European Parliament
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Committee on Foreign Affairs

2023/2072(INI)

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AMENDMENTS
1 - 151

Draft report
Klemen Grošelj
(PE750.176v01-00)

Security and defence implications of China's influence on critical infrastructure in the European Union
((2023/2072(INI))
Amendment 1
Markéta Gregorová
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution
Citation 4 a (new)

Motion for a resolution
Amendment

– having regard to joint
Communication to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee, the
Committee of the Regions and the
European Investment Bank of 1
December 2021 entitled “The Global
Gateway” JOIN(2021) 30 final,

Or. en

Amendment 2
Markéta Gregorová
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution
Citation 4 b (new)

Motion for a resolution
Amendment

– having regard to the Commission
recommendation of 3.10.2023 on critical
technology areas for the EU’s economic
security for further risk assessment with
Member States (C(2023) 6689),

Or. en

Amendment 3
Assita Kanko, Anna Fotyga

Motion for a resolution
Citation 5 a (new)

Motion for a resolution
Amendment
– having regard to the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries (2021/0406(COD)),

Amendment 4
Assita Kanko, Anna Fotyga

Motion for a resolution
Citation 5 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 on a new EU-China strategy (2021/2037(INI)), inter alia aimed at strengthening the EU’s ‘trade toolbox’ to help mitigate the current disproportioned bilateral economic and trade relations between China and the EU,

Amendment 5
Miriam Lexmann

Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

– having regard to the Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union,
Amendment 6
Miriam Lexmann

Motion for a resolution
citation 6 b (new)

Motion for a resolution Amendment
– having regard to the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries COM/2021/775 final,

Or. en

Amendment 7
Miriam Lexmann

Motion for a resolution
citation 6 c (new)

Motion for a resolution Amendment
– having regard to the Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market,

Or. en

Amendment 8
Assita Kanko, Anna Fotyga

Motion for a resolution
citation 8 a (new)

Motion for a resolution Amendment
– having regard to the embargo imposed by China on Lithuania in December 2021, following the approval of the establishment of a representative office of Taiwan in Vilnius,
Amendment 9
Markéta Gregorová
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 a (new)

Motion for a resolution Amendment
– having regard to the G7 Hiroshima Leaders’ Communiqué of 20 May 2023,

Amendment 10
Clare Daly, Mick Wallace

Motion for a resolution
Citation 9

Motion for a resolution Amendment
– having regard to the Vilnius Summit Communiqué, issued by the NATO heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Vilnius on 11 July 2023,

Amendment 11
Miriam Lexmann

Motion for a resolution
Citation 9 a (new)

Motion for a resolution Amendment
– having regard to the Final Assessment Report of the NATO-EU Task Force on the Resilience of Critical
Infrastructure of 29 June 2023,

Amendment 12
Miriam Lexmann

Motion for a resolution
Citation 9 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 13
Miriam Lexmann

Motion for a resolution
Citation 10 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 14
Miriam Lexmann

Motion for a resolution
Citation 11 a (new)

Motion for a resolution  

— having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 1 December 2021 entitled ‘The Global Gateway’ (JOIN/2021/0030),

Or. en

Amendment 15
Nathalie Loiseau

Motion for a resolution
Citation 11 a (new)

Motion for a resolution  

— having regard to the Parliament’s resolutions of 9 March 2022 and of 1 June 2023 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation,

Or. en

Amendment 16
Assita Kanko, Anna Fotyga

Motion for a resolution
Citation 11 a (new)

Motion for a resolution  

— having regard to the Critical Raw Materials Act proposed by the Commission on 16 March 2023 (COM(2023) 160),

Or. en
**Amendment 17**
Miriam Lexmann

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

*Motion for a resolution*

A. whereas the recent joint communication on a European economic security strategy focuses on minimising the risks arising from certain economic flows in the context of increased geopolitical tensions and accelerated technological shifts, while preserving maximum economic openness and dynamism;

*Amendment*

A. whereas the recent joint communication on a European economic security strategy focuses on minimising the risks arising from certain economic flows and the Union's dependency on authoritarian and totalitarian regimes such as the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the context of increased geopolitical tensions and accelerated technological shifts, while protecting free market principles from distortion by such regimes and, thereby, preserving maximum economic openness and dynamism;

Or. en

**Amendment 18**
Juozas Olekas

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

*Motion for a resolution*

A. whereas the recent joint communication on a European economic security strategy focuses on minimising the risks arising from certain economic flows in the context of increased geopolitical tensions and accelerated technological shifts, while preserving maximum economic openness and dynamism;

*Amendment*

A. whereas the recent joint communication on a European economic security strategy focuses on managing and minimising the risks arising from certain economic flows in the context of increased geopolitical tensions and accelerated technological shifts, while preserving maximum economic openness and dynamism;

Or. en
Amendment 19
Miriam Lexmann

Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Aa. whereas disruptions to critical infrastructure can have significant negative consequences for vital government functions, essential services to the population, economic activity as well as security and defence of the Union;

Amendment 20
Clare Daly, Mick Wallace

Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Aa. whereas the European Union remains committed to the 'One-China' policy and recognises the government of the PRC as the sole legal government of China;

Amendment 21
Lukas Mandl

Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Ba. whereas it is important to acknowledge the potential threat posed by foreign ownership of critical infrastructure within the Union because services, the economy and the free
movement and safety of Union citizens depend on the proper functioning of critical infrastructure. It is crucial that Member States and the Commission be vigilant with regard to financial investments that foreign countries make in the operation of critical entities within the Union and the consequences that such investments could have on the ability to prevent significant disruptions;

Or. en

Amendment 22
Assita Kanko, Anna Fotyga

Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)

Amendment

Ca. whereas pursuant to the international commitments undertaken in the WTO, in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and in the trade and investment agreements concluded with third countries, it is possible for the EU and the Member States to adopt restrictive measures relating to foreign direct investment on the grounds of security or public order, subject to certain requirements;

Or. en

Amendment 23
Assita Kanko, Anna Fotyga

Motion for a resolution
Recital C b (new)

Amendment

Cb. whereas the three largest Chinese shareholders in European ports have
assets in almost half the ports (14 out of 29) that are located either close to naval bases or provide logistical support to NATO forces, highly increasing the risk of espionage;

Amendment 24
Clare Daly, Mick Wallace

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas the coercive policies and the growing assertiveness of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including its aggressive stance towards Taiwan, as well as the social and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine have exposed the EU’s vulnerabilities and reaffirmed the need to ‘de-risk’ its relations vis-à-vis the PRC and other non-democratic third countries;

Amendment

D. whereas in direct response to the coercive policies of the US there is a growing assertiveness of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including its response to aggressive provocations by the US in Taiwan;

Amendment 25
Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas the coercive policies and the growing assertiveness of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including its aggressive stance towards Taiwan, as well as the social and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine have exposed the EU’s vulnerabilities and

Amendment

D. whereas the coercive policies and the growing assertiveness of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including its aggressive stance towards Taiwan and the increasingly muscular posture assumed in the South China Sea, as well as the social and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian war...
reaffirmed the need to ‘de-risk’ its relations vis-à-vis the PRC and other non-democratic third countries; of aggression against Ukraine have exposed the EU’s vulnerabilities and reaffirmed the need to ‘de-risk’ its relations vis-à-vis the PRC and other non-democratic third countries;

Amendment 26
Miriam Lexmann

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

Motion for a resolution
D. whereas the coercive policies and the growing assertiveness of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including its aggressive stance towards Taiwan, as well as the social and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine have exposed the EU’s vulnerabilities and reaffirmed the need to ‘de-risk’ its relations vis-à-vis the PRC and other non-democratic third countries;

Amendment
D. whereas the coercive policies and the growing assertiveness of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including its increasingly aggressive stance towards Taiwan, as well as the social and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine have exposed the EU’s vulnerabilities and reaffirmed the need to ‘de-risk’ its relations vis-à-vis the PRC and other non-democratic third countries;

Amendment 27
Isabel Santos

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

Motion for a resolution
D. whereas the coercive policies and the growing assertiveness of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including its aggressive stance towards Taiwan, as well as the social and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine have exposed the EU’s vulnerabilities and

Amendment
D. whereas the coercive policies and the growing assertiveness of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including its aggressive stance towards Taiwan, as well as the social and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine have exposed the EU’s vulnerabilities and
reaffirmed the need to ‘de-risk’ its relations vis-à-vis the PRC and other non-democratic third countries;

Or. en

Amendment 28
Juozas Olekas

Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)

Amendment

Da. whereas in 2021-22, China engaged in economic blockade against Lithuania in response to Lithuania’s decision to withdraw from Belt and Road Initiative and to open Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania, resulting in the European Commission's request to establish a panel at the World Trade Organization to examine the legality of China's trade restrictions against Lithuanian and EU exports containing Lithuanian content; this demonstrates China's assertiveness in targeting specific EU countries, not only through direct economic coercion, but also through the threat of secondary sanctions;

Or. en

Amendment 29
Miriam Lexmann

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

Amendment

E. whereas China’s acquisition of critical infrastructure, especially in the EU’s neighbourhood, including the Western Balkans, poses an increasing risk

E. whereas China’s acquisition of critical infrastructure, especially within the EU and in its neighbourhood, including the Western Balkans, poses an increasing
to the *trade-security nexus*;

multi-dimensional risk to the *Union's security*;

Or. en

**Amendment 30**  
Clare Daly, Mick Wallace

**Motion for a resolution**

**Recital E**

*Motion for a resolution*  

**Amendment**

E. whereas China’s *acquisition of critical* infrastructure, especially in the EU’s neighbourhood, including the Western Balkans, poses *an increasing risk to the trade-security nexus*;

E. whereas China’s *investment in* infrastructure, especially in the EU’s neighbourhood, including the Western Balkans, poses *opportunities for increased trade and development links between the EU and China*;

Or. en

**Amendment 31**  
Isabel Santos

**Motion for a resolution**

**Recital E**

*Motion for a resolution*  

**Amendment**

E. whereas China’s acquisition of critical infrastructure, especially in the EU’s neighbourhood, including the Western Balkans, poses an increasing risk to the trade-security nexus;

