



2023/2126(INI)

13.9.2023

DRAFT REPORT

on a European Parliament recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning EU-US relations (2023/2126(INI))

Committee on Foreign Affairs

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to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning EU-US relations (2023/2126(INI))

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 2 December 2020 on a new EU-US agenda for global change (JOIN(2020)0022),
- having regard to the Council conclusions on EU-US relations of 7 December 2020,
- having regard to the joint statement by President von der Leyen and US President Biden of 10 March 2023,
- having regard to the joint statement of the Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue of 17 June 2023,
- having regard to the NATO Vilnius summit that took place on 11 and 12 July 2023,
- having regard to the US-EU Joint Statement of the Trade and Technology Council, issued on 31 May 2023,
- having regard to the 9th US-EU Energy Council joint statement issued on 7 February 2022 and the 10th US-EU Energy Council joint statement issued on 4 April 2023,
- having regard to the joint statement between the European Commission and the United States on European Energy Security of 25 March 2022,
- having regard to the third joint EU-NATO declaration signed on 10 January 2023,
- having regard to the Administrative Arrangement between the European Defence Agency and the Department of Defense of the United States of America signed on 26 April 2023,
- having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/750 of 6 May 2021 on the participation of the United States of America in the PESCO project Military Mobility¹,
- having regard to the Joint Communication on an EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence adopted on 10 March 2023,
- having regard to its previous resolutions on transatlantic relations, in particular its resolution of 26 March 2009 on the state of transatlantic relations in the aftermath of the

¹ OJ L 160, 7.5.2021, p. 112.

US elections², its resolution of 13 June 2013 on the role of the EU in promoting a broader Transatlantic Partnership³, its resolution of 12 September 2018 on the state of EU-US relations⁴ and its resolution of 6 October 2021 on the future of EU-US relations⁵,

- having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2023 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2022⁶,
 - having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2023 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2022⁷,
 - having regard to Rule 118 of its Rules of Procedure,
 - having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-000/2023),
- A. whereas a strong transatlantic cooperation based on the principle of a partnership of joint leadership and responsibility is necessary to weather the storm of multiple crises on both sides of the Atlantic;
- B. whereas the transatlantic partnership in foreign affairs is instrumental in asserting and enhancing the principles of international law and multilateral cooperation in the face of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;
- C. whereas the United States, with its bipartisan support for Ukraine, has shown true solidarity with the EU as we jointly work to protect peace and security on the European continent, as well as the principles of international law and the UN Charter;
- D. whereas standing together against the brutality of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine will be even more crucial in the months to come;
- E. whereas EU-US transatlantic dialogue and parliamentary diplomacy must continue to address global challenges;
- F. whereas the multiple issues we cooperate on would benefit immensely from an even stronger parliamentary dimension between the US Congress and the European Parliament, which would enhance public awareness, democratic legitimacy, oversight and the ability to deliver on our joint endeavours;
- G. whereas the Strategic Compass, adopted in March 2022, dedicates one of its main sections to the role of partnerships and calls for stronger tailored bilateral partnerships, in particular with the US and NATO;
1. Recommends that the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security

² OJ C 117 E, 6.5.2010, p. 198.

³ OJ C 65, 19.2.2016, p. 120.

⁴ OJ C 433, 23.12.2019, p. 89.

⁵ OJ C 132, 24.3.2022, p. 70.

⁶ OJ C 214, 16.6.2023, p. 26.

⁷ OJ C 214, 16.6.2023, p. 54.

Policy:

- (a) work towards fostering an even stronger, mutually beneficial partnership between the EU and the US in order to face the new and dangerous realities shaping our societies and communities;
- (b) foster the EU's open strategic autonomy as a means to pursue the EU's own legitimate interests while strengthening the transatlantic bond and increasing the joint leverage of the EU and the US on the world scene;
- (c) reassert the continued relevance of the strategic transatlantic relationship for the rebuilding and reinvigoration of the multilateral rules-based international order, with the UN system and international law at its centre;
- (d) strengthen the transatlantic partnership in the fight for democracy, the rules-based international order and multilateralism;
- (e) reinforce the accountability and resilience of our democratic systems in the run-up to the elections next year on both sides, as well as enhance transatlantic dialogue and cooperation on policies supporting democracy, human rights and the rule of law and combating disinformation and foreign interference from authoritarian regimes;

