be updated to better reflect the evolution of core international instruments and standards and take a proactive approach to sustainable development in keeping with the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2030<sup>18</sup>. In this regard, the following conventions are added: the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (2015) – replacing the Kyoto Protocol; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OP-CRC-AC); ILO Convention No 81 on Labour Inspection; ILO Convention No 144 on Tripartite Consultation; and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

climate and environmental protection and good governance, and commit to **pursuing** the effective implementation thereof, ***including through a public, ambitious and time-bound plan of action, adopted in accordance with this Regulation.*** The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should help those countries to assume the additional responsibilities resulting from the ratification and effective implementation of these conventions. The list of conventions relevant for GSP should be updated to better reflect the evolution of core international instruments and standards and take a proactive approach to sustainable development in keeping with the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2030<sup>18</sup>. In this regard, the following conventions are added: the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (2015) – replacing the Kyoto Protocol; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OP-CRC-AC); ***the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;*** ILO Convention No 81 on Labour Inspection; ILO Convention No 144 on Tripartite Consultation; and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

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<sup>18</sup> United Nations (2015). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, Transforming our World: the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1), available at: <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld>

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<sup>18</sup> United Nations (2015). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, Transforming our World: the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1), available at: <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld>

Or. en

## Amendment 35

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Recital 11**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(11) The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) is based on the integral concept of sustainable development, as recognised by international conventions and instruments such as the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the 1998 International Labour Organisation (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration, the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, the ILO Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work of 2019, the Outcome Document of the UN Summit on Sustainable Development of 2015 "Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Consequently, the additional tariff preferences provided for under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be granted to those developing countries which, due to a lack of diversification, are economically vulnerable, have ratified core international conventions on human and labour rights, climate and environmental protection and good governance, and commit to ensuring the effective implementation thereof. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should help those countries to assume the additional responsibilities resulting from the ratification and effective implementation of these conventions. The list of conventions relevant for GSP should

*Amendment*

(11) The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) is based on the integral concept of sustainable development, as recognised by international conventions and instruments such as the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the 1998 International Labour Organisation (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration, the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, the ILO Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work of 2019, the Outcome Document of the UN Summit on Sustainable Development of 2015 "Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Consequently, the additional tariff preferences provided for under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be granted to those developing countries which, due to a lack of diversification, are economically vulnerable, have ratified core international conventions on human and labour rights, climate and environmental protection and good governance, and commit to ensuring the effective implementation thereof. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should help those countries to assume the additional responsibilities resulting from the ratification and effective implementation of these conventions. The list of conventions relevant for GSP should

be updated to better reflect the evolution of core international instruments and standards and take a proactive approach to sustainable development in keeping with the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2030<sup>18</sup>. In this regard, the following conventions are added: the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (2015) – replacing the Kyoto Protocol; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OP-CRC-AC); ILO Convention No 81 on Labour Inspection; ILO Convention No 144 on Tripartite Consultation; *and* the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

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<sup>18</sup> United Nations (2015). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, Transforming our World: the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1), available at: <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld>

be updated to better reflect the evolution of core international instruments and standards and take a proactive approach to sustainable development in keeping with the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2030<sup>18</sup>. In this regard, the following conventions are added: the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (2015) – replacing the Kyoto Protocol; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OP-CRC-AC); ILO Convention No 81 on Labour Inspection; ILO Convention No 144 on Tripartite Consultation; the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime *and the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*.

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<sup>18</sup> United Nations (2015). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, Transforming our World: the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1), available at: <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld>

Or. en

**Amendment 36**  
**Hannah Neumann**  
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 11 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(11 a) ‘serious and systematic violation’ means widespread and systematic human rights violations or abuses that are of serious concern, including but not limited to the following:***

- i. genocide;*
- ii. crimes against humanity;*
- iii. torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;*
- iv. slavery or forced labour;*
- v. extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings;*
- vi. enforced disappearance of persons;*
- vii. arbitrary arrests or detentions;*
- viii. trafficking in human beings, including people-smuggling;*
- ix. sexual and gender-based violence,*
- x. other violations of the laws and customs of war;*
- xi. violations or abuses of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association,*
- xii. violations or abuses of freedom of opinion and expression,*
- xiii. violations or abuses of freedom of religion or belief;*

Or. en

**Amendment 37**  
**Miguel Urbán Crespo**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 11 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**(11a) While the GSP+ makes trade preferences conditional on the ratification and effective implementation of 27 core conventions relating to human and labour rights, environmental standards and governance principles, it does not include effective mechanisms for monitoring compliance and enforcement of these standards. Moreover, the European Commission has failed to introduce a transparent and objective process for establishing when an inquiry should be**

*launched, making it impossible for NGOs or others to participate and making it difficult to trigger the safeguard clause that would halt duty-free imports.*

Or. es

#### **Amendment 38**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Maria Arena, Bettina Vollath, Isabel Santos, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Giuliano Pisapia**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

##### **Recital 16**

###### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(16) The Commission and where appropriate the European External Action Service should monitor the status of ratification of the international conventions on human and labour rights, environmental protection and good governance and their effective implementation, by examining the relevant information, in particular where available the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies established under those conventions. Every *three* years, the Commission should present to the European Parliament and the Council a report on the status of ratification of the respective conventions, the compliance of the beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions, and the status of the implementation of the conventions in practice.

###### *Amendment*

(16) The Commission and where appropriate the European External Action Service should monitor the status of ratification of the international conventions on human and labour rights, environmental protection and good governance and their effective implementation, by examining the relevant information, in particular where available the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies established under those conventions. Every *two* years, the Commission should present to the European Parliament and the Council a report on the status of ratification of the respective conventions, the compliance of the beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions, and the status of the implementation of the conventions in practice.

Or. en

#### **Amendment 39**

**Miguel Urbán Crespo**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

##### **Recital 26**



**(26)** *Orderly international migration can bring important benefits to the countries of origin and destination of migrants and contribute to their sustainable development needs. Increasing coherence between trade, development and migration policies is key to ensure that the benefits of migration accrue mutually to both the origin and destination countries. In this respect, it is essential for both origin and destination countries to address common challenges, such as, stepping up cooperation on readmission of own nationals and their sustainable reintegration in the country of origin, in particular in order to avoid a constant drain in active population in the countries of origin, with the ensuing long-term consequences on development, and to ensure that migrants are treated with dignity.*

*deleted*

Or. es

**Amendment 40**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Recital 26**

**(26)** *Orderly international migration can bring important benefits to the countries of origin and destination of migrants and contribute to their sustainable development needs. Increasing coherence between trade, development and migration policies is key to ensure that the benefits of migration accrue mutually to both the origin and destination countries. In this respect, it is essential for both origin and destination countries to address common challenges, such as, stepping up cooperation on*

*deleted*

*readmission of own nationals and their sustainable reintegration in the country of origin, in particular in order to avoid a constant drain in active population in the countries of origin, with the ensuing long-term consequences on development, and to ensure that migrants are treated with dignity.*

Or. en

**Amendment 41**  
**Peter van Dalen**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 26**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(26) Orderly international migration can bring important benefits to the countries of origin and destination of migrants and contribute to their sustainable development needs. Increasing coherence between trade, development and migration policies is key to ensure that the benefits of migration accrue mutually to both the origin and destination countries. In this respect, it is essential for both origin and destination countries to address common challenges, such as, stepping up cooperation on readmission of own nationals and their sustainable reintegration in the country of origin, in particular in order to avoid a constant drain in active population in the countries of origin, with the ensuing long-term consequences on development, and to ensure that migrants are treated with dignity.