E. whereas China’s acquisition of critical infrastructure, especially in the EU’s neighbourhood, including the Western Balkans, *and in Africa*, poses an increasing risk to the trade-security nexus;

Or. en

**Amendment 32**  
Markéta Gregorová  
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**Motion for a resolution**

**Recital E a (new)**
Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Ea. whereas China’s national security related legislation, such as the 2015 National Security Law of People’s Republic of China, requires citizens and organisations to provide support and assistance to the PRC’s public security, state security or military organs;

Or. en

Amendment 33
Nathalie Loiseau

Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Ea. whereas a large number of Chinese students study in Member States universities, especially in the field of dual use technologies potentially leading for some to a high risk of espionage;

Or. en

Amendment 34
Assita Kanko, Anna Fotyga

Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Ea. whereas China is involved in constructing EU-funded infrastructure in different EU Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 35
Markéta Gregorová
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution
Recital E b (new)

Amendment

Eb. whereas China is restricting non-Chinese companies from participating in infrastructure projects due to security risks and is putting forward legislation with regard to critical infrastructure, such as Critical Information Infrastructure Security Protection Regulations;

Or. en

Amendment 36
Nathalie Loiseau

Motion for a resolution
Recital E b (new)

Amendment

Eb. whereas former European fighter pilots have been employed by the Chinese army; whereas such recruitments create a heavy risk of transfer of critical information putting the military-strategic interests of the concerned countries at risk;

Or. en

Amendment 37
Assita Kanko, Anna Fotyga

Motion for a resolution
Recital E b (new)

Amendment

Eb. whereas European ports in which Chinese state-owned companies have
stakes handle about more than 10% of Europe’s total shipping container capacity;

Amendment 38
Assita Kanko, Anna Fotyga

Motion for a resolution
Recital E c (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Ec. whereas the Chinese government has demonstrated that it is willing to weaponize its overwhelming control of global rare earth supplies to obtain political concessions;

Amendment 39
Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

F. whereas the Sino-Russian strategic partnership continues to grow, including in the areas of technology and military capability transfers;

F. whereas the Sino-Russian strategic partnership formalised with the Joint Statement "on the international relations entering a new era and the global sustainable development" of 4 February 2022 continues to grow, including in the areas of technology and military capability transfers;

Amendment 40
Miriam Lexmann
F. whereas the Sino-Russian strategic partnership continues to grow, including in the areas of technology and military capability transfers;

F. whereas the Sino-Russian strategic partnership continues to grow, including in the areas of technology and military capability transfers, posing an increasing threat to European security;

Amendment 41
Petras Aušrevičius

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas the Sino-Russian strategic partnership continues to grow, including in the areas of technology and military capability transfers;

F. whereas the Sino-Russian strategic partnership continues to grow, including in the areas of technology and military know-how and capability transfers;

Amendment 42
Miriam Lexmann

Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)

Fa. whereas the spread of China’s digital authoritarianism and mass surveillance continues to intensify both within China and beyond, targeting democratic institutions and societies;

Or. en
Amendment 43  
Miriam Lexmann  
Motion for a resolution  
Recital F b (new)  

Motion for a resolution  

Amendment  

Fb. whereas totalitarian China’s rapidly rising technological, economic and military power risks establishing a new international order that would endanger freedom and democracy around the world;

Or. en

Amendment 44  
Miriam Lexmann  
Motion for a resolution  
Recital F c (new)  

Motion for a resolution  

Amendment  

Fc. whereas Chinese ambitions are growing in strategic areas such as AI, cloud computing, semiconductors, or hardware; whereas these instruments, particularly AI, could be developed for military purposes, driving the next revolution in military affairs;

Or. en

Amendment 45  
Miriam Lexmann  
Motion for a resolution  
Paragraph 1  

Motion for a resolution  

Amendment  

1. Underlines that China’s military-civil fusion (MCF) strategy is a state-led, state-directed programme and plan to

1. Underlines that China’s military-civil fusion (MCF) strategy is a state-led, state-directed programme and plan to
instrumentalise all levers of state and commercial power to strengthen and support the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); instrumentalise all levers of state and commercial power to strengthen and support the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), particularly by acquiring and diverting the world’s cutting-edge technologies, with the objective of strengthening the totalitarian regime and achieving military dominance;

Amendment 46
Clare Daly, Mick Wallace

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Underlines that China’s military-civil fusion (MCF) strategy is a state-led, state-directed programme and plan to instrumentalise all levers of state and commercial power to strengthen and support the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP);

Amendment

1. Underlines that China’s military-civil fusion (MCF) strategy is a state-led, state-directed programme and plan to instrumentalise all levers of state and commercial power to strengthen and support the People’s Liberation Army (PLA);

Amendment 47
Juozas Olekas

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Underlines that China’s military-civil fusion (MCF) strategy is a state-led, state-directed programme and plan to instrumentalise all levers of state and commercial power to strengthen and support the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its armed wing People’s
2. Considers that China’s party-driven political system and economy often require private companies to align their commercial interests with the CCP’s military, repression and political interference activities; highlights that, consequentially, Chinese companies’ international activities help the CCP to expand its influence over foreign countries and undermine geopolitical rivals;

2. Considers that China’s political system and planned economy often require private companies to align their commercial interests within the scope of China’s economic reform programmes in order to protect the national interest;

2. Considers that China’s party-driven political system and economy often require private companies to align their commercial interests with the CCP’s military, repression and political interference activities; highlights that, consequentially, Chinese companies’ international activities help the CCP to expand its influence over foreign countries and undermine geopolitical rivals;

2. Considers that China’s party-driven political system and economy often require private companies to align their commercial interests with the CCP’s military, repression and political interference activities; highlights that, consequentially, Chinese companies’ international activities support the CCP’s goals of expanding its influence over foreign countries, undermining geopolitical rivals and increase Chinese’s influence;
Amendment 50
Juozas Olekas

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

Motion for a resolution

2. Considers that China’s party-driven political system and economy often require private companies to align their commercial interests with the CCP’s military, repression and political interference activities; highlights that, consequentially, Chinese companies’ international activities help the CCP to expand its influence over foreign countries and undermine geopolitical rivals;

Amendment

2. Considers that China’s party-driven political system and economy often require private companies to align their commercial interests with the CCP, including in its military, repression, influence and political interference activities; highlights that, consequentially, Chinese companies’ international activities help the CCP to expand its influence over foreign countries and undermine geopolitical rivals;

Or. en

Amendment 51
Markéta Gregorová
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

Motion for a resolution

2. Considers that China’s party-driven political system and economy often require private companies to align their commercial interests with the CCP’s military, repression and political interference activities; highlights that, consequentially, Chinese companies’ international activities help the CCP to expand its influence over foreign countries and undermine geopolitical rivals;

Amendment

2. Considers that in China’s economic system private companies are often required to align their commercial activities with the CCP’s political interests; notes that CCP party cells inside private companies are commonly used as tools of direct party control; highlights that, Chinese companies’ international activities may enable the CCP to expand its influence in third countries and pursue its geopolitical goals;

Or. en
Amendment 52
Miriam Lexmann

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

Motion for a resolution

3. Believes that MCF must be understood in a larger political and strategic context, taking into account its interconnections with other initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (including the Digital Silk Road); believes that the ultimate aim of MCF is to advance China’s long-term strategic goal to become the world’s leading power;

Amendment

3. Believes that MCF must be understood in a larger political and strategic context, taking into account its interconnections with other initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (including the Digital Silk Road), subversion activities and China's increasing assertiveness and aggressive posturing abroad; believes that the ultimate aim of MCF is to advance the party-state's long-term strategic goal to increase asymmetrical interdependence of third countries vis-a-vis China and become the world’s leading power under the rule of the CCP;

Or. en

Amendment 53
Juozas Olekas

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

Motion for a resolution

3. Believes that MCF must be understood in a larger political and strategic context, taking into account its interconnections with other initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (including the Digital Silk Road); believes that the ultimate aim of MCF is to advance China’s long-term strategic goal to become the world’s leading power;

Amendment

3. Believes that MCF must be understood in a larger geopolitical, economic and strategic context, taking into account its interconnections with other initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (including the Digital Silk Road) and the Global Security Initiative; believes that the ultimate aim of MCF is to advance China’s long-term strategic goal to become the world’s leading power in terms of political influence, economic capacities, technological dominance and
Amendment 54
Markéta Gregorová
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Believes that MCF must be understood in a larger political and strategic context, taking into account its interconnections with other initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (including the Digital Silk Road); believes that the ultimate aim of MCF is to **advance China’s long-term strategic goal to become the world’s leading power**;

Amendment

3. Believes that MCF must be understood in a larger political and strategic context, taking into account its interconnections with other initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (including the Digital Silk Road), **Made in China 2025, Dual Circulation Strategy and China Standards 2035**; believes that the ultimate aim of MCF is to **create a world-class military force, which could be used to challenge the existing international security order**;

Amendment 55
Isabel Santos

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Believes that MCF must be understood in a larger political and strategic context, taking into account its interconnections with other initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (including the Digital Silk Road); believes that the ultimate aim of MCF is to advance China’s long-term strategic goal to become the world’s leading power;

Amendment

3. Believes that MCF must be understood in a larger political and strategic context, taking into account its interconnections with other initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (including the Digital Silk Road); believes that the ultimate aim of MCF is to advance China’s long-term strategic goal to become the world’s leading power **and to undermine the rules-based international order**;
Amendment 56
Clare Daly, Mick Wallace

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

Motion for a resolution
Amendment

3. Believes that MCF must be understood in a larger political and strategic context, taking into account its interconnections with other initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (including the Digital Silk Road); believes that the ultimate aim of MCF is to advance China’s long-term strategic goal to become the world’s leading power;

3. Believes that MCF must be understood in a larger political and strategic context, taking into account the increasing threats and provocations, military and economic emanating from the United States; believes that the ultimate aim of MCF is to ensure that China is capable of defending its sovereignty and strategic interests in its immediate periphery;