Foreign policy cooperation

- (f) continue the full EU-US coordination on effective international sanctions on Russia, Belarus and all those who facilitate Russia's aggression in order to undermine Russia's ability to continue the war and other aggressions against its neighbours and to prevent sanction circumvention;
- (g) continue EU-US cooperation in working with Ukraine to support its reform process and to develop a long-term reconstruction plan;
- (h) strengthen bilateral cooperation between the EU and US in the context of international forums such as the G7 and G20, as well as at UN General Assembly level, in order to isolate Russia and foster cooperation with countries genuinely interested in promoting multilateralism and defending the rules-based international order;
- (i) continue the excellent cooperation on countering foreign information manipulation and interference and reinforce our readiness against the malign usage of technological advancement to harm our shared interests;
- (j) assess the importance of the strong convergence of transatlantic positions towards China, building more and more on the 'de-risking' strategy while looking for ways to cooperate with China on some global challenges;
- (k) reach out jointly to countries of the Global South and reinforce our capacity to work in partnership and our commitment to democratic values, a rules-based international order and to working with the Global South on an attractive

alternative path to digital development;

- (l) explore ways to create synergies and possibilities of EU-US engagement with China in multilateral frameworks on common and global challenges, such as climate change, health-related risks, respect for human rights, cyberspace, arms control, non-proliferation and emerging disruptive technologies;
- (m) work with the US and partners around the world to minimise risks arising from the proliferation of sensitive technologies, while preserving maximum levels of openness towards international cooperation;
- (n) deepen cooperation in forging democratic standards for the use of technology by aligning their digital diplomacy strategies in order to defend our values, enhance our security and foster democracy-serving digital standards at home and worldwide;
- (o) deepen joint transatlantic efforts to secure key transatlantic infrastructure and to advance secure and resilient connectivity infrastructure for information and communication technologies around the world with partners;
- (p) ensure that the EU and the US, together with other relevant partners, create robust avenues for transatlantic data transfer and secure alternatives so that data flow can be maintained or quickly be restored even in instances of attempts at disruption;
- (q) foster closer partnership with the US and other like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific region;
- (r) continue EU-US cooperation in the Western Balkans to bring the countries in that region closer to EU membership and take forward the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue;
- (s) underline the need to continue the good bilateral engagements on our respective policies towards the Middle East Peace Process, as well as to continue to coordinate our efforts to encourage positive developments in the wider region;
- (t) strengthen transatlantic cooperation on situational awareness, diplomatic responses, capacity-building and on enhancing cyber resilience through the EU-US Cyber Dialogue;
- (u) ensure that the US remains an important partner for the EU's energy security;
- (v) further operationalise closer transatlantic dialogue and cooperation on renewable energy sources;
- (w) aim for an EU-US agreement on a common carbon footprint calculation methodology;

Security and defence cooperation

- (x) build upon the third joint EU-NATO declaration and further operationalise EU-NATO cooperation in areas such as resilience and protection of critical

infrastructure, emerging and disruptive technologies, space, the security implications of climate change, as well as foreign information manipulation and interference;

- (y) deepen partnerships in the areas of cooperation envisaged by the NATO Strategic Concept and the EU Strategic Compass, particularly in the areas of military mobility, dual-use infrastructure, resilience and inclusive joint exercises;
- (z) enhance collaboration between US-EU defence companies on joint projects which serve to achieve shared security and defence goals and ensure better interoperability between the EU, the US and NATO;
- (aa) encourage further defence cooperation between the EU, its Member States and the US by putting in practice the Administrative Arrangement between the European Defence Agency and the United States Department of Defense, in view of its importance in the current geopolitical reality;
- (ab) continue the ongoing coordination of the military support provided to Ukraine within the Ukraine Defense Contact Group;
- (ac) deepen cooperation in space security with the US;
- (ad) jointly address the spread of Russian and Chinese information manipulation and interference, particularly in the context of Russia's illegal war against Ukraine and its impact on the Western Balkans, Africa and Latin America;

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2. Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.