*Amendment*

(26) Orderly international migration can bring important benefits to the countries of origin and destination of migrants and contribute to their sustainable development needs. Increasing coherence between trade, development and migration policies is key to ensure that the benefits of migration accrue mutually to both the origin and destination countries. In this respect, it is essential for both origin and destination countries to address common challenges, such as, stepping up cooperation on readmission of own nationals and their sustainable reintegration in the country of origin, in particular in order to avoid a constant drain in active population in the countries of origin, with the ensuing long-term consequences on development, and to ensure that migrants are treated with dignity *and that their human rights are fully respected.*

Or. en

**Amendment 42**  
**Miguel Urbán Crespo**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 27**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**(27) Return, readmission and reintegration are a common challenge for the Union and its partners. In particular, every State has the obligation to readmit its own nationals under international customary law, and multilateral international conventions such as the Convention on International Civil Aviation signed in Chicago on 7 December 1944. Improving sustainable reintegration and capacity building would significantly strengthen the local development in the partner countries.**

**deleted**

Or. es

**Amendment 43**  
**Hannah Neumann**  
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 27**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**(27) Return, readmission and reintegration are a common challenge for the Union and its partners. In particular, every State has the obligation to readmit its own nationals under international customary law, and multilateral international conventions such as the Convention on International Civil Aviation signed in Chicago on 7 December 1944. Improving sustainable reintegration and capacity building would significantly strengthen the local development in the partner countries.**

**deleted**

Or. en

**Amendment 44**  
**Peter van Dalen**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 27**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(27) Return, readmission and reintegration are a common challenge for the Union and its partners. In particular, every State has the obligation to readmit its own nationals under international customary law, and multilateral international conventions such as the Convention on International Civil Aviation signed in Chicago on 7 December 1944. Improving sustainable reintegration and capacity building would significantly strengthen the local development in the partner countries.

*Amendment*

(27) Return, readmission and reintegration are a common challenge for the Union and its partners. In particular, every State has the obligation to readmit its own nationals under international customary law, and multilateral international conventions such as the Convention on International Civil Aviation signed in Chicago on 7 December 1944. Improving ***the living conditions and resilience to global challenges to mitigate the need for migration must be encouraged, as this would lead to improved*** sustainable reintegration and capacity building, ***which*** would significantly strengthen the local development in the partner countries.

Or. en

**Amendment 45**  
**Miguel Urbán Crespo**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 11 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(11a) 'gross and systematic infringement':widespread and systematic infringements or abuses of human rights that cause grave concern, including, inter alia, the following:***

***I. genocide***

***II. crimes against humanity***

***III. torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment***

***IV. slavery and forced labour***

*V. extra-judicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings*

*VI. enforced disappearance of persons*

*VII. arbitrary arrests or detentions*

*VIII. trafficking in human beings, including people-smuggling*

*IX. sexual and gender-based violence*

*X. other infringements of the laws and customs of war*

*XI. infringements or abuses of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association*

*XII. infringements or abuses of freedom of opinion and expression*

*XIII. infringements or abuses of freedom of religion or belief*

*XIV. infringements of rights of indigenous peoples and tribes.*

*Indicators for determining whether such gross and systematic infringements have occurred should be clear and include, inter alia*

*i. judgments and rulings of international human rights courts or other prominent judicial or quasi-judicial authorities and mechanisms;*

*ii. the establishment of committees of inquiry, fact-finding missions, special rapporteurs or other monitoring mechanisms by the Human Rights Council, the UN General Assembly or other regional intergovernmental bodies and their findings;*

*iii. the conclusions of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Special Procedures and other UN human rights experts;*

*iv. reports by leading local and international human rights and civil society groups.*

Or. es

**Amendment 46**  
**Peter van Dalen**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 11 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(11 a) ‘serious and systematic violation’ means widespread and systematic human rights violations or abuses that are of serious concern as regards the objectives of the common foreign and security policy set out in Article 21 TEU. Indicators to determine whether such serious and systematic violations have occurred should include, amongst others:***

***(i) Rulings and opinions by international human rights courts;***

***(ii) Establishment and findings of commissions of inquiry, fact-finding missions, special rapporteurs, or other monitoring mechanisms by the UN Human Rights Council or General Assembly or by other regional intergovernmental bodies;***

***(iii) Findings by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Special Procedures, or other UN independent human rights experts;***

Or. en

**Amendment 47**  
**Maria Arena, Raphaël Glucksmann, Bettina Vollath, Isabel Santos, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Giuliano Pisapia**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 11 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(11 a) "human rights due diligence obligations" refers to the responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights and to protect against human rights abuse by business as set in the UN***

*Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) in 2011. The responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights refers to internationally recognized human rights – understood, at a minimum, as those expressed in the International Bill of Human Rights and the principles concerning fundamental rights set out in the International Labour Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work*

Or. en

**Amendment 48**  
**Miguel Urbán Crespo**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 3 – paragraph 2 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*2a. Before according any preferential arrangement to a country, the Commission must first conduct a human rights and environmental impact assessment and publish the findings thereof, so as to identify, evaluate and determine measures to prevent any risks to human rights possibly arising from the granting of preferences. These assessments should be carried out by independent experts, in consultation with civil society, including representatives of communities affected by the granting of trade preferences.*

Or. es

**Amendment 49**  
**Hannah Neumann**  
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 3 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**Article 3 a**

***Human rights and environmental impact assessment***

***Before granting any preferential regime to a country, the Commission should conduct and publish an ex-ante human rights and environmental impact assessment in order to identify, assess, and indicate measures to prevent, mitigate and address any risk of human rights violations which the granting of preferences may contribute to;***

Or. en

**Amendment 50**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(a a) there is sufficient ground to consider that serious and systematic shortcomings and violations of the conditions set out in Article 19.1 points (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) exist.***

Or. en

**Amendment 51**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(b a) The results of an ex ante human rights and environmental impact***



*assessment carried out by the Commission pursuant to article 3 paragraph a(new) show a considerable risk of negative impact on human rights or on the environment in the beneficiary country linked to the granting of preferences, and proposed measures to prevent and address it are insufficient or have not been accepted by the beneficiary country's government;*

Or. en

**Amendment 52**  
**Miguel Urbán Crespo**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*(ba) it has not ratified and begun to implement all the conventions listed in Annex VI;*