Amendment 57
Klemen Grošelj

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

Motion for a resolution
Amendment

3a. Recalls that achieving primacy in science and technology has been one of the CCP’s top priorities in recent years and that the CCP’s MCF strategy incentivises the sharing of research and development results between market-oriented and Chinese defence industries;

Amendment 58
Markéta Gregorová
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Amendment 59
Clare Daly, Mick Wallace

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 2 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Notes that while China can already compete with the United States military across a range of military fields, a hegemonic military presence is dependant on the ability to project power across the world through military bases and military equipment, the United States, with its hundreds of bases and military equipment encircling the globe poses a far greater threat than any other military power on earth;

Or. en

Amendment 60
Clare Daly, Mick Wallace

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Warns of the risk of Chinese companies having any involvement with EU strategic assets, especially those companies that have direct or indirect links to China’s military system;

deleted
underlines, in this regard, its concern that technology and technological expertise will be transferred to China’s military, increasing the PLA’s ability to develop the next generation of military technology, which may be used to coerce partners in Asia and around the world;

Amendment 61
Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

 Amendment
4. Warns of the risk of Chinese companies having any involvement with EU strategic assets, especially those companies that have direct or indirect links to China’s military system; underlines, in this regard, its concern that technology and technological expertise will be transferred to China’s military, increasing the PLA’s ability to develop the next generation of military technology, which may be used to coerce partners in Asia and around the world; urges EU member states to increase regulatory oversight and introduce specific background checks over individuals and legal entities with direct ties to the Chinese government;

Or. en

Amendment 62
Miriam Lexmann

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

 Amendment
4. Warns of the risk of Chinese companies having any involvement with EU strategic assets, especially those companies that have direct or indirect links to China’s military system; underlines, in this regard, its concern that technology and technological expertise will be transferred to China’s military, increasing the PLA’s ability to develop the next generation of military technology, which may be used to coerce partners in Asia and around the world; urges EU member states to increase regulatory oversight and introduce specific background checks over individuals and legal entities with direct ties to the Chinese government;

Or. en
companies having any involvement with EU strategic assets, especially those companies that have direct or indirect links to China’s military system; underlines, in this regard, its concern that technology and technological expertise will be transferred to China’s military, increasing the PLA’s ability to develop the next generation of military technology, which may be used to coerce partners in Asia and around the world;

companies having any involvement with EU strategic assets, especially those companies that have direct or indirect links to China’s political-military system; underlines, in this regard, its concern that technology and technological expertise used in civilian activities, particularly in the economic sphere, continues to be transferred to China’s military, increasing the PLA’s ability to develop the next generation of military technology, which may be used to coerce partners in Asia and around the world;

Amendment 63
Petras Aušrevičius

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Warns of the risk of Chinese companies having any involvement with EU strategic assets, especially those companies that have direct or indirect links to China’s military system; underlines, in this regard, its concern that technology and technological expertise will be transferred to China’s military, increasing the PLA’s ability to develop the next generation of military technology, which may be used to coerce partners in Asia and around the world;

Amendment

4. Warns of the risk of Chinese companies having any involvement with EU strategic assets, especially those companies that have direct or indirect links to China’s military or intelligence systems; underlines, in this regard, its concern that technology and technological expertise will be transferred to China’s military, increasing the PLA’s ability to develop the next generation of military technology, which may be used to coerce partners in Asia and around the world;

Amendment 64
Markéta Gregorová
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Warns of the risk of Chinese companies having any involvement with EU strategic assets, especially those companies that have direct or indirect links to China’s military system; underlines, in this regard, its concern that technology and technological expertise will be transferred to China’s military, increasing the PLA’s ability to develop the next generation of military technology, which may be used to coerce partners in Asia and around the world;

4. Warns of the risk of Chinese companies having any involvement with EU strategic assets, especially those companies that have direct or indirect links to China’s military system; underlines, in this regard, its concern that technology and technological expertise risk being transferred to China’s military, increasing the PLA’s ability to develop the next generation of military technology, which may be used to coerce partners in Asia and around the world;

Or. en

Amendment 65
Assita Kanko, Anna Fotyga

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

4a. Underlines that PRC projects power overseas by using a network of commercial ports and dual-use facilities that provide logistics and intelligence support to the Chinese navy; notes that in 2022, Chinese companies owned or operated terminals in 96 ports across 53 countries; further notes that in at least 9 ports, two of which in Europe, PLAN warships have undergone significant repairs or maintenance for vessels and equipment; points out that naval visits reveal areas of influence, prioritised operational zones, intelligence collection objectives and cooperation priorities;

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 66
Miriam Lexmann
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Stresses the repeated warnings by intelligence agencies against the risks of economic dependence, espionage and sabotage caused by the economic presence of entities from non-EU countries, in particular China, in critical infrastructure and strategic sectors across the EU;

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 67
Clare Daly, Mick Wallace

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Emphasises that China produces 70 % of the world’s batteries (hosting three of the top five battery manufacturing giants), accounts for 60 % of global aluminium production and 75 % of silicon production, is the leading refiner of 60 % of lithium and 70 % of copper processing and produces 84 % of the world’s nickel and 85 % of its cobalt; underlines that Chinese mining companies are active in the Democratic Republic of Congo (cobalt), Indonesia (nickel) and Chile and Australia (lithium) and that its quasi-monopoly on the production and processing of these critical commodities presents not only an acute geopolitical challenge for the EU, but also a huge risk for Europe’s defence and other industrial sectors;

5. Emphasises that China produces 70 % of the world’s batteries (hosting three of the top five battery manufacturing giants), accounts for 60 % of global aluminium production and 75 % of silicon production, is the leading refiner of 60 % of lithium and 70 % of copper processing and produces 84 % of the world’s nickel and 85 % of its cobalt; underlines that Chinese mining companies are active in the Democratic Republic of Congo (cobalt), Indonesia (nickel) and Chile and Australia (lithium) and that its quasi-monopoly on the production and processing of these critical commodities and that in light of the severity of the climate crisis and the need for international cooperation at an unprecedented scale in order to tackle the crisis, China's advances in these areas of mining and processing present huge opportunities for collaboration on green infrastructure and that duplication of efforts and competition in these areas of economic activity will be counterproductive, potentially having
disastrous results for the economy of the EU and the future of life on earth;

Amendment 68
Miriam Lexmann

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Emphasises that China produces 70 % of the world’s batteries (hosting three of the top five battery manufacturing giants), accounts for 60 % of global aluminium production and 75 % of silicon production, is the leading refiner of 60 % of lithium and 70 % of copper processing and produces 84 % of the world’s nickel and 85 % of its cobalt; underlines that Chinese mining companies are active in the Democratic Republic of Congo (cobalt), Indonesia (nickel) and Chile and Australia (lithium) and that its quasi-monopoly on the production and processing of these critical commodities presents not only an acute geopolitical challenge for the EU, but also a huge risk for Europe’s defence and other industrial sectors;

welcomes, in this regard the Commission proposal for the Critical Raw Materials Act and calls for the speedy implementation of its goals in order strengthen the Union’s supply chain resilience;

Amendment 69
Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Emphasises that China produces 70 % of the world’s batteries (hosting three of the top five battery manufacturing giants), accounts for 60 % of global aluminium production and 75 % of silicon production, is the leading refiner of 60 % of lithium and 70 % of copper processing and produces 84 % of the world’s nickel and 85 % of its cobalt; underlines that Chinese mining companies are active in the Democratic Republic of Congo (cobalt), Indonesia (nickel) and Chile and Australia (lithium) and that its quasi-monopoly on the production and processing of these critical commodities presents not only an acute geopolitical challenge for the EU, but also a huge risk for Europe’s defence and other industrial sectors;
Motion for a resolution

5. Emphasises that China produces 70% of the world’s batteries (hosting three of the top five battery manufacturing giants), accounts for 60% of global aluminium production and 75% of silicon production, is the leading refiner of 60% of lithium and 70% of copper processing and produces 84% of the world’s nickel and 85% of its cobalt; underlines that Chinese mining companies are active in the Democratic Republic of Congo (cobalt), Indonesia (nickel) and Chile and Australia (lithium) and that its quasi-monopoly on the production and processing of these critical commodities presents not only an acute geopolitical challenge for the EU, but also a huge risk for Europe’s defence and other industrial sectors;

Amendment

5. Emphasises that China produces 70% of the world’s batteries (hosting three of the top five battery manufacturing giants), accounts for 60% of global aluminium production and 75% of silicon production, as well as 94% the global production of gallium and around 60% of germanium production, and is the leading refiner of 60% of lithium and 70% of copper processing and produces 84% of the world’s nickel and 85% of its cobalt; underlines that Chinese mining companies are active in the Democratic Republic of Congo (cobalt), Indonesia (nickel) and Chile and Australia (lithium) and that its quasi-monopoly on the production and processing of these critical commodities presents not only an acute geopolitical challenge for the EU, but also a huge risk for Europe’s defence and other industrial sectors;

Or. en

Amendment 70
Juozas Olekas

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Emphasises that China produces 70% of the world’s batteries (hosting three of the top five battery manufacturing giants), accounts for 60% of global aluminium production and 75% of silicon production, is the leading refiner of 60% of lithium and 70% of copper processing and produces 84% of the world’s nickel and 85% of its cobalt; underlines that Chinese mining companies are active in the Democratic Republic of Congo (cobalt), Indonesia (nickel) and Chile and Australia (lithium) and that its quasi-monopoly on the production and processing of these critical commodities presents not only an acute geopolitical challenge for the EU, but also a huge risk for Europe’s defence and other industrial sectors;
Emphasises that China produces 70 % of the world’s batteries (hosting three of the top five battery manufacturing giants), accounts for 60 % of global aluminium production and 75 % of silicon production, is the leading refiner of 60 % of lithium and 70 % of copper processing and produces 84 % of the world’s nickel and 85 % of its cobalt; underlines that Chinese mining companies are active in the Democratic Republic of Congo (cobalt), Indonesia (nickel) and Chile and Australia (lithium) and that its quasi-monopoly on the production and processing of these critical commodities presents not only an acute geopolitical challenge for the EU, but also a huge risk for Europe’s defence and other industrial sectors;
Motion for a resolution

