MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the situation in Venezuela
16.9.2024 - (2024/2810(RSP))
pursuant to Rule 136(2) of the Rules of Procedure
Dolors Montserrat, Esteban González Pons, Gabriel Mato, Sebastião Bugalho, Antonio López‑Istúriz White
on behalf of the PPE Group
See also joint motion for a resolution RC-B10-0023/2024
B10‑0023/2024
European Parliament resolution on the situation in Venezuela
The European Parliament,
– having regard to its previous resolutions on Venezuela,
– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to other UN human rights treaties and instruments,
– having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
– having regard to the statements by the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela of 31 July and 12 August 2024,
– having regard to the statement of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights of 3 September 2024 on the ‘climate of fear’ in Venezuela,
– having regard to the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 29 July 2024 on the presidential elections in Venezuela,
– having regard to the statements by the High Representative on behalf of the EU of 4 and 24 August 2024 on post-election developments,
– having regard to the report of the Department of Electoral Cooperation and Observation of the Organization of American States’ Secretariat for Strengthening Democracy of 30 July 2024 on the presidential elections in Venezuela
– having regard to the statement of the Carter Center of 30 July 2024 on the Venezuelan election,
– having regard to the Partial Agreement on the Promotion of Political Rights and Electoral Guarantees for All, signed by Nicolás Maduro’s regime and the Venezuelan opposition alliance, the Unitary Platform, in October 2023 (the Barbados Agreement),
– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas Venezuela’s 2024 elections would have represented a unique opportunity to move from a corrupt autocracy towards a return to democracy if all the items of the Barbados Agreement had been respected; whereas civil and political rights continue to be violated in Venezuela;
B. whereas the ongoing socio-economic, political and humanitarian crisis, marked by hyperinflation, escalating starvation, disease, high levels of corruption, crime and impunity, flagrant violations of human rights and increasing mortality rates, has resulted in the mass emigration of more than 7.7 million Venezuelans seeking to escape tyranny;
C. whereas on 17 October 2023 in Venezuela, the representatives of the Maduro regime and the Unitary Platform opposition alliance signed two agreements, known as the Barbados Agreements, which covered matters including the promotion of political rights, electoral guarantees for all, respect for the right of each political actor to choose their candidate for the presidential elections freely, and the release of political prisoners; whereas these agreements covered important topics such as allowing international observers to participate in the electoral process; whereas the agreements were signed to serve as a first step to ensure free and fair elections in Venezuela;
D. whereas there have been systematic restrictions on public information, freedom of opinion and expression and the right to peaceful assembly, particularly for dissidents of the regime, trade unionists, human rights defenders and the most vulnerable members of society; whereas political prisoners have not been not released, despite this being an explicit condition of the Barbados Agreement;
E. whereas María Corina Machado was elected as the candidate of the opposition to the regime at the primaries of the Unitary Platform in 2023 with 92.35 % of the vote; whereas the Maduro regime disqualified her from standing for election on arbitrary and politically motivated grounds, in a flagrant breach of the Barbados Agreement; whereas upon her disqualification, María Corina Machado maintained the unity of the democratic opposition to the regime by supporting a new candidate, Corina Yoris, who in turn was not authorised to register; whereas Edmundo González Urrutia was ultimately the candidate of the democratic opposition to the regime;
F. whereas numerous irregularities and violations were reported in the lead-up to the election, including the disqualification of around 16 political parties, barriers to the registration of presidential candidates, short voter registration deadlines and a lack of registration offices, minimal public information, obstruction of oversees voters, and attacks against and detentions of members of the campaign staff of María Corina Machado;
G. whereas the regime-controlled National Electoral Council (CNE) revoked the invitation sent to the EU to observe the election; whereas numerous international delegations that were invited by the democratic opposition to the regime, the Comando Nacional de Campaña Con VZLA, were denied entry into the country and expelled, including a delegation of members of a political group of the European Parliament and five Latin American ex-presidents;
H. whereas on election day, the Venezuelan people turned out to vote in high numbers, demonstrating outstanding civic and democratic behaviour despite the constant efforts by the regime to thwart the electoral process; whereas numerous reports of restrictions on access to many polling stations for domestic observers and opposition party witnesses were recorded; whereas pressure on voters through check-points set up by the regime was also reported at numerous polling stations;
