MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on continued financial and military support to Ukraine by EU Member States
16.9.2024 - (2024/2799(RSP))
pursuant to Rule 136(2) of the Rules of Procedure
Sergey Lagodinsky, Alice Kuhnke, Villy Søvndal, Nicolae Ştefănuță, Mārtiņš Staķis, Reinier Van Lanschot, Erik Marquardt, Damian Boeselager, Virginijus Sinkevičius
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
See also joint motion for a resolution RC-B10-0028/2024
B10‑0028/2024
European Parliament resolution on continued financial and military support to Ukraine by EU Member States
The European Parliament,
– having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and Russia,
– having regard to the UN Charter, the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols thereto and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
– having regard to the report of 14 February 2024 by the World Bank, the Government of Ukraine, the European Commission and the United Nations, entitled ‘Ukraine – Third Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA3) February 2022 – December 2023’,
– having regard to the European Council conclusions and the Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine of 12 July 2023,
– having regard to the joint security commitments between the European Union and Ukraine of 27 June 2024,
A. whereas on 24 February 2022 the Russian Federation launched another continuous and unprecedented assault as part of its unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas Russian aggression against Ukraine started in 2014 with the occupation of parts of the Donbas region and the occupation and annexation of Ukraine’s Autonomous Republic of Crimea;
B. whereas Russia’s forces continue to make systematic and indiscriminate attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine; whereas heavy and intense bombardments combined with ground fighting continued throughout 2024, with a recent drone and missile attack killing seven civilians in the western city of Lviv just 70 km from the Polish border; whereas waves of Russian attacks on energy infrastructure disrupting power and water supplies have seriously limited access to essential services for civilians, healthcare facilities and schools, with longer-term implications anticipated and the situation expected to worsen in winter;
C. whereas the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has warned that the humanitarian situation in Ukraine has deteriorated even further this year; whereas the intensified hostilities in Kharkivska Oblast in May also caused the largest displacement in Ukraine since 2023; whereas strikes and attacks continued to kill civilians and damage homes, health facilities and schools across the country; whereas waves of attacks on energy infrastructure have affected access to essential services, with longer-term implications anticipated; whereas such systematic attacks constitute war crimes under international law; whereas due to the funding shortfall – only 28 % of the amount pledged in response to the 2024 humanitarian appeal had been received as of the end of June – UN OCHA reports aid workers cannot currently fully meet critical needs in the country;
D. whereas Hungary issued a decree in breach of the temporary protection directive[1], cancelling state-funded shelter for refugees from western Ukraine, leaving many, the majority women and children, homeless;
E. whereas the latest estimate in the joint Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA3) released by the Government of Ukraine, the World Bank Group, the European Commission and the United Nations is that as of 31 December 2023 the total cost of reconstruction and recovery in Ukraine will amount to at least USD 486 billion over the next decade, up from USD 411 billion estimated one year ago;
F. whereas Russia still has an advantage in the air and in troops on the ground as it currently fields some 520 000 troops in Ukraine and plans to raise this number to 690 000 by the end of 2024; whereas Russia is rapidly increasing its own military production with military spending reaching around EUR 140 billion in 2024; whereas Russia is also using Belarus’s ammunition stockpile and artillery shells and ballistic missiles from North Korea as well as Iranian drones and missiles; whereas according to governmental sources Iran has recently transferred shipments of Fath-360 close-range ballistic missiles to Russia, which could be used against Ukraine within weeks; whereas France, Germany and the United Kingdom have announced a new set of sanctions against Iran in return;
G. whereas there continues to be a low level of military aid both in terms of quality and quantity and a delay in actual delivery of weapons and ammunition to Ukraine after delivery decisions are taken; whereas a significant number of the systems that Ukraine was supposed to receive after the decision taken at the NATO Summit have not yet been delivered;