5. Emphasises that China produces 70% of the world’s batteries (hosting three of the top five battery manufacturing giants), accounts for 60% of global aluminium production and 75% of silicon production, is the leading refiner of 60% of lithium and 70% of copper processing and produces 84% of the world’s nickel and 85% of its cobalt; underlines that Chinese mining companies are active in the Democratic Republic of Congo (cobalt), Indonesia (nickel) and Chile and Australia (lithium) and that its quasi-monopoly on the production and processing of these critical commodities presents not only an acute geopolitical challenge for the EU, but also a huge risk for Europe’s defence and other industrial sectors;

Amendment

5. Emphasises that China produces 70% of the world’s batteries (hosting three of the top five battery manufacturing giants), accounts for 60% of global aluminium production and 75% of silicon production, is the leading refiner of 60% of lithium and 70% of copper processing and produces 84% of the world’s nickel and 85% of its cobalt; underlines that Chinese mining companies are active in Serbia (copper and gold), the Democratic Republic of Congo (cobalt), Indonesia (nickel) and Chile and Australia (lithium) and that its quasi-monopoly on the production and processing of these critical commodities presents not only an acute geopolitical challenge for the EU, but also a huge risk for Europe’s defence and other industrial sectors;

Or. en

Amendment 73
Petras Aušrevičius

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

Motion for a resolution

5. Emphasises that China produces 70% of the world’s batteries (hosting three of the top five battery manufacturing giants), accounts for 60% of global aluminium production and 75% of silicon production, is the leading refiner of 60% of lithium and 70% of copper processing and produces 84% of the world’s nickel and 85% of its cobalt; underlines that Chinese mining companies are active in the Democratic Republic of Congo (cobalt), Indonesia (nickel) and Chile and Australia (lithium) and that its quasi-monopoly on the production and processing of these critical commodities presents not only an acute geopolitical challenge for the EU, but

Amendment

5. Emphasises that China produces 70% of the world’s batteries (hosting three of the top five battery manufacturing giants), accounts for 60% of global aluminium production and 75% of silicon production, is the leading refiner of 60% of lithium and 70% of copper processing and produces 84% of the world’s nickel and 85% of its cobalt; underlines that Chinese mining companies are active in the Democratic Republic of Congo (cobalt), Indonesia (nickel) and Chile and Australia (lithium) and that its quasi-monopoly on the production and processing of these critical commodities presents not only an acute geopolitical challenge for the EU, but
also a huge risk for Europe’s defence and other key industrial sectors;

Amendment 74
Assita Kanko, Anna Fotyga

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Emphasises that 98% of EU’s demand for rare earths is being met by the PRC, and that the EU is also reliant on China for solar panels, clean technology, cars, and pharmaceutical technology; underlines the importance of reshoring, using various ways to encourage it, such as financial incentives, innovation policies, industrial policies, trade policies, environmental policies or monetary policies;

Amendment 75
Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Further calls on the EU and member states to gradually reduce the dependence on China by diversifying the sources of critical raw minerals and rare earth elements to domestic production and urging the EU to assist member states in developing projects, such as lithium mining, that will aim for greater independence from Chinese production;
Amendment 76
Isabel Santos

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

Motion for a resolution

6. Recalls that both diplomatic and military communication travels through privately owned undersea cables provided by Chinese companies, such as HMN Technologies, a PLA cyber intelligence–affiliated entity; expresses its grave concern over the undersea data cable systems operated by Chinese company HMN Technologies, which connect EU Member States’ territories and the Indo-Pacific region, including Member State and NATO military bases in the region, creating security vulnerabilities as regards underwater surveillance and the collection of intelligence;

Amendment

6. Recalls that both diplomatic and military communication travels through privately owned undersea cables provided by Chinese companies, such as HMN Technologies, a PLA cyber intelligence–affiliated entity; expresses its grave concern over the undersea data cable systems operated by Chinese company HMN Technologies, which connect EU Member States’ territories and the Indo-Pacific region, including Member State and NATO military bases in the region, creating security vulnerabilities as regards to cyber security, underwater surveillance and the collection of intelligence;

Or. en

Amendment 77
Miriam Lexmann

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

Motion for a resolution

6. Recalls that both diplomatic and military communication travels through privately owned undersea cables provided by Chinese companies, such as HMN Technologies, a PLA cyber intelligence–affiliated entity; expresses its grave concern over the undersea data cable systems operated by Chinese company HMN Technologies, which connect EU Member States’ territories and the Indo-Pacific region, including Member State and NATO military bases in the region,

Amendment

6. Recalls that both diplomatic and military communication travels through privately owned undersea cables provided by Chinese companies, such as HMN Technologies, a PLA cyber intelligence–affiliated entity; expresses its grave concern over the undersea data cable systems operated by Chinese company HMN Technologies, which connect EU Member States’ territories and the Indo-Pacific region, including Member State and NATO military bases in the region,
creating security vulnerabilities as regards underwater surveillance and the collection of intelligence;

creating security vulnerabilities as regards underwater surveillance and the collection data for intelligence purposes;

Amendment 78
Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

Motion for a resolution

6. Recalls that both diplomatic and military communication travels through privately owned undersea cables provided by Chinese companies, such as HMN Technologies, a PLA cyber intelligence–affiliated entity; expresses its grave concern over the undersea data cable systems operated by Chinese company HMN Technologies, which connect EU Member States’ territories and the Indo-Pacific region, including Member State and NATO military bases in the region, creating security vulnerabilities as regards underwater surveillance and the collection of intelligence;

Amendment

6. Is deeply concerned that both diplomatic and military communication travels through privately owned undersea cables provided by Chinese companies, such as HMN Technologies, a PLA cyber intelligence–affiliated entity; expresses its grave concern over the undersea data cable systems operated by Chinese company HMN Technologies, which connect EU Member States’ territories and the Indo-Pacific region, including Member State and NATO military bases in the region, creating security vulnerabilities as regards underwater surveillance and the collection of intelligence;

Amendment 79
Juozas Olekas

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

Motion for a resolution

6. Recalls that both diplomatic and military communication travels through privately owned undersea cables provided by Chinese companies, such as HMN Technologies, a PLA cyber intelligence–affiliated entity; expresses its grave concern over the undersea data cable systems operated by Chinese company HMN Technologies, which connect EU Member States’ territories and the Indo-Pacific region, including Member State and NATO military bases in the region, creating security vulnerabilities as regards underwater surveillance and the collection of intelligence;

Amendment

6. Recalls that privately owned undersea cables provided by Chinese companies, such as HMN Technologies, a PLA cyber intelligence–affiliated entity, facilitate diplomatic and military communication; expresses its grave concern over the undersea data cable systems operated by Chinese company HMN Technologies, which connect EU Member States’ territories and the Indo-Pacific region, including Member State and NATO military bases in the region, creating security vulnerabilities as regards underwater surveillance and the collection of intelligence;
Amendment 80
Klemen Grošelj

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

6a. Notes that Chinese companies are already leaders in key technologies used in sectors such as 5G wireless infrastructure, drones, batteries, hypersonic, solar and wind energy, as well as cryptocurrency; expresses its concerns over the uses of these technologies and the dependencies they create which could be used to apply economic leverage and enhance the CCP’s influence over European assets and critical infrastructure;

Amendment

6a. In this regard, is concern with the sale of a Dutch company, the backbone of Estonia’s internet infrastructure, to a
Amendment 82
Miriam Lexmann

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

Motion for a resolution
7. Warns that the deterioration in the security environment in Europe and around the globe requires urgent reflection on how to strengthen the EU’s strategic autonomy and reduce its dependencies on countries like the PRC that are systemic rivals, not strategic partners; stresses the need to prevent sensitive emerging technologies and key dual-use items from being leaked to destinations of concern that pursue or collaborate in MCF strategies;

Amendment
7. Warns that the deterioration in the security environment in Europe and around the globe requires urgent reflection on how to strengthen the EU’s strategic autonomy and reduce its dependencies on countries that pose a security threat to the Union like the PRC and are systemic rivals, not strategic partners; stresses the need to prevent sensitive emerging technologies and key dual-use items from being leaked to destinations of concern that pursue or collaborate in MCF strategies; calls on the EU institutions and the Member States to strengthen cooperation with the transatlantic and other like-minded partners in the protection of critical infrastructure, and to defend democracy and preserve our shared values, security and prosperity;

Amendment 83
Clare Daly, Mick Wallace

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

Motion for a resolution
7. Warns that the deterioration in the

Amendment
7. Warns that the deterioration in the
security environment in Europe and around the globe requires urgent reflection on how to strengthen the EU’s strategic autonomy and reduce its dependencies on countries like the PRC that are systemic rivals, not strategic partners; stresses the need to prevent sensitive emerging technologies and key dual-use items from being leaked to destinations of concern that pursue or collaborate in MCF strategies;

Amendment 84
Markéta Gregorová
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Warns that the deterioration in the security environment in Europe and around the globe requires urgent reflection on how to strengthen the EU’s strategic autonomy and reduce its dependencies on countries like the PRC that are systemic rivals, not strategic partners; stresses the need to prevent sensitive emerging technologies and key dual-use items from being leaked to destinations of concern that pursue or collaborate in MCF strategies;

Amendment 85
Juozas Olekas

Motion for a resolution

7. Warns that the deterioration in the security environment in Europe and around the globe requires urgent reflection on how to strengthen the EU’s strategic autonomy and reduce its critical dependencies on countries like the PRC that are systemic rivals, not strategic partners; stresses the need to prevent sensitive emerging technologies and key dual-use items from being transferred to China; regards the establishment of EU-wide electronic customs and export licensing systems as a critical step towards effective common European export controls and urges all Member States to make these systems operational by the end of 2023;
Paragraph 7

Motion for a resolution

7. Warns that the deterioration in the security environment in Europe and around the globe requires urgent reflection on how to strengthen the EU’s strategic autonomy and reduce its dependencies on countries like the PRC that are systemic rivals, not strategic partners; stresses the need to prevent sensitive emerging technologies and key dual-use items from being leaked to destinations of concern that pursue or collaborate in MCF strategies;