Or. es

**Amendment 53**  
**Miguel Urbán Crespo**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point b b (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*(bb) the findings of a prior impact assessment by the Commission pursuant to Article 3(2)(a) (new) reveal a significant risk to human rights and the environment in the countries benefiting from preferential arrangements, while the proposed countermeasures are inadequate or have not been accepted by the government of the beneficiary country;*

Or. es

**Amendment 54**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point b b (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(b b) it has not ratified the conventions listed in Annex VI within five years upon the application of the preferences,***

Or. en

**Amendment 55**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***1 a. The Commission and, where applicable, the European External Action Service, shall make sure that countries that benefit from the standard arrangement referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article have ratified the conventions listed in Annex VI within the five years upon the application of the preferences;***

Or. en

**Amendment 56**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 4 – paragraph 1 b (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***1 b. The Commission and, where applicable, the European External Action Service, shall make sure that countries that benefit from the standard arrangement referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article have adopted a National Action Plan for the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, in conformity with the Guidance on National Action Plans of the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights;***

Or. en

**Amendment 57**  
**Hannah Neumann**  
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 4 – paragraph 1 c (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***1 c. EU development finance programming shall prioritise support to countries benefitting from the special arrangement referred to in paragraph 1 aiming to support them ratify the conventions listed in Annex VI and adopt a National Action Plan for the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.***

Or. en

**Amendment 58**  
**Hannah Neumann**  
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point b**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

(b) it has ratified all the conventions listed in Annex VI (the 'relevant conventions') and the Commission has not identified, based on available information, in particular the most recent available conclusions of the monitoring bodies under those conventions, a serious failure to effectively implement any of those conventions;

(b) it has ratified all the conventions listed in Annex VI (the 'relevant conventions') and the Commission has not identified, based on available information, in particular the most recent available conclusions of the monitoring bodies under those conventions ***as well as information submitted by civil society organizations***, a serious failure to effectively implement any of those conventions;

Or. en

#### **Amendment 59**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(b a) it has adopted a National Action Plan for the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, in conformity with the Guidance on National Action Plans of the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights;***

Or. en

#### **Amendment 60**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point d**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

(d) it gives a binding undertaking to maintain ratification of the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof, accompanied by a plan of action ***for the effective***

(d) it gives a binding undertaking to maintain ratification of the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof, accompanied by a ***time-bound*** plan of action of ***measures***

*implementation* of the relevant conventions;

*that are necessary to effectively implement* the relevant conventions. *The beneficiary country and the Commission should reach a common understanding on the plan of action, which shall thereafter be made public;*

Or. en

**Amendment 61**  
**Miguel Urbán Crespo**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point d**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(d) it gives a binding undertaking to maintain ratification of the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof, accompanied by a plan of action for the effective implementation of the relevant conventions;

*Amendment*

(d) it gives a binding undertaking to maintain ratification of the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof, accompanied by a ***publicly scheduled*** plan of action for the effective implementation of the relevant conventions ***approved by the Commission in consultation with the European Parliament and civil society at local and international level;***

Or. es

**Amendment 62**  
**Peter van Dalen**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point d**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(d) it gives a binding undertaking to maintain ratification of the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof, accompanied by a plan of action for the effective implementation of the relevant conventions;

*Amendment*

(d) it gives a binding undertaking to maintain ratification of the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof, accompanied by a plan of action for the effective implementation of the relevant conventions ***that shall be approved by the Commission in consultation with the European***

**Amendment 63**  
**Samira Rafaela**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point d**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(d) it gives a binding undertaking to maintain ratification of the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof, accompanied by a plan of action for the effective implementation of the relevant conventions;

*Amendment*

(d) it gives a binding undertaking to maintain ratification of the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof, accompanied by a **public** plan of action for the effective implementation of the relevant conventions;

**Amendment 64**  
**Peter van Dalen**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point d a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(d a) it accepts that the plan of action referred to in point (d) is public and includes a roadmap with clear benchmarks and deadlines***

**Amendment 65**  
**Hannah Neumann**  
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point f a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(f a) The results of an ex ante human rights and environmental impact assessment carried out by the Commission pursuant to article 3 paragraph a(new) do not show a considerable risk of negative impact on human rights or on the environment in the beneficiary country linked to the granting of preferences, or proposed measures to prevent and address it are sufficient and have been accepted by the beneficiary country's government;***

Or. en

**Amendment 66**  
**Miguel Urbán Crespo**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point f a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(fa) the results of a prior impact assessment by the Commission under Article 3(2a) (new) do not reveal a significant risk to human rights or the environment arising from preferential arrangements in the recipient country;***

Or. es

**Amendment 67**  
**Raphaël Glucksmann, Maria Arena, Bettina Vollath, Isabel Santos, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Giuliano Pisapia**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 9 – paragraph 1 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***The plan of action referred to in paragraph 1 point d) shall:***  
***(a) contain a schedule for the implementation of Article 12 (the ‘tariff***

*suspension schedule’), based on benchmarks against which the progress in the implementation of the relevant conventions is assessed;*

*(b) be jointly agreed with the Commission for a period of two years;*

*(c) serve as a basis for the report referred to in Article 14;*

*(d) be publicly available.*

Or. en

## **Amendment 68**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point b**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(b) the Commission considers, based on examination of the request, that the requesting country fulfils the conditions laid down in Article 9.

*Amendment*

(b) the Commission considers, based on examination of the request, *including of the plan of action as indicated in article 9 paragraph 1 (d), as well as on the results of the human rights impact assessment referred to in Article 3, paragraph a (new)*, that the requesting country fulfils the conditions laid down in Article 9.

Or. en

## **Amendment 69**

**Miguel Urbán Crespo**

### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point b**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(b) the Commission considers, based on examination of the request, that the requesting country fulfils the conditions laid down in Article 9.

*Amendment*

(b) the Commission considers, based on examination of the request, *including the action plan referred to in Article 9(1)(d) and the findings of the human rights assessment*, that the requesting



country fulfils the conditions laid down in Article 9.

Or. es

**Amendment 70**  
**Samira Rafaela**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point b**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(b) the Commission considers, based on examination of the request, that the requesting country fulfils the conditions laid down in Article 9.

*Amendment*

(b) the Commission considers, based on examination of the request, ***including but not limited to the plan of action***, that the requesting country fulfils the conditions laid down in Article 9.

Or. en

**Amendment 71**  
**Hannah Neumann**  
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 10 – paragraph 2**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

2. The requesting country shall submit its request to the Commission in writing. The request shall provide comprehensive information concerning the ratification of the relevant conventions and shall include the binding undertakings referred to in Article 9, pointes (d), (e), and (f).