I. whereas the few credible observation missions that managed to observe the election – teams from the UN and the Carter Center – have reported that ‘Venezuela’s 2024 presidential election did not meet international standards of electoral integrity and cannot be considered democratic’, that they ‘cannot verify or corroborate the results of the election declared by the regime-controlled CNE’, and that ‘the electoral authority’s failure to announce disaggregated results by polling station constitutes a serious breach of electoral principles’; whereas the report of the UN panel of experts stated that the premature declaration of a winner ‘had no precedent in contemporary democratic elections’, and that the election process lacked ‘basic transparency and integrity’; whereas the elections were neither free nor fair;
J. whereas after voting closed, the regime-controlled CNE refused to publish the official record of tally sheets and falsified the results of the election, announcing the false victory of Maduro; whereas the democratic opposition to the regime has managed to obtain 83.5 % of the official tally sheets and has credibly demonstrated that the winner of the election was Edmundo González Urrutia, with 67.08 % of votes cast;
K. whereas in the aftermath of the election, peaceful protests took place across the country to contest the fraudulent display by the Maduro regime; whereas these protests were met with extreme violence and repression, resulting in over 20 deaths and over 2 400 arrests and enforced disappearances, including of approximately 120 children;
L. whereas María Corina Machado has been forced to go into hiding for fear of reprisals from the Maduro regime and Edmundo González Urrutia has been forced into exile after an arrest warrant was issued against him and serious threats were made to his life and that of his relatives;
1. Recognises Edmundo González Urrutia as the legitimate and democratically elected President of Venezuela; also recognises María Corina Machado as the leader of the democratic forces in Venezuela, since she was elected at the primaries of the Unitary Platform in 2023 with 92.35 % of the vote;
2. Urges all EU Member States to recognise Edmundo González Urrutia as the legitimate and democratically elected President of Venezuela;
3. Strongly condemns and fully rejects the electoral fraud orchestrated by the regime-controlled CNE, which refused to make public the official result by publishing the tally sheet of each polling station, despite repeated calls from the international community;
4. Fully supports the investigations of the International Criminal Court and the UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission into the Venezuelan regime’s extensive crimes and acts of repression and calls for the EU to support the investigations currently being considered under the Rome Statute into the alleged crimes against humanity, in order to hold those responsible to account;
5. Calls for the EU and its Member States to request an international arrest warrant for Nicolás Maduro for crimes against humanity, on the basis of all the grave violations of human rights he has committed;
6. Condemns, in the strongest possible terms, the murders, harassment, violations and arrests that have been perpetrated against the democratic opposition to the regime and the Venezuelan people; demands the immediate and unconditional release of all politically and arbitrarily detained persons, in particular minors;
7. Recalls that in May 2024, the EU lifted its sanctions against members of the CNE, as a gesture of goodwill; underlines that this action did not produce any positive effect; calls for these sanctions against the members of the CNE to be reinstated; further calls for targeted sanctions to be applied against Nicolás Maduro, his inner circle and their families, including Jorge Rodríguez and all those responsible for violations of human rights in the country;
8. Condemns the decision by the CNE to revoke the invitation to the EU to deploy an election observation mission; further condemns the decision of the regime to impede the access of and expel international observers invited by the democratic opposition to the regime, Comando Nacional de Campaña Con VZLA, for election day;
9. Calls for the EU and its Member States to do their utmost to ensure that the legitimate and democratically elected president can take office on 10 January 2025, in accordance with the Venezuelan Constitution;
10. Urges the regional players to put all the pressure they can on the Maduro regime and Maduro’s inner circle to accept the democratic will of the Venezuelan people, recognising Edmundo González Urrutia as the legitimate and democratically elected President of Venezuela; is convinced that if a peaceful transfer of power and the re-establishment of democracy does not occur on 10 January 2025, a renewed migratory exodus to the other countries of the region will follow, similar to that which has led close to 8 million Venezuelans to flee the country in recent years;
11. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EU-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States summit participants, the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly, the Organization of American States, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the authorities of the Venezuelan regime.