Amendment

7. Warns that the deterioration in the security environment in Europe and around the globe requires urgent reflection on how to strengthen the EU’s open strategic autonomy and reduce its dependencies on non-democratic countries like the PRC; stresses the need to prevent sensitive emerging technologies and key dual-use items especially those which are critical to the security and defence of the Union from being leaked to destinations of concern that pursue or collaborate in MCF strategies;

Or. en

Amendment 86
Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

Motion for a resolution

7. Warns that the deterioration in the security environment in Europe and around the globe requires urgent reflection on how to strengthen the EU’s strategic autonomy and reduce its dependencies on countries like the PRC that are systemic rivals, not strategic partners; stresses the need to prevent sensitive emerging technologies and key dual-use items from being leaked to destinations of concern that pursue or collaborate in MCF strategies;

Amendment

7. Warns that the deterioration in the security environment in Europe, in its neighbourhood, and around the globe requires urgent reflection on how to strengthen the EU’s strategic autonomy and reduce its dependencies on countries like the PRC that are systemic rivals, not strategic partners; stresses the need to prevent sensitive emerging technologies and key dual-use items from being leaked to destinations of concern that pursue or collaborate in MCF strategies;

Or. en

Amendment 87
Charlie Weimers
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

Amendment

7. Warns that the deterioration in the security environment in Europe and around the globe requires urgent reflection on how to strengthen the EU’s strategic autonomy and reduce its dependencies on countries like the PRC that are systemic rivals, not strategic partners; stresses the need to prevent sensitive emerging technologies and key dual-use items from being leaked to destinations of concern that pursue or collaborate in MCF strategies;

Amendment 88
Klemen Grošelj

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. Considers it necessary to strengthen FDI-screening procedures with due-diligence standards to identify China’s leverage over investors in EU critical infrastructure, such as European ports and undersea cables in the Baltic, Mediterranean and Arctic seas; underlines that this approach should apply equally to candidate and potential candidate countries;

Amendment 89
Rasa Juknevičienė, Andrius Kubilius

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Motion for a resolution

7a. Strongly advocates for the diversification of suppliers and partners in critical infrastructure initiatives to reduce the vulnerability to external influences, ensuring that reliance on any single source is minimized;

Amendment

7a. Stresses that the EU and NATO must work together to develop a long-term plan to counter China’s military-civil fusion (MCF) strategy in Europe;

Amendment

7a. Welcomes the publication of the Final Assessment Report of the EU-NATO Task Force and calls for the full implementation of its recommendations;

Amendment

Amendment 90
Assita Kanko, Anna Fotyga

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

Amendment 91
Miriam Lexmann

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

Amendment 92
Miriam Lexmann
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 b (new)

7b. Warns that large investments in seaports, railways and airports give Beijing the opportunity to monitor and control activities in key logistical nodes with a fundamental strategic dimension;

Or. en

Amendment 93
Miriam Lexmann

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Remains concerned that European critical infrastructure is becoming increasingly vulnerable to external influence; commends, in this respect, recent legislative steps to enhance the resilience of critical entities in the EU; notes with concern, however, that such initiatives are largely limited to screening procedures for foreign direct investment, leaving other channels open for the CCP to gain access and influence over critical assets;

8. Remains concerned that European critical infrastructure is becoming increasingly vulnerable to external influence; commends, in this respect, recent legislative steps to enhance the resilience of critical entities in the EU; notes with concern, however, that such initiatives are largely limited to screening procedures for foreign direct investment, leaving other channels open for the CCP to gain access and influence over critical assets; is further concerned by the political pressure asserted in the approval of specific Chinese investments into critical infrastructure, as in the case of the German government's decision to agree to the acquisition of a stake at the port of Hamburg by COSCO, contrary to the assessment of the intelligence services;

Or. en

Amendment 94
Miriam Lexmann
Motion for a resolution  
Paragraph 8

Motion for a resolution

8. Remains concerned that European critical infrastructure is becoming increasingly vulnerable to external influence; commends, in this respect, recent legislative steps to enhance the resilience of critical entities in the EU; notes with concern, however, that such initiatives are largely limited to screening procedures for foreign direct investment, leaving other channels open for the CCP to gain access and influence over critical assets;

Amendment

8. Remains concerned that European critical infrastructure, from telecommunications networks to port facilities, is becoming increasingly vulnerable to external influence; commends, in this respect, recent legislative steps to enhance the resilience of critical entities in the EU; notes with concern, however, that such initiatives are largely limited to screening procedures for foreign direct investment, leaving other channels open for the CCP to gain access and influence over critical assets; notes that a framework introducing rules for cooperation and sharing of information on FDI between EU member states and the European Commission is a good first step, more must be done in this direction to ensure the protection of critical European infrastructure from Chinese interferences;

Or. en

Amendment 95  
Juozas Olekas

Motion for a resolution  
Paragraph 8

Motion for a resolution

8. Remains concerned that European critical infrastructure is becoming increasingly vulnerable to external influence; commends, in this respect, recent legislative steps to enhance the resilience of critical entities in the EU; notes with concern, however, that such initiatives are largely limited to screening procedures for foreign direct investment, leaving other channels open for the CCP to gain access and influence over critical assets;

Amendment

8. Remains concerned that European critical infrastructure is becoming increasingly vulnerable to external influence; commends, in this respect, recent legislative steps to enhance the resilience of critical entities in the EU; notes with concern, however, that such initiatives are largely limited to screening procedures for foreign direct investment, leaving other channels open for the CCP to
gain access and influence over critical assets; gain access and influence over critical assets, including through elite capture, technology and intellectual property transfers, supply chain and sales market dependencies, and therefore calls for the expansion of these legislative initiatives to address such risks;

Amendment 96
Miriam Lexmann

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8a (new)

Motion for a resolution

8a. welcomes the decision of EU institutions and those of several EU Member States to suspend the TikTok application on corporate devices, as well as personal devices enrolled in the institutions’ mobile device services; calls for implementation of the suspension across all EU and Member State institutions, as well as a thorough risk assessment of other such vendors with connections to authoritarian and totalitarian regimes;

Amendment 97
Rasa Juknevičienė, Andrius Kubilius

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8a (new)

Motion for a resolution

8a. Notes that the establishment of a thorough risk assessment and mapping framework is imperative to identify critical infrastructure assets and their susceptibilities; calls on the Commission, with the support of the Member States, to
compile an exhaustive inventory of critical assets and systematically evaluate their vulnerability to external influences;

Amendment 98
Miriam Lexmann

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

8b. Notes with concern that Huawei today controls just under 50% of the EU's 4G network and, in the case of 5G, 100% of the 5G RAN in Cyprus is composed of Chinese equipment, and 59% in the case of Germany; stresses that this runs counter to the EU’s “5G security toolbox” guidelines to mitigate security risks in networks and calls on the Member States to remove equipment and services from Huawei, ZTE and other vendors in core network functions;

Amendment 99
Rasa Juknevičienė, Andrius Kubilius

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

8b. Underlines that routine evaluations of critical infrastructure projects that involve non-EU stakeholders are essential; this process should encompass scrutiny of ownership structures, dependencies within supply chains, and the transfer of technology associated with these projects;
Amendment 100
Juozas Olekas

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Notes that the screening of stakeholders with access to critical infrastructure cannot be limited to direct investment; calls for the current instruments that address foreign direct investment and foreign subsidies to be expanded to include generalised screening procedures for all stakeholders involved in EU critical infrastructure projects; calls on the Commission, with the support of the Member States, to map, track and assess China’s access to critical infrastructure in the EU; stresses that the Member States are ultimately responsible for infrastructure protection, but have not consistently implemented current guidelines on foreign direct investment or set up national-level investment-screening mechanisms;

9. Notes that the screening of stakeholders with access to critical infrastructure cannot be limited only to direct investment; calls for the current instruments that address foreign direct investment and foreign subsidies to be expanded to include generalised screening procedures for all stakeholders involved in EU critical infrastructure projects; calls on the Commission, with the support of the Member States, to map, track and assess China’s, and other third countries’ access to critical infrastructure in the EU and to jointly proceed with mitigating measures where necessary; stresses that the Member States are ultimately responsible for infrastructure protection, but have not consistently implemented current guidelines on foreign direct investment or set up national-level investment-screening mechanisms; calls in this regard for the Commission and the Member States to conduct a process to increase the harmonization of the regulations on screening and control of foreign investments, and to fully implement the Foreign Direct Investment screening mechanism; further calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop a response mechanism in case of detection of dual-use or misuse of critical infrastructure in the Union, which are under the property, participation or to the advantage of interests linked to the Chinese MCF strategy;
Amendment 101  
Clare Daly, Mick Wallace

Motion for a resolution  
Paragraph 9

9. Notes that the screening of stakeholders with access to critical infrastructure cannot be limited to direct investment; calls for the current instruments that address foreign direct investment and foreign subsidies to be expanded to include generalised screening procedures for all stakeholders involved in EU critical infrastructure projects; **calls on the Commission, with the support of the Member States, to map, track and assess China’s access to critical infrastructure in the EU; stresses that the Member States are ultimately responsible for infrastructure protection, but have not consistently implemented current guidelines on foreign direct investment or set up national-level investment-screening mechanisms;**

Amendment

9. Notes that the screening of stakeholders with access to critical infrastructure cannot be limited to direct investment; calls for the current instruments that address foreign direct investment and foreign subsidies to be expanded to include generalised screening procedures for all stakeholders involved in EU critical infrastructure projects;

Amendment 102  
Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Motion for a resolution  
Paragraph 9

9. Notes that the screening of stakeholders with access to critical infrastructure cannot be limited to direct investment; calls for the current instruments that address foreign direct investment and foreign subsidies to be expanded to include generalised screening procedures for all stakeholders involved in

Amendment

9. Notes that the screening of stakeholders with access to critical infrastructure cannot be limited to direct investment; calls for the current instruments that address foreign direct investment and foreign subsidies to be expanded to include generalised screening procedures for all stakeholders involved in
EU critical infrastructure projects; calls on
the Commission, with the support of the
Member States, to map, track and assess
China’s access to critical infrastructure in
the EU; stresses that the Member States are
ultimately responsible for infrastructure
protection, but have not consistently
implemented current guidelines on foreign
direct investment or set up national-level
investment-screening mechanisms;

strongly encourages the Member States to
refrain from concludings deals that
involve the ownership of critical and
strategically relevant infrastructures with
the PRC;