*Amendment*

2. The requesting country shall submit its request to the Commission in writing. The request shall provide comprehensive information concerning the ratification of the relevant conventions and shall include the binding undertakings referred to in Article 9, pointes (d), (e), and (f), ***including a finalized plan of action.***

Or. en

**Amendment 72**  
**Hannah Neumann**  
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 10 – paragraph 4**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

4. After examining the request, the Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I in order to grant a requesting country the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance by including that country in the list of GSP+ beneficiary countries.

*Amendment*

4. ***While examining the request, the European Commission shall consult the European Parliament and the Council and the advisory body referred to in Article 13a (new).*** After examining the request, the Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I in order to grant a requesting country the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance by including that country in the list of GSP+ beneficiary countries.

Or. en

**Amendment 73**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Maria Arena, Bettina Vollath, Isabel Santos, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Giuliano Pisapia**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 12 – paragraph 1**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

1. The Common Customs Tariff ad valorem duties on all products listed in Annex III and Annex VII, which originate in a GSP+ beneficiary country, shall be suspended.

*Amendment*

1. The Common Customs Tariff ad valorem duties on all products listed in Annex III and Annex VII, which originate in a GSP+ beneficiary country, shall be suspended ***according to the tariff suspension schedule referred to in Article 9(2).***

Or. en

**Amendment 74**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**

## Article 13 – paragraph 1

### *Text proposed by the Commission*

1. As of the date of the granting of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the Commission shall, with regard to each of the GSP+ beneficiary countries, keep under review and monitor the status of ratification of the relevant conventions and their effective implementation, as well as the cooperation of the GSP+ beneficiary country with the relevant monitoring bodies. In doing so, the Commission shall examine all relevant information, in particular the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies.

### *Amendment*

1. As of the date of the granting of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the Commission shall, with regard to each of the GSP+ beneficiary countries, keep under review and monitor the status of ratification of the relevant conventions and their effective implementation, as well as the cooperation of the GSP+ beneficiary country with the relevant monitoring bodies. In doing so, the Commission shall ***assess the progress made by the GSP+ beneficiary countries in implementing their plans of action, as well as*** examine all relevant information, in particular the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies ***as well as duly substantiated information submitted by individual citizens, private sector actors, civil society organisations, representatives of trade unions and other relevant stakeholders. The information may also be submitted via the Single Entry Point, which shall be accessible to stakeholders from both the Union and GSP+ beneficiary countries. The Commission, including through the EEAS and the delegations, should hold regular contacts with local and international civil society to assess the beneficiary countries' implementation of the conventions listed in annex VI. A cycle of 3 years for the review, monitoring and assessment (hereinafter monitoring cycle) is hereby established.***

Or. en

**Amendment 75**  
**Miguel Urbán Crespo**

**Proposal for a regulation**

## Article 13 – paragraph 1

### *Text proposed by the Commission*

1. As of the date of the granting of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the Commission shall, with regard to each of the GSP+ beneficiary countries, keep under review and monitor the status of ratification of the relevant conventions and their effective implementation, as well as the cooperation of the GSP+ beneficiary country with the relevant monitoring bodies. In doing so, the Commission shall examine all relevant information, ***in particular*** the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies.

### *Amendment*

1. As of the date of the granting of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the Commission shall, with regard to each of the GSP+ beneficiary countries, keep under review and monitor the status of ratification of the relevant conventions and their effective implementation, as well as the cooperation of the GSP+ beneficiary country with the relevant monitoring bodies. In doing so, the Commission shall examine all relevant information, ***including*** the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies, ***as well as duly substantiated information submitted by civil society organisations, representatives of trade unions and other relevant stakeholders. Information may also be submitted through the one-stop shop, which will be accessible to stakeholders from the Union and GSP+ beneficiary countries. The Commission shall maintain regular contacts with local and international civil society, through the EEAS and delegations for example, to assess the implementation by beneficiary countries of the conventions listed in Annex VI.***

Or. es

## Amendment 76 Peter van Dalen

### Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 1 a (new)

### *Text proposed by the Commission*

### *Amendment*

***1 a. For the purpose of paragraph 1, the Commission shall also inquire the views of the European Parliament as***

*expressed by its competent committees  
and through the relevant resolutions  
adopted during plenaries.*

Or. en

**Amendment 77**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 13 – paragraph 2**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

2. A GSP+ beneficiary country shall cooperate with the Commission and provide all information necessary to assess its respect of the binding undertakings referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e), and (f) and its situation as regards Article 9, points (b) and (c).

*Amendment*

2. A GSP+ beneficiary country shall cooperate with the Commission and provide all information necessary to assess its respect of the binding undertakings referred to in Article 9, points (d) ***including the implementation of its plan of action***, (e), and (f) and its situation as regards Article 9, points (b) and (c).

Or. en

**Amendment 78**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 13 – paragraph 2 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***2 a. The Commission, where applicable jointly with the EEAS, shall carry out at least one high-level monitoring mission per monitoring cycle to the beneficiary countries in order to assess progress on the ground, including in line with the plans of action. In the framework of the mission, relevant stakeholders, including civil society organizations and human rights defenders in the beneficiary countries shall be duly consulted.***

**Amendment 79**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 13 – paragraph 2 b (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***2 b. At the beginning of each monitoring cycle, the Commission shall send a list of issues to all GSP+ beneficiary countries outlining implementation issues that need to be addressed during the cycle. The lists of issues shall be made publicly available.***

Or. en

**Amendment 80**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 13 – paragraph 2 c (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***2 c. The plans of action and the recommendations of the Commission and European External Action Service on priority implementation actions shall be taken into account in the EU development finance programming in order to support GSP+ beneficiary countries in attaining their commitments.***

Or. en

**Amendment 81**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 13 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**Article 13 a**

**[Advisory Body]**

**1. The Commission shall be assisted in reviewing, monitoring and assessing the binding undertakings referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f) by an advisory body composed of stakeholders' representatives.**

**2. The Commission shall consult with the advisory body in regards to the plans of action submitted by the GSP+ beneficiary countries in view of their application to the GSP+ scheme; to that purpose, the participation to the advisory body shall be extended to stakeholders in the beneficiary countries. The Commission shall also consult with and report to the advisory body when assessing the implementation of the plans of action during each monitoring cycle and more generally throughout the cycle as regularly as necessary, including ahead of and after monitoring missions.**

Or. en

**Amendment 82**  
**Hannah Neumann**  
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 14 – paragraph 1**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

1. By 1 January 2027, and every three years thereafter, the Commission shall present to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the status of ratification of the relevant conventions, the compliance of the GSP+ beneficiary

1. By 1 January 2027, and every three years thereafter, the Commission shall present to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the status of ratification of the relevant conventions, the compliance of the GSP+ beneficiary

countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions and the status of the effective implementation thereof.

countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions and the status of the effective implementation thereof, ***also based on the assessment of the implementation of the plans of action.***

Or. en

### **Amendment 83**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Maria Arena, Bettina Vollath, Isabel Santos, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Giuliano Pisapia**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 14 – paragraph 1**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

1. By 1 January 2027, and every ***three*** years thereafter, the Commission shall present to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the status of ratification of the relevant conventions, the compliance of the GSP+ beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions and the status of the effective implementation thereof.