H. whereas, at the February 2024 meeting of EU defence ministers VP/HR Josep Borrell announced that Member States had undertaken to send at least EUR 21 billion of military aid to Ukraine during 2024; whereas, at the end of 2023 and the beginning of 2024, the German chancellor, Olaf Scholz, announced that his country alone would commit EUR 8 billion in military aid for 2024 and urged other Member States to significantly increase their commitments for 2024;
I. whereas in August 2024, the German Government decided to cut military aid to Ukraine by half for 2025; whereas the German Government pointed to using sources other than the federal budget to provide financial support to Ukraine, specifically capital gains from frozen Russian assets; whereas no legal framework has been established for the effective capture and redistribution of capital gains from frozen Russian assets;
J. whereas, in addition, Hungary is blocking both the newly established EUR 5 billion Ukraine Assistance Fund (UAF) set up in March 2024 within the European Peace Facility (EPF) and the eighth tranche of EPF reimbursements for Member States, which has been delivering military aid to Ukraine for more than 18 months;
K. whereas EU Member States continue to purchase fossil fuels from Russia, contributing to the Russian economy and bolstering its war chest; whereas since February 2022, EU Members have spent more than EUR 201 billion on Russian fossil fuels; whereas in August 2024, the top five largest Russian fossil-fuel-importing countries in the EU still paid Russia a total of EUR 1.2 billion for their imports; whereas the EU has granted an exemption for Russian crude oil imported through the southern branch of the Druzhba pipeline to Hungary, Slovakia and Czechia; whereas Russian pipeline gas and liquefied natural gas also remain unsanctioned; whereas increased imports of Russian gas by Azerbaijan are cause for concern about the viability of the EU’s pivoting towards Azerbaijan as an alternative gas supplier to Russia as Baku, unable to meet European demand, may relabel Russian gas as Azerbaijani for European consumption;
1. Condemns in the strongest possible terms Russia’s continued war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as the involvement of Belarus in this war, and demands that Russia immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine and compensate Ukraine for the damage caused to its people, land and infrastructure;
2. Expresses its undivided solidarity with the people of Ukraine, fully supports Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, and underlines that this war constitutes a serious violation of international law; stresses that the ultimate goal remains to achieve a just and lasting peace in Ukraine on its terms, ensuring the safety and dignity of its people within a peaceful and stable Europe;
3. Calls for active EU engagement in implementing Ukraine’s Peace Formula, engaging with countries from the Global South in this context, and creating the grounds for holding the second Peace Summit;
4. Calls on the Commission to swiftly propose long-term financial assistance for the reconstruction of Ukraine in collaboration with partner countries, in particular by ensuring swift implementation of the Ukraine Facility to ensure continued support at adequate levels and resources for reconstruction commensurate with our political support for Ukraine;
5. Stresses that over 14.6 million people in Ukraine are in need of humanitarian aid while over 6 million Ukrainians have been displaced from Ukraine; notes that the number of people affected is expected to increase significantly if Russia makes further territorial gains and as attacks on energy and other critical infrastructure continue; underlines the continued need for the EU to provide systemic and predictable humanitarian aid to Ukraine; calls for a substantive increase in the EU’s humanitarian aid in order to ensure full support for Ukraine also in 2025 as well as to fulfil the EU’s global responsibilities; notes that the need for humanitarian support will likely continue for years to come and stresses the need for the EU to be prepared to meet these needs with long-term planning and adequate funds; calls on neutral states to increase their humanitarian aid to Ukraine;
6. Urges Hungary to withdraw the decree cancelling state-funded shelter for refugees from western Ukraine and uphold its responsibilities under the EU Temporary Protection Directive;
7. Strongly condemns the use of sexual and gender-based violence as a weapon of war and stresses that this constitutes a war crime; calls for the EU and host and transit countries to guarantee access to sexual and reproductive health and rights services, particularly emergency contraception, post-exposure prophylaxis and abortion care, including for survivors of rape;
8. Reiterates its call for the EU to step up efforts to address the dire situation of those forcibly deported to Russia and children forcibly adopted in Russia, including by sanctioning persons directly responsible for and involved in the forced transfer and unjustified detention of Ukrainian children;