Amendment 103
Rasa Juknevičienė, Andrius Kubilius

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Notes that the screening of
stakeholders with access to critical
infrastructure cannot be limited to direct
investment; calls for the current
instruments that address foreign direct
investment and foreign subsidies to be
expanded to include generalised screening
procedures for all stakeholders involved in
EU critical infrastructure projects; calls on
the Commission, with the support of the
Member States, to map, track and assess
China’s access to critical infrastructure in
the EU; stresses that the Member States are
ultimately responsible for infrastructure
protection, but have not consistently
implemented current guidelines on foreign
direct investment or set up national-level
investment-screening mechanisms;

encompassing all modes of participation
in critical infrastructure endeavors,
including collaborative ventures,
partnerships, and technology transfers;
calls on the Commission, with the support
of the Member States, to map, track and
assess China’s access to critical
infrastructure in the EU; stresses that the
Member States are ultimately responsible
for infrastructure protection, but have not
consistently implemented current
guidelines on foreign direct investment or
set up national-level investment-screening
Amendment 104
Miriam Lexmann

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Notes that the screening of stakeholders with access to critical infrastructure cannot be limited to direct investment; calls for the current instruments that address foreign direct investment and foreign subsidies to be expanded to include generalised screening procedures for all stakeholders involved in EU critical infrastructure projects; calls on the Commission, with the support of the Member States, to map, track and assess China’s access to critical infrastructure in the EU; stresses that the Member States are ultimately responsible for infrastructure protection, but have not consistently implemented current guidelines on foreign direct investment or set up national-level investment-screening mechanisms;

Amendment

9. Notes that the screening of stakeholders with access to critical infrastructure cannot be limited to direct investment; calls for the current instruments that address foreign direct investment and foreign subsidies to be expanded to include generalised screening procedures for all stakeholders involved in EU critical infrastructure projects; calls on the Commission, with the support of the Member States, to map, track and assess China’s access to critical infrastructure in the EU; stresses that the Member States are ultimately responsible for infrastructure protection; urgently calls on the Member States to consistently implement current legislation related to the resilience of critical entities and on foreign direct investment, and to set up national-level investment-screening mechanisms;

Amendment 105
Klemen Grošelj

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Notes that the screening of stakeholders with access to critical infrastructure cannot be limited to direct

Amendment

9. Notes that the screening of stakeholders with access to critical infrastructure cannot be limited to direct
investment; calls for the current instruments that address foreign direct investment and foreign subsidies to be expanded to include generalised screening procedures for all stakeholders involved in EU critical infrastructure projects; calls on the Commission, with the support of the Member States, to map, track and assess China’s access to critical infrastructure in the EU; stresses that the Member States are ultimately responsible for infrastructure protection, but have not consistently implemented current guidelines on foreign direct investment or set up national-level investment-screening mechanisms;
Amendment 107
Nathalie Loiseau

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)

Motion for a resolution
Amendment

9a. Regrets in this regard the lack of adequate screening of risks of interference on public procurement related to security equipment, such as the case of the contract signed by the Airport of Strasbourg to instal airport security scanners and gates supplied by the European subsidiary of the Chinese company Nuctech, partially owned by the Chinese government and bound by the United Front policy; warns that any such technologies could incorporate in-built security gaps or be accessed during their maintenance;

Or. en

Amendment 108
Miriam Lexmann

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)

Motion for a resolution
Amendment

9a. Welcomes the decision of the Romanian government to terminate negotiations with China General Nuclear Power Corporation, GCNPC, on the construction of nuclear reactors 3 and 4 at Cernavoda and further welcomes the ratification of the 2020 intergovernmental agreement with the United States on cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, including construction of reactors 3 and 4 at Cernavoda;

Or. en
Amendment 109  
Nathalie Loiseau  

Motion for a resolution  
Paragraph 9 b (new)  

9b. Recalls that Huawei has been participating in 11 projects under Horizon Europe until June 2023, thus receiving 3.89 million euros of funding in total, and raising obvious security concerns due to the type of services that threaten the EU’s data security and strategic autonomy; therefore, calls on the EU and European institutions to carry out a systematic screening of Chinese companies benefiting directly or indirectly from European programmes of strategic importance for the EU;

Or. en

Amendment 110  
Miriam Lexmann  

Motion for a resolution  
Paragraph 10

10. Welcomes the potential of the Commission’s proposal for a European economic security strategy to expand the EU toolkit to exports or outward investments in a narrow set of key enabling technologies with military applications, inter alia, in the areas of quantum computing, advanced semiconductors and artificial intelligence; calls for the swift adoption of the Commission’s proposals and for the Member States to fully implement the EU’s expanded regulatory framework to exclude entities that could contribute to MCF;
development of a comprehensive approach on commonly identifying,
assessing and managing risks to
European economic security; commends
the multilateral involvement of
Commission and member states in
cooporation with the High Representative,
where appropriate, and the input from
private sector as envisioned by the
Strategy;

Amendment 111
Clare Daly, Mick Wallace

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

Motion for a resolution

10. Welcomes the potential of the
Commission’s proposal for a European
economic security strategy to expand the
EU toolkit to exports or outward
investments in a narrow set of key enabling
technologies with military applications,
inter alia, in the areas of quantum
computing, advanced semiconductors and
artificial intelligence; calls for the swift
adoption of the Commission’s proposals
and for the Member States to fully
implement the EU’s expanded regulatory
framework to exclude entities that could
contribute to MCF;

Amendment

10. Welcomes the potential of the
Commission’s proposal for a European
economic security strategy to expand the
EU toolkit to exports or outward
investments in a narrow set of key enabling
technologies with military applications,
inter alia, in the areas of quantum
computing, advanced semiconductors and
artificial intelligence;

Amendment 112
Assita Kanko, Anna Fotyga

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

Motion for a resolution

10. Welcomes the potential of the
Commission’s proposal for a European
economic security strategy to expand the
EU toolkit to exports or outward
investments in a narrow set of key enabling
technologies with military applications,
inter alia, in the areas of quantum
computing, advanced semiconductors and
artificial intelligence;

Amendment

10. Welcomes the potential of the
Commission’s proposal for a European
economic security strategy to expand the
EU toolkit to exports or outward
investments in a narrow set of key enabling
technologies with military applications,
inter alia, in the areas of quantum
computing, advanced semiconductors and
artificial intelligence;
10. Welcomes the potential of the Commission’s proposal for a European economic security strategy to expand the EU toolkit to exports or outward investments in a narrow set of key enabling technologies with military applications, inter alia, in the areas of quantum computing, advanced semiconductors and artificial intelligence; calls for the swift adoption of the Commission’s proposals and for the Member States to fully implement the EU’s expanded regulatory framework to exclude entities that could contribute to MCF;

Amendment 113
Juozas Olekas

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

Motion for a resolution

10. Welcomes the potential of the Commission’s proposal for a European economic security strategy to expand the EU toolkit to exports or outward investments in a narrow set of key enabling technologies with military applications, inter alia, in the areas of quantum computing, advanced semiconductors and artificial intelligence; calls for the swift adoption of the Commission’s proposals and for the Member States to fully implement the EU’s expanded regulatory framework to exclude entities that could contribute to MCF; and to find alternatives for Chinese-financed projects in the EU;

Amendment

10. Welcomes the potential of the Commission’s proposal for a European economic security strategy to expand the EU toolkit to exports or outward investments in a narrow set of key enabling technologies with military applications, inter alia, in the areas of quantum computing, advanced semiconductors and artificial intelligence; calls for the swift adoption of the Commission’s proposals and for the Member States to fully implement the EU’s expanded regulatory framework to exclude entities that could contribute to MCF;

Amendment 114
Markéta Gregorová
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Welcomes the potential of the Commission’s proposal for a European economic security strategy to expand the EU toolkit to exports or outward investments in a narrow set of key enabling technologies with military applications, inter alia, in the areas of quantum computing, advanced semiconductors and artificial intelligence; calls for the swift adoption of the Commission’s proposals and for the Member States to fully implement the EU’s expanded regulatory framework to exclude entities that could contribute to MCF;

Amendment

10. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a European economic security strategy to expand the EU toolkit to export controls or outbound investments in a narrow set of key enabling technologies with military applications, inter alia, in the areas of quantum computing, advanced semiconductors and artificial intelligence; calls on the Commission to propose the announced proposals by Spring 2024 and for the Member States to fully implement the EU’s expanded regulatory framework to exclude entities that could contribute to MCF;

Or. en

Amendment 115
Klemen Grošelj

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Welcomes the potential of the Commission’s proposal for a European economic security strategy to expand the EU toolkit to exports or outward investments in a narrow set of key enabling technologies with military applications, inter alia, in the areas of quantum computing, advanced semiconductors and artificial intelligence; calls for the swift adoption of the Commission’s proposals and for the Member States to fully implement the EU’s expanded regulatory framework to exclude entities that could contribute to MCF;

Amendment

10. Welcomes the potential of the European economic security strategy to expand the EU toolkit to exports or outward investments in a narrow set of key enabling technologies with military applications, inter alia, in the areas of quantum computing, advanced semiconductors and artificial intelligence; calls for the swift adoption of the High Representative and Commission’s proposals and calls on Member States to fully implement the EU’s expanded regulatory framework to exclude entities that could contribute to MCF;

Or. en
Amendment 116
Isabel Santos

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Welcomes the potential of the Commission’s proposal for a European economic security strategy to expand the EU toolkit to exports or outward investments in a narrow set of key enabling technologies with military applications, inter alia, in the areas of quantum computing, advanced semiconductors and artificial intelligence; calls for the swift adoption of the Commission’s proposals and for the Member States to fully implement the EU’s expanded regulatory framework to exclude entities that could contribute to MCF;