##### *Amendment*

1. By 1 January 2027, and every ***two*** years thereafter, the Commission shall present to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the status of ratification of the relevant conventions, the compliance of the GSP+ beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions and the status of the effective implementation thereof.

Or. en

### **Amendment 84**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point b – introductory part**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(b) the Commission's and where appropriate the European External Action Service's conclusions on whether each GSP+ beneficiary country respects its binding undertakings to comply with reporting obligations, to cooperate with relevant monitoring bodies in accordance with the relevant conventions and to ensure

##### *Amendment*

(b) the Commission's and where appropriate the European External Action Service's conclusions on whether each GSP+ beneficiary country respects its binding undertakings to comply with reporting obligations, to cooperate with relevant monitoring bodies in accordance with the relevant conventions and to ensure



the effective implementation thereof;

the effective implementation thereof,  
***including through an assessment of the  
implementation of its plan of action;***

Or. en

#### **Amendment 85**

**Peter van Dalen**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point b – introductory part**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(b) the Commission's and where appropriate the European External Action Service's conclusions on whether each GSP+ beneficiary country respects its binding undertakings to comply with reporting obligations, to cooperate with relevant monitoring bodies in accordance with the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof;

##### *Amendment*

(b) the Commission's and where appropriate the European External Action Service's conclusions on whether each GSP+ beneficiary country respects its binding undertakings to comply with reporting obligations, to cooperate with relevant monitoring bodies in accordance with the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof, ***and***

Or. en

#### **Amendment 86**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point b – paragraph 1**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

The report may include any information from any source the Commission considers appropriate.

##### *Amendment*

The report may include any information from any source the Commission considers appropriate, ***including from civil society organizations and social partners.***

Or. en

#### **Amendment 87**

**Peter van Dalen**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point b a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(b a) a copy of the scorecard that the Commission has evaluated with the beneficiary country***

Or. en

**Amendment 88**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 14 – paragraph 3**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

3. In drawing their conclusions concerning effective implementation of the relevant conventions, the Commission and where appropriate the European External Action Service shall assess the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies, as well as, without prejudice to other sources, information submitted by the European Parliament or the Council as well as third parties, including governments and international organisations, civil society, and social partners.

3. In drawing their conclusions concerning effective implementation of the relevant conventions, the Commission and where appropriate the European External Action Service shall assess ***the implementation of the plans of action, also based on*** the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies, as well as, without prejudice to other sources, information submitted by the European Parliament or the Council as well as third parties, including governments and international organisations, civil society, and social partners. ***The Commission and where appropriate the European External Action Service shall provide recommendations on issues and actions to be prioritised in the following monitoring cycle. In case of major shortcomings with effective implementation or persistent failure to effectively implement the plans of action, the report shall indicate which measures the country shall undertake in order to comply with obligations under Article 9(d).***

**Amendment 89**  
**Peter van Dalen**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 14 – paragraph 3**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

3. In drawing their conclusions concerning effective implementation of the relevant conventions, the Commission and where appropriate the European External Action Service shall assess the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies, **as well as**, without prejudice to other sources, information submitted by **the European Parliament or the Council as well as** third parties, including governments and international organisations, civil society, and social partners.

*Amendment*

3. In drawing their conclusions concerning effective implementation of the relevant conventions, the Commission and where appropriate the European External Action Service shall assess the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies. **It shall also request the opinion of the European Parliament and the Council, and shall assess**, without prejudice to other sources, information submitted by third parties, including **complaints submitted through the Single Entry Point, such as** governments and international organisations, civil society, and social partners.

Or. en

**Amendment 90**  
**Hannah Neumann**  
 on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 15 – paragraph 1**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

1. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance shall be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products originating in a GSP+ beneficiary country, where that country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), or the GSP+ beneficiary country has formulated a

*Amendment*

1. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance shall be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products originating in a GSP+ beneficiary country, where that country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), **including in case of major shortcomings**

reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c).

*in implementing or of systemic failure to implement the plan of action referred to in Article 9 point (d) are identified*, or the GSP+ beneficiary country has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c).

Or. en

## **Amendment 91**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 15 – paragraph 3**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

3. Where, either on the basis of the conclusions *of* the report referred to in Article 14 or on the basis of the evidence available, including evidence submitted through a complaint, the Commission has a reasonable doubt that a particular GSP+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), or has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c), it shall, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for the temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council thereof.

##### *Amendment*

3. Where, either on the basis of the conclusions *and of the GSP+ beneficiary country's follow up to the recommendations and priority actions as provided by* the report referred to in Article 14 or on the basis of the evidence available, including evidence submitted through a complaint, the Commission has a reasonable doubt that a particular GSP+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), *including with regards to the implementation of its plan of action*, or has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c), it shall, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for the temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council

thereof.

*In its assessment of whether the GSP+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings referred to in Article 9 point (d), the Commission will in particular take into account whether the relevant monitoring bodies, treaty mechanisms and supervisory mechanisms have signalled potentially serious failure to effectively implement the relevant conventions, based on such indicators as:*

- the establishment of commission of inquiries, fact-finding missions, country special rapporteurs, or other monitoring mechanisms by the UN Human Rights Council or General Assembly;*
- findings by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Special Procedures or other UN independent human rights experts;*
- reports of the ILO Committee of Application of Standards;*
- rulings and opinions by international human rights courts;*
- reports by prominent local and international human rights groups.*

Or. en

**Amendment 92**  
**Peter van Dalen**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 15 – paragraph 3**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

3. Where, either on the basis of the conclusions of the report referred to in Article 14 or on the basis of the evidence available, including evidence submitted through a complaint, the Commission has a reasonable doubt that a particular GSP+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in

*Amendment*

3. Where, either on the basis of the conclusions of the report referred to in Article 14 or on the basis of the evidence available, including *evidence submitted by the European Parliament through its competent committees and through the relevant resolutions adopted during plenaries, and* evidence submitted through

Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), or has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c), it shall, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for the temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council thereof.

a complaint, the Commission has a reasonable doubt that a particular GSP+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), or has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c), it shall, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for the temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council thereof.

Or. en

### **Amendment 93**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Maria Arena, Bettina Vollath, Isabel Santos, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Giuliano Pisapia**

#### **Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 3**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

3. Where, either on the basis of the conclusions of the report referred to in Article 14 or on the basis of the evidence available, including evidence submitted through a complaint, the Commission has a reasonable doubt that a particular GSP+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), or has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c), it shall, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2),

##### *Amendment*

3. ***At the request of the European Parliament or*** where, either on the basis of the conclusions of the report referred to in Article 14 or on the basis of the evidence available, including evidence submitted through a complaint, the Commission has a reasonable doubt that a particular GSP+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), or has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c), it shall, in accordance with the advisory

adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for the temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council thereof.

procedure referred to in Article 39(2), adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for the temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council thereof.