9. Welcomes the signing of the joint security commitments between the European Union and Ukraine and calls for the Commission and Member States to act swiftly to effectively implement the commitments made;
10. Underlines that insufficient or delayed deliveries of weapons and ammunition risk undermining efforts made so far and therefore urges the Member States to substantially increase and significantly accelerate their military support as a matter of the utmost urgency, in particular the provision of weapons and ammunition in response to clearly identified needs, including TAURUS missiles; emphasises that a significant number of the systems that Ukraine was supposed to receive after the decision taken at the NATO Summit have not yet been delivered; condemns limitations imposed on the use of western arms for legitimate military targets in Russian territory that contradict Ukraine’s rights under international public law; believes that the EU must show leadership in this fight against impunity and for peace;
11. Deeply deplores the declining financial volume of bilateral military aid to Ukraine from Member States, despite strong statements made at the beginning of this year, which are now being contradicted by recent governmental decisions and the severe problems of the overall functioning of the EU’s key mechanism (EPF) to incentivise bilateral military aid to Ukraine; regrets the announcement by Germany that it intends to decrease funding for Ukraine in its state budget; stresses that use of frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine financially is at the moment still only a theoretical proposal as the legal framework to make this possible is yet to be established; notes that such funds should be considered additional and cannot replace funding for Ukraine from existing state budgets;
12. Echoes VP/HR Borrell’s assessment of Hungary’s unacceptable blockade of up to EUR 5.68 billion of EFP funds, which are supposed to reimburse parts of bilateral military aid and have now been partially frozen for over a year and a half; calls on EU Member States, the President of the Commission, and the VP/HR to do their utmost to end or overcome Hungary’s veto as a matter of urgency;
13. Calls for the EU and its Member States to redouble their efforts to ensure the right quantity and quality of military support to Ukraine along with the right timing of delivery and rights of use that would tangibly allow Ukraine to re-establish its territorial integrity; reiterates its previous position that all EU Member States and NATO allies should collectively and individually commit to supporting Ukraine militarily with no less than 0.25 % of their GDP annually;
14. Calls on the Council to maintain and extend its sanctions policy against Russia and Belarus, while monitoring, reviewing and enhancing its effectiveness and impact; stresses that the impact of existing sanctions, as well as financial and military support to Ukraine, will continue to be undermined as long as the EU allows Russian fossil fuels to be imported; is strongly concerned about China and other countries deemed to be helping Moscow’s war effort;
15. Calls for a ban on importing Russian grain and fertilisers, as well as raw materials, including aluminium, steel products, uranium, titanium, nickel, wood and wood products, and gas and oil; calls for a full embargo of Russian liquefied natural gas and sanctions against Gazprom and Russian oil companies; calls for the EU to impose the requirement that Arc-7 ice-class vessels exporting Russian liquefied natural gas be included on OFAC and EU sanctions lists, denying them access to ports or Western maritime services; calls for the EU and its Member States to impose targeted sanctions on maritime vessels used by Russia to circumvent sanctions on its oil and gas exports and servicing of its energy projects in the Arctic; calls for the EU to introduce a full ban on refined products produced from Russian oil;
16. Calls for sanctions on Russia’s nuclear sector and targeted sanctions against perpetrators committing violations of nuclear safety and security at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant; calls for a ban on passenger flights from non-EU countries to Russia and vice versa passing through the EU’s airspace; calls for the EU and its Member States to stop importing re-exported Russian refined-oil products;
17. Calls on the Council to systematically tackle the circumvention of sanctions by EU-based companies, third parties and third states; further calls on the Council to adopt and strictly implement restrictive measures against all entities and affiliated natural persons facilitating the circumvention of sanctions and providing the Russian military complex with military and dual-use technologies and equipment;
18. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and the United Nations.
- [1] Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2001/55/oj.