Amendment

10. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a European economic security strategy to expand the EU toolkit to exports or outward investments in a narrow set of key enabling technologies with military applications, inter alia, in the areas of quantum computing, advanced semiconductors and artificial intelligence; calls for the swift adoption of the Commission’s proposals and for the Member States to fully implement the EU’s expanded regulatory framework to exclude entities that could contribute to MCF;

Or. en

Amendment 117
Clare Daly, Mick Wallace

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Further welcomes the Commission’s proposal to prevent the leakage of sensitive emerging technologies by establishing a list of dual-use technologies, based on narrowly defined and forward-looking criteria, such as the potential enabling and transformative nature of a technology, the risk of MCF and the risk of the technology being misused to violate human rights; calls on the Commission and the Member States to identify and implement the relevant protection measures for these dual-use technologies as soon as possible;

Amendment

11. Further welcomes the Commission’s proposal to prevent the leakage of sensitive emerging technologies by establishing a list of dual-use technologies, based on narrowly defined and forward-looking criteria, such as the potential enabling and transformative nature of a technology; calls on the Commission and the Member States to identify and implement the relevant protection measures for these dual-use technologies as soon as possible;
11. Further welcomes the Commission’s proposal to prevent the leakage of sensitive emerging technologies by establishing a list of dual-use technologies, based on narrowly defined and forward-looking criteria, such as the potential enabling and transformative nature of a technology, the risk of MCF and the risk of the technology being misused to violate human rights; calls on the Commission and the Member States to identify and implement the relevant protection measures for these dual-use technologies as soon as possible;
Amendment 120
Juozas Olekas

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Welcomes the adoption of the European Chips Act, which will increase the EU’s ability to produce semiconductors and create a strategic map of, inter alia, capability gaps in the semiconductor value chain in the EU, thereby limiting the EU’s dependence on third countries such as China; calls for further proposals to secure the production and supply chains of critical infrastructure and material within the EU;

Amendment

12. Welcomes the adoption of the European Chips Act, which will increase the EU’s ability to produce semiconductors and create a strategic map of, inter alia, capability gaps in the semiconductor value chain in the EU, thereby limiting the EU’s dependence on third countries such as China; calls for further proposals to secure the production and supply chains of critical infrastructure and material within the EU; 

further calls on the Commission and Member States to develop additional initiatives aimed at enabling closer coordination and collaboration with like-minded partners and allies to monitor and develop further, where possible and in line with the EU’s aim to reduce further dependencies, global production capacities and supply chains of critical infrastructure and materials which are crucial to the security and defence of the Union;

Or. en

Amendment 121
Miriam Lexmann

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Welcomes the adoption of the European Chips Act, which will increase the EU’s ability to produce semiconductors and create a strategic map of, inter alia, capability gaps in the semiconductor value chain in the EU, thereby limiting the EU’s dependence on third countries such as

Amendment

12. Welcomes the adoption of the European Chips Act, which will increase the EU’s ability to produce semiconductors and create a strategic map of, inter alia, capability gaps in the semiconductor value chain in the EU, thereby limiting the EU’s dependence on third countries such as
China; calls for further proposals to secure the production and supply chains of critical infrastructure and material within the EU; in this regard, further calls for closer economic and scientific ties with like-minded partners, in particular with Taiwan, which plays a significant role in the global supply chains, while in the meantime standing on the frontline defending against the expansion and assertivity of the PRC and its threats to the international rules-based order;

Amendment 122
Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Welcomes the adoption of the European Chips Act, which will increase the EU’s ability to produce semiconductors and create a strategic map of, inter alia, capability gaps in the semiconductor value chain in the EU, thereby limiting the EU’s dependence on third countries such as China; calls for further proposals to secure the production and supply chains of critical infrastructure and material within the EU; welcomes the launch of the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), which will foster the EU’s quest for strategic autonomy and digital sovereignty;

Amendment 123
Markéta Gregorová
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution

12. Welcomes the adoption of the European Chips Act, which will increase the EU’s ability to produce semiconductors and create a strategic map of, inter alia, capability gaps in the semiconductor value chain in the EU, thereby limiting the EU’s dependence on third countries such as China; calls for further proposals to secure the production and supply chains of critical infrastructure and material within the EU;

Amendment

12. Welcomes the adoption of the European Chips Act, which will increase the EU’s ability to produce semiconductors and create a strategic map of, inter alia, capability gaps in the semiconductor value chain in the EU, thereby limiting the EU’s dependence on third countries such as China; calls for further proposals to secure the production and supply chains of critical infrastructure and material within the EU, as well as strengthening strategic partnerships, such as with Taiwan;

Or. en

Amendment 124
Clare Daly, Mick Wallace

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution

12. Welcomes the adoption of the European Chips Act, which will increase the EU’s ability to produce semiconductors and create a strategic map of, inter alia, capability gaps in the semiconductor value chain in the EU, thereby limiting the EU’s dependence on third countries such as China; calls for further proposals to secure the production and supply chains of critical infrastructure and material within the EU;

Amendment

12. Welcomes the adoption of the European Chips Act, which will increase the EU’s ability to produce semiconductors and create a strategic map of, inter alia, capability gaps in the semiconductor value chain in the EU, thereby limiting the EU’s dependence on third countries such as China; calls for further proposals to secure the production and supply chains of critical infrastructure and material within the EU;

Or. en

Amendment 125
Miriam Lexmann

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Notes that ports are gateways to the world and as such play a crucial role in the EU’s economy; notes with concern, however, that Chinese-owned or controlled entities have strategically increased their stakes in European ports and port infrastructure, including the Germany's Hamburg and Duisburg, Greek ports of Pireus and Thessaloniki, Belgium's Zeebrugge and Antwerp, the Netherlands' Rotterdam, Spain's Valencia, Bilbao and Barcelona, France's Montoir, Dunkirk, Le Havre and Fos, Sweden's Stockholm, Poland's Gdynia, Italy's Vado Ligure and Malta's Marsaxlokk;

Amendment 126
Klemen Grošelj

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

12a. Underlines the importance of the Critical Raw Materials Act and recalls that critical raw materials are essential for the success of the EU’s digital and green transitions, but also for the security and defence sector; emphasises the need to establish strategic partnerships with third countries with a view to ensuring a secure and reliable supply of critical raw materials;

Amendment 127
Miriam Lexmann

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 b (new)
Motion for a resolution
12b. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to urgently address the need to reduce the risks of espionage and sabotage in critical infrastructure, in particular those with a military function, such as ports that are used by NATO;

Amendment 128
Miriam Lexmann

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 c (new)

Motion for a resolution
12c. Calls on the Commission to present an EU strategic policy framework to reduce and limit influence and operational control by China and other regimes that a security threat to the Union in the EU’s ports and in their processes and hinterland operations;

Amendment 129
Miriam Lexmann

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 d (new)

Motion for a resolution
12d. Highlight that Taiwan’s semiconductor industry is vital for the global economy; welcomes Taiwan’s semiconductor manufacturing diversification in Europe and reiterate its longstanding support for the EU-Taiwan Bilateral Investment Agreement and any arrangements mutually beneficial to
bilateral trade and investment;

Amendment 130
Juozas Olekas

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Calls on the Commission to propose a new legislative framework to mitigate the security risks coming from the suppliers of undersea cable systems; stresses the need to prevent cable system suppliers, such as Chinese companies, from sharing data with intelligence services other than to protect the infrastructure from outside intrusions or malignant attacks;

Amendment

13. Calls on the Commission to propose a new legislative framework to mitigate the security risks coming from the suppliers of undersea cable systems, including through stricter monitoring and frequent review of the ownership structures of such suppliers, their previous investments in the undersea cable systems and the proximity of the undersea cable systems to European and allied military bases; stresses the need to prevent cable system suppliers, such as Chinese companies, from sharing data with intelligence services other than to protect the infrastructure from outside intrusions or malignant attacks; calls in this regards for initiatives aimed at the further development of European owned or based companies in the field of undersea cable systems;

Amendment 131
Markéta Gregorová on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Calls on the Commission to propose a new legislative framework to

Amendment

13. Calls on the Commission to propose a new legislative framework to
mitigate the security risks coming from the suppliers of undersea cable systems; stresses the need to prevent cable system suppliers, such as Chinese companies, from sharing data with intelligence services other than to protect the infrastructure from outside intrusions or malignant attacks;

Amendment 132
Clare Daly, Mick Wallace

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

Motion for a resolution
13. Calls on the Commission to propose a new legislative framework to mitigate the security risks coming from the suppliers of undersea cable systems; stresses the need to prevent cable system suppliers, such as Chinese companies, from sharing data with intelligence services other than to protect the infrastructure from outside intrusions or malignant attacks;

Amendment
13. Calls on the Commission to propose a new legislative framework to mitigate the security risks coming from the suppliers of undersea cable systems; stresses the need to prevent cable system suppliers from sharing data with intelligence services other than to protect the infrastructure from outside intrusions or malignant attacks;

Amendment 133
Nathalie Loiseau

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)

Motion for a resolution
13a. Recalls the need to perform a thorough evaluation of the EU institutions' information security infrastructure and services, in particular regarding classified communications between the institutions and missions and operations abroad; reminds that the full supply chain should be taken into account

Amendment
13a. Recalls the need to perform a thorough evaluation of the EU institutions' information security infrastructure and services, in particular regarding classified communications between the institutions and missions and operations abroad; reminds that the full supply chain should be taken into account
to ensure that the companies do not have any direct or indirect links with the PRC; calls for specific provisions in EU institutions procurements procedures to limit the risk of interference, including the acquisition, maintenance, or the vetting of third party;

Amendment 134
Assita Kanko, Anna Fotyga
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)

Motion for a resolution Amendment
13a. Stresses the importance of tracking and assessing China’s access to critical infrastructure in the EU, as well as strengthening FDI-screening procedures with due-diligence standards to identify China’s leverage on investors in critical infrastructure;

Amendment 135
Charlie Weimers
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)

Motion for a resolution Amendment
13a. Encourages the EU and Member States to deepen cooperation with Taiwan in confronting disinformation from mainland China, including the sharing of best-practices;
Amendment 136
Assita Kanko, Anna Fotyga

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 b (new)