Or. en

#### **Amendment 94**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 15 – paragraph 3 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**3 a. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament, the Council and the advisory body referred to in Article 13a (new) about the complaints received. The Commission shall inform the complainant, the European Parliament, the Council and the advisory body referred to in Article 13 a (new) where it decides that the complaint does not provide sufficient evidence in relation to the indicators referred to in this article.**

Or. en

#### **Amendment 95**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 15 – paragraph 5**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

5. The Commission shall provide the GSP+ beneficiary country concerned with

5. The Commission shall provide the GSP+ beneficiary country concerned with

every opportunity to cooperate during the period referred to in paragraph 4, point (b).

every opportunity to cooperate ***and engage with a view to addressing the violations of its binding undertakings as referred to in paragraph 3*** during the period referred to in paragraph 4, point (b).

Or. en

#### **Amendment 96**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

##### **Article 15 – paragraph 6**

###### *Text proposed by the Commission*

6. The Commission shall seek all information it considers necessary including, inter alia, the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies. In drawing its conclusions, the Commission shall assess all relevant information.

###### *Amendment*

6. The Commission shall seek all information it considers necessary including, inter alia, the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies. In drawing its conclusions, the Commission shall assess all relevant information, ***including from civil society organisations and social partners.***

Or. en

#### **Amendment 97**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

##### **Article 15 – paragraph 7 – point a**

###### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(a) to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure;

###### *Amendment*

(a) to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure, ***either because the grounds for the reasonable doubt are not confirmed in the assessment referred to in paragraph 6, or because the GSP+ beneficiary country has engaged and committed to address the violations of its binding undertakings as referred to in***



*paragraph 3;*

Or. en

#### **Amendment 98**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 15 – paragraph 8**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

8. Where the Commission considers ***that the findings do not justify*** temporary withdrawal, it shall adopt an implementing act to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). That implementing act shall be based inter alia on evidence received.

##### *Amendment*

8. Where the Commission considers, ***based on the elements referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6, that a*** temporary withdrawal ***is not justified***, it shall adopt an implementing act to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). That implementing act shall be based inter alia on evidence received.

Or. en

#### **Amendment 99**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 15 – paragraph 9**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

9. Where the Commission considers ***that*** the findings ***justify*** temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b). In adopting the

##### *Amendment*

9. Where the Commission considers, ***based on the outcome of the cooperation and engagement and the findings referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6, and after consulting the advisory body referred to in Article 13a (new), that*** temporary withdrawal ***is justified*** for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II in order to

delegated act the Commission may, when appropriate, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country.

temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b). ***The Commission shall clearly and publicly state the grounds for withdrawing preferences and set clear benchmarks that the beneficiary country should meet for the preferences to be reinstated; such benchmarks may also guide a phased approach, including the progressive withdrawal or reinstatement of part of the benefits against clear benchmarks and conditions.*** In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, when appropriate, consider the ***human rights and*** socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country, ***especially when considering a partial withdrawal, with a view to minimising the negative socio-economic impact on the GSP+ beneficiary country's population while maximising the leverage on its government.***

Or. en

## **Amendment 100**

### **Peter van Dalen**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 15 – paragraph 9**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

9. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b). ***In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, when appropriate, consider the socio-***

##### *Amendment*

9. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b). The Commission ***shall clearly and publicly state the grounds for withdrawing***

*economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country.*

preferences *and set clear benchmarks that the beneficiary country should meet for the preferences to be reinstated; such benchmarks may also guide a phased approach, including the progressive withdrawal or reinstatement of part of the benefits against clear benchmarks and conditions.*

Or. en

**Amendment 101**  
**Miguel Urbán Crespo**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 15 – paragraph 9**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

9. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b). In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, when appropriate, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country.

*Amendment*

9. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b). In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, when appropriate, consider the socio-economic effect *and the impact on human rights* of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country.

Or. es

**Amendment 102**  
**Samira Rafaela**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 15 – paragraph 9**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

9. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b). In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, when appropriate, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country.

9. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b). In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, when appropriate, consider the **human rights** **and** socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country.

Or. en

#### **Amendment 103**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 15 – paragraph 10 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***10 a. During the application of a temporary withdrawal, the Commission shall continue the dialogue with the beneficiary country, including in the framework referred to in Article 18a, aiming at remedying the reasons for the withdrawal referred to in paragraph 3. The Commission shall regularly assess the effects of the withdrawal on remedying the violations, including in the report referred to in Article 14. The Commission shall regularly consult with the advisory body referred to in Article 13a.***

Or. en

#### **Amendment 104**

**Miguel Urbán Crespo**

**Proposal for a regulation  
Article 17 – paragraph 1**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

1. An eligible country shall benefit from the tariff preferences provided under the special arrangement for the least-developed countries referred to in Article 1(2), point (c), if that country is identified by the United Nations as a least-developed country.

*Amendment*

1. An eligible country shall benefit from the tariff preferences provided under the special arrangement for the least-developed countries referred to in Article 1(2), point (c), if that country is identified by the United Nations as a least-developed country ***and whether that country has ratified the conventions listed in Annex VI and made a firm commitment to continue to be bound by them.***

Or. es

**Amendment 105**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation  
Article 17 – paragraph 1 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***1 a. The Commission and, where applicable the EEAS, shall make sure that countries that benefit from the special arrangement referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article make continued and sustained progress towards ratifying the conventions listed in Annex VI.***

***EU development finance programming shall prioritise support to countries benefitting from the special arrangement referred to in paragraph 1 aiming to make progress towards the ratification of the conventions listed in Annex VI.***

Or. en

**Amendment 106**  
**Hannah Neumann**  
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Chapter V – title**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

V Temporary withdrawal provisions  
common to all arrangements

*Amendment*

V ***Enhanced engagement and***  
temporary withdrawal provisions common  
to all arrangements

Or. en

**Amendment 107**  
**Hannah Neumann**  
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article -19 (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***Article -19***

***In the framework of a Cooperation, Partnership or Association Agreement the EU has concluded with a beneficiary country, a general review of the status of the country in the framework of the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) shall be conducted yearly and in consultation with the European Parliament. To that purpose, the Commission, and where relevant the European External Action Service, and the beneficiary country shall review the issues pertaining to the conditions referred to in Article 19(1), including in relation to any complaints received by the Commission. The Commission, where relevant the European External Action Service, and the beneficiary country shall also review the status of the ratification of the conventions listed in Annex VI as referred to in Article 4(1) point (c) and progress towards ratification of the conventions listed in Annex VI as referred***

*to in Article 17(1a).*

Or. en

**Amendment 108**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 19 – paragraph 1 – introductory part**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

1. The preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) may be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products originating in a beneficiary country, for any of the following reasons:

*Amendment*

1. The preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) may be withdrawn temporarily, **fully or partly**, in respect of all or of certain products originating in **or of all or some economic sectors of** a beneficiary country, for any of the following reasons:

Or. en

**Amendment 109**

**Maria Arena, Raphaël Glucksmann, Bettina Vollath, Isabel Santos, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Giuliano Pisapia**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 19 – paragraph 1 – introductory part**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

1. The preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) may be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products originating in a beneficiary country, for any of the following reasons:

*Amendment*

1. **1.** The preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) may be withdrawn temporarily, **fully or partially**, in respect of all or of certain products, **or of economic sectors**, originating in a beneficiary country, for any of the following reasons:

Or. en

**Amendment 110**

**Peter van Dalen**

## Proposal for a regulation

### Article 19 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

*Text proposed by the Commission*

1. The preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) may be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products originating in a beneficiary country, for any of the following reasons:

*Amendment*

1. The preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) may be withdrawn temporarily, **fully or partly**, in respect of all or of certain products originating in a beneficiary country, for any of the following reasons:

Or. en

## Amendment 111

**Maria Arena, Raphaël Glucksmann, Bettina Vollath, Isabel Santos, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Giuliano Pisapia**

## Proposal for a regulation

### Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new)

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(a a) the beneficiary country fails to show effective implementation of the plan of action ;***

Or. en

## Amendment 112

**Maria Arena, Bettina Vollath, Isabel Santos, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Giuliano Pisapia**

## Proposal for a regulation

### Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(b a) When the Commission, acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative, considers that there may be sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 19 a)***



*or b), the Commission may before publishing the notice referred § 4 art 19 enhance its engagement with the partner country and negotiate a dedicated and timebound action plan to remedy the violations including through a full cooperation with the UN human rights and labour rights monitoring mechanisms.*

Or. en

**Amendment 113**

**Maria Arena, Raphaël Glucksmann, Bettina Vollath, Isabel Santos, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Giuliano Pisapia**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point b b (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*(b b) when the Commission decides to withdraw a preferential arrangement to a beneficiary country in a particular economic sector, in application of article 19 (a and b) the commission may publish a list of companies, EU importers and local suppliers, that may still benefit from preferences. This list should be established based on the evidences provided by companies that they fully implemented their human rights due diligence obligations and that they have a supply chain free from human rights violations. The companies should agree on having the evidences and informations published for public scrutiny and civil society consultation.*

Or. en

**Amendment 114**

**Peter van Dalen**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point c**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(c) serious shortcomings in customs controls on the export or transit of drugs (illicit substances or precursors), or related to the obligation to readmit the beneficiary country's own nationals or serious failure to comply with international conventions on antiterrorism or anti-money laundering;

*Amendment*

(c) serious shortcomings in customs controls on the export or transit of drugs (illicit substances or precursors), or related to the obligation to readmit the beneficiary country's own nationals ***under international customary law and multilateral international conventions, whilst fully respecting human rights and dignity***, or serious failure to comply with international conventions on antiterrorism or anti-money laundering;

Or. en

**Amendment 115**  
**Miguel Urbán Crespo**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point c**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(c) serious shortcomings in customs controls on the export or transit of drugs (illicit substances or precursors), or ***related to the obligation to readmit the beneficiary country's own nationals or*** serious failure to comply with international conventions on antiterrorism or anti-money laundering;

*Amendment*

(c) serious shortcomings in customs controls on the export or transit of drugs (illicit substances or precursors), or serious failure to comply with international conventions on antiterrorism or anti-money laundering;

Or. es

**Amendment 116**  
**Hannah Neumann**  
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point c**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(c) serious shortcomings in customs

*Amendment*

(c) serious shortcomings in customs

controls on the export or transit of drugs (illicit substances or precursors), or ***related to the obligation to readmit the beneficiary country's own nationals or*** serious failure to comply with international conventions on antiterrorism or anti-money laundering;

controls on the export or transit of drugs (illicit substances or precursors), or serious failure to comply with international conventions on antiterrorism or anti-money laundering;

Or. en

#### **Amendment 117**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 19 – paragraph 1 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***1 a. For the purpose of applying point 1 (a), the Commission will in particular take into account whether the relevant monitoring bodies, treaty mechanisms and supervisory mechanisms have signalled potentially serious and systematic violations of the principles of the relevant conventions, based on such indicators as:***

- the establishment of commission of inquiries, fact-finding missions, country special rapporteurs, or other monitoring mechanisms by the UN Human Rights Council or General Assembly;***
- findings by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Special Procedures or other UN independent human rights experts;***
- reports of the ILO Committee of Application of Standards;***
- rulings and opinions by international human rights courts;***
- reports by prominent local and international human rights groups.***

Or. en

**Amendment 118**  
**Hannah Neumann**  
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 19 – paragraph 2 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**2 a.** *When in particular the seriousness of the violations of principles of the international conventions listed in Annex VI so requires, based on available assessments, comments, decisions, recommendations and the conclusions of the relevant monitoring bodies, or based on duly substantiated concerns expressed by the European Parliament, the Council, international organisations, and civil society including trade unions, or acting upon a complaint, the Commission shall notify the beneficiary country.*

*Starting from the date of the notification and during one year, the beneficiary country and the Commission shall enter into an enhanced engagement, where the country commits to adopt time-bound roadmaps providing for concrete actions and sustainable solutions to the serious and systematic violations as identified.*

*The Commission shall regularly consult with the advisory body referred to in Article 13a during the enhanced engagement process.*

Or. en

**Amendment 119**  
**Hannah Neumann**  
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 19 – paragraph 2 b (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**2 b.** *If considered necessary, the*

*enhanced engagement may be prolonged by up to another year. The Commission shall publish a list of countries with which enhanced engagement has been prolonged beyond one year and shall regularly update the list as necessary. The roadmaps referred to in paragraph 2a shall be made public.*

Or. en

**Amendment 120**  
**Hannah Neumann**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 19 – paragraph 3**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

3. Where the Commission, acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative, considers that there are sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the adoption of that implementing act.

*Amendment*

3. Where the Commission, acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative, considers that there are sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) ***because the beneficiary country has failed to deliver in the framework of the enhanced engagement*** ***or*** on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the adoption of that implementing act.

Or. en

**Amendment 121**  
**Raphaël Glucksmann, Maria Arena, Bettina Vollath, Isabel Santos, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Giuliano Pisapia**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 19 – paragraph 3**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

3. Where the Commission, acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative, considers that there **are** sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the adoption of that implementing act.

*Amendment*

3. ***At the request of the European Parliament or*** where the Commission, acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative, considers that there ***may be*** sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the adoption of that implementing act.

Or. en

**Amendment 122**  
**Hannah Neumann**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 19 – paragraph 3 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***3 a. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament, the Council and the advisory body referred to in Article 13a about the complaints received. The Commission shall inform the complainant, the European Parliament, the Council and the advisory body referred to in Article 13a where it decides that the complaint does not provide sufficient evidence in relation to the indicators referred to in this article.***

Or. en

**Amendment 123**

**Hannah Neumann**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 19 – paragraph 4 – point b**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(b) state that the Commission will monitor and evaluate the situation in the beneficiary country concerned during the monitoring and evaluation period referred to in Paragraph 5.

