



2023/2127(INI)

12.9.2023

DRAFT REPORT

on a European Parliament recommendation to the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning EU-China relations
(2023/2127(INI))

Committee on Foreign Affairs

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to the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning EU-China relations (2023/2127(INI))

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the European Council Conclusions on China of 30 June 2023,
 - having regard to the Joint Communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 12 March 2019 entitled ‘EU-China – A strategic outlook’ (JOIN(2019)0005),
 - having regard to the EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific from 16 September 2021,
 - having regard to the Council conclusions of 28 July 2020 on Hong Kong,
 - having regard to the speeches by President Ursula von der Leyen on de-risking at the European Policy Centre on 30 March 2023 and at Parliament on 18 April 2023,
 - having regard to the Joint Communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council of 20 June 2023 entitled ‘on “European Economic Security Strategy”’ (JOIN(2023)0020),
 - having regard to its resolution of 20 May 2021 on Chinese countersanctions on EU entities and MEPs and MPs¹,
 - having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 on a new EU-China strategy²,
 - having regard to Rule 118 of its Rules of Procedure,
 - having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0000/2023),
- A. whereas China is simultaneously a partner and also increasingly a competitor and systemic rival to the EU;
- B. whereas both the European Union and China have a shared interest in pursuing constructive and stable relations, which must be based on respect for the rules-based international order, international law, balanced engagement and reciprocity;
- C. whereas the Chinese Communist Party does not share the same values as European democracies, has become increasingly authoritarian and promotes governance models

¹ OJ C 15, 12.1.2022, p. 17.

² OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 40.

internationally that contradict the EU's values;

- D. whereas China is changing and moving into a new era of security and control characterised by an increasingly assertive economic and foreign policy, attempts to change the international rules-based order and increasingly oppressive domestic policies;
- E. whereas the EU can only credibly defend its interests and values against an increasingly assertive China if it acts with a single, united approach;
- F. whereas in order to defend its core values and be treated as an equal partner, Europe needs a new approach towards China based on European strategic autonomy, reciprocity, cooperation with like-minded partners and opposition to coercion;
- G. whereas the EU must not accept critical political or military support by China for Russia's illegal war of aggression in Ukraine or for any circumvention of EU sanctions imposed following Russia's illegal invasion;
- H. whereas the EU must not accept any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, particularly by force, nor ongoing human rights violations within China, in particular in Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Hong Kong;
- 1. Recommends that the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy:

Engaging China to tackle global challenges

- (a) continue engaging with China to tackle global challenges such as climate change and biodiversity, health and pandemic preparedness, debt relief and humanitarian assistance, and increase dialogue with China on security issues in view of China's increasingly critical role in global security;
- (b) call on China to uphold the rules-based international order, especially the principles of the UN Charter, including respect for the territorial integrity or political independence of all states;
- (c) maintain diplomatic stability while increasing the EU's assertiveness towards China in order to assume its responsibility as a member of the UN Security Council to pressure Russia into stopping its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine;
- (d) reiterate that China, as the world's largest carbon emitter, must commit to peak its CO₂ emissions before 2030 in line with the Paris Agreement and its own promises;
- (e) ensure that China plays a constructive role in multilateral organisations such as the World Trade Organization, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations and support steps towards allowing Taiwan's participation in the meetings, mechanism and activities of relevant international institutions such as the WHO, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the UN Framework

Convention on Climate Change;

- (f) respond adequately to China's efforts to build alternative international organisations, including through the BRICS group of countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), by ensuring better coordination among the EU Member States and intensifying partnerships with like-minded partners around the world;

Opposing China's human rights violations

- (g) insist that China fulfils its responsibilities as a global power by upholding human rights and the rule of law;
- (h) ensure a unified European approach when China uses its economic leverage to silence opposition against its human rights abuses; intensify and include Members of the European Parliament in the Human Rights Dialogue with China and work towards a united approach on cultural and academic cooperation with China while preventing undue influence from Chinese sources of finance;
- (i) support an independent and impartial UN investigation into human rights violations in China, in particular in Xinjiang and Tibet, and urge the Chinese authorities to grant meaningful access to the regions concerned and immediately and unconditionally release the Uyghur scholar and 2019 Sakharov Prize Laureate Ilham Tohti;
- (j) address individual cases of European citizens being held in 'administrative detention' in China, such as the Swedish bookseller Gui Minhai, and use all diplomatic channels to pressure for their release;
- (k) show solidarity with civil society in China and Hong Kong and speed up the implementation of the European human rights framework with Magnitsky-style sanctions in close collaboration with international partners, including the freezing of foreign assets and visa restrictions against those involved in human rights abuses, including political decision makers in Hong Kong;
- (l) identify and close down any avenues that currently facilitate transnational repression efforts by the People's Republic of China (PRC), including in the European Union and in particular those targeting diaspora communities, in cooperation and coordination with like-minded partners;
- (m) review the autonomous status of Hong Kong in the light of the National Security Law and the PRC's violation of its international commitments, its breaches of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 'one country, two systems' principle, and the crackdown on Hong Kong's autonomy and opposition figures, including members of civil society;
- (n) condemn attempts by the Chinese authorities to target Hong Kong diaspora communities within the EU and call on Member States to suspend extradition treaties with the PRC and Hong Kong;

Ensuring Europe's strategic autonomy in dealing with China by de-risking

- (o) work closely towards fostering unity among the Member States' approach towards China and strengthen the EU's strategic autonomy to ensure that Europe is able to defend its values and economic interests, as well as the global rules-based order;
- (p) work towards a renewed, assertive and coherent EU approach towards China that shapes relations with the PRC in the interest of the EU as a whole and takes full account of the challenges stemming from the PRC's rise as a global actor and its increasingly oppressive domestic policies and assertive foreign policy;
- (q) strengthen the EU's economic autonomy, ensure mutually beneficial economic relations and prevent sensitive technologies from being used for military purposes by de-risking trade flows and reducing critical dependencies on the PRC without aiming to decouple or turning inwards;
- (r) swiftly implement, in this context, the European Economic Security Strategy and make better use of our existing trade instruments to minimise the detrimental effects of de-risking on the European economy and to ensure close alignment with like-minded partners around the world, such as our transatlantic partners and partners in Southeast Asia;
- (s) work towards a more coordinated approach towards the protection of critical infrastructure at EU level;
- (t) ensure greater coordination and cooperation with like-minded partners on issues of common concern, especially but not exclusively on issues such as strategic dependencies, economic coercion, political interference and disinformation, and to promote rules-based multilateralism and strategic solidarity between democracies;
- (u) highlight that the EU's 'One China policy' remains the foundation of our engagement with both the PRC and Taiwan but also underline the positive effect of deepening ties between the EU and Taiwan;
- (v) revisit the EU's engagement policy with Taiwan and continue supporting democracy there together with like-minded partners; encourage further exchanges between Parliament and its Taiwanese counterparts in this context;
- (w) ensure that the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is not changed by means of force or coercion by supporting initiatives aimed at promoting dialogue, cooperation and confidence-building between the two sides; prepare a scenario-based strategy for tackling potential security challenges in the Taiwan Strait;
- (x) establish a 'Far-East StratCom Task Force' as part of the European External Action Service, to be tasked with identifying, monitoring and countering disinformation efforts and nation-specific actions by China;
- (y) fully leverage the Global Gateway strategy as a tool to intensify the EU's engagement and business relations with partners from developing countries and

provide an alternative to Chinese-driven foreign investment strategies;

2. Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and, for information, to the Government of the People's Republic of China.