13b. Underlines the need to coordinate critical-infrastructure protection at EU and national levels; considers that responsibility for protecting critical infrastructure ultimately lies with Member States, which should enact critical-infrastructure protection regulations consistent with those in force at EU level;

Amendment

Amendment 137
Markéta Gregorová
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Is cognisant of the role that Chinese companies play in the EU’s market and its wider neighbourhood; calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to ensure that the measures taken to strengthen the resilience of the EU in the face of Chinese influence, including de-risking, diversification and reduction of critical dependencies, are also extended to the EU’s closest partners, in particular accession countries and those part of the EU’s neighbourhood policy;

Amendment

Amendment 138
Isabel Santos

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Is cognisant of the PRC’s penetration of the EU market and its wider neighbourhood; calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to ensure that the measures taken to strengthen the resilience of the EU in the face of Chinese influence are also extended to the EU’s closest partners, in particular accession countries and those part of the EUs neighbourhood policy;

Amendment

14. Expresses concerned regarding the PRC’s penetration of the EU market and its wider neighbourhood; calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to ensure that the measures taken to strengthen the resilience of the EU in the face of Chinese influence are also extended to the EU’s closest partners, in particular accession countries and those part of the EUs neighbourhood policy;

Or. en

Amendment 139
Markéta Gregorová
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)

14a. Notes that despite European FDI screening mechanisms, Chinese companies have been granted contracts in European critical infrastructure, leading to security risks; calls therefore on the Council and the Commission to exclude the use of equipment and software from manufacturers based in the PRC, particularly ByteDance, Huawei, ZTE and Nuctech; calls on critical sectors to exclude the use of hardware and software from the PRC in order to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data and services; considers the TikTok app, owned by Chinese conglomerate ByteDance, to be in breach of the European data privacy framework, making it a potential risk and a source of
Chinese-backed disinformation; welcomes the decision of the EU institutions to restrict the use of TikTok on corporate devices; recommends the banning of TikTok at all levels of national government and in the EU institutions;

Amendment 140
Clare Daly, Mick Wallace

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)

14a. Recalls that in order to ensure climate and economic resilience of all countries, the UN states that all countries and all sectors of society need to act now; emphasises that increasing great power competition in the military and economic spheres is directly contrary to the interests of humanity at the present conjuncture, and that in the interests of stability and the sustainable survival of the human species we need increased international cooperation across all sectors; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to ensure that all measures are taken to advance international cooperation on climate action;

Amendment 141
Charlie Weimers

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)

14a. Encourages dialogue and cooperation with like-minded partners,
such as Taiwan, in all industrial sectors and supply chains, in particular emerging industries and industries of strategic importance such as electronic vehicles, robotics and smart manufacturing, as well as semiconductor technologies, in order to divert the EU’s and Member States’ dependence on China;

Amendment 142
Juozas Olekas

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

Motion for a resolution

15. Recalls that the PRC’s naval forces have legal tools to ensure that China’s civilian ships and infrastructure can be used for military and security purposes; considers that China can use its civilian commercial infrastructure to support the PLA’s presence in third countries; warns that such MCF provides the PLA with access to foreign ports, enabling it to pre-position logistics support to sustain naval deployments as far afield as the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean; underlines that the risks of espionage are highest when Chinese civilian commercial assets are located in logistical hubs close to EU and NATO naval bases or port operators that have signed agreements to provide logistical support to European companies;

Amendment

15. Recalls that the PRC’s naval forces have means and legal tools to ensure that China’s civilian ships and infrastructure can be used for military and security purposes; considers that China can use its civilian commercial infrastructure to support the PLA’s presence in third countries; warns that such MCF provides the PLA with access to foreign ports, enabling it to pre-position logistics support to sustain naval deployments as far afield as the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean; underlines that the risks of espionage are highest when Chinese civilian commercial assets are located in logistical hubs close to EU and NATO naval bases or port operators that have signed agreements to provide logistical support to European companies;

Amendment 143
Miriam Lexmann

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Notes that one third of all African infrastructure built since 2010 has been financed and constructed by Chinese state-owned enterprises; underlines that, over the past 20 years, China has increased its trade, investment and loan commitments with few or opaque contractual obligations; expresses concern that this Chinese model is clearly attractive to many countries that cannot satisfy EU requirements for accessing equivalent levels of finance, thereby expanding Chinese influence to the detriment of EU partnerships; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to ensure that the EU’s high standards for investment with partners do not compromise it security relationships and engagement as a reliable and strategic partner; calls on the Commission to effectively use the Global Gateway as an instrument to increase the EU’s presence and visibility worldwide by means of infrastructure investment that creates national value in partner countries, in line with the Sustainable Development Goals; calls on the Commission to strengthen its cooperation with international financial institutions and the private sector to mobilise the necessary funding;

Amendment 144
Tomáš Zdechovský

Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16

16. Notes that one third of all African infrastructure built since 2010 has been financed and constructed by Chinese state-owned enterprises; underlines that, over the past 20 years, China has increased its trade,
investment and loan commitments with few or opaque contractual obligations; expresses concern that this Chinese model is clearly attractive to many countries that cannot satisfy EU requirements for accessing equivalent levels of finance, thereby expanding Chinese influence to the detriment of EU partnerships; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to ensure that the EU’s high standards for investment with partners do not compromise it security relationships and engagement as a reliable and strategic partner;

Amendment 145
Javier Nart

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

*Motion for a resolution*

16. Notes that one third of all African infrastructure built since 2010 has been financed and constructed by Chinese state-owned enterprises; underlines that, over the past 20 years, China has increased its trade, investment and loan commitments with few or opaque contractual obligations; expresses concern that this Chinese model is clearly attractive to many countries that cannot satisfy EU requirements for accessing equivalent levels of finance, thereby expanding Chinese influence to the detriment of EU partnerships; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to ensure that the EU’s high standards for investment with partners do not compromise it security relationships and engagement as a reliable and strategic partner;

*Amendment*

16. Notes that one third of all African infrastructure built since 2010 has been financed and constructed by Chinese state-owned enterprises; underlines that, over the past 20 years, China has increased its trade, investment and loan commitments *worth $160 billion* with few or opaque contractual obligations *predominately in transportation, power generation, mining and telecommunications*; expresses concern that this Chinese model is clearly attractive to many countries that cannot satisfy EU requirements for accessing equivalent levels of finance, thereby expanding Chinese influence to the detriment of EU partnerships; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to ensure that the EU’s high standards for investment with partners do not compromise it security relationships and engagement as a reliable and strategic partner;
standards for investment with partners do not compromise its security relationships and engagement as a reliable and strategic partner;

Amendment 146
Klemen Grošelj

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Notes that one third of all African infrastructure built since 2010 has been financed and constructed by Chinese state-owned enterprises; underlines that, over the past 20 years, China has increased its trade, investment and loan commitments with few or opaque contractual obligations; expresses concern that this Chinese model is clearly attractive to many countries that cannot satisfy EU requirements for accessing equivalent levels of finance, thereby expanding Chinese influence to the detriment of EU partnerships; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to ensure that the EU’s high standards for investment with partners do not compromise its security relationships and engagement as a reliable and strategic partner;

Amendment 147
Juozas Olekas

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Notes that one third of all African infrastructure built since 2010 has been, including around 50 % of
financed and constructed by Chinese state-owned enterprises; underlines that, over the past 20 years, China has increased its trade, investment and loan commitments with few or opaque contractual obligations; expresses concern that this Chinese model is clearly attractive to many countries that cannot satisfy EU requirements for accessing equivalent levels of finance, thereby expanding Chinese influence to the detriment of EU partnerships; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to ensure that the EU’s high standards for investment with partners do not compromise its security relationships and engagement as a reliable and strategic partner;

Africa’s 3G networks and 70% of its 4G networks, built since 2010 has been financed and constructed by Chinese enterprises; underlines that, over the past 20 years, China has increased its trade, investment and loan commitments with opaque contractual obligations; expresses concern that the Chinese model is clearly attractive to many countries that cannot satisfy EU requirements for accessing equivalent levels of finance, thereby expanding Chinese influence to the detriment of EU partnerships and triggering risks of unsustainable debt for these countries, harming their long-term development to the detriment of their local population;

Or. en

Amendment 148
Javier Nart

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

16a. Recognises that the increase of China’s strategic investments in Sub-Saharan Africa is a matter for concern; highlights in particular the fact that a single Chinese telecommunication company has constructed up to 70% of Africa’s information technology infrastructure, as well as the role played by Chinese companies in the financing, building, expansion and renovation of at least 14 sensitive intra-governmental African telecommunication networks; consequently warns of the certain possibility of access by Chinese State-owned enterprises to the telecommunications of African citizens and institutions;

Or. en
Amendment 149
Markéta Gregorová
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

16a. Emphasises the need for a geopolitical approach to global cooperation on critical infrastructure in order for the EU to successfully face up to the new security challenges; in this context welcomes the European Union’s Global Gateway Initiative that seeks to provide connectivity solutions, including in the area of critical infrastructure, to third countries that are sustainable and trusted; urges Council and Commission to swiftly implement projects, especially lighthouse projects, under the initiative;

Or. en

Amendment 150
Juozas Olekas

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

17. Underlines with concern the PRC’s strategy to build a ‘blue economy cooperation base’ along the coast of Africa, including through the construction of fishing vessels and vessel repairs facilities, which can also be used for military purposes; stresses that there is a general lack of detail and transparency on these agreements and licences with African countries; outlines the potential geopolitical consequences for the EU, especially in third countries where the EU is engaged;

17. Underlines with concern that the PCR’s basing strategy to build a ‘blue economy cooperation base’ along the coast of Africa, including through the construction of fishing vessels and vessel repairs facilities, can also be used for military purposes; stresses that there is a general lack of detail and transparency on these agreements and licences with African countries; outlines the potential geopolitical consequences for the EU, especially in third countries where the EU is engaged;
Amendment 151
Juozas Olekas

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)

*Motion for a resolution*  

*Amendment*

17a. Calls on the Commission to periodically report to the European Parliament on the detection of possible dual use of strategic infrastructures that provide logistical and intelligence support to China which poses a security concern to the Union;