*Amendment*

(b) state that the Commission will ***continue to pursue dialogue in the framework of the enhanced engagement*** and monitor and evaluate the situation in the beneficiary country concerned during the monitoring and evaluation period referred to in Paragraph 5.

Or. en

**Amendment 124**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 19 – paragraph 5**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

5. The Commission shall provide the beneficiary country concerned with every opportunity to cooperate during the monitoring and evaluation period of six months from the date of publication of the notice.

*Amendment*

5. The Commission shall provide the beneficiary country concerned with every opportunity to ***start engaging with and*** cooperate ***at any time*** during the monitoring and evaluation period of six months from the date of publication of the notice.

Or. en

**Amendment 125**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 19 – paragraph 6**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

6. The Commission shall seek all

*Amendment*

6. The Commission shall seek all

information it considers necessary, inter alia, the available assessments, comments, decisions, recommendations and conclusions of the relevant monitoring bodies, and relevant information from other sources, including evidence submitted through a complaint or provided by third parties, as appropriate. In drawing its conclusions, the Commission shall assess all relevant information.

information it considers necessary, inter alia, the available assessments, comments, decisions, recommendations and conclusions of the relevant monitoring bodies, and relevant information from other sources, including evidence submitted through a complaint or provided by third parties, as appropriate. In drawing its conclusions, the Commission shall assess all relevant information ***and consider the progress made by the country in delivering on its roadmap in the framework of the enhanced engagement as referred to in paragraph 2a.***

Or. en

#### **Amendment 126**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

##### **Article 19 – paragraph 7**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

7. Within three months from the expiry of the period referred to in paragraph 5, the Commission shall submit a report on its findings and conclusions to the beneficiary country concerned. The beneficiary country has the right to submit its comments on the report. The period for comments shall not exceed one month.

*Amendment*

7. Within three months from the expiry of the period referred to in paragraph 5, ***and after consultation of the advisory body referred to in Article 13(a)***, the Commission shall submit a report on its findings and conclusions to the beneficiary country concerned. The beneficiary country has the right to submit its comments on the report. The period for comments shall not exceed one month.

Or. en

#### **Amendment 127**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

##### **Article 19 – paragraph 9**



*Text proposed by the Commission*

9. Where the Commission considers ***that the findings do not justify*** temporary withdrawal, it shall adopt an implementing act, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), on the termination of the temporary withdrawal procedure.

*Amendment*

9. Where the Commission considers, ***based on the elements referred to in paragraph 6, that a*** temporary withdrawal ***is not justified***, it shall adopt an implementing act, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), on the termination of the temporary withdrawal procedure.

Or. en

**Amendment 128**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 19 – paragraph 10**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

10. Where the Commission considers that the ***findings justify*** temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II, in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2). In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, where appropriate, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country.

*Amendment*

10. Where the Commission, ***based on the elements referred to in paragraph 6***, considers that the temporary withdrawal ***is justified*** for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II, in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2). In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, where appropriate, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country, ***especially when considering a partial withdrawal, with a view to minimising the negative socio-economic impact on the GSP+ beneficiary country's populations while maximising the leverage on its government.***

Or. en

**Amendment 129**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 19 – paragraph 10**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

10. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II, in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2). ***In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, where appropriate, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country.***

*Amendment*

10. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II, in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2).

Or. en

**Amendment 130**  
**Peter van Dalen**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 19 – paragraph 10**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

10. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II, in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2). ***In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, where appropriate, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country.***

*Amendment*

10. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II, in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2).

Or. en

## **Amendment 131**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 19 – paragraph 12 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**12 a. During the application of a temporary withdrawal, the Commission shall continue the dialogue with the beneficiary country, including in the framework referred to in Article 18a, aiming at remedying the reasons for the withdrawal referred to in paragraph 1. The Commission shall regularly assess the effects of the withdrawal on remedying the violations, and shall consult with the advisory body referred to in Article 13a.**

Or. en

## **Amendment 132**

**Peter van Dalen**

### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 19 – paragraph 16**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

16. Where the Commission considers that there is sufficient evidence to justify temporary withdrawal for the reason set out in paragraph 1, point (a) and the exceptional gravity of the violations calls for a rapid response in view of the specific circumstances in the beneficiary country, it shall initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with paragraphs (3) to (15). However, the period referred to in paragraph 4, point (b) is reduced to **2 months** and the deadline referred to in paragraph 8 is reduced to **5 months**.

16. Where the Commission considers that there is sufficient evidence to justify temporary withdrawal for the reason set out in paragraph 1, point (a) and the exceptional gravity of the violations calls for a rapid response in view of the specific circumstances in the beneficiary country, it shall initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with paragraphs (3) to (15). However, the period referred to in paragraph 4, point (b) is reduced to **1 month** and the deadline referred to in paragraph 8 is reduced to **3 months**.

**Amendment 133**

**Hannah Neumann**

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 19 – paragraph 17 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***17 a. When deciding to withdraw preferences, the Commission may publish a list of importers and suppliers that may still benefit from preferences. This list should be established based on publicly available evidence provided by the importer that it fully implemented its human rights and environmental due diligence obligations and that its supply chains are free from human rights violations.***

**Amendment 134**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Maria Arena, Bettina Vollath, Isabel Santos, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Giuliano Pisapia**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 40 – paragraph 1**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

By 1 January 2027 and every ***three*** years thereafter, the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the effects of the scheme covering the most recent ***three-year*** period and all of the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2).

By 1 January 2027 and every ***two*** years thereafter, the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the effects of the scheme covering the most recent ***two-year*** period and all of the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2).

**Amendment 135**  
**Hannah Neumann**  
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Annex VI – subheading 1 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***First Optional Protocol to the  
International Covenant on Civil and  
Political Rights (1966)***

Or. en

**Amendment 136**  
**Raphaël Glucksmann, Maria Arena, Bettina Vollath, Isabel Santos, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Giuliano Pisapia**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Annex VI – paragraph 1 – point a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(a) First Optional Protocol to the  
International Covenant on Civil and  
Political Rights (1966)***

Or. en

**Amendment 137**  
**Hannah Neumann**  
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Annex VI – paragraph 1 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***Rome Statute of the International  
Criminal Court (1998)***

Or. en

**Amendment 138**  
**Miguel Urbán Crespo**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Annex VI – paragraph 1 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***Rome Statute of the International  
Criminal Court (1998)***

Or. es

**Amendment 139**  
**Miguel Urbán Crespo**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Annex VI – paragraph 1 b (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***First Optional Protocol to the  
International Covenant on Civil and  
Political Rights (1966)***

Or. es

**Amendment 140**  
**Miguel Urbán Crespo**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Annex VI – paragraph 1 c (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and  
Tribal Peoples***